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Preface
Preface
An investment in knowledge pays the best interest 
— Benjamin Franklin 'The Way to Wealth' (1758).
There is something profoundly wrong with the 
way we are living today. There are corrosive 
pathologies of inequality all around us — be they 
access to a safe environment, healthcare, education 
or clean water. These are reinforced by short-term 
political actions and a socially divisive language 
based on the adulation of wealth. A progressive 
response will require not only greater knowledge 
about the state of the planet and its resources, but 
also an awareness that many aspects will remain 
unknown. We will need a more ethical form of 
public decision-making based on a language in 
which our moral instincts and concerns can be 
better expressed. These are the overall aims of 
Volume 2 of Late lessons from early warnings. 
Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings 
was published at a time when the world was 
experiencing an economic slowdown, China had 
joined the World Trade Organization and western 
Europe was still a 15-member Union. Global grain 
production had declined for the third time in four 
years due mainly to droughts in North America 
and Australia, and the world saw major recalls 
of contaminated meat, foot and mouth disease 
and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad 
cow disease). Global temperatures continued to 
climb and many bird populations were in decline, 
but the United States of America had rejected the 
Kyoto Protocol. We were seeing ourselves through 
the lens of the first human genome sequence, yet 
we were trying to manage chemicals known to 
be harmful to humans and ecosystems, through 
international conventions and treaties such as the 
Basel Convention to deal with toxic waste dumping 
in the developing world; the OSPAR/HELCOM 
Conventions to reduce the discharges, emissions and 
the loss of hazardous substances into the sea and 
the Montreal Protocol, to phase out ozone-depleting 
substances. The destruction of the World Trade 
Center had just happened. 
Since then, we have witnessed a period of 
extraordinary hubris. Most visibly, the financial 
profligacy of the first decade of the century led 
inexorably to the crises of 2007–2009 whereby 
the major components of the international 
financial system were weakened to the extreme by 
indebtedness, mispriced products, lax monetary 
policies and mis-engineered protection against 
risks and uncertainty. The world experienced 
more not less volatility. Political systems became 
silted up by vested interests and a determination 
by citizens to protect assets accumulated in 
easier times, and beneath it all lay a deeper 
environmental crisis epitomised by climate change 
and biodiversity loss. 
There was also a collapse of trust, not only in 
financial institutions but in big companies, as 
they abandoned staff, pensions and health care 
schemes. Recent evidence from social psychology 
has shown that despite rising levels of education 
and innovation in products and services, people 
trust only those they know and not strangers. As 
Stephen Green said in Good value: reflections on 
money, morality, and an uncertain world in 2009:
'There has been a massive breakdown of trust: 
trust in the financial system, trust in bankers, 
trust in business and business leaders, trust 
in politicians, trust in the media, trust in the 
whole process of globalisation — all have 
been severely damaged, in rich countries and 
poor countries alike'.
The scientific elites have also been slowly losing 
public support. This is in part because of the 
growing number of instances of misplaced 
certainty about the absence of harm, which has 
delayed preventive actions to reduce risks to 
human health, despite evidence to the contrary.
Suddenly, our problems have grown into what 
Charles W. Churchman in 1967 termed wicked 
problems — difficult or impossible to solve because 
of incomplete, contradictory and changing 
requirements, difficult to recognize, resistant 
to resolution because of the complexity of their 
interdependencies and needing to be tackled not 
by one but via many forms of social power. Solving 
Preface
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them requires a new combination of hierarchical 
power, solidarity and individualism. 
What could this mean, for example, for the 
100 thousand chemicals currently in commercial use? 
To begin with we have more conventions and 
treaties in place than a decade ago: the 2004 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC) Procedure covering international 
trade of 24 pesticides, four severely hazardous 
pesticide formulations and 11 industrial chemicals; 
the 2004 Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants to protect human health and the 
environment from substances which are highly toxic, 
persistent, bio-accumulative and move long distances 
in the environment, such as DDT, PCBs, various 
industrial chemicals, and a set of unintentional 
chemical by-products such as dioxin. But these 
conventions only address the top-down hierarchical 
approach to power.
At the same time Europe has put in place 
legislation to achieve a global regulatory influence 
including the EU Cosmetic Directive banning the 
use of chemicals known or strongly suspected 
of being carcinogens, reproductive toxins, or 
mutagens causing cancer, mutation or birth defects; 
the EU Restriction of Hazardous Substances 
Directive, which restricts the use of hazardous 
materials in the manufacture of various types 
of electronic and electrical equipment including 
lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, 
the flame retardents polybrominated biphenyls 
and polybrominated diphenyl ethers, and which 
encourages the substitution to safe/or safer 
alternatives in the electric and electronic equipment 
industry; the closely linked 2006 EU Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive for 
collection, recycling and recovery of electrical 
goods; the 2006 Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management (SAICM); and the 2007 
EU Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of 
Chemicals, widely known as REACH, to assign 
greater responsibility to industry to manage 
the risks from chemicals and to provide safety 
information on substances. The effects of these 
regulatory tools are described in different chapters, 
but once again point to the main economic actors 
rather than communities or individuals.
One thing that has become clearer over the past 
decade is that certain chemical substances are 
highly stable in nature and can have long-lasting 
and wide ranging effects before being broken 
down into a harmless form. The risk of a stable 
compound is that it can be bio-accumulated in 
fatty tissues at concentrations many times higher 
than in the surrounding environment. Predators, 
such as polar bears, fish and seals, are known 
to bio-magnify certain chemicals in even higher 
concentrations with devastating consequences 
for both humans and ecosystems. So exposure to 
toxic chemicals and certain foodstuffs are at risk of 
causing harm, especially to vulnerable groups such 
as foetuses in the womb or during childhood when 
the endocrine system is being actively built. Even 
with small dose exposures, the consequences can 
in some instances be devastating with problems 
ranging from cancer, serious impacts on human 
development, chronic diseases and learning 
disabilities. Here the power to act could be more 
properly set by well-informed individuals and 
communities.
The relationship between knowledge and power 
lies at the heart of Volume 2. In many chapters, 
the implicit links between the sources of scientific 
knowledge about pollutants, changes in the 
environment and new technologies, and strong 
vested interests, both economic and paradigmatic, 
are exposed. A number of authors also explore 
in greater depth, the short-sightedness of 
regulatory science and its role in the identification, 
evaluation and governance of natural resources, 
physical and chemical hazards. By creating a 
better understanding of these normally invisible 
aspects, it is hoped that this volume will enable 
communities and people to become more effective 
stakeholders and participants in the governance of 
innovation and economic activities in relation to 
the associated risks to humans and the planet. 
Much of what we are able to learn from the 
histories of past environmental and public health 
mistakes is also directly applicable to the better 
regulation and governance of global institutions 
and financial and economic risks. Robin G. 
Collingwood argued in his Autobiography (1939), 
that:
'History can offer something altogether 
different from [scientific] rules, namely 
insight. The true function of insight is to 
inform people about the present…we study 
history in order to see more clearly into the 
situation in which we are called upon to act… 
the plane on which, ultimately, all problems 
arise is the plane of 'real' life: that to which 
they are referred for their solution is history.'
In this volume, we go further. Whilst still drawing 
lessons from such widely accepted tragedies 
as leaded petrol, mercury poisoning in Japan's 
Preface
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Minamata Bay and older pesticides which sterilised 
many men who used it, we have ventured into the 
uncertainties of potential yet contested harm, from 
genetically modified products; nanotechnologies; 
chemicals such as Bisphenol A; new pesticides 
and mobile phones. There is also an examination 
of the 80 or so potential 'false positives' where 
there had been indications of harm but where it 
was subsequently claimed that there were in fact 
no risks to prevent: these cases too can provide 
information that can help to improve future 
decision-making about innovation and emerging 
technologies. 
A major part of effective decision-making lies in 
the way issues are framed. In the case of climate 
change, the first order question is whether it is 
worth worrying about at all. US Vice President 
Al Gore chose to make the question a matter of 
choice between believers and sceptics. However, 
problems arose when the public was asked to 
make a scientific decision when too few people had 
the qualifications to make any kind of reasoned 
judgement. They were in fact asked to make a false 
choice. Instead the question should have been 
framed around which areas should people and 
governments make decisions and which should be 
delegated to experts. 
In the end there are few certain and enduring 
truths in the ecological and biological sciences, nor 
in the economics, psychologies, sociologies and 
politics that we use to govern them. One, however, 
comes from the work of Elinor Ostrom, a late and 
widely missed colleague, who showed from her 
work on managing fisheries and ecosystems that 
complex problems can be solved if communication 
is transparent and open, visions are shared, trust is 
high and communities are activated to work from 
the bottom-up as well as from the top down. 
As we navigate the Anthropocene, the epoch 
named in recognition of our impact on the 
planet, we will need to encourage more people to 
become involved in solving the wicked problems 
of our times. Whether through gathering local 
information or becoming more aware of the 
many uncertainties and unpredictabilities in our 
surroundings, the power structures of knowledge 
will need to change. And if we are to respond more 
responsibly to the early warning signals of change, 
we will need to re-design our style of governance 
to one which reflects a future defined by the local 
and specific rather than only the global and the 
average. We hope that Volume 2 of Late lessons from 
early warnings with its many lessons and insights 
can help us all meet such a challenge.  
 
Professor Jacqueline McGlade, 
Executive Director
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Introduction
1 Introduction
Why further late lessons from early 
warnings?
The 2013 Late lessons from early warnings report is 
the second of its type produced by the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) in collaboration with a 
broad range of external authors and peer reviewers.
Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings: the 
precautionary principle 1896–2000 published in 2001, 
looked at the history of a selection of occupational, 
public health and environmental hazards and 
asked whether we could have been better at taking 
action early enough to prevent harm. Twelve key 
lessons for better decision-making were drawn 
from cases where public policy was formulated 
against a background of scientific uncertainty and 
'surprises' — and where clear evidence of hazards 
to people and the environment was often ignored 
(see box on page 11).
The 14 case studies and 12 key lessons from the 2001 
report remain highly pertinent today, and underline 
four main reasons for a second report. The first 
relates to expanding the late lessons approach to 
consider long-known, important additional issues 
with broad societal implications such as lead in 
petrol, mercury, environmental tobacco smoke and 
DDT, as well as issues from which lessons have 
emerged more recently such as the effects of the 
contraceptive pill on feminisation of fish and the 
impacts of insecticides on honeybees.
The second concerns filling an acknowledged 
gap in the 2001 report, by analysing the issue of 
false positives where government regulation was 
undertaken based on precaution but later turned 
out to be unnecessary. Most of the cases examined 
in the Late lessons from early warnings reports are 
'false negatives' — instances where early warnings 
existed but no preventive actions were taken. 
The third reason is to address the rapid emergence 
of new society-wide challenges such as radiation 
from mobile phones, genetically-modified 
products, nanotechnologies and invasive alien 
species as well as if, how and where precautionary 
actions can play a role. 
The final reason relates to how precautionary 
approaches can help manage the fast-changing, 
multiple, systemic challenges the world faces 
today, what new insights can be drawn in this 
context and how these can underpin opportunities 
for sustainable innovations and, supported 
by information technologies, greater public 
participation in their selection. 
Overall approach 
As for Volume 1, the approach in Volume 2 has 
been to include a wide range of relevant case 
studies produced by external authors along with 
chapters written by members of the report's 
editorial team (see acknowledgements section 
for details). The relevant topics for case study 
treatment were selected on the basis of advice 
from the editor, in collaboration with the editorial 
team and an advisory board, members of the 
EEA Scientific Committee and the Collegium 
Ramazzini (1). 
The chapters in Volume 2 are grouped into 
five parts: A. Lessons from health hazards; 
B. Emerging lessons from ecosystems; C. Emerging 
issues; D. Costs, justice and innovation; and 
E. Implications for science and governance. 
The chapters have been written by authors 
who, to varying degrees, have had substantial 
involvement in the subject area being addressed. 
Indeed they would not have been approached if 
(1) The Collegium Ramazzini is an independent, international academy founded in 1982 by Irving J. Selikoff, Cesare Maltoni and other 
eminent scientists. Its mission is to advance the study of occupational and environmental health issues and to be a bridge between 
the world of scientific discovery and the social and political centers, which must act on the discoveries of science to protect public 
health.
Introduction
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they had not already extensively studied the case 
that they were asked to write about. All of them, as 
respected experts in their fields and in line with their 
professional scientific training, were expected to be 
as objective as possible in answering the questions 
put to them by EEA. To support this, and to develop 
consistency between chapters, the authors were 
provided with seven structuring questions to be 
followed when building their chapter.
The case studies have been peer-reviewed by 
recognised experts in the respective fields who gave 
of their time freely and provided their feedback 
within a set of editorial guidelines provided by the 
EEA. 
Scope 
The report has been designed, structured and 
written in order to, inter alia, help politicians, 
policymakers and the public to:
i understand better the ways in which scientific 
knowledge is financed, created, evaluated, 
ignored, used and misused in taking timely and 
precautionary decisions about how to reduce 
harms, whilst stimulating benign innovations 
and generating useful employment;
ii learn from some very expensive 'mistakes' 
in the past so as to help societies make fewer 
mistakes now, and in the future, especially with 
some of the relatively new, largely unknown, 
yet already widespread technologies like 
nanotechnology and mobile phones;
iii be aware of less visible, important factors such 
as the skewed ways in which the costs of actions 
and inactions for hazardous technologies 
have been estimated, and the role that some 
businesses have played in ignoring early 
warnings and in manufacturing doubt about the 
science supporting such warnings; 
iv consider how the law, or administrative 
arrangements, could be better used to deliver 
justice, to those people (and ecosystems) that 
have been, or could be, harmed by poorly 
designed, or badly deployed, innovations; 
v explore how best to engage the public in 
helping to make strategic choices over 
innovations, and their technological and 
social pathways, as well as their involvement 
in ecosystems management and in long term 
monitoring through citizen science.
Part A of the report commences with an analysis 
of 'false positives' showing that these are few and 
far between as compared to false negatives and 
that carefully designed precautionary actions can 
stimulate innovation, even if the risk turns out 
not to be real or as serious as initially feared. The 
remaining nine chapters address false negatives — 
lead in petrol, perchlorethylene contaminated water, 
Minamata disease, occupational beryllium disease, 
environmental tobacco smoke, vinyl chloride, 
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), Bisphenol A and 
dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane (DDT) — from 
which three common themes emerge: there was 
more than sufficient evidence for much earlier 
action; slow and sometimes obstructive behaviour 
by businesses whose products endangered 
workers, the public and the environment; and the 
value of independent scientific research and risk 
assessments. 
Part B focuses on emerging lessons from the 
degradation of natural systems and their wider 
implications for society — booster biocides, the pill 
and the feminisation of fish, climate change, floods, 
insecticides and honeybees as well as ecosystem 
resilience more broadly. It considers, like its 
predecessor, the issues of scientific evidence as the 
basis for action/inaction, the multiple, often complex 
factors and feedback loops in play, many of which 
are not fully understood, as well as the interfaces 
between science, policy and society and how all 
actors can move together towards necessary actions 
in the context of heightened systemic risks, and 
substantial unknowns. 
Part C analyses some newly emerging and 
large-scale products, technologies and trends, which 
potentially offer many benefits but also potentially 
much harm to people and ecosystems and thereby 
ultimately economic development. Cases addressed 
include the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear 
accidents; genetically modified agricultural crops 
and agroecology; the growing threat of invasive 
alien species; mobile phones and the risk of brain 
tumours; and nanotechnologies. There is often little 
science, and very little direct hindsight, to assist in 
the management of these emerging technologies but 
the lessons from the historical case studies need to 
be applied if hazards are to be avoided.
The evidence from the chapters in Part C is that, 
by and large, societies are not making the most 
use of the costly lessons that can be gleaned 
from their histories. A key question is how 
this can be improved given the many reasons 
identified from the case studies why taking 
actions have been delayed including: the novel 
Introduction
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and challenging nature of the issues themselves; 
poorly or inconsistently evaluated information; 
strong opposition by the corporate and scientific 
establishments of the day; and the tendency by 
the decision making institutions, practices and 
cultures to favour the status quo and the short 
term perspective. This section also illustrates the 
value of bottom up as well as top down approaches 
to innovations in ensuring that the directions of 
technological pathways, the equitable distributions 
of benefits, costs and knowledge ownership, and 
the diversity of locally sensitive technological 
options are relevant to the food, energy and 
ecosystems crises.
The historical chapters illustrate numerous harms 
which for the most part have been caused by 
irresponsible corporations. This fact, coupled 
with shortcomings in how decisions are made by 
governments on when to act on early warnings, 
and in the law when it comes to compensating 
victims of harm, are analysed in three chapters 
in Part D of the report. Each chapter analyses the 
reasons behind prevailing practice and then goes 
on to offer insights, for example, on how cost 
calculation methods can be improved; on how 
insurance schemes could be used to compensate 
future victims of harm; and on the reasons why 
businesses frequently ignore early warnings.
The cases in Parts A–D form the basis for 
considering in Part E the governance implications 
for science, public policy and public engagement, 
and how current practices could be improved 
to enable society to maximise the benefits of 
innovations while minimising harms. The main 
insights are that science could be more relevant for 
precautionary decision-making; that the wider use 
of the precautionary principle can avert harm and 
stimulate innovation; and that the late lessons of 
history and precautionary approaches are highly 
pertinent to today's multiple and inter-connected 
crises — such as those arising from finance, 
economics, the use of ecosystems, climate change, 
and the use and supply of energy and food. 
Finally, many of the historical and recent case 
studies illustrate the value of engaging the public 
in broadening the knowledge base and stimulating 
robust innovations.
 
Twelve late lessons
Based on the case studies of Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001), twelve key lessons 
for better decision‑making were drawn:
1 Acknowledge and respond to ignorance, as well as uncertainty and risk, in technology appraisal and public policymaking
2 Provide adequate long‑term environmental and health monitoring and research into early warnings
3 Identify and work to reduce 'blind spots' and gaps in scientific knowledge
4 Identify and reduce interdisciplinary obstacles to learning
5 Ensure that real world conditions are adequately accounted for in regulatory appraisal
6 Systematically scrutinise the claimed justifications and benefits alongside the potential risks
7  Evaluate a range of alternative options for meeting needs alongside the option under appraisal, and promote more robust, 
diverse and adaptable technologies so as to minimise the costs of surprises and maximise the benefits of innovation
8 Ensure use of 'lay' and local knowledge, as well as relevant specialist expertise in the appraisal
9 Take full account of the assumptions and values of different social groups
10  Maintain the regulatory independence of interested parties while retaining an inclusive approach to information and opinion 
gathering
11  Identify and reduce institutional obstacles to learning and action
12  Avoid 'paralysis by analysis' by acting to reduce potential harm when there are reasonable grounds for concern
Source: EEA, 2001, Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1986–2000, Environmental issues report 
No 22, European Environment Agency.
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2 The precautionary principle and false 
alarms — lessons learned
Most of the cases examined in the Late lessons 
from early warnings reports are 'false negatives' 
— instances where early warnings existed but 
no preventive actions were taken. In debates 
surrounding the precautionary principle it is 
often claimed that widespread application of the 
principle will lead to a large number of regulatory 
false positives — over-regulation of minor risks 
and regulation of non-existent risks, often due to 
unwarranted public 'fears'. Understanding and 
learning from past false positives as well as false 
negatives is essential for improving decision-making 
about public health and the environment. 
This chapter reviews incidents of 'false positives', 
where government regulation was undertaken based 
on precaution but later turned out to be unnecessary. 
In total 88 cases were identified to be alleged false 
positives, however, following a detailed analysis 
most of them turned out to be either real risks, or 
cases where 'the jury is still out', or unregulated 
alarms, or risk-risk trade-offs, rather than false 
positives. 
The analysis revealed four regulatory false 
positives: US swine flu, saccharin, food irradiation, 
and Southern leaf corn blight. Numerous important 
lessons can be learned from each, although there 
are few parallels between them in terms of when 
and why each risk was falsely believed to be real. 
This is a lesson in itself: each risk is unique, as 
is the science and politics behind it and hence a 
flexible approach is therefore needed, adapted 
to the nature of the problem. The costs of the 
false positives identified were mainly economic, 
although the actions taken to address swine flu 
in 1976 did lead to some unintended deaths and 
human suffering, and diverted resources from 
other potentially serious health risks. Determining 
the net costs of mistaken regulatory action, 
however, requires a complete assessment of the 
impacts of the regulation, including the costs and 
benefits of using alternative technologies and 
approaches. 
Overall, the analysis shows that fear of false 
positives is misplaced and should not be a rationale 
for avoiding precautionary actions where warranted. 
False positives are few and far between as 
compared to false negatives and carefully designed 
precautionary actions can stimulate innovation, even 
if the risk turns out not to be real or as serious as 
initially feared. There is a need for new approaches 
to characterising and preventing complex risks 
that move debate from the 'problem' sphere to the 
'solutions' sphere. By learning from the lessons in 
this chapter, more effective preventive decisions can 
be made in the future.
The scarcity of genuine false positives compared 
to the large number of 'mistaken false positives' 
could partly be the result of a deliberate strategy 
in risk communication. Several references and 
leaked documents have shown that some regulated 
parties have consciously recruited reputable 
scientists, media experts and politicians to call on 
if their products are linked to a possible hazard. 
Manufacturing doubt, disregarding scientific 
evidence of risks and claiming over-regulation 
appear to be a deliberate strategy for some industry 
groups and think tanks to undermine precautionary 
decision-making. 
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3 Lead in petrol 'makes the mind give 
way'
This chapter addresses the widespread use of 
lead in petrol. It focuses on the period 1925–2005, 
when leaded petrol was first widely marketed in 
the US and then spread to the rest of the world 
before being gradually phased out from the 1970s. 
In Europe, the Aarhus Protocol (www.unece.org/
env/pp/treatytext.html) initiated the phase-out of 
leaded petrol in the period 1998–2005. 
The neurotoxic effects of lead were recognised as 
far back as Roman times. And in 1925, at the 'one 
day trial' of leaded petrol in the US, many experts 
warned of the likely health impacts of adding lead 
to petrol. Yet, despite the availability of an equally 
effective alcohol additive which was assessed 
by experts to be cleaner, the leaded route to fuel 
efficiency was chosen in the US and then exported to 
the rest of the world.
For several decades after the introduction of leaded 
petrol, virtually no independent research was 
carried out and the main source of information was 
industry and industry-sponsored researchers. Not 
until the 1960s and 1970s did independent scientists 
from outside this group show, for example, that 
body burdens of lead arising from human activities 
were not 'normal', as industry claimed, but were 
hundreds of times higher than before the industrial 
revolution and were therefore likely to be harmful.
At its peak in the mid-1970s, leaded petrol released 
about 200 000 tonnes of lead into the atmosphere 
annually in both the US and Europe. Following 
the subsequent phase-out, blood lead levels in 
children (the most sensitive group exposed) quickly 
fell, in line with the decrease in air concentrations. 
The lessons nevertheless remain relevant globally 
today. Although nearly all countries worldwide 
had phased out leaded petrol by 2012, lead 
concentrations in soils and sediments remain high. 
Meanwhile, electronic wastes containing lead and 
other contaminants also cause elevated blood lead 
levels.
Supplementary panel texts focus on the events 
leading up to the US choice of leaded petrol as 
the primary fuel source in 1925 and more recent 
accounts of EU policymaking on lead in petrol and 
the road to phase-outs in Germany and the United 
Kingdom.
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4 Too much to swallow: PCE 
contamination of mains water
PCE (perchlorethylene, also known as 'perc' or 
tetrachloroethylene), was used in the production of 
plastic linings for drinking water distribution pipes 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. This new and relatively 
untested type of distribution pipe was used in over 
700 miles of New England's water distribution 
systems. Not until 1976 was it discovered that 
PCE had been leaching into the water from the 
pipe lining, causing widespread contamination of 
water supplies that still today require continuous 
remediation.
Before the pipes were put into production there 
was a substantial amount of scientific information 
available about the potential hazards of PCE. This 
did not include current concerns about PCE's 
carcinogenicity, teratogenicity and other health 
consequences of relatively low-level exposure 
upper most among today's concerns, but many 
early warnings suggested the need for caution in 
introducing PCE-based mains pipe linings.
PCE had been used to treat hookworm and data 
on side effects were in the literature, while later 
a variety of occupational users were studied, 
including aircraft workers, small companies in 
countries where biological monitoring was required, 
and dry-cleaning firms. Several environmental 
studies were also conducted to see if drinking 
water contaminated with PCE or its close relative, 
TCE (trichloroethylene), was associated with 
cancer. Results were mixed and the chemical 
industry consistently denied that PCE was a human 
carcinogen.
This case study explores the early (pre 1970) 
history researching the toxicity of the chemical. It 
also focuses on the failure of one manufacturer, 
Johns-Manville Corporation, to recognise the 
warning signals about using a suspected toxic 
substance. It examines why a new product was 
deployed without thought to the public health 
consequences and why evidence of the potential 
hazard was ignored.
The science has not been hidden. It has been 
ineffective in guiding and catalysing action. 
Whether the problem is a failed duty of care or 
a lack of clarity about what evidence will trigger 
action, the contemporary argument over how to 
interpret the scientific evidence is irresolvable 
within science itself. There are no overarching 
criteria from the philosophy of science that can 
dictate a solution.
This chapter also includes two supplementary texts. 
A panel that analyses the differences between the 
conclusions of risk assessments based on the same 
data, focusing in particular on assessments of PCE 
and TCE. A further panel describes the opportunities 
to switch to wet-cleaning technologies to reduce the 
current use of PCE in dry cleaning.
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5 Minamata disease: a challenge for 
democracy and justice
Minamata disease, which can induce lethal or 
severely debilitating mental and physical effects, 
was caused by methylmercury-contaminated 
effluent released into Minamata Bay by Chisso, 
Japan's largest chemical manufacturer. It resulted 
in widespread suffering among those who 
unknowingly ate the contaminated fish. This chapter 
documents the story in three phases.
The disease first came to prominence in the 1950s. 
It was officially identified in 1956 and attributed to 
factory effluent but the government took no action 
to stop contamination or prohibit fish consumption. 
Chisso knew it was discharging methylmercury 
and could have known that it was the likely active 
factor but it chose not to collaborate and actively 
hindered research. The government concurred, 
prioritising industrial growth over public health. 
In 1968 Chisso stopped using the process that 
caused methylmercury pollution and the Japanese 
government then conceded that methylmercury was 
the etiologic agent of Minamata disease.
The second part of the story addresses the discovery 
that methylmercury is transferred across the 
placenta to affect the development of unborn 
children, resulting in serious mental and physical 
problems in later life. Experts missed this at first 
because of a medical consensus that such transfer 
across the placenta was impossible.
The third phase focuses on the battle for 
compensation. Initially, Chisso gave token 
'sympathy money' under very limited criteria. In 
1971 the Japanese government adopted a more 
generous approach but after claims and costs soared 
a more restrictive definition was introduced in 
1977, justified by controversial 'expert opinions'. 
Legal victories for the victims subsequently made 
the government's position untenable and a political 
solution was reached in 1995–1996. In 2003, the 
'expert opinions' were shown to be flawed and the 
Supreme Court declared the definition invalid in 
2004. 
In September 2011 there were 2 273 officially 
recognised patients. Still, the continuing failure 
to investigate which areas and communities were 
affected means that the financial settlement's 
geographic and temporal scope is still not properly 
determined. Alongside deep-seated issues with 
respect to transparency in decision-making and 
information sharing, this indicates that Japan 
still faces a fundamental democratic deficit in its 
handling of manmade disasters.
This chapter is followed by three short updates 
on the effects of mercury poisoning since 
Minamata; on attempts to contain it, including 
the 2009 global agreement to phase mercury out 
of economic activity; and on the need for better 
information about contaminant exposures to 
enable policymakers to make informed choices that 
balance the benefits of fish consumption against the 
assumed adverse effects of low-level methylmercury 
exposures.
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6 Beryllium's 'public relations problem'
Scores of workers employed in nuclear weapons 
production have been diagnosed with chronic 
beryllium disease (CBD), a progressive and 
irreversible inflammatory lung disease. This chapter 
presents a history of knowledge and public policy 
about preventing beryllium-related disease, focusing 
primarily on the United States beryllium industry's 
role in shaping US regulatory policy.
Over several decades increasingly compelling 
evidence accumulated that CBD was associated 
with beryllium exposure at levels below the existing 
regulatory standard. The beryllium industry had a 
strong financial incentive to challenge the data and 
decided to be proactive in shaping interpretation 
of scientific literature on beryllium's health effects. 
It hired public relations and 'product defence' 
consulting firms to refute evidence that the standard 
was inadequate. When the scientific evidence 
became so great that it was no longer credible to 
deny that workers developed CBD at permitted 
exposure levels, the beryllium industry responded 
with a new rationale to delay promulgation of a 
new, more protective exposure limit.
This case study underscores the importance of 
considering the hazards from toxic materials 
throughout the entire product life cycle. While 
primary producers of beryllium products may be 
able to control exposures in their own facilities, it is 
unlikely that many secondary users and recyclers 
have the expertise, resources and knowledge 
necessary to prevent beryllium disease in exposed 
workers and residents in nearby communities.
The primary lessons of this chapter are widely 
applicable to many environmental health 
controversies. In particular, it illustrates the practice 
of 'manufacturing uncertainty' — a strategy used 
by some polluters and manufacturers of hazardous 
products to prevent or delay regulation or victim 
compensation. 
This chapter is followed by an analysis of the 
rationale for corporate behaviour in the regulation 
of beryllium. It is argued that the availability of 
occasional and limited opportunities for companies 
to change course without suffering onerous 
consequences would encourage them to rethink their 
position and create an obligation on shareholders 
to take the responsible course. Although this may 
be perceived as letting them 'get away with it', the 
end result may be better public policy and corporate 
responsibility.
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7 Tobacco industry manipulation of 
research 
This chapter differs in some ways from the others 
in Volume 2 of Late lessons from early warnings. The 
history of 'second hand', 'passive' or 'environmental 
tobacco smoke' (ETS), to which non-smokers are 
exposed overlaps with the history of active smoking. 
Those affected include the partners and children of 
smokers, and the bartenders and other workers who 
have to work in smoky environments.
The focus in this chapter is on the strategies used 
by the tobacco industry to deny, downplay, distort 
and dismiss the growing evidence that, like active 
smoking, ETS causes lung cancer and other effects 
in non-smokers. It does not address the history 
of scientific knowledge about tobacco and how it 
was used or not used to reduce lung cancer and 
other harmful effects of tobacco smoke. There is 
much literature on this and a table at the end of the 
chapter summarises the main dates in the evolution 
of knowledge in this area. 
The chapter concentrates on the 'argumentation' 
that was used to accept, or reject, the growing 
scientific evidence of harm. Who generated 
and financed the science used to refute data on 
adverse health effects? What were the motivations? 
What kind of science and information, tools and 
assumptions were used to refute data on the 
adverse health of tobacco?
The release of millions of internal tobacco industry 
documents due to law suits in the US has given 
insights into the inner workings of the tobacco 
industry and revealed their previously hidden 
involvement in manipulating research. However, 
this insight is not available for most corporate 
sectors. The chapter discusses the possibilities of 'full 
disclosure' of funding sources and special interests 
in research and risk assessment in order to secure 
independence and prevent bias towards particular 
viewpoints. 
While smoking bans are now being introduced 
in more and more countries, other industries 
are drawing inspiration from tobacco company 
strategies, seeking to maintain doubt about 
harm in order to keep hazardous products in the 
marketplace.
The chapter also includes a summary of the tobacco 
industry's role in shaping risk assessment in the US 
and Europe to serve its own interests.
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8 Vinyl chloride: a saga of secrecy
This chapter is about how early warnings in the 
1950s and 1960s concerning the short-term harm of 
vinyl chloride (VC) to the skin and bones of workers, 
and to the livers of laboratory animals, were initially 
hidden from other workers and regulators. This 
was despite some early misgivings by company 
experts whose advice was initially ignored by their 
employers. This pattern was repeated when the 
later, more devastating news of a rare liver cancer 
in workers was revealed by long-term animal 
studies and by an attentive and concerned company 
physician.
Unlike many other histories, however, this story 
features a very prompt response from the global 
chemical industry to the publication of the liver 
cancer evidence, a response that included funding 
cancer testing and later compliance with a large 
reduction in the permissible exposure limits. The 
case also provides early evidence of reproductive 
effects of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM). 
Other features of this story presage the later and 
common responses of the corporate world to 
heightened public awareness and pressure from 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade 
unions, including greatly exaggerated estimates of 
the likely costs of complying with tighter pollution 
controls; a frequent mismatch between the position 
of the trade association and that of many, more 
progressive companies within the association; but 
also some relatively quick corporate responses to 
public, NGO and regulatory pressure. 
The chapter also features two legal aspects, which, 
though more common in the US, are also valuable 
for Europeans. First, the potentially positive role that 
judicial review of regulatory proposals can play in 
providing a societal judgement about the behaviour 
of corporations. This can embrace not just moral 
judgements but also judgements about the state of 
the science and what society should do with it. 
Second, the role that document discovery in 
legal compensation cases can play in revealing 
the real and until then secret activities of 
corporations. Any proposals to promote justice 
for victims of environmental and health harms 
via no fault administrative arrangements need 
to be accompanied by other measures to extract 
information about corporate behaviour.
The chapter is followed by a panel analysing the 
value of animal testing for identifying carcinogens.
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9 The pesticide DBCP and male infertility 
Dibromochloropropane (DBCP) is a pesticide used 
against nematodes (roundworms or threadworms) 
that damage pineapples, bananas and other tropical 
fruits. It was introduced into US agriculture 
in 1955 and approved for use as a fumigant in 
1964. By 1961 laboratory experiments had shown 
that it made the testicles of rodents shrink and 
significantly reduced the quantity and quality of 
sperm. Nonetheless, the compound was widely 
marketed and became a commercial success.
In 1977, workers at a production plant became 
worried that they were unable to father children. 
An emergency study by a US government agency 
discovered that in many cases the workers were 
suffering from deficient or absent sperm. While 
controls were improved at US facilities, the product 
continued to be marketed and sprayed in Latin 
America, the Philippines, some African countries, 
and elsewhere.
By the 1990s, tens of thousands of plantation 
workers in these countries had allegedly suffered 
adverse reproductive effects from DBCP use. 
The story continues today with contentious 
legal claims for compensation, contamination of 
drinking water and industry attempts to prevent 
a Swedish documentary on the issue from being 
screened.
This chapter looks at the knowledge available 
about the hazards and the actions taken, or not 
taken, to avert them. The DBCP story is significant 
as it is the first clear example of reproductive 
damage to workers who manufactured and used a 
synthetic chemical. This is one of many examples 
supporting the growing concerns about increasing 
rates of reproductive and developmental disease, 
and about the endocrine disrupting chemicals that 
seem to be playing a role in these disorders.
Protecting production workers, users, consumers 
and the environment from chemicals that may 
damage reproduction demands closer integration 
of scientific disciplines, as well as government 
action. The lessons of DBCP may help in 
ensuring timely protection from harm, based on 
precautionary approaches to scientific evidence. 
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10 Bisphenol A: contested science, 
divergent safety evaluations
Bisphenol A (BPA) is currently one of the world's 
best-selling chemicals and primarily used to make 
polycarbonate plastics. It is widely used in common 
products such as baby bottles, household electronics, 
medical devices and coatings on food containers. BPA 
is known to mimic the female hormone oestrogen and 
has been found to leach from the materials where it is 
used.
Studies have suggested that even exposure to low 
doses of BPA may cause endocrine disrupting 
effects. As with other hormones, it appears that an 
organism is most sensitive during development but 
that effects are often not observed until much later 
in the lifecycle. This means that at the time when the 
effects become detectable, the chemical exposure has 
vanished. This makes it extremely difficult to link 
exposure to effects in humans.
This chapter maps some of the findings in studies of 
rodents and humans. It also discusses the challenges 
of evaluating scientific findings in a field where 
industry-sponsored studies and independent 
scientific research seem to deviate strongly. The 
authors offer suggestions for ways to uncouple 
financial interests from scientific research and testing.
A widely used and dispersed industrial chemical 
like Bisphenol A is a controversial example 
of an endocrine disrupting substance that 
has implications for policymakers. Different 
approaches to risk assessment for BPA by US and 
European authorities are presented. It throws light 
on the ways in which similar evidence is evaluated 
differently in different risk assessments and 
presents challenges for applying the precautionary 
principle.
The intense discussion and scientific work on BPA 
have slowly contributed to a process of improving 
test strategies. While traditional toxicology has 
relied on a monotonic increasing dose-response 
relationship as evidence that the effect is caused by 
the test agent, studies on BPA and other endocrine 
disruptor chemicals (EDCs) have demonstrated the 
limitations of this approach and adjustments have 
been made in some cases. 
It has also been widely accepted that effects 
cannot be predicted by simply thinking of BPA as 
a weak oestrogen and extrapolating from what is 
observed for more potent endogenous oestrogens. 
This lesson is particularly evident in the intense 
pharmaceutical interest in selective oestrogen 
response modifiers (SERMs).
The chapter is followed by a panel analysing the 
value of animal testing for identifying carcinogens.
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11 DDT: fifty years since Silent Spring
'There was a strange stillness. The birds for example 
— where had they gone? Many people spoke about 
them, puzzled and disturbed. The feeding stations 
in the backyards were deserted. The few birds seen 
anywhere were moribund: they trembled violently 
and could not fly. It was a spring without voices 
... only silence lay over the fields and woods and 
marsh.'
The book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson is mainly 
about the impacts of chemicals (in particular 
dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane also known as DDT) 
on the environment and human health. Indeed, the 
close association between humans and birds remains 
very apt. Representing the only two warm-blooded 
groups of life on Earth, mammals and birds share 
the same environments and threats.
Carson's claim that she lived in 'an era dominated 
by industry, in which the right to make a dollar at 
whatever cost is seldom challenged' still resonates 
strongly with the problems that societies face all 
over the world. One chapter heading, 'The obligation 
to endure', derived from the French biologist and 
philosopher Jean Rostand's famous observation that, 
'the obligation to endure gives us the right to know'. 
United States President John F. Kennedy responded 
to the challenge posed by Carson by investigating 
DDT, leading to its complete ban in the US. The 
ban was followed by a range of institutions and 
regulations concerned with environmental issues in 
the US and elsewhere, driven by public demand for 
knowledge and protection.
DDT was the primary tool used in the first global 
malaria eradication programme during the 1950s 
and 1960s. The insecticide is sprayed on the inner 
walls and ceilings of houses. Malaria has been 
successfully eliminated from many regions but 
remains endemic in large parts of the world. 
DDT remains one of the 12 insecticides — and 
the only organochlorine compound — currently 
recommended by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and under the Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, countries may 
continue to use DDT. Global annual use of DDT 
for disease vector control is estimated at more than 
5 000 tonnes.
It is clear that the social conscience awakened by 
Rachel Carson 50 years ago gave momentum to a 
groundswell of actions and interventions that are 
slowly but steadily making inroads at myriad levels. 
Chapter 17 of her book, 'The other road' reminds the 
reader of the opportunities that should have been 
seized much earlier. With more than 10 % of bird 
species worldwide now threatened in one way or 
another, it is clear that we missed early warnings 
or failed to act on them. Will we continue to miss 
signposts to 'other roads'? Are our obligations to 
endure met by our rights to know? As Carson said 
50 years ago: 'The choice, after all, is ours to make.' 
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12 Booster biocide antifoulants: is history 
repeating itself?
Tributyltin (TBT) was widely used as an effective 
antifouling agent in paints for ships and boats until 
the European Community restricted its use in 1989 
because of its proven harm to the environment 
and shellfisheries. Thereafter, booster biocides 
were introduced to enhance the performance of 
antifouling paints. They were believed to be less 
damaging to aquatic life than TBT. Subsequently, 
however, it has been established that booster 
biocides can also create significant environmental 
risks.
This chapter outlines the background to booster 
biocide use, the early warnings about their potential 
physiological and ecological impacts on non-target 
species, and the actions taken in response. The 
science that set some alarm bells ringing is described, 
along with lessons that could influence the future of 
an industry still searching for less environmentally 
invasive solutions.
Booster biocide antifouling agents threaten a variety 
of habitats — from coral reefs and seagrass beds 
to open moorings — within the EU and globally. 
Their primarily herbicidal properties mean that 
coral zooxanthellae, phytoplankton and periphyton 
are particularly vulnerable. Compared to TBT, an 
antifouling agent with a quite specific action, booster 
biocides have more broad-spectrum impacts. The 
wider ecological effect of shifting to booster biocides 
remain poorly understood but of considerable 
concern because they may affect the base of marine 
food chains.
From a toxicological viewpoint, booster 
biocides do not threaten to have endocrine 
disrupting properties similar to TBTs. At current 
environmental concentrations, however, some 
can damage primary producers and some are 
persistent. While legislation has been introduced 
to control their use, the rigour of regulations varies 
between countries. These geographical disparities 
need to be addressed, and future biocidal products 
and novel approaches to antifouling should be 
better appraised.
For policymakers, the challenge is to protect 
non-target biological communities from selective 
change resulting from booster biocide use. 
Persistence, bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT) criteria 
can be used to evaluate the relative potential impact 
from the available biocides, and consequently 
target appropriate legislation. Nevertheless, 
lateral thinking, aiming to identify novel materials 
and strategies to address antifouling, could pay 
dividends in the future.
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13 Ethinyl oestradiol in the aquatic 
environment
Many decades of research have shown that when 
released to the environment, a group of hormones 
known as oestrogens, both synthetic and naturally 
occurring, can have serious impacts on wildlife. This 
includes the development of intersex characteristics 
in male fish, which diminishes fertility and 
fecundity. Although often sublethal, such impacts 
may be permanent and irreversible. 
This chapter describes the scientific evidence 
and regulatory debates concerning one of these 
oestrogens, ethinyloestradiol (EE2), an active 
ingredient in the birth control pill. First developed 
in 1938, it is released to the aquatic environment 
via wastewater treatment plants. Although it is 
now clear that wildlife species are exposed to and 
impacted by a cocktail of endocrine disrupting 
chemicals, there is also reasonable scientific certainty 
that EE2 plays a significant role, and at vanishingly 
low levels in the environment. 
In 2004 the Environment Agency of England and 
Wales accepted this, judging the evidence sufficient 
to warrant consideration of risk management. 
In 2012, nearly 75 years after its synthesis, the 
European Commission proposed to regulate EE2 
as a EU-wide 'priority substance' under the Water 
Framework Directive (the primary legislation for 
protecting and conserving European water bodies). 
This proposal was subsequently amended, delaying 
any decision on a regulatory 'environmental quality 
standard' until at least 2016.
This is in part because control of EE2 will come 
at a significant price. Complying with proposed 
regulatory limits in the environment means 
removing very low (part per trillion) levels of EE2 
from wastewater effluents at considerable expense. 
Is this a price we are willing to pay? Or will the 
price of precautionary action be simply too high 
— a pill too bitter to swallow? To what extent is 
society, which has enjoyed decades of flexible 
fertility and will also ultimately pay for the control 
and management of its unintended consequences, 
involved in this decision? And what could this mean 
for the many thousands of other pharmaceuticals 
that ubiquitously infiltrate our environment and 
which could have sublethal effects on aquatic 
animals at similarly low levels?
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14 Climate change: science and the 
precautionary principle
Hartmut Grassl and Bert Metz
The first scientifically credible early warning 
about the possible dangers of climate change 
due to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 
burning fossil fuels came in 1897. While the basic 
physical principles of global warming are simple, 
however, the more detailed science of climate 
change is exceedingly complicated. Even now, 
more than a hundred years since the first early 
warning, many important details of climate change 
cannot be predicted with certainty. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the science of climate change and 
questions about the true value of burning fossil 
fuels have fostered sustained scientific and political 
controversy.
When the first volume of Late lessons from early 
warnings was drafted there appeared to be too 
much legitimate controversy about climate change 
for the issue to be included. A case study could 
have led to arguments that distracted attention 
from the valuable and robust lessons from more 
established issues such as asbestos, polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and 
the ozone-hole, X-rays and acid rain. This decision 
was taken despite the then widespread acceptance 
that 'the balance of evidence suggests a discernible 
human influence on global climate' (Contribution of 
Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, 
1995).
Over a decade later and after two more reviews by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) of a much greater volume of climate change 
science it seemed appropriate to include climate 
change in this volume, despite some continuing 
controversy. The evidence that human activities 
are having a dangerous impact on the climate has 
strengthened since 1995. By 2007, the IPCC was able 
to conclude with 'very high confidence that the global 
net effect of human activities since 1750 has been 
one of warming'. Given the size and irreversibility 
(on human time scales) of many of the harmful effects 
of human-induced climate change, there is an urgent 
need for action to reduce CO2 emissions and other 
greenhouse gases. Some contrarian views persist, 
however, as the authors illustrate.
This chapter summarises the history of growing 
knowledge about human-induced climate 
change and of the main actions, or inactions that 
accompanied it. Like many other chapters, it 
reflects the lifelong commitment of both authors 
to trying to understand and mitigate the effects of 
human-induced climate change. It concludes with 
some lessons and insights that are relevant to many 
other environmental and health issues.
Also included is a panel text describing how the 
IPCC's approach to assessing uncertainty evolved 
between its first to its fifth assessment reports.
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15 Floods: lessons about early warning 
systems
Floods are an increasingly acute problem. Intense 
precipitation has become more frequent and more 
intense, growing manmade pressure has increased 
the magnitude of floods that result from any level 
of precipitation, and flawed decisions about the 
location of human infrastructure have increased the 
flood loss potential.
Unlike most other case studies presented in this 
report, this chapter focuses on flooding as a 
phenomenon and the requirements for effective 
early warning systems, rather than addressing 
a particular event and the lessons that can be 
learned.
Flooding cannot be wholly prevented. The 
occurrence of a flood need not be considered a 
'failure' and, conversely, minimisation of losses 
may constitute a 'success'. There are lessons to 
be learned from every flood and it is important 
to use them in preparing for the next flood. Once 
we accept that no flood protection measures can 
guarantee complete safety, a general change of 
paradigm is needed to reduce human vulnerability 
to floods. The attitude of 'living with floods' and 
accommodating them in planning seems more 
sustainable than hopelessly striving to eradicate 
them.
Flood forecasting and warning systems fail because 
links in the chain perform poorly or fail completely. 
A single weak point in a system that otherwise 
contains excellent components may render the 
overall system performance unsatisfactory. 
A successful system requires sufficient integration 
of components and collaboration and coordination 
between multiple institutions.
The chapter deals primarily with the challenges of 
fluvial (river) floods. It is complemented by three 
short supplementary texts. The first highlights 
the complex, dynamic and diverse ecosystems of 
river floodplains, which are often degraded during 
construction of flood defences. Despite their huge 
economic value, near-natural floodplains are 
among the most threatened ecosystems globally. 
The second discusses uncertainties in anticipating 
rainfall patterns and intensity, and their 
relationship to flood levels during extreme flows. 
Such uncertainties present challenges for scientists 
and decision-makers alike. 
The third addresses the increasing risks of coastal 
flooding due to factors such as climate change and 
sea-level rise, and reviews European experience 
with precautionary action.
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16 Seed‑dressing systemic insecticides and 
honeybees
In 1994 French beekeepers began to report alarming 
signs. During summer, many honeybees did not 
return to the hives. Honeybees gathered close 
together in small groups on the ground or hovered, 
disoriented, in front of the hive and displayed 
abnormal foraging behaviour. These signs were 
accompanied by winter losses.
Evidence pointed to Bayer's seed-dressing systemic 
insecticide Gaucho®, which contains the active 
substance imidacloprid. This chapter presents 
the historical evolution of evidence on the risks 
of Gaucho® to honeybees in sunflower and maize 
seed-dressing in France, and analyses the actions in 
response to the accumulating evidence regarding 
these risks.
The social processes that ultimately lead to 
application of the precautionary principle for 
the ban of Gaucho® in sunflower and maize 
seed-dressing are described, with a focus on the 
ways in which scientific findings were used by 
stakeholders and decision-makers to influence 
policy during the controversy.
Public scientists were in a difficult position in this 
case. The results of their work were central to a 
social debate with high economic and political 
stakes. In certain cases their work was not judged 
according to its scientific merit but based on 
whether or not it supported the positions of some 
stakeholders. This situation tested the ability and 
courage of researchers to withstand pressure and 
continue working on imidacloprid.
Other European countries also suspended 
neonicotinoid seed-dressing insecticides. Evidence 
of the toxicity of neonicotinoids present in the dust 
emitted during sowing of coated seeds supported 
such decisions. Most important, the French case 
highlighted the major weaknesses of regulatory 
risk assessment and marketing authorisation of 
pesticides, and particularly neonicotinoids. These 
insights were recently confirmed by work by the 
European Food Safety Authority. 
From this case study eight lessons are drawn about 
governance of controversies related to chemical 
risks. The study is followed by two additional 
texts. A first panel presents Bayer Crop Science's 
comments on the analysis in this chapter. A second 
contains the authors' response to the Bayer 
comments.
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17 Ecosystems and managing the 
dynamics of change
A decade after Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was 
published, describing the toxic legacy of the 
twentieth century, Annie Dillard in her Pulitzer 
prize winning book Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 
opened up a different way of looking at the 
world. It presaged a twenty first century in which 
the global economy would be based on a more 
thorough understanding of nature, its functioning 
and material wealth. Wholly descriptive, yet 
increasingly relevant, her book captured the very 
essence of what this chapter is about: that amongst 
the observations which routinely help to predict 
the evolution of the natural world are the seeds of 
surprise — surprise of the unusual and surprise 
as a portent of future change. Our systemic failure 
to anticipate such surprises forms the core of this 
chapter. A series of case studies from fisheries, 
forests, savannah and aquatic systems are used to 
underline how early warnings about changes in 
these natural systems emerged but were not used. 
The chapter highlights how the division of 
knowledge into political, disciplinary and 
geographic silos has led to the 'recurring 
nightmares' of short-term interests outcompeting 
long-term vision; situations where competition 
replaces co-operation; fragmentation of values 
and interest; fragmentation of authority and 
responsibility; and fragmentation of information 
and knowledge leading to inadequate solutions 
or even additional problems. In addition, the 
lack of institutional fit has often confounded the 
effectiveness of the stewardship of ecosystem 
services, and led to unexpected surprises, excessive 
rent seeking and high transaction costs. 
Using counterfactual thinking (i.e. the dependence 
of whether, when and how one event occurs on 
whether, when and how another event occurs and the 
possible alteration of events), built around the four 
interconnected concepts of planetary boundaries, 
tipping points, panarchy and resilience, the chapter 
provides an analytical lens through which to 
explore why many of the warning signals were 
not seen. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
why ecosystems are likely to be even more at risk 
in the future and why we will need to observe 
and interpret the dynamics of both nature and 
institutions ever more closely if we are to avoid 
sudden irreversible ecological changes.
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18 Late lessons from Chernobyl, early 
warnings from Fukushima
The nuclear accident at Fukushima in Japan occurred 
almost exactly 25 years after the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident in 1986. Analysis of each provides valuable 
late and early lessons that could prove helpful to 
decision-makers and the public as plans are made 
to meet the energy demands of the coming decades 
while responding to the growing environmental costs 
of climate change and the need to ensure energy 
security in a politically unstable world.
This chapter explores some key aspects of the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, the radiation 
releases, their effects and their implications for 
any construction of new nuclear plants in Europe. 
There are also lessons to be learned about nuclear 
construction costs, liabilities, future investments 
and risk assessment of foreseeable and unexpected 
events that affect people and the environment.
Since health consequences may start to arise from 
the Fukushima accident and be documented over 
the next 5–40 years, a key lesson to be learned 
concerns the multifactorial nature of the event. In 
planning future radiation protection, preventive 
measures and bio-monitoring of exposed 
populations, it will be of great importance to 
integrate the available data on both cancer and 
non-cancer diseases following overexposure to 
ionising radiation; adopt a complex approach to 
interpreting data, considering the impacts of age, 
gender and geographical dispersion of affected 
individuals; and integrate the evaluation of latency 
periods between exposure and disease diagnosis 
development for each cancer type. 
Given the degree of uncertainty and complexity 
attached to even the most tightly framed and 
rigorous nuclear risk assessment, attempts to 
weight the magnitude of accident by the expected 
probability of occurrence have proven problematic, 
since these essentially theoretical calculations 
can only be based on sets of pre-conditioning 
assumptions. This is not an arcane philosophical 
point but rather a very practical issue with 
significant implications for the proper management 
of nuclear risk. With its failure to plan for the 
cascade of unexpected beyond design-base 
accidents, the regulatory emphasis on risk-based 
probabilistic assessment has proven very limited. 
An urgent reappraisal of this approach and its 
real-life application seems overdue.
Whatever one's view of the risks and benefits of 
nuclear energy, it is clear that the possibility of 
catastrophic accidents and consequent economic 
liabilities must be factored into the policy and 
regulatory decision-making process. In the context 
of current collective knowledge on nuclear risks, 
planned pan-European liability regimes will need 
significant re-evaluation.
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19 Hungry for innovation: from GM crops 
to agroecology
Innovation's potential to deliver food security 
and solve other agriculture-related problems is 
high on the agenda of virtually all nations. This 
chapter looks at two different examples of food and 
agricultural innovation: genetically modified (GM) 
crops and agroecological methods, which illustrate 
how different innovation strategies affect future 
agricultural and social options. 
GM crops are well suited to high-input 
monoculture agricultural systems that are highly 
productive but largely unsustainable in their 
reliance on external, non-renewable inputs. 
Intellectual property rights granted for GM crops 
often close down, rather than open up further 
innovation potential, and stifle investment into a 
broader diversity of innovations allowing a greater 
distribution of their benefits.
Science-based agroecological methods are 
participatory in nature and designed to fit within 
the dynamics underpinning the multifunctional 
role of agriculture in producing food, enhancing 
biodiversity and ecoystem services, and providing 
security to communities. They are better suited to 
agricultural systems that aim to deliver sustainable 
food security than high external input approaches. 
They do, however, require a broader range of 
incentives and supportive frameworks to succeed. 
Both approaches raise the issue of the governance 
of innovation within agriculture and more generally 
within societies.
The chapter explores the consequences of a 
'top-down transfer of technology' approach 
in addressing the needs of poor farmers. Here 
innovation is often framed in terms of economic 
growth in a competitive global economy, a focus 
that may conflict with efforts to reduce or reverse 
environmental damage caused by existing models 
of agriculture, or even deter investment into socially 
responsible innovation. 
Another option explored is a 'bottom-up' approach, 
using and building upon resources already 
available: local people, their knowledge, needs, 
aspirations and indigenous natural resources. The 
bottom-up approach may also involve the public 
as a key actor in decisions about the design of food 
systems, particularly as it relates to food quality, 
health, and social and environmental sustainability.
Options are presented for how best to answer 
consumer calls for food quality, sustainability and 
social equity in a wide sense, while responding to 
health and environmental concerns and securing 
livelihoods in local small-scale agriculture. If we 
fail to address the governance of innovation in 
food, fibre and fuel production now, then current 
indications are that we will design agriculture to fail.
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20 Invasive alien species: a growing but 
neglected threat?
Biological invasions are one of the five major causes 
of biodiversity loss as global human travel and 
trade have moved, and continue to move, thousands 
of species between and across continents. Some 
species of alien origin have a high probability of 
unrestrained growth which can ultimately lead to 
environmental damage.
An alien species — animal, plant or microorganism 
— is one that has been introduced, as a result of 
human activity, either accidentally or deliberately, 
to an area it could not have reached on its own. 
A common definition of the term 'invasive' 
focuses on its (negative) impact, while other 
definitions consider only rate of spread and exclude 
considerations of impact.
Despite the growing amount of legislation being 
adopted at the global scale, biological invasions 
continue to grow at a rapid rate, with no indication 
yet of any saturation effect. Decision-making in this 
area is very challenging. The overall complexity 
of the problem, its interdisciplinarity, the scientific 
uncertainties and the large number of stakeholders 
that need to be informed and involved, together 
demand governance actions that are difficult to see 
emerging at the regional scale (as in the EU), let 
alone globally.
It is widely agreed that preventing biological 
invasions or tackling them at a very early stage 
is the most efficient and cost-effective approach. 
Harmless species can be confused with harmful 
invasive species, however, leading to a waste of 
resources. Even more seriously, harmful invaders 
can be mistaken for innocuous species — so-called 
'invaders in disguise' — and no appropriate action 
may be taken to counter the threats they pose.
Even with a very good risk assessment system, new 
outbreaks of invasive alien species could still occur, 
necessitating a system of rapid early warning 
and effective eradication response. The decision 
on where to draw the line on the acceptable 
environmental risks versus the introduction of 
new species or new communities that may carry 
invasive alien species then becomes a value 
judgement.
There is lively debate within the scientific 
community regarding the most appropriate 
strategies for managing invasive alien species. 
Governments and institutions charged with making 
decisions have access to considerable knowledge 
on the topic, but the lack of rules of interactions 
between multiple parties regularly thwarts effective 
decision-making.
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21 Mobile phones and brain tumour risk: 
early warnings, early actions?
In 2011 the World Health Organization's 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
categorised the radiation fields from mobile phones 
and other devices that emit similar non-ionizing 
electromagnetic fields (EMFs), as a Group 2B 
i.e. 'possible' human carcinogen. Nine years earlier 
IARC gave the same classification to the magnetic 
fields from overhead electric power lines.
The IARC decision on mobile phones was 
principally based on two sets of case-control human 
studies of possible links between mobile phone use 
and brain tumours: the IARC Interphone study 
and the Hardell group studies from Sweden. Both 
provided complementary and generally mutually 
supportive results. This chapter gives an account 
of the studies by these two groups — and others 
coming to different conclusions — as well as reviews 
and discussions leading up to the IARC decision 
in 2011. The chapter also describes how different 
groups have interpreted the authoritative IARC 
evaluation very differently. 
There are by now several meta-analyses and reviews 
on mobile phones and brain tumours, which 
describe the challenges of doing epidemiology on 
this issue, the methodological limitations of the 
major studies published so far and the difficulties of 
interpreting their results.
It has been suggested that national incidence data 
on brain tumours could be used to qualify or 
disqualify the association between mobile phones 
and brain tumours observed in the case-control 
studies. However, in addition to methodological 
shortcomings, there might be other factors that 
influence the overall incidence rate such as changes 
in exposure to other risk factors for brain tumours 
that are unknown in descriptive studies. Cancer 
incidence depends on initiation, promotion and 
progression of the disease. As the mechanism for 
radiofrequency electromagnetic fields carcinogenesis 
is unclear, it supports the view that descriptive data 
on brain tumour incidence is of limited value.
The chapter points to mobile phone industry inertia 
in considering the various studies and taking the 
IARC carcinogenic classification into account and 
a failings from the media in providing the public 
with robust and consistent information on potential 
health risks. The IARC carcinogenic classification 
also appears not to have had any significant impact 
on governments' perceptions of their responsibilities 
to protect public health from this widespread source 
of radiation.
The benefits of mobile telecommunications are 
many but such benefits need to be accompanied 
by consideration of the possibility of widespread 
harms. Precautionary actions now to reduce head 
exposures would limit the size and seriousness of 
any brain tumour risk that may exist. Reducing 
exposures may also help to reduce the other possible 
harms that are not considered in this case study.
Evidence is increasing that workers with heavy 
long-term use of wireless phones who develop 
glioma or acoustic neuroma should be compensated. 
The first case in the world was established on 
12 October 2012. The Italian Supreme Court affirmed 
a previous ruling that the Insurance Body for Work 
(INAIL) must grant worker's compensation to a 
businessman who had used wireless phones for 
12 years and developed a neuroma in the brain.
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22 Nanotechnology — early lessons from 
early warnings
Nanotechnology is the latest in a long series of 
technologies heralded as ushering in a new era of 
technology-driven prosperity. Current and future 
applications of nanotechnology are expected to lead 
to substantial societal and environmental benefits, 
increasing economic development and employment, 
generating better materials at lower environmental 
costs, and offering new ways to diagnose and treat 
medical conditions. Nevertheless, as new materials 
based on nanoscale engineering move from the lab 
to the marketplace, have we learnt the lessons of 
past 'wonder technologies' or are we destined to 
repeat past mistakes?
This chapter first introduces nanotechnology, 
clarifies the terminology of nanomaterials and 
describes current uses of these unique materials. 
Some of the early warning signs of possible adverse 
impacts of some nanomaterials are summarised, 
along with regulatory responses of some 
governments. Inspired by the EEA's first volume 
of Late lessons from early warnings, the chapter looks 
critically at what lessons can already be learned, 
notwithstanding nanotechnology's immaturity.
Nanotechnology development has occurred in 
the absence of clear design rules for chemists and 
materials developers on how to integrate health, 
safety and environmental concerns into design. 
The emerging area of 'green nanotechnology' offers 
promise for the future with its focus on preventive 
design. To gain traction, however, it is important 
that research on the sustainability of materials 
is funded at levels significant enough to identify 
early warnings, and that regulatory systems 
provide incentives for safer and sustainable 
materials.
Political decision-makers have yet to address many 
of the shortcomings in legislation, research and 
development, and limitations in risk assessment, 
management and governance of nanotechnologies 
and other emerging technologies. As a result, 
there remains a developmental environment that 
hinders the adoption of precautionary yet socially 
and economically responsive strategies in the field 
of nanotechnology. If left unresolved, this could 
hamper society's ability to ensure responsible 
development of nanotechnologies.
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23 Understanding and accounting for the 
costs of inaction
In political decision-making processes, the burden 
of proof is often distributed such that policymakers 
only respond to early warning signals from 
environmental hazards once the costs of inaction 
have been estimated. 
This chapter revisits some key environmental issues 
for which estimates of costs of inaction have been 
carefully developed over many years of research. 
The aim is to consider the methodological challenges 
involved in producing estimates that are credible 
and appropriate rather than present specific 
estimates for these costs. 
The case studies also provide insights into how 
early warning signals might provide a basis 
for estimating the costs of inaction, when the 
science base is less consolidated. For example, 
the case of nitrates in drinking water illustrates 
that a precautionary approach to the costs of 
inaction is quite conceivable. The phase-out of 
ozone-depleting substances, where early-warning 
scientists successfully alerted the world to the 
damaging effects of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
provides another important case because additional 
impacts for global warming actually cause the 
costs of inaction to be considerably higher than 
initially believed. This is a reminder that figures 
for the costs of inaction have often been grossly 
underestimated.
Finally, in the case of air pollution, making use of 
different estimates for mortality risk avoidance will 
help decision-makers to see that there are higher- 
and lower-bound estimates for the costs of inaction. 
Even if the lower-bound estimates are perhaps too 
conservative, with a bias towards health effects, they 
will in many situations encourage more rather than 
less abatement effort. Reducing emission loads will 
also tend to bring relief for the intangible assets of 
biodiversity and nature. 
Making the best use of environmental science and 
modelling helps to make environmental protection 
and precaution a priority. Producing cost estimates 
should not be left to economists alone, but should 
rather be seen as a starting point for a broader 
discussion, featuring also the relevant expertise 
in health, ecology, demography, modelling and 
science. Well researched estimates, based on 
interdisciplinary collaboration, can strengthen 
some of those scattered and diffuse interests, which 
during the ordinary processes of policy-making 
have difficulty making their voices heard.
Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation34
Part D — Summary
Carl Cranor
24 Protecting early warners and late 
victims
Many Late lessons from early warnings chapters 
provide examples of early warning scientists who 
were harassed for bringing inconvenient truths 
about impending harm to the attention of the 
public and regulators. There is also some evidence 
that young scientists are being discouraged from 
entering controversial fields for fear of such 
harassment. In addition, where warnings have been 
ignored and damage has ensued, it has often proven 
difficult in the past to achieve prompt and fair 
compensation for the victims. Some ideas for reform, 
building on some current institutional models are 
explored here.
This chapter first explores the idea of extending 
whistleblowing laws to help encourage and protect 
early-warning scientists and others who identify 
evidence of impending harm. Complementary 
measures, such as greater involvement of 
professional societies and the use of recognition 
awards, as for example in Germany, could also be 
helpful. 
Next, the chapter explores improved mechanisms 
for compensating victims of pollution and 
contamination. The chapter on the Minamata Bay 
disaster provides an extreme example of long 
delays in getting adequate compensation for the 
victims of methylmercury poisoning. It was almost 
fifty years, between 1956 and 2004, before the 
victims attained equitable levels of compensation 
and legal recognition of responsibility. Other case 
studies illustrate similar examples of long delays in 
receiving adequate compensation. 
Options are examined for providing justice to any 
future victims of those emerging technologies 
such as nanotechnology, genetically modified 
crops and mobile phone use, which currently can 
provide broad public benefits but potentially at a 
cost to small groups of victims. The potential for 
widespread exposure and uncertain science could 
justify 'no-fault' administrative schemes that provide 
more efficient and equitable redress in situations 
where the benefit of scientific doubt would be 
given to victims. The use of anticipatory assurance 
bonds to help minimise and meet the costs of future 
environmental damage from large scale technologies 
is also explored.
A supplementary panel text describes cases of 
asbestos and mesothelioma, where the senior 
courts in the United Kingdom have developed 
innovative ways of dealing with both joint and 
several liability, and the foreseeability of subsequent 
asbestos cancers, after the initial recognition of 
the respiratory disease, asbestosis. Such legal 
developments in the field of personal injury could 
illustrate the future direction of long-tail liability in 
both environmental damage and personal injury. 
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25 Why did business not react with 
precaution to early warnings?
In the past, companies have frequently neglected 
early warning signals about potential hazards for 
human health or the environment associated with 
their products or operations. This chapter reviews 
and analyses relevant interdisciplinary literature 
and prominent case studies — in particular those 
documented in both volumes of Late lessons from 
early warnings — and identifies main factors 
responsible for the disregard of early warning 
signals. 
The chapter shows how economic motives often 
drive non-precautionary business decisions. In 
virtually all reviewed cases it was perceived to 
be profitable for industries to continue using 
potentially harmful products or operations. 
However, decisions are also influenced by a complex 
mix of epistemological, regulatory, cultural and 
psychological aspects. For instance, characteristics of 
the research environment and the regulatory context 
can provide business actors with opportunities 
to enter into 'political actions' to deny or even 
suppress early warning signals. Also, business 
decision-makers face psychological barriers to 
awareness and acceptance of the conflicts of values 
and interests entailed by early warning signals. 
Cultural business context may further contribute to 
the denial of conflicts of values.
The chapter concludes with a set of reflections 
on how to support more precautionary business 
decision making. A prominent policy response to 
the conflicting interests of business and society 
is introducing regulations that attempt to steer 
business rationality towards internalising external 
effects. Innovative solutions such as assurance 
bonding should be considered. 
There is a need to better understand and expose 
why business actors do not respond voluntarily to 
early warning signals with precautionary actions. 
Blaming business, in particular with hindsight, 
tends to be common reaction that may not always 
be constructive. It often misses the complex or 
even contradictory set of motives and drivers that 
business actors face. 
Public institutions could support progressive 
business by analysing and publically disclosing 
the dilemmas and temptations entailed by early 
warning signals, for example for different industries 
and for the specific societal and regulatory context 
of decisions. Rigorous and explicit exposition of 
the dilemmas will create further incentives for 
responsible actors to share and communicate their 
precautionary responses. 
An additional reflection centres on the role of 
political actions of business actors, in particular 
those actions aimed at suppressing early warning 
signals. Regulatory efforts that make the political 
actions of business more transparent can help 
to sustain a sound balance of power, thereby 
maintaining our ability to benefit from early 
warning signals and reducing the likelihood of 
health and environmental hazards.
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26 Science for precautionary 
decision‑making
The goals of academic researchers may differ 
from those of regulatory agencies responsible for 
protecting the environment. Thus, research must 
take into account issues such as feasibility, merit and 
institutional agendas, which may lead to inflexibility 
and inertia.
A large proportion of academic research on 
environmental hazards therefore seems to focus 
on a small number of well studied environmental 
chemicals, such as metals. Research on 
environmental hazards should therefore to a greater 
extent consider poorly known problems, especially 
the potential hazards about which new information 
is in particular need. 
Misinterpretation may occur when results 
published in scientific journals are expressed in 
hedged language. For example, a study that fails to 
document with statistical significance the presence 
of a hazard is often said to be negative, and the 
results may be misinterpreted as evidence that 
a hazard is absent. Such erroneous conclusions 
are inspired by science traditions, which demand 
meticulous and repeated examination before a 
hypothesis can be said to be substantiated.
For prioritising needs for action, research 
should instead focus on identifying the possible 
magnitude of potential hazards. Research is always 
affected by uncertainties and many of them can 
blur a real association between an environmental 
hazard and its adverse effects, thereby resulting 
in an underestimated risk. Environmental health 
research therefore needs to address the following 
question: are we sufficiently confident that this 
exposure to a potential hazard leads to adverse 
effects serious enough to initiate transparent and 
democratic procedures to decide on appropriate 
intervention? 
The choice of research topics must consider 
societal needs for information on poorly known 
and potentially dangerous risks. The research 
should be complementary and extend current 
knowledge, rather than being repetitive for 
verification purposes, as required by the 
traditional science paradigm. Research findings 
should be openly available and reported so that 
they inform judgments concerning the possible 
magnitude of suspected environmental hazards, 
thereby facilitating precautionary and timely 
decision-making.
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27 More or less precaution?
Despite its presence in a growing body of EU and 
national legislation and case law, the application 
of the precautionary principle has been strongly 
opposed by vested interests who perceive short term 
economic costs from its use. There is also intellectual 
resistance from scientists who fail to acknowledge 
that scientific ignorance and uncertainty, are 
excessively attached to conventional scientific 
paradigms, and who wait for very high strengths 
of evidence before accepting causal links between 
exposure to stressors and harm. 
The chapter focuses on some of the key issues that 
are relevant to a more common understanding of the 
precautionary principle and to its wider application. 
These include different and confusing definitions of 
the precautionary principle and of related concepts 
such as prevention, risk, uncertainty, variability and 
ignorance; common myths about the meaning of the 
precautionary principle; different approaches to the 
handling of scientific complexity and uncertainty; 
and the use of different strengths of evidence for 
different purposes.
The context for applying the precautionary 
principle also involves considering the 'knowledge 
to ignorance' ratio for the agent in focus: the 
precautionary principle is particularly relevant 
where the ratio of knowledge to ignorance is low, as 
with emerging technologies.
A working definition of the precautionary principle 
is presented that aims to overcome some of the 
difficulties with other definitions, such as their use 
of triple negatives; a failure to address the context 
of use of the precautionary principle; no reference 
to the need for case specific strengths of evidence to 
justify precaution; and overly narrow interpretations 
of the pros and cons of action or inaction.
The chapter also points to the need for greater 
public engagement in the process of framing and 
decision-making about both upstream innovations 
and their downstream hazards, including the 
specification of the 'high level of protection' required 
by the EU treaty. A precautionary and participatory 
framework for risk analysis is proposed, along with 
some 'criteria for action' to complement criteria for 
causation.
The capacity to foresee and forestall disasters, 
especially when such action is opposed by powerful 
economic and political interests, appears to be 
limited, as the case studies in Late lesson from early 
warnings illustrate. The chapter argues that with 
more humility in the face of uncertainty, ignorance 
and complexity, and wider public engagement, 
societies could heed the lessons of past experience 
and use the precautionary principle, to anticipate 
and minimise many future hazards, whilst 
stimulating innovation. Such an approach would 
also encourage more participatory risk analysis; 
more realistic and transparent systems science; 
and more socially relevant and diverse innovations 
designed to meet the needs of people and 
ecosystems.
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The first volume of Late lessons from early warnings 
highlighted the difficulties of balancing precaution 
with technological innovation and ended with a call 
to action for policymakers. How much progress has 
been made since then? 
First, there is growing evidence that precautionary 
measures do not stifle innovation, but instead can 
encourage it, in particular when supported by smart 
regulation or well-designed tax changes. Not only 
has the body of knowledge become richer since 
2001, but also the number of stakeholders involved 
in decision-making has become larger and more 
diverse. There has also been increasing attention 
to communicating scientific uncertainty, especially 
in the fields of climate change, food safety, and 
emerging risks. 
However, there has been less progress in other areas: 
for example, many of the political and scientific 
'bureaucratic silos' still remain, despite frequent 
calls for policy integration and inter-departmental 
coordination. This has led to the unintended 
destruction of stocks of natural capital in some 
parts of the world and in other instances, the 
global spread of technologies, despite warnings of 
impending hazards. The result has been widespread 
damage, with most polluters still not paying the full 
costs of pollution.
Yet, more encouragingly, new transformative 
approaches are emerging to manage the systemic 
and interconnected challenges the world faces 
e.g. economic/financial, climate/energy, ecosystems/ 
food. These relate, inter alia, to the increasing use 
of digital communications and networking by 
consumers, citizens and shareholders to demand 
and foster increased participation, more social 
responsibility, greater levels of accountability and 
higher transparency, especially in determining 
future pathways for energy and food production. 
There is a greater understanding of the complexity 
of the environment, of scientific ignorance 
and uncertainties, the irreversibility of many 
harmful impacts and on the broader risks to 
the long term interests of society if political and 
financial institutions remain unchanged. Also 
some corporations are fundamentally embracing 
sustainable development objectives in their business 
models and activities.
The case studies across both volumes of Late lessons 
from early warnings cover a diverse range of chemical 
and technological innovations, and highlight a 
number of systemic problems. These include a lack 
of institutional and other mechanisms to respond 
to early warning signals; a lack of ways to correct 
market failures either caused by misleading market 
prices or where costs and risks to society and nature 
are not properly internalised; and the fact that key 
decisions on innovation pathways are made by those 
with vested interests and/or by a limited number of 
people on behalf of many. The insights and lessons 
drawn from the case histories certainly provide the 
seeds for some of the answers. They also provide 
knowledge for a series of key actions that are 
outlined below.
Of course, many questions remain. For example: 
how can the precautionary principle be used 
further to support decision-making in the face 
of uncertainties and the inevitable surprises that 
come from complex systems?; how can societies 
avoid a lack of 'perfect' knowledge being used as 
a justification for inaction in the face of 'plausible' 
evidence of serious harm?; how can conflicting 
interests be balanced during the phases of 
development and use?; and how can the benefits 
of products and technologies be more equitably 
distributed? 
Reduce delays between early warnings 
and actions
The majority of the case studies in Late lessons 
from early warnings Volumes 1 and 2 illustrate 
that if the precautionary principle had been 
applied on the basis of early warnings, justified 
by 'reasonable grounds for concern' many lives 
would have been saved and much damage to 
ecosystems avoided. It is therefore very important 
that large scale emerging technologies, such as 
biotechnologies, nanotechnologies and information 
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and communication technologies, apply the 
precautionary principle based on the experiences and 
lessons learned from these and other case studies. 
Precautionary actions can be seen to stimulate rather 
than hinder innovation; they certainly do not lead to 
excessive false alarms. As the analysis in Volume 2 
shows, of 88 cases of claimed 'false positives', where 
hazards were wrongly regulated as potential risks, 
only four were genuine false alarms. The frequency 
and scale of harm from the mainly 'false negative' 
case studies indicate that shifting public policy 
towards avoiding harm, even at the cost of some 
false alarms, would seem to be worthwhile, given the 
asymmetrical costs of being wrong in terms of acting 
or not acting based on credible early warnings. 
However, the speed and scale of today's 
technological innovations can inhibit timely action. 
This is often because by the time clear evidence 
of harm has been established, the technology 
has been modified, thereby allowing claims of 
safety to be subsequently re-asserted. Even where 
the technological change has been marginal, the 
large, often global, scale of investment can lead to 
widespread technological lock-in, which is then 
difficult and expensive to alter.
These features of current technological innovation 
strengthen the case for taking early warning signals 
more seriously and acting on lower strengths 
of evidence than those normally used to reach 
'scientific causality'. Most of the historical case 
studies show that by the time such strong evidence 
of causality becomes available, the harm to people 
and ecosystems has become more diverse and 
widespread than when first identified, and may 
even have been caused by much lower exposures 
than those initially considered dangerous. 
The case studies have also shown that there are 
many barriers to precautionary action, including: 
the short-term nature of most political and financial 
horizons; the existence of technological monopolies; 
the conservative nature of the sciences involved, 
including the separate 'silos' within which they 
operate; the power of some stakeholders; and the 
cultural and institutional circumstances of public 
policymaking that often favour the status quo.
Acknowledge complexity when dealing 
with multiple effects and thresholds
Increasing scientific knowledge has shown that the 
causal links between stressors and harm are more 
complex than was previously thought and this has 
practical consequences for minimising harm. Much 
of the harm described in Volumes 1 and 2, such 
as cancers or species decline, is caused by several 
co-causal factors acting either independently or 
together. For example, the reduction of intelligence 
in children can be linked to lead in petrol, mercury 
and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) as well as 
to socio-economic factors; bee colony collapse can 
be linked to viruses, climate change and nicotinoid 
pesticides; and climate change itself is caused 
by many complex and inter-linked chemical and 
physical processes. 
In some cases, such as foetal or fish exposures, 
it is the timing of the exposure to a stressor that 
causes the harm, not necessarily the amount; the 
harm may also be caused or exacerbated by other 
stressors acting in a particular timed sequence. In 
other cases, such as radiation and some chemicals 
such as bisphenol A (BPA), low exposures can be 
more harmful than high exposures; and in others, 
such as asbestos with tobacco, and some endocrine 
disrupting substances, the harmful effects of 
mixtures can be greater than from each separate 
stressor. There are also varying susceptibilities 
to the same stressors in different people, species 
and ecosystems, depending on pre-existing stress 
levels, genetics and epigenetics. This variation can 
lead to differences in thresholds or tipping point 
exposures, above which harm becomes apparent in 
some exposed groups or ecosystems but not others. 
Indeed there are some harmful effects which occur 
only at the level of the system, such as a bee colony, 
which cannot be predicted from analysing a single 
part of the system, such as an individual bee.
Our increased knowledge of complex biological 
and ecological systems has also revealed that 
certain harmful substances, such as polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) and dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane 
(DDT) can move around the world via a range of 
biogeochemical and physical processes and then 
accumulate in organisms and ecosystems many 
thousands of kilometres away.
The practical implications of these observations 
are threefold. First, it is very difficult to establish 
very strong evidence that a single substance or 
stressor 'causes' harm to justify timely actions to 
avoid harm; in many cases only reasonable evidence 
of co-causality will be available. Second, a lack 
of consistency between research results is not a 
strong reason for dismissing possible causal links: 
inconsistency is to be expected from complexity. 
Third, while reducing harmful exposure to one 
co-causal factor may not necessarily lead to a large 
reduction in the overall harm caused by many other 
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factors, in some cases the removal of just one link 
in the chain of multi-causality could reduce much 
harm. 
A more holistic and multi-disciplinary systems 
science is needed to analyse and manage the causal 
complexity of the systems in which we live.
Rethink and enrich environment and 
health research
Environment and health research overly focuses 
on well-known rather than unknown hazards at 
the expense of emerging issues and their potential 
impacts. For example the ten most well-known 
substances, such as lead and mercury, account for 
about half of all articles on chemical substances 
published in the main environmental journals 
over the last decade. Over the past decade, 
public research funding in the European Union 
on nanotechnology, biotechnology as well as 
Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) is heavily biased towards product 
development with about 1 %  being spent on 
their potential hazards. A more equal division of 
funding between known and emerging issues, and 
between products and their hazards, would enrich 
science and help avoid future harm to people and 
ecosystems and to the long term economic success 
of those technologies.
Funding more holistic systems science would 
also help achieve a greater integration among 
the different branches of science and counteract 
problems such as: peer review predominantly within 
and not across disciplines; short-term interests 
outcompeting long-term vision; competition 
replacing cooperation because of conflicts of interest; 
contradictions amongst paradigms; fragmentation 
of values and authority; as well as fragmentation 
of information and knowledge. These can all 
lead to inferior solutions and provide increased 
opportunities for those with vested interests to 
manufacture doubt. 
Scientific methods can also be improved. For 
example, much higher strengths of evidence are 
required overall before causality is accepted, 
compared to the evidence being used to assert 
safety. The assertion that there is no evidence of 
harm is then often assumed to be evidence of no 
harm, even though the relevant research is missing. 
Historically there has been an over-reliance on the 
statistical significance of point estimates compared 
to confidence limits based on multiple sampling. 
There has also been a bias towards using models 
that grossly simplify reality rather than using 
long-term observations and trend data of biological 
and ecological systems. These approaches have 
sometimes led to the production of false positives. 
More importantly the governance of scientific 
ignorance and unknown unknowns has been 
neglected.
Finally, many case studies highlight the problems 
faced by early warning scientists who have been 
harassed for their pioneering work, including bans 
on speaking out or publishing, loss of funding, 
legal or other threats, and demotion. One obvious 
conclusion is that scientists in these situations 
should receive better protection either via an 
extension of 'whistle blowing' and discrimination 
laws, or by independent acknowledgement of the 
value of their work. 
Improve the quality and value of risk 
assessments
The majority of the case studies in Late lessons 
from early warnings indicate that risk assessment 
approaches need to better embrace the realities 
of causal and systems complexity (rather than 
use a narrow conception of 'risk') with the 
inevitable features of ignorance, indeterminacy 
and contingency. In a number of case studies, for 
example BPA, where low doses are more harmful 
than high doses, or tributyltin antifoulants (TBT) 
and synthetic oestrogen diethylstilboestrol (DES) 
where the timing of the dose is what makes it 
harmful, simplistic assumptions are inadequate. 
Variability in exposures and varying susceptibilities 
in populations and species exposed also need to be 
more realistically factored into risk assessments. 
This is equally true for technological risk 
assessments. As the Fukushima Investigation 
Committee concluded in 2011:
'…the accidents present us with crucial lessons 
on how we should be prepared for 'incidents 
beyond assumptions'. With its failure to plan 
for the cascade effects beyond design–base 
accidents 'the regulatory emphasis on risk 
based probabilistic risk assessment has proven 
very limited'. 
In other words, narrow risk assessment approaches 
are now outstripped by the realities which they 
cannot address, recognise and communicate. Too 
often this contributes to the effective denial of those 
risks that do not fit the risk assessment frame. It 
is therefore urgent that risk assessment practices 
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be transformed to make them broader-based, 
more inclusive, transparent and accountable. 
There should also be more communication on the 
diversity of scientific views, especially on emerging 
issues where ignorance and uncertainties are high 
and genuine differences of scientific interpretations 
are likely, desirable, and defensible. In this sense, 
recognising the pedigree of knowledge, i.e. the 
consistency of views amongst peers and the level 
of convergence coming from different branches of 
research, is essential for effective decision making 
and action to support the wellbeing of people and 
the environment.
The case studies show that evaluations of evidence 
in risk assessments can be improved by including 
a wide range of stakeholders when framing the 
risks and options agenda; broadening the scope and 
membership of evaluation committees; increasing 
the transparency of committee approaches and 
methods, particularly in identifying uncertainties 
and ignorance; and ensuring their independence 
from undue influence through using appropriate 
funding sources and applying robust policies on 
conflicts of interest. 
Public confidence would be increased if all the 
evidence used in risk assessments was made 
publicly accessible and open to independent 
verification, including data submitted by industries 
to authorities. 
As experiences from mercury, nuclear accidents, 
leaded petrol, mobile phones, BPA, and bees 
show, there can be a significant divergence in the 
evaluations of the same, or very similar, scientific 
evidence by different risk assessment committees. 
In such instances, differences in the choice of 
paradigm, assumptions, criteria for accepting 
evidence, weights placed on different types of 
evidence, and how uncertainties were handled, all 
need to be explained. Risk assessors and decision 
makers also need to be aware that complexity and 
uncertainty have sometimes been misused to shift 
the focus away from precautionary actions by 
'manufacturing doubt' and by waiting for 'sound 
science' approaches that were originally developed 
by the tobacco industry to delay action. 
Foster cooperation between business, 
government and citizens 
Policy formulation should start from a broad 
concept of technological innovation to include 
non-technological, social, institutional, 
organisational and behavioural innovation. In 
this framework, governments have at least three 
roles: providing direction by putting in place smart 
regulations and consistent market signals; ensuring 
that the distributional consequences of innovations 
are balanced between risks and rewards across 
society, fostering a diversity of innovations so that 
the wider interests of society; and take precedence 
over narrower interests. 
Numerous case studies show that decisions to act 
without precaution often come from businesses. 
There are, however, several impediments to 
businesses acting in a precautionary manner, 
including a focus on short-term economic value 
for shareholders alongside psychological factors 
that lead to a so-called 'ethical blindness' or a 
'self-serving bias' whereby people largely interpret 
ambiguous situations in their own interests. 
Governments and businesses could collaborate more 
with citizens on publicly disclosing the potential 
value conflicts entailed in acting on early warning 
signals. A culture of transparency can in turn 
promote positive business attitudes and innovations.
Involving the public can also help in choosing 
between those innovation pathways to the future; on 
prioritising relevant public research; on providing 
data and information in support of monitoring and 
early warnings; improving risk assessments; on 
striking appropriate trade-offs between innovations 
and plausible health and environmental harms; and, 
making decisions about risk-risk trade-offs.
Correcting market failures using the 
polluter pays and prevention principles 
When evidence of initial harm emerges, the costs 
should be internalised retroactively into the prices 
of polluting products, via taxes and charges, in 
line with the polluter pays principle and emerging 
practice across the world. The revenues could then 
be devoted partly to stimulating research into less 
hazardous alternatives, and partly to reform tax 
systems by reducing taxes and charges on 'societal 
goods' like employment. 
The pollution taxes/charges would rise or fall in line 
with new scientific knowledge about increasing/
decreasing harm, and this would help to level the 
playing field for less-polluting alternative products. 
Tax shifts from employment to pollution and the 
inefficient use of resources can bring multiple 
benefits such as increased employment, a stimulus 
to innovation, a more stable tax base in the light of 
expected demographic changes, and a more efficient 
tax collection system. 
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More broadly, firms and governments need to extend 
their economic accounting systems to incorporate the 
full impacts of their activities on people's health and 
on ecosystems. Governments need to anticipate this 
in their policies, by providing the right blend of fiscal 
instruments to both protect the public and ensure that 
firms internalise the true costs of potential harm. 
A number of case studies also demonstrate the 
long time lags between evidence of harm and the 
additional injustice and time of forcing victims 
to pursue their cases through civil compensation 
claims. Prompt and anticipatory no-fault 
compensation schemes and assurance bonds, could 
be set up and financed in advance of potential 
harm by the industries that are producing novel 
and large-scale technologies, thereby helping to 
offset any potential market failure. Such schemes 
can also be designed to increase the incentives for 
innovating companies to carry out more a priori 
research into the identification and elimination of 
hazards. 
Governance of innovation and innovation 
in governance
The Late lessons from early warnings reports 
demonstrate the complexities of developing not 
only the right kind of science and knowledge but 
also handling the interactions between the many 
actors and institutions involved — governments, 
policymakers, businesses, entrepreneurs, scientists, 
civil society representatives, citizens and the media. 
Alongside many other analyses produced across 
the world today, the reports also stress the need to 
act to transform our ways of thinking and of doing, 
and urgently so in the face of unprecedented global 
changes, challenges and opportunities. Many lessons 
have been learnt, yet have not been acted upon. Any 
calls for action will need to reflect on today's global 
socio-economic setting and support, among other 
things, the drive to:
•	 rebalance	the	prioritisation	of	economic	and	
financial capital over social, human and natural 
capitals through the broader application of the 
policy principles of precaution, prevention and 
polluter-pays, and environmental accounting; 
•	 broaden	the	nature	of	evidence	and	public	
engagement in choices about key innovation 
pathways by directing scientific efforts more 
towards dealing with complex, systemic 
challenges and unknowns and complementing 
this with professional, lay, local and traditional 
knowledge; and,
•	 build	greater	adaptability	and	resilience	in	
governance systems to deal with multiple 
systemic threats and surprises, through 
strengthening institutional structures and 
deploying information technologies in support 
of the concept of responsible information and 
dialogues. 
The governance of innovation will remain at the 
level of good intentions unless it is translated 
into innovations in science practices, institutional 
arrangements and public engagements as well as 
transformations in prevailing business attitudes, 
practice and influence. These are the tasks that lie 
ahead.
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Masazumi Harada, a physician involved for 
many years in the study of the mercury poisoning 
Minamata disease, died in June 2012 of acute 
myelocytic leukemia at his home in Kumamoto 
City. He was 77.
Harada conducted medical examinations on the 
disease's sufferers for the first time in the summer 
of 1961 in Minamata city in Kumamoto Prefecture 
while he was a student at Kumamoto University's 
graduate school.
Shocked by their miserable lives, Harada devoted 
himself to the study of the disease from that time. 
Harada published a thesis on congenital Minamata 
disease in 1964. The work had a significant impact 
as it disproved the conventional belief at the 
time that the placenta does not pass poisons. He 
received an award from the Japanese Society of 
Psychiatry and Neurology for the thesis in 1965.
He then established the Open Research Center 
for Minamata Studies at the university in 2005, 
becoming the center's head. He continued to 
lead the disease's research from non-medical 
perspectives as well. Harada visited Brazil, China 
and native Indian communities in Canada to 
discover those suspected of suffering from the 
disease.
Author of many books, Harada wrote 'Minamata 
Byo' (Minamata Disease), which raised awareness 
on the issue around the world.
Dr. Masazumi Harada first came to 
Asubpeeschoseewagong (Grassy Narrows) and 
Wabaseemoong (White Dog) First Nations in 
Canada in the early 1970s. Harada's death comes 
at the end of River Run 2012, five days of actions 
by members and supporters of Grassy Narrows in 
Toronto, who are seeking to have Minamata disease 
recognized in Canada and Ontario. Harada's final 
report for the Grassy Narrows community was 
released on 4 June 2012 after 30 years of research, 
showing mercury deposited in the river by the 
Dryden paper mill in the 1970s is impacting those 
who were not yet born when the dumping ceased.
In memory of Masazumi Harada,  
1935–2012
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In memory of Poul Harremoës,  
1934–2003
Poul Harremoës was a key player in environmental 
issues in Denmark and internationally for more than 
30 years until his death, at 69, in 2003. In that time, 
those who worked closely with him benefited from 
a continuous, almost daily flow of excellent ideas for 
new research projects. 
He was a member of the Danish Pollution Council, 
which prepared the first framework national law 
on environmental protection and advised on the 
establishment of a Ministry of Environment from 
1971. He was a key participant in numerous settings, 
including the first Scientific Committee of the 
European Environment Agency from 1995.
He had a civil engineering degree from the Technical 
University of Denmark. He specialised early on in 
geo-technics and constructed dams on the Faroe 
Islands. While teaching geo-technics he wrote a 
textbook that was used for more than 40 years. 
However, he was able to quickly change his research 
direction and develop new areas of excellence. So, 
for example, he got a grant to study at Berkeley, 
California, from where he received a M.Sc. degree in 
environmental engineering. 
In 1972, he became professor in environmental 
engineering at the Technical University of Denmark 
where he originally worked with wastewater 
discharge to the sea and the biological processes of 
wastewater treatment. He became a world leading 
scientist in the theories of biofilms for removal 
of organics and nitrogen from wastewater before 
turning to sewer design and modelling. In 2000, Poul 
was awarded the Heineken prize for Environmental 
Sciences for his contributions to the theory of 
biofilm kinetics in relation to biological waste water 
treatment and for his successful organisation of the 
international scientific community in water pollution 
research and control. 
As a result of his work with sewers and storm water 
he went into the area of risk analysis and the role of 
the precautionary principle. In a short time he became 
an international expert in this field and was highly 
demanded for lectures in all parts of the world. A key 
outcome of his interest was his contributions as 
chairman of the editorial team for the first volume of 
Late lessons from early warnings published in 2001.
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Steffen Foss Hansen and Joel A. Tickner
2 The precautionary principle and false 
alarms — lessons learned
  
Most of the cases examined in the Late lessons from early warnings reports are 'false negatives' 
— instances where early warnings existed but no preventive actions were taken. In debates 
surrounding the precautionary principle it is often claimed that widespread application of the 
principle will lead to a large number of regulatory false positives — over-regulation of minor 
risks and regulation of non-existent risks, often due to unwarranted public 'fears'. Understanding 
and learning from past false positives as well as false negatives is essential for improving 
decision-making about public health and the environment. 
This chapter reviews incidents of 'false positives', where government regulation was undertaken 
based on precaution but later turned out to be unnecessary. In total 88 cases were identified 
to be alleged false positives, however, following a detailed analysis most of them turned out 
to be either real risks, or cases where 'the jury is still out', or unregulated alarms, or risk-risk 
trade-offs, rather than false positives. 
The analysis revealed four regulatory false positives: US swine flu, saccharin, food irradiation, 
and Southern leaf corn blight. Numerous important lessons can be learned from each, although 
there are few parallels between them in terms of when and why each risk was falsely believed to 
be real. This is a lesson in itself: each risk is unique, as is the science and politics behind it and 
hence a flexible approach is therefore needed, adapted to the nature of the problem. The costs of 
the false positives identified were mainly economic, although the actions taken to address swine 
flu in 1976 did lead to some unintended deaths and human suffering, and diverted resources 
from other potentially serious health risks. Determining the net costs of mistaken regulatory 
action, however, requires a complete assessment of the impacts of the regulation, including the 
costs and benefits of using alternative technologies and approaches. 
Overall, the analysis shows that fear of false positives is misplaced and should not be a rationale 
for avoiding precautionary actions where warranted. False positives are few and far between 
as compared to false negatives and carefully designed precautionary actions can stimulate 
innovation, even if the risk turns out not to be real or as serious as initially feared. There is a 
need for new approaches to characterising and preventing complex risks that move debate from 
the 'problem' sphere to the 'solutions' sphere. By learning from the lessons in this chapter, more 
effective preventive decisions can be made in the future.
The scarcity of genuine false positives compared to the large number of 'mistaken false positives' 
could partly be the result of a deliberate strategy in risk communication. Several references 
and leaked documents have shown that some regulated parties have consciously recruited 
reputable scientists, media experts and politicians to call on if their products are linked to a 
possible hazard. Manufacturing doubt, disregarding scientific evidence of risks and claiming 
over-regulation appear to be a deliberate strategy for some industry groups and think tanks to 
undermine precautionary decision-making. 
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In debates surrounding the precautionary principle 
it is often claimed that widespread application 
of the principle will lead to a large number of 
regulatory false positives — over-regulation of 
minor risks and regulation of non-existent risks, 
often due to unwarranted public 'fears'. Critics of 
the precautionary principle argue that this means 
losing economic, environmental and human 
health benefits associated with the over-regulated 
activities (Smith, 1997 and 2000; Within Worldwide, 
2000; Bate, 2001; Bergkamp, 2002; Sunstein, 2002; 
Graham, 2004). The literature is replete with case 
studies in which researchers claim excessive or 
unnecessary environmental and health regulation 
(see for instance Claus and Bolander, 1977; Whelan, 
1985 and 1993; Bast et al., 1994; Wildavsky, 1995; 
Lieberman and Kwon, 1998; Sanera and Shaw, 1999; 
Bailey, 2002).
The case studies in the first volume of Late lessons 
from early warnings (EEA, 2001) were all false 
negatives, where early warnings existed but no 
preventive action was taken. In preparing the first 
volume, the editorial team queried the existence of 
'false positives' and invited industry representatives 
to submit examples of instances where action was 
taken on the basis of a precautionary approach that 
turned out to be unnecessary. No suitable examples 
emerged and the false positive were therefore not 
addressed. To address this shortfall, the present 
chapter contains a thorough review of the issue. 
2�1 'False alarms', 'regulatory abuse' 
and 'regulatory false positives'
The terminology regarding false positives varies. 
Lieberman and Kwon (1998) call their cases of 
overreaction 'unfounded health scares', whereas 
others use terms like 'environmental hoaxes and 
myths' (Martin, 1990), 'eco-myths' (Bailey, 2002), 
'regulatory abuse' (Cohen and Giovanetti, 1999) 
and 'false alarms' (Mazur, 2004). Each of these 
researchers uses a different set of criteria — often 
not clearly outlined — to define when such cases of 
overreaction have occurred. 
Most often, the authors cited above have included 
any case where concerns were raised over the 
safety of an activity, and where they deem that 
these concerns were later shown to be unfounded. 
The mere fact that concerns were raised does not, 
however, imply that regulatory measures were 
taken. The present analysis focuses on the extent to 
which applying the precautionary principle leads 
to over-regulation and it is therefore important that 
regulatory measures were actually taken to mitigate 
the suspected risk as a result of public and scientific 
concerns. Clearly, concerns raised by the media or 
public entities can lead to changes in markets or 
companies ceasing activities because of concerns 
over, for example, liability. The present chapter 
focuses, however, on false positives in terms of 
government regulation.
Similarly, for a case to be classified as a 'false 
positive', scientific evidence must exist showing 
that a perceived risk is actually non-existent and 
this evidence must be generally accepted in the 
scientific and regulatory communities. Using the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
sliding scale for assessing the state of knowledge 
on climate change (Moss and Schneider, 2000; 
Table 2.1), we argue that there should at least be a 
'high confidence' (67–95 %) in the scientific evidence 
indicating no harm before a case can reasonably be 
claimed to be a false positive. This is consistent with 
the strength of evidence often sought in regulatory 
policy before preventive actions are taken, and 
with the classification systems of international 
bodies. For example, the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer requires that strict criteria be 
applied in concluding that there is no evidence of 
carcinogenicity as it is often difficult to rule out the 
possibility of effects. 
For the purpose of this analysis, regulatory false 
positives are defined as:
'Cases where (i) regulatory authorities 
suspected that an activity posed a risk, 
and acted upon this suspected risk by 
implementing measures aimed at mitigating 
this risk, and (ii) that there is at least 'high 
confidence' in the scientific evidence that later 
became available indicating that the activity 
regulated did not pose the risk originally 
suspected' (Hansen et al., 2007a).
Thus, in the absence of preventive regulatory 
(mandated) action and high confidence in the 
scientific evidence about an activity's risk, a case 
Table 2�1 IPCC scale for assessing the state 
of knowledge
95–100 % Very high confidence
67–95 % High confidence
33–67 % Medium confidence
5–33 % Low confidence
0–5 % Very low confidence
Source:  Moss and Schneider, 2000.
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cannot be considered a regulatory false positive. 
All types of regulatory measures — including 
bans, labelling requirements and restrictions — 
fall under the definition of preventive measures. 
Contrastingly, decisions to study a suspected risk 
further or non-regulatory actions (e.g. including a 
substance on a list of chemicals of concern) are not 
considered regulatory measures for the purposes 
of this chapter, although some might consider 
government agency programmes or statements to 
be de facto regulation. 
2�2 Identifying regulatory false 
positives
In order to identify regulatory false positives, we 
followed a two-step approach. 
First, we conducted a detailed literature review 
to identify examples of regulatory false positives 
in the environmental and human health fields. 
The search terms used included 'false positives', 
'over-regulation', 'health scares' and 'false alarms'. 
The review involved detailed literature searches and 
cross-referencing, and scrutiny of relevant websites. 
We also interviewed experts from academia, 
industry, non-governmental organisations and 
independent think tanks. Based on the review, we 
compiled a list of 88 case studies that claimed to be 
regulatory false positives (listed in full in Table 2.3 
at the end of this chapter). A limited number of 
references provided the majority of these cases 
(Mazur, 2004; Wildavsky, 1995; Lieberman and 
Kwon, 1998; Milloy, 2001). 
In the second part of the study, we analysed the 
literature on each of these examples to determine 
whether the case could indeed be considered a 
regulatory false positive. This was assessed based 
on the definition of a regulatory false positive 
elaborated in the previous section and current 
scientific knowledge. The analysis of the literature 
on each of the examples was performed as follows:
1. first, scientific opinions and reviews conducted 
by international consensus panels or bodies 
such as the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), European Commission Scientific 
Committees, and the IPCC, were consulted;
2. if no recent international reviews were available, 
we consulted up-to-date, recent reviews 
conducted by national governmental institutions 
such as the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and national environmental protection 
agencies such as the US National Academy of 
Sciences or Britain's Royal Society;
3. in cases where neither international nor national 
reviews were available, we performed literature 
reviews of peer-reviewed journals.
When reviewing the cases, emphasis was first placed 
on whether the conclusions reached in the scientific 
literature and by the different scientific panels and 
agencies were in conflict. Differing conclusions by 
various scientific panels, agencies, and scientists 
would tend to lead to dismissing the case as a false 
positive, whereas consistent conclusions would tend 
to lead to accepting the case. In cases of conflicting 
conclusions between different scientific panels, 
agencies and scientists, however, we investigated the 
scientific literature to identify possible explanations 
for those differing viewpoints. If a reasonable 
explanation was identified to support the claim that 
a case was a false positive and the explanation was 
found to be scientifically valid by most scientists 
(some dissenting scientific views were accepted) in 
the field, the case was accepted as an authentic false 
positive. 
For each case, we investigated what regulatory 
action had been taken to mitigate the risk in 
question, when and why, in order to determine 
whether the action taken could be considered to be 
unnecessary or disproportionate. In the event that 
a case was not considered to be a false positive, 
which occurred frequently, the reason for this was 
identified. 
2�3 Mistaken false positives
Following a detailed analysis of each of the 88 cases, 
we developed a series of 'categories' of mistaken 
false positives including: real risks; 'the jury is still 
out'; unregulated alarms; 'too narrow a definition 
of risk'; and risk-risk trade-offs. The criteria used to 
assign cases to each category are set out in Table 2.2, 
and Hansen et al. (2007a) present additional 
examples that illustrate the key characteristics of 
each category. 
Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of cases in 
categories of false positives and mistaken false 
positives.
A detailed written analysis of each case is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. For a rationale for the 
categorisation of the cases into false positive and 
mistaken false positive categories, see Hansen 
(2004). Below, the categories are summarised.
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Table 2�2 Categories of mistaken false positives and criteria for inclusion
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Conclusion
Real risks Hazard and exposure 
Not a
false positive
'The jury is still out' Uncertain hazard or uncertain exposure or disputed evidence
Unregulated alarms Alarm raised and no action taken 
'Too narrow a definition of risk' Other hazard and exposure
Risk-risk trade-offs Target risk and countervailing risk and action taken 
Figure 2�1 Distribution of 88 proclaimed false positives
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2.3.1 Real risks
In about one third of the 88 cases proclaimed to 
be false positives, scientific evidence is available 
indicating that the activity in question posed a real 
risk. In these cases, a lack of regulatory intervention 
could have (and in some cases has) led to adverse 
effects on human health or the environment. 
An example of such a case is acid rain. When 
exposed to bright sunshine, human emissions 
of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides can be 
converted into sulfate and nitrate molecules. These 
particles can then interact with water vapour to form 
sulphuric or nitric acids, which return to Earth in 
rain, snow or fog. Concern was raised in the 1980s 
that acid rain might injure human health and the 
environment but according to Bast et al. (1994) and 
Wildavsky (1995) acid rain poses little or no threat to 
forests, crops, human health or lakes in America. 
In response to the claims about damage caused by 
acid rain, the US Congress authorised a ten-year 
research effort called the National Acid Precipitation 
Assessment Program (NAPAP) (Bast et al., 1994). 
NAPAP acts as a coordinating office between six 
federal agencies including the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) (NAPAP, 2011). 
In 1996 NAPAP published an integrated assessment 
of costs, benefits and effectiveness of acid rain 
controls. NAPAP found that, although most forest 
ecosystems were not then known to be adversely 
impacted by acid deposition, sulphur and nitrogen 
deposition had caused adverse impacts on certain 
highly sensitive forest ecosystems, especially 
high-elevation spruce-fir forests in the eastern 
United States. These adverse effects might develop 
in more forests if deposition levels were not reduced 
(NAPAP, 1996). Because acid deposition has had 
adverse impacts on certain highly sensitive forest 
ecosystems in the eastern United States, this case 
is considered a real risk. See Semb (2001) for a 
discussion of sulphur dioxide and acid rain in the 
European context.
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2.3.2 'The jury is still out'
In another third of the 88 cases, there is not a 'high 
confidence' in the scientific evidence of no harm from 
the activity in question. These could be categorised 
as cases for which 'the jury is still out' — instances 
where the scientific data are uncertain or disputed 
and no final conclusion has yet been reached. 
In these cases, lack of evidence of harm has 
been misinterpreted as evidence of safety. This 
may be due to numerous factors, including the 
length of time the hazard has been studied, clear 
disagreements in the scientific literature, or limited 
human studies. For example, for the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) to classify a 
chemical as 'probably not carcinogenic to humans', 
there is a need for 'strong evidence that it does not 
cause cancer in humans'. Only one substance has 
been listed as such. 
An example of a case where 'the jury is still out' 
is the health risks of mobile phones (see also 
Chapter 21). Lieberman and Kwon (1998) argue 
that there is no evidence of serious health effects 
from routine use of cellular phones. Graham (2004) 
also mentions cell phones and brain cancer as a 
scare where qualified scientists did not replicate 
early studies suggesting danger. Several reviews 
of the scientific literature have been conducted by 
both international and national bodies such as the 
UK's Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones 
(IEGMP, 2000), the British Medical Association 
(BMA, 2001), the Health Council of the Netherlands 
(2002), the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority's 
Independent Expert Group on Electromagnetic 
Fields (2003), the UK's National Radiological 
Protection Board (NRPB, 2003), Sweden's Research 
Council for Worklife and Social Science (FAS, 
2003), WHO (2004) and the Scientific Committee 
on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks 
(SCENIHR, 2009). Although most reviews conclude 
that cellular phones probably do not constitute 
a health hazard after less than ten years of use, 
many still advise a 'precautionary approach' and 
recommend further research into the long-term 
effects on health because of the prolonged latency 
period of many chronic diseases (SCENIHR, 2009; 
WHO, 2010a and 2010b). A recent book compiling 
the scientific evidence on cell phone health risks 
(Davis, 2010), found that the there is strong enough 
evidence on health risks to warrant immediate 
action to redesign cell phones to make them safer. 
According to the IEGMP (2000), the US FDA (cited 
in US GAO, 2001), the Danish Health Agency 
(2000), the Royal Society of Canada (RSC, 1999) and 
SCENIHR (2009), there is not enough information 
to conclude that cellular phones are without risk 
after long-term use (more than 10 years), although 
research to date does not show that mobile phones 
have adverse effects after short-term use (less than 
10 years). 
Several factors make it difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions from existing studies (US GAO, 2001; 
SCENIHR, 2009). Existing epidemiological studies 
on the health effects of radiofrequency in general 
have focused on short-term exposure of the entire 
body, not long-term exposure to the head. No 
studies on mobile and cordless phone use among 
children and adolescents have been completed 
so far. Additionally, most research has been 
conducted on the use of analogue phones instead 
of digital phones, which have become the standard 
technology. Finally, most research investigates the 
health effects at different frequencies than those 
used in mobile phones, and it is not clear how 
impacts from one frequency on the radiofrequency 
spectrum relate to other frequencies (US GAO, 
2001; SCENIHR, 2009). 
Studies on animal and human cells and tissues 
have shown that radiofrequency emissions can 
produce measurable responses, although it is 
not known whether or not these responses are 
harmful (Bast et al., 1994; RSC, 1999; ICNIRP, 
2001). IEGMP (2000) found evidence to suggest 
that radiofrequency radiation might influence 
the ion channels and other membrane proteins of 
neurons in the brain under normal conditions but 
the significance of such effects for human health 
is uncertain. According to the US FDA (cited in 
US GAO, 2001), one type of test known as the 
micronucleus assay has shown changes in the 
genetic material, which is a common precursor to 
cancer. The US FDA therefore calls for additional 
research into the safety of mobile phones 
emissions. Numerous national and international 
research projects have been initiated across the 
globe to study the health risks (BMA, 2004). 
The IARC has an electromagnetic field (EMF) project 
under way to coordinate and stimulate research 
and scientific discussion that can provide the basis 
for its reviews. IARC (2008) has established a series 
of multinational case-control studies (known as 
the Interphone study) that will potentially deliver 
more conclusive data on the possible health effects 
of mobile phones than previous research. Several 
studies from the Interphone study have been 
published (IARC, 2008) and a majority of these have 
found no association between cellular phone use and 
the risk of brain cancer. A number of small, long-term 
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studies did, however, find a slightly increased risk 
for certain types of brain tumours after long-term use 
of cellular phones (Lönn et al., 2004 and 2005; Hours 
et al., 2007; Klaeboe et al., 2007). After pooling data 
from Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, 
Lahkola et al. (2007) and Schoemaker et al. (2005) 
reported finding a significant increased risk of glioma 
on the side of the head where the tumour developed 
after at least 10 years of using cellular phones (IARC, 
2008). See Chapter 21 on mobile phone use and 
brain tumour risk for an updated evaluation of this 
evidence.
There are a number of reasons why this case 
falls into the category 'the jury is still out'. First, 
several factors make it hard to evaluate existing 
epidemiological studies, as previously noted. 
Second, although the significance for human 
health is unknown, different effects on cells and 
tissues have been observed when exposed to 
radiofrequency radiation. Third, there is a vast 
amount of research currently under way as a result 
of lingering scientific concerns and uncertainties. 
2.3.3 Unregulated alarms 
In a number of cases, a given substance, technology 
or procedure was proclaimed to be a risk but no 
regulatory action was ever taken to mitigate it. 
Concerns could be raised as a result of a scientific 
study (which later turns out to be a scientific 
false positive) or public or political concern. 
Since the cases have not been regulated, they are 
not considered false positives from a regulatory 
point of view. Examples of cases that fall into this 
category include the claimed links between coffee 
and pancreatic cancer, between fluoridated water 
and associated health effects, and between the 
measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism.
There has been great public concern about the safety 
of the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine since 
Wakefield et al. (1998) published a small study in The 
Lancet suggesting an association between the vaccine 
and bowel problems and autism in 12 children. In the 
study, parents or doctors recalled that the first signs of 
autism had started within two weeks after the MMR 
vaccination and the researchers wondered whether 
these two were connected. They never claimed, 
however, to have conclusively demonstrated this 
association (IOM, 2001a). The culprit was suspected 
to be a vaccine preservative known as thimerosal, 
which contains mercury (Fields, 2004).
According to Bate (2001), this research made 
some pressure groups argue that a precautionary 
approach should be taken and that the vaccines 
should be withdrawn, which could lead to 
new disease outbreaks with severe public 
health consequences. According to Bate (2001) 
'Precautionary vaccination propaganda that results 
in individual and government action harms, 
and sometimes even kills, children.' Guldberg 
(2000) calls this case an obvious example of 
scare-mongering and argues that damage has been 
done because many parents decided not to take the 
one-in-a-million chance of a serious reaction to the 
vaccine. According to Guldberg (2000) this led to 
falling vaccination rates in the United Kingdom, 
which could lead to a measles epidemic. Marchant 
(2003) also mentions the MMR vaccine as a case in 
which excessive precaution was taken. 
Extensive efforts have been made to confirm the 
findings of Wakefield et al. (1998). A number of 
small studies have supported the results, whereas 
a series of large-scale studies have found no 
association between MMR vaccines and autism 
(e.g. Taylor et al., 1999; Meldgaard Madsen et al., 
2002; DeStefano et al., 2004; Smeeth et al., 2004; 
Hornig et al., 2008). A number of literature reviews 
have also been published that have all concluded 
that the epidemiological evidence does not support 
the hypothesis of an association between the MMR 
vaccine and autism. These reviews further conclude 
that the epidemiological studies that do support an 
association have significant flaws in their design that 
limit the validity of their conclusions (CSM, 1999; 
IOM, 2001a, 2001b and 2004; WHO, 2003a; Parker 
et al., 2004). In 2004, 10 of the 12 authors of the 
original article by Wakefield et al. (1998) retracted 
their support for the findings in the study (Murch 
et al., 2004). 
Despite the public concern about MMR vaccine and 
actions by many advocacy groups and parents, no 
regulatory action was ever taken to stop parents 
from getting their children MMR vaccinated. On 
the contrary, health agencies all over the world 
strongly recommended MMR vaccines at the time 
concerns were raised and still do (NACI, 2003; 
CDC, 2004; UK Department of Health, 2004; WHO, 
2001 and 2003b). Therefore, this case falls into the 
'unregulated alarm' category. 
It is correct that the controversy about the safety 
of MMR vaccines led to decreasing numbers of 
children being vaccinated in the United Kingdom 
but according to the UK Department of Health 
(2003) the numbers are increasing again. There has 
been an outbreak of mumps in England and Wales 
but the agency has emphasised that this outbreak 
could not be attributed to the drop in MMR 
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vaccinations caused by fears of a link to autism. The 
outbreak was actually largely due to young adults 
that missed out on the MMR programme, which 
began in 1988 (see Medical News Today, 2004). 
2.3.4 'Too narrow a definition of risk'
Some cases proclaimed as false positives focus 
only on one aspect of the potential risks from a 
hazard. This can happen, for example, when only 
the human health effects of a particular hazard 
are examined and not the known environmental 
effects. Another example could be claims that a 
given substance is a false positive because it has 
been shown not to cause one type of cancer, when 
there is documented evidence that it increases the 
risk of other kinds of cancer. Examples of cases in 
this category include the links between hair dyes 
and certain cancers, and between second-hand 
smoke and breast cancer.
Nuclear power is another example, with some 
authors arguing that precautionary decisions to 
halt nuclear plant construction were not justified 
by the risks to those living near plants or the risks 
of accidents at the plants. For example, Graham 
(2004) notes that on the basis of precautionary 
considerations there has been a de facto 
moratorium (1) on the construction of new nuclear 
power plants in the US since the 1979 Three Mile 
Island incident. As a consequence, he argues that the 
US has become deeply dependent on fossil fuels for 
energy and 'now precaution is being invoked as a 
reason to enact stricter rules on use of fossil fuels'. 
Bast et al. (1994) have further argued that the public 
is overly fearful of nuclear power and has been since 
the Three Mile Island incident. They further argue 
that low doses of radiation are not harmful and 
that nuclear power is a safe and clean technology, 
although they admit that accidents can happen. 
More recently, some have argued that nuclear 
power poses no risk of cancer based on a 2011 
UK Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in 
the Environment (COMARE) 30 year study which 
found no increased risk of leukemia among children 
in the proximity of nuclear power plants in the 
United Kingdom (Ross, 2011; COMRE, 2011).
In fact, concerns about at least two other types 
of issues need to be considered in discussions 
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(1) Since the moratorium has only been de facto, this case can also be discounted as a regulatory false positive because it constitutes 
an 'unregulated alarm'.
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about risks from nuclear plants: the cost of 
nuclear-generated electricity and radioactive 
waste. Before considering them, however, it is 
worth asking whether the risks to those living near 
nuclear plants are, indeed, insufficient to justify a 
precautionary moratorium. There is little doubt, for 
example, that a major reactor accident could release 
large amounts of radiation into the environment, as 
was demonstrated during the nuclear disasters at 
Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986 and more recently at 
Fukushima, Japan, in 2011. Dispute seems to centre 
on the likelihood of such an event and there seems 
to be a significant disagreement between expert 
and lay perceptions of risk. 
In 1975, the Rasmussen report assessed reactor 
safety in US commercial nuclear power plants. It 
found that the probability of having an accident 
like the Three Mile Island is anywhere from 1 in 
250 to 1 in 25 000 reactor-years. These estimates 
did not take (among other factors) the possibility 
of human errors into consideration. US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission data indicate that there is 
a 50 % chance of another accident occurring equal 
in size to Three Mile Island or larger (Shrader-
Frechette, 1993). 
These findings suggest that a precautionary 
moratorium on plant construction based on 
concerns about accidents and radiation leaks alone 
might not have been irrational. As noted, however, 
other factors played a role, including concerns 
about financial risks. Orders to construct nuclear 
plants had begun to decline sharply even before 
the Three Mile Island accident. By September 
1974, 57 of 191 nuclear plants under construction, 
under licensing review, on order, or announced 
by utilities had been delayed by a year or more 
and a few had been cancelled altogether. Fourteen 
months later, 122 of the 191 projects had been 
deferred and nine had been cancelled. Between 
1975 and 1978, US utilities ordered only 11 nuclear 
units. Utilities cut back on both coal and nuclear 
projects, but the blow fell disproportionately on 
builders of nuclear units because of higher capital 
costs (Walker, 2004). This was only partly due to 
public opposition. 
The energy crisis of the early seventies sharply 
and quickly drove up the price of oil and other 
fuels that utilities purchased to run their plants. 
This again drained their financial resources. 
Adding to this, the serious problem of inflation 
greatly increased the cost of borrowing money 
for plant construction. An economic slump and 
increasing unemployment also curtailed demand 
for electricity, which grew at a substantially slower 
rate than experts had anticipated (Walker, 2004). 
As Giere (1991) states 'The accidents at Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl dramatised the dangers 
of nuclear power, but the immediate cause of 
the demise of the nuclear power industry in the 
United States has been economic'. Supporting 
Giere's statement, the costs of nuclear-generated 
electricity quadrupled in the 1980s alone, and 
2001 data from the US Department of Energy 
show that nuclear fission is more expensive per 
kilowatt-hour than coal, natural gas, wind, and 
solar thermal (Shrader-Frechette, 1993). According 
to Shrader-Frechette (2003) this is just another 
reason that no new nuclear plant has been ordered 
since the seventies. 
In addition to accidents, radiation leaks and doubts 
about the financial viability of nuclear power, 
concerns also focused on the risks associated with 
radioactive waste produced as a by-product of 
power generation. During the 1980s radioactive 
waste doubled and there is still controversy 
surrounding how to deal with it. Although 
large-scale nuclear accidents might be rare, several 
accidents have occurred at nuclear storage facilities 
causing the death of hundreds of people. Clean-ups 
will cost hundreds of billions of dollars (Shrader-
Frechette, 1993). 
The example of nuclear power demonstrates that 
in assessing whether a decision is based on a false 
perception of risk, it is essential to examine all 
the factors motivating that decision. In this case, 
claims that the US moratorium represents (de facto) 
over-regulation based on disproportionate fears 
about accidents and radiation leaks do not bear up 
to scrutiny.
2.3.5 Risk-risk trade-offs
Risk-risk trade-offs can be defined as cases 
where efforts to combat a 'target risk' of concern 
unintentionally create 'countervailing risks' 
(also known as 'side-effects' or 'unintended 
consequences') (Graham and Wiener, 1995). 
Addressing risk-risk trade-offs (ensuring that 
regulatory actions do not create new risks) is an 
important concern in regulatory policy and several 
authors have written about this subject (see Tickner 
and Gouveia-Vigeant, 2005). The situation differs, 
however, from precautionary over-regulation. 
One example of such a case is the use of nitrites 
in meat preservation. Nitrites have been used to 
cure meat, such as bacon, ham, hot dogs and other 
sausages, for several centuries. Besides enhancing 
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colour and flavour, nitrites inhibit the growth of 
Clostridium botulinum and other toxins. Clostridium 
botulinum causes botulism, a rare but often fatal 
form of food poisoning (McCutcheon, 1984). Since 
1899 there have been only seven outbreaks of 
botulism poisoning in commercially cured meat 
products in the US and Canada, resulting in nine 
deaths. The excellent safety record of cured meat 
has been largely attributed to the use of nitrites 
(Pierson and Smoot, 1982). 
In the late 1970s there was a discussion about 
whether or not to ban nitrites in the US. Concerns 
were raised after scientists found that nitrites 
react in the body with other food agents to form 
nitrosamines, which are known carcinogens 
(IPCS, 1978). Since attempts to discover a single 
alternative preservative with all the properties of 
nitrites have been unsuccessful, banning nitrites 
could result in a risk-risk trade-off between the 
risk of nitrosamine-induced cancers and increased 
risk of botulism. This argument was used by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and as a 
result nitrites were not banned (Wildavsky, 1995; 
Lieberman and Kwon, 1998).
Lieberman and Kwon (1998) have described the 
arguments against nitrites as one of the 'greatest 
unfounded health scares of recent times' fuelled by 
application of the precautionary principle. But the 
fact that a ban on nitrites could itself have created 
certain risks is not evidence that concerns about 
nitrites were unfounded. Indeed, the measured 
response of government and the food industry 
that ensued looks like smart management of risks, 
rather than over-regulation.
In 1978 the USDA required that the level of nitrite 
be reduced and that nitrite be used in combination 
with sodium ascorbate or erythorbate. Sodium 
ascorbate (vitamin C) or erythorbate (chemically 
similar to vitamin C) block or inhibit the formation 
of nitrosamines from nitrite (Institute of Food 
Technologists, 1998). The USDA took forceful 
steps to ensure that bacon was in compliance 
with the new regulations and began an extensive 
three-phase monitoring programme. The 
intent of the programme was not to stop bacon 
production but rather to produce bacon according 
to the new requirements. Plants in violation 
of the requirements were allowed to correct 
their procedures to reduce nitrosamines, and 
USDA offered technical assistance to plants with 
potential problems. The food industry responded 
by tightening its own quality control and nearly 
all bacon was free from confirmable levels of 
nitrosamines within one year of the start of the 
three-phase monitoring programme (McCutcheon, 
1984). 
Beyond bacon, the food industry generally 
made substantial changes to the cured meat 
manufacturing process. It stopped using sodium 
nitrate in major meat processes; it reduced the use 
of nitrite in the processing of cured meats; and it 
increased the use of ascorbate and erythorbate in 
the curing process. As a result, the food industry 
was able to eliminate the addition of nitrite to 
foods, reducing residual nitrite levels in cured 
meat products five-fold without compromising 
antibotulinal effects. Today the average level of 
residual nitrite is one-fifth of the amount present 
20 years ago (Institute of Food Technologists, 
1998). Indeed, there is a growing market for 
non-preserved meats due to concerns about the 
health implications of nitrites and antibiotics in 
traditional processed meats with no known safety 
implications to date.
2�4 Identified false positives 
Of 88 cases of alleged over-regulation, only four 
cases fulfilled the definition of a regulatory false 
positive (Hansen et al., 2007a). These are the cases of: 
•	 Southern corn leaf blight: the US Department 
of Agriculture decision in 1971 to plant more 
corn in the mistaken anticipation that Southern 
corn leaf blight would return and destroy a large 
part of the harvest (Lawless, 1977; Mazur, 2004; 
Hansen 2004); 
•	 saccharin: the 1977 decision requiring saccharin 
to be labelled in the US because it was believed 
to be a human carcinogen;
•	 swine flu: the US Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare decision in 1976 to mass 
immunise the entire American population in the 
mistaken anticipation of a return of swine flu 
(US GAO, 1977; Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978);
•	 food irradiation impacts on consumer health: 
the reluctance of the US Food and Drug 
Administration to allow food irradiation that 
could help reduce a large number of food 
pathogens and increase shelf life (WHO, 1981; 
1999; SCF, 2003). 
The latter two cases are presented below in greater 
detail. An in-depth analysis of the first two cases can 
be found in Hansen (2004). In the discussion that 
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follows, however, all four cases are referred to in 
drawing policy relevant lessons for decision-makers. 
Each case was analysed in order to understand: 
•	 when	and	why	precautionary	regulatory	action	
was taken; 
•	 when	and	why	it	was	realised	that	this	
precautionary action was unnecessary; 
•	 what	the	resulting	cost	and	benefits	were.	
These factors are emphasised differently in each 
of the cases, as each has a unique historical and 
scientific basis. Literature is very scarce on Southern 
corn leaf blight, which makes it impossible to 
analyse and answer all of the questions in depth. 
2�5 Swine flu
In late January 1976, twelve soldiers at Fort Dix in 
New Jersey became sick with an upper respiratory 
infection. One of the soldiers died after participating 
in a forced march. The cause of the infection was 
a new strain of the flu virus dubbed 'swine flu', 
which was antigenetically similar to the Spanish flu 
that had caused 40–50 million deaths worldwide in 
1918–1919 (US GAO, 1977; Potter, 1998; Reid et al., 
1999). Influenza epidemics result in about three 
to five million cases of severe illness annually and 
about 250 000 to 500 000 deaths, primarily among 
the elderly (WHO, 2010c). 
US President Ford decided to immunise the entire 
American population against swine flu, dedicating 
USD 135 million to the production of vaccines 
(US GAO, 1977). The immunisation programme 
suffered a number of setbacks in the implementation 
phase, however, and only 40 million Americans (out 
of 200 million) were inoculated. The widespread 
swine flu outbreak feared by decision-makers never 
occurred. On this basis, the mass immunisation 
program appears to have been unnecessary. 
2.5.1 Responses to early warnings
The initial outbreak at Fort Dix was taken very 
seriously by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
and other agencies for a number of reasons. Among 
them:
•	 Scientists	had	observed	that	when	a	new	strain	
of the flu emerged, it would typically appear in 
low levels towards the end of a flu season — just 
as swine flu did at Fort Dix — and then return in 
epidemic proportions the following flu season.
•	 A	hypothesis	at	the	time	suggested	that	major	
flu epidemics took place at regular intervals of 
eleven years. Because the US had experienced 
epidemics in 1946, 1957 and 1968, it seemed 
plausible that a new one would occur in 1977.
•	 Another	theory	suggested	that	virulent	flu	
strains recycled themselves at intervals of sixty 
or seventy years. Almost sixty years had elapsed 
since the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918–1919 and 
it seemed reasonable that the swine flu virus was 
in the process of re-emerging.
•	 A	new	strain	of	flu	virus	had	never	before	
appeared without it leading to a major epidemic 
(Boffey, 1976; Colin, 1976; USDHEW, 1976; 
Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; Wecht, 1979; 
Silverstein, 1978; Bernstein, 1985). 
Knowing this, government officials held a series 
of emergency meetings and decided that the CDC 
should begin preparing to produce large amounts 
of swine flu antibodies. Special attention was Photo:  © istockphoto/Sean Locke
Lessons from health hazards | The precautionary principle and false alarms — lessons learned
59Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
paid to informing the public to prevent the media 
portraying the Fort Dix outbreak as a 'gloom and 
doom' scenario (Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; 
Silverstein, 1978). 
Little new information on the Fort Dix outbreak 
was available when the CDC's Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) held its annual 
meeting in March, 1976 to review the vaccine 
recommendations for the next flu season. Most of 
the participants were in favour of recommending 
mass production of swine flu vaccine and 
inoculation of the American population as soon as 
possible. 
One member of ACIP suggested producing the 
vaccine and then stockpiling it until a clearer 
signal of a flu pandemic emerged. According to the 
records, he felt that one should always be careful 
about putting foreign material into the human body, 
especially when the number of bodies approached 
200 million (Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; 
Silverstein, 1978). According to the minutes of the 
meeting, the possibility of stockpiling vaccines was 
never really discussed. According to some experts 
(Wecht, 1979), however, the option was discussed 
by Dr Sencer, Director of the CDC, and a few other 
committee members during one of the breaks of the 
meeting. They did not consider the option viable 
due to the amount of time required to distribute and 
administer the vaccines. Too many people could 
get sick and perhaps die in the time it would take 
for the vaccine to find its way through the delivery 
pipeline. The basis for not discussing this option 
openly during the ACIP meeting was later attributed 
by some to Dr Sencer's eagerness to act immediately 
(US GAO, 1977; Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; 
Silverstein, 1978; Bernstein, 1985). 
Based on the ACIP recommendations, Dr Sencer 
prepared a memorandum presenting the pros and 
cons of four courses of action: 
1. No action: leave it to private drug manufacturers 
to produce vaccines in response to their 
estimates of demand, and let consumers 
make their own decisions on whether to get 
vaccinated. 
2. Minimum response: the federal government 
would advise the drug industry to produce 
sufficient vaccine to immunise the general 
population and would undertake a public 
awareness programme. 
3. Government programme: the federal government 
would advise vaccine manufacturers to embark 
on full scale production with the expectation of a 
federal government purchase of up to 200 million 
doses. The health authorities would carry out 
an immunisation programme designed to reach 
100 % of the population. 
4. Combined approach: the federal government 
would advise vaccine manufacturers to 
embark on full-scale production and purchase 
200 million doses. However, they would leave 
it to state health agencies to develop plans for 
immunisation (USDHEW, 1976). 
The memorandum recommended the 'combined 
approach' for a number of reasons. Previous 
experiences with widespread flu pandemics in 
1957 and 1968 indicated that the vaccine should be 
produced, distributed and administered as fast as 
possible. In 1957 the flu outbreak came earlier than 
expected and only about a quarter of the vaccine 
doses were administered before massive outbreaks 
occurred, and ultimately only about half of the 
doses were administrated. Efforts to contain the flu 
pandemic of 1968 were hampered by the fact that 
it was realised too late that a new strain of flu had 
appeared, rendering vaccines in use ineffective. 
A combined approach was considered be the only 
way to immunise the whole population successfully 
before the next flu season. Furthermore full public 
funding was the only means of ensuring the 
availability of vaccines to all citizens. The cost of 
approximately USD 135 million would be small in 
comparison with the human and economic costs 
of past pandemics (USDHEW, 1976; Wade, 1976; 
Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; Dowdle, 1997). The 
1957 and 1968 pandemics caused about 45 and 
50 million cases of influenza and resulted in the loss 
of about 70 000 and 33 000 lives, respectively. The 
total economic cost due to death and disease, health 
care costs and loss of productivity was USD 7 billion 
in 1957 and USD 3.9 billion in 1968 (US GAO, 1977; 
Silverstein, 1978; Bernstein, 1985). 
The White House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) prepared a briefing paper for President 
Ford. It raised three main questions, relating to 
the probability that swine flu would reappear, the 
seriousness of the epidemic should it come, and 
whether the scientific community fully agreed 
with the recommendation made in Dr Sencer's 
memorandum (Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; 
Silverstein, 1978). 
Before announcing his decision on 24 March, 
President Ford requested a meeting with the nation's 
top influenza and public health experts. Many of 
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the scientists at the meeting thought that the vaccine 
was safe, that there was little to lose and that it was 
'better to be safe than sorry' (Neustadt and Fineberg, 
1978). Consequently, the experts voted unanimously 
in favour of proceeding with the immunisation 
campaign. Immediately after the meeting, 
President Ford requested Congress to appropriate 
USD 135 million for producing vaccines to inoculate 
the entire US population (US GAO, 1977; Neustadt 
and Fineberg, 1978; Bernstein, 1985). Later the 
President stated: 
'I think you ought to gamble on the side of 
caution. I would rather be ahead of the curve 
than behind it' (Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978).
Congress approved the funds with little debate, and 
the final bill was signed some four months after the 
initial outbreak of swine flu at Fort Dix (Neustadt 
and Fineberg, 1978; Silverstein, 1978; Reitze, 1986). 
There are some indications that the consultation 
process leading up to President Ford's decision did 
not give proper attention to alternative options and 
dissenting opinions. Many of the scientists consulted 
by President Ford noted that the discussions felt 
pro forma and that President Ford seemed already 
to have reached a decision (Boffey, 1976; Silverstein, 
1978). 
There was little doubt that Congress would 
respond positively to the President's request to 
appropriate money for producing vaccines in 
the face of unknown dangers (Silverstein, 1978). 
However, Bernstein (1985) argues that the hearings 
in Congress were carefully staged and that dissent 
was excluded. Only a few voices questioned the 
programme during hearings in the House of 
Representatives. For instance consumer advocate 
Ralph Nader's Health Research Group claimed that 
everyone was being overly alarmist, and hinted 
at some sort of federal-scientific plot to waste 
taxpayers' money. Democratic congressmen Henry 
Waxman of California and Andrew Maguire of New 
Jersey also spoke critically, implying that a potential 
'rip-off' might be in the making, giving huge profits 
to the vaccine manufacturers (Silverstein, 1978; 
Garrett, 1994). 
Two studies had also become available, indicating 
that the swine flu virus was not as virulent as 
had been feared. In England, Beare and Craig 
(1976) had injected six volunteers with the virus 
and only four had developed minor symptoms. 
They concluded that the virus was not especially 
contagious, a pandemic was very unlikely, and 
mass immunisation was unnecessary. 
These results were supported by a study in the 
US on monkeys, which suggested that the virus 
would cause only a 'mild disease' (Silverstein, 
1981; Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; Edsall, 1979). 
According to Medical World News (1977), the 
results of the British study were known to the 
programme scientists, and according to Dr Sencer 
the programme was reconsidered three times: after 
the field trials; just before the President's push 
for money; and finally when the programme was 
suspended (Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978). 
2.5.2 Evidence of a false positive 
Although the mass immunization programme got 
off to a good start, the programme soon ran into 
a series of setbacks that delayed the inoculation 
process. Eventually, concerns over a possible link 
between the swine flu vaccination and an outbreak 
of a rare neurological disease, Guillain-Barré 
Syndrome (GBS), led the CDC to suspend the 
programme after only a fraction of the vaccine 
had been administered. By mid-December 1976, 
the CDC had received reports of 107 cases of GBS, 
including six deaths. The evidence indicated that the 
incidence of the disease was higher in the part of the 
population that had received the swine flu vaccine 
(one case in 100 000–200 000) compared to those 
who had not (one case in more than a million). An 
option was left open to resume immunisation if 
the swine flu pandemic in fact occurred in the US 
but swine flu did not reappear anywhere in the 
world during the winter of 1976–1977. The media's 
verdict on the swine flu immunisation programme 
was harsh, and allegations of incompetence and 
mismanagement of public funds were common 
(Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978; Silverstein, 1978; 
Dowdle, 1997; Reitze, 1986). 
2.5.3 Costs and benefits
Besides the non-monetary costs in life and 
personal injuries due to the vaccine's side effects, 
the US Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare spent over USD 100 million on the mass 
immunisation programme, and state and local 
agencies are estimated to have spent USD 24 million 
(US GAO, 1977; Silverstein, 1978). In addition to 
these direct costs, the federal government had to 
pay settlements and legal fees related to the over 
4 100 lawsuits that followed in the wake of the 
immunisation programme. Most of these lawsuits 
either alleged that the swine flu vaccine had caused 
GBS, or that it was responsible for various other 
illnesses including rheumatoid arthritis and multiple 
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sclerosis. The indemnities paid by the government 
totalled USD 83 million which, when added to the 
administrative and legal costs associated with the 
law suits, probably equalled the USD 100 million 
spent directly on the immunisation programme 
(Kurland et al., 1984; Reitze, 1986; Christoffel and 
Teret, 1991).
On a positive note, much was learned about the 
preparation, standardisation and administration 
of vaccines, as well as adverse reactions, whole 
and split vaccines and the adjustment of dosage 
according to age. Besides these benefits, some of 
the more puzzling findings from previous vaccine 
studies were clarified (Dowdle, 1997). After the 
events of 1976, research was initiated on the 
causes and possible treatment of GBS in medical 
institutions throughout the US (Silverstein, 1978), 
and a nationwide disease surveillance system was 
established (Neustadt and Fineberg, 1978). 
2�6 Food irradiation and consumer 
health
Food irradiation was first applied on strawberries 
in Sweden in 1916 and the first patents were taken 
on this technology in 1921 in the US. Three kinds 
of radiation are typically used to sterilise food: 
gamma rays, X-rays and electron beams. And there 
are three main purposes for irradiating food: killing 
insects and other pests in grain, fruit, and spices; 
delaying ripening of fruit and vegetables; and 
reducing bacterial contamination of meat, chicken, 
seafood and spices (SOU, 1983; MAFF, 1986; WHO, 
1981, 1999; SCF, 2003). 
Gamma irradiation uses radioactive elements, 
whereas X-rays and electronic beams use ordinary 
electricity. However, all three perform a similar 
function (Environmental Nutrition, 2000; Pothisiri 
et al., 1991; WHO, 1993). Over the years, the FDA 
has issued a number of clearances to use this 
technology on food but in the late 1960s concerns 
were raised about the safety of food irradiation 
and no additional approvals were given for the 
next twenty years. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
the FDA authorised irradiation for several different 
kinds of foods, despite consumer reluctance to 
buy irradiated food (Meeker-Lowry and Ferrara, 
1996; Adams, 2000). Consumer resistance is seen by 
many as the main reason why food irradiation is 
not widely applied (Thorne et al., 1991). 
The failure of regulatory agencies to approve and 
accept food irradiation, despite evidence of its 
safety for consumers, constitutes a false positive. 
Similar evidence of safety was not identified for 
either the potential risks to worker health and 
safety from irradiating food, or the potential 
increased threat of terrorism that could follow from 
implementing large-scale food irradiation. Since 
these concerns cannot be ruled out, the perspective 
of this case is limited to consumer health.
2.6.1 Responses to early warnings
Serious progress in developing food irradiation 
technology first began in the 1950s when President 
Eisenhower announced his 'Atoms for Peace' 
programme, and extensive research and funding 
went into food irradiation from the US Department 
of Defence. Irradiation was approved for use 
in inhibiting potato sprouting and disinfecting 
wheat in 1963. Irradiation of can-packed bacon 
was approved in 1963 but this permission was 
subsequently withdrawn in 1968, after a review of 
the research found adverse effects in animals fed 
irradiated food, such as fewer surviving offspring 
(Webb et al., 1987). 
2.6.2 Evidence of a false positive 
Several international and national committees have 
evaluated the safety and 'wholesomeness' of food 
irradiation since the beginning of the 1980s, and all 
have concluded that irradiated foods are safe for 
consumers (SOU, 1983; MAFF, 1986; WHO, 1981, 
1999; SCF, 1998, 2003; US FDA, 1986; NFA, 1986). 
However, this has not led to a general acceptance 
of food irradiation, and a variety of concerns have 
been raised through the years.
One of these concerns is about so-called radiolytic 
products, which form in irradiated food. Some 
of these radiolytic products are unique for 
irradiation (SOU, 1983; US FDA, 1986). Opponents 
of food irradiation argue that some of these 
chemical changes are known to be mutagenic and 
carcinogenic, and that free radicals — believed 
to be cancer promoters — are produced during 
irradiation (Webb et al., 1987; Public Citizen and 
Grace, 2002; Epstein, 2002). 
Numerous toxicity studies have been performed 
on a range of animals, using a wide variety of 
different kinds of irradiated food, and examining 
different doses and endpoints. According to the 
World Health Organization, these studies have not 
provided evidence of harmful effects (WHO, 1981, 
1994 and 1999). A number of highly controversial 
studies have indicated changes in the number 
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of polyploid cells in rats, monkeys and even 
malnourished Indian children fed freshly irradiated 
wheat (US FDA, 1986; WHO, 1994; Thayer, 1990; 
Vijayalaxmi and Rao, 1976; Bhaskaram and 
Sadasivan, 1975; Vijaylaxmi, 1975 and 1978). The 
WHO (1994) states, however, that 'No effects were 
seen showing any consistent pattern or trend, 
and the studies were overwhelmingly negative 
indicating that the consumption of irradiated food 
… had no toxicological effect'. 
The WHO (1981, 1994 and 1999) and a British 
Government Advisory Committee on Irradiated 
and Novel Foods (MAFF, 1986) concluded that 
virtually all the radiolytic products found in both 
low- and high-dose irradiated food were either 
naturally present in food or produced in thermally 
processed food. In the US, radiation doses of up to 
1 kilogray (kGy) have been approved on the basis 
that the concentration of radiolytic products is too 
small to be of toxicological significance (US FDA, 
1986). 
Others have argued, however, that irradiated 
food has never been rigorously tested (Bloomfield 
and Webb, 1990). It was originally thought that 
the radiolytic compounds could and should be 
tested according to the accepted protocols for food 
additives. This would require, however, that all 
of the chemicals be identified, isolated and fed 
separately to laboratory animals. Because of the 
difficulties of isolating and purifying the numerous 
radiolytic products, this approach is simply 
impossible (Bloomfield and Webb, 1990; WHO, 
1994). Attempts to apply a safety margin by giving 
animals food irradiated at high radiation doses 
were also unsuccessful because the animals simply 
refused to eat the unpalatable food (US FDA, 1986; 
Bloomfield and Webb, 1990). Because of these 
problems testing has been done without safety 
margins, which may miss underlying or long-term 
safety hazards, according to Webb et al. (1987).
Concerns have also been raised that food 
irradiation could benefit irradiation-resistant 
bacteria, which would then grow exponentially 
after the food has been irradiated. It has been 
argued that the consequences of this are unknown 
(Murray, 1990; Tritsch, 2000). However, the WHO 
(1981, 1994 and 1999), MAFF (1986) and the 
Scientific Committee on Food (SCF) (2003) have 
all found no evidence of selective destruction 
and potential development of mutations. On the 
contrary both the WHO (1994) and the SCF (2003) 
state that irradiation has been found to cause loss 
of virulence and infectivity, as mutants are usually 
less competitive and less adapted. 
Discussion about the safety of food irradiation 
has focused in particular on the chemical class of 
cyclobutanones and the question of whether or not 
they are carcinogens (Public Citizen and Grace, 
2002; Epstein, 2002). Cyclobutanones are created 
only when fat-containing food is radiated (Delincée 
and Pool-Zobel, 1998; Delincée et al., 2002). Reports 
by both the FDA and the WHO have been criticised 
heavily for ignoring the issue of cyclobutanones 
(Public Citizen and Grace, 2002; Epstein, 2002). 
Concern was originally raised after studies by 
Delincée and Pool-Zobel (1999) and Delincée et al. 
(1999) found that 2-Dodecylcyclobutanone (DCB) 
was genotoxic. The identity and purity of the 
compound had not been verified prior to the studies, 
however, which the authors argue cast doubts on the 
results originally obtained (Delincée and Pool-Zobel, 
1998).
A further concern relates to reducing the nutritional 
value of foods. Irradiation treatment does not 
significantly alter the nutrient value and digestibility 
of fatty acids and macronutrients, such as proteins, 
fats and carbohydrates (MAFF, 1986; WHO, 1981, 
1999; Bloomfield and Webb, 1990) but loss of 
micronutrients does increase with radiation doses. 
The rate of loss differs substantially depending on 
the food and nutrients. Therefore these losses must 
be assessed for each food and for each vitamin 
specifically. According to the WHO (1981), thiamine 
(B1) is the only vitamin that should be considered 
in terms of dietary intake because it is radiation 
sensitive and the main sources of thiamine in 
the diet (e.g. pork) are candidates for high-dose 
irradiation. 
In 1981, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
conducted a review of the studies performed with 
doses below 10 kGy and found that irradiated 
food has been conclusively demonstrated to 
be safe from the standpoint of toxicological, 
nutritional or microbiological risks to human 
health. This document has later been described 
as the culmination and turning point in the 
scientific evaluation of the safety of irradiated 
foods (WHO, 1993; 1994; Urbain, 1993). Following 
this report, the FDA began a systematic review of 
the over 400 toxicological studies on mice, rats, 
dogs, pigs and monkeys available up to 1982. 
Only five studies were considered to have been 
properly conducted in accordance with 1980 
toxicological standards and were able to stand 
alone in support of safety (US FDA, 1986; WHO, 
1994). Despite several years of consumer reluctance 
to eat irradiated food, the FDA decided to allow 
irradiation of spices and seasonings in 1983 while 
requiring that irradiated whole foods be labelled 
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as such. Since then the FDA has further allowed 
irradiation of fruits, vegetables, pork, poultry, red 
meat and eggs (Meeker-Lowry and Ferrara, 1996; 
Webb et al., 1987; US FDA, 1997; USDA, 1999a, 
1999b; Epstein and Hauter, 2001). 
2.6.3 Costs and benefits
Complete estimates of cost and benefits of irradiated 
food are not available. The costs of food-borne 
diseases in health and economic terms, and the 
potential role of food irradiation in reducing those 
costs, are not well documented (WHO, 1993). Robert 
and Murrell (1993) estimated that the economic losses 
in the US from food-borne pathogenic diseases are up 
to USD 5.3 billion annually. A number of factors affect 
these cost estimates, however, such as the number of 
estimated cases and estimated deaths, the severity 
of the illness and the type of food-borne disease 
(Todd, 1993). Cost-benefit estimates done by the US 
Department of Agriculture indicate that the benefits 
would be likely to exceed costs by a ratio of 2.2–2.8 
to 1 and that the irradiation of just 10 % of poultry 
production would produce annual savings in the US 
of up to USD 50 million (WHO, 1993).
Several cost-benefit analyses have assessed the 
feasibility of using irradiation in developing 
countries. Most have indicated large potential 
benefits, especially with regard to increased shelf 
life and reduced post-harvest losses (Grünewald, 
1973; Al-Bachir et al., 1993; Kahn, 1993; Moretti, 
1993; Neketsia-Tabire et al., 1993). A number of 
challenges would have to be addressed, however, 
before developing countries can benefit from food 
irradiation. For the technology to be used efficiently 
requires, for instance, that the necessary infrastructure 
be established (WHO, 1993; Hackwood, 1991).
One of the frequently cited benefits of food irradiation 
is that it reduces the use of chemicals, for example 
use of ethylene dibromide in controlling insects and 
mould infestation in grain (WHO, 1993; Grünewald, 
1973; Piccioni, 1987). The plausibility of this argument 
is, however, unclear (Webb et al., 1987; EC, 2002a and 
2002b; Piccioni, 1987). 
Nestlé (2007) has voiced concerns that extensive 
irradiation could reduce attention to the sources 
of pathogenic contamination of food and primary 
prevention. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that public reluctance to accept food irradiation 
may actually focus greater attention on improved 
sanitation in manufacturing and food preparation. 
It is unclear, however, whether or not this has been 
the case.
2�7 Discussion 
This chapter aims to identify false positives and 
investigate lessons that could be learned to improve 
future decision-making — to minimise both false 
positives and false negatives. In this final section, 
we discuss the results of our analysis, focusing on: 
1. when and why precautionary regulatory action 
was taken; 
2. when and why it was realised that this 
precautionary action was unnecessary; 
3. the resulting cost and benefits. 
Finally, we discuss what lessons can be learned 
about false positives, why we were only able 
to identify four false positives, and the policy 
implications of our analysis. 
2.7.1 False positives and early warnings 
There are few parallels between the four cases in 
terms of when and why each perceived risk was 
falsely believed to be real. This is a lesson in itself: 
each risk is unique, as is the science and politics 
behind it. A flexible approach to science and policy 
is therefore needed, adapted to the nature of the 
problem. 
In the swine flu case, concern was mainly raised 
because an 'early warning' of an outbreak fitted 
perfectly into three widely held theories about 
influenza cycles. Perhaps too much faith was placed 
on the ability of science to foresee the impending 
outbreak in this case. Even with hindsight, however, 
it is not at all obvious that the decision to mass 
immunise the American population was the wrong 
decision or an over-reaction considering the scientific 
understanding at the time and the stakes involved. 
Much contemporary scientific knowledge indicated 
that swine flu could return and had it done so it 
could potentially have killed millions. Even with 
the benefit of current knowledge, the science behind 
predicting flu epidemics remains very uncertain. One 
lesson from this case could be the need to be open 
to dissenting opinions and to discuss their validity 
before making decisions. Swine flu did not return 
and this was recognised almost immediately after the 
flu season, reducing the negative impact of this false 
positive.
In the case of saccharin, concern was triggered by 
new scientific knowledge indicating that saccharin 
causes bladder cancer in rats. There is now a general 
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scientific consensus that saccharin does not have 
the same effect on humans, although some minority 
opinions still exist. While it proved unnecessary, 
it would be wrong to say that the decision to label 
saccharin as a cause of cancer in laboratory animals 
was unjustified at the time preventive action was 
taken. For instance there is no way decision-makers 
could have known that rats would be the only 
species in which saccharin causes bladder cancer. 
Nor could they have known that scientific evidence 
would emerge indicating that the mechanisms by 
which it operates in rats appear to be irrelevant 
in humans. Only the often slow evolution of our 
scientific understanding gave decision-makers 
reasons to eliminate the labelling requirements for 
saccharin. 
In both of these cases, it was virtually impossible for 
scientists, regulatory agencies or decision-makers to 
know or foresee that the potential risk was not real. 
The mechanism by which saccharin causes cancer in 
rats is so specific to this one laboratory animal that no 
one could have known that it would be irrelevant for 
humans; even today these mechanisms are disputed. 
Similarly, no one could know whether the swine flu 
would reappear or was smouldering in sub-clinical 
form in the public and would return in epidemic 
proportions when the flu season began. 
The situation was similar with respect to Southern 
corn leaf blight (SCLB). In that case, the USDA 
correctly anticipated that the SCLB would return but 
could not have anticipated that it would not have the 
same devastating effect as the year before, probably 
due to a change in weather conditions. 
Food irradiation stands out because the publication 
of a WHO review of existing literature in 1981 
created a general consensus regarding the safety 
of the technology. Even before that, the WHO and 
others had endorsed and used food irradiation 
and there had been general consensus about its 
safety for some time. Nevertheless, the decision to 
withdraw permission to irradiate can-packed bacon 
seems completely reasonable in view of the fact that 
studies had found adverse effects in animals fed 
irradiated food. At that time there was a serious need 
for scientific studies investigating the safety of food 
irradiation. 
It is also noteworthy that the false positive of 
food irradiation had little impact on consumers 
because alternatives were available to achieve the 
same outcome, such as improved sanitation in the 
manufacturing processes and good hygiene. Hence 
it seems that the availability of alternatives can 
minimise the total impact of a false positive. 
2.7.2 The costs of false positives 
The costs of the false positives identified were 
mainly economic, although the actions taken to 
address swine flu did lead to some unintended 
deaths and human suffering, and diverted 
resources from other potentially serious health 
risks. Clearly, however, determining the net costs 
of mistaken regulatory action requires a complete 
assessment of the positive and negative impacts of 
the regulation, including the costs and benefits of 
using alternative technologies and approaches.
The case of irradiation illustrates this point. There 
is no doubt that society could benefit substantially 
from preventing the numbers of food-borne 
illnesses but it is not obvious that food irradiation 
is the right answer. An alternative could be 
improving animal welfare to reduce pathogenic 
contamination, improving sanitation and 
conditions in manufacturing processes, and good 
hygiene (which manufacturers and governments 
should already be enforcing). Indeed, food 
irradiation provides an obvious opportunity to 
cover bad practices. Poor hygiene practices in food 
production have been widely documented (Webb 
et al., 1987; Bloomfield and Webb, 1990; Epstein 
and Hauter, 2001). And since existing regulations 
and requirements should guarantee that the 
public receives safe food even without the use of 
irradiation, the public would have no immediate 
benefit from food irradiation but would suffer 
the adverse health impacts if any existed (Tritsch, 
2000; Begley and Roberts, 2002). Addressing the 
root causes of pathogenic contamination in food 
supply would probably lead to more sustainable 
prevention actions.
2.7.3 The precautionary principle, science and 
technological innovation 
Opponents of the precautionary principle often argue 
that the principle stifles technological innovation 
(e.g. Wildavsky, 1995; Mazur, 2004). It appears, 
however, that the four false positives identified 
actually sparked innovation within industry and 
within government. 
Innovation experts have noted that regulation 
may result in technological innovation because 
stringent regulations indirectly cause dramatic 
changes in technology and often allow new firms or 
entrants, thereby displacing dominant technologies 
(Ashford et al., 1985; Ashford, 1993; Porter, 1991). 
This phenomenon can be observed in the case of 
saccharin, whose existence was a major deterrent to 
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the development of other, more costly non-caloric 
sweeteners. 
The mistaken actions to address swine flu likewise 
resulted in an unprecedented nationwide disease 
surveillance programme and the government learned 
how to mobilise resources quickly in the face of an 
apparent public health threat (Reitze, 1986). Such 
knowledge is particularly important in the context of 
new concerns related to bioterrorism. 
In all the four cases, regulatory action indirectly 
sparked a large amount of research in previously 
unexplored fields of science. Saccharin and food 
irradiation are often mentioned as being some of 
the most tested hazards ever, and the swine flu case 
generated new and far better understanding of GBS 
— a disease that was previously little understood. 
The SCLB case sparked research concerning gene 
diversity and gene vulnerability. 
Hrudey and Leiss (2003) state that:
'If a hazard is important enough to invoke 
precaution as a justification to prioritise action, 
it must also be important enough to understand 
better'.
This definitely seems to have been the case in these 
four cases.
2.7.4 Why so few false positives?
Given the vast amount of literature raising concerns 
that precautionary and preventive policies lead 
to false positives, it is surprising that so few were 
identified.
Clearly, interpreting scientific literature includes some 
level of subjectivity. Employing the definitions used 
in this study, different researchers might come up 
with slightly different categorisations of the 88 cases 
reviewed and the number of false positives could 
differ from analysis to analysis. But other studies 
might also adopt different definitions. For example, 
some analysts might argue that the concept of a 
false positive includes situations where an agency 
conducts a high-profile investigation, makes a public 
statement or runs an advocacy campaign and this 
results in concerns that lead to unnecessary actions. 
Analysts may also vary in their interpretation of 
the difference between categories such as 'the jury 
is still out' and 'false positive', as well as in terms 
of the types of evidence they review and how they 
value uncertainties. The science informs decisions 
about whether a risk is real or not (does it cross some 
threshold of 'acceptable risk'?). But these are partly 
policy judgements, based on considerations such as 
levels of uncertainty and the economic consequences 
of acting or not acting. 
Similarly, the question of whether a regulation is 
excessive to address a certain risk is a controversial 
and highly subjective question and difficult to 
characterise. For example, in current science-policy 
debates some scientists argue that precautionary 
regulation of phthalates in children's products or 
bisphenol-A (BPA) in items that come into contact 
with food may represent 'over-regulation' based on 
current understanding. Assessing politically defined 
'safe' levels of exposure is incredibly complex given 
the subtle nature of many product-based exposures, 
lack of understanding of cumulative and interactive 
exposures, limited information about exposure 
pathways and human epidemiological data, and 
inadequate understanding about critical windows 
of vulnerability. Given significant uncertainties in 
such cases, a qualitative synthesis that considers the 
totality of the evidence of potential exposure (from 
body burden studies), hazard information, and 
information on potentially safer alternatives, may 
be the soundest approach to science for addressing 
complex risks and sufficient to spur innovation in 
safer materials (Sarewitz, et al., 2010). 
To address concerns about subjectivity, we have 
attempted in this chapter to make our categorisation 
and evaluation as transparent as possible so that 
other researchers can repeat the analysis with these 
or other cases. Given the large number of cases 
examined, however, we feel confident in our core 
findings: that many of the cases identified as false 
positives are in fact 'mistaken false positives' and 
that the number of genuine regulatory false positives 
identified in the literature is small. Cox (2007) and 
Hansen et al. (2007b) discuss this issue in more 
detail. In examining the regulatory landscape, the 
analysis also suggests that common concerns about 
over-regulation are not justified, based on empirical 
evidence. As such, a more nuanced approach to 
policy analysis is needed.
The scarcity of genuine false positives compared 
to the large number of 'mistaken false positives' 
could also be the result of a deliberate strategy in 
risk communication. Several references and leaked 
documents (e.g. Martin, 2003) have shown that 
some regulated parties have consciously recruited 
reputable scientists, media experts and politicians 
to call on if their products are linked to a possible 
hazard. As an automatic response or first barrier of 
defence, these experts are then sent to different news 
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sources to denounce any risk or to manufacture 
uncertainty about the risk, regardless of whether the 
risk is real or not (Barnes and Bero, 1998; Rampton 
and Stauber, 2001; Michaels, 2005). Manufacturing 
doubt, disregarding scientific evidence of risks and 
claiming over-regulation appear to be a deliberate 
strategy for some industry groups and think tanks to 
undermine precautionary decision-making. 
A complementary explanation could be that current 
decision-making processes in public health and 
environmental regulation have focused on minimising 
false positives, which increases the probability of 
false negatives. Shrader-Frechette (1991) argues that 
this preference for false negatives arises because it 
appears to be more consistent with scientific practice. 
Furthermore, many risk assessments and impact 
analyses are conducted by those with a vested 
interest in a particular technology. In such cases, 
Shrader-Frechette argues that assessors typically 
underestimate risk probabilities at least in part because 
it is difficult to identify all hazards and because 
unidentified risks are usually assumed to be zero. 
According to Ozonoff and Boden (1987), institutional 
reasons also explain why agencies tend to favour not 
responding to identified effects. First, acknowledging 
an effect means that the public would expect the 
agency to do something and might even accuse the 
agency of not doing enough about the situation in 
the first place. Second, the solutions to the problem 
often conflict with other interests, such as economic 
development. Third, agencies know that affected 
industries may challenge the agency, accusing it of 
creating hysteria or negatively impacting business 
(Ozonoff and Boden, 1987). 
In addition to the scientific and political reasons 
limiting false positives, several aspects of legal 
and regulatory decision-making in the US and EU, 
such as judicial review or cost-benefit analysis, 
greatly influence the steps that agencies must 
fulfil before taking precautionary actions and how 
much precaution can be applied. The slow pace 
of the regulatory process often precludes swift 
precautionary action on uncertain hazards, unless 
they pose imminent risks of severe harm. The pace 
is determined both by regulatory requirements 
and, especially in the US, by court interpretations of 
federal policies. The regulatory process has become 
more rigid and burdensome since the 1970s, leading 
to the 'ossification' of rule-making (McGarity, 1990).
While avoiding false positives is important, 
we believe that too little attention is being 
paid to avoiding false negatives in regulatory 
decision-making. Decision-makers often worry about 
taking too much precaution but seem to lack similar 
concerns about not taking enough. This tendency 
has developed despite evidence that the costs of 
not taking precautionary action are substantial — 
both economically and socially (e.g. EEA, 2001) and 
despite the many identified benefits of preventive 
regulation with regards to health, safety and 
the environment (Ashford, 1993; Ackerman and 
Heinzerling, 2004). Furthermore, compared to false 
negatives, the impact of false positives may be more 
short term (over-regulation can be quickly caught) 
and affect a relatively small number of actors. 
A decision to act on limited knowledge about a 
hazard may ultimately turn out to have been due to 
a false positive. But if it spurs innovations, stimulates 
new economic forces, and raises awareness about 
sustainability then it may still be judged to have been 
worthwhile. As a result, there is a need to develop 
more nuanced policy analysis methods that give equal 
weight to avoiding both false negatives and false 
positives. Combining a more precautionary approach 
with proper assessment of impacts and alternatives in 
a more flexible management process could minimise 
the number of false positives and negatives and 
maximise society's benefits from false positives.
2.7.5 Lessons learned 
Understanding and learning from past mistakes is 
essential for improving decision-making about public 
health and the environment. Numerous important 
lessons can be learned from each of the false positives 
identified. Some are specific to the case and cannot 
easily be transferred to other risk situations. The focus 
here is on experience that is applicable to other cases 
and can be generalised. These lessons are important 
to avoid both false positives and false negatives. 
Lesson 1: the cases of swine flu and saccharin 
show how important it is to be open and honest 
about disagreement and not suggest that there is 
consensus when there is not. Even though scientists 
and others might think that reaching consensus is 
a goal in itself, disagreement can help provide the 
decision-maker with a broad picture of alternative 
explanations of the science, what is at stake and 
which options and alternatives are available before 
making a decision.
Lesson 2: following on the previous lesson, it is 
important to be transparent about what is known or 
not known and about uncertainties and make sure 
that these are apparent in communication between 
scientists, regulatory authorities, politicians and 
the public. Alternative courses of action should be 
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 Subject Risk category
1 Acid rain (Bast et al., 1994, Wildavsky, 1995) Real risk
2 Acrylamide (Löfstedt, 2003) 'The jury is still out'
3 Aflatoxins (Majone, 2002) Real risk
4 Agent Orange (Milloy, 2001) Real risk
5 Air pollution in the USA (Whelan, 1993) Real risk
6 Alar (Fumento, 1990; Wildavsky, 1995; Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Risk-risk trade-off
7 Amalgam dental fillings (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Unregulated alarm
8 Antibiotics cause breast cancer (Kava et al., 2004) 'The jury is still out'
9 Asbestos in hair dryers (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Unregulated alarm
10 Asbestos in schools (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Real risk
11 BAM (From, 2004) 'The jury is still out'
12 Ban of Coca Cola (Whelan, 1999)  'The jury is still out'
13 Bendectin (Marchant, 2003) Unregulated alarm
14 Benzene in Perrier Water (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Real risk
15 Bovine Somatotropin (bST) (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
16 Breast implants (Fumento, 1996; Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
17 BSE and vCJD (Adams, 2000) 'The jury is still out'
18 Busy streets and childhood cancer (Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
19 Cellular phones (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998; Graham, 2004) 'The jury is still out'
20 Cheeseburgers and Cardiovascular Disease (Kava et al., 2004) Too narrow a definition of risk
21 Chemical Mace (Mazur, 2004) Unregulated alarm
22 Chemicals in cosmetics (Kava et al., 2004) 'The jury is still out'
23 Chlormequat and Cerone (IMV, 2003) 'The jury is still out'
24 Coffee and pancreatic cancer (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Unregulated alarm
Table 2�3 Overview — the 88 case studies claimed to be regulatory false positives
considered with an open mind and limits should not 
be placed on the range of alternatives in advance. 
Lesson 3: the cases of food irradiation and saccharin 
indicate that the availability of options minimises 
the total impact of false positives. An alternatives 
assessment that considers the pros and cons of other 
courses of action (including no action) is critical to 
avoid risk-risk trade-offs. To reduce the potential 
negative impact of committing false positives, 
adequate resources should be made available to 
consider alternative courses of action. In conducting 
assessments attention must be paid to defining 'safer' 
alternatives. 
Lesson 4: particular care is needed when 
introducing a new substance or technology at 
a large scale because of the risk of 'unknown 
unknowns'. In two of the four cases (swine flu 
and Southern leaf corn blight), the precautionary 
action initially taken had unintended consequences 
because of events that could not have been 
anticipated and had severe consequences because of 
its widespread application. 
Lesson 5: initiating and funding research to 
increase understanding and reduce uncertainties 
should supplement other risk-reducing regulatory 
measures and not be seen as a regulatory measure 
in itself. In none of the cases could more scientific 
research have prevented the false positives from 
happening; indeed, in some of the cases too 
much trust was put on the capability of science to 
demonstrate effects. 
Lesson 6: precautionary actions (both necessary 
and unnecessary) can lead to innovation in science, 
policy and technology. Decision-makers should take 
this into consideration when they consider regulating 
a potentially harmful technology and choose 
regulatory measures that can spark innovation even if 
the precautionary action proves unnecessary. 
Lesson 7: it is necessary to be flexible in 
decision-making processes. The decision-making 
process should be designed with re-evaluation as 
a key component, so that decisions can be altered 
in the light of new knowledge. It is also important 
that the regulators are prepared to alter their initial 
decisions about risks. 
In conclusion, the analysis has shown that fear of 
false positives should not be a rationale for avoiding 
precautionary actions where warranted. False 
positives are few and far between as compared to 
false negatives and carefully designed precautionary 
actions can stimulate innovation, even if the risk turns 
out not to be real or as serious as initially feared. 
Overall, the analysis has demonstrated the need for 
new approaches to characterising and preventing 
complex risks that move debate from the 'problem' 
sphere to the 'solutions' sphere (Sarewitz, et al., 2010). 
By learning from the lessons above, more effective 
preventive decisions can be made in the future.
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Table 2�3 Overview — the 88 case studies claimed to be regulatory false positives (cont�)
25 Cyclamates (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
26 DDT and malaria (Wildavsky, 1995; Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Real risk
27 DEHP (Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
28 DES in Beef (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Real risk
29 Destruction of the ozone layer (Bast et al., 1994) Real risk
30 Dioxin (Gough, 1994) Real risk
31 Electric Blankets (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
32 Electromagnetic fields (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
33 Endocrine disrupting chemicals (Maxeiner and Miersch, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
34 Ethylene dibromide (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Risk-risk trade-off
35 Fen-Phen and heart value disease (Milloy, 2001) Real risk
36 Fluoridated water (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Unregulated alarm
37 Food irradiation (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) False positive
38 Formaldehyde (Maxeiner and Miersch, 1998) Real risk
39 Functional food (Marchant and Mossman, 2002) 'The jury is still out'
40 Genetically Modified Organisms (Miller and Conko, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
41 Global warming (Bast et al., 1994; Wildavsky, 1995) Real risk
42 Hair dyes and cancer (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Too narrow a definition of risk
43 Homocysteine causing Atheroschlerosis (Milloy, 2001) Real risk
44 Hormone replacement therapy and breast cancer (Milloy, 2001) Real risk
45 Hypoxia: dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico (Avery, 1999) Real risk
46 Laundry detergents (Mazur, 2004) Unregulated alarm
47 Love Canal (Wildavsky, 1995; Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Real risk
48 4-MBC in sun-lotion (Politiken, 2001) Risk-risk trade-off
49 Mercury in fish (Mazur, 2004) Real risk
50 MMR vaccines (Bate, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
51 Monarch butterfly and Bt corn (Marchant, 2003) 'The jury is still out'
52 Monosodium Glutamate (MSG) (Mazur, 2004) Real risk
53 Nightlights and leukemia (Kava et al., 2004) 'The jury is still out'
54 Nitrilotriacetic acid in detergents (Mazur, 2004) Risk-risk trade-off 
55 Nitrites (Sodium Nitrite) (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Risk-risk trade-off 
56 Nuclear power (Bast et al., 1994; Graham, 2004) Too narrow a definition of risk
57 Oral contraceptive pill scare (Adams, 2000) Real risk
58 Perce in a Harlem School (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
59 Pesticides (Whelan, 1993) Real risk
60 Phenolphthalein (Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
61 Polybrominated biphenyls (Whelan, 1993) 'The jury is still out'
62 Polychlorinated biphenyls (Whelan, 1993) Real risk
63 PVC blood bags and cancer (Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
64 Radon gas in houses poses a health risk (Miloy, 2001) Real risk
65 Red Dye Number 2 (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
66 Saccharin (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) False positive
67 Second hand smoke and breast cancer (Milloy, 2001) Too narrow a definition of risk
68 Second hand smoke and lung cancer (Matthews, 2000) Real risk
69 Second hand smoke causing hearing problems (Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
70 Soda causes esophageal cancer (Kava et al., 2004) 'The jury is still out'
71 Spermicides and birth defects (Mills, 1993) Unregulated alarm
72 Superfund's abandoned hazardous waste sites (Milloy, 2001) Real risk
73 2,4,5-T (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) 'The jury is still out'
74 Taconite pollution (Mazur, 2004) Too narrow a definition of risk
75 Teflon causes health problems in humans (Kava et al., 2004) 'The jury is still out'
76 The 'Cranberry Scare' of 1959 (Wildavsky, 1995; Lieberman and Kwon, 1998; Mazur, 
2004) 
'The jury is still out'
77 The baby bottle scare (Kamrin, 2004) 'The jury is still out'
78 The Dalkon Shield (Milloy, 2001) Unregulated alarm
79 The Peruvian outbreak of cholera (Bate 2001; Milloy, 2001) 'The jury is still out'
80 The Southern leaf corn blight (Lawless, 1977) False positive
81 The swine flu (Marchant, 2003) False positive
82 Three Mile Island (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998; Graham, 2004) Too narrow a definition of risk
83 Times beach, Missouri (Wildavsky, 1995; Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Real risk
84 Toxins in breast milk causing harm to babies (Ross, 2004) Risk-risk trade-off
85 Trichloroethylene (TCE) (Jaeger and Weiss, 1994) Real risk
86 Tris (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Unregulated alarm
87 Video display terminals (Lieberman and Kwon, 1998) Too narrow a definition of risk
88 Water contamination in Sydney (Clancy, 2000) Real risk
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3 Lead in petrol 'makes the mind give 
way'
  
This chapter addresses the widespread use of lead in petrol. It focuses on the period 1925–2005, 
when leaded petrol was first widely marketed in the US and then spread to the rest of the world 
before being gradually phased out from the 1970s. In Europe, the Aarhus Protocol (UNECE, 
1998) initiated the phase-out of leaded petrol in the period 1998–2005. 
The neurotoxic effects of lead were recognised as far back as Roman times. And in 1925, at the 
'one day trial' of leaded petrol in the US, many experts warned of the likely health impacts of 
adding lead to petrol. Yet, despite the availability of an equally effective alcohol additive which 
was assessed by experts to be cleaner, the leaded route to fuel efficiency was chosen in the US 
and then exported to the rest of the world.
For several decades after the introduction of leaded petrol, virtually no independent research was 
carried out and the main source of information was industry and industry-sponsored researchers. 
Not until the 1960s and 1970s did independent scientists from outside this group show, for 
example, that body burdens of lead arising from human activities were not 'normal', as industry 
claimed, but were hundreds of times higher than before the industrial revolution and were 
therefore likely to be harmful.
At its peak in the mid-1970s, leaded petrol released about 200 000 tonnes of lead into the 
atmosphere annually in both the US and Europe. Following the subsequent phase-out, blood 
lead levels in children (the most sensitive group exposed) quickly fell, in line with the decrease 
in air concentrations. The lessons nevertheless remain relevant globally today. Although nearly 
all countries worldwide had phased out leaded petrol by 2012, lead concentrations in soils and 
sediments remain high. Meanwhile, electronic wastes containing lead and other contaminants 
also cause elevated blood lead levels.
Supplementary panel texts focus on the events leading up to the US choice of leaded petrol as 
the primary fuel source in 1925 and more recent accounts of EU policymaking on lead in petrol 
and the road to phase-outs in Germany and the United Kingdom.
(1) Authors would like to thank Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner for their detailed history of the leaded petrol story in Deceit and 
denial: the deadly politics of industrial pollution.
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Dr Yandell Henderson, Professor of Physiology at 
Yale, told the conference that lead was as serious 
a public health menace as infectious diseases. 
He foresaw that: 
'conditions will grow worse so gradually, and 
the development of lead poisoning will come 
on so insidiously ... that leaded petrol will be 
in nearly universal use ... before the public 
and the government awakens to the situation' 
(USPHS, 1925).
3�1 Introduction
There were 50–70 years between Henderson's 
prescient early warning about the long-term, 
low-level poisoning from leaded petrol, when it was 
introduced in 1925, and its phase out in the US and 
then Europe in the 1970s and mid-1980s. This long 
history is rich in lessons about the science, economics, 
 
Box 3�1 Children and lead: health impacts
At high levels of chronic exposure, lead attacks the brain and central nervous system, causing coma, 
convulsions and even death. Children who survive acute lead poisoning are typically left with grossly 
obvious mental retardation and behavioural disruption. At lower levels of exposure that cause no obvious 
symptoms and that were previously considered safe, lead is now known to produce a spectrum of harm 
involving diminished cognition, shortened attention span, disruptive behaviour, dyslexia, attention deficit 
disorder, hypertension, renal impairment, immunotoxicity and toxicity to the reproductive organs. For the 
most part, these effects are permanent and largely untreatable.
The major sources of children's exposure to lead are:
• lead from active industries, such as mining (especially in soils);
• lead-based paints and pigments;
• lead solder in food cans;
• ceramic glazes;
• drinking-water systems with lead solder and lead pipes; 
• lead in products, such as herbal and traditional medicines, folk remedies, cosmetics and toys;
• lead released by incineration of lead-containing waste;
• lead in electronic waste (e-waste);
• lead in the food chain, via contaminated soil;
• lead contamination as a legacy of historical contamination from former mining and industrial sites.
Acute lead poisoning still occurs today and is most common among children in low-income countries and 
marginalised populations or in children living on lead-polluted sites of old lead factories or mines.
Recent research indicates that lead is associated with neurobehavioural damage at concentrations in the 
blood of 5 μg/dl and even lower. There appears to be no threshold level below which lead causes no injury 
to the developing human brain (see Box 3.11). 
The biology of childhood lead poisoning is similar everywhere and the results of lead studies in one country 
are largely relevant to children in other countries.
Source:  WHO, 2010.
and politics of identifying and controlling the hazards 
of toxic substances. 
The focus of this chapter is lead in petrol and its 
damage to children (Box 3.1). However, the even 
longer histories of lead in pots and paints weave in 
and out of the leaded petrol saga, both complicating 
the search for the causes of lead poisoning in 
children, and creating a ubiquitous stock of lead in 
people and their environments that persists today 
in soils, sediments, plants, house dust and old paint. 
Such exposures affect adults too and recent research 
emphasises the increasing evidence linking lead 
with hypertension, heart disease and kidney disease 
(Navas-Acien et al., 2007; EFSA, 2010).
Most of Europe and North America now has lead free 
petrol but the lessons from this chapter are relevant 
for controlling most toxic chemicals. They may 
also be useful for the millions of people, including 
children, who are still exposed to leaded petrol or 
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Box 3�2 Ancient lead poisoning 
Analysis of the Greenland ice core covering the period from 3 000 to 500 years ago — the Greek, Roman, 
Medieval and Renaissance eras — shows that from about 500 B.C. to 300 A.D. lead was present at 
concentrations four times greater than natural values. Greek and Roman lead mining and smelting clearly 
polluted the northern hemisphere long before the industrial revolution, which initiated the modern era of lead 
poisoning from about from 1750 onwards. Cumulative lead fallout to the Greenland ice sheet during those 
eight centuries was as high as 15 % of that caused by use of lead alkyl additives in petrol since the 1930s.
Source:  Hong, Candelone et al., 1994.
other sources of lead, such as from old lead works, 
paint and toys, in many countries of the world. 
3�2 Lead toxicity: some early warnings
The neurotoxic properties of lead were first noted 
during the first century AD by Dioscerides, a 
physician in Nero's army. In his book Materia Medica 
he observed that 'Lead makes the mind give way'. 
Exposure came from the leaded glaze on pots and 
from using lead in winemaking to counteracted 
the harsh acidity of the grapes (lead plates were 
dipped into the wine during fermentation and the 
lead acetate, which is also called 'sugar of lead', 
sweetened the taste). Centuries later, toddlers 
who chewed the leaded paint on cradles, beds and 
verandas found that it tasted like lemon drops.
Lead continued to be used in wine-making and 
epidemics of lead colic were common in Europe and 
the Americas. One of the earliest public health laws 
in the US was passed in 1723 to protect rum drinkers 
from what was called 'the dry gripes'. The law 
banned the use of leaden 'worms' (condensing coils) 
in the distilling process. A penalty of 100 pounds 
was imposed on law breakers, half being distributed 
to the poor and half to the person who informed 
the authorities about the breach of law. This was an 
early attempt to reward and protect 'whistleblowers' 
— an issue taken up in Chapter 24.
In early-18th century England, a severe outbreak 
of colic was reported each autumn in Devon. The 
disease was strictly limited to particular areas while 
neighbouring shires escaped. The physician Sir 
(2)  Such 'shooting the messenger' is well illustrated by Ibsen's play 'An enemy of the people'. The play chronicles the gradual downfall 
of the town physician who discovers pollution in the river caused by the local leather factory: a discovery that is initially welcomed 
by the mayor, the media and the public, but then rejected, as the economic implications for local industry begin to emerge. Many 
public health advocates in similar circumstances to Baker have taken comfort from Ibsen's play, such as Dr Hosakowa of the Chisso 
Company Japan, which polluted Minimata Bay with mercury. He, like Ibsen's Doctor Stockmann, was told to suppress his early 
discovery that sewage from Chisso caused the mercury poisoning (see Chapter 5 on the Minamata disaster).
George Baker identified the source of the epidemic 
as the leaden keys in the millstones used in pressing 
cider apples. His paper to the Royal College of 
Physicians showed that Devonshire cider contained 
lead (Baker, 1768). Rather than receiving praise for 
his incisive work, Baker was condemned by the 
clergy, by mill owners and by fellow physicians: 
cider was Devon's main export. 
Baker suffered the fate of many 'early warning' 
scientists whose inconvenient truths are not 
welcomed by supporters of the status quo (2). 
During his European travels, Benjamin Franklin had 
also noted how long it took for 'useful truths' about 
health hazards to be acted on (Box 3.3). 
The UK pottery manufacturer, Josiah Wedgewood, 
also experienced the long delay between 'useful 
truths' and regulatory actions. He was sufficiently 
moved by accidents and lead poisoning in 
his factories, and concerned about the unfair 
competition that arose from other, less scrupulous, 
employers, that he asked the British government 
to extend the recent Factories Act of 1833 from 
the textiles industries to the potteries industries 
so that he could share a 'level playing field' with 
his competitors. Opposition from other pottery 
manufacturers meant, however, that Wedgewood 
had to wait some 30 years before legal controls on 
lead were established in the Potteries Regulations of 
1867. 
These early warnings about occupational and 
consumer lead toxicity largely went unheeded. The 
use of lead for pots, paints, pipes and toys greatly 
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Box 3�3 The 'useful truths' about lead poisoning in French painters, potters and plumbers
In 1818, Benjamin Franklin, while ambassador to France, described the 'dangles' of wrist drop, and the 
'dry gripes' of stomach aches in painters, potters and plumbers who were widely known to suffer from lead 
poisoning. But he also observed two other trades that suffered similarly but seemed not to be obviously 
exposed to lead: stonecutters and soldiers. Pursuing this puzzle, he found that the stonecutters used lead 
to set metal rails in stone, and that soldiers found part time employment as painters' assistants. This 
provided an early example of the value of detailed job and life exposure histories in identifying occupational 
and environmental hazards.
Franklin concluded: 'this mischievous effect from lead is at least 60 years old; and you will observe with 
concern how long a useful truth may be known and exist, before it is generally received and practiced on' 
(Franklin, 1818).
expanded in the 19th and 20th centuries (Hunter, 
1975), accompanied by widespread lead poisoning 
that could sometimes take years to appear:
'Lead poisoning develops insidiously' often 
years after the exposure, deranging the 
functions and structure of the cells, 'so that 
life is gradually brought to a close by the 
 
Box 3�4  The early poisoning of children by leaded paint, and current poisoning from paint and 
battery plants in Asia
Children face increased risk of lead poisoning compared to adults because they can be exposed during 
pregnancy; they take in more food, drink and air relative to their weight; they have more hands-to-mouth 
activity; and they are more likely to have nutritional deficiencies that can increase lead absorption (WHO, 
2010).
In 1892 an Australian doctor observed the link between the lead-based paints used on porches, verandas, 
and window frames, and lead poisoning in 10 children who chewed the flakes of paint and swallowed the 
dust and chips on the floor where they crawled and played (Gibson, 1904).
In 1914 in the US, the first childhood lead poisoning case was reported with a death from lead poisoning in 
a child who had chewed lead paint from his crib railings (Thomas and Blackfan, 1914).
By 1925 there was much scientific evidence in the US, Europe and elsewhere showing that infants and 
children were poisoned by lead in the paint that they found in their daily environments. But their eventual 
protection from this source of lead came via regulations to protect painters, which led to the widespread 
banning of lead in paint in Europe and Australia between 1909 and the 1930s. 
The US, however, only banned leaded paint for interior surfaces in 1971. As a result, government 
authorities are still dealing with the legacy of lead poisoning in the poorer areas of the US where the 
housing remediation costs, and associated legal cases over who is to pay remediation, still consume much 
time and money. 
Meanwhile, there is still widespread exposure of children to leaded paint in many regions, particularly, 
developing countries. A survey of 10 countries in Asia, Africa, South America and eastern Europe found 
much leaded paint on sale, some with lead levels ranging from 4 000 to nearly 40 000 parts per million 
(ppm), compared to the US recommended limit of 90 ppm (UNEP/WHO, 2010). Moreover, China has 
reported many serious childhood lead poisoning incidents in recent years. 
intervention of disease of organs, such as the 
kidney or nervous system' (Oliver, 1911).
This 'insidious' nature of lead poisoning would 
later be noted by some of the medical experts who 
assessed the likely risks from lead in petrol when 
it was introduced in the 1920s. Children were 
particularly at risk (Box 3.4).
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3�3 Lead in petrol 1922–1925: the 
early warnings of hazards to the 
public
3.3.1 Origins of lead in petrol
Until 1925, the principal source of toxic lead for 
the public was household paint. This changed 
dramatically when General Motors, in second place 
behind Ford Motors in car sales, sought to compete 
with its new higher performance Cadillac. The new 
GM engine had a severe engine 'knock' that arose 
from the premature ignition of the petrol, meaning 
that GM needed to find an anti-knock additive for 
the petrol. Their chief chemist, Thomas Midgely, 
who later invented the CFC chemicals that created 
the hole in the ozone layer, (see EEA, 2001, Ch. 7 
on halocarbons), found an old German patent for 
tetraethyl lead (TEL) and discovered that it could be 
used in petrol to control the engine knock. 
Alternatives to petroleum-based fuel, such as 
ethanol, were available. They were likely to be 
much less profitable, however, especially given the 
family and financial links between GM, the chemical 
company, DuPont, and Standard Oil. Pierre Dupont 
was chair of the GM Board, his brother Irene ran 
DuPont, both had close links with Standard Oil, 
and in 1924 the three companies created the Ethyl 
Corporation of America to produce TEL. 
It was made clear at the outset that the word 'lead' 
was not to be used in the company name or sales 
literature: the little known term, 'ethyl' was used 
instead so as not to alarm the public.
This was an early example of the censoring of 
sensitive words from the discussion of hazards, a 
practice repeated in the other Late lessons from early 
warnings case studies, for example asbestos (EEA, 
2001). For example, the word 'cancer' in the early 
studies of asbestos workers was initially replaced by 
the less well known terms, 'tumour' or 'malignancy', 
at the request of asbestos manufacturers. 
3.3.2 Early warnings of risk and 'authoritative 
assertions' of safety
During World War I, TEL was evaluated for possible 
use as a battlefield weapon. Mansfield Clark, a 
professor of chemistry familiar with this work, 
warned the US Public Health Service (PHS) in 1922 
about the 'serious menace to the public health' that 
would arise from the use of TEL in petrol because 
'on busy thoroughfares it is highly probable that the 
lead oxide dust will remain in the lower stratum.' 
(Mansfield Clark, 1922) 
The Surgeon General of the US Public Health 
Service, Huge Cummings, responded some months 
later by writing to Pierre Dupont, Chair of the 
Board of GM, asking if the public health effects 
of TEL had been taken into account, 'since lead 
poisoning in human beings is of the cumulative type 
resulting frequently from the daily intake of minute 
quantities.' (Needleman, 1997)
Thomas Midgely replied by saying that GM had given 
the question 'very serious consideration ... although 
no actual experimental data has been taken'. However, 
they were confident that 'the average street will 
probably be so free from lead that it will be impossible 
to detect it or its absorption.' (Midgely, 1922)
Midgely's response has parallels in other Late lessons 
from early warnings case studies, including those 
addressing asbestos, CFCs and BSE in Volume 1 
(EEA, 2001). In response to early warnings about 
public health hazards, interested parties often 
make 'authoritative assertions' about the absence 
of risk despite having little or no data to support 
their claims. 'No evidence of harm' is thereby 
mischaracterised as 'evidence of no harm. This 
approach to early warnings of potential harm is still 
common (3).
In order to provide some evidence to back up their 
assertions of safety, GM paid the US government's 
Bureau of Mines to conduct some animal 
experiments, but within tight reporting constraints 
imposed by the Ethyl Corporation. These conditions 
included the replacement of the word 'lead' by 
'ethyl', even in internal correspondence, and the 
submission of draft reports to the Ethyl Corporation 
for their 'comments, criticism and approval' before 
publication. The chief chemist in the Bureau of Mines 
'raised his concerns about this censorship but was 
assured by his director that … it would not be so 
bad if the word lead were omitted as this term is apt 
to prejudice somewhat against its use' (Needleman, 
1997).
(3) For example, there are no studies in children of the potential head cancer hazard of using mobile phones: the early suspicions 
of risk have come from studies in adults only. Yet it is widely asserted that there are no risks to children from the use of mobile 
phones. In 2007, 2009 and 2011 the EEA issued 'early warnings' about the potential hazard of head cancers from mobile phones, 
particularly in younger people. See Chapter 21 on mobile phones.
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Such contractual gagging had already been 
condemned as unprofessional by Yandell 
Henderson, Professor of Physiology at Yale, who 
had turned down an invitation by GM to study 
TEL two years earlier. He was now asked by the 
Bureau of Mines to join their investigation but he 
declined, saying that it was 'extremely unfortunate' 
that the work was being funded by GM as there 
was an 'urgent need for an absolutely unbiased 
investigation'. He was prepared to investigate the 
hazards but only 'on the assumption that so terrible 
a poison as TEL should not be generally introduced 
until absolute proof was available that no danger to 
the public would be involved'. Soon after, his long 
standing contract with the Bureau of Mines was 
terminated, as well as his contract with Standard 
Oil: an early example of the harassment of 'early 
warning' scientists which is repeated in this and 
other chapters. 
Henderson was later to testify against the use of 
TEL in petrol at its 'one day trial' in 1925 (discussed 
below). 
By 1925 industrial production of TEL had been 
under way for nearly two years but within months 
it had caused the dramatic deaths of a dozen or so 
workers and mental illness in many others (Box 3.5).
The news media ran dramatic headlines about 
the TEL deaths: 'Mad gas claims third victim' and 
'Bar Ethyl gas as fifth victim dies' appeared above 
pictures of workers being taken away in straitjackets. 
New York State then banned the sale of leaded 
petrol. This put pressure on the PHS and the TEL 
industry to somehow demonstrate that though 
workers may be at risk, partly because of their 
 
Box 3�5 TEL workers die in the 'house of butterflies'
On Thursday 26 October 1924, Ernest Oelgert, a TEL worker at Standard Oil's Bayway labs in New Jersey, 
began hallucinating and then became extremely paranoid, running round the plant saying that 'three were 
coming at me'. By Saturday he had to be forcibly constrained and taken to the nearest mental hospital 
where he died the next day. 
Over the next five days, four other TEL workers from the plant died and another 35 showed severe 
neurological symptoms of lead poisoning. At the other two TEL workplaces, the DuPont plant at Deepwater, 
New Jersey, and GM's research lab in Dayton, Ohio, at least six other workers had died. 
Despite their declared difficulties in getting the facts out of the companies and the hospitals, The New York 
Times journalists uncovered more than 300 cases of lead poisoning at the Deepwater plant. Workers called 
that TEL plant 'the house of butterflies' as they frequently had hallucinations about insects during their 
bouts of lead poisoning.
'carelessness', or because they 'worked too hard', as 
the factory management claimed, the public would 
not be at risk from TEL in their car fuel. 
Standard Oil had already confidently asserted 
that no 'perils existed in the use of this gas in 
automobiles', even though no evidence had been 
gathered to support that view. 
The day after the fifth employee at their TEL plant 
died, Standard Oil's assertions regarding the safety 
of TEL received support from the Bureau of Mines, 
which published a report showing that animal 
studies indicated no risks to the public from TEL. 
On 1 November 1924, The New York Times (1924) 
ran the headline: 'No peril to public after long 
experiments with motor exhausts'. 
However, the Bureau of Mines report was heavily 
criticised. It was labelled as 'inadequate' by Cecil 
Drinker, editor of the Journal of Industrial Hygiene, 
David Edsall, Dean of Harvard Medical School, and 
others, including the Surgeon General (Drinker, 
1925). They considered that the number of animals 
used was too small and the duration of exposure 
was too short to draw reliable conclusions about 
safety. These are still features of some current 
toxicology that can result in underestimation of 
hazards (see Chapter 26 on science for precautionay 
decision-making). 
Some public health specialists supported the Bureau 
of Mines and the Ethyl Corporation, but again with 
confident assertions rather than robust evidence.
For example, Dr Emery Hayhurst of the Ohio 
Department of Health provided an unsigned 
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editorial in the American Journal of Public Health, 
stating that 'observational evidence' and other 
reports from around the country have 'corroborated 
the statement of complete safety so far as the public 
health has been concerned' (Ethyl Gasoline, 1925). 
Few people knew that, at that time, he was also 
a paid consultant to the Ethyl Corporation and 
advisor to the Bureau of Mines (Hayhurst, 1924).
These 'authoritative assurances' failed to quell 
public and scientific concern. The Surgeon General 
responded to requests for action from public health 
experts, who felt that both the public's health and 
the probity of the PHS were at risk from the TEL 
issue. He organised a high level conference of all 
the key actors, stating that leaded petrol 'is a public 
health question of extreme seriousness … if this 
product is actually causing slow poisoning and 
serious effects of a cumulative nature' (New York 
World, 1925). 
The conference took place in Washington on 24 May 
1925.
3�4 'Progress' or precaution? 
3.4.1 The 'one day trial' of the 'gift of God' 
Every major stakeholder was represented at the 
meeting. Industry opened the debate by making 
four main points: leaded petrol was essential to 
the industrial progress of America; all innovation 
entails risks; the deaths and disabilities caused by 
TEL in the manufacturing plants were due to the 
carelessness of the men in not taking precautions; 
and there was no risk to the public from the different 
exposure conditions in the streets, compared to the 
factories. 
No 'innovation' other than TEL was discussed at the 
meeting, despite the declared intention of the Surgeon 
General to spend two or three days discussing 
alternatives to TEL. The toxicologist Robert Kehoe 
spoke first for industry, citing lack of evidence of risks 
to the public; he was followed by eight other industry 
representatives who took up the morning session.
The public health representatives used the afternoon 
to try to shift the burden of proof back to their 
opponents, arguing that industry needed to show 
that TEL was safe for the public, rather than public 
health scientists needing to show that it was 
dangerous. 
Dr Yandell Henderson, Professor of Physiology at 
Yale, told the conference that lead was as serious 
a public health menace as infectious diseases. 
He foresaw that 'conditions will grow worse so 
gradually, and the development of lead poisoning 
will come on so insidiously ... that leaded petrol 
will be in nearly universal use … before the public 
and the government awakens to the situation' 
(USPHS, 1925). His claims proved to be prescient.
Dr David Edsall, Dean of Harvard Medical School, 
also dismissed the view of industry that 'nobody 
has shown any symptoms of lead poisoning'. 
He went on to say that: 'I cannot escape feeling 
that a hazard is perfectly clearly shown … here 
today, and that it appears to be a hazard of public 
moment, and that the only way it could be said it 
is a safe thing to continue with this hazard would 
be after very careful and prolonged and devoted 
study.' This did not happen until the 1970s.
Edsall was followed by Dr Touart, who had 
treated many of the workers. He too emphasised 
the central issue of the burden and strength of 
evidence: 'It seems to me that ... this ethyl gas is 
under suspicion and therefore should be withheld 
from public consumption until it is conclusively 
shown that it is not poisonous.'
Haven Emerson, Professor of Public Health at 
Columbia University, observed that industry's 
use of deaths as an indicator of hazard was 
unsound: information about functional and mental 
disabilities of those that did not die would also be 
needed. 
However, industry was supported by some of the 
other public health scientists at the meeting. They 
observed that, while there was solid and direct 
evidence of industrial benefits from TEL, evidence 
on health risks to the public was not available. This 
asymmetry between short-term economic benefits 
and long-term health hazards is another continuing 
problem. 
Dr Hayhurst of the Ohio Department of Health 
said that 27 months of public use of leaded petrol 
'should have sufficed to bring out some mishaps 
and poisonings suspected to have been caused by 
TEL'. It had not, so he was prepared to declare that 
leaded petrol was safe.
His position was based on two weak assumptions: 
that existing statistics, collected for other purposes, 
provided reliable evidence of safety from a new 
technology; and that a short, two-year-period after 
first exposure would be enough to uncover any 
new hazards. These assumptions are still common 
in debates on current health hazards. 
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Some public health experts who supported 
industry at the meeting had earlier expressed their 
concerns about the health risks, but only in private. 
Hayhurst, for example, despite being a consultant 
for the Ethyl Corporation, had written to the PHS 
a week before the May meeting expressing the 
concerns that he shared with some of the PHS 
scientists, such as Dr Thompson, who had declared 
that 'lead has no business in the human body ... 
everyone agrees lead is an undesirable hazard and 
the only way to control it is to stop its use by the 
general public'. 
However, Hayhurst continued his letter by noting 
that his scientific judgement was influenced by 
political and economic factors. 'Personally, I can 
quite agree with Dr Thompson's wholesome point 
of view but, still, I am afraid human progress 
cannot go on under such restrictions … if we are 
to survive among the nations. Dr Thompson's 
arguments might also be applied to the thousand 
and one other poisons and hazards which 
characterise our modern civilisation' (Hayhurst, 
1925).
The country's foremost authority on lead, Alice 
Hamilton, told the May meeting that there was 
no way to know how to regulate leaded petrol so 
that it would be safe. 'You may control conditions 
within a factory ... but how can you control the 
whole country?' She later spelled out the dangers 
further, noting that even under the strictest factory 
conditions the use of lead resulted in poisoning, 
sooner or later (Hamilton, 1925).
The meeting seemed to be going the way of 
precaution and public health until Frank Howard, 
first President of the Ethyl Corporation, concluded 
the industry view: 'You have only one problem', 
he told the health scientists, 'is this a public health 
hazard?' Industry, he said, had other problems such 
as ensuring that automobiles and oil played a key 
role in the industrial progress of the nation. 'Our 
continued development of motor fuels is essential 
in our civilisation'. The development of TEL after 
a decade of research was an 'apparent gift of God'. 
What is our duty under these circumstances, he 
asked, 'should we say no: we will not use a material 
(that is) a certain means of saving petrol? Because 
some animals die and some do not die in some 
experiments, shall we give this thing up entirely?'
In a couple of rhetorical sentences he put the 
burden of proof back onto the public health 
scientists to prove that TEL was dangerous. He had 
also put them on the defensive by making them 
appear to be reactionaries who were retarding 
human progress and technological innovation on 
the unproven grounds that there could be public 
hazards.
The meeting ended after less than seven hours. 
The Ethyl Corporation announced that there 
would be a temporary ban on leaded petrol 
sales until a 'blue ribbon committee' of top-level 
scientists set up by the PHS after the meeting had 
studied the issue. 
After the meeting Alice Hamilton thought that 
the direct involvement of the top scientists and 
decision-makers from industry and government 
would produce the right results, especially if 
there was 'a blaze of publicity turned on their 
deliberations'. 
3.4.2 Blue ribbon committee findings
This perceived victory of objective science over 
short-term economic and political interests was 
short lived. The scientific review committee 
was under great time pressure to produce its 
report, so a very limited, seven month, study 
of 252 garage and filling station attendants, 
chauffeurs and factory workers was conducted. 
The committee concluded that 'at present there are 
no good grounds for prohibiting the use of ethyl 
gasoline [petrol] ... provided that its distribution 
and use are controlled by proper regulations'. 
A recommendation from committee member 
Winslow to continue the search for alternatives 
was omitted from the final committee report.
The report included clear caveats, however, stating 
that: 
'Owing to the incompleteness of the data, 
it is not possible to say definitely whether 
exposure to lead dust increases in garages 
when tetraethyl lead is used. It is very 
desirable that these investigations be 
continued ... It remains possible that if the 
use of leaded petrol becomes widespread, 
conditions may arise very different from 
those studied by us which would render its 
use more of a hazard than would appear to 
be the case from this investigation. Longer 
exposure may show that even such slight 
storage of lead as was observed in these 
studies may lead eventually in susceptible 
individuals to recognizable lead poisoning 
or chronic degenerative disease of obvious 
character ... The committee feels this 
investigation must not be allowed to lapse.'
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Panel 3�1 A road not taken: the alcohol alternative to lead in 1925 
Bill Kovarik
The US Geological Service (USGS) and the US navy performed over 2 000 tests on alcohol and petrol 
engines in 1907 and 1908 and concluded that: 'In regard to general cleanliness, such as absence of smoke 
and disagreeable odors, alcohol has many advantages over gasoline or kerosene as a fuel. The exhaust from 
an alcohol engine is never clouded with a black or grayish smoke.' 
USGS continued the comparative tests and later noted that alcohol was 'a more ideal fuel than gasoline' with 
better efficiency despite the high cost'. Others were also experimenting (see Box 1.6).
GM was also interested in long-term security of fuel supplies, as is apparent in an unpublished du Pont study 
drafted by a member of the firm's legal staff. According to the study (Wescott, 1936): 
'…An important special motive for this research [into ethyl alcohol] was General Motors' desire to fortify 
itself against the exhaustion or prohibitive cost of the gasoline supply, which was then believed to be 
impending in about twenty-five years; the thought being that the high compression motors, which 
should be that time have been brought into general use if knocking could be overcome, could more 
advantageously be switched to [ethyl] alcohol.'
The DuPont conclusion is supported by internal memos sent by Midgley. Alcohol was the 'most direct route 
... for converting energy from its source, the sun, into a material that is suitable for a fuel…' he said in one 
internal memo. 
To promote alcohol-blended fuels among automotive and chemical engineers in October 1921, Midgley 
drove a high compression ratio car from Dayton to an October 1921 Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
meeting in Indianapolis using a 30 % alcohol blend in petrol. 'Alcohol has tremendous advantages and minor 
disadvantages,' Midgley told fellow SAE members in a discussion. Advantages included 'clean burning and 
freedom from any carbon deposit... [and] tremendously high compression under which alcohol will operate 
without knocking... Because of the possible high compression, the available horsepower is much greater with 
alcohol than with gasoline.'
'From our cellulose waste products on the farm such as straw, corn-stalks, corn cobs and all similar sorts 
of material we throw away, we can get, by present known methods, enough alcohol to run our automotive 
equipment in the United States,' he said. The catch was that it would cost two dollars per gallon. However, 
other alternatives looked even more problematic — oil shale would not work and benzene from coal would 
only bring in about 20 % of the total fuel need (Midgley, 1921).
Despite their enthusiastic support for alcohol as a 'fuel of the future', Midgley and his boss, Charles Kettering, 
categorically denied the existence of alternatives to TEL once they had begun to invest in TEL production 
facilities:
'So far as science knows at the present time, tetraethyl lead is the only material available which can 
bring about these [antiknock] results, which are of vital importance to the continued economic use by 
the general public of all automotive equipment, and unless a grave and inescapable hazard exists in the 
manufacture of tetraethyl lead, its abandonment cannot be justified' (The New York Times, 7 April 1925).
Information about alternatives could have emerged with more social and scientific force at this critical 
moment in the history of TEL (4). For example, it was widely thought that the May 1925 conference would 
last several days in order to discuss alternatives to TEL: the Surgeon General had declared his intention to do 
so at the opening of the May conference.
A report published but not released by the US Department of Commerce a few days before the May 
conference showed that alternative antiknock additives (mostly ethyl alcohol blends in petrol) were being
(4) 'Ethyl leaded gasoline crashed through the modest defenses of the American public health system of the 1920s not only through 
brute force of industry's political influence over government but also due to the disorganized information resources available to 
public health advocates', particularly regarding the potential for alternatives to TEL (Kovarik, 2003).
Lessons from health hazards | Lead in petrol 'makes the mind give way'
87Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Panel 3�1 A road not taken: the alcohol alternative to lead in 1925 (cont�)
used routinely in two dozen other industrial nations. And anyone familiar with the Midgley papers and 
statements of 1921 and 1922 would see that by 1925 he was contradicting his own published research.
Information about alternatives did not emerge from the 'one day trial' of TEL in 1925, however, except in 
a few statements by public health scientists and hints in the media. No record of any dissent exists, even 
though the industry was now flatly contradicting its own previous research and statements on the alcohol 
alternative. 
In 1933 the US Defence Agency and US navy conducted tests on alternative fuels and found that Ethyl 
leaded petrol and 20 % ethyl alcohol blends in petrol were almost exactly equivalent in terms of brake 
horsepower and useful compression ratios. This report was never published.
Other potential substitutes for tetraethyl lead known to Kettering and the US automotive industry were 
based on the I.G. Farben/BASF Fischer-Tropsche and Bergius processes for making synthetic fuels from 
coal. This was seen as such serious competition to TEL that Standard Oil entered into a 'full marriage' 
agreement with Farben in which Standard agreed to stay out of the world chemical business and Farben 
agreed to stay out of the world fuel business — no matter how World War II progressed (Davis, 2007). 
The wide variety of alternatives and substitutes known in the 1920s and 1930s were forgotten by the 
1960s. Histories of the oil industry omitted any mention of alternatives.
 In 1974, when Thomas Reed of MIT began his ground-breaking investigation of alcohol fuel as an 
alternative to petrol in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, he was unaware of any other similar work before 
him. It was as if, having found in TEL the one solution to the engine knock problem, no other solution — 
and no other history — was necessary. 
Defeating the alcohol competition to leaded petrol
By the mid-1930s, Ethyl leaded petrol succeeded beyond all expectations. Public health crusaders who 
found this troubling still spoke out in political forums but competitors were not allowed to criticise leaded 
petrol in the commercial marketplace. In a restraining order forbidding such criticism, the Federal Trade 
Commission told competitors to stop criticising Ethyl petrol since it 'is entirely safe to the health of 
[motorists] and to the public in general when used as a motor fuel, and is not a narcotic in its effect, 
a poisonous dope, or dangerous to the life or health of a customer, purchaser, user or the general public.' 
(US FTC 1936)
During the 1930s, the few attempts to promote alcohol petrol were met by fierce and unfair competition 
from the Ethyl company, which led to an anti-trust case against Ethyl Corporation in 1937. By then Ethyl 
leaded petrol was used in 70 % or more of American petrol (90 % according to Ethyl's advertising) and in 
all but one major brand — Sunoco. Dealers who cut prices or who used alcohol or benzene in other fuels 
were not allowed to wholesale Ethyl's lead additive. 
'It seems clear that the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation has exercised its dominant control over the use of Ethyl 
fluid substantially to restrain competition by regulating the ability of jobbers to buy and sell petrol treated 
with ethyl fluid and by requiring jobbers and dealers to maintain certain prices and marketing policies', 
a 1937 Department of Justice memo said. Ethyl lost the suit at the Federal District Court level in 1938 and 
at the Supreme Court in 1940. The company was ordered to make the product available to any customer 
who met minimum technical criteria.
Many scientists, businessmen and farmers believed that making fuel from corn and cornstalks would help 
put people back to work and ease the severe problems of the Depression. This movement for alcohol fuels 
became part of a broader campaign for industrial uses for farm crops to help fight the Depression. The 
'farm chemurgy' movement, as it was called, with alcohol fuel as a controversial centrepiece, had grown 
into an unprecedented mixture of agronomy, chemistry and prairie populism. Many felt that the time had 
come to compete directly with the oil industry. 'Try a tankfull — you'll be thankful,' the Agrol brochures 
said. The blend was sold to initial enthusiasm at 2 000 service stations. Although Agrol sold for the same 
price as its 'main competitor', leaded petrol, it cost wholesalers and retailers an extra penny to handle it 
and this cut into their profit. By 1939, the Agrol plant had closed (Hale, 1934; Kovarik, 2003 and 2005).
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The Committee recognised the limitations of its 
small, interim and retrospective study and strongly 
urged the PHS to obtain funds from Congress for 
long-term prospective studies that could follow the 
history of leaded petrol and its consequences that 
were 'not now foreseen'. However, the PHS never 
undertook such research. For the next 40 years all 
studies of TEL were conducted and funded by the 
Ethyl Corporation and GM (Markowitz and Rosner, 
2002).
Shortly after the Surgeon General's committee had 
declared that TEL was safe for general use, in 1926, 
the Public Health Service recommended that the 
allowable concentration of TEL be set at 3 cc per 
gallon. Ethyl quickly agreed to comply, relieving 
the government of any pressure to introduce the 
regulations on lead in petrol that had been called for 
by the expert committee. 
For the next 35 years lead toxicity as a public health 
issue virtually disappeared from sight, while at the 
peak of TEL production some 250 000 tonnes of lead 
were released into the air in the United States every 
year.
3�5 Lead contamination is 'normal and 
safe'
After the Surgeon General's report of 1926 had 
given the go ahead to industry, Robert Kehoe, the 
toxicologist from the University of Cincinnati, who 
had claimed the safety of TEL at the 1925 meeting, 
was cultivated by the TEL industry as the dominant 
authority on lead. C. F. Kettering established a 
laboratory in Cincinnati with an initial gift of 
USD 130 000 from Ethyl, E. I. DuPont and General 
Motors. He had initially asked Kehoe to study the 
worker deaths at the Ethyl plant in Dayton and now 
he asked him to direct the Kettering laboratory. 
Kehoe later also became a corporate officer at GM 
and a consultant to DuPont.
Data on the health effects of TEL were sparse, and 
the only source of funding for research came from 
industry sources. The strong recommendation 
from the Surgeon General's 1926 report that there 
should be publicly funded research on TEL was not 
implemented.
Kehoe's early studies compared lead concentrations 
in workers in direct contact with TEL with men 
in the same plant but who had other jobs. He 
designated this second group as 'unexposed' 
controls. When he found lead in the excreta of his 
so-called unexposed group, he concluded that 
as lead was naturally present in all the workers 
it could not be very harmful to them. The mere 
presence of lead in workers, he argued, could not 
be an indicator of poisoning. 
This view had been vigorously attacked by David 
Edsall, Yandell Henderson and others at the 
Surgeon General's 1925 meeting. They had argued 
that, as potentially all workers in the Dayton plant 
were exposed to TEL fumes, any comparison of 
workers within the plant would be of little value 
as exposed controls would mask the full effects of 
lead. 
Kehoe eventually came to see the merit in his 
critics' assertions: clearly he had chosen the wrong 
control group. To answer his critics he searched for 
an unexposed group in a remote farming village 
outside Mexico City, far removed from industry or 
urban pollution. There he sampled food, utensils 
and the excreta of the residents, which he found 
also contained lead.
This observation of 'natural' lead levels in Mexican 
farmers became the nucleus of Kehoe's position 
 
Box 3�6 Early London buses experiment with alcohol fuels
In 1919 the London General Omnibus Co. also compared petrol with blends of ethyl alcohol and benzene. 
Mileage was about the same, with petrol slightly ahead. 'In all other respects the [alcohol] fuel compared 
favourably with petrol, and exhibited the characteristics of other alcohol mixtures in respect of flexibility, 
absence of knocking and cleanliness' (although it would later emerge that benzene is a dangerous 
carcinogen.) 
The bus experiment also showed that a large-scale switch from petroleum was technically feasible and 
needed in any case to increase security of fuel Contentsies. 'We are fast squandering the oil that has 
been stored in the fuel beds, and it seems so far as our present knowledge takes us that it is to the fuels 
experimented with that we must turn for our salvation,' concluded the omnibus company engineer. 
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Box 3�7 TEL and 'treason' in Germany
In March 1942, Thurman Arnold, a US Assistant Attorney General, told a Senate Committee investigating 
war profiteering that without the leaded petrol from Ethyl, the Nazis could not have flown their planes or 
fuelled their land vehicles so efficiently. The Chairman of the Committee, Harry Truman, called the alliance 
between some American companies and I.G. Farben 'treason'. 
A German memo found after the war supported his view: 'It need not be especially mentioned that without 
TEL the present methods of warfare would be impossible. The fact that since the beginning of the war 
we could produce TEL is entirely due to the circumstances that shortly before the war the Americans had 
provided us with the production plans complete with their know how. It was moreover the first time that 
the Americans had decided to give a licence on this process to a foreign country ... and this only on our 
urgent request to Standard Oil to fulfil our wish' (Davis, 2007).
throughout his career. From this observation 
he concluded that lead in petrol presented no 
danger to the public, making the same mistake in 
argumentation that he had made with the Dayton 
workers. He assumed that general lead contamination 
was 'normal' and therefore 'natural' and harmless at 
those 'low' levels. It was not until the geologist Clair 
Patterson questioned this view some 30 years later 
that this argumentation was successfully challenged: 
'normal' lead exposures in the 20th century were far 
from 'natural' (Patterson, 1965).
The Second World War years saw the economics 
and politics of TEL plumbing new depths. The 
Ethyl Corporation and Standard Oil had continued 
to develop their business links with Hitler's 
Germany which they had begun in the 1930s 
when Ethyl formed the German company Ethyl 
Gemeinschaft and Standard Oil linked up with the 
largest German company, I.G. Farben, one of the 
main corporate supporters of Hitler. This enabled 
them to provide the German war machine with 
the technical ability to improve the fuel efficiency 
of their tanks, lorries and planes by using leaded 
petrol (Box 3.7).
Industry control of both the economic and public 
agenda seemed complete by the 1950s but a new 
perspective was emerging from well outside the 
TEL community, which would soon seriously 
challenge industry's virtual dominance of this 
intellectual terrain. 
Is 'normal' lead contamination really 'harmless'?
In 1965, Kehoe's monopoly on lead data was 
threatened by a geochemist from outside the public 
health debates. Clair Patterson was a research 
associate in geology at the California Institute of 
Technology. His measurements of the isotopic 
ratios of certain minerals convinced him that the 
long-held consensus of geologists that the age of 
the Earth was 3 billion years old was wildly wrong. 
Patterson's studies placed the age of the earth at 
4.5 billion years, a serious challenge to the orthodox 
scientific view. 
His findings were fiercely rejected by believers 
in the conventional paradigm but they were 
eventually confirmed, his sceptics refuted, and the 
geology textbooks revised. 
Patterson uncovered the errors in the conventional 
geological view by employing extraordinary 
measures to avoid contamination while collecting 
and analysing his specimens. As a result his 
measurements were much more accurate than 
those of earlier workers. 
Many scientists would have treated the 
contamination of his reagents as a technical 
annoyance to be overcome and then forgotten. 
To Patterson it was not a nuisance but a clear 
indication of lead contamination from human 
activities, which needed to be further investigated. 
From the depths of the Pacific Ocean he brought 
tuna to the surface with extreme care to avoid 
contamination. He studied pre-iron age mummies 
that had been buried in sandy soil and he sampled 
cores from the Greenland ice pack. By slicing 
the ice cores he was able to date the specimen 
precisely and show the time course of lead in the 
atmosphere.
Patterson and his colleagues showed that 
technological activity had raised modern human 
body lead burdens to levels that were some 
600 times higher than that of our pre-industrial 
ancestors. 
In 1965, in response to an invitation by the editor of 
the Archives of Environmental Health, he submitted a 
long article entitled 'Contaminated and natural lead 
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environments of man'. Kehoe was asked to review 
the manuscript and to decide whether it should be 
published. Kehoe argued for the paper's publication 
so that Patterson could be offered up for demolition. 
'I should let the man, with his obvious faults, speak in 
such a way as to display these faults.' 
He went on: 'The inferences as to the natural human 
body burden of lead are, I think, remarkably naïve. 
It is an example of how wrong one can be in his 
biological postulates and conclusions, when he steps 
into this field, of which he is woefully ignorant, 
and so lacking in any concept of the depth of his 
ignorance that he is not even cautious in drawing 
sweeping conclusions. This bespeaks the brash young 
man, or perhaps the not so young [Patterson was 43 
at the time] passionate supporter of a cause. In either 
case, hardly the mark of the critical investigator. 
It must be faced and demolished, and therefore, 
I welcome its 'public appearance'.' (Kehoe, 1965).
Patterson's Archives of Environmental Health paper 
fundamentally altered the vocabulary of the debate 
over the health effects of lead. He recognised that 
because a certain level of lead was commonplace it 
did not mean it was without harm. He argued that 
the term 'normal' should be replaced by 'typical'. 
'Natural' should be reserved for those concentrations 
of lead that existed in the body or environment before 
contamination by human activities. 
It also showed that the so-called 'unexposed' subjects 
in Kehoe's studies of the Dayton plant workers, or 
his Mexican farmers, were contaminated by lead, 
and this lack of a truly unexposed part of the study 
population would dilute or hide risks of exposure. 
This dilution of risks by background contamination 
is now a much more common problem for public 
health, given the widespread exposures of most 
people to low levels of chemicals and radiations.
The Archives of Environmental Health paper released 
a fusillade of angry responses from orthodox 
toxicologists. Their fury focused on Patterson for 
his hubris in stepping outside his field to talk about 
people instead of rocks, but they also attacked the 
editor of the Archives journal. This is another example 
of 'shooting the messenger' which pervades this and 
most other 'Late Lessons' stories, from John Snow 
and cholera in 1864 (EEA, 2001) to those current 
scientists who publish warnings of hazards about 
climate change, genetically modified organisms and 
electromagnetic fields. 
The controversy over Patterson's paper crystallised 
the opposing views held by him and Kehoe. Those 
who adhered to Kehoe believed that lead poisoning 
occurred only at high doses with obvious signs of 
severe illness. Patterson clearly spelled out the other 
position: elevated levels of lead found in all humans 
were associated with sometimes silent disturbances in 
body chemistry. Perhaps, Patterson argued, everyone 
was poisoned to some extent. 
For the TEL industry, however, much more than 
professional reputation were at stake. A group from 
Ethyl Corporation visited Patterson and tried, in his 
words, to 'buy me out through research support that 
would yield results favourable to their cause.' He 
refused to cooperate (Patterson, 1992).
Following the meeting with Ethyl, his longstanding 
contract with the Public Health Service was not 
renewed, and his substantial contract with the 
American Petroleum Institute was terminated. 
Members of the Board of Trustees at California 
Institute of Technology visited the chairman of 
his department asking that he be fired. Patterson 
responded with a lecture in which he predicted that 
future scientists would show that Ethyl's activities 
were poisoning both the environment and people, 
and that their operations would eventually be shut 
down.
Publicly vilified and professionally threatened, 
Patterson would eventually be recognised by 
the scientific establishment for his extraordinary 
contributions to science. He would win the 
Goldschmidt Medal, the equivalent of the Nobel 
Prize in geochemistry, be elected to the National 
Academy of Sciences, and have both a mountain peak 
in Antarctica and a large asteroid named after him. 
He also provided the main character for a Saul Bellow 
novel (Box 3.8).
3�6 1966: US Congress asks awkward 
questions
In 1966, Senator Edward Muskie, Chairman of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, 
presided over hearings on the future Clean Air Act 
of 1970. He gave considerable attention to the status 
of lead in the air and in petrol. The Surgeon General, 
William Stewart, one of the first to testify, gave 
testimony that revealed the government's concern, 
perhaps for the first time, about the effects of lead 
at low doses, particularly in children and pregnant 
women:
'Existing evidence suggests that certain 
groups in the population may be particularly 
susceptible to lead injury. Children and 
pregnant women constitute two of the most 
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Box 3�8 Saul Bellow and 'zones of incomprehension' in scientists
In The Dean's December, Saul Bellow described Professor Sam Beech, a character easily recognisable as 
Clair Patterson, his friend. 'These scientists were diapered babies when they went public with a cause. But 
Beech somehow inspired respect … He had authoritatively dated the age of the earth, had analysed the 
rocks brought back from the moon.' 
Bellow describes Beech's theories about the relationship between lead and social disorder and the 
chilly reception they received from the orthodoxy. 'Here science, which itself was designed for deeper 
realisation, experienced a singular failure. The genius of these evils was their ability to create zones of 
incomprehension. It was because they were so fully apparent that you couldn't see them' (Bellow, 1982).
important of such groups. Some studies 
have suggested an association between 
lead exposure and the occurrence of mental 
retardation among children' (Needleman, 
2000).
Once again Kehoe was the industry's principal 
witness. Two years earlier he had said that enough 
was known about TEL toxicity to allow the amount 
of TEL to be increased without risk, noting: 'that no 
other hygienic problem in the field of air pollution 
has been investigated so intensively, over such a 
prolonged period of time, and with such positive 
results'. When Muskie pointed out that the Public 
Health Service and others disagreed with Kehoe and 
that many felt that there were unanswered questions 
and a need for more research, Kehoe responded:
'I would simply say that in developing 
information on this subject, I have had a 
greater responsibility than any other persons 
in this country. The evidence at the present 
time is better than it has been at any time 
that this is not a present hazard' (Needleman, 
1998). 
However, Muskie pressed on: 'would it be desirable 
if a substitute for lead in petrol could be found?' 
Kehoe replied: 'There is no evidence that this (TEL) 
has introduced a danger in the field of public health 
… I may say the work of the Kettering Laboratory … 
has established that ... lead is an inevitable element 
in the surface of the earth, in its vegetation, in its 
animal life, and that there is no way in which man 
has ever been able to escape the absorption of lead 
while living on this planet'.
One week later Clair Patterson testified. He began 
by attacking the belief that natural lead cycling and 
human activity contributed about the same amount 
of lead to the environment. About 10 thousand 
tonnes of lead were naturally recycled each year, he 
said, while millions of tonnes were emitted due to 
industrial and transport emissions. Large numbers 
of people are sickened, he believed, as a result of this 
unnatural load, and the brain is the most significant 
target. Patterson attacked the PHS for relying on 
industry data: 
'It is not just a mistake for public health 
agencies to cooperate and collaborate with 
industries in investigating and deciding 
whether public health is endangered; it is a 
direct abrogation and violation of the duties 
and responsibilities of those public health 
organisations. In the past, these bodies have 
acted as though their own activities and 
those of the lead industries in health matters 
were science, and they could be considered 
objectively in that sense. Whether the best 
interests of public health have been served 
by having public health agencies work 
jointly with representatives of the lead alkyl 
industries in evaluating the hazards of lead 
alkyl to public health is a question to be asked 
and answered.' 
Industry had traditionally measured the prevalence 
of lead toxicity by counting deaths, or at least severe 
damage to the brain. Muskie raised the question 
of a larger pool of unrecognised toxic illness, an 
issue that had been first raised at the one day trial 
of leaded petrol in 1925 (Needleman, 2000): 'Is it 
conceivable that there is something different in the 
deleterious effects on health from low-level exposure 
than from more concentrated exposure leading to 
classical lead poisoning?' 
Patterson replied: 'when you expose an organism 
to a toxic substance it responds in a continuum, to 
continuously changing levels of exposure to this 
toxic substance. There is no abrupt change between 
a response and no response. Classical poisoning is 
just one extreme of a whole continuum of responses 
of an organism, human organism, to this toxic 
metal.'
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Muskie's inquiry marked the government's shift 
away from complacency about the hazards of lead. 
His Senate hearings established a new premise: that 
lead poisoning was not only a disease of workers; 
it could be an insidious, silent danger to the public. 
The notion that lead poisoning was an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon was discredited and replaced by 
degrees of disease spanning across a biological 
continuum of 'effects' to 'adverse effects'. The issue 
still dominates current discussions about chemicals, 
radiation and other public health hazards, where 
early 'effects' are often dismissed as having no 
biological or ecological significance. 
3�7 Lead in petrol poisons catalytic 
converters — so it's got to go 
In 1962 GM sold Ethyl and in 1970 GM announced 
that it would begin installing catalytic converters in 
its new models in order to comply with the Clean 
Air Act of 1970. As a result, GM stated, it would 
be necessary to phase out lead in petrol as it was 
poisonous for the platinum in the catalytic converter. 
Apparently, poisoning a technology was more 
important than poisoning people.
To Ethyl's management this was a betrayal and 
they resolved to fight the growing environmental 
movement in the United States. They argued that 
it was fully justified to speak out for this additive, 
which had saved billions of dollars for the American 
economy and helped make the modern automobile 
possible. To combat lead regulation, it formed a 
defence team and called it, with unconscious irony, 
the 'Ethyl Air Conservation Group'. The Group 
was staffed with Ethyl officials and members of the 
Hunton and Williams law firm. Lawrence Blanchard, 
a partner in Hunton and Williams and board member 
of Ethyl, headed the group. 
EPA medical officers continued to push for a 
separate health standard, fearing that if a substitute 
for platinum were discovered sometime in the 
future, lead would return to fuel. In 1973, aware that 
200 000 tonnes of lead were emitted from the exhausts 
of American cars each year, the EPA promulgated a 
regulation phasing down lead content in all petrol. Its 
target was to reduce lead in petrol to 0.5 g/gal within 
five years (Schoenbrod, 1980).
The TEL industry responded by skilfully exploiting 
the growing national anxiety about fuel supplies 
caused by the spike in the price of oil, which had 
reached unprecedented levels by 1973. The EPA 
estimated that the oil penalty from phasing out lead 
was 30 000 barrels per day. Industry's calculations 
were different: on 2 December 1973 a full page 
advertisement appeared in The New York Times 
showing an oil barrel bearing an American flag 
pouring oil down a manhole. Its headline proclaimed 
that removing lead from petrol would have the effect 
of dumping one million barrels of oil a day. 
On 6 December 1973, however, the EPA released the 
final regulations requiring a phased reduction of 
lead in petrol to protect health. Ethyl Corporation 
and DuPont sued in court, arguing that removing 
lead would cost an enormous amount of money and 
crude oil resources; that no one had been poisoned by 
lead in air; and that any effects in humans reported 
at low doses of lead were not adverse health effects. 
The court agreed with industry, setting aside the 
regulations as 'arbitrary and capricious'. 
On appeal, the earlier judgement was overturned 
and the EPA regulations upheld. The court stated 
that 'the regulatory action under this precautionary 
statute [the Clean Air Act] should precede, and 
hopefully prevent, the perceived harm.' Furthermore, 
'in making his policy judgment by assessing risks 
the Administrator is not required to limit his 
consideration to the danger presented by lead 
additives 'in and of themselves'. He may consider 
the cumulative impact of lead additives with other 
sources of human exposure to lead' (Ethyl Corp. v 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1976).
Ethyl, PPG Industries, DuPont, NALCO Chemical 
and the National Petroleum Refiners Association then 
appealed to the Supreme Court, where they lost. 
3�8 Public funding to study lead 
poisoning in children 
In 1970, the US Surgeon General had called for early 
identification of children with 'undue' lead exposure. 
His statement avoided the loaded term 'poisoning' 
but indicated that this was probably more lead 
than a child should have. For the first time since 
1925 significant research funds were allocated from 
Federal sources to study the health impacts of lead 
on children. The industrial monopoly on scientific 
data was drawing to an end. 
Professor Herb Needleman was one of the public 
health scientists who used the recently released 
public funds to research the low-dose effects of lead 
on children's IQ. His seminal paper on the subject 
(Needleman et al., 1979) showed that the higher the 
lead content, the greater the negative impact on IQ. 
His work shifted another paradigm by focusing not 
on the flow of blood through the body but on the 
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Box 3�9 Lead in petrol: 'it's all about economics…'
Late one night after a long day's work on the issue of lead in petrol, Herb Needleman and others from the 
EPA expert committee had dinner at the home of an EPA staffer. After dinner and a liberal amount of red 
wine, Needleman asked Jacobs from DuPont why, with its wealth of excellent research chemists, it had not 
developed a safer petrol additive to replace TEL. In Needleman's words:
'Jacobs, who had matched my intake, told me that their economists had modelled the future sales of leaded 
gasoline and projected that the consumption of gasoline would soon level off, and perhaps decline. Given 
such a projection, the company would not invest USD 100 million in research and development funds. I 
learned a valuable lesson that night: the entire debate about scientific studies, about the health risks for 
children, was merely a shadow play. The real decision had been made by DuPont's economists. Their plan 
was clear: don't budge on TEL and seek medical and environmental arguments to support the choice' 
(Needleman, 2000).
stocks of lead in the bones. His innovation was to 
analyse 'milk' teeth from more than 2 000 infants 
and to correlate their lead content with their later 
development in terms of intelligence and behaviour. 
He observed that the average IQ of this group of 
children fell by 5 points, a shift that was dismissed 
by industry as 'small' and insignificant. This view 
ignored the effect on very large groups of children 
who were at both ends of the normal distribution 
of IQ, i.e. those either severely handicapped or 
exceptionally gifted, whose numbers would be 
doubled and halved respectively (Bellinger and 
Bellinger, 2006)  (5). 
Industry responded to this dramatic observation 
with unprecedented opposition, resorting eventually 
to a character assassination of Needleman.
Needleman later followed up the 1943 Byers 
discovery of the chronic anti-social behaviour 
of children who had 'recovered' from acute lead 
poisoning, confirming the association between 
childhood lead poisoning and anti-social adolescent 
behaviour (Needleman, 1996). Studies have further 
confirmed the link between lead and anti-social 
behaviour (WHO, 2010). 
3�9 1977–1995: the phase down of 
lead in petrol
The EPA published its Air quality criteria for lead 
in December 1977, which stated that lead in air 
and in dust was a significant source of human 
(5) Chapter 23 on costs of inaction provides an illustration of this effect in Figure 23.1.
exposure to lead, and that brain damage could 
occur in individuals with no acute symptoms of 
lead poisoning. The Air Office of EPA used the new 
criteria document to determine a standard for lead 
concentrations in air.
With the new standard in place and the gradual 
retirement of old cars that ran on leaded fuel, air 
lead levels began to fall. In 1977 air concentrations 
in Philadelphia ranged between 1.3 and 1.6 μg/m3, 
whereas by 1980 the concentrations were between 
0.3 and 0.4 μg/m3 (Needleman, 2000). Similar trends 
were observed in most major cities.
Between 1976 and 1980, the amount of lead 
consumed in petrol production dropped by 50 % 
and the blood lead level of the average American 
dropped by 37 %. Furthermore, in its second volume 
of the Air quality criteria for lead the EPA concluded 
that, contrary to the claims of the industry, the 
relationship between petrol production and air lead 
levels was causal. It noted that between 1975 and 
1984 the lead consumed in petrol had decreased 
73 %, while the corresponding composite maximum 
quarterly average of ambient air lead had decreased 
by 71 % (USEPA, 1986). 
In the 1970s the toxic threshold for lead in blood 
was defined as 60 μg/dl. The reduction of blood lead 
levels gradually allowed comparisons with children 
whose background blood lead levels were 1μg/dl or 
less. As a result, effects of lead on children's IQ have 
been found at levels below 10 μg/dl, with most of 
the cognitive impairment seeming to occur at blood 
lead levels as low as 5 μg/dl (Lanphear et al., 2000).
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Box 3�11 Continuous reductions in the 'safe' level of lead 1960–2010
In the 1960s, an elevated paediatric lead level was defined by the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a concentration in whole blood of 
60 μg/dl.
In the 1970s, the level was reduced to 40 μg/dl, and then to 30 μg/dl. In the 1980s, it was reduced to 
25 μg/dl. Most recently, in the early 1990s, the CDC reduced the blood lead level of concern to 10 μg/dl, 
the level that remains in place today (Surkan et al., 2007).
An international pooled analysis of data from seven cohorts showed an increase in blood lead level from 
less than 1 μg/dl to 10 μg/dl was associated with a six IQ point decrement, which is considerably greater 
than the decrement associated with an increase in blood lead level from 10 μg/dl to 20 μg/dl. (Lanphear 
et al., 2005).
In 2004, 16 % of all children worldwide were estimated to have levels above 10 μg/dl (WHO, 2010).
In 2010 the European Food Standards Agency withdrew its support for a provisional tolerable weekly intake 
guideline value on the grounds that it was inadequate to protect against IQ loss (EFSA, 2010).
 
Box 3�10 Lead levels in blood decline
The phasing-out of leaded petrol between 1976 and 1995 was associated with a more than 90 % reduction 
in the mean blood lead concentration (Annest et al., 1983; CDC, 1997; Jones et al., 2009). The percentage 
of children in the United States aged between one and five with blood lead levels greater than or equal to 
10 μg/dl declined from 77.8 % in the late 1970s to 4.4 % in the early 1990s, and the average lead level of 
a child in the United States declined to 1.9 μg/dl between 1999 and 2002 (CDC, 2005). At the same time, 
lead was eliminated from solder used in food cans and new residential paint products (President's Task 
Force, 2000). An estimated gain of 5–6 points in mean population IQ score was associated with the decline 
in mean blood lead concentrations, and this gain in IQ has been calculated to yield an annual economic 
benefit of between USD 100 billion and USD 300 billion in each birth cohort on the US (Grosse et al., 2002).
Similar reports of success in reducing the harm from lead in children level were achieved in Europe and 
elsewhere as they began to phase out lead in petrol.
In a number of rapidly industrialising countries, too, including China, El Salvador, India, Mexico and 
Thailand, declines in blood lead levels have followed the removal of lead from petrol (OECD, 1999; Mathee 
et al., 2006; He et al., 2009). Worldwide, unleaded petrol now accounts for an estimated 99 % of total 
sales. 
 
Source: WHO, 2010.
3�10 The pros and cons of leaded petrol
Leaded petrol was finally completely phased out 
in the US in 1995, seventy years since the 'one day 
trial' in 1925. 
The benefit of taking lead out of petrol exceeded 
the predictions of even the most convinced lead 
advocates. Lead levels in children's and adults' 
blood continued to drop in direct relationship 
to the reduction in lead in petrol. The average 
American child's blood lead level in 1976 was 
13.7 μg/dl. In 1991 it was 3.2 μg/dl and in 2000 it 
was 2.0 μg/dl (WHO, 2010).
The health and other costs of lead damaged 
workers, child bearing women and children 
to the taxpayer, the Health service and to the 
economy have been huge and have persisted 
for decades after the leaded petrol phase out, as 
contamination persists in soils and dusts (Mielke, 
2010). This damage to health has also had large 
economic consequences as outlined in Box 23.1 in 
Chapter 23.
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Panel 3�2 EU policymaking on lead in petrol — a brief summary 
Nigel Haigh (6)
EU policymaking on leaded petrol emerged mainly from the activities of the UK and Germany. In 1971, the 
UK government received advice from its Chief Medical Officer that air lead levels should not be allowed to 
increase above current levels. The government responded by deciding on a phased three-stage reduction in 
petrol's lead content, from 0.84 to 0.4 g/l to be achieved in 1976. This phase down was then delayed and the 
deadline postponed until required by the subsequent EC directive. In the same year the German government 
decided to reduce lead levels but chose a faster programme, which was implemented as planned: 0.4 g/l in 
1972 and 0.15 g/l in 1976. 
In both countries this in initial action arose in response to scientific advice, without much public pressure. 
The more leisurely approach of the UK government was possibly linked to the fact that the largest European 
plant then manufacturing lead additives for petrol was in the United Kingdom. 
In 1971 the UK was not yet a member of the EC and it was Germany's unilateral decision that resulted 
in the EC Commission establishing two committees in 1971 to study the health and technical aspects of 
lead pollution from motor vehicles. The memorandum concluded that although there was no immediate 
danger to public health, it was desirable to prevent an increased lead pollution in air. Increasing car use and 
cross-border sales of petrol by oil refiners therefore warranted EC-wide limits on lead in petrol.
On 10 November 1975, at the European Parliament, the rapporteur of the Environment Committee said 
that the proposed second stage reduction of lead to 0.15 g/l for regular grade had met with insurmountable 
opposition in the Committee because it would have required industry to make substantial investments and 
increased petrol consumption. Since these objections could not be refuted, the Committee preferred to 
require the Commission to postpone the introduction of the second stage. The Committee did, however, 
approve the first stage limit of 0.4 g/l. 
All subsequent discussion in the Council — where decisions then had to be taken unanimously — was 
coloured by the existing German limit of 0.15 g/l. Directive 78/611 therefore had to allow Member States to 
introduce national limits of 0.15 g/l but its main provision was an upper limit of 0.4 g/l.
This example shows how in favourable circumstances a determined Member State can lead its peers despite 
considerable opposition and scientific uncertainty. In doing so, Germany ensured that higher environmental 
standards were achieved more quickly than if the Member States had proceeded at their own pace.
In the United Kingdom in 1981, following the report of a scientific committee on lead and health, chaired 
by Professor Lowther (Lowther, 1980), and of a government working party on lead in petrol (WOPLIP) 
(UK Department of Transport, 1979), the government decided to require petrol's lead content to be limited to 
0.15 g/l, the lowest level that could be required under the Directive. It did not propose lead-free petrol. This 
recommendation followed a major battle within government: the health and environment ministries were 
defeated on the second point by transport, energy and the treasury. 
Then there was a dramatic change in policy. In April 1983 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(1983) recommended that the government initiate negotiations with the European Commission and 
other Member States to secure removal of the lower limit of lead in petrol in Directive 78/611 so that at 
the earliest practicable date all new cars should be required to run on lead-free petrol. The Government 
immediately accepted this recommendation.
Between these two decisions in the UK (1981 and 1983) there was an extraordinary public campaign. A new 
organisation called CLEAR (campaign for lead-free air), supported by a millionaire, provided very effective 
political lobbying and also publicity for the scientific information. It is possible that the Royal Commission 
only decided to look at the issue of lead because of the campaign, although that is not the view of its 
Chairman (Richard Southwood). What can be said with some certainty is that the government only endorsed 
the Commission's conclusions so quickly (within half an hour of publication) because of the campaign and 
because of an imminent general election.
(6) This panel is based on extracts from Haigh (1998).
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Panel 3�2 EU policymaking on lead in petrol — a brief summary (cont�) 
When the first approaches were made to the European Commission in April 1983 the reaction was negative 
but the coincidence that changed the debate was the concern in Germany about forest die-back, partly 
caused by air pollution. Germany realised that to achieve its objective of significant NOX reductions from 
cars, catalytic converters would be required. Since lead poisons catalytic converters, it would have to be 
removed. Germany, together with the Netherlands and Denmark, then supported the UK initiative and 
Directive 85/210 was adopted.
The catalysts for action in the United Kingdom and Germany were similar, but public conscience was 
excited by two quite different issues: public health and death of forests. It is pure chance that they came 
together at the same time and if either had been missing it is quite possible that the directive would not 
have been agreed, or not agreed so quickly. If we are tempted to speculate further, what would have 
happened if someone had invented a lead tolerant catalytic converter?
Science plays a unique and essential role in informing the public and influencing and guiding public opinion 
which is a major determinant of policy. But science itself does not always reach the public at a specific 
point in time when a specific decision is called for. Since we cannot yet claim that there is a European 
public, but only a collection of national and regional publics, the way the policy debate develops under the 
pressure of public opinion, more or less informed by science, is very likely to differ between countries. 
European policymaking is very much about reconciling these differences.
Figure 3�1 Key events which help to explain reduction in lead levels in petrol in Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the EU
Source:  Reprinted with permission from Haigh, 1998.
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Panel 3�3 Lead in petrol: a reflection on the German experience
Hans von Storch et al. (7)
Environmental matters in the early 1970s featured strongly in German politics (Peters, 1980), and 
Germany was the first European country to impose restrictions on the lead content in petrol. From 1972, 
German production and importation of petrol with more than 0.4 g Pb/l was prohibited (down from the 
usual 0.6 g Pb/l), and from 1976 the stricter limit of 0.15 g Pb/1 was imposed. A preliminary analysis 
of newspaper coverage found that the health dangers of leaded petrol entered the German press in the 
1960s. Comparable British articles at that time focused on urban smog. 
Unleaded petrol (0.013 g Pb/1) was introduced in Germany in October 1984. Prohibiting the sale of 
leaded petrol in Germany was not an option because the European Union did not then allow such trade 
restrictions among its members. Instead, Germany introduced tax incentives for unleaded petrol in 
1984, and in 1985 its availability at all German gas stations became mandatory. Enhanced tax incentives 
in 1986 made German unleaded petrol cheaper than the leaded variety, and its market share increased 
steadily. 
In 1985, the EU mandated that by October 1989 super unleaded petrol had to be available for sale in 
all member states, alongside the leaded variety (Council Directive 85/210/EEC). In addition, member 
states were asked to adopt a 0.15 g Pb/1 limit voluntarily. Unleaded petrol was defined as containing 
no more than 0.013 g Pb/1. In 1987, Directive 87/416/EEC emphasised the importance of the 
availability of unleaded petrol for sale in every country. All Member States were then allowed to prohibit 
national production and sales of leaded 92-octane petrol because of damage to public health and the 
environment.
According to Löfgren and Hammar (2000), by 1995, unleaded petrol had conquered over 80 % of the 
market in Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria, but less than 30 % in 
France, Greece and Portugal. Higher leaded petrol prices and the widespread adoption of cars using 
leadaverse catalysts were the two most important factors in reducing the market share of leaded petrol. 
Löfgren and Hammar also note the importance of effectively informing the public that unleaded petrol 
can safely be used with non-catalyst cars. 
Road lead emissions totalled an estimated 31 000 metric tonnes in 1955 in Europe and this nearly 
quadrupled to 119 000 in 1975 with increasing car use. While road transport and petrol consumption 
continued to rise, subsequent petrol lead content regulations nearly halved road lead emissions to 
62 000 tonnes in 1985. As unleaded petrol conquered increasingly higher market shares, road lead 
emissions dropped further to 42 000 tonnes in 1990 and to 19 500 in 1995. 
Overall, favourable terms of competition were experienced by producers of cars with high technical 
standards, who had already gathered experience with catalyst systems on the US market (Hagner, 
2000).
Blood levels in Germany with and without the reduction of lead in petrol
In the 1970s, lead in blood (PbB) values were reaching a level that health officials considered potentially 
harmful for foetuses and small children. To estimate how PbB levels may have developed if regulations of 
the use of lead in petrol had been implemented differently a model based on lead emissions was applied. 
In the case of no or delayed regulations, the model estimates that PbB levels well beyond the critical 
level would have emerged. Thus, the regulation instituted in Germany since the 1970s has reduced 
health hazards significantly.
The macroeconomic costs of the regulation seem to have been insignificant in spite of concerns that they 
would be substantial (Hagner, 2000). In fact, the case of leaded petrol demonstrated the limited utility 
of purportedly objective cost-benefit analyses, as the costs claimed at the time of the regulations turned 
out to be significantly biased, due to the vested interests that supported the analyses.
(7) Adapted from von Storch et al. (2003) with permission from authors.
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Panel 3�3 Lead in petrol: a reflection on the German experience (cont�) 
 
 
 
 
The conclusion of a successful regulation in terms of limiting risks for human health should not downplay 
the consequences of the introduction of tetraethyl lead as an anti-knock additive in petrol, in particular 
since alternatives were known and available already in the 1920s and 1930s (Kitmann, 2000). Heavy 
metals such as lead pose a large-scale and long-term environmental problem as reduced emissions have 
limited influence on accumulations in the soil, which will remain for centuries. The strategy of protecting 
the environment from persistent substances must be based on continuous assessment and precautionary 
principles (Johansson et al., 2001).
Figure 3.2 Scenarios for mean PbB (μg L-1), as derived by the Münster model  
(M, orange, continuous) and for the Germany model (G, blue, dashed)
Note:  Scenario 1 presents an evolution without regulation (i.e. continuing use of 0.6 g/l lead in petrol in Germany, upper 
curves). 
 In scenario 2 no unleaded petrol has been introduced in Germany in 1985 (middle curves).
  In scenario 3, the regulation was instituted in Germany already in 1961 (lower curves). The reconstructed lead levels 
in blood are also given as open (Germany model) and full circles (Münster model).
Source: Helmholtz-Zentrum Geestacht Centre for Material and Coastal Research
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Panel 3�4 The UK experience — expert risk assessments and public campaigns
Erik Millstone
In the United Kingdom, a committee examined the possible dangers of TEL use and submitted their 
report to the Minister of Health in 1930 (Departmental Committee on Ethyl Petrol, 1930). The committee 
received advice from several experts, including Dr Kehoe and US Surgeon General Cummings. 
Cummings had moved from initial concern to the enthusiastic promotion of TEL writing dozens of letters 
touting Ethyl leaded petrol to public health leaders around the world. The fact that Cummings reported 
to Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, whose Gulf Oil Co. had exclusive contracts to distribute Ethyl 
petrol in the south-eastern US, may have had something to do with his enthusiasm. 
The committee concluded that 'the widespread use of Ethyl petrol as a motor fuel for motor vehicles 
would not, in our opinion, increase the proportion of particulate lead in the atmosphere of our streets 
to such an extent as to constitute a risk even to the health of that part of the population which is most 
exposed — namely, police officers on traffic control duty and drivers of motor and other vehicles'. 
Given the assurances from this report, TEL readily came into use in the UK and the rest of Europe.
By the late 1970s there was evidence of high levels of lead exposure in Britain and strengthening 
evidence of the toxicity of lead, even at low levels of exposure. The UK government responded by 
establishing a committee of enquiry. The Lawther report (as it came to be known) reported in 1980 that: 
'We have not been able to come to clear conclusions concerning the effects of small amounts of lead 
on the intelligence, behaviour and performance of children' (Lawther, 1980). That statement was highly 
controversial. It was subsequently repudiated by several members of the committee for having been 
overly timid and was criticised by other lead experts (Rutter, 1983; Bryce-Smith and Stephens, 1980). 
Despite downplaying the dangers of lead in petrol, Lawther nevertheless advised the government and 
industry to reduce emissions of lead into the atmosphere progressively, without explaining why that 
advice was provided. 
The government subsequently tried to represent the report as if it had proved that children's blood lead 
levels were entirely harmless. And British Petroleum and Associated Octel, which produced leaded petrol, 
continued to downplay the toxicity of TEL and atmospheric lead pollution, and the British government 
resisted efforts to reduce the lead concentration in petrol.
In general, scientists adopted a very cautious approach. For example, a report under the auspices of 
the Medical Research Council concluded that: 'While the observed statistical associations detailed in this 
review are consistent with the hypothesis that low-level lead exposure has a small negative effect on 
the performance of children in ability and attainment tests, the limitations of epidemiological studies on 
drawing causal inferences are such that it is not possible to conclude that exposure to lead at current 
urban levels is definitely harmful' (MRC Advisory Group on Lead, 1988).
That approach was marginally modified after the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution pointed 
out in 1983 that: 'We are not aware of any other toxin which is so widely distributed in human and 
animal populations and which is also so universally present at levels that exceed even one tenth of that 
at which clinical signs and symptoms occur' (RCEP, 1983).
The Lawther committee had recommended that if a child was found to have a blood lead level (or PbB) 
above 35 µg/dl then steps should be taken to ascertain the source of exposure, and to reduce them 
(Lawther, 1980). By then, however, evidence of adverse effects below that level was available implying 
a maximum blood lead target significantly below 35 µg/dL (Chishold, 1976; Needleman, 1979). The 
Lawther report also neglected to recommend the establishment of a screening programme to identify 
children with elevated blood lead levels. The committee did, however, recommend that 'There should 
be a programme for the detection of lead in paint coatings accessible to children in areas where a high 
incidence of old lead paint surfaces may be suspected, such as old inner city residential areas.' That 
recommendation was sensible but 30 years later has not yet been properly implemented. 
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Panel 3�4 The UK experience — expert risk assessments and public campaigns (cont�)
When in 1980, the Lawther Committee recommended that, where a child was found to have a PbB level 
above 35 µg/dL, an investigation should be conducted to identify and reduce their sources of exposure, 
it was merely reiterating a policy to which the British government and all other EEC Member States had 
already agreed three years previously. In 1981 the Department of Health went marginally further when it 
advised that any child with a PbB over 30 µg/dL should be followed up (Quinn and Sherlock, 1990). 
In 1982 the UK government shifted its position and set a maximum figure or 'action level' for lead in the 
blood (PbB) at 25 µg/dL. When it did so, that decision was made by reference to the results of a blood lead 
survey rather than toxicological considerations. Surveillance work had indicated that the vast majority of 
the population then had PbB levels below 25 µg/dL, and therefore endorsing that figure as an 'action level' 
necessitated no further remedial action. This exemplifies the British government's practice of not setting 
lead targets until they had already been met.
Throughout the 1980s evidence that lead exerted adverse neurotoxic effects on children at ever lower 
levels of exposure continued to emerge, especially in the US, Greece and Australia. In the UK an influential 
pressure group, CLEAR, pressed the government to ensure that the use of lead as a petrol additive was 
ended. The response of the British authorities to those pressures was the classic tactic of establishing yet 
another investigative committee, this time under the auspices of the Medical Research Council (MRC). 
The question posed by the UK government to the MRC panel was: 'does the evidence on childhood 
neurotoxicity prove that levels of lead in British children are doing them obvious harm?' Implicitly, it set a 
particularly high evidential bar: indicative evidence short of proof would be insufficient. It did not ask: in 
which physiological system(s), and at which lowest level of exposure, are adverse effects detectable? If it 
had asked a question of that sort, a rather different answer would have been obtained. The government 
proposed only to act in the face of compelling evidence rather than, for example, the balance of 
probabilities. 
Eventually, the MRC committee produced two reports. The first one sat resolutely on the fence; it just 
listed several of the important studies, emphasised their methodological limitations and suggested that if 
lead was having an adverse neurological effect on British children, the effect was a small one (MRC, 1984).
By 1988, several further studies had emerged, and the second report (MRC, 1988) focused on those 
recent studies. The committee emphasised many of the methodological limitations of the studies but 
acknowledged that in the intervening four years the evidence had strengthened. It accepted that 'low level 
lead exposure has a small negative effect on the performance of children in ability and attainment tests', 
and so concluded that 'it would be prudent to continue to reduce the environmental lead to which children 
are exposed.' That final remark was an acknowledgement that the levels of lead to which British children 
were then being exposed were unacceptably high, although it was couched in language designed not to 
provoke public anxiety. 
In 1987 the United Kingdom eventually started to facilitate the increasing use of unleaded petrol after 
a preferential tax rate on unleaded fuel was introduced. That policy was adopted to facilitate the use 
of catalytic converters in motor vehicle exhaust systems rather than in response to evidence of lead's 
neurotoxicity. Curiously, official efforts to monitor childhood blood lead levels in British children then came 
to an end, so detailed evidence indicating the beneficial effects of phasing out leaded petrol in the UK have 
been only fragmentarily documented. It remains difficult, moreover, to estimate the proportion of children 
in the United Kingdom with elevated blood lead levels. 
When the preferential tax change was introduced in 1987, the UK was one of the last industrialised 
countries to embrace unleaded petrol. It has been difficult to establish the extent to which the slow 
pace of change could be attributed to the fact that one of the world's main producers of lead tetra-ethyl 
(Associated Octel) was located in the UK. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in the summer of 2010 two 
former senior executives of Octel were convicted of having bribed government officials in Indonesia and 
Iraq to continue allowing the use of tetra ethyl lead as a fuel additive in those countries (Leigh et al., 
2010). 
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Of course, leaded petrol also brought many 
benefits. It improved the energy and fuel efficiency 
of cars and other vehicles, provided thousands 
of jobs and generated much profit for the lead, 
oil and car industries of America, Europe and 
elsewhere. These benefits could, however, have 
been attained by alternative uses of the economic 
capital involved. Indeed, a 10-year phase out of 
leaded petrol at any time since 1925 would have 
encouraged innovators to develop less hazardous 
and perhaps more efficient fuel additives and 
engine designs. Since the early 1900s, such 
innovations have been widely recognised as a 
useful defence against high oil prices and insecure 
oil supplies. 
3�11 European reflections on phasing 
out leaded petrol
Campaigns to take lead out of petrol in other 
countries went through similar phases and 
arguments. Panel 3.1 and Panel 3.3 provide 
European reflections on lead in petrol, focusing on 
the EU, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
In Europe the legacy of leaded petrol and other 
sources of lead, such as old mines and lead shot, 
that can contaminate the food chain via soils and 
water still pose a threat to the neurodevelopmental 
health of some children in Europe (EFSA, 
2010), as well as to wildlife (Mateo et al., 2007; 
Rodriguez-Estival et al., 2012).
Meanwhile, lead in electronic waste is an emerging 
hazard for children in poor countries in Asia and 
Africa, where waste from rich countries is dumped 
(Box 3.12) . 
 
Box 3�12 Lead in electronic waste: an emerging hazard 
With the global proliferation of computers, cellular telephones and other electronic equipment — as well as 
rapid cycles of replacement and obsolescence of these instruments — an enormous amount of electronic 
waste is now generated each year worldwide. Much of this waste — or electronic material near the end of 
its useful life — is shipped to low-income countries where large numbers of workers in both the formal and 
informal sectors separate lead, mercury and other metals from the waste for recovery and recycling. In 
the informal sector, much of the work is performed by children. Elevated lead levels in dust and blood have 
been reported in the communities and the children performing this work (Xia Huo et al., 2007). In 2004, 
16 % of all children worldwide were estimated to have levels above 10 μg/dl (WHO, 2010).
In 2010 the European Food Standards Agency withdrew its support for a provisional tolerable weekly intake 
guideline value on the grounds that it was inadequate to protect against IQ loss (EFSA, 2010).
3�12 Some late but contemporary 
lessons
The lessons from the story of leaded petrol are 
divided into two groups: lessons from the science 
and lessons from the influence of society on 
the science. In addition there are some lessons 
concerning some of the main arguments about the 
epidemiology that are relevant to many current 
controversies and which are therefore discussed 
in Chapter 26 on science for precautionary 
decision-making.
3.12.1 Some general lessons from the science
1. Much of the early evidence on lead poisoning 
came from the high exposures of fit, adult, 
usually male workers. Such findings were widely 
seen as irrelevant to the much lower exposures of 
the public to lead in petrol. However, the public 
can be more vulnerable to low doses of poisons 
because of sub-groups who are more sensitive to 
toxicants than workers, such as children, infants, 
foetuses, the elderly, the sick, pregnant women 
and the immuno-compromised. In addition, the 
public are often exposed for up to 24 hours a day 
and from multiple sources of the same poison via 
several routes e.g. ingestion and skin absorption 
from food, water, dust and consumer products, 
as well as via the inhalation of polluted air. Great 
care must therefore be taken in assuming that 
evidence from highly exposed occupational 
groups, or from low exposures to average 
populations, is not relevant to sensitive public 
groups. 
2. Much reliance was initially placed on evidence 
from mortality, or from short-term (acute) 
poisoning. This can be a poor guide to 
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long-term (chronic) effects on morbidity such as 
neurological or reproductive damage. 
3. Key assumptions that are critical to outcomes of 
harm or its absence were confidently asserted 
rather than demonstrated. For example, the initial 
assumption from the lead industry, in reply to the 
US Surgeon General's query about possible health 
hazards from leaded petrol, was to state that there 
were none, 'although no actual experimental 
data has been taken'. This was an early example 
of assuming that 'no evidence of harm' is the 
same as 'evidence of no harm' when no relevant 
research is available to support that assumption. 
This is a still a common mistake in public health. 
4. Another key assumption was that the intake of 
lead into the body was counteracted by excretion, 
which was sufficient to achieve a harmless 
physiological balance, whereby no, or only 
minimal accumulation of lead in the body would 
take place. This assumption was not supported 
by actual evidence of the absence of lead 
accumulation.
5. Early studies of workers and Mexican 
farmers did not serve as unexposed control 
groups as they too were contaminated with 
lead. When 'unexposed' control groups are 
also contaminated then true risks will be 
underestimated.
6. The first study of consumer risks from lead in 
petrol was too small and short term to detect 
effects other than acute and gross ones and it 
was not followed up by the publicly funded 
longterm monitoring that its authors strongly 
recommended. 
7. Experimental studies in animals documented 
adverse effects of lead from environmentally 
relevant concentrations but this evidence was 
frequently ignored or regarded as irrelevant for 
humans.
8. Extensive scientific debates, sometimes focusing 
on diversionary details, or based on the potential 
for exploiting or even manufacturing scientific 
doubt helped to maintain the impression that 
the adverse health effects of environmental 
lead pollution were unproven. It is often more 
convenient for a hazardous industry to debate 
the science than to discuss options for reducing 
hazards. 
9. It was assumed that there was a threshold 
between biological effects and 'adverse' 
effects. This is still a dominant assumption 
in conventional toxicology despite the 
accumulating evidence that biological effects 
can be critical steps on the way to adverse 
effects, as Patterson pointed out in the 1960s. 
There is usually a biological continuum and 
not a discrete change. This means that action to 
avoid significant biological 'effects' will often 
be needed if we are to prevent, as opposed to 
merely observe, 'adverse effects'.
3.12.2 The influence of society on science
1. For several decades after the introduction 
of leaded petrol in the 1920s, virtually no 
independent research was carried out, and the 
main source of information was industry and 
industry-sponsored researchers. It took more 
independent scientists from outside this group, 
such as Patterson in the 1960s and Needleman 
in the 1970s to show, for example, that 'typical' 
body burdens of lead arising from human 
activities were not 'normal', as industry claimed, 
but were hundreds of times higher than before 
the industrial revolution, and were therefore 
likely to be harmful, especially to the brains of 
children.
2. There is a need for sufficient incentives and 
funds for independent long-term prospective 
monitoring of potential health hazards when 
new technologies are introduced.
3. The established and specific technical and 
economic benefits from leaded petrol, which 
largely accrued to particular and powerful 
minorities, were contrasted to the unproven, 
more general and future health threats to the 
public. This was an unequal contest, which even 
influenced many public health specialists, who 
allowed their appreciation of 'the gift from God', 
as the car industry described leaded petrol, to 
override their scientific concerns about health 
effects.
4. Public health is well served when scientists who 
discover hazards, especially when funded by 
the public, play an active role in disseminating 
both their results and their implications for 
precautionary or preventive action. Alice 
Hamilton, Yandell Henderson, Craig Patterson 
and Herbert Needleman played this role in the 
US leaded petrol story.
5. Each wave of 'early warning' scientists in the 
leaded patrol saga, from Yandall Henderson in 
the 1920s, to Byers in the 1940s, Patterson in the 
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Table 3�1 Key dates
Year Event
2nd century BC First published record of occupational lead poisoning by Nicander.
1695 The count of Württemberg bans lead addition to wine based on Eberhard Gockel's study of lead poisoning in the city of Ulm.
1892 First report of poisoning cases in children from old lead paint.
1920 Leaded paint is banned in Australia and later in Europe.
1921 The octane-boosting property of tetraethyl (TEL) lead is discovered.
1921–1923 Ethanol-based alternative additives are considered by Du Pont and GM but rejected as less profitable than TEL, which goes into production.
1923–1924 Deaths of TEL workers lead to its temporary suspension.
1925 The 'one day trial' of TEL leads to its approval by an expert committee but only under careful monitoring and regulations, which do not take place.
1930–1960s Kehoe and the TEL industry dominate the research field for next 50–60 years asserting that widespread human lead exposures are 'natural' and therefore safe — and that only acute, clinical effects are serious.
1943 Byers and Lord report chronic brain damage and anti-social behaviour in lead-poisoned children 
1965 Patterson reports that current lead exposures are 100 times higher than natural levels and dismisses Kehoes' argument that 'normal' is 'natural'. 
1966 Senator Muskie and US Congress start asking questions about leaded petrol and Patterson asserts the likelihood of no safe threshold with a continuum between effects and adverse effects.
1970 US Clean Air Act comes into force. GM announces the phase out of leaded petrol as it poisons the catalytic converters needed to secure the Act's targets for NOX ,SO2 and other air pollutants. 
1971 UK and Germany begin to reduce permitted levels of lead in petrol.
1973 The US EPA introduces regulations to reduce lead in petrol but is opposed in the courts by industry. 
1976 The EPA wins the court case on appeal.
1977 The EPA recognises the existence of subclinical lead poisoning due to environmental lead exposure.
1979 Needleman and colleagues report dose-related mental deficits in children with background lead exposures.
1983 A European Commission study with lead isotopes in northern Italy demonstrates that petrol additives cause substantial human exposures.
1984 Germany introduces low-lead petrol and other countries follow.
1985 A European Commission directive requires Member States to make unleaded petrol available and lowers the limits of lead permissible in petrol.
1995–2000 Virtually all western Europe only uses lead-free petrol.
2012 Nearly all countries worldwide have phased out leaded petrol. Legacy lead persists in water and soils threatening the neurodevelopmental health of some children. 
1960s and Needleman in the 1980s, had either 
their funding withdrawn, their jobs threatened 
or their characters assassinated. They share 
such experiences with other 'early warning' 
scientists. Such scientists need more support 
from society via recognition for their work, 
help with their defence and legal protection 
against discrimination. This issue is picked up in 
Chapter 24 on protecting early warners and late 
victims. 
6. The concrete record of decision-making by 
industries, scientists and governments need 
to be made publicly available if history is to 
stand a reasonable chance of being understood 
and providing relevant lessons for the future. 
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This usually only occurs many years after the 
relevant events and then only via legal cases for 
compensation. 
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PCE (perchlorethylene, also known as 'perc' or tetrachloroethylene), was used in the production 
of plastic linings for drinking water distribution pipes in the late 1960s and 1970s. This new and 
relatively untested type of distribution pipe was used in over 700 miles of New England's water 
distribution systems. Not until 1976 was it discovered that PCE had been leaching into the water 
from the pipe lining, causing widespread contamination of water supplies that still today require 
continuous remediation.
Before the pipes were put into production there was a substantial amount of scientific information 
available about the potential hazards of PCE. This did not include current concerns about PCE's 
carcinogenicity, teratogenicity and other health consequences of relatively low-level exposure 
upper most among today's concerns, but many early warnings suggested the need for caution in 
introducing PCE-based mains pipe linings.
PCE had been used to treat hookworm and data on side effects were in the literature, while 
later a variety of occupational users were studied, including aircraft workers, small companies 
in countries where biological monitoring was required, and dry-cleaning firms. Several 
environmental studies were also conducted to see if drinking water contaminated with PCE or its 
close relative, TCE (trichloroethylene), was associated with cancer. Results were mixed and the 
chemical industry consistently denied that PCE was a human carcinogen.
This case study explores the early (pre 1970) history researching the toxicity of the chemical. 
It also focuses on the failure of one manufacturer, Johns-Manville Corporation, to recognise the 
warning signals about using a suspected toxic substance. It examines why a new product was 
deployed without thought to the public health consequences and why evidence of the potential 
hazard was ignored.
The science has not been hidden. It has been ineffective in guiding and catalysing action. 
Whether the problem is a failed duty of care or a lack of clarity about what evidence will trigger 
action, the contemporary argument over how to interpret the scientific evidence is irresolvable 
within science itself. There are no overarching criteria from the philosophy of science that can 
dictate a solution.
This chapter also includes two supplementary texts. A panel that analyses the differences 
between the conclusions of risk assessments based on the same data, focusing in particular 
on assessments of PCE and TCE. A further panel describes the opportunities to switch to 
wet-cleaning technologies to reduce the current use of PCE in dry cleaning.
David Ozonoff
4 Too much to swallow: PCE 
contamination of mains water
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Institutions, large and small, make decisions every 
day where a conscious application of foresight could 
prevent a later hazard. Yet such foresight — based 
on existing information — is often absent. 
The present chapter illustrates this with a case 
study on the use of a now ubiquitous chlorinated 
ethylene, PCE (perchlorethylene, also known as 
'perc' or tetrachloroethylene), to produce plastic 
linings for drinking water distribution pipes in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. Those years represented 
a strategic and historical turning point in awareness 
of the importance of environmental carcinogens 
and teratogens (substances causing embryo 
malformations). 
Some public water supplies are still today 
contaminated with PCE and require continuous 
remediation. The use of PCE to apply plastic 
lining to water pipes occurred when there was 
already considerable scientific information about 
the potential hazards it posed. Admittedly, this 
understanding did not include current concerns 
about PCE's carcinogenicity, teratogenicity, and 
other health consequences of exposure to relatively 
low levels of PCE via various exposure routes, 
including water mains, whose public health 
implications remain unresolved. Nevertheless, 
certain clear early warnings suggested the need for 
caution in introducing PCE-lined drinking water 
pipe linings. And the lessons from this early period 
remain applicable to the situation today.
4�1 PCE linings in water mains
A new and relatively untested type of distribution 
pipe, installed in the years 1969–1979, is now known 
to have caused widespread PCE contamination of 
water supplies in the US state of Massachusetts 
(Demond, 1982; MDEE, 1982; Larsen et al., 1983).
Efforts to develop and market the new pipe began 
in the early 1960s when Providence, Rhode Island, 
Water Supply Board officials sought to replace cast 
iron mains in low-flow areas that were troubled 
with colour and taste problems. The Johns-Manville 
Corporation, a manufacturer of asbestos cement 
water mains, experimented with clear plastic linings 
of various kinds. To apply the lining, the plastic 
was dissolved in PCE and the resulting slurry used 
to paint the inside of the pipe. The first trial of 
plastic-lined pipes in 1966 produced water with a 
slight chemical taste and odour, whose origin was 
not revealed by routine water quality tests like pH, 
alkalinity and hardness. In early 1968 Johns-Manville 
delivered a pipe with the new type of clear lining 
to the Providence Water Supply Board for testing. 
It was immediately apparent that air trapped in the 
pipe took on a chemical odour of slight to moderate 
intensity, described as similar to chloroform and 
strongly resembling a commercial dry-cleaning fluid 
used at a local cleaning plant. Conventional water 
tests revealed no taste or odour, although the air in 
the pipe still had a chloroform-like smell.
Further testing showed that under static conditions 
the lining material continued to contribute a very 
slight odour even after substantial volumes of 
water had run through the pipe. Consequently 
a Johns-Manville representative visited the 
Providence Water Supply Board, accompanied by 
two representatives of the company, and they were 
shown first hand that the water retained a slight 
odour of chloroform. At a subsequent visit to inspect 
water samples at a 277-foot pipe with an eight-inch 
diameter that had been installed the previous 
month, neither the company representatives 
nor the water supply chemist detected a similar 
odour. Explaining the discrepancy, company 
representatives argued that the pipe with the odour 
had been kept covered in brown paper and therefore 
not 'cured' completely.
There is no indication that the taste and odour 
incident prompted Johns-Manville to investigate 
the curing process to evaluate whether PCE 
remained in the liner and potentially contaminated 
drinking water. Nor is there any record that tests 
other than routine water quality measures, which 
did not indicate the nature or amount of organic 
contaminants, were ever done on samples from the 
newly developed lined pipe. Not until 1976, when 
over 700 miles of this pipe had been installed in 
New England water distribution systems, was it 
accidentally discovered that PCE had been leaching 
from the pipe lining into the water.
4�2 Foreseeable harm?
The use of PCE in water mains is a classic case 
of deploying a new product without considering 
the public health consequences. In the ensuing 
battle over who should pay for the damage, 
Johns-Manville Corporation argued that it did not 
and could not have known that PCE was a chemical 
of public health concern, whose presence in drinking 
water was certainly inappropriate and probably 
harmful. Much work after 1970 has revealed 
potential adverse effects from environmental 
and occupational exposure to PCE, including 
various cancers, birth defects and autoimmune 
disease. But could this have been foreseen? If 
Lessons from health hazards | Too much to swallow: PCE contamination of mains water
110 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
it was unforeseeable, what factors made it so? 
Alternatively, if it was foreseeable, what factors 
prevented adequate foresight? 
4.2.1 An insight from the early history of PCE
Before examining these questions, the early history 
of chlorinated hydrocarbons provides at least one 
lesson involving PCE. Michael Faraday, now best 
known for his work on electricity but also a great 
chemist (Williams, 1965) created hexachloroethane, 
C2Cl6, the first chlorinated hydrocarbon to be 
synthesised. Heating the mixture produced another 
gas, perchloroethylene, C2Cl4 (PCE). 
Faraday was attracted to chlorine chemistry because 
of a philosophical dispute between his mentor, Sir 
Humphrey Davy, and Antoine Lavoisier, centred on 
reconciling the mechanical character of Newtonian 
mechanics with the notion of free will. Davy and 
Faraday were Kantians and deeply religious, and 
the philosophical stakes were extremely high. This 
resulted in intense disputes with other founders of 
modern chemistry, including Jöns Jacob Berzelius 
and John Dalton (Sharlin, 1966). 
For the purposes of the present study, the key point 
to note from this early period in PCE's history is 
the way that non-scientific concerns can distort 
scientific disputes. Ideology can make it impossible 
for protagonists to reverse a course of action or alter 
a position. But other interests, such as money, market 
share and reputation, can have similar effects.
PCE's infancy was thus characterised by dispute 
and doubt. Of course, disputes and doubts 
are normal in science, particularly when the 
consequences matter. But this has two corollaries. 
The first is that a scientific finding may become 
the subject of dispute and doubt (whether real 
or manufactured to prevent action) because the 
outcome matters to someone with the means to 
challenge the finding and delay action. Conversely, 
the second corollary is that, if nobody cares or 
nobody with means cares, there will be little 
pressure to challenge a scientific finding or explore 
an issue in greater detail. Results of potentially 
great significance in other contexts may fail to 
influence the public health landscape.
4�3 PCE and the chlorinated ethylenes
PCE is one of a closely related group of chemicals 
called chlorinated ethylenes. All the chlorinated 
ethylenes are built on a common chemical backbone, 
Figure 4�1 Chemical structure of chlorinated 
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which consists of two carbon atoms connected by a 
double-bond. This leaves room or 'slots' for four more 
atoms, two on each carbon atom. When all slots are 
occupied by hydrogen atoms, we have the parent 
hydrocarbon, ethylene. As shown in Figure 4.1, 
successively replacing each hydrogen atom with a 
chlorine atom generates vinyl chloride (a known 
human carcinogen), dichloroethylene (DCE), 
trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene 
(PCE).
All of these chemicals are used by the chemical 
industry as 'feedstocks' (i.e. the basic ingredients) for 
plastics or other chemicals. Several are commonly 
used as solvents for degreasing (i.e. cleaning) metal 
parts or in the dry-cleaning industry.
The chlorinated ethylenes trichloroethylene (TCE) 
and perchloroethylene (PCE) were among the 
highest production volume chlorinated solvents 
in the twentieth century, used for everything from 
dry cleaning, metal degreasing and printing to 
medical applications such as anaesthetics (TCE) or 
to kill parasitic worms (PCE). These medical and 
pharmaceutical uses date back almost a century. The 
familiarity and benefits of these substances should 
have alerted us to the fact that exposure to these 
chemicals has biological effects that could also be 
harmful. 
Using PCE to apply plastic resin to the interior of 
water mains is thus just one of many applications. 
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But the use of PCE in close connection with drinking 
water occurred at a time when problems could have 
been foreseen. The early warnings are outlined briefly 
below.
4�4 Discovery of PCE's toxic effects
Despite PCE's current importance, for more than 
a hundred years after its discovery by Faraday it 
saw no significant commercial use. There was little 
literature about PCE or knowledge of its toxic effects 
until the 1920s when it was proposed as a treatment 
for hookworm — parasites of the small intestine that 
cause severe anaemia. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, hookworm disease affected the 
health and vitality of millions of rural poor in the 
United States and elsewhere, stunting children's 
growth and robbing communities of productivity. 
Resulting economic losses were substantial 
(Rosenau, 1935). In the first decade of the twentieth 
century the Rockefeller Foundation undertook a 
massive campaign against hookworm disease in 
the southern regions of the United States using the 
relatively toxic medicine, thymol. Because thymol 
had frequent side effects, there was a continuing 
search for a better agent. One of the first shown to 
be effective was carbon tetrachloride (CCl4), but 
this was less than ideal, leading to the trial of other 
similar compounds, including PCE.
The introduction of PCE as an anthelmintic 
(anti-parasite medication) by Hall and Shillinger 
in 1925 began a process of toxicological evaluation 
of PCE that has continued to the present day. As 
new uses for PCE were found in 1934 (dry cleaning) 
and 1939 (degreasing metals), further studies were 
undertaken to investigate the effects of PCE on those 
exposed to the chemical in these new applications.
This pre-carcinogen literature can conveniently 
be divided into two phases: in the first, from 1925 
until approximately 1940, the main interest was in 
assessing the side effects of a medicine taken by 
mouth for hookworm disease. In the second phase, 
from 1940 to 1970 up to the point where PCE-lined 
pipes were installed, the effects of inhaling PCE 
from use as a dry-cleaning fluid or degreasing agent 
were the principal focus of concern.
4.4.1 Phase I: 1925–1940 (PCE use in treating 
hookworm disease)
When Hall and Shillinger introduced PCE as a 
treatment for hookworm disease in 1925 they first 
tested the substance on dogs: 'The question as to 
the safety of the drug is naturally one of major 
importance …' (Hall and Shillinger, 1925). Three 
of the 55 dogs tested died, even though they had 
received what were believed to be therapeutic doses. 
None of the dogs that died received the largest 
doses and as a result Hall and Shillinger became the 
first of many to comment on potentially significant 
differences in individual susceptibility. 
To test PCE's effects on humans, one of the 
researchers took a 1 cc (one fifth of a teaspoon) 
capsule of PCE after breakfast. That night he 
experienced prompt and complete relaxation of the 
muscles with slight cerebral discomfort. He had 
an unusual dream involving levitation, which he 
believed was due to the effects of the drug.
The dog experiments, self-medication and PCE's 
chemical structure suggested to Hall and Shillinger 
that the drug's safety was comparable to carbon 
tetrachloride (useful in addressing hookworm disease 
but with known toxicity to the liver), causing lesions 
similar to those of chloroform. They recommended 
that PCE be tested under hospital conditions to 
ascertain its possible value in treating hookworm 
patients, with due attention to contraindications 
such as acute or chronic alcoholism, liver disease, 
infections or other debilitating diseases. 
From this modest beginning the use of PCE for 
hookworm disease gradually increased. Additional 
studies suggested that PCE, even in relatively small 
quantities, could have harmful effects on animals 
and people. But because of its effectiveness as an 
anthelmintic, PCE's popularity continued to grow 
and was the subject of several articles (Manson, 
1934; AMA Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry, 
1936; Wright et al., 1937; Fernando et al., 1939). Thus, 
while PCE became a commonly used drug, it was 
not a completely safe one and untoward side effects 
continued to be reported. These included a paper by 
Sandground (1941) on two cases of unconsciousness 
following a normal therapeutic dose. He concluded 
that: 
'While for want of a better drug [these 
cases] should not discourage the use of 
tetrachlorethylene [PCE], they illustrate the 
truth of a remark which the late Dr Maurice 
Hall made to me, to the effect that one cannot 
assume that any anthelmintic is entirely safe 
for human use until there are reliable reports 
on at least a million treatments without any 
untoward effects.'
The number of other severe side effects from using 
PCE as a drug is difficult to estimate, although the 
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question was being considered at the time that the 
PCE-lined pipes were installed (Bwibo, 1969). 
Throughout its use over several decades, PCE 
tended to produce serious detrimental effects on a 
small percentage of those treated. As with the earlier 
dog experiments, the effects were not necessarily 
related to the dosage. The toxicological picture 
that emerges from this early literature is evidence 
of pathologic changes in animals at therapeutic 
doses, together with reported side-effects in 
humans, some of which were extremely serious 
or fatal at doses as small as half a teaspoon 
(2–3 cc). PCE's potentially lethal side-effects 
were tolerated because hookworm disease was 
a major public health problem. There remained 
uncertainties about the degree of absorption of the 
drug in humans and the individual variation in 
susceptibility to its effects. But there was a balance 
to be struck in terms of achieving public health 
goals — a balance not found in newer uses.
4.4.2 Phase II: 1940–1970 (PCE in degreasing 
operations and other industrial uses)
The initial information on PCE's adverse effects 
came from its therapeutic uses and was sufficient to 
arouse concern. Subsequent modes of PCE exposure 
were primarily by inhalation and skin absorption 
rather than ingestion. Investigators soon began to 
look more closely at inhalation in particular and for 
the next three decades much of the study of PCE 
toxicology involved exposure of human volunteers 
and animals to PCE via the air. Chronic exposure 
now joined acute effects as a concern. It is significant 
that the discipline of epidemiology — the systematic 
evaluation of the incidence, distribution and possible 
control of diseases and other factors relating to 
health — was still primitive and did not enter into 
most decisions.
In a general review of dangerous gases and 
vapours, Zernik (1933) noted that Lamson et al. 
(1929) had produced an optimistic assessment of 
PCE's risks but contrasted a report by Beyer and 
Gerbis (1932) of stomach and liver disease ending 
in death after chronic inhalation of a solution 
containing PCE as the main ingredient. The extent 
to which other ingredients might have been 
responsible for this fatal case was not clear but the 
potential hazard of PCE exposure appeared evident 
to the authors.
Dr Alice Hamilton, an industrial health pioneer, 
was among the first to focus on the new uses of 
PCE. Writing in The New England Journal of Medicine 
in 1936, Hamilton cautioned that data on PCE's 
effects on animals might be difficult to apply to 
human exposures. Humans tended to have more 
liver damage and less kidney damage than animals 
exposed to the same substances, she observed. 
Hamilton also emphasised the differences between 
acute clinical poisonings and chronic industrial 
exposures, citing lead and benzene as striking 
examples of the greater damage that can be caused by 
low, chronic exposures compared to large, acute ones. 
In the discussion that followed her paper, a 
Massachusetts physician bemoaned the fact that 
manufacturers were marketing products under trade 
names, with little information for physicians about 
the effects of the chemicals. On this point, Hamilton 
(1936) had observed that:
'This, in my opinion, is a problem for the 
general practitioner since the use of these 
solvents in industry is increasing by leaps 
and bounds each day. I have seen many 
individuals, both male and female, who in 
my opinion were suffering from conditions 
brought about by prolonged exposure or 
exposure under definite circumstances to some 
of these solvents.'
The importance of low-level chronic exposures 
was emphasised again in a general review of the 
pathology of exposure to new volatile solvents, 
published the following year (St George, 1937). 
St George noted that slow, chronic intoxications 
were difficult to recognise and he suggested 
that chemicals could be broken down into other 
compounds or retained in the body. Outlining 
the available information on the toxicity of PCE, 
he described it as a 'relatively new solvent' and 
listed its symptoms on inhalation as nausea, 
giddiness and vomiting with mucous membrane 
irritation, headache and drowsiness. Echoing the 
Massachusetts physician, St George (1937) made a 
special point about warnings: 
'The danger of these solvents should be 
explained to every worker and they should 
be instructed in the preventive measures that 
have been instituted. When these products 
are marketed for household use under trade 
names, etc., detailed instructions should be 
stated on each container, and it is especially 
important to state that the product must 
only be employed in a room with at least one 
window wide open.' 
One of the first to turn his attention directly to 
PCE as an industrial poison was Carpenter (1937). 
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He exposed albino rats and human volunteers 
to PCE vapours at a variety of concentrations. In 
the rat experiments no pathology was evident at 
70 parts per million (ppm) over a 10-week period, 
but at the next highest level, 230 ppm, there was 
evidence of congestion, light granular swelling 
of the kidneys and minimal changes in the liver. 
Carpenter also exposed himself and his colleagues 
to PCE concentrations of 500, 1 000, 2 000 and 
5 000 ppm. All of them could smell PCE at 50 ppm 
in air and this odour threshold was reported by 
many subsequent studies, citing Carpenter. After 
some hours of exposure, subjects noticed increased 
salivation, irritation of the eyes, and tightness in 
the frontal sinuses. One became slightly nauseated 
at an exposure of 500 ppm for two hours, while 
higher levels caused more marked effects of central 
nervous system depression and mucous membrane 
irritation. At the highest levels, exposure could only 
be endured for a few minutes. Carpenter concluded 
that a safe concentration for continuous daily 
exposure probably lay somewhere between 100 ppm 
and 500 ppm, but he stated a more precise statement 
would require additional human experience with 
exposures within this range.
In the 1940s, despite much discussion about the 
hazards of chlorinated solvent use, little original 
work was done, perhaps because of the war effort 
and the pressures of industrial production. However, 
several general reviews (e.g. Lehmann and Flury, 
1943; Sappington, 1943) recounted information 
regarding the use of PCE as a drug and the findings 
of Carpenter (1937) and Barrett et al. (1939).
Morse and Goldberg (1943) affirmed that:
'Nevertheless, both solvents are regarded 
as toxic. There is only one published 
medical research with which we are familiar 
[Carpenter] … This investigation by no means 
clarified the toxicity of perchlorethylene. It 
stated that 50 ppm produced a definite odour 
and concluded that a concentration between 
100 to 500 ppm is considered safe for daily 
exposures not in excess of 40 hours per week. 
This range of 100 to 500 ppm is in need of 
extensive study'. 
They concluded that complaints of headache, nausea 
and dizziness were common among degreaser 
operators even when concentrations were well 
within the generally accepted toxic limit.
Many writers were alarmed by the lack of hard data 
and the misperception that PCE was non-toxic based 
on its therapeutic use. For example, in his 1949 
textbook on industrial toxicology Fairhall noted that 
PCE should not be regarded as harmless; indeed, 
that under certain conditions it was even more toxic 
than carbon tetrachloride, which was recognised as a 
serious industrial hazard. Like other authors before 
him Fairhall called attention to the phenomenon of 
varying individual susceptibility.
In 1952 a major manufacturer of PCE for degreasing 
use, the Dow Chemical Company, began to publish 
reports on the chemical's toxicity. Rowe et al. (1952) 
assessed the toxicity of PCE vapour to laboratory 
animals and its effects on human volunteers, with 
attention primarily focusing on acute effects. Based 
on this analysis, Rowe et al. argued that exposure 
should be limited to an average of 100 ppm and 
should not exceed 200 ppm. They identified 
irritation of the eyes and central nervous system 
depression as the prime toxic effects, and considered 
serious organic injury to be unlikely. 
The following year, however, Coler and Rosmiller 
(1953) reported the effects of PCE exposure 
and toxicity at a small pump-manufacturing 
company where parts covered with grease were 
cleaned with a solvent that consisted of 99 % 
PCE. A physician who examined a 35-year-old 
worker with severe stomach bleeding found 
that he also suffered from severe cirrhosis of the 
liver and ruptured oesophageal varicose veins. 
Two of the patient's co-workers complained of 
malaise, dizziness, light-headedness, headache and 
irritation of the nose. All three had been exposed 
to PCE. Worksite exposure measurements showed 
levels of 200–400 ppm. Subsequent interviews 
with other workers revealed similar complaints, 
including tiredness, and feelings of intoxication 
and hangovers. A few workers reported passing 
out after exposure but said that they recovered 
quickly. One worker reported that his eyes 'did 
not coordinate'. Staggering, stomach aches and 
slowed ability to think and remember were 
among the many complaints. Three of seven 
workers tested had abnormal liver function. The 
authors concluded that the liver toxicity of PCE 
should be investigated more thoroughly rather 
than disregarded. Thus, contemporary clinical 
observations contradicted the Dow studies.
Coler and Rossmiller's concern was echoed by 
Lob (1957) in an article entitled, 'The dangers of 
perchlorethylene'. Lob noted that a toxic industrial 
chemical is often considered harmless until 
experience shows the opposite. He then reviewed 
the animal literature on PCE, remarking that 
experience was meagre and that the conditions in 
which investigations had been conducted were 
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quite varied, meaning that definitive conclusions 
could not be drawn. He also cited the example 
of TCE as evidence that the results from animal 
experimentation could not always be transferred 
easily to humans.
Lob reviewed clinical experience with PCE, 
pointing out that it was also scant but identifying 
ten additional cases of PCE poisoning. One was a 
fatal case, two more were cases of severe chronic 
poisoning with damage to the autonomic nervous 
system, and seven cases were less serious, involving 
symptoms of fatigue, dizziness, vertigo, headache, 
nausea and vomiting, anorexia, insomnia, irritability 
and light cough. The latter symptoms disappeared 
when the workers were removed from exposure.
Meanwhile, experimental toxicology continued 
to address PCE (Friberg et al., 1953) but new 
techniques in animal experimentation were 
beginning to show inconsistent effects. An 
investigation attempting to rank chlorinated 
hydrocarbons according to their liver-damaging 
potential (Plaa et al., 1958) revealed no correlation 
between the dose that caused liver damage and the 
lethal dose in acute exposure experiments.
These concerns spurred further activity in the 1960s 
on the part of the manufacturer, Dow Chemical 
Company. In a series of reports, researchers from 
Dow studied the absorption and excretion of PCE 
in the body (Stewart et al., 1961a and 1961b; Irish, 
1962; Rowe et al., 1963; Stewart et al., 1963; Stewart 
and Dodd, 1964; Stewart et al., 1965; Stewart and 
Erley, 1965; Gehring, 1968; Stewart, 1969). Using 
gas chromatography with infrared spectroscopy 
or electron capture detection, these researchers 
discovered that excretion of PCE from the body took 
an extended time, suggesting that PCE accumulated 
with chronic exposure. The Dow researchers 
noted that acute exposure to PCE might, in fact, 
be a chronic exposure from the body's standpoint 
because of the slow excretion rate. In studying an 
accidental over-exposure, they discovered that liver 
function tests may not become abnormal until two to 
three weeks after exposure.
The Dow researchers also noted that the mistaken 
perception that PCE was relatively non-toxic 
encouraged careless use, which could result in 
poisoning (Irish, 1962). The Dow reports culminated 
in a human exposure experiment (Stewart et al., 
1970), which found an unexpected prevalence 
of light-headedness and abnormal neurological 
results (based on a modified Romberg test) at the 
lowest exposure levels. The Dow authors could not 
interpret this unanticipated finding.
Finally, Smyth and his colleagues (1969) added 
a new and disturbing dimension when they 
investigated the toxicity of 27 industrial chemicals 
given to rats in all possible pairs. Using death as 
the endpoint, they found that most combinations 
showed no tendency to produce lethal effects in 
excess of what would be expected from the additive 
effects of each component separately. Of the nine 
combinations that did deviate significantly from 
this pattern, four of them contained PCE, making 
it the chemical most often associated with causing 
a net effect greater than the sum of the effects of its 
separate components. This strongly suggested that 
PCE could have a potentiating effect on the toxicity 
of other chemicals (and vice versa).
4.4.3 The view from 1970
The 1960s closed with continued reports of 
poisoning from PCE at the workplace, usually 
involving central nervous system depression and 
concomitant liver damage. There was uncertainty 
as to the threshold at which such damage first 
occurred, with some writers considering PCE to 
be more dangerous than conventionally believed. 
During that decade there were significant advances 
in the measurement of PCE and one of its leading 
manufacturers, Dow Chemical, performed 
in-house research that was published in the open 
scientific literature. It was known that individual 
susceptibility to the effects of PCE varied widely and 
that the chemical was excreted very slowly from the 
body, often concentrating there and resulting in a 
chronic, low-level internal exposure. The suspicion 
was also raised that PCE could act together with 
other chemicals to produce a synergistic effect of 
unknown magnitude.
4�5 Implications for PCE use in water 
supply infrastructure
What did all the evidence imply for water suppliers 
contemplating using a product containing PCE?
Leaving aside the acute and chronic effects, there 
was a potential aesthetic concern. In 1968 the 
United States Public Health Service Drinking Water 
Standards stipulated that 'drinking water should 
contain no impurity which would cause offence to 
the sense of sight, taste, or smell'. This was done 
to prevent consumers from seeking alternative but 
less safe sources of water. Public health experts 
might have worried that the new pipes could cause 
a health problem on that basis alone, as a chemical 
odour was an initial concern.
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A review of the medical literature would have 
added to their unease. It showed that there was 
considerable individual variation in responses to 
the chemical, both in the therapeutic environment 
and in the workplace. Some variation was thought 
to be inherent and some due to wide variation 
in the health, diets and exposures of the general 
population. All these factors were known to affect 
the potential toxicity. The fact that extremely serious 
and sometimes fatal side effects were tolerated in 
mass treatment of a population for a serious disease 
such as hookworm would probably have been of 
little relevance to water managers who had no 
interest in purveying an anthelmintic drug through 
the water mains.
Experimental work and occupational experience 
had already shown PCE to be excreted from the 
body very slowly. Like a bathtub in which the 
amount flowing from the tap is greater than that 
draining out, it was plausible that PCE could 
accumulate from constant daily exposure until it 
reached the point where it caused toxic effects in 
some consumers. Using data from Stewart et al. 
(1965) an elimination rate constant of approximately 
25 % (through the lungs) per day can be estimated. 
Regardless of the level of exposure, after about two 
weeks (four to five half-lives of 2.5 days each) the 
level of PCE in the body would have built up to the 
point where the amount eliminated from the body 
would be roughly equal to the amount ingested. 
The final level of PCE would depend on the amount 
ingested each day. 
The maximum level of PCE in water is 100–150 ppm, 
as determined by its solubility. No measurements 
of PCE appear to have been made at the time the 
pipes were installed but assuming a worst case 
concentration of 125 ppm and the ingestion of 
2 litres of water per day implies a constant body 
burden of approximately 1 gram of PCE. That is 
close to the dose used to treat hookworm, which 
had caused serious side effects in some people. For 
lower exposure, there could plausibly be concern 
about an 'internal' exposure to levels which would 
be about four times the daily ingested dose. Concern 
about such chronic exposures runs through the 
literature on chlorinated hydrocarbon solvents from 
Hamilton's 1936 paper onwards.
Public health experts might have been troubled 
by the emerging literature on the inconsistencies 
between the animal and human data, as well as 
inconsistencies in the animal data itself. They might 
also have been concerned about the possibility that 
exposures to other chemicals might heighten the 
toxicity of PCE synergistically. 
Public health experts would have been unlikely 
to view the presence of any PCE in their water 
favourably unless it was unavoidable. This is not 
merely a statement based on hindsight. Public 
health and water managers of that era had been 
concerned for some time with contamination of 
groundwater from surface disposal of hazardous 
wastes like PCE, and the unusual mode of 
contamination in this case was irrelevant. The 
environmental historian Craig Colten (1991) has 
shown that by the early 1950s, 'governmental 
agencies, professional organisations and 
industry-trade associations, drawing on three 
decades of experience, all publicly recognised the 
hazards posed by the surface disposal of liquid 
wastes... By the 1940s, it had become apparent 
that simply protecting a well was insufficient. 
Public-health officials began to take stronger action 
to alter industrial waste-disposal practices and 
thereby prevent the introduction of contaminants 
into the ground.'
Other historians of waste disposal have come to the 
same conclusion: the propensity of wastes, including 
chlorinated solvents, to contaminate groundwater 
was generally understood in the 1940s–1960s 
and measures were advocated to prevent it. Put 
another way, it was understood that contamination 
of drinking water with chlorinated solvents was a 
threat to the quality of the water (Amter and Ross, 
2001). The fact that in this case the solvent entered 
the water from the pipe lining rather than land 
disposal was irrelevant.
4.5.1 Why did Johns-Manville fail to foresee the 
potential harm?
Johns-Manville Corporation (the pipe manufacturer) 
may only have recognised the potential harm of 
PCE with the benefit of 'hindsight'. But the question 
remains as to why the risks were not recognised 
earlier. 
In the best interpretation, it could be argued that 
Johns-Manville was never aware of the problem of 
PCE contamination. Yet, while it is possible that no 
one in this large industrial concern bothered to think 
about or investigate the medical literature on PCE, it 
is quite clear they could have done so. At that point 
they would have had several options, including 
redesigning the product, alerting water managers to 
the potential for contamination from an insufficiently 
'cured' product, or continuing to act as if it was not 
a problem. The company did not even consider or 
worry about the possibility of insufficient curing, and 
once the problem was detected, it denied that there 
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were any health hazards — a necessary position if it 
were to avoid paying damages for a faulty product. 
What is the lesson here? Although there is abundant 
evidence that Johns-Manville wilfully disregarded 
and concealed scientific evidence with respect to its 
principal asbestos products (Ozonoff, 1988), there 
is no such evidence in relation to PCE. Assuming 
that knowledge was not hidden, the proposition 
that Johns-Manville was merely indifferent to these 
dangers is a plausible explanation for its action; 
there are many similar examples involving other 
companies in this period.
The lack of epidemiological evidence would not have 
been a reason to delay action. Epidemiology was in its 
infancy and the requirement that even well accepted 
findings be reconfirmed with epidemiological 
studies was not yet the norm. The available evidence 
mainly circulated in the restricted arena of medical 
specialist literature and the ignorance of most treating 
physicians and workers about what materials they 
were being exposed to further served to keep the 
problem of solvent toxicity off the agenda. This also 
prevented workers, their unions and their advocates 
from entering into the conversation about solvent 
toxicity. If occupational exposures were not on the 
table, water contamination was also unlikely to be 
well recognised in this period.
1970 also marked a turning point in the US from 
minimal federal engagement in workplace and 
 
Panel 4�1 Differences between risk assessments drawn from the same basic data 
 
Christina Rudén
Trichloroethylene, TCE, a relative of PCE, is widely used as a raw material for chemical synthesis, as a 
solvent for cleaning metal parts and in dry cleaning. A review of 29 TCE carcinogenicity risk assessments 
conducted between 1973 and 1997 (Rudén, 2002) explored how differences in the selection, interpretation 
and weighting of primary data affected their differing conclusions. 
Eight of the 10 evaluations that identified a risk for animals but not for humans were conducted by 
international organisations or industry. Contrastingly, eight of the nine assessments that concluded a 
human risk based on animal evidence were conducted by government or academic authors. Rudén (2002) 
observed that this may reflect more risk-averse assessment policies applied by government agencies 
and academia, and a tendency for industry to apply less precautionary criteria. These wide variations in 
conclusions continued even within a narrower period, such as 1995–1996, when the evaluating bodies 
were working from the same available body of knowledge. 
Similarly, as shown in the table below, different risk assessors have reached varying conclusions about PCE.
Conclusions of risk assessments: carcinogenicity, epidemiology, human cancer risk
  No evidence indicating 
carcinogenicity:  
 
human risk not plausible
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity in 
animals: 
 
human risk not plausible 
(animal data not 
considered relevant for 
humans)
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity in 
animals: 
 
plausible human risk 
(based on animal data)
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity 
in animals and in 
epidemiology: 
 
plausible human risk 
(based on a combination 
of animal and 
epidemiological data)
Total number 
of assessments 
1973–1997
6 10 9 4
Assessments 
conducted 
1995–1996
1 1 1 3
Classification of TCE risk in risk assessment reports 1973 and 1997
Note: 'Plausible epidemiological evidence' means that people exposed to TCE have greater prevalence of cancer compared to 
unexposed people.  
'Plausible evidence for carcinogenicity in animals' means that animals exposed to TCE in laboratory experiments have 
an increased incidence of cancer compared to unexposed animals. 
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Panel 4�1 Differences between risk assessments drawn from the same basic data (cont�)
 
 
One important reason why risk assessors differ in their conclusions concerning the size and even the 
nature of risk is that scientific knowledge increases over time. As risk assessments are updated to include 
new data the conclusions may change. This is a time-dependent and natural part of the scientific and 
regulatory process. However, risk assessors may also select different sets of data to support their risk 
assessments and may interpret key studies in different ways.
An example of this is the interpretation of PCE epidemiology (Rudén, 2006). PCE epidemiology was 
considered positive in the risk assessment performed by IARC in 1995 and negative in the ECETOC 
assessment from 1999. The IARC conclusion on epidemiology is based on findings of elevated relative 
risk of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL) in three epidemiological studies: Blair et al. (1990), Spirtas 
et al. (1991) and Anttila et al. (1995). Contrastingly, ECETOC acknowledged the increased incidence of 
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in Spirtas et al. (1991) but assigned little weight to the data since the study 
was initiated because of a priori concerns about lymphatic cancers. ECETOC described the excess of 
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in the Anttila study as not statistically significant. Regarding the Blair study 
ECETOC stated that it did 'not provide results for NHL as a cause of death'. Furthermore, ECETOC 
concluded that there was 'no excess of deaths due to lymphosarcoma or reticulosarcoma in the Ruder 
study (1994) and no excess of deaths due to other lymphatic or hematopoietic cancers'. ECETOC 
concluded that 'available epidemiological studies were either negative or were not sufficient to provide 
evidence of a relationship between exposure to [tetra] and cancer in humans'. The varying interpretations 
in the ECETOC and IARC studies are set out in the table below, which is adapted from Rudén (2006).
 
Various case studies in the first volume of Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001) emphasise that 
such differences are not uncommon in risk assessments. Indeed, as EEA (2008) indicate, this variance in 
interpretations is attracting increasing attention from regulators and policymakers. 
Evidently, evaluators must communicate better about the approach they use to evaluate the strength 
of evidence and scientific uncertainties. Different evaluators must also employ clear and consistent 
terminology. This will help minimise the concerns that arise among risk managers and stakeholders 
when different experts derive different conclusions from the 'same' body of scientific knowledge, or when 
conclusions and uncertainties are communicated using unclear or inconsistent terminology. 
Interpretation of four epidemiological studies regarding non-Hodgkin's lymphoma by  
ECETOC (1999) and IARC (1995b)
ECETOC 1999 IARC 1995
Anttila et al., 1995 Negative (*) Positive
Ruder et al., 1994 Negative Data on non-Hodgkin's lymphoma not reported
Spirtas et al., 1991 Positive (**) Positive
Blair et al., 1990 Negative Positive
(*)  ECETOC described this study as positive on p. 143 ('Anttila et al. reported an excess of NHL...'), and as 
negative on p.136 ('Increased risks...but none was significant').
(**)  Not considered a key study by ECETOC since it was initiated due to a priori concerns about lymphatic cancers. 
Conclusions on the carcinogenicity of PCE
ECETOC (1999) IARC (1995b) ACGIH (1993) MAK (1992)
Conclusions on PCE 
carcinogenicity 
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity in 
animals: 
human risk not 
plausible
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity 
in animals and in 
epidemiology: 
plausible human 
risk (based on a 
combination of animal 
and epidemiological 
data)
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity in 
animals: 
human risk not 
plausible (animal data 
not considered relevant 
for humans)
Plausible evidence 
of carcinogenicity in 
animals:
plausible human risk 
(based on animal 
data)
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environmental concerns to a prominent role. With the 
new attention after 1970 came new concerns about 
contaminating water.
The scientific information on PCE never figured 
in the water mains product design. It was ignored 
or invisible. This suggests that the principal 
reason that Johns-Manville did not care enough 
to examine thoroughly the risks of using PCE was 
that nobody made them care. Industrial firms are 
not people but they nevertheless have interests and 
intentions, which are rarely related to public health 
and environmental concerns. The job of a company 
is to make money for its owners. For Johns-
Manville, PCE water mains represented a means 
of generating profits, with the actual nature of the 
product having secondary importance. In order 
for public health concerns to be brought to the 
forefront, additional mechanisms are needed, most 
notably criminal and civil liability, both of which 
rely on state enforcement of legal rules. Other 
mechanisms are possible, such as moral pressure 
and voluntary industry standards, but they must 
all pass the acid test: are they sufficient to make the 
company care? 
Once a problem has risen to the level where it can 
no longer be ignored (and the ability to ignore a 
problem depends on contextual factors such as 
the state of knowledge, power relations, economic 
considerations and political arrangements), much 
will depend upon a company's assessment of what 
is at stake. High stakes mean the deployment 
of considerable resources — resources more 
at the disposal of large corporations. In such 
circumstances, uncertainty favours the side of 
inaction.
4�6 The view from 2012
The period before 1970 had revealed the outline 
of acute reactions to PCE, and established concern 
about chronic and delayed effects. Not long after 
the Massachusetts pipes were installed, an entirely 
new dimension of PCE toxicology became apparent, 
concerning carcinogenicity, teratogenicity and other 
health effects. 
In the early 1970s it was discovered that the first 
member of the chlorinated ethylene series, vinyl 
chloride monomer, was a human carcinogen (see 
Chapter 8 on vinyl chloride). This immediately 
raised the question as to whether other high-
volume chlorinated ethylenes, primarily 
trichloroethylene (TCE) and PCE, might also be 
carcinogens. By this time PCE was widely used 
in the dry-cleaning industry, exposing workers 
and patrons of dry cleaners, and often producing 
groundwater contamination from improper 
disposal of spent solvent from the numerous small 
firms using it. 
Because of this heightened suspicion, both TCE 
and PCE were tested in animal bioassays for 
carcinogenicity beginning in the mid-1970s (for 
PCE see NCI, 1977; Mennear et al., 1986). Both 
were found to be animal carcinogens, although 
by this time the methodology and validity of 
animal bioassays had become a matter of dispute 
and no finding went unchallenged. Attempts at 
epidemiological verification of PCE's carcinogenicity 
were difficult because of the long latency for cancer, 
lack of exposure information and low statistical 
power of most studies. 
A variety of occupational groups were studied, 
including aircraft workers, small companies 
in countries where biological monitoring was 
required, and dry-cleaning firms. Several 
environmental studies were also conducted to 
see if TCE/PCE-contaminated drinking water was 
associated with cancer. Results were mixed and 
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Panel 4.2 Wet-cleaning technology eliminates PCE use in dry cleaning  
 
Joy Onasch
Massachusetts has designated PCE as a higher hazard substance under the Toxics Use Reduction Act but 
further policy measures could help phase out the solvent, including by encouraging a shift away from dry 
cleaning to wet-cleaning technologies. This shift could be further supported by a more comprehensive 
assistance programme helping convert facilities to professional wet cleaning. As outlined below, the 
electricity and gas savings involved mean that partnerships with utility companies could help create a 
programme with additional depth.
Able to dissolve most organic materials, PCE is the most widely used dry-cleaning solvent in the US. 
The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates that some 85 % of cleaners use PCE as their 
primary solvent. PCE is also a major contributor to contamination at dry-cleaning facilities, mainly due 
to past unsafe handling practices. PCE is reported to be the chemical most widely found in groundwater 
contamination at Superfund sites (TURI, 2007), dry cleaning being one of the main sources.
The concept of wet cleaning in the professional garment care industry has existed for several decades. 
However, it is only in the last 10 years or so that technology has advanced such that 100 % of garments 
can be cleaned using the wet-cleaning system. In 1997, Keoleian et al. recommended in the Journal 
of Cleaner Production that larger cleaners could consider operating mixed mode facilities using both 
dry-cleaning and wet-cleaning equipment. 
Today over 150 dedicated wet cleaners operate in California, a state where PCE is being phased out 
through regulations. California Air Resources Board amendments will over time phase out the use of PCE 
dry-cleaning machines and related equipment by 1 January 2023. Still, the shift to wet cleaning from 
solvent-based cleaning has been slow, especially where regulations phasing out solvent use do not exist. 
Sinsheimer et al. concluded in the Journal of the Air and Waste Management Association in 2007 that 
cleaners they studied in California that switched to professional wet cleaning were able to maintain their 
level of service and customer base while lowering operating costs. They also found that the cleaners were 
able to transition to professional wet cleaning without great difficulty and were highly satisfied with the 
new technology (Sinsheimer et al., 2007).
Onasch (2011) studied a dry cleaning shop in Bellingham, Massachusetts, showing that by becoming a 
dedicated wet cleaner electricity and natural gas use were reduced by as much as 20 % and even water 
use was reduced. For this facility, equipment costs were reduced by USD 500 over 12 months, performance 
costs (claims) were reduced by USD 1 000 over 12 months, operational costs (mainly due to costs of 
detergents) increased by USD 1 069 over 12 months and costs associated with resource use (calculated 
using normalised rates) were reduced by USD 2 318 over 12 months. Together, savings totalled USD 2 749 
over the 12 months of the study. To replace its 
solvent machine, the facility spent approximately 
USD 12 000 (in actual costs, but not factoring in 
discounts and grant monies received). This implies 
that the firm would have realised a return on the 
investment in just under 4.5 years.
With appropriate training and practice the 
personnel at this facility were able to master 
difficult garments and even boasted that wet 
cleaning resulted in 'whiter' whites and brighter 
colours than had been possible via dry cleaning.
Time spent cleaning garments was difficult to 
quantify but with proper training and practice 
total cleaning time could be reduced due to less 
pre-spotting, the ability to simultaneously wash and dry in separate machines (unlike the all-in-one 
traditional dry-cleaning machines) and mastery of the finishing equipment. Indirect benefits of improved 
air quality, reduced liability, elimination of regulatory oversight, and environmentally friendly niche 
marketing should all also factor into the analysis of the professional wet-cleaning system.
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the chemical industry consistently denied that PCE 
was a human carcinogen. In each of the individual 
studies it was possible to find limitations or 
alternative explanations for positive results (and 
for negative ones). With each new iteration, new 
arguments were spun out, sometimes involving 
epidemiology, later involving sophisticated 
toxicological arguments as to why PCE could be 
a carcinogen in rodents but not a carcinogen in 
humans. In this setting it is not surprising that 
scientists could look at exactly the same set of data 
and come to opposing conclusions. 
Christina Rudén's panel on inconsistencies between 
risk assessments of TCE and PCE drawn from the 
same basic data (Panel 4.1) explores these issues 
in more detail. Taken as a whole, however, the 
literature shows a clear and consistent progression 
towards increasing concern about the carcinogenic 
effects of PCE. According to Karstadt (1998):
'Trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene have 
been reviewed by IARC panels several times: 
three times (volumes 20, supplement 7, and 
volume 63) for tetrachloroethylene, four times 
(volumes 11, 20, supplement 7, and volume 63) 
for trichloroethylene. Until the consensus 
meeting that resulted in volume 63 (published 
1995) animal evidence for the two chemicals 
was evaluated as limited and human evidence 
as inadequate; both evaluations were raised in 
volume 63, to sufficient in animals and limited 
in humans. The IARC reviews of those two 
chemicals clearly show the gradual accretion of 
human evidence over the years as well as the 
development of definitive animal data.'
Throughout this period PCE has been on the radar 
screen of the occupational health and environmental 
scientific communities, unlike the period before 
1970. As a result, fairly strict community drinking 
water standards have been established, although 
occupational standards have lagged behind. 
This inconsistency may partly result from the 
combination of a weak labour movement and some 
highly publicised environmental cases involving 
childhood cancer (e.g. Lagakos et al., 1986). 
The problem is no longer invisibility and neglect, 
but intense scrutiny. The chemical industry has 
been active and aggressive in countering new 
information through the strategy of artificially and 
purposefully creating doubt and uncertainty in 
the minds of decision-makers. With this chemical 
now on the cusp of being declared a confirmed 
human carcinogen in some major national markets, 
the industry is essentially buying extra time (and 
creating continuing exposure and disease) by 
this strategy. Thus 40 years after the hard lesson 
of the water mains in Massachusetts, a sound 
precautionary strategy for continued exposure to 
PCE has still not been initiated.
The means used to avoid or promote action today 
are different from those of 1970, employing many 
sophisticated means to create doubt and increase 
uncertainty about the true value of a regulatory 
action. The 1970 context was simpler. Evidence 
was available and not acted on for reasons not 
complicated by complex regulations, the potential 
of lawsuits or the activities of environmental or 
activist organisations. Information about effects 
and exposure was restricted or non-existent and 
available primarily to scientists. The industry felt 
no special need to consult it (although they had 
contributed to it) and apparently did not. It was of 
no interest to them.
During both periods the lesson of this small but 
revealing case study seems clear. Mechanisms 
are needed to force the production, sharing 
and publication of information about exposure 
and effects; normative and legal requirements 
concerning the duty of care of employers and 
manufacturers are also required. Alternatives 
are available, as Joy Onasch's description of 
wet-cleaning technologies (Panel 4.2) illustrates.
Today, continued argument over how to interpret 
the scientific evidence is irresolvable within science 
itself because the same evidence can be interpreted 
differently and there are no overarching criteria from 
the philosophy of science that can force a solution. 
Whether the problem is a failed duty of care or 
a lack of clarity about what evidence will trigger 
action, the history of PCE will continue in the 
future as it has in the past. The science has not 
been hidden. It has been ineffective in guiding and 
catalysing action.
Lessons from health hazards | Too much to swallow: PCE contamination of mains water
121Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Table 4�1 Early warnings and actions
1860 PCE synthesised
1920s–1960s PCE used in the treatment of hookworm
1925 First toxicological evaluation of PCE
1925–1940 Clinical and toxicological evaluation of therapeutic use identified a variety of problems and recognised that the 
responses of different subjects varied 
1940–1970 New uses prompt consideration of inhalation dangers; chronic effects studied (central nervous system depression) 
and new analytical methods brought into play (gas chromatography)
1970–present Discovery that vinyl chloride is a carcinogen prompts controversy and large literature with competing accounts of 
PCE's carcinogenicity
Environmental and occupational standards were promulgated, generating controversy couched in scientific terms. 
PCE figures in lawsuits
Today PCE is regulated in the environmental and occupational environments but controversy continues over where to set 
standards and whether PCE has caused harm in many legal cases
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Minamata disease, which can induce lethal or severely debilitating mental and physical effects, 
was caused by methylmercury-contaminated effluent released into Minamata Bay by Chisso, 
Japan's largest chemical manufacturer. It resulted in widespread suffering among those who 
unknowingly ate the contaminated fish. This chapter documents the story in three phases.
The disease first came to prominence in the 1950s. It was officially identified in 1956 and 
attributed to factory effluent but the government took no action to stop contamination or prohibit 
fish consumption. Chisso knew it was discharging methylmercury and could have known that it 
was the likely active factor but it chose not to collaborate and actively hindered research. The 
government concurred, prioritising industrial growth over public health. In 1968 Chisso stopped 
using the process that caused methylmercury pollution and the Japanese government then 
conceded that methylmercury was the etiologic agent of Minamata disease.
The second part of the story addresses the discovery that methylmercury is transferred across 
the placenta to affect the development of unborn children, resulting in serious mental and 
physical problems in later life. Experts missed this at first because of a medical consensus that 
such transfer across the placenta was impossible.
The third phase focuses on the battle for compensation. Initially, Chisso gave token 'sympathy 
money' under very limited criteria. In 1971 the Japanese government adopted a more generous 
approach but after claims and costs soared a more restrictive definition was introduced in 1977, 
justified by controversial 'expert opinions'. Legal victories for the victims subsequently made the 
government's position untenable and a political solution was reached in 1995–1996. In 2003, the 
'expert opinions' were shown to be flawed and the Supreme Court declared the definition invalid 
in 2004. 
In September 2011 there were 2 273 officially recognised patients. Still, the continuing failure 
to investigate which areas and communities were affected means that the financial settlement's 
geographic and temporal scope is still not properly determined. Alongside deep-seated issues 
with respect to transparency in decision-making and information sharing, this indicates that 
Japan still faces a fundamental democratic deficit in its handling of manmade disasters.
This chapter is followed by three short updates on the effects of mercury poisoning since 
Minamata; on attempts to contain it, including the 2009 global agreement to phase mercury 
out of economic activity; and on the need for better information about contaminant exposures 
to enable policymakers to make informed choices that balance the benefits of fish consumption 
against the assumed adverse effects of low-level methylmercury exposures.
Takashi Yorifuji, Toshihide Tsuda and Masazumi Harada (1)
5 Minamata disease: a challenge for 
democracy and justice
(1) Authors would like to thank Nobuo Miyazawa, Yoichi Tani, Saori Kashima and Sachiko Inoue for helping to prepare the manuscript.
Lessons from health hazards | Minamata disease: a challenge for democracy and justice
125Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
5�1 Introduction
The Minamata disease story is one of blinkered 
awareness by industry and government, of 
inaction, refusal to take evidence seriously, 
insistence on high levels of proof before addressing 
the problem, and delay, delay, delay.
In 1972 scientists, politicians and the public 
were shocked by the presence of two Minamata 
disease patients on the platform at the first global 
environmental conference, held in Stockholm — 
the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Harada, 2004). They were halting 
and unsteady, they struggled to speak. They had 
been poisoned by mercury in their environment.
It took a further thirty-eight years for the first 
session of an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee, also held in Stockholm, in June 
2010, to start developing a global legally binding 
instrument on mercury pollution prevention, 
following the elaboration of a legally binding 
instrument on mercury at the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing 
Council in February 2009.
At the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee's 
opening session, the representative of Japan 
reported that his government wished to host the 
conference at which the global mercury agreement 
would be agreed (UNEP, 2010). He proposed that 
it be called the 'Minamata Convention', indicating 
the international community's resolve to ensure 
that the human health and environmental disaster 
caused by methylmercury in the Bay of Minamata 
would never be repeated (UNEP, 2010). He also 
reported that the Japanese government would 
contribute all it had learnt about reducing the risk 
of mercury (METI, 2010). 
Despite the Japanese government's apparent 
determination, many problems remain unresolved 
in Japan. Key aspects of the disaster are unknown, 
such as the number of Minamata disease sufferers 
and exposed residents, and the area and duration 
Photo: In 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm focused on the Minamata disease. (From the 
left) Dr Noboru Ogino, Mr Tsuginori Hamamoto, Dr Masazumi Harada, Ms Fujie Sakamoto (Shinobu's mother), Ms Shinobu 
Sakamoto, unknown person, and Dr Soubei Togo. Mr Hamamoto and Ms Shinobu Sakamoto are Minamata disease patients.
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(2) Masazumi Harada, co-author of the present chapter, started researching Minamata disease in 1961 and went to Stockholm with the 
Minamata patients in 1972. 
(3) He seems to have played a similar role as that of Peter Stockmann, the mayor in Ibsen's play 'An enemy of the people', where he 
opposed taking action on the public health doctor's report on pollution of the town's spa baths and in favour of suppressing the 
report. The Chisso doctor Hosokawa, whose report on Minamata disease in the Chisso factory cats was also suppressed, drew some 
comfort from reading 'An enemy of the people.'
of exposure. There is not even a consensus on the 
definition of Minamata disease (Ekino et al., 2007), 
making it hard to count the number of Minamata 
disease patients and determine who qualifies 
for compensation. Indeed, the diagnostic criteria 
that the Government has consistently used to 
certify Minamata Disease were judged medically 
invalid by the Japanese Society of Psychiatry 
and Neurology (JSPN) in 1998 (JSPN, 1998) and 
declared invalid by the Supreme Court in 2004 
(McCurry, 2006). Nevertheless, the government has 
not changed the criteria. 
The criteria currently being used to diagnose 
Minamata disease are too strict, meaning that 
even patients with the related neurological 
symptoms lack government accreditation. And 
without government recognition of a Minamata 
disease diagnosis, a patient will not be properly 
compensated. Consequently, in September 
2011 although 2 273 individuals were officially 
recognised as Minamata Disease patients 
(Minamata Disease Museum, 2010), several 
tens of thousands have neurological symptoms 
characteristic of methylmercury poisoning but 
remain formally unrecognised as Minamata disease 
patients (McCurry, 2006; Watts, 2001; Sankei 
Shinbun, 2011; Yorifuji et al., 2013).
Given this continuing conflict and suffering, 
Masazumi Harada (2), has observed that when the 
government of Japan expressed a desire to share 
its experience and expertise, and to name the new 
global convention on mercury phase-out after 
Minamata, it should not merely report its technical 
success in controlling mercury pollution. It should 
also 'report to the world that there still remain 
unsolved problems in Minamata. Not only cases 
of success but also cases of failure can be valuable 
lessons for the world' (Kumamoto Nichinichi 
Shinbun, 2010b).
In this chapter, the history of Minamata disease is 
presented chronologically, broadly separating the 
discussion into three parts: the period before 1968; 
specific issues associated with congenital Minamata 
disease; and the period after 1968. The chapter 
concludes with the lessons that can be drawn from 
the history of Minamata disease.
5�2 Minamata disease in the period up 
to 1968
5.2.1 Early warnings and signs of Minamata 
disease: from wildlife to children 
'Don't think of labourers as humans; treat them as 
cattle and horses'
This quote is widely attributed to the Chisso 
factory founder Shitagau Noguchi, suggestive of 
past attitudes towards workers, residents and the 
environment in Minamata (Miyazawa, 1996). 
Minamata is the south-western part of Kumamoto 
Prefecture in Japan, facing Shiranui Sea (Map 5.1), 
1 000 km from Tokyo. In 1908, the Nihon Carbide 
factory was established in Minamata. Later 
that year it merged with Sogi Electric to form 
Nihon Chisso Hiryo Kabushiki Gaisha (Japan 
Nitrogenous Fertilisers). The firm initially used 
carbide to produce ammonia for fertilisers but, 
having purchased a German patent for producing 
ammonia without carbide in 1921, it began using 
carbide and acetylene (derived from carbide) to 
manufacture a wider range of organic synthetic 
compounds. 
One such compound was acetaldehyde. The factory 
began producing it in 1932 from acetylene gas, using 
mercury as a catalyst. The process was developed 
by Hikoshichi Hashimoto, who later became factory 
manager and served as Minamata's mayor (3). 
It is now understood that the effluent from the 
acetaldehyde production contained methylmercury 
and this caused Minamata disease. In fact, Vogt 
and Nieuwland had already shown in 1921 that 
organic mercury was synthesised in producing 
acetaldehyde (Ishihara, 2002). In the 1930s, Zangger 
(1930) and Koelsch (1937) reported on intoxication 
due to occupational exposure to organic mercury 
or methylmercury (short-chain organic mercury) 
(Ishihara, 2002). A researcher at Chisso factory 
demonstrated in 1951 that organic mercury is 
synthesised in the production of acetaldehyde 
(Arima, 1979) but it is not clear whether the Chisso 
factory was aware of the toxic effects at that time. 
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The factory's knowledge of the Zangger study (1930) 
was considered at the Minamata Disease Trial in 1987 
(Hashimoto, 2000) but the findings were inconclusive. 
The Chisso factory's acetaldehyde production initially 
peaked at 9 159 tonnes in 1940, a level not matched 
after the war until 1955. By 1960, however, it had 
quintupled to 45 200 tonnes (Figure 5.1), making 
up 40 % of Japan's total output (Arima, 1979). 
In 1951, to increase production of acetaldehyde, 
the factory changed the oxidiser of acetaldehyde 
production from manganese to iron (Miyazawa, 
1996). This production change and related technical 
improvement are considered to have increased 
methylmercury waste from the factory (Miyazawa, 
1996). Nishimura and Okamoto (2001) estimate a 
more than eight-fold increase from 1951 to 1959. 
In 1952, the factory succeeded in producing octanol 
from acetaldehyde (Miyazawa, 1996). Japan had 
previously relied on imports of octanol, an important 
ingredient in plastics. As a result, the factory 
increased production of acetaldehyde and by 1959, 
the factory accounted for 85 % of Japan's octanol 
output (Hashimoto, 2000). As a consequence the 
methylmercury waste from the factory also increased.
Map 5�1 Map of Shiranui Sea region
Source: Dr. Saori Kashima, Department of Public Health and Health Policy, Hiroshima University Graduate School of Biomedical 
Sciences, Hiroshima, Japan.
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The economic significance of this production was 
considerable. Japan had recorded a trade deficit 
since the end of the Second World War (Ministry 
of Finance, 2011) and plastic products were key 
Japanese exports at that time helping to reduce its 
deficit. As the most advanced chemical company 
during those decades, the Chisso factory clearly had 
an important economic role.
Minamata city grew with the factory, 'reaching a 
population of 20 000 in 1921, 30 000 in 1941, 40 000 
in 1948, and a peak of 50 000 in 1956' (George, 2001). 
The factory was a main employer in the city: at least 
3 811 of Minamata's 19 819 workers were employed 
at the factory in 1960 (Ui, 1968). In addition, the 
factory not only paid half of the local taxes in 
Minamata but also provided public facilities, 
such as a factory hospital (Ui, 1968). Hikoshichi 
Hashimoto, who developed the method to produce 
acetaldehyde, went on to serve four terms as 
Minamata's mayor (1950–1958 and 1962–1970) after 
managing the factory during the Second World War 
(George, 2001). In these circumstances, Minamata 
was known as Chisso's 'castle town' (after the capital 
cities of the feudal lords who controlled much of the 
lives of its citizens) (Harada, 2004).
The first hints of what was to become Minamata 
disease may be apparent in reports of the factory's 
impact on the local fishery (Harada, 2004). Around 
1925–1926, the company began to receive requests 
for compensation from the fishing cooperative. On 
the condition that no further complaints would ever 
be lodged, Chisso paid a small amount of 'sympathy 
money'. The issue of fishery damage arose again in 
1943 due to carbide residue from acetylene production 
and another compensation contract was concluded. 
And after the war the issue of fishery damage 
resurfaced in 1949 but compensation negotiations 
reached no conclusion and the issues faded. 
The fishermen knew that it had become more difficult 
to catch fish; that barnacles did not attach themselves 
to boats moored near the factory waste outfall; and 
that fish could not live in water from the outfall. 
But, the factory would not listen to them, replying 
that these facts were 'not scientific, not supported by 
data' (Harada, 2004), although the fishing cooperative 
Figure 5�1 Acetaldehyde production at the Chisso factory (line) and methylmercury 
concentrations in the umbilical cords of residents around the Shiranui Sea (dots)
Source: Reprinted from Science of the Total Environment, vol. 408, 272–276, Yorifuji, T., Kashima, S., Tsuda, T. and Harada, M., 
'What has methylmercury in umbilical cords told us? — Minamata disease', Copyright (2009), with permission from Elsevier.
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collected and showed detailed data of the fishery 
damage (described below). In addition, neither the 
company nor the government assisted in identifying 
an appropriate scientific protocol for researching the 
fishermen's significant concerns.
From around 1950, strange phenomena started 
occurring around Minamata Bay (Harada, 2005). 
Fishermen witnessed huge numbers of fish rising to 
the surface and swimming around as though they 
were crazy. Sea birds that had become unable to fly 
were seen crouching on the shores of the bay. Oysters 
and cockles were washed up onto the beach rotting 
with their shells open, emitting a horrible stench. 
During this period, according to the data collected by 
the fishing cooperative, total fish catch of 459 225 kg 
on average in the period 1950–1953 dropped to 
172 305 kg in 1955 and 95 599 kg in 1956 (Harada, 
2004). 
In 1952, fishermen requested Kumamoto Prefecture 
to address the situation. The Fisheries Division 
at Kumamoto Prefecture asked the factory about 
the discharge treatment and the factory submitted 
documentation, which reported that mercury 
was used in the process of producing acetic acid 
(a substance produced after acetaldehyde) (Chisso 
factory, 1996). Reiji Miyoshi at the Fisheries Division 
inspected the factory five months later and reported 
that the discharge should be analysed (Miyazawa, 
1996). However, Kumamoto Prefecture did not 
conduct a further survey of the fishery damage or 
the discharge and the fishery damage continued. 
Moreover, neither Kumamoto Prefecture nor 
any other group (including the research group 
at Kumamoto University) ever used the factory 
documentation indicating mercury use to identify the 
etiologic agent for Minamata disease or its production 
mechanism. 
Around 1953, local cats, which ate great quantities of 
fish, began exhibiting strange behaviour: drooling and 
staggering about, undergoing convulsions or running 
in circles as though they were mad, or leaping up 
into the air and charging forward (Harada, 2004). 
Eventually, fishermen had no more cats. In August, 
1954, a local newspaper reported that fishermen in a 
village (Modo) were annoyed by the increase in mice 
due to the annihilation of cats (Kumamoto Nichinichi 
Shinbun, 1954). These strange occurrences were 
an omen of what would happen next to humans. 
Watching the 'dancing cats', people began to feel 
uneasy. Indeed, a few patients with neurological 
symptoms of unknown origin were detected during 
this period and a subsequent study revealed that the 
first patient was traced back to 1942 (Nishigaki and 
Harada, 1975).
On 21 April 1956, a paediatrician at Chisso 
Hospital, Kaneki Noda, examined a girl aged five 
years and 11 months. The girl had difficulty in 
walking and speaking; she appeared to be in a 
drunken state, unsteady on her feet and slurring 
her words. She was hospitalised two days later. 
On the same day, her sister, aged two years and 
11 months, developed the same symptoms and 
she was hospitalised on 29 April. Subsequently, 
Dr Noda learned of other patients with similar 
symptoms in the neighbourhood. He officially 
notified the Minamata Public Health Centre on 
1 May 1956 (Harada, 1995 and 2004; Miyazawa, 
1996). 
Hasuo Ito, the Director of the Public Health Centre, 
interviewed the children's mother in detail about 
the disease. He then made a report to the Health 
Department at Kumamoto Prefecture (Ito, 1996). 
A newspaper in Kyushu Area, the south-western 
area of Japan, reported the disease on the 8 May 
(Miyazawa, 1996). On 28 May, the Minamata 
Doctors Association, the Public Health Centre, 
Chisso Hospital, the municipal hospital, and 
the city government established the Minamata 
Strange Disease Countermeasures Committee 
Cats eating great quantities of fish from the polluted Minamata 
Bay went mad and died after strange dancing and convulsions.
Photo:  © istockphoto/Taner Yildirim
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(Harada, 2004). Subsequently, doctors including 
Dr Noda and Hajime Hosokawa, the Director of 
Chisso Hospital, identified numerous new cases. 
According to the report of Dr Hosokawa, 30 cases 
including 11 deaths were identified by 29 August 
(Hosokawa, 1996).
The first official patients lived in a secluded spot 
at the end of a tiny inlet off Minamata Bay, where 
five or six families huddled together on the narrow 
strand. They were so close to the sea that they 
could have cast a fishing line from the windows 
at high tide. They were people who lived as one 
with nature. Because the outbreak of the disease 
was spontaneous and occurred among neighbours, 
the doctors at the factory and officials at the Public 
Health Centre suspected that they were dealing 
with a contagious disease and moved the patients 
to an isolation ward. Officials from the Public 
Health Centre went to the patients' homes and 
made a show of spraying them with disinfectant. 
Transferring the patients to an isolation ward may 
have indicated an intention on the part of doctors 
and the city — out of good will or for political 
reasons — to mitigate the residents' anxiety and 
to exempt the patients from medical expenses. 
The patients hated it, however, and it fostered 
discrimination against them. They were shunned 
by other community members and experienced 
years of discrimination (Harada, 2004).
This was the beginning of Minamata disease.
5.2.2 The cause: fish and shellfish contaminated by 
factory discharge (1956–1957)
In response to the request of the Minamata Strange 
Disease Countermeasures Committee, Kumamoto 
University School of Medicine established 
a research group including various medical 
departments on 24 August 1956 (MDRG, 1966). 
In the epidemiological section, Shoji Kitamura 
and his group conducted both descriptive and 
analytic epidemiological studies (Kitamura et al., 
1957). In the descriptive study, the time sequence 
of cases was evaluated on a spot map, which 
indicated that the disease was not contagious. The 
analytical study revealed a relationship between 
the family occupation (fishing) and the disease, 
and a dose-response relationship between eating 
fish caught in Minamata Bay and the disease. 
Prof. Kitamura concluded that the disease could 
be induced by continuous exposure to a common 
factor, which seemed to be contaminated fish in 
Minamata Bay. 
On 3 November 1956, the Research Group on 
Minamata Disease reported that the disease was 
not contagious but rather a food poisoning incident 
resulting from intake of fish contaminated by a 
heavy metal in Minamata Bay. It also reported 
that the factory's effluent was considered the 
cause of contamination (Kumamoto University, 
1956). Furthermore, in the second debrief 
session on 26 February 1957, the Research Group 
recommended prohibiting fishing or applying the 
Food Sanitation Act (Miyazawa, 1996). The Act could 
be used to take actions against food poisoning, such 
as prohibiting the sale or distribution of food. An 
individual disobeying such a prohibition could face 
criminal punishment.
In November 1956, the Scientific Research Team 
of the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan 
(MHWJ) started an epidemiological investigation 
in Minamata (Matsuda et al., 1996). In March 1957, 
they demonstrated a relationship between the family 
occupation (fishing) and the disease, consistent 
with the Kumamoto University Research Group's 
epidemiological study. Moreover, they showed that 
families living closer to Minamata harbour, where 
factory effluent was discharged, were affected more 
than families living further away. For example, 
all seven families in the Tsukinoura area included 
at least one patient, while 33 % (7/24) of families 
included a patient in the Yudo area. Noting that 
sea water and mud in Minamata Bay was strongly 
affected by the factory effluent, the Research Team 
inferred that fish caught in Minamata Bay were 
contaminated by the effluent. They concluded that 
the disease could be induced by contaminated 
fish in Minamata Bay and that the factory and its 
effluent should be fully investigated to elucidate the 
disease's mechanism. 
In response to these findings, the local government 
of Kumamoto Prefecture considered applying the 
Food Sanitation Act in March 1957 (Kumamoto 
Prefecture, 1996b) because Shizuoka Prefecture 
had used the Act to address an episode of shellfish 
food poisoning in 1950 (Shizuoka Prefecture, 
1996). The local government had the authority to 
decide whether to apply the Act but asked for an 
opinion from the national government on 16 August 
(Kumamoto Prefecture, 1996a). On 11 September 
1957, Masayoshi Yamaguchi, the Chief of the 
Public Health Bureau of MHWJ replied to the local 
government as follows (bold added) (MHWJ, 1996a):
I. 'We recommend that you should continue 
your policy of warning against the ingestion 
of fish and shellfish caught in a specified area 
of Minamata Bay because it may lead to the 
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occurrence of the unknown disease of the central 
nervous system.'
II. 'There was no clear evidence that all fish and 
all shellfish are poisoned in the specified area in 
Minamata Bay. Therefore, we have decided that 
it is impossible to apply Provision 4-2 of the Food 
Sanitation Act to all the fish and shellfish to be 
caught in that area.' 
Japan's Food Sanitation Act provides that a 
local government's public health centre must 
investigate food poisoning outbreaks in detail and 
take measures in response. When a cause (e.g. an 
institution or food) is identified, the exposed area 
and residents must be investigated and the sale or 
distribution of the cause prohibited. In Minamata, 
despite the risk outlined in paragraph I of the 
reply, consumption of contaminated fish was not 
prohibited based on the reasoning in paragraph II. 
Although the Minamata Public Health Centre, like 
the Minamata Strange Disease Countermeasures 
Committee, identified severely affected patients 
from the start of its work, it did not further 
investigate the area and the exposed residents 
epidemiologically. Residents continued to eat 
contaminated fish without effective information. 
In 1990, the government of Japan asserted 
that another reason it did not apply the Food 
Sanitation Act in 1957 was that the etiological 
agent (methylmercury) had not been identified in 
1957 (Environment Agency et al., 1999). While the 
etiologic agent may not have been clearly identified 
in 1957, however, the cause/transmission (ingesting 
fish caught in Minamata Bay) was identified in 1956. 
Indeed, fish in Minamata Bay were recognised as 
food causing Minamata disease even in records 
of food poisoning published by MHWJ in 1956 
(Department of Environmental Sanitation, 1957).
It is perhaps surprising that the governments of 
Shizuoka and Kumamoto Prefectures responded 
differently to their respective food poisoning 
episodes, although each had the same strength of 
evidence that shellfish or fish were contaminated 
with an unknown etiologic agent. Shizuoka 
Prefecture decided itself to apply the Food 
Sanitation Act, while Kumamoto Prefecture asked 
MHWJ and finally did not apply the Act. Miyazawa 
(1996) has argued that Kumamoto Prefecture's 
response reflected the Prefecture's concern about the 
compensation claims that Chisso factory would have 
faced if the Act had been invoked. 
The early epidemiological studies identified the 
causes of the health impacts but concentrated solely 
on severely affected patients and did not investigate 
the health status of residents in affected areas, as 
required by the Act. This caused serious problems 
later. Since the government undertook no effective 
countermeasure, subsequent research sought to 
discover the etiologic agent or its mechanism of 
production in university laboratory settings rather 
than using epidemiological studies to find moderate 
cases or investigate health in local settings. During 
this period, local residents were almost unaware 
of the finding that the fish and shellfish were 
contaminated. Although some residents probably 
knew of the contamination from newspapers and 
their own experiences, poor fishermen in particular 
could not stop fishing, as this was their only means of 
survival. 
Whereas affected fishermen lacked political power 
locally and nationally, Chisso factory was supported 
by the local government and Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry of Japan (MITIJ) at that time. 
Subsequent events clearly indicate that Chisso 
factory had considerable influence in Japanese 
industry and society. The Chief of the Department 
of Environmental Health who recommended not 
invoking the act in his reply to local government in 
1957 had taken measures beyond the law to address 
a polio outbreak in the 1950s, importing vaccine 
from Russia. When a lawyer later asked him why 
he had avoided prohibiting fish consumption in the 
Minamata disease outbreak in accordance with the 
Food Sanitation Act despite taking measures beyond 
the law in the polio outbreak, he replied 'Chisso never 
existed behind the polio outbreak'.
In the late-1950s, the officers of MITIJ sent weekly 
demands to the Water Quality Maintenance Section 
of the Economic Planning Agency of Japan (EPAJ) 
that wastewater bans should never be implemented. 
The MITIJ officers urged their counterparts to 'stick 
it out' and 'offer opposition to the ban', stressing that 
'Japanese economic growth would never be realised if 
such a big industry, Chisso, were stopped. Never stop 
it!' (Hashimoto, 2000).
5.2.3 Organic mercury theory (1958–1959) 
With neither the factory not the Government taking 
appropriate measures to control the outbreak, 
exposure continued and spread. Following a 
research meeting on 15 February 1958, Masayoshi 
Yamaguchi, Chief of the Public Health Bureau 
of MHWJ reported to other ministries and local 
governments on 7 July 1958 that: 'Minamata disease 
was caused by intake of contaminated fish and 
shellfish. The discharge from Minamata factory 
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(Chisso factory) affected Minamata Bay. The same 
chemical toxicant (which the discharge of which 
affected the bay) was considered to poison the fish 
and shellfish' (MHWJ, 1996b). 
A local newspaper reported the news, describing it 
as the first MHWJ statement to mention the factory 
as a cause (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 1958). 
Yamaguchi, who made the statement, explained later 
in court that MHWJ had reported to Kumamoto 
Prefecture because it expected the Prefecture to 
take control measures based on the Food Sanitation 
Act (Miyazawa, 1996). However, the Act was not 
invoked.
Following the MHWJ statement the factory 
took steps to dilute the discharge containing 
methylmercury. In September 1958 it changed 
the drainage route of acetaldehyde production 
from Minamata Bay to Minamata River (Harada, 
1995 and 2004; Miyazawa, 1996), where some 
effluents (such as phosphoric acid effluent, carbide 
residue) were already discharged (Nishimura and 
Okamoto, 2001). Several other factors probably also 
influenced the factory's decision to act (Miyazawa, 
1996): the factory had learned of Kumamoto 
University's focus on mercury; high mercury 
concentrations had been detected in shellfish in 
Minamata Bay; the factory wanted to increase 
acetaldehyde production; and everyone knew that 
residents continued to eat fish. 
Hajime Hosokawa, Director of Chisso hospital, 
objected to the plan. He also noted that 'if patients 
were detected in the area around the Minamata 
River, it would prove that the discharge was 
the cause' (Miyazawa, 1996). However, the plan 
was executed — without the knowledge of local 
residents. Exposure subsequently spread not only in 
Minamata Bay but along the entire coast of Shiranui 
Sea. Fish and cats began to die in other villages 
(Harada, 1995). And from 1959 onwards, patients 
with similar neurological symptoms were identified 
among the residents of other villages around the 
Shiranui Sea (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 1959; 
Ninomiya et al., 1995; Yorifuji et al., 2008). 
Meanwhile, researchers at Kumamoto University's 
School of Medicine continued their efforts to find 
the etiologic agent of Minamata Disease and its 
biological mechanism of action. This was not easy 
because the Research Group knew nothing about the 
interior of Chisso factory (Harada, 2005): what was 
produced, how it was produced, what substances 
were used and which processes. At that time the 
Research Group received no assistance from the 
engineers at Chisso factory or even from the organic 
chemistry sector of Kumamoto University's School 
of Engineering. 
The Research Group identified various possible 
etiologic agents — manganese, thallium and 
selenium — but when fed to cats these substances 
did not produce effects comparable to organic 
mercury (Takeuchi et al., 1960). Although mercury 
was the first etiologic agent considered, Shoji 
Kitamura of the Research Group has recollected 
with regret that 'Mercury was taken off the list on 
the assumption that such an expensive material 
would never be thrown away in the sea' (Harada, 
2004). 
Douglas McAlpine, a British neurologist, visited 
Minamata on 13 and 14 March 1958. He examined 
15 Minamata disease patients and made a very 
valuable observation, noting that symptoms such as 
constriction of the visual field, impaired hearing and 
ataxia closely resembled those of methylmercury 
poisoning reported by Hunter et al. (1940). 
McAlpine reported his observations in the journal 
Lancet in September 1958 (McAlpine and Araki, 
1958). In his paper, he pointed out that the disease 
was caused by eating fish caught in Minamata Bay 
as well as the toxic action of a chemical compound 
contained in the effluent from Chisso factory 
(McAlpine and Araki, 1958). Moreover, he listed 
methylmercury as one of the metals which could 
induce Minamata disease. This was the first time 
that methylmercury was identified as a potential 
etiologic agent. McAlpine's observations were 
important but before he could report them to a 
Japanese Society of Neurology Conference he was 
stopped by a professor of Kumamoto University 
on the grounds that too many theories would be 
confusing (Harada, 2004).
Meanwhile, another researcher, Tadao Takeuchi, 
also suspected that the etiological agent was organic 
mercury since he also saw similarities to so-called 
Hunter-Russell syndrome (Hunter et al., 1940; 
Hunter and Russell, 1954). Takeuchi et al. (1960) 
extracted significant levels of mercury (not organic 
mercury) from patients' organs at autopsy and 
also succeeded in inducing similar neurological 
symptoms in cats by feeding them organic mercury. 
Shoji Kitamura and his Research Group likewise 
extracted large quantities of mercury from mud 
and shellfish in Minamata Bay (Kitamura et al., 
1960b), and noted that concentrations decreased 
as the distance from the factory increased. They 
extracted mercury from experimentally affected 
cats at autopsy and ascertained that mercury levels 
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increased in shellfish bred in the bay, demonstrating 
that mercury was accumulating internally (Kitamura 
et al., 1960b). On 22 July 1959, researchers finally 
concluded that the etiological agent was mercury 
based on the clinical characteristics and animal 
experiments (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 1959; 
Kumamoto University, 1996). 
During this period, researchers at Kumamoto 
University School of Medicine suspected that the 
mercury concentrations were a byproduct of vinyl 
chloride production. This is because when they 
had asked the factory in 1957, the factory had only 
mentioned vinyl chloride among organic synthetic 
compounds that the factory produced, and mercuric 
chloride was actually used as a catalyst in the 
production process (Miyazawa, 1996). In addition, 
they noticed that vinyl chloride output growth 
paralleled the increase in patients (Takeuchi et al., 
1960). Although focusing on the vinyl chloride 
process, the Kumamoto University Research Group 
was unable to show how inorganic mercury in the 
waste from producing vinyl chloride changed to 
organic mercury.
Leonard Kurland of the National Institute of Health 
(NIH) in the US visited Minamata in September 1958 
and examined patients. In a subsequent article, he 
supported the Kumamoto University's conclusion 
that the etiologic agent was organic mercury in 
World Neurology and also focused on vinyl chloride 
production (Kurland et al., 1960). However, a local 
newspaper, the 'Minamata Times', published by 
Masao Shino, a Minamata citizen, already noted on 
10 December 1959 that mercuric salt was used as a 
catalyst in producing acetaldehyde and suspected the 
relationship between the acetaldehyde production 
and the disease (Minamata Times, 1996). This 
information must have been leaked from workers 
inside the factory. 
On 7 October 1959, Hajime Hosokawa, Director of 
Chisso Hospital, succeeded in inducing Minamata 
disease in a cat, labelled number 400, which had been 
given waste water from acetaldehyde production 
daily for 78 days (Harada, 2004). This important 
finding, which was not made public, clearly shows 
that the waste from acetaldehyde production actually 
contained organic mercury. If the Kumamoto 
University Research Group had known of this finding 
it could have made great process. Instead, when Dr 
Hosokawa reported the cat number 400 result to the 
factory, the findings were kept secret and the factory 
prohibited further studies (Miyazawa, 1996). When 
allowed to restart experiments in 1960, Hosokawa 
found that cats given waste water from acetaldehyde 
production also manifested disease. However, he 
resigned from the factory in April 1962, without being 
able to make the results public. 
Later in 1962, Jun Ui, a postgraduate engineering 
student, and Shisei Kuwabara, a photographer, visited 
a doctor at the Chisso factory (Mishima, 1992) and 
found a note concerning the results of the experiments 
on cats. Kuhabara photographed this evidence when 
the doctor was out of the room. They subsequently 
showed the photograph to Dr Hosokawa who 
acknowledged its authenticity. Ui later related these 
facts along with other details about Minamata disease 
in the monthly magazine Goka and the information 
played an important role in the first Minamata 
disease lawsuit (Tomita, 1965). Despite suffering 
from lung cancer, Dr Hosokawa testified in the first 
Minamata disease lawsuit in 1970 from his hospital 
bed, making two key points (Mishima, 1992): first, cat 
number 400 had definitely demonstrated symptoms 
of Minamata disease; second, his recommendation 
that the factory waste should not be shifted from 
Minamata Bay to the mouth of the Minamata River 
had been ignored. He died later that year.
Wastewater containing methylmercury from Chisso factory was 
led directly into Minamata Bay. 
Photo: By Eugene Smith © Aileen M. Smith
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Based on the Kumamoto University Research 
Group's July 1959 report, organic mercury was 
recognised as the etiological agent by the Minamata 
Food Poisoning Committee organised by MHWJ on 
12 November 1959 (MFPC, 1996). However, there 
was no mention of the source of the contamination, 
Chisso factory. Indeed, before the Committee 
announced that organic mercury was an etiologic 
agent, the section chief of the MHWJ Environmental 
Sanitation Department told the Committee's 
representative not to conclude that the factory was 
a cause because it was not 'scientifically' proved 
(Miyazawa, 1996). And after the Committee had 
reported its opinion to the Minister of Health and 
Welfare, it was suddenly dissolved. No official 
reason was ever given.  
An inter-ministerial meeting was held on the day 
before the Minamata Food Poisoning Committee's 
announcement. There, an MITIJ representative 
told researchers and other officers that: 'No similar 
patients have been observed around chemical 
factories with the same system as Chisso. If the 
operation by Chisso were causal, we would find 
such patients around those factories. Furthermore, 
the mercury used in the Chisso factory as a catalyst 
is inorganic. The causative agent that you have 
identified is organic mercury. No means by which 
inorganic mercury could be converted to organic 
mercury has been identified. We cannot accept 
the explanation that waste water from Chisso 
contains the etiologic agent of Minamata disease' 
(Hashimoto, 2000). 
In September 1959, Chisso factory likewise refuted 
the organic mercury theory based on the absence 
of similar disease at other factories; difficulties 
explaining the abrupt increase in patients since 1954 
and uncertainty regarding the organic chemical 
reaction mechanism (Minamata factory, 1996). This 
was despite the fact that a factory researcher had 
already demonstrated that organic mercury was 
synthesised in the production of acetaldehyde in 
1951 (Arima, 1979). 
The factory also claimed that it was difficult to trust 
the Kumamoto University Research Group because 
it had considered other theories (manganese, 
thallium or selenium) before identifying organic 
mercury (Minamata factory, 1996). In line with 
Chisso's counterargument, Raisaku Kiyoura, a 
professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology, claimed 
that mercury concentrations in Minamata Bay were 
not higher than those in other areas (Harada, 2004). 
Furthermore, Takeji Ohshima, the Executive Director 
of the Japanese Association of Chemical Industries, 
suggested that the cause might be explosives 
dumped into Minamata Bay by the Japanese military 
(Harada, 2004).
The debate suggests that Chisso factory intentionally, 
although inconsistently, used reductionist 
argumentation to postpone action. On one hand, 
despite the abundance of evidence that had already 
existed since 1956, Chisso factory contended that the 
only way to prove causality between its production 
processes and the organic mercury concentrations 
was to demonstrate, via a reductionist approach, 
the chemical mechanism linking the two. On the 
other, it criticised the researchers at Kumamoto 
University for applying a reductionist approach by 
considering other possible metals first. In addition, 
the consistency argument (relating to the absence of 
similar disease in other areas and abrupt increases 
in patient numbers) was also intentionally used to 
postpone action.
Recent analysis provides the following explanations 
for the absence of similar disease near comparable 
factories. First, the factor's output of acetaldehyde was 
the highest in Japan at that time, accounting for one 
third or a quarter of national production (Hashimoto, 
2000). Second, methylmercury by-product per unit 
of acetaldehyde production was higher than at 
other factories due to technical improvements to 
increase acetaldehyde production (Hashimoto, 2000; 
Miyazawa, 1996). Third, the factory's proximity to 
the sea meant that the chloride ion concentration 
of industrial water was high, which changed the 
methylmercury byproduct to volatile methylmercuric 
chloride (Hashimoto, 2000; Nishimura and Okamoto, 
2001). It was then discharged when the acetaldehyde 
was purified by distillation. 
Organic mercury represented the most credible 
explanation but was resisted by Chisso, the chemical 
industry and the MITIJ. The MITIJ therefore ordered 
Chisso to return the drainage outfall of acetaldehyde 
production to Minamata Bay (from the Minamata 
River) and to install wastewater treatment equipment 
within the year (Harada, 2004). The factory therefore 
established a purifying system for the contaminated 
water in December 1959 (Arima, 1979; Harada, 2004). 
Most residents believed that the discharge of the 
etiological agent would soon cease. However, the 
system installed, as should have been known by 
Chisso at the time of installation, was completely 
ineffective at removing methylmercury (Irukayama, 
1969). It was installed only to give the appearance of 
action by the company and researchers at Kumamoto 
University were deceived by being given a fake 
sample from Chisso factory (Miyazawa, 1996). 
Unsurprisingly, mercury concentration in fish and 
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shellfish in Minamata Bay failed to decline after the 
system was installed (Irukayama, 1969). To make 
matters worse, the effluents also continued to be 
discharged into Shiranui Sea (Irukayama, 1969). As a 
result, residents not only in Minamata Bay but also in 
the other villages around Shiranui Sea continued to 
be exposed. 
5.2.4 Detecting the organic mercury production 
process and social recognition of Minamata 
disease (1960–1963)
Although researchers were now satisfied that 
organic mercury was the etiologic agent of Minamata 
disease, no steps were taken to control the poisoning. 
Researchers concentrated on identifying organic 
mercury in organisms or finding the mechanism 
by which it was produced. On 14 February 1960, 
Makio Uchida, a professor at Kumamoto University, 
extracted organic mercury in a shellfish in Minamata 
Bay (Harada, 2004; Uchida et al., 1960). Subsequently, 
researchers at Kumamoto University made further 
important findings: confirming that short-chain 
organic mercury was toxic, extracting methylmercury 
sulfide from shellfish, and inducing Minamata 
disease in cats and mice using the substance (Harada, 
2004; Sebe et al., 1961; Uchida et al., 1960). 
In February 1960, the Minamata Disease General 
Investigation Committee was established to replace 
the dissolved MHWJ committee and research 
Minamata disease (MDGIC, 1996). Many of the 
discussions in the Committee centred on possible 
objections to the organic mercury theory and served 
only to obscure the theory (George, 2001). Its last 
meeting was held in March 1961. Finally, in March 
1962, Fisheries Agency abandoned research regarding 
Minamata disease (Arima, 1979). After that, no 
research activities were conducted by government 
agencies until 1968. 
In April 1960, the Minamata Disease Research 
Council, known as the 'Tamiya Committee', 
was established (Miyazawa, 1996). Its chair was 
Takeo Tamiya, President of the Japanese Medical 
Association, and all members were from universities 
in Tokyo. Primarily sponsored by the Chisso factory, 
the Tamiya Committee attempted to obscure the 
organic mercury theory. The Committee wished to 
involve Kumamoto University but Kansuke Sera, 
Dean of Kumamoto University School of Medicine, 
refused the request (George, 2001), which was a 
remarkable and noteworthy act.
Researchers on the supposedly 'authoritative' Tamiya 
Committee disputed Kumamoto University's organic 
mercury theory by arguing that other factors were 
responsible (Harada, 2004). On 13 April 1960, Raisaku 
Kiyoura published a newspaper article promoting 
his theory that a group of organic chemicals called 
amines were responsible (4). He claimed that amines, 
not mercury, were detected in shellfish that caused 
Minamata disease in cats. Any detailed examination 
would have demonstrated the dubious medical 
validity of that counter-theory but the mass media 
were enthusiastic (Harada, 2004). 
The next year, Kikuji Tokita, a professor of Toho 
University, proposed that eating rotten fish was the 
cause and the etiologic agent was again suggested to 
be amines. However, people in Minamata, despite 
their poverty, were able to eat as much fresh fish as 
they wanted. Anyone who visited Minamata and 
observed the life of its people would understand 
immediately that his theory was wrong. In his 
paper, the name of Chisso factory, Takeji Ohshima 
(who had suggested that dumped munitions were 
responsible) and Raisaku Kiyoura were listed in 
the acknowledgments. George (2001) notes the 
emphasis placed on the 'line of attack-that scientists 
from the "centre" could be trusted over those from 
"hick" universities on the periphery'. Importantly, all 
researchers recognised that fish were a cause.
During this period, researchers at the Department 
of Internal Medicine at Kumamoto University 
School of Medicine conducted a large investigation 
to locate unidentified Minamata disease sufferers 
and determine whether Minamata disease occurred 
in a chronic form and, if so, what its diagnostic 
features were (Tokuomi et al., 1962). They 
targeted 1 831 residents in affected areas, of whom 
1 152 (62.9 %) participated, and used a questionnaire 
to identify participants who needed further physical 
examination. The study identified 131 participants 
with neurological signs similar to Minamata disease 
(Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 1962), although 
only 24 of these had severe symptoms. Finally, the 
Screening Council for Minamata Disease Patients 
(described below) recognised two of cases as having 
Minamata disease (Miyazawa, 1996 and 2007). 
Although this investigation could be seen as an 
important step towards fully describing Minamata 
disease (e.g. the nature, threshold, frequency and 
severity of symptoms; the scale of poisoning; 
and the prognosis) in practice the investigation 
could not go far beyond the boundaries of earlier 
(4) An amine is any derivative of ammonia in which one or more hydrogen atoms are replaced by alkyl or aryl groups.
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epidemiological studies. This is probably because 
researchers at Kumamoto University, keen to protect 
the organic mercury theory from a steady flow of 
criticism at that time, focused on the typical and 
severe cases of organic mercury (Hunter-Russell 
syndrome) (Miyazawa, 2007), even though this was 
contrary to the primary object of their investigation. 
They did not use non-exposed areas as controls to 
compare prevalence and they did not follow up 
with the 131 participants identified as having similar 
symptoms to Minamata disease. Finally, when 
publishing their findings in March 1962 (Tokuomi 
et al., 1962), the researchers gave the impression 
that Minamata disease was no longer a problem, 
observing that 'Minamata disease seems to have 
terminated at last.' 
Meanwhile, in 1960 the Kumamoto Prefecture 
Institute for Health Research investigated the 
mercury concentration in hair samples from 
1 645 healthy fishermen from around Shiranui 
Sea (Doi and Matsushima, 1996; Matsushima and 
Mizoguchi, 1996). It was the first large survey using 
hair samples. The distribution of a high concentration 
(0–920 ppm) of mercury among the hair samples 
indicated that the contamination had spread 
throughout entire Shiranui Sea. The mercury content 
in Minamata was the highest (a median of 30 ppm) 
but the mercury content in Goshonoura (median 
21.5 ppm) on the other side of the Shiranui Sea was 
also about 10 times higher than that of residents 
in the non-exposed city of Kumamoto (median 
2.1 ppm) (Doi and Matsushima, 1996; Matsushima 
and Mizoguchi, 1996; Ninomiya et al., 2005). Among 
199 residents examined in Minamata, 61 residents 
(30.7 %) had hair mercury concentration greater than 
50 ppm, while even in Goshonoura 153 residents 
(13.2 %) among 1 160 examined had those levels of 
mercury. 
Two other investigations were conducted up to 
1962 (Doi et al., 1996). Although the investigators 
claimed that further follow-up studies were needed 
because the contamination source was not removed 
and the mercury concentration in hair samples was 
high, Kumamoto Prefecture decided to stop the 
investigation in 1962 (Miyazawa, 1996). Furthermore, 
the health status of the fishermen who provided hair 
samples was never followed up and the fishermen 
were never informed of the mercury concentration 
results. 
After Masachika Kutsuna replaced Kansuke Sera as 
Dean in April 1961, Kumamoto University School of 
Medicine adopted a conciliatory attitude to Chisso 
factory (Miyazawa, 1996). It joined the Tamiya 
Committee and began to receive research funding 
from Chisso factory and the Tamiya Committee. 
Indeed, when Kumamoto University published a 
volume of their research reports in 1966, Chisso 
factory was listed in the acknowledgments (MDRG, 
1966). From that time, Minamata disease became a 
sensitive problem in Kumamoto University. When 
a local news paper reported that Prof. Irukayama 
extracted methylmercury chloride from the sludge 
of the factory (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 
1963), Dean Kutsuna reprimanded him and called 
Chisso factory to apologise for the news (Miyazawa, 
1996). Later on, an instruction was handed down in 
the School of Medicine: 'you can do experimental 
research about Minamata disease but do not conduct 
clinical research.' It was said that clinical research 
'is not research but rather work conducted by social 
activist or Prefecture Government' (Harada, 2004) 
because if researchers included human beings, they 
naturally became involved in various social problems 
surrounding Minamata disease. 
Finally in 1962, Katsuro Irukayama, a professor at 
Kumamoto University School of Medicine succeeded 
in extracting methylmercury chloride from the 
sludge of the acetaldehyde production process in the 
factory (Irukayama et al., 1962). Although it was not 
disclosed, Chisso factory laboratory also extracted 
methylmercury chloride from the sludge (Miyazawa, 
1996). This showed that methylmercury was a 
by-product of acetaldehyde production and present 
in discharges from the factory. However, the Food 
Sanitation Act was not applied as a result of these 
findings, nor was the factory regulated in any other 
manner. 
Important scientific findings continued. In addition 
to the success extracting methylmercury chloride 
from the sludge of the factory, in 1962 an unusual 
occurrence of cerebral palsy infants was diagnosed 
as resulting from methylmercury intoxication during 
fetal life (Harada, 2004). However, the public's 
attention began to shift away from Minamata Disease. 
Chisso factory paid 'mimaikin' ('sympathy money') 
to patients in 1959 meaning that many, including 
researchers, believed that the issue was settled. 
Furthermore, from 1962 to 1963, there was a big 
dispute at Chisso over workers' pay (Harada, 2004). 
The issue of Minamata disease began to be forgotten 
except among sufferers and their families.
5.2.5 Niigata Minamata disease and proof of the 
causal relationship (1964–1968)
Although the source of contamination, the causal 
food, the etiologic agent and the process creating the 
methylmercury had all been identied, the government 
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did not regulate fish consumption or factory waste 
at Chisso. In January 1965, similar methylmercury 
food poisoning occurred in Niigata, causing 'Niigata 
Minamata disease' (Niigata Prefecture, 2007; Saito, 
2009). The factory responsible (Showa Denko) 
operated in the same way as Chisso in Minamata, 
with methylmercury being discharged during 
acetaldehyde production. Although the damage was 
less than Minamata, over 1 500 individuals (Niigata 
Prefecture, 2007) were needlessly affected. Once 
more, cats started dancing and dying from madness 
in Niigata as a harbinger to the human consequences 
that were to follow (Harada, 2004). 
From the beginning, MITIJ and Chisso had disputed 
that the factory was the cause of Minamata disease. 
A compelling argument, in their eyes, had been 
the observation that 'No similar patients have been 
observed around other production plants with the 
same system as Chisso. If the operation by Chisso 
was causal, we would find such patients around 
these other factories' (Hashimoto, 2000). At that 
time, Chisso was by far the largest producer of 
acetaldehyde, and Showa Denko was the second 
most important (Harada, 2004). The appearance of 
Minamata disease in the vicinity of Showa Denko 
was a powerful refutation of their argument. 
A legal case relating to Niigata Minamata disease 
went on trial in 1967 and on 26 September 1968 
the government of Japan finally agreed that there 
was the causal relationship between wastewater 
from Chisso (and Showa Denko) and Minamata 
disease (MHWJ, 1996c). By then, however, this 
admission was immaterial as acetaldehyde was no 
longer necessary and production had stopped by 
May 1968 (Arima, 1979). Twelve years had passed 
since the institution and food contaminant had 
been identified. In total, 488 tonnes of mercury 
were discharged into the sea from 1932 to 1968 
(Miyazawa, 1996). 
5�3 Congenital Minamata disease: 
intrauterine methylmercury 
poisoning
Minamata disease can be considered a typical 
example of industrial pollution (Ui, 1968) for 
several reasons. First is the manner of the outbreak. 
Minamata disease is a form of food poisoning (and 
indeed carried through the food chain) as a result 
of environmental pollution. Second, it is a classic 
example of how decisions supposedly based on 
factual judgements were influenced by political, 
financial, legal and even psychological factors (such 
as hierarchies within society, within and between 
scientific disciplines and between different wings of 
government, and supposed 'loss of face' in admitting 
error). Corruption also played a role. 
However there is another reason why it will long be 
remembered: the discovery of congenital Minamata 
disease. Before congenital Minamata disease was 
proven, it was believed that the womb protected 
the foetus from poisons. This was the first clear-cut 
case of chemical poisoning transmitted through the 
placenta to the foetus. A paragraph from Harada 
(2005) conveys the normal attitudes towards 
congenital Minamata disease at that time (1961):
When conducting a survey in the area of 
frequent outbreak of Minamata disease, 
I came upon two brothers on a veranda. Their 
symptoms were exactly the same; so I assumed 
that they must both have Minamata disease. 
However, their mother said, 'The 9 year-old 
contracted Minamata disease when he was 
3 years and 6 months, but the 5 year-old has 
cerebral palsy.' 'Why?' I asked, to which she 
responded, 'The younger one has never eaten 
fish; he was born this way, so it's not Minamata 
disease.' I was convinced right away. This is 
because we used to believe at that time that the 
placenta would not let poisons pass though. 
Then the mother added, 'That's what doctors 
say. Both my husband and this older child got 
Minamata disease. My husband died in 1954. 
I ate the same fish. At the time the younger 
boy was inside of me. I think the reason I have 
few symptoms of the disease is because this 
child absorbed all the mercury that I ate.' At 
the time I thought this was just the fancy of 
an amateur who knew nothing about medical 
science. But time proved that she was correct. 
Her words were prophetic in speaking of the 
suffering of the foetus because after that time 
we had many experiences of congenital cases.
Many infants born after 1955 showed symptoms 
resembling those of cerebral palsy in the affected 
areas (Kitamura et al., 1959 and 1960a). Shoji 
Kitamura mentioned in 1959, 'It is possible that the 
substance causing the poisoning was transferred to 
the infants through the placenta or mother's milk, 
producing symptoms similar to those of Minamata 
disease' (Kitamura et al., 1959). Careful clinical and 
epidemiological studies were conducted (Harada, 
1978). All the patients displayed similar symptoms 
(Harada, 2005) including mental retardation, 
disturbed coordination, deformities of limbs, poor 
reflexes, poor nutrition, and impaired growth. Most 
were hyperactive, suffered from muscular spasms 
and uncontrollable slow writhing, had squints, 
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produced excess saliva resulting in drooling, and 
were subject to sudden mood changes. 
Epidemiologically, the patients were coincident 
with Minamata disease both in timing and location 
(Harada, 1964). Their mothers consumed a large 
amount of fish and exhibited mild symptoms of 
Minamata disease. Furthermore, 13 infants (6.9 %) 
among 188 infants born during the period 1955–1958 
suffered from severe cerebral-palsy-like symptoms in 
the three most heavily contaminated areas (Harada, 
1964). Since the overall incidence of cerebral palsy in 
Japan was 0.2–0.6 % at that time, this clearly showed 
that this incidence of cerebral-palsy-like infants 
(congenital Minamata disease patients) was very high 
(Harada, 1964).
Despite these clinical and epidemiological features, 
it took a long time for congenital Minamata disease 
to be accepted as a fact. Mothers of children seeking 
assistance with medical costs were told that they 
would only be helped once some children had died, 
had been autopsied, and the nature of the illness had 
been confirmed (Harada, 2004). Finally, two autopsies 
of infants confirmed methylmercury intoxication 
during foetal life. Then, in December 1962, 17 patients 
were officially diagnosed with congenital Minamata 
disease (Miyazawa, 1996). Later research revealed that 
the disease existed in a broader region, and 66 cases 
including 13 deaths were identified by Harada (2005 
and 2007). However, no other epidemiological studies 
to investigate the existence of congenital Minamata 
disease have ever been conducted.
One reason why it took five to eight years to confirm 
congenital Minamata disease is that researchers had 
never previously seen a case of poisoning through 
the placenta (Harada, 2005). In addition, researchers 
who became convinced that the disease was being 
transferred from mother to foetus were told (for 
example by the Screening Council for Minamata 
Disease Patients and city officials) that they had 
no proof (Harada, 2005). Because organic mercury 
was only recognised as the etiologic agent in 1959, 
mercury levels in hair or umbilical cord blood were 
not previously measured at birth. However, in 1968 
Masazumi Harada realised that the Japanese tradition 
of preserving the umbilical cord might make it 
possible to measure methylmercury concentrations 
in preserved umbilical cords as an indicator of 
foetal exposure. He collected umbilical cords among 
the residents around Shiranui Sea and was able to 
demonstrate a correlation between acetaldehyde 
production in Chisso factory and the concentration 
of methylmercury in umbilical cords (Figure 5.1) 
(Nishigaki and Harada, 1975; Yorifuji et al., 2009a). 
This supported the hypothesis that methylmercury 
affected foetuses in the uterus via the placenta. 
A continuing problem relating to intrauterine 
exposure to methylmercury is the effects of low 
to moderate exposure (Harada and Tajiri, 2009), 
i.e. exposure that is below the level that produces 
the full effects but is nevertheless debilitating. While 
symptoms of congenital Minamata disease can be 
similar to cerebral palsy, some individuals exposed 
to a high umbilical cord mercury level did not show 
exactly these symptoms — and were therefore 
disregarded — despite showing other mental 
disabilities, behavioural anomalies or other cerebral 
dysfunctions. They were missed because of the failure 
to implement proactive epidemiological investigation 
targeting residents exposed to methylmercury via the 
uterus. 
It is well established that methylmercury 
concentrations in congenital Minamata disease and 
Minamata disease patients are higher than in healthy 
individuals. But we now know that methylmercury 
concentrations in other mentally retarded groups 
are also higher than in healthy people (Harada et al., 
1999). Further investigation of mental retardation 
cases revealed clumsiness in finger movement 
and other light motor dysfunctions. The on-going 
developments regarding the effects of low to 
moderate exposure among residents underline the 
continuing failure to investigate the consequences 
of Minamata thoroughly. Further follow-up 
One of the symptoms of Minamata disease is deformed limbs. 
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studies are needed targeting congenital Minamata 
disease patients and more moderate exposure to 
methylmercury in the uterus. Nothing can reverse the 
history of exposure but much could and should be 
done to mitigate and learn from its effects.
5�4 Chaos implementing the Minamata 
disease accreditation system (1968 
to present)
After the Japanese government accepted the causal 
relationship between Chisso factory and Minamata 
disease in 1968, attention shifted to the 'accreditation' 
of the disease in individual patients, in order to 
determine compensation claims. The payment of 
compensation can be grouped into four phases. First, 
Chisso paid 'sympathy money' without accepting 
responsibility. Second, 1971 witnessed an early 
application of the precautionary principle, when 
accreditation criteria were relaxed and applications 
for compensation soared. Third, the government 
introduced far harsher accreditation criteria in 1977. 
Fourth, a period of 'political settlements' took place 
from 1995/96 until the present, with the government 
and Chisso factory attempting to settle the conflict 
by paying lump sums (not as compensation) without 
changing the strict criteria or recognising affected 
individuals as official patients. 
All of this was done without formally defining 
Minamata disease and legal cases still continue 
because the geographic and temporal boundaries for 
claimants still lack an agreed evidential basis. 
5.4.1 Accreditation system
As of 2012, the Minamata disease accreditation 
system remains based on Japan's Pollution-Related 
Health Damage Compensation Act. This involves 
passive assessment based on applications by patients 
to become accredited (Minamata Disease Museum, 
2007; Ministry of Environment, 2006), rather than 
the active surveillance system based on the Food 
Sanitation Act, described earlier. 
The Judgment Committee for Minamata Disease 
Accreditation (an advisory body to the Governor of 
the Prefecture) determines whether 'the applicant is 
a Minamata disease patient' based on the results of 
a medical examination (Minamata Disease Museum, 
2007; Ministry of Environment, 2006). Committee 
meetings are held in the cities of Kumamoto and 
Kagoshima, nearly 70 km from Minamata, and 
committee members do not directly examine the 
applicants, regardless of their proximity. The 
Committee consists largely of neurologists, with a 
few pathologists, ophthalmologists (eye disorder 
experts) or otolaryngologists (ear and throat 
experts). Having considered a case, the Committee 
makes an assessment by unanimous decision and 
submits it to the Governor of the Prefecture. If the 
judgment is positive then the Governor accredits 
the applicant as an officially recognised Minamata 
disease patient. Compensation is not available 
without accreditation, which can take a long time. 
For example one patient accreditation took 25 years 
(Miyazawa, 1996), imposing a significant burden on 
the applicant.
The Environmental Agency of Japan (EAJ), a 
predecessor of the Ministry of Environment of 
Japan, determined the official position that patients 
with a 'probability of 50 % or more' of having the 
disease are to be accredited as Minamata disease 
patients (Ministry of Environment, 2006). As such, 
a quantitative approach is supposed to be applied. In 
practice, however, the Committee for Accreditation 
uses a qualitative diagnostic method, based on 
whether the symptoms match those documented for 
the 'Hunter-Russell' syndrome. 
As described below, the criteria for accreditation have 
been revised several times since their introduction 
in 1959 (Yorifuji et al., in press), with profound 
implications for those affected by Minamata disease.
5.4.2 History of the accreditation system
Prior to 1969, the initial disease accreditation 
system, the 'Screening Council for Minamata 
Disease Patients', was used to identify patients 
who deserved low 'mimaikin' ('sympathy money') 
payments from Chisso factory (Harada, 2004; 
Minamata Disease Museum, 2007). This was not 
considered compensation, nor was it done based on 
any law because Chisso factory insisted that it was 
not proven that it was the cause of Minamata disease 
(Miyazawa, 2007). 
The settlements, in effect decided by Chisso factory, 
were very small. A death resulted in a lump sum 
payment of JPY 300 000 (about EUR 2 900 today) 
while affected adults received JPY 100 000 (about 
EUR 960) annually and children JPY 30 000 (about 
EUR 290) annually (Minamata Disease Museum, 
2007). The contract provided that 'the patients 
relinquish their claim to further compensation even 
if it is decided in the future that Minamata disease 
is caused by Chisso's effluents' (Harada, 2004). In its 
judgement at the First Minamata Disease Lawsuit 
in 1973, the court nullified these agreements as a 
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breach of the common good (Minamata Disease 
Museum, 2007).
By 1969, eighty-nine Minamata disease patients, 
excluding those with congenital Minamata disease, 
had been accredited through this system (Minamata 
Disease Museum, 2007). At that time, patients 
suffered not only from the disease itself but also 
faced discrimination from Minamata citizens in 
part because accredited patients could obtain 
compensation money. This climate in Minamata 
deterred residents from seeking accreditation. 
Instead, some sought to hide their neurological 
symptoms (Miyazawa, 2007). 
In the 1960s, large-scale incidences of health effects 
from environmental pollution were identified 
elsewhere in Japan, for example, methylmercury 
poisoning in Niigata (Niigata Prefecture, 2007), 
air pollution in urban areas (Yoshida et al., 1966), 
cadmium poisoning in Toyama (Osawa et al., 
2001), and arsenic poisoning in Miyazaki (Tsuchiya, 
1977). This lead to a change in the public mood. 
The Japanese government was forced to take 
active measures to prevent further cases, and 
make better provision for patient support and 
compensation. In 1969, the Act on Special Measures 
for Pollution-Related Health Damage Relief (later 
changed to the Pollution-Related Health Damage 
Compensation Act) was created. It came into effect the 
following year (Minamata Disease Museum, 2007). 
Subsequently, the EAJ was established in July 1971.
As a result of the Act, the Screening Council 
for Minamata Disease Patients was replaced 
by the Judgment Committee for Minamata 
Disease Accreditation (hereafter, 'Committee for 
Accreditation') at the end of 1969 and this continues 
to be the responsible body (Minamata Disease 
Museum, 2007). 
On 7 August, 1971, the 'Administrative Vice Director 
of the EAJ Notice' was published, marking the first 
real policy change since 1956 (JSPN, 1997). This 
Notice specified that if it appeared 'clear that a 
patient had been affected by the consumption of 
fish and shellfish containing organic mercury, the 
cause of [his/her neurological signs (characteristic 
of methylmercury poisoning)] should be presumed 
to be Minamata disease, even if other causes were 
conceivable' (George, 2001). The approach reflected 
the usual thinking with respect to food poisoning 
and was not dissimilar to the precautionary principle 
concept, as developed in Europe in the following 
decade. The Notice listed neurological signs such 
as constriction of the visual field, ataxia (loss of 
bodily coordination), hearing loss and paresthesia 
(a disabling tingling sensation, 'pins and needles', 
on both sides of the body) and did not require 
combinations of these neurological signs for 
Minamata disease to be confirmed. 
On 20 March 1973, the Kumamoto District Court 
ordered Chisso factory to pay compensation to 
Minamata disease patients engaged in a lawsuit 
against the company (Minamata Disease Museum, 
2007). The patients then signed a compensation 
agreement with Chisso (Minamata Disease Museum, 
2007). This resulted in dramatic increase of the 
number of accreditation applications. 
Meanwhile, in 1971, the Department of 
Neuropsychiatry at Kumamoto University School 
of Medicine undertook the first and largest 
cross-sectional population-based investigation to 
evaluate the prevalence of neurological signs of 
Minamata disease among local residents (Tatetsu 
et al., 1972). Leonard Kurland had first suggested this 
study to the Japanese Society of Neurology but the 
proposal was rejected and the Department of Internal 
Medicine therefore did not cooperate in the study. 
In the study, three areas were selected for 
investigation in Kumamoto Prefecture: 
Minamata (a high-exposure area), Goshonoura 
(a medium-exposure area) and Ariake 
(a low-exposure, reference area). The findings 
demonstrated the severe effects of methylmercury 
on residents in Minamata and even in Goshonoura. 
It provoked debate about the 'Third Minamata 
disease' (following those experienced in Minamata 
and Niigata) since even in the reference area there 
were residents with neurological signs of Minamata 
disease (Miyazawa, 1996), although the prevalence 
was not so high. 
The analysis was highly plausible because the 
Ariake and Minamata areas are connected by sea 
(Map 5.1) and fishermen often went to the Shiranui 
Sea to catch fish. Unfortunately, the findings were 
made public before the investigation was complete 
and created a sensation. People stopped buying 
fish or shellfish caught in Ariake area, causing 
Ariake's fishermen to protest against the Prefecture 
and Kumamoto University. A doctor at Kyushu 
University diagnosed those with neurological 
symptoms in Ariake as not having the disease, 
which caused distrust of Kumamoto University 
researchers. These pressures meant that the 
research was terminated after only two thirds of the 
programme had been completed. 
Recent publications in international journals (Yorifuji 
et al., 2008, 2009b, 2010, 2011 and in press) have 
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shown, however, that even the incomplete findings 
of the Kumamoto University investigation were 
valuable and should have been more fully utilised. 
They fill out the details of Minamata disease: the 
kinds of symptoms, their frequency and thresholds 
and the types of residents affected. Unfortunately, 
this information has never been used for diagnosis 
or compensation from the 1970s to the present. 
The third change in EAJ policy came in 1977 
when, following the sensational news of the 'Third 
Minamata disease', and also a dramatic increase 
of accreditation applications, the 'precautionary' 
approach of the 1971 EAJ Notice, based on the 
notion of food poisoning, was reversed. A new 
and more rigid set of accreditation criteria 
for Minamata disease the '1977 criteria' were 
established (Minamata Disease Museum, 2007; 
Ministry of Environment, 2006; Yorifuji et al., in 
press) and remain in force today. Subsequently, 
there was a rise in the number of patients who had 
methylmercury-related symptoms but were not 
formally accredited. This is because the 1977 Criteria 
once more require a combination of neurological 
signs (Minamata Disease Medical Research Group, 
1995, JSPN, 1997). They also provide that in addition 
to taking into account a person's exposure history, 
paraesthesia would now be regarded as a necessary 
but insufficient criterion for accreditation. Unlike the 
1971 Criteria, the occurrence of paraesthesia 'alone' 
would not result in accreditation. 
In 1978, it was decided that Kumamoto Prefecture 
should issue debt to support Chisso factory 
in paying compensation money (Ministry of 
Environment, 2006). This meant that the authorities 
now had a potential conflict of interest between their 
duty to the patients and their financial situation. It 
became increasingly apparent that the accreditation 
system was an important defensive barrier — 
not only for Chisso but also for the government 
(Miyazawa, 2007). 
The 1977 Criteria became a continuing source of 
dispute. In August 1985 the Fukuoka High Court 
decided that the criteria for accreditation should 
be relaxed again, allowing more people to qualify 
(Minamata Disease Museum, 2007). In response, 
in October 1985, the EAJ summoned eight 
medical specialists to reconsider the 1977 Criteria 
(Miyazawa, 2007). Their 'expert opinion' stated 
that the Criteria remained 'valid' and once more 
asserted that it was not certain that paraesthesia 
occurred in isolation in Minamata disease and 
should not, therefore, be used to accredit patients 
(JSPN, 1997). Only neurologists were present at the 
meeting, which was both closed and brief (seven 
hours). The meeting minutes were not published 
and no medical evidence was given in public to 
support their conclusion. It seems inconceivable 
that they would not have been aware of the 
prominent research of Bakir et al. (1973), which 
provides evidence that paresthesia can occur in 
isolation following methylmercury exposure (JSPN, 
1999).
By the early 1990s many accreditation applications 
(including new applicants and those who had 
reapplied) and lawsuits remained outstanding, in 
part because the 1977 Criteria were strict. Indeed, 
of the 944 patients who satisfied the diagnostic 
criteria and should have been accredited according 
to the 1977 Criteria, only 205 patients were in fact 
accredited by 1981 (Miyai, 1997). Even by 1992, only 
about one third of the qualified applicants had been 
accredited (316/944) (Miyai, 1999). 
The EAJ therefore asked the Japanese Central 
Council for Environmental Pollution Control, an 
advisory body to the EAJ Director, to consider 
the issue in 1991 (Ministry of Environment, 2006). 
A 14 member Minamata disease working group 
was set up, comprising nine members with medical 
backgrounds and five with legal expertise. Based 
on the working group's advice, the Council stated 
that its accreditation of Minamata disease was 
in accordance with the 1985 'expert opinion' and 
proposed a medical care project to support exposed 
residents who had signs of the disease but were not 
accredited as Minamata disease patients. 
In 1995–1996, under a condition that there was 
no liability on government, a reconciliation (the 
so-called 'first political solution') was reached 
based on the Central Council's recognition 
and the medical care project. According to the 
reconciliation, instead of issuing further Minamata 
disease accreditation, Chisso would make a lump 
sum payment to patients with methylmercury-
related symptoms living in the exposed areas but 
these patients must withdraw any legal action 
or claim against Chisso (McCurry, 2006). In this 
reconciliation, about 10 000 patients received lump 
sum payments of JPY 2.6 million (about EUR 25 000 
today) as relief money (not compensation) because 
neither the government nor Chisso admitted 
liability and they were not formally recognised 
as 'Minamata disease patients' (Miyazawa, 2007). 
Accordingly, this situation could be considered 
as repeating the 'mimaikin' ('sympathy money') 
payments in 1959. The number of accreditation 
applicants fell to zero but one legal action 
continued in Osaka, where some residents born in 
Minamata had previously moved. 
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By this time the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and 
Neurology (JSPN) — an independent academic 
society consisting mainly of psychiatrists and 
neurologists — was becoming increasingly involved. 
In 1998, it examined whether the medical specialists 
in the EAJ commission in 1975 had used any 
medical evidence when creating the 1977 Criteria. 
It concluded that they did not. Moreover, the JSPN 
judged the 1977 criteria to be medically invalid 
based on an evaluation of the data gathered in the 
Kumamoto University study of 1971 (JSPN, 1998). 
Subsequently, in a 1999 review, JSPN strongly 
criticised the 1985 'expert opinion', stating that 
there was no scientific evidence for the 1985 'expert 
opinion'; that the 'experts' were selected to justify the 
1977 Criteria and the position of the EAJ; and that the 
'experts' were guilty of pandering to the government's 
desires (JSPN, 1999).
Throughout the history of Minamata disease, key 
decisions have been characterised by very little 
transparency and much secrecy, making it hard 
to evaluate their reasoning. In 2003, after the first 
political settlement, JSPN (2003) analysed the 
minutes of the Central Committee working group's 
discussions in 1991, which were disclosed under 
the Access to Government Information Act (5). It 
concluded that the working group members did 
not have the medical evidence to support the 1977 
criteria; that the 1985 'expert opinion' was not a 
medical assessment but a government opinion; and 
that the meeting minutes made it evident that the 
working group's discussion had been conducted with 
the sole aim of producing an opinion that complied 
with the EAJ's view. These facts had, until then, been 
hidden from the public.
In October 2004, the Japanese Supreme Court decided 
on the case involving Osaka residents, confirming 
the liability of the national and Kumamoto Prefecture 
governments for damage caused by methylmercury 
poisoning in the Minamata area (McCurry, 2006; 
Minamata Disease Museum, 2007; Nagashima, 2005). 
Like the Fukuoka High Court in its 1985 decision, 
the Japanese Supreme Court also ruled that the 
1977 criteria should be relaxed (McCurry, 2006; 
Nagashima, 2005). Remarkably, the EAJ has still not 
changed its attitude on the criteria. As a result of the 
Court's ruling, the number of accreditation applicants 
began to grow again, exceeding 6 000 by 2008 and 
8 000 in 2010) (Minamata Disease Museum, 2010). 
In 2009, an Act on Special Measures (the so-called 
'second political solution') was passed without 
changing the strict 1977 criteria. It was determined 
that Chisso should pay lump sums of JPY 2.1 million 
(about EUR 20 000) to patients who at least have 
paresthesia and who had lived in defined affected 
areas for at least one year during a defined period of 
time (Kumamoto Prefecture, 2010). Similar to the first 
reconciliation in 1995–1996, the lump sum money is 
not compensation but relief money because neither 
the government nor Chisso admits liability and the 
patients are not formally recognised as 'Minamata 
disease patients'. 
It is expected that most of the applicants involved 
in litigation will withdraw their actions. Residents 
who have never applied for compensation but have 
neurological symptoms are also able to apply for 
lump sums. However, the outcome is perplexing. 
While 2 273 patients were officially recognised as 
Minamata disease patients in the affected prefectures, 
there are also at least several tens of thousands 
of exposed patients with neurological signs 
characteristic of methylmercury poisoning who have 
not been formally recognised as Minamata disease 
patients and not properly compensated. 
Despite the enactment of the Act on Special Measures, 
several lawsuits are still under way because the Act 
defined the affected area and time period without 
investigating or defining evidential criteria. It is 
known that exposed residents with neurological 
signs characteristic of methylmercury poisoning are 
observed in areas other than those defined in the 
Act (Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun, 2010a). The 
approach used in the Act has shortcomings. First, it 
is inappropriate to define 'areas' based on the notion 
of food poisoning; instead, exposed persons with 
relevant symptoms should be counted as patients. 
Furthermore, the problem will persist because 
individuals who were exposed in the uterus but 
were not severely enough affected to be recognised 
as 'congenital' Minamata disease patients are not 
covered by the Act. 
5.4.3 Criminal charges
One criminal case was put forward against 
Chisso in 1975 although a number of civil trials 
were raised against the factory. The report by 
Hunter et al. (1940) was the best known in Japan, 
although the danger of using organic mercury 
in the production had been common knowledge 
long before 7 May 1932, when Chisso began to 
discharge effluents containing organic mercury 
(5)  The Aarhus Convention and 'right to know' laws have made public access to data and decision-making an issue of critical 
importance. 
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into Minamata Bay (Iriguchi 2012). However, the 
accused stressed that toxicity of methylmercury 
was not well known before 1956 when the first 
patient was notified by the Minamata Public Health 
Center. In 1979, the Kumamoto District Court 
sentenced the ex-president and the ex-factory-head 
to two years in prison with three years suspension 
of sentence. The Japanese Supreme Court accepted 
the court's ruling as final in 1988.
5�5 What are the lessons of the 
Minamata disease story?
5.5.1 Medical, scientific and public health lessons
Respond to the signals of sentinel wildlife
As a result of the pollution route, at Minamata harm 
to wildlife was observed before human harm. Fish 
and cats died strangely before the first patients were 
observed in Minamata and surrounding areas, and 
the same pattern occurred at Niigata. Subsequently, 
those who lived and worked close to nature and 
who ate the local fish were the first to suffer from 
pollution. The earliest cases identified lived close 
enough to the sea that they could fish from their 
windows. They were people who lived at one with 
nature.
This suggests that, as a general rule, when wildlife 
impacts are observed we should ensure that we 
understand the epidemiology, identify the source 
of the problem and take action to prevent human 
suffering. Minamata showed that effective action 
(preventing the discharge of pollution) was 
possible even before the first patients were notified. 
Early actions are justified by our responsibility to 
protect the environment — but they can also avoid 
subsequent harm to humans.
Prevention is possible and essential
As Hajime Hosokawa (Director of Chisso hospital) 
pointed out 'prevention is far more important than 
relief.' (Harada, 2004). It was already known in 
1921 that organic mercury was synthesised in the 
production of acetaldehyde (Ishihara, 2002; Vogt 
and Nieuwland, 1921). And a researcher at Chisso 
factory had demonstrated that organic mercury 
was synthesised in the production of acetaldehyde 
in 1951 (Arima, 1979). Furthermore, intoxication 
due to occupational exposure to organic mercury 
was reported in the 1930s in Europe (Ishihara, 2002; 
Koelsch, 1937; Zangger, 1930). While these reports 
were published in Europe, especially in Germany 
(where Chisso had strong links since the 1920s), this 
is no excuse for a diligent company to be unaware of 
such important risks. Prevention was possible before 
the hideous consequences were first identified in 
1956. 
Early epidemiological studies are valuable
Early epidemiological studies, 'good enough' for 
their purpose can play a key role in preventing and 
minimising future harm. The Kumamoto University 
research group's early study in 1956 demonstrated 
that eating fish caught in Minamata Bay was a cause 
of harm and this conclusion has never changed. 
Minamata is a classic example of how spurious 
demands for more precision with respect to the cause 
of harm resulted in unnecessary delay and continuing 
exposure ('analysis by paralysis'). It was three years 
before the etiologic agent was found and six years 
before the mechanism by which methylmercury 
was produced was (re)discovered. As an important 
principle, this shows that prompt countermeasures 
should be conducted when the cause is identified and 
should not be postponed until an etiological agent or 
the biological mechanism of action is identified.
In-depth epidemiological studies are also valuable
While early epidemiological studies should have been 
heeded, far more could have been done to reduce 
harm if there had been more early epidemiological 
effort focusing on the features of the disease (such as 
the threshold, frequency and severity of symptoms; 
the scale of poisoning; and the prognosis). The first 
systematic epidemiological study of the features 
of the disease was not conducted until 1971. An 
investigation by the Department of Internal Medicine 
in 1960 only focused on the severest cases and 
did not follow up with the participants. Similarly 
the Kumamoto Prefecture Institute for Health 
Research's investigation of mercury concentrations in 
1 645 healthy fishermen in 1960 was not able to follow 
up the participants. Follow-up studies would have 
revealed the developments of neurological symptoms 
or the dose-response relationship between exposure 
and symptoms. 
Instead, the initial emphasis was placed on clinical 
manifestation (Hunter-Russell syndrome) and 
became bogged down in legal dispute about what 
was and was not Minamata disease. However, after 
organic mercury or fish was identified as a cause, 
causal criteria (i.e. cause and disease) should have 
been used in subsequent epidemiological studies. 
They should also have been used from the outset 
to certify patients and determine entitlement to 
compensation.
Demands for excessive levels of scientific proof can 
exacerbate harm
The history of Minamata disease provides many 
examples of spurious obstacles and inappropriate 
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(6)  The excessive dominance of one discipline in a multidisciplinary dispute was noted in Late lessons from early warnings Volume 1 
(EEA, 2001).
burdens of proof, which prevented speedy and 
effective action. The demand for high levels of 
scientific proof (i.e. 'clear evidence' or 'beyond the 
reasonable doubt') was used as spurious cover, 
allowing Chisso to delay the search for what 
turned out to be a simple alternative production 
technology that avoided methylmercury pollution. 
Epidemiology demonstrated that poisoning was 
caused by contaminated fish and the factory 
discharge in 1956. This was unintentionally 
confirmed when the drainage route was altered 
in 1958 causing new victims in the new discharge 
area. There was a tendency for many stakeholders 
to accept that high evidential burden was required 
to justify taking preventative action.
Be wary of deliberately manufactured doubt
Regulators (and others) should be attuned to 
'manufacturing of doubt' by those with sufficient 
means and an incentive to maintain the status 
quo. At various points, alternative explanations 
arose for the harm, such as metals, dumped 
explosives or amines in rotten fish and these were 
exploited to the full by Chisso and its supporters in 
government. 
Of course, a plurality of viewpoints is essential for 
scientific analysis. Indeed, during the early stages 
of the disaster various metals were considered as 
possible causes but these were dropped when the 
evidence did not stand up to scrutiny. Ironically, 
this openness to consider alternative explanations 
was then used by Chisso to criticise the researchers 
when they concluded that methymercury was the 
likely cause. 
Several characteristics distinguish those 
manufacturing doubt, often by proxy, from 
those promoting genuine open debate. Often 
they demand high levels of proof for results that 
demand action from the vested interest but accept 
low levels of proof (or standards of analysis) for 
their alternative hypothesis, which may be the 
object of criticism from scientific peers. They also 
fail to consider the pros and cons of alternative 
courses of action judged from the perspective 
of society as a whole and that of the wider 
environment.
Look beneath the tip of the iceberg
Throughout the history of Minamata disease, 
researchers have consistently discovered more 
subtle effects, at lower exposure concentrations. 
However neurologists, who occupied a dominant 
position in the process (6), became fixated on 
qualitative diagnostic method and a set of symptoms 
(Hunter-Russell syndrome), which were used to 
determine the disease's presence. This insistence 
restricted greater understanding of the disease in all 
its manifestations.
The legalistic approach to accreditation and 
compensation compounded the problems, 
encouraging constant premature attempts to define 
formally what Minamata disease is and is not. 
A number of scientists involved in the compensation 
process ended up having their reputations damaged 
by defending rigid criteria that became increasingly 
indefensible as time progressed.
Congenital Minamata disease
The uterus is part of the environment: to pollute 
the exterior environment is to pollute the uterus 
and thereby to pollute future life (Harada, 2005). 
Contrary to previous assumptions, we now know 
that the biological barrier of the uterus (and also 
the blood brain barrier) cannot be assumed to 
prevent the transfer of substances not found in the 
natural world or high exposure to substances that 
are naturally of low concentrations. The former are 
synthetic chemical compounds created by man. 
The latter are things we dig up from the earth, 
concentrate, process and use in great quantities. 
On a practical note, the Minamata disaster has 
demonstrated the utility of umbilical cords for 
assessing pollution and shows that simple methods 
of preservation of biological tissue are sufficient to 
capture the disease's history (Miller, 1976). 
5.5.2 Social lessons
A narrow focus on economic growth subverts 
society's wellbeing
The economic and political power of one factory or 
stakeholder can dominate public health interests 
in a context that is strongly oriented to promoting 
economic growth. In this case, the factory was 
Chisso, which had a great influence in Japanese 
industry and society in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
Economic growth was the top priority in Chisso and 
in Japanese society more broadly.
It is noteworthy that after years of scientific 
evidence of harm to humans, it was only when the 
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production process was no longer needed that the 
factory changed its processes and the government 
altered its stance regarding the harm. In Minamata, 
acetaldehyde production became unnecessary 
and stopped on 18 May 1968. Only after this date 
did the Japanese government officially accept 
the causal relationship between wastewater from 
Chisso factory and Minamata disease.
Discrimination perpetuates harm
The Minamata story reveals discrimination in 
various forms. There was discrimination against 
the fishermen of South Kyushu, who were poor 
and situated far from Tokyo, the geographical 
and political centre of Japan. It is notable that 
when the discharge from paper manufacturing in 
Tokyo caused fishery damage in 1958, the Tokyo 
metropolitan government halted the factory's 
production (Hashimoto, 2000). 
Furthermore, when the disease occurred it was 
initially considered infectious. Patients were 
shunned and avoided by other community 
members and experienced years of discrimination. 
Fear of this actually prevented patients from 
coming forward. They also experienced 
discrimination after they obtained compensation 
money. 
Don't 'shoot the messenger' who brings 
'inconvenient truths' 
After the Minamata Food Poisoning Committee 
published its organic mercury theory, the 
Committee was suddenly dissolved without stated 
reason. With hindsight, it is evident that their 
conclusions were not welcome to the authorities. 
Indeed, researchers at Kumamoto University were 
criticised as being a 'hick' university by the 'centre' 
after they proposed the organic mercury theory. 
Stakeholders can supress science
Science can be absorbed and suppressed by 
the stakeholders such as industries and public 
authorities. Hajime Hosokawa, Director of Chisso 
hospital, demonstrated that giving a cat wastewater 
from acetaldehyde production induced Minamata 
disease. These results were suppressed by the 
factory. Later, Kumamoto University School of 
Medicine, which had initially analysed organic 
mercury as a cause of Minamata disease, joined the 
(pro-industry, later discredited) Tamiya Committee 
and began to receive research funds from Chisso 
factory and the Tamiya Committee. From that time, 
Minamata disease became a sensitive research issue 
at Kumamoto University.
Similarly, the Japanese Central Council in 1991 
(JSPN, 2003) was not neutral and its discussions were 
directed towards complying with the EAJ's views. 
This fact was hidden from the public. Furthermore, 
JSPN also pointed out that biased distribution of 
public research funding played an important role in 
e.g. controlling researchers (JSPN, 2000).
Information must be transparent and broadly 
communicated
It is important to be transparent with information 
and to communicate it widely so that events are not 
repeated elsewhere. With better management of 
information, Niigata Minamata disease could have 
been avoided altogether. 
While transparency and communications have 
improved in many advanced industrial economies, 
the translocation of manufacturing capacity 
elsewhere means that the consequences of product 
manufacture may no longer be transparent to 
consumers in advanced economies. Moreover, there 
are cases where information is not communicated 
to the public. Indeed, in Minamata, none of the 
information generated was publicly communicated 
to residents during the contamination period.
5.5.3 Inter-disciplinary lessons
Value of lay and local knowledge
Lay and local knowledge should not be ignored. 
The fishermen knew that that fish could not live in 
water from the outfall from Chisso factory before 
Minamata disease occurred. Minamata citizens 
knew that mercuric salt was used to produce 
acetaldehyde in 1959. Finally, as described in the 
conversation between Masazumi Harada and the 
mother of congenital Minamata disease patient, 
the mother had deduced that neurological signs 
observed in her son were due to Minamata disease, 
at a time when this was assumed to be impossible 
by experts. The value of lay and local knowledge 
is one of the 'Twelve late lessons' of Volume 1 
(EEA, 2001) (7).
Interdisciplinary barriers and the absence of open 
discussion augment harm
In the Minamata case, a lack of open discussion 
delayed preventive actions, obscured the features 
(7)  See also the report from EEA workshop on Lay, local traditional knowledge and citizen science, June 2011 (http://lltk.ew.eea.
europa.eu/about/lltk-and-citizen-science-meeting-report.pdf).
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of the disease and postponed its resolution. 
Researchers at Kumamoto University did not know 
what was produced at the factory, how it was 
produced, or what substances were used in which 
processes. The Research Group did not receive 
assistance from the engineers at Chisso factory, 
or from the organic chemistry sector of School 
of Engineering at Kumamoto University. Even 
within medicine, epidemiology was considered an 
inferior discipline and neurologists did not apply 
epidemiological thinking in certifying patients. 
Among the universities, it was said that scientists 
from the 'centre' could be trusted over those from 
'hick' universities on the periphery. 
The Japanese medical community misunderstood or 
was unfamiliar with the Food Sanitation Act, which 
must have bolstered the government's position. 
According to the Food Sanitation Act, doctors who 
recognise food poisoning must notify the local 
health centre, which must investigate the problem. 
No doctors (both clinicians and researchers) notified 
this outbreak as food poisoning in Kumamoto 
Prefecture. Instead, they continued to search for the 
etiologic agents. Had doctors treated and identified 
this as food poisoning, the government would have 
had difficulty not applying the Act.
Even the ministry responsible for health policy was 
unfamiliar with the Act. In 1990, the MHWJ argued 
that the government did not apply the Act because 
the etiological agent (methylmercury) had not been 
identified in 1957. In fact, the Act should have been 
applied when cause/transmission was identified. 
The different approach employed in the food 
poisoning case in Shizuoka in 1950 suggests that not 
applying the Act in Minamata was a political choice.
Finally, there was little direct discussion between 
stakeholders. In Japan, even in 2010, policymaking 
decisions do not involve stakeholders such 
as patients' organisations. However, EAJ and 
the exposed patients do share some common 
perspectives and conclusions regarding Minamata 
disease. The protracted legal action might have 
been shortened via direct dialogue between EAJ 
and the exposed patients. The fact that experts at 
the university, the health centre and Chisso were 
not willing to hear and consider the opinions of 
lay and local people are symptoms of the same 
problem. Recently, there are some measures toward 
Minamata's regeneration, such as making Minamata 
city a model city for the environment, facilitating 
waste reduction and recycling etc. (Minamata 
Disease Museum, 2007). In particular, the word 
'Moyainaoshi' (the re-establishment of emotional 
ties or reconciliation) is often used to strengthen 
interpersonal ties so that citizens can speak up in 
public about Minamata disease issues. Despite such 
efforts, there is still little discussion about how to 
support patients, investigating the exposed patients 
etc. to solve the real problem of Minamata disease. 
It can be said that Japan still faces a problem of 
democracy (George, 2001). 
Table 5�1 Early warnings and actions
1908 The Nihon Carbide factory was established in Minamata
1921 Methylmercury synthesised during acetaldehyde production in Germany
1921 The Chisso factory in Minamata Bay bought German patent and began using carbide and acetylene to manufacture a 
wide range of chemicals
1925–1926 The company began to receive requests for compensation from the fishing cooperative. On the condition that no 
further complaints would ever be lodged, Chisso paid a small amount of 'sympathy money'
1932 The Chisso factory in Minamata began to produce acetaldehyde from acetylene gas, using mercury as a catalyst
1930–1937 Mercury poisoning in German factories using acetaldehyde
1943 The issue of fishery damage arose again due to carbide residue from acetylene production and another compensation 
contract was concluded
1949 More fishery damage negotiations failed. Chisso said the catch data were 'not scientific'
1950 Fishermen around Minamata Bay witnessed huge numbers of fish rising to the surface and swimming around as 
though crazy. Sea birds were unable to fly. Oysters and cockles were washed up onto the beach rotting with their 
shells open. Barnacles did not attach themselves to boats fishing near factory outlet
1951 Chisso increased production of acetaldehyde and related methylmercury pollution from the factory
1952 Upon request from local fishermen, the Fisheries Division of the Kumamoto Prefecture inspected the factory and 
Chisso documents about mercury use and discharge. As a result they reported that the discharge should be analysed. 
Kumamoto Prefecture and Chisso failed to do this and fishery damage continued
1953 Local cats, which ate great quantities of fish, went mad and died after strange dancing and convulsions
1956 1 May: First official notification of strange disease to the Minamata Public Health Centre. 
28 May: Minamata Strange Disease Countermeasures Committee was organised by Chisso Hospital, local doctors and 
Minamata Public Health Centre. 30 cases including 11 deaths were identified. Kumamoto University Research Group 
reported that the disease was not contagious (as was claimed at first) but rather a food poisoning from eating fish 
contaminated by a heavy metal in Minamata Bay
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1957 Kumamoto University Research Group recommended prohibiting fishing under the Food Sanitation Act. Japanese 
Ministry of Health and Welfare Research Group from Tokyo confirms local conclusions and recommends full 
investigation of Chisso effluents. In response to these findings, the local government of Kumamoto Prefecture 
considered applying the Food Sanitation Act in March 1957, although the Chief of the Public Health Bureau of the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan replied to the local government that it is impossible to apply the Food 
Sanitation Act. Then, the local government abandoned the application
1958 Chisso changed the drainage route of acetaldehyde production from Minamata Bay to Minamata River
1958 UK neurologist Douglas McAlpine examined 15 Minamata disease patients and reported his observations in The 
Lancet, listing methylmercury as one of the metals which could induce Minamata disease. This was the first time in 
a scientific paper that methylmercury was identified as possible cause. McAlpine was prevented from presenting his 
findings to the Japanese Society of Neurology
1959 On 7 October 1959, Chisso Hospital director Hajime Hosokawa fed factory effluent to cats and induced Minamata 
disease but this was suppressed until a compensation case in 1970
1959 Organic mercury was recognised as the etiological agent by the Minamata Food Poisoning Committee organised by 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan on 12 November 1959. However, there was no mention of the source of 
the contamination, Chisso factory. Indeed, the section chief of the Ministry of Health and Welfare's Environmental 
Sanitation Department asks for Chisso effluent case to be removed from report as it was not 'scientifically' proven. 
After the Committee had reported its opinion to the Minister of Health and Welfare, it was suddenly dissolved
1959 In December 1959, Chisso factory established an ineffective purifying system for the contaminated water
1960 Kumamoto Prefecture Institute for Health Research investigated the mercury concentration in hair samples from 
1 645 healthy fishermen from around Shiranui Sea. Results indicated that the contamination had spread throughout 
the entire Shiranui Sea
1962 An unusual occurrence of cerebral palsy infants was officially recognised as congenital Minamata Disease.
Professor Katsuro Irukayama succeeded in extracting methylmercury chloride from the sludge of the acetaldehyde 
production process in the factory but the Fisheries Agency abandoned research on Minamata disease. No research 
activities were conducted by government agencies until 1968
1965 Methylmercury food poisoning occurred in Niigata, causing 'Niigata Minamata disease'. The factory responsible 
(Showa Denko) operated in the same way as Chisso in Minamata
1968 In May, Chisso stopped its acetaldehyde production for commercial reasons. In total, 488 tonnes of mercury were 
discharged into the sea from 1932 to 1968.
After that, on 26 September, Japan's government accepts causal link between wastewater from Chisso (and Showa 
Denko) and Minamata disease
1969– Government compensation arrangements applied 'chaotically'.
Private compensation cases for Minamata victims begin
1971 On 7 August, 1971, the 'Administrative Vice Director of the EAJ Notice' was published, marking the first real policy 
change since 1956. 
The Department of Neuropsychiatry at Kumamoto University School of Medicine undertook the first and largest 
cross-sectional population-based investigation to evaluate the prevalence of neurological signs of Minamata disease 
among local residents
1972 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm. Two Minamata disease patients 
attended and created much public awareness
1973 Kumamoto District Court ordered Chisso factory to pay compensation to Minamata disease patients engaged in a 
lawsuit against the company
1975 From 1968, Masazumi Harada collected umbilical cords (traditionally preserved in Japan) from residents around 
Shiranui Sea and demonstrated a link between acetaldehyde production in Chisso factory and methylmercury; 
supporting the hypothesis that methylmercury could affect foetuses
1977 A new and more rigid set of government accreditation criteria for Minamata disease required a combination of 
neurological signs: the '1977 criteria'. These remain in force today. Subsequently, there was a rise in the number of 
patients who had methylmercury-related symptoms but were not formally accredited
1978 Kumamoto local government issues debt to help Chisso pay compensation
1995–1996 In the 'first political solution' the government and Chisso factory attempted to settle the conflict by paying lump 
sums (not as compensation) in 10 000 cases without changing the strict criteria or recognising affected individuals as 
official patients
2004 The Japanese Supreme Court confirmed the liability of the national and Kumamoto Prefecture governments for 
damage caused by methylmercury poisoning in the Minamata area. The court also ruled that the 1977 criteria should 
be relaxed
2009 The Act on Special Measures (the so-called 'second political solution') was passed without changing the strict 1977 
criteria. Chisso to pay lump sums to patients, not as compensation but relief money because neither the government 
nor Chisso admits liability and the patients are not formally recognised as 'Minamata disease patients'
2009– UNEP initiates a global mercury phase-out and works to develop a global legally binding instrument on mercury, 
planned for signature in Japan in 2013
2013– Private law suits still continue
Table 5�1 Early warnings and actions (cont�)
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From Minamata to Global Health Risk
Philippe Grandjean (8) (9)
While the Minamata incident was being elucidated, 
other methylmercury poisonings occurred elsewhere 
due to extensive use of mercury fungicides 
and improper labelling. Treated seed grain was 
mistakenly used for bread-making, and the most 
serious poisoning incident happened in Iraq during 
a famine in 1970-1971 (Bakir et al., 1973). A widely 
cited report on 93 poisoned Iraqi adults reported 
that facial paraesthesia was the earliest clinical sign 
of poisoning and showed a clear dose-dependence 
(Bakir et al., 1973). However, the study was 
small in comparison with the officially recorded 
6 500 hospitalisations, of whom 459 died (Bakir 
et al., 1973), and the amount of treated grain used 
(100 000 tonnes) would suggest that many more 
may have been poisoned. The first author of the 
science report, Farhan Bakir, was later recognised 
as Saddam Hussein's personal physician, then in 
exile along with at least one other Iraqi co-author 
(Giles, 2003; Hightower, 2009). As no useful 
dose-response data were available from Minamata, 
the Iraqi data were used for many years as the 
main documentation for risk assessment. Given 
the history of the poisonings, one can assume that 
methylmercury toxicity was at least not exaggerated 
(Grandjean et al., 2010). 
Attention turned to neurotoxicity during brain 
development as a result of an experimental study: 
rats exposed during early development showed 
adverse effects that were not apparent at first, but 
later became obvious as deranged behaviour in the 
mature animals (Spyker et al., 1972). This report 
clearly supported the Minamata evidence as well 
as a Swedish report 20 years earlier that described 
mental retardation in two children exposed to 
methylmercury from treated grain (Engleson and 
Herner, 1952). 
There was another surprise when Swedish 
researchers examined the chemical fate of mercury 
in a simple aquarium: methylmercury was 
formed from inorganic mercury compounds in 
the aquarium sediment. None was formed after 
prior autoclaving of the sediment, suggesting that 
microorganisms played a role (Jensen and Jernelov, 
1967). Although these processes were of little 
(8) This work was funded, in part, by the NIH, National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences (ES09797). 
(9) Competing interests declaration: Philippe Grandjean has provided paid expert testimony on mercury toxicology for the 
US Department of Justice in a legal case concerning environmental pollution from coal-fired power plants.
significance in Minamata, where methylmercury 
was formed in the acetaldehyde plant (Grandjean 
et al., 2010), methylation of mercury suddenly 
became a world-wide problem. Widespread use of 
methylmercury for seed dressing or as a fungicide 
in paper mills was already known to cause local 
pollution of waterways and coastal waters. Now 
it turned out that any release of mercury could 
be converted into the dangerous methylmercury 
molecule. Studies in North America verified that 
bio-accumulation took place, with the highest 
concentrations at the top of the food chains (Fimreite, 
1974). Although the first studies were contradicted 
and explained away, methylmercury contamination 
of fish emerged as a worldwide concern. Many rivers 
and lakes were already so polluted with mercury that 
fish advisories against eating sports fish were issued, 
especially in countries like Canada, Sweden and the 
US Advisories against eating locally caught fish now 
affect over 16 million lake acres and 1.3 million river 
miles in the US (US EPA, 2007). 
Mercury must always have been a natural 
component of life on the planet, but pollution has 
released large amounts to the biosphere. Mercury 
analyses of preserved hair, teeth, and feathers from 
Arctic indicator species show that current levels are 
about ten times those in pre-industrial times (Dietz 
et al., 2009). 
After the discovery that exposures to lead at levels 
considered to be 'low' could cause damage to brain 
development (Needleman et al., 1979), researchers 
suspected that methylmercury might have similar 
effects and may not be safe at common levels 
of exposure. Some of the most highly exposed 
populations were indigenous groups. In Canada, a 
study of 234 Cree children showed abnormal tendon 
reflexes with increased mercury concentrations 
in maternal hair which reflected exposure during 
pregnancy (McKeown-Eyssen et al., 1983). Soon 
after, a larger study from New Zealand showed 
that increased levels of mercury in mothers' hair 
during pregnancy were associated with delayed 
brain development of their children (Kjellström 
et al., 1986; Kjellström et al., 1989). The results 
were published after peer review by the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency, but were ignored 
for formal reasons by other regulatory authorities, 
allegedly because the reports had not appeared in a 
peer-reviewed scientific journal. 
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Two large prospective studies were then initiated in 
the mid-1980s. The largest consisted of 1 000 children 
from the Faroe Islands and concluded that 
low-level methylmercury exposure during prenatal 
development was associated with deficits in several 
brain functions at school age; clear deficits were 
apparent well below a previously proposed safe level 
of 10 μg/g for mercury concentration in maternal 
hair (Grandjean et al., 1997). On the other hand, 
largely non-positive findings were initially reported 
in children from a similar study in the Seychelles 
(Myers et al., 2003), and the apparent disagreement 
was perceived as a controversy and fuelled a debate 
on uncertainty (Grandjean, 1999), with resonance in 
trade journals, internet sites, commercial campaigns, 
and even an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. 
Additional longitudinal data later appeared from 
Japan, Poland and the US in support of the Faroes 
conclusions (Jedrychowski et al., 2006; Lederman 
et al., 2008; Murata et al., 2006; Oken et al., 2008). 
Although less weighty, several cross-sectional studies 
also supported the existence of low-level exposure 
neurotoxicity (Grandjean et al., 2005).
The reasons for the apparent lack of mercury effects 
in the Seychelles could be that beneficial nutrients 
in fish might obliterate or dampen the mercury 
toxicity (Clarkson and Strain, 2003). New research 
from the Seychelles has recently shown that cognitive 
development in children was associated neither 
with maternal fish intake nor with methylmercury 
exposure, when each of them was considered 
separately. If maternal fish intake and mercury were 
included in the statistical analysis at the same time, 
then fish intake was clearly beneficial, while mercury 
had negative effects (Strain et al., 2008). Also, in the 
Faroes, the mercury toxicity became more prominent 
after adjustment for the beneficial effects of fish intake 
during pregnancy (Budtz-Jorgensen et al., 2007). 
Because of the apparent disagreement between the 
two major studies and the public health implications 
of mercury, the US White House in 1998 called for 
an international workshop with 30 invited experts, 
who were asked to critically examine the scientific 
evidence. They emphasised a variety of possible 
uncertainties. The conclusions stated that 'there are 
inadequate data … to draw meaningful conclusions 
at this time' (NIEHS, 1998). Despite the possibility 
that subclinical toxicity could easily be missed 
and underestimated, the workshop experts were 
quite optimistic: 'Measurement error can impact 
significantly on both the estimated levels of effect 
and the decision on the level of exposure at which 
an effect is detected because of the potential for 
misclassification. However, the data presented in the 
workshop suggest that the precision of measurements 
of methylmercury in hair or cord blood is very good.' 
The experts recommended further research. 
At the request of the US Congress, a new expert 
panel was then convened by the National Research 
Council (NRC, 2000) to determine whether an 
exposure limit of 0.1 μg/kg bodyweight per day was 
appropriate, as proposed by the US EPA on the basis 
of the data from Iraq. The committee supported 
the US EPA limit, but recommended that it should 
be based on the data from the Faroes study (which 
agreed with the overall evidence including New 
Zealand and Seychelles). 
This recommendation would seem justified and 
appropriate, but may not be sufficiently protective. 
First, the exposure limit should address the problem 
that mercury toxicity may be masked by increased 
intake of essential nutrients from seafood that 
promote brain development (Budtz-Jorgensen 
et al., 2007). If this adjustment is not made, mercury 
would seem less toxic than it really is. Second, all 
the calculations have assumed that the mercury 
exposures are precise, but any imprecision in 
exposure assessments will result in misclassification 
and a likely underestimate of the real mercury 
toxicity. If this factor is taken into account, the 
exposure limit should be decreased by about 50 % 
(Grandjean and Budtz-Jorgensen, 2007). 
Thus, the first likely cases of developmental 
methylmercury poisoning were already described 
in 1952 and subsequently reported from Minamata; 
replication in laboratory animals was published in 
1972; and the first prospective population study of 
prenatal methylmercury toxicity due to contaminated 
seafood in humans was published in 1986. However, 
scientific consensus on prenatal vulnerability was 
hampered by focusing on scientific details rather 
than public health implications, and international 
agreement on the need for protection against prenatal 
exposures was only reached in 2002, i.e. 50 years 
after the first medical report that methylmercury can 
damage brain development.
Environmental methylation of mercury in sediment 
was discovered accidentally, since systematic 
studies of mercury's environmental fate were not 
conducted, and initial studies focused on total 
mercury concentration, not on the methylmercury 
compound responsible for brain toxicity. Recognition 
of contamination of food chains and environmental 
bioaccumulation of methylmercury was therefore 
also delayed by several decades. 
Following the publication of new data on the adverse 
effects of low-level exposures to methylmercury, 
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regulatory agencies requested scientific scrutiny. 
Expert committees emphasised uncertainties and 
weaknesses in the available data. Less attention 
was paid to the question of what could have been 
known, given the research methods and possibilities, 
and whether developmental neurotoxicity at low 
doses could be ruled out. The reports also generally 
ignored that the imprecision of the measurements 
most likely resulted in an underestimate of the true 
effects. Instead, more research was recommended. 
The insistence on solid evidence promoted by 
polluters and regulatory agencies therefore agreed 
with a desire among researchers to expand scientific 
activities in this area. However, the wish to obtain 
a more complete proof had the untoward effect of 
delaying corrective action. 
In a commentary on the regulatory delays 
in dealing with methylmercury poisoning in 
Minamata, Professor Jun Ui wrote (quoted from 
D'Itri and D'Itri, 1978): 'It might be a coincidence, 
but a strange, parallel relationship was observed 
between the actual symptoms of Minamata Disease 
and the reactions of these formal organizations. 
A constriction of the visual field was common 
among all organizations. Ataxia, a loss of 
coordination between various parts of the body, 
was often exhibited in contradictions between the 
measures taken by various parts of the government. 
There was also a loss of sensation as the appeal 
of the victims went unheard and there was little 
effort to grasp the situation as a whole. Many 
organizations also reacted with spasmic convulsions 
when they faced the problem. This was followed 
by mental retardation and forgetfulness.' It seems 
that memory loss, narrow-mindedness, and lack 
of coordination also affected the planning and 
the interpretation of environmental research on 
methylmercury in a more general sense. 
Important early warnings of methylmercury toxicity
1952 First report on developmental methylmercury neurotoxicity in two infants
1960 Mental retardation in Minamata associated with maternal seafood diet
1955–1972 Poisoning epidemics from use of methylmercury-treated seed grain for baking and cooking 
1967 Demonstration of mercury methylation in sediments 
1972 Experimental study of delayed effects due to developmental neurotoxicity
1978 Exposure limit based on toxicity in adults
1986 First epidemiology report on adverse effects in children related to maternal fish intake during pregnancy in 
New Zealand
1997 Confirmation from the Faroe Islands on adverse effects in children from methylmercury in maternal seafood 
intake during pregnancy
1998 White House workshop of 30 scientists identifies uncertainties in evidence
2000 US National Research Council supports exposure limit based on Faroes data 
2004 European Food Safety Authority recommends that exposures be minimised
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Mercury Science and Policy since 
Minamata: Four Insights for Policy
Noelle E. Selin
Introduction
The events at Minamata, as well as other serious 
instances of high-dose exposure, showed 
the extremely toxic potential of mercury. 
Furthermore, beginning in the 1960s, widespread 
environmental contamination by mercury beyond 
locally-contaminated areas began to be measured 
by scientists and addressed by policymakers. 
Mercury emerged through the late 20th century as a 
substance known to pose risks at locations far from 
its release, and at low doses (UNEP, 2002). In the 
21st century, policies continue to be developed to 
address the global spread of mercury, and scientists 
and policymakers are becoming increasingly aware 
of the complexities of the links between human 
activities such as energy production and connections 
between mercury and other environmental and 
health issues. The case history of mercury beyond 
Minamata provides four major and partially 
overlapping insights into the application of 
scientific knowledge to political efforts to deal with 
environmental and human health hazards, for both 
scientists and policymakers. 
These are the need to: 
•	 conduct	research	into	'blind	spots';	
•	 encourage	policy-relevant	scientific	assessments;	
•	 design	policies	that	can	be	adapted	to	changing	
knowledge; and 
•	 acknowledge	and	manage	interactions	between	
different risk issues. 
Conduct research into 'blind spots'
A first insight from the mercury case, for the 
scientific community, is the need to conduct 
policy-relevant research into 'blind spots,' and be 
open for that research to challenge the dominant 
scientific understanding of a problem. (The scientific 
inertia that can lead to a focus on conventional 
paradigms is also illustrated in Chapter 26 on 
science for precautionary decision-making). The 
conventional wisdom in the 1970s was that mercury 
was essentially a local problem. The World Health 
Organization illustrated this view by stating: 'In 
the global cycle, most of the mercury is derived 
from natural sources whereas the local cycle is 
predominantly concerned with man-made release' 
(WHO and UNEP, 1976). A lawsuit by US swordfish 
distributors also challenged US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) mercury limits for fish, 
based on the understanding that anthropogenic 
mercury remained in directly-contaminated areas. 
The swordfish distributors argued that mercury in 
fish was naturally-occurring and thus should not be 
regulated as a contaminated product (US Court of 
Appeals, 1980). However, there was early evidence 
that mercury from human activities could be at least 
as important as natural mercury in remote areas, 
as reported by the US EPA in 1973: 'Mercury from 
burning coal is dispersed widely, and may enter 
the aquatic or terrestrial environment far from the 
point of discharge. Since mercury discharged in 
this way is of the same order of magnitude as the 
total of mercury mined in the world, it appears 
advisable to try to develop a technology to remove 
mercury either from the coals or from stack gases' 
(Klein, 1973). Despite these early warnings, mercury 
continued to enter the global environment at an 
increasing rate. 
The understanding that mercury was a global 
problem began to emerge as predominant, at least 
scientifically, in the 1980s and early 1990s. Scientific 
research demonstrated clearly that industrial 
contaminants, including mercury and persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs), were present at elevated 
levels in areas far from their sources (Selin, 2010). 
A review of environmental concentrations of 
mercury in the Arctic environment in 1997 by the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP) noted that circumpolar levels of mercury 
were increasing in lake and ocean sediments and 
in the livers and kidneys of marine mammals 
(AMAP, 1997). While research about the degree of 
anthropogenic relative to natural contamination 
was still uncertain, AMAP urged Arctic countries 
to develop international mechanisms to address 
mercury contamination. The changed scientific 
understanding of mercury as a substance that travels 
long distances and poses risks far from its release 
points slowly began to shape policies to address 
mercury internationally.
Scientific understanding of the mercury problem 
continues to evolve. While international policy is 
now addressing the widespread spatial scale of 
mercury as a global problem, scientific research 
is also illuminating the multiple timescales under 
which mercury affects humans and the environment 
(Selin, 2011). Mercury mobilised from fossil sources 
continues to circulate in the land-atmosphere-ocean 
system over timescales longer than those 
considered by policies. It will take an estimated 
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3 000–10 000 years for mercury so mobilised to 
return to deep-ocean sediments (Mason and Sheu, 
2002; Selin et al., 2008). A corollary to this is that 
only about one third of mercury currently entering 
ecosystems comes from direct anthropogenic 
activity. Another third results from natural sources, 
and the remainder is legacy mercury, previously 
emitted from anthropogenic sources, continuing to 
circulate between the land, ocean and atmosphere. 
This means that human perturbations to the global 
mercury cycle are very long-lived, and the Earth 
system will recover only slowly from historical 
mercury contamination. On the other hand, 
some environments may respond very quickly to 
decreases in mercury input (Harris et al., 2007). One 
example is the Northeast US, where, coincident 
with and likely as a result of regional policies to 
reduce emissions, concentrations of mercury in fish 
declined from 1999 to 2004 (Hutcheson et al., 2006). 
Monitoring the continuing impacts of mercury in 
ecosystems, and potential improvements resulting 
from policies, will require this evolving scientific 
understanding of the environmental timescales of 
mercury to be taken into account. 
Encourage policy-relevant scientific assessments 
A second insight from the interface with science 
and policymaking, relevant to both scientists and 
policymakers, is that scientific information on 
new risks can influence the policy process through 
targeted, international scientific assessments. These 
are widely applied to inform international and 
global policymaking on environmental issues such 
as ozone depletion and climate change (Eckley, 
2001; Mitchell et al., 2006). In the case of mercury, 
they provide a mechanism for new scientific 
understanding to be taken up and addressed. This 
suggests that scientists should participate actively in 
international assessment processes. 
An example of the influence of scientific assessments 
on mercury policy occurred in the late 20th 
century. The process that led to the 1997 AMAP 
assessment, discussed above, was a critical factor 
in bringing mercury contamination of remote areas 
to public attention (Selin and Selin, 2008). Partially 
influenced by the AMAP work, the Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), 
a regional agreement among the countries of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(including western and eastern European countries, 
Russia, the United States and Canada), was one of 
the first international bodies to express interest in 
addressing mercury. Following their own scientific 
assessment process (UNECE, 1995), CLRTAP 
countries negotiated a protocol on heavy metals, 
which was adopted in 1998 and entered into force 
in 2003. The protocol requires parties to reduce 
emissions of three heavy metals (lead and cadmium 
as well as mercury) below 1990 levels (or, alternately, 
below the year of their choice between 1985 and 
1995), and to apply limit values and best available 
techniques to control major sources. 
Another example of scientific assessments of 
mercury influencing policy came when, in 
response to growing global concerns about 
mercury, a mercury assessment organised by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
concluded that there was 'sufficient evidence of 
significant global adverse impacts to warrant 
international action to reduce the risks to human 
health and/or the environment arising from the 
release of mercury into the environment' (UNEP, 
2002). Despite this strong statement, policy actions 
following this pronouncement proceeded slowly, as 
there were strong political interests both in favour of 
and against a mercury treaty (Selin and Selin, 2006). 
However, in 2009, partly as a result of a change in 
the position of the United States (after a change 
in presidential administration), countries agreed 
to begin negotiations on a global, legally-binding 
instrument to address mercury. The process towards 
a global mercury treaty began in 2009 with the goal 
of completing negotiations in 2013. This delay shows 
that even with strong scientific assessments, gaining 
international consensus, balancing political and 
stakeholder interests, is a lengthy process, and can 
be slow to respond to new scientific information and 
understanding of the problem. 
Design policies to adapt to changing knowledge
A third insight, for policymakers, is that 
policymaking processes and policies should be 
designed so that specific policies can be revised and 
adapted to reflect new information and changing 
scientific understanding. Early policies, focused on 
local contamination of mercury, did not address 
its long-range impacts, and new institutional 
frameworks such as a mercury treaty are thus 
needed to address mercury as a global problem. 
As noted above, gaining political agreement for 
new institutions can delay action for years to 
decades. As scientific work continues to reveal new 
information and paradigms change, flexible policies 
might be able to respond more quickly. 
Even today, few policies address the full complexity 
of mercury in the environment. While there are 
several forms of mercury emitted from ecosystems 
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— long-lived forms that transport globally and 
other forms that cause local impacts — policies 
generally treat all forms of mercury in the same way. 
A recent review of the effectiveness of the CLRTAP 
heavy metals protocol noted that pollution control 
techniques specified by the protocol primarily 
address the forms that cause local impacts, raising 
questions about how effective mercury controls are at 
addressing the forms that cause global contamination 
(van der Gon et al., 2005). In addition, there are few 
links between policies that address emissions and 
those that address exposure and impacts (Selin, 2011).
Policies for minimising mercury exposure through 
dietary advice for fish consumers are one area where 
interventions have been expanded, formalised and 
revised over time. In 2003, the Joint FAO/WHO 
Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) 
revised its provisional tolerable weekly intake (PWTI) 
of methylmercury from 3.3 μg kg–1 bodyweight per 
week down to 1.6 μg kg–1 bodyweight per week, 
specifically to protect against developmental toxicity 
for childbearing women. Some countries have also 
set domestic standards. For example, the United 
Kingdom Food Standards Agency recommends 
that pregnant women and children under 16 avoid 
eating shark, marlin and swordfish, and minimise 
their consumption of tuna to four medium-sized 
cans or two steaks per week (United Kingdom Food 
Standards Agency, 2004). In Sweden, pregnant or 
nursing women are advised to avoid eating fish 
high in mercury more than two or three times a year 
(Sweden National Food Agency (Livsmedelsverket), 
2011). Some research has shown that the consequence 
of dietary advice focused on methylmercury has 
been an overall decrease in fish consumption by 
pregnant women (Burger and Gochfeld, 2008). There 
is growing scientific understanding of the benefits 
of n-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids (n-3 PUFAs), 
nutrients present in fish and shellfish, on prenatal 
development (Mahaffey et al., 2011). Some fish, 
however, such as mackerel or herring, are high in 
n-3 PUFAs and low in mercury, suggesting that 
dietary advice could better reflect fish choices to 
maximise benefit and minimise risk (Mahaffey et al., 
2011). However, sensitive populations continue to be 
exposed to high levels of methylmercury, suggesting 
the potential for improved risk management 
(Mahaffey et al., 2009).
Acknowledge and manage interactions between risk 
issues
As a fourth and final insight, for both scientists 
and policymakers, the mercury case shows that 
acknowledging and managing both environmental 
and societal connections between different risk 
issues can be critical. From an environmental 
perspective, in addition to the potential benefits 
of fish consumption noted above, other pollutants 
such as PCBs may be present in different kinds 
of fish, complicating efforts to provide dietary 
advice (Mahaffey et al., 2011). Climate and other 
environmental changes can affect the mercury 
problem by changing environmental pathways of 
contamination (AMAP, 2011).
Societal issues such as economic development 
also intersect with the mercury issue. While global 
emissions of mercury have remained relatively 
constant since 1990 (Pacyna and Pacyna, 2002; Pacyna 
et al., 2006; Pacyna et al., 2009), this reflects increases 
in Asia, resulting from rapid industrialisation and the 
increasing use of coal, compensating for decreases in 
North America and Europe. Future Asian economic 
development, particularly in China, could lead to 
dramatic increase in mercury emissions from that 
region (Streets et al., 2009). In addition, increasing 
gold prices can lead to increased use of mercury in 
artisanal and small-scale gold mining (Spiegel and 
Veiga, 2005).
Governance-related connections have additional 
importance. Actions in the 1980s to reduce air 
pollution had substantial co-benefits for mercury 
reductions in Europe and North America, as 
traditional air pollutant controls can potentially 
achieve > 90 % emission reductions for mercury 
(Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use 
Management, 2010). Information about the 
long-range transport and low-dose effects of other 
substances, such as persistent organic pollutants, 
have also helped to improve the scientific 
understanding of mercury risks (Selin, 2010). 
Finding ways to harness and encourage co-benefits, 
while mitigating shared risks, is a complex and 
continuing challenge.
Concluding remarks
After decades of science and policy actions, 
mercury still poses significant challenges to society. 
A major reason is that conceptions of the mercury 
problem were initially limited, and scientific and 
policy understanding has continued to expand 
and increase in complexity, increasing complexity 
unfortunately being the rule rather than the 
exception in addressing environmental risks. 
The case of mercury shows that both scientists 
and policymakers can play an important role in 
risk management, through the four major insights 
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summarised above. Scientists should encourage 
early research into 'blind spots' expanding 
understanding of environmental complexity. 
Policymakers should support, and scientists should 
participate in, targeted and international scientific 
assessments for policy. Policymakers should also be 
conscious that scientific information can and will 
change and design policies accordingly. Finally, 
both scientists and policymakers would benefit 
from acknowledging the full complexities and 
links between environmental risks. Understanding 
and managing multiple, linked environmental 
and human stressors is a primary challenge for 
sustainability. 
While it is tempting to assume that our current 
understanding of the mercury problem represents 
a comprehensive picture of the real world, history 
suggests that both our understanding of the 
problem and our strategies to address it probably 
continue to have blind spots. A substantial area 
of uncertainty, for example, is the mechanism by 
which mercury is converted to methylmercury in 
the ocean. Additional connections with other risks 
— both environmental and social — are likely to be 
identified in the future. Drawing lessons from the 
mercury case, by encouraging expanded research 
paradigms, supporting scientific assessments, 
designing dynamic policies, and exploring and 
taking advantage of cross-issue connections — 
would help societies to better address risks and 
surprises in the future. 
References
AMAP, 1997, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the 
Arctic Environment Report, Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme, Oslo.
AMAP, 2011, Arctic Pollution 2011, Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme, Oslo.
Burger, J., and Gochfeld, M., 2008, 'Knowledge about 
fish consumption advisories: a risk communication 
failure within a university population', The Science of 
the Total Environment, 390, 346–354.
Eckley, N., 2001. Designing Effective Assessments: 
The Role of Participation, Science and Governance, 
and Focus. Report from a Workshop Co‑organized by 
the Global Environmental Assessment Project and 
the European Environment Agency, 1–3 March 2001. 
Expert's Corner, Environmental Issue Report No 26. 
Copenhagen, Denmark, European Environment 
Agency.
Harris, R.C., Rudd, J.W.M., Amyot, M., Babiarz, 
C.L., Beaty, K.G., Blanchfield, P.J., Bodaly, R.A., 
Branfireun, B.A., Gilmour, C.C., Graydon, J.A., 
Heyes, A., Hintelmann, H., Hurley, J.P., Kelly, 
C.A., Krabbenhoft, D.P., Lindberg, S.E., Mason, 
R.P.,Paterson, M.J., Podemski, C.L., Robinson, A., 
Sandilands, K.A., Southworth, G.R., St. Louis, V.L. 
and Tate, M.T., 2007, Whole‑ecosystem study shows 
rapid fish‑mercury response to changes in mercury 
deposition. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 
16 586–16 591.
Klein, D.H., 1973, Mercury in the Environment, 
EPA‑660/2‑73‑008, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Research and Development, 
Washington, D.C.
Hutcheson, M.S.,Rose, J., Smith, C.M., West, C.R., 
Pancorbo, O., Sullivan, J. and Eddy, B., 2006, 
Massachusetts fish tissue mercury studies: Long‑term 
monitoring results, 1999–2004, Boston, MA (http://
www.mass.gov/dep/toxics/stypes/hgtrend.pdf) 
accessed 3 March 2012.
Mahaffey, K.R., Clickner, R.P. and Jeffries, R.A., 2009, 
'Adult women's blood mercury concentrations vary 
regionally in the United States: association with 
patterns of fish consumption (NHANES 1999–2004)', 
Environmental Health Perspectives, 117(1), 47–53.
Mahaffey, K.R., Sunderland, E.M., Chan, H.M., 
Choi, A.L., Grandjean, P., Mariën, K., Oken, E., 
Sakamoto, M., Schoeny, R., Weihe, P., Yan, C.H. 
and Yasutake, A., 2011, 'Balancing the benefits of 
n-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids and the risks of 
methylmercury exposure from fish consumption', 
Nutrition Reviews, 69(9), 493–508.
Mason, R.P. and G. . Sheu, 2002, 'Role of the ocean 
in the global mercury cycle', Global Biogeochemical 
Cycles, 16.
Mitchell, R.B., Clark, W.C., Cash, D.W. and Frank 
Alcock, eds. 2006, Global Environmental Assessments: 
Information, Institutions, and Influence, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA.
Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use 
Management, 2010, Technologies for Control and 
Measurement of Mercury Emissions from Coal-Fired 
Power Plants in the United States, NESCAUM, 
Boston (http://www.nescaum.org/documents/hg-
control-and-measurement-techs-at-us-pps_201007.
pdf) accessed 3 March 2012.
Lessons from health hazards | Minamata disease: a challenge for democracy and justice
161Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Pacyna, E.G., and Pacyna, J.M., 2002, 'Global 
Emission of Mercury from Anthropogenic Sources in 
1995', Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, 137, 149–165.
Pacyna, E.G., Pacyna, J.M., Steenhuisen, F. and 
Wilson, S., 2006, 'Global anthropogenic mercury 
emission inventory for 2000', Atmospheric 
Environment, 40, 4 048–4 063.
Pacyna, E.G., Pacyna, J.M., Sundseth, K., Munthe, 
J., Kindbom, K., Wilson, S., Steenhuisen, F. and 
Maxson, P., 2009, Global emission of mercury to the 
atmosphere from anthropogenic sources in 2005 and 
projections to 2020, Atmospheric Environment.
Selin, H., 2010, Global Governance of Hazardous 
Chemicals: Challenges of Multilevel Management, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Selin, H., and Selin, N.E., 2008, 'Indigenous Peoples 
in International Environmental Cooperation: 
Arctic Management of Hazardous Substances', 
Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law, 17, 72–83.
Selin, N.E., 2011, 'Science and strategies to 
reduce mercury risks: a critical review', Journal of 
Environmental Monitoring: JEM, 13(9), 2 389–2 399.
Selin, N.E., and Selin, H., 2006, 'Global Politics 
of Mercury Pollution: The Need for Multi-Scale 
Governance', Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law, 15, 258–269.
Selin, N.E., Jacob, D.J., Yantosca, R.M., Strode, 
S., Jaeglé, L. and Sunderland, E.M., 2008, 'Global 
3-D land-ocean-atmosphere model for mercury: 
Present-day versus preindustrial cycles and 
anthropogenic enrichment factors for deposition', 
Global Biogeochemical Cycles, 22, GB2011.
Spiegel, S.J., and Veiga, M.M., 2005, 'Building 
Capacity in Small-Scale Mining Communities: 
Health, Ecosystem Sustainability, and the Global 
Mercury Project', EcoHealth, 2, 361–369.
Streets, D.G., Zhang, Q.and Wu, Y., 2009, 'Projections 
of Global Mercury Emissions in 2050', Environmental 
Science & Technology, 43, 2 983–2 988.
Sweden National Food Agency (Livsmedelsverket), 
2011, Råd om Fisk (http://slv.se/sv/grupp1/Mat-och-
naring/Kostrad/Rad-om-fisk/) accessed 7 November 
2011.
US Court of Appeals, 1980, United States of America 
v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc., edited, US Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
UNECE, 1995, Task Force on Heavy Metals Emissions: 
State‑of‑the‑Art Report. Second Edition. Executive Body 
for the Convention on Long‑Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution, Working Group on Technology. United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Prague, 
June 1995.
UNEP, 2002, Global Mercury Assessment, Inter‑
Organisation Programme for the Sound Management of 
Chemicals, United Nations Environment Programme, 
Geneva.
United Kingdom Food Standards Agency, 2004, 
Mercury in Fish (http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/
faq/mercuryfish/) accessed 7 November 2011.
van der Gon, H.A.C.D., van het Bolscher, M., 
Visschedijk, A.J.H. and Zandveld, P.Y.J., 2005, Study 
to the effectiveness of the UNECE Heavy Metals Protocol 
and costs of possible additional measures, TNO Built 
Environment and Geosciences, Apeldoorn, the 
Netherlands.
WHO and UNEP, 1976, Environmental Health Criteria 
I: Mercury, International Programme on Chemical Safety, 
World Health Organization and United Nations 
Environment Programme (http://www.inchem.org/
documents/ehc/ehc/ehc001.htm) accessed 3 March 
2012.
Lessons from health hazards | Minamata disease: a challenge for democracy and justice
162 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Mercury in fish — the need for better 
information about contaminant 
exposures
Argelia Castaño
There is no doubt about adverse effects of mercury 
in highly exposed populations, but the question 
is where to put an acceptable level for the general 
population? The major source of methyl-mercury is 
fish and particularly large marine fishes like tuna, 
sharks and swordfish. Fish and marine products are 
rich in unsaturated fatty acids which reduce the risk 
of cardiovascular disease and therefore are beneficial 
for health. Cardio-vascular disease is related to 
high consumption of red meat and dairy products 
and low intake of vegetables and fruits. Public 
health authorities are therefore recommending a 
Mediterranean diet with a high proportion of fish, 
marine products, vegetables and fruit as a way to 
reduce cardiovascular disease burden. 
However, the authorities are facing the dilemma of 
balancing the benefits of fish consumption with the 
assumed adverse effects of low level methyl-mercury 
exposures. Should the policymakers advise against 
fish consumption because of contaminants or are 
the negative effects of the contaminant burden 
still minor compared with the positive effects of a 
healthier diet? The issue is even more serious for 
indigenous populations, for example in the Arctic 
region, which traditionally have a diet based on 
marine species (seals, whales) which today have high 
levels of contaminants. Should we recommend these 
populations to change their diet to a Western life style 
diet with the accompanying new health problems 
like obesity and diabetes? The contaminants are there 
— we have to accept this although we should try to 
reduce the exposure by all means — but we have 
to be pragmatic in establishing the safe levels and 
not exaggerate the risks in the light of the obvious 
benefits.
Security and confidence are the driving forces 
for decision-making. For mercury we have a 
good knowledge base from experimental and 
epidemiological studies connecting body burdens 
and adverse effects. What is critical to assess is the 
exposure. How much mercury are we exposed to in 
our daily lives and from where is it coming? 
The decision makers need robust information 
before they can decide on mitigation strategies. 
The European Commission within the frame of 
Environment & Health action plan 2004-2010, 
has funded a project to standardise protocols for 
human biomonitoring in Europe (10). The protocols 
and methodologies that were developed are now 
being tested in a pilot study co-funded by 17 EU 
Member States with contribution from the EU LIFE+ 
programme (11). This study, which will be reported 
by the end of 2012, will provide an insight into 
mercury levels in children and their mothers in 
Europe, measured for the first time under strictly 
standardised and harmonised conditions. 
It will then be possible to map human mercury 
exposure at a European level with real and 
comparable numbers, even though the sample 
cannot be considered representative at national 
levels. For individual Member States this mapping 
provides an important benchmark which could 
assist in national mitigation strategies. Information 
of this kind is essential both for developing a 
European position for international negotiations 
concerning the implementation of the Global 
Mercury Treaty currently being progressed by 
UNEP and for helping national authorities and 
consumers to make better-informed choices about 
healthy diets. 
(10) http://www.eu-hbm.info/cophes. 
(11) http://www.eu-hbm.info/democophes.
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Scores of workers employed in nuclear weapons production have been diagnosed with chronic 
beryllium disease (CBD), a progressive and irreversible inflammatory lung disease. This chapter 
presents a history of knowledge and public policy about preventing beryllium-related disease, 
focusing primarily on the United States beryllium industry's role in shaping US regulatory policy.
Over several decades increasingly compelling evidence accumulated that CBD was associated 
with beryllium exposure at levels below the existing regulatory standard. The beryllium industry 
had a strong financial incentive to challenge the data and decided to be proactive in shaping 
interpretation of scientific literature on beryllium's health effects. It hired public relations and 
'product defence' consulting firms to refute evidence that the standard was inadequate. When the 
scientific evidence became so great that it was no longer credible to deny that workers developed 
CBD at permitted exposure levels, the beryllium industry responded with a new rationale to delay 
promulgation of a new, more protective exposure limit.
This case study underscores the importance of considering the hazards from toxic materials 
throughout the entire product life cycle. While primary producers of beryllium products may be 
able to control exposures in their own facilities, it is unlikely that many secondary users and 
recyclers have the expertise, resources and knowledge necessary to prevent beryllium disease in 
exposed workers and residents in nearby communities.
The primary lessons of this chapter are widely applicable to many environmental health 
controversies. In particular, it illustrates the practice of 'manufacturing uncertainty' — a strategy 
used by some polluters and manufacturers of hazardous products to prevent or delay regulation 
or victim compensation. 
This chapter is followed by an analysis of the rationale for corporate behaviour in the regulation 
of beryllium. It is argued that the availability of occasional and limited opportunities for 
companies to change course without suffering onerous consequences would encourage them to 
rethink their position and create an obligation on shareholders to take the responsible course. 
Although this may be perceived as letting them 'get away with it', the end result may be better 
public policy and corporate responsibility.
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6�1 Introduction
In a dramatic announcement on a national television 
news magazine in April 2000, Bill Richardson, the 
United States Secretary of Energy, acknowledged 
that his department had collaborated with the 
beryllium industry to defeat a 1975 attempt by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) to reduce workers' exposure to beryllium. 
The collaboration had been documented in a 
powerful newspaper exposé (Roe, 1999). 'Priority 
one was production of our nuclear weapons', 
Richardson stated, '[the] last priority was the safety 
and health of the workers that build these weapons' 
(ABC, 2000).
The Secretary of Energy's declaration was 
remarkable; rarely do the most senior officials in 
government admit deception that resulted in death 
and disability of its own citizens. Yet, for those in 
the public health community, Richardson's candid 
announcement was long overdue. Scores of workers 
employed in nuclear weapons production have 
been diagnosed with Chronic Beryllium Disease 
(CBD), a progressive and irreversible inflammatory 
lung disease. In the decades leading up to the 
announcement, increasingly compelling evidence 
accumulated that CBD was associated with exposure 
at levels below the standard in place at the time. In 
response to this evidence, the beryllium industry 
waged a concerted campaign to delay a safer 
standard. The industry hired public relations and 
'product defence' consulting firms to refute evidence 
that the old standard was inadequate. Eventually, 
when the scientific evidence became so great that 
it was no longer credible to deny that workers 
developed CBD at levels permitted by an out-dated 
standard, the beryllium industry responded with a 
new rationale to delay promulgation of a new, more 
protective exposure limit.
In the television interview, Secretary Richardson 
described how the Department of Energy (DOE) 
had changed course, and was now lowering the 
level that triggered protection for beryllium-exposed 
workers in the US nuclear weapons complex from 
2.0 μg/m3 to 0.2 μg/m3 (micrograms of beryllium 
per cubic meter of air). The Department's new 
Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program was 
designed to provide further protection for workers 
from a substance so hazardous that no safe level of 
exposure has ever been established. 
The DOE standard covers only workers employed 
in the nuclear weapons complex. Although OSHA 
has acknowledged the inadequacy of its present 
workplace beryllium exposure limit, it has not 
updated its standard, which covers workers in the 
private sector. Researchers at the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
have estimated that there are between 28 000 
and 107 000 private-sector workers potentially 
exposed to beryllium in the US; only 1 500 of these 
are employed in primary producers of beryllium 
products (Henneberger et al., 2004).
This case study presents a history of the knowledge 
and public policy about preventing beryllium-related 
disease, focusing primarily on the US beryllium 
industry's role in shaping US regulatory policy. 
A similar investigation has been performed in the 
United Kingdom (Watterson, 2005). Although the 
present study primarily discusses events in the 
United States, it is worth noting that Brush Wellman, 
the leading US manufacturer of beryllium products, 
has operated factories in Europe and that Brush 
Wellman's actions influenced beryllium safety and 
health policy throughout the world. 
The present study is based on a review of 
documents and on the personal knowledge of one 
of the authors (David Michaels), who, as Assistant 
Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety and 
Health, directed the DOE efforts to issue a stronger 
beryllium standard and develop a programme to 
provide compensation payments to workers with 
CBD. Some of the documents cited were obtained 
from government files and others were provided by 
attorneys who obtained them via litigation. 
6�2 Early warnings and the first 
beryllium workplace exposure 
standard 
The first significant industrial use of beryllium 
occurred in the 1930s, in production of fluorescent 
lamp tubes. Soon after the metal was first 
introduced, dozens of workers employed at 
fluorescent lamp factories in Massachusetts 
developed a form of chemical pneumonitis now 
known as Acute Beryllium Disease (ABD) (Hardy, 
1950). It quickly became apparent that workers 
could not safely work with beryllium without 
respiratory protection. 
Beryllium's importance grew dramatically with the 
Manhattan Project, the secret initiative to construct 
atomic weapons, and the subsequent expansion of 
the nuclear weapons industry, fuelled by the Cold 
War. This lightweight metal is a vital component 
in nuclear weapons. Beryllium slows down the 
neutrons released when an uranium atom is split in 
an atomic chain reaction; this facilitates the splitting 
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of more atoms, thereby increasing a weapon's 
power, or 'yield'. In the early years of US nuclear 
weapons production many cases of beryllium 
disease occurred among workers employed at 
privately operated beryllium production plants and 
among residents living near these facilities. 
To its credit, the DOE's predecessor, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, acted quickly. Coming 
soon after the success of the Manhattan Project, 
the AEC had a group of very capable scientists 
who had virtually invented the field of radiation 
protection (Hacker, 1987). The AEC focused its 
attention on beryllium, funding numerous studies 
at laboratories and universities throughout the 
country. Most importantly, AEC environmental 
health specialists developed a beryllium exposure 
limit. 
In many ways, the AEC had no choice but to 
tackle the problem directly. Since the weapons 
complex was now the nation's primary consumer 
of beryllium products, the AEC tacitly assumed 
responsibility for researching the health perils that 
the valuable metal posed. In a 1947 report, Public 
Relations Problems in Connection with Occupational 
Diseases in the Beryllium Industry, the AEC openly 
acknowledged problems of both 'obvious moral 
responsibility' and public relations, the latter 
exacerbated by the fact that, unlike remote research 
and bomb-making facilities, some beryllium-
processing factories were located in more populous 
areas. The 1947 report states bluntly, 
'There is no doubt at all that the amount 
of publicity and public indignation about 
beryllium poisoning could reach proportions 
met with in the cases of silicosis or radium 
poisoning.' It also notes that the industry was 
already reporting problems recruiting workers 
'because of local prejudice … engendered by 
actual and rumored experience with beryllium 
poisoning' (Tumbelson, 1947). 
The origin of the AEC beryllium exposure limit is 
discussed in the autobiography of Merril Eisenbud, 
an AEC industrial hygienist who went on to be the 
Environmental Protection Administrator of New 
York City. Eisenbud describes how he and Willard 
Machle, a physician who was a consultant to the 
firm building the Brookhaven Laboratory in Long 
Island, New York, decided on the number while 
in the back seat of a taxi on their way to a meeting 
at the laboratory in 1948. In his autobiography, 
Dr Eisenbud reports that he and Dr Machle selected 
2 μg/m3 for workplace exposures and 0.01 μg/m3 
for community exposures 'in the absence of an 
epidemiological basis for establishing a standard' 
(Eisenbud, 1991). Instead, the scientists used what 
Herbert Stokinger of the US Public Health Service 
later described as a 'crude analogy' to protect health 
(Stokinger, 1966).
The AEC 'tentatively' adopted these exposure limits 
in 1949 and then reviewed them annually for seven 
years before permanently accepting them (Stokinger, 
1966). The agency applied this exposure limit in its 
own facilities and incorporated adherence to the 
exposure limit into its contracts with manufacturers 
that supplied it beryllium products. OSHA later 
adopted the 2 μg/m3 limit when it first issued 
workplace exposure standards in 1971. While the 
story of Eisenbud's 'taxicab standard' has been often 
retold, a recent reviewer of the historical data has 
suggested that the workplace exposure limit was 
actually selected on the basis of feasibility not health 
protection (Egilman et al., 2003).
The 2 μg/m3 exposure limit was a great step 
forward. It was very stringent for its time, and its 
acceptance was probably aided by two factors. The 
first was that it addressed a severe problem; the 
human cost of acute beryllium disease was so great 
that the accompanying 'public relations problems' 
threatened the AEC's mission. Second, nuclear 
weapons production was well funded — essentially 
a 'cost-plus' operation in which the participating 
companies were assured a healthy profit. For the 
most part, the weapons plants were run by private 
employers, with the US government reimbursing 
their costs, plus an additional percentage awarded 
as profit. The largest US manufacturer of beryllium 
products was Brush Wellman, now known as 
Materion; Brush (as it was often called) was both 
a vendor to the US government and a contractor, 
operating a beryllium products production facility 
for the AEC in Ohio from 1950 to 1956.
The 2 μg/m3 exposure limit was an immediate 
success; ABD virtually disappeared and there 
appeared to be a reduction in new cases of CBD as 
well. But it was not long before questions arose about 
the level of beryllium exposure necessary to cause 
CBD. 
6�3 The science and its use
6.3.1 Evidence of CBD at exposures below  
the 2 µg/m3 standard 
With funding from the AEC, Dr Harriet Hardy 
established the Beryllium Case Registry (BCR) at the 
Massachusetts General Hospital in 1952. ABD and 
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CBD case reports were sent to the BCR, to track the 
disease and to aggregate a sufficient number of 
cases to conduct epidemiologic analyses (Hardy, 
1955; Hall, et al., 1959; Hardy, 1962). As of 1972, 
the BCR had recorded at least 20 CBD cases among 
workers who started employment after 1949, the 
year the AEC exposure limit was adopted (NIOSH, 
1972). By 1975, that number had risen to at least 
36 (OSHA, 1975), suggesting the disease might be 
occurring in workers whose exposure was below 
the 2 μg/m3 exposure limit. Moreover, CBD had 
been diagnosed in persons with no workplace 
exposure to the metal, including individuals who 
simply laundered the clothes of workers, drove a 
milk delivery truck with a route near a beryllium 
plant, or tended cemetery graves near a beryllium 
factory (NIOSH, 1972). 
Although the acute illness was typically seen 
among workers exposed to very high levels of 
soluble forms of beryllium, the distribution of 
the chronic form of beryllium disease did not 
follow the usual exposure-response model seen 
for most toxic substances. Instead, CBD was found 
among workers and community residents without 
substantial exposure histories. As early as 1951, 
Sterner and Eisenbud reported that exposure 
levels were not correlated with CBD severity, and 
hypothesised an immunological susceptibility 
(Sterner and Eisenbud, 1951). 
Scores of workers exposed to beryllium from manufacturing 
nuclear weapons developed Cronic Beryllium Disease. 
Photo: © istockphoto/Oleksiy Mark
In 1966, Beryllium: Its Industrial Hygiene Aspects, 
was published under the direction of the American 
Industrial Hygiene Association for the AEC. 
Dr Stokinger, the editor of the text, asserted that: 
'Numerous cases of the chronic disease have 
occurred from exposures to seemingly trivial 
concentrations of a beryllium compound 
that at higher levels produced no effect; no 
dose-response relationship appears to hold' 
(Stokinger, 1966) (emphasis added).
It was becoming increasingly clear that a simple, 
linear dose-response relationship (risk increasing 
in direct proportion to dose) did not apply to this 
metal, and that it might not be possible to identify 
a threshold below which no CBD cases would 
occur. 
In these early years, the community cases were 
evidently viewed as anomalous, or the result of 
episodes of high exposure. CBD incidence among 
workers did appear to drop dramatically with the 
reduced exposure associated with the standard, 
leading to speculation at the time that the 2 μg/m3 
exposure limit might be overly conservative (Breslin 
and Harris, 1959; Stokinger, 1966). There thus 
appeared to be a conundrum: how could there be 
community cases and occasional case reports of 
workers with very low exposures, while the standard 
appeared to be effective in systematic studies of 
beryllium production workers? With hindsight, 
we can speculate that the explanation is that CBD 
is an immune-mediated disease with considerable 
inter-individual variability in susceptibility, and a 
dose-response relationship which is probably driven 
by 'peak' exposures — possibly of very short duration 
— which standard methods of exposure assessment 
do not detect.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, CBD case reports 
involving workers whose exposures were below 
2 μg/m3 continued to emerge. In 1974, for example, 
representatives of NGK, a Japanese beryllium 
producer that also operated a manufacturing 
facility in the US, travelled to the US to meet with 
local beryllium industry executives. The Japanese 
delegation brought a report of five CBD cases that 
had occurred among workers exposed below the 
2 μg/m3 standard (Kohara, 1974; Shima, 1974). Similar 
cases occurred at US plants, including four cases 
among workers at a single scrap metal reclamation 
facility who were consistently exposed to beryllium 
below 2 μg/m3 (Cullen et al., 1987). 
Today, it is understood that CBD is initiated by an 
immune system response to beryllium exposure; the 
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associated adverse health effects begin well before 
the disease has pulmonary manifestations that 
allow diagnosis with a chest x-ray or pulmonary 
function test (Newman et al., 1996). The first 
published reports of CBD diagnosed using blood 
lymphocyte proliferation tests (BeLPT) appeared in 
1983 (MMWR, 1983). By the end of the decade the 
diagnostic techniques had progressed significantly, 
allowing clinicians to more easily identify 
individuals with beryllium sensitisation (BeS), an 
immunologic condition that is a precursor to CBD 
(Kreiss et al., 1989; Mroz et al., 1991).
Using the BeLPT as a screening tool, researchers 
have found CBD prevalence rates ranging from 
0.1 to 4.4 % among beryllium-exposed workers 
in the nuclear weapons, ceramics, primary 
beryllium manufacturing, metal machining, and 
copper-beryllium alloy industries, with Be(S) 
prevalence in these groups from 0.9 to 9.9 %. In most 
of these surveys, workers identified through the 
BeLPT as beryllium sensitised were given clinical 
evaluations to determine whether they had CBD. 
Depending upon the workplace, the CBD rate 
among workers with BeS ranged from 9 to 100 % 
(Kreiss et al., 1993a; Kreiss et al., 1993b; Kriess et al., 
1996; Stange et al., 1996; Kreiss et al., 1997; Deubner 
et al., 2001; Henneberger et al., 2001; Newman et al., 
2001; Stange et al., 2001; Sackett et al., 2004; Welch 
et al., 2004; Rosenman et al., 2005; Schuler et al., 
2005; Schuler et al., 2008). 
These studies diagnosed CBD or BeS among 
workers, including clerical workers and security 
guards, who had only experienced bystander 
exposure to beryllium. Clinical follow-up studies 
have found that individuals with BeS progress to 
CBD at a rate of 6 % to 8 % per year, but it is not 
known if all individuals with BeS will eventually 
progress to CBD (Newman et al., 2005).
6.3.2 Evidence of beryllium's capacity to cause 
cancer
In addition to its non-malignant effects on the lungs, 
beryllium has been shown to be a lung carcinogen. 
By the 1970s, significant toxicological evidence had 
accumulated on beryllium's carcinogenic effects, 
leading an NIOSH official to assert in 1977 that 
'probably no compounds known to man give so 
consistent a carcinogenic response in so many 
animal species as do the compounds of beryllium' 
(NIOSH, 1977). This indictment of the potential risk 
of beryllium exposure compelled OSHA to propose 
a new occupational exposure limit for beryllium of 
1 μg/m3, measured as an eight-hour time-weighted 
average. NIOSH then recommended lowering the 
permissible exposure limit further, to 0.5 μg/m3 
(NIOSH, 1977). 
Brush Wellman assembled a team of toxicologists, 
statisticians and physicians to challenge the new 
regulatory initiative (Michaels, 2008). The stakes 
were high for Brush: 'If beryllium is determined to 
be a carcinogen and so labelled and so regulated it 
would only be a matter of time until its usage would 
shrink to a point where it would no longer be a 
viable industry' (Brush Wellman, 1977). Ultimately, 
intense lobbying by the industry and the US 
Departments of Defense and Energy and the election 
of President Ronald Reagan prevented OSHA from 
finalising a new workplace exposure limit (Roe, 
1999). Nonetheless, NIOSH continued to conduct 
epidemiological studies of cancer risk among 
beryllium-exposed workers (Steenland and Ward, 
1991; Ward et al., 1992). The results of these studies, 
along with the extensive animal evidence, led the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer to list 
beryllium and beryllium compounds as Group 1 
agents (i.e. carcinogenic to humans) in 1994 (IARC, 
1994) and to reaffirm the designation in 2009 (Straif 
et al., 2009). Similarly, the US National Toxicology 
Program designated beryllium in 2002 as a 'known 
human carcinogen' (NTP, 2002).
6.3.3 The beryllium industry's public relations 
efforts
The increasing evidence of adverse health effects 
associated with beryllium exposure continued to 
create a problem for the industry. If government 
agencies formally designated beryllium as a 
substance for which there is no safe exposure level 
or as a carcinogen, the economic consequences for 
the industry could be significant. The industry's 
customers would be more likely to look for 
substitutes for the light-weight metal (Brush 
Wellman, 1977; Hanes, 1992b).
Beryllium producers decided to be proactive in 
shaping the interpretation of scientific literature on 
beryllium's health effects. Aspects of the programme 
were detailed in a 1987 internal Brush Wellman 
memo, with the subject line 'Proposed program 
for filling need for new and accurate beryllium 
health and safety literature'. The memo by Martin 
B. Powers, a retired Brush Wellman executive who 
was a consultant to the company, and Dr Otto 
P. Preuss, Corporate Medical Director, warned: 
'… the literature on Be published in the last 
twenty years has been very damaging. The 
Lessons from health hazards | Beryllium's 'public relations problem'
168 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
literature is constantly being cited, either to 
our doctors at medical meetings in rebuttal 
of the Brush experience, or by potential 
customers as the cause of their unwillingness 
to use our products. Federal Government 
regulatory agencies, such as OSHA and EPA 
[the US Environmental Protection Agency], 
publish much of this material and then in the 
absence of good data, cite these erroneous 
documents to support regulatory activities.'
'What is needed to combat this situation is a 
complete, accurate and well written textbook 
on Be health and safety. It will have to be 
financed by Brush (or Brush and NGK?) and 
the bulk of the work done by Marty Powers 
and Otto Preuss. To be fully acceptable and 
credible, however, it will have to be published 
under the auspices of some not-for-profit 
organization such as a university or medical 
group. … In addition to the book, we should 
have a number of medical papers published 
in prestigious medical books' (Powers and 
Preuss, 1987). 
Beryllium: Biomedical and Environmental Aspects was 
published in 1991; two of its editors were Martin 
Powers and Otto Preuss, along with a respected 
academic physician (Rossman et al., 1991). 
In the face of increasing evidence about the toxic 
effects of their products, the beryllium industry 
also turned for assistance to the public relations 
(PR) firm Hill & Knowlton (Hill & Knowlton, 
1986). This firm has gained much notoriety for 
its now well-known efforts in manufacturing and 
promoting scientific uncertainty for the tobacco 
industry (Brandt, 2007; Glantz et al., 1996). In the 
proposal it sent to Brush describing how it could 
help, Hill & Knowlton echoed the AEC 'public 
relations problem' memo of 1947:
'Beryllium undoubtedly continues to have a 
public relations problem. We still see it cited 
in the media, as well as in our conversations 
with people who should know better, as a 
gravely toxic metal that is problematic for 
workers … We would like to work with 
Brush Wellman to help change these common 
erroneous attitudes. We envision a public 
relations program designed to educate 
various audiences … to dispel myths and 
misinformation about the metal' (Marder, 
1989a).
Hill & Knowlton proposed to prepare 'an 
authoritative white paper on beryllium … [which] 
would serve as the most definitive document 
available on beryllium.' The PR firm also suggested 
projects to engage outside scientists in independent 
reviews of Brush Wellman materials, 'to nurture 
relations with the Environmental Protection 
Agency' and 'to challenge all unfair or erroneous 
treatment in the media to set the record straight' 
(Marder, 1989a).
Appended to the letter was a document in which 
Hill & Knowlton boasted of their experience 
assisting other corporations who faced regulatory 
difficulties stemming from their production of 
hazardous products, including asbestos, vinyl 
chloride, fluorocarbons and dioxin. There was 
no mention, however, of the firm's work for the 
cigarette manufacturers. Matthew Swetonic, the 
staff member proposed to direct the PR effort, had 
been a key player in Hill & Knowlton's efforts on 
behalf of a cigarette manufacturer to convince the 
public that non-smoker exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke was harmless (Swetonic, 1987) 
and to 'create a favorable public climate' to assist 
in defeating lawsuits filed by smokers with 
lung cancer (RJR Nabisco, no date). In addition, 
Swetonic had previously performed public 
relations work for Johns-Manville, the asbestos 
producer, and had been the first full-time executive 
secretary of the Asbestos Information Association 
(Asbestos Textile Institute, 1973). 
Once hired, Hill & Knowlton sought to reassure 
Brush's customers of the safety of beryllium. The 
firm drafted a series of letters for Brush to send to 
their beryllium ceramic customers, downplaying 
beryllium's hazardous properties (Marder, 1989b; 
Davis, 1989a; Davis, 1989b). 
6.3.4 Manufacturing uncertainty about beryllium 
and disease
By the late 1980s, the continued incidence of new 
CBD cases raised concerns among health and safety 
professionals who previously believed the 2 μg/m3 
'taxicab standard' was adequate to protect workers 
from CBD. Dr Eisenbud, who had become a 
consultant to Brush Wellman, notified the company 
in 1989 that 'he did not feel that he could defend 
the 2 microgram standard any longer' (Rozek, 
1989).
The rising number of CBD cases also contributed 
to an increase in litigation. Brush management 
recognised that a change in the OSHA standard 
could be used in legal suits brought by sick 
workers. 'Maintaining the existing [OSHA] 
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standard is fundamental to successfully defending 
against any product liability litigation', a Brush 
official asserted in 1989 (Rozek, 1989). This effort 
was an integral part of Brush's Health, Safety and 
Environment Strategic Plan in 1991: 
'Employ legal means to defeat unreasonably 
restrictive occupational and emission 
standards and to challenge rulemaking and 
other regulatory activities that seek to impose 
unreasonable or unwarranted changes. Resist 
an attempt to make the existing occupational 
exposure standard of 2 micrograms/cubic 
meter, as measured and calculated by Brush, 
more restrictive. The standard is safe, it is 
one of the most stringent standards, and it is 
fundamental to our product liability defense' 
(Rozek, 1991).
In contrast, the evidence of the standard's 
inadequacy was clear to the DOE. In 1991, the 
nuclear weapons agency began the process of 
lowering the exposure limit to reduce workers' risk 
of developing CBD. The change was opposed by the 
beryllium industry, whose position is summarised in 
this excerpt from a 1992 Brush Wellman letter: 
'We regret that DOE apparently still intends to 
abandon the existing standard of over 40 years 
standing with no evidence, either that the 
existing standard is unsafe or that the new 
proposed standard affords any greater degree 
or [sic] safety. The NIOSH recommendation of 
1977, which fortunately no one ever adopted, 
of 0.5 micrograms, introduced an element 
of confusion that can only be compounded 
by DOE's proposed introduction of a third 
number. A proliferation of numbers as 
'standards' can only weaken the acceptance, 
and therefore, the efficacy of the individual 
protection afforded. Confusion is never in the 
best interests of the worker' (Hanes, 1992a).
Progress on a more protective rule was also impeded 
by opposition from within the DOE. The offices 
responsible for manufacturing nuclear weapons 
argued that money spent protecting workers would 
mean less money for producing arms. The debate 
continued for several years, leaving the proposed 
rule in limbo. 
Despite the institutional obstacles, US government 
safety officials continued to advocate a new, more 
protective standard. The DOE health and safety 
office sponsored a series of public forums to gather 
information on beryllium's health effects. At one 
session, Brush Wellman's Director of Environmental 
Health and Safety asserted (according to minutes 
of the meeting): 'Brush Wellman is unaware of 
any scientific evidence that the standard is not 
protective. However, we do recognize that there 
have been sporadic reports of disease at less than 
2 μg/m3. Brush Wellman has studied each of these 
reports and found them to be scientifically unsound' 
(DOE, 1997).
This was the industry's primary argument; 
subsequent studies have demonstrated that the 
underlying logic to the argument was flawed. At the 
time, however, it was not difficult to go back into 
the work history of anyone with CBD and speculate 
that, at some point, the airborne beryllium level may 
have exceeded the standard. Even if no evidence 
for overexposure was found, it was assumed that 
exposure over the standard had occurred because 
the worker had developed CBD. Brush did this, 
and then reasoned that the 2 μg/m3 must be fully 
protective since everyone who had CBD must have 
at some point been exposed to levels above the 
standard.
Although flawed, this tautological construct served 
as the basis for Brush's defence of the 2 μg/m3 
exposure limit. Talking points prepared for Brush 
executives advised: 
'you may be asked in some fashion whether 
or not the 2 μg/m3 standard is still considered 
by the company to be reliable. Your answer 
should be as follows: 
1. Experience over several decades has, 
in our view, demonstrated that levels 
of airborne beryllium within the OSHA 
threshold limit value afford a safe 
workplace. 
2. In most cases involving our employees, 
we can point to circumstances of exposure 
(usually accidental), higher than the 
standard allows. In some cases, we have 
been unable (for lack of clear history) to 
identify such circumstances. However, in 
these cases we also cannot say that there 
was not excessive exposure' (emphasis in 
original) (Pallum, 1991). 
This position, however, could not be maintained 
indefinitely. As the DOE provided medical screening 
to more workers, the number of CBD and BeS cases 
continued to grow, reaching several hundred by the 
middle of the decade (DOE, 1998). Moreover, the 
growing literature reporting cases of CBD associated 
with low levels of exposure undermined the claim 
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that the old standard was safe (Wambach and 
Tuggle, 2000). Scores of beryllium-exposed workers 
who had developed CBD filed civil suits against 
Brush, alleging that the firm failed to disclose 
information about the material's toxicity. Continued 
denial of the relationship between low-level 
exposure and CBD was unlikely to be a successful 
strategy to oppose either the claims raised by sick 
workers or the attempts by the DOE and OSHA 
to strengthen their beryllium exposure standards. 
Instead, Brush Wellman asserted that not enough 
was known to prevent CBD from occurring. If true, 
the industry might avoid liability in CBD litigation. 
In 1998, Brush Wellman and NIOSH embarked 
on a collaborative research initiative, conducting 
medical surveillance of beryllium-exposed workers 
and examining the beryllium-CBD relationship. 
The research partnership has been productive, 
delivering findings that have substantially 
contributed to the literature on beryllium disease 
(NIOSH, 2002).
In December 1998, the DOE officially proposed 
a rule to protect workers from CBD, including 
an action level of 0.5 μg/m3, or 25 % of the OSHA 
standard, and asked for public comment on the 
proposal (DOE, 1998). Brush Wellman no longer 
asserted that the old standard was effective in 
preventing CBD but instead took the position 
that not enough was known to prevent CBD from 
occurring. During a public hearing in February 
1999, a Brush representative offered this new 
rationale for the DOE to delay issuing a new 
standard. He testified that 'important research is 
underway which may provide a scientific basis 
for a revision to the occupational standard for 
beryllium,' pointing to studies on particle size, 
particle number and particle surface area (Kolanz, 
1999). 
For assistance in promoting this new strategy, Brush 
turned to Exponent, Inc., a US firm that provides 
scientific and technical support to polluters and 
manufacturers of dangerous products (Exponent, 
Inc., 2006). Exponent, Inc. is a leading practitioner of 
'product defence', a specialisation that aims to help 
corporations reduce their regulatory burden and 
defeat liability claims that arise in the civil justice 
system (Michaels, 2008). With Exponent's assistance, 
in September 1999 Brush Wellman convened 
a conference, co-sponsored by the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, 
to bring 'leading scientists together to present and 
discuss the current information and new research on 
the hazards posed by beryllium' (Paustenbach et al., 
2001). 
At the time of the conference, the DOE was a 
few months away from issuing its final ruling, 
and OSHA had recently signalled its intention 
to revise its outdated 2 μg/m3 standard (OSHA, 
1998). The paper summarising the proceedings, 
entitled 'Identifying an Appropriate Occupational 
Exposure Limit (OEL) for Beryllium: Data Gaps 
and Current Research Initiatives' voiced the same 
position that DOE officials had heard earlier in the 
year. Specifically, that more research was needed on 
the effects on CBD risk of particle size, exposure to 
beryllium compounds and skin exposure. Although 
it is not uncommon for a scientific paper to call 
for additional research, this paper went further, 
advocating postponement of any changes in the 
workplace beryllium exposure standard: 'At this 
time,' the paper concludes, 'it is difficult to identify 
a single new TLV (threshold limit value) for all 
forms of beryllium that will protect nearly all 
workers. It is likely that within three or four years, 
a series of TLVs might need to be considered… In 
short, the beryllium OEL could easily be among the 
most complex yet established' (Paustenbach et al., 
2001). 
In December 1999, the DOE completed its work, 
mandating that protection from beryllium exposure 
in DOE facilities be triggered at 0.2 μg/m3 rather 
than the 0.5 μg/m3 level the agency had proposed 
some months earlier (DOE, 1999). In its ruling, DOE 
relied on a common industrial hygiene measure 
of exposure: full-shift concentration by weight of 
airborne beryllium. 
The government's responsibility is to protect 
public health using the best available evidence. 
More research was, and is, needed, but since the 
relationship of CBD to beryllium particle size, 
number of particles and surface area was, and 
remains, poorly understood, the officials responsible 
for protecting the health of beryllium-exposed 
workers determined that new policy should not be 
delayed until this research was completed. 
6.3.5 New evidence but no new OSHA standard
Once the DOE prepared to issue its new standard, 
OSHA, the lead US agency for worker safety and 
health, recognised an opportunity to update its 
own beryllium standard. In written comments 
to the DOE, OSHA's Assistant Secretary 
acknowledged the inadequacy of the current OSHA 
standard, writing: 
'we now believe that our 2 μg/m3 PEL does 
not adequately protect beryllium-exposed 
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workers from developing chronic beryllium 
disease, and there are adequate exposure and 
health effects data to support [the DOE's] 
rulemaking.' 
The letter continues by citing existing data: 
'Cases of chronic beryllium disease have 
occurred in machinists where 90 % of the 
personal exposure samples found levels of 
beryllium to be below the detection limit 
of 0.01 μg/m3 … Viewed from OSHA's 
regulatory perspective, these DOE study 
results document risk of sensitization to 
beryllium of 35–40 per 1 000 workers and risk 
of chronic beryllium disease to machinists of 
94 per 1 000' (Jeffress, 1998). 
Despite a commitment to issue a new standard 
by September 2001 (OSHA, 2000), OSHA did 
not propose a rule to protect beryllium-exposed 
workers. When President George W. Bush's 
Administration took office in 2001, OSHA 
formally dropped its commitment to strengthen 
the beryllium standard, asserting it needed more 
information before deciding how to proceed 
(OSHA, 2002). 
Scientific knowledge on the risks associated 
with low-level beryllium exposure continues to 
accumulate, silencing those who had previously 
defended the adequacy of the current standard. 
In the few years since DOE issued its standard, 
US researchers, including several affiliated 
with Brush Wellman, have published several 
epidemiologic studies that provide additional 
evidence that OSHA's standard does not fully 
prevent CBD (Henneberger et al., 2001; Kelleher, 
et al., 2001; Schuler et al., 2005; Stange et al., 2001; 
Rosenman et al., 2005; Madl et al., 2007). Finally, in 
2006, a literature review and editorial supported 
by Brush Wellman acknowledged that the current 
OSHA standard 'provides insufficient protection 
for beryllium-exposed workers' (Borak, 2006).
Beryllium exposure continues to be a public 
health concern at 'downstream' facilities, which 
use beryllium products but are not involved in 
primary production, in recycling facilities, and 
in communities adjacent to beryllium-processing 
facilities. In 1999, the diagnosis of a sentinel CBD 
case in a metals recycling plant in Quebec, Canada 
resulted in the identification of 31 additional 
cases at three metals plants (Robin, 2005). It also 
prompted a survey that identified 2 789 workplaces 
where beryllium was used in that province, 
including 63 golf club manufacturers and 15 bicycle 
manufacturers (Tremblay, 2005). There have also 
been eight new cases of community-acquired CBD 
recognised between 1999 and 2002 in the US (Maier 
et al., 2008)
Given the wealth of new research, is it now possible 
to identify a safe level of beryllium exposure? 
Unfortunately, it is not. There are many complex 
questions to answer, and there are relatively few 
workplaces in which these questions can be easily 
studied. A committee of the US National Research 
Council recently concluded that 'it is not possible 
to estimate a chronic inhalation-exposure level 
that is likely to prevent BeS and CBD' (National 
Research Council, 2008). This scepticism is shared 
throughout the scientific community; in the opinion 
of three NIOSH scientists, the evidence gathered 
to date suggests that 'attempts to define a safe air 
concentration of beryllium for all workers are not 
likely to be successful' (Kreiss et al., 2007). 
This uncertainty does not, however, justify 
deferring implementation of programmes to 
reduce exposure. There is ample evidence that 
interventions designed to reduce beryllium 
exposure to the lowest achievable levels have 
successfully decreased BeS and CBD incidence 
(National Research Council, 2008). Furthermore, 
in 2009 the American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists issued a Threshold Limit 
Value recommendation of 0.05 μg/m3, which is well 
below both the current OSHA and DOE standards 
(ACGIH, 2009). 
Since at present there is no compelling evidence 
for a safe level of beryllium exposure, it would be 
prudent public health policy for manufacturers 
to substitute a less toxic material for beryllium 
whenever possible. However, in those products and 
processes in which there is no adequate substitute 
for beryllium, such as the production of nuclear 
weapons, exposure should be reduced to the lowest 
level technically feasible. 
6�4 Lessons for policymakers
The primary lessons of this case study are widely 
applicable across many environmental health 
controversies.
The first is that the absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence. In the decades following the 
reduction in beryllium exposures in the early 1950s, 
relatively few new CBD cases were diagnosed. 
This is likely attributable both to improved 
working conditions and the limitations of the 
Lessons from health hazards | Beryllium's 'public relations problem'
172 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Table 6�1 Early warnings and actions
1930s First industrial uses of beryllium and first reported cases of beryllium disease
1949 AEC adopted the 2.0 µg/m
3 exposure limit for weapons workers
1952 Establishment of Beryllium Case Registry
1971 OSHA adopted the 2.0 µg/m
3 exposure limit
1975 OSHA proposed a 1.0 µg/m
3 exposure limit but this was never approved
1980s BeLPT used to diagnose cases of CBD
1989 DOE proposed a 0.5 µg/m
3 exposure limit for DOE weapons and clean-up workers
1999 DOE issued a 0.2 µg/m
3 exposure limit for DOE weapons and clean-up workers
2009 ACGIH recommended a 0.05 µg/m
3 exposure limit
2012 OSHA has yet to propose new workplace beryllium standard
diagnostic methods available at the time. With the 
development of the BeLPT, many new cases were 
diagnosed, no doubt including cases that would 
not have been previously recognised as CBD. 
There were indications before the advent of the 
BeLPT, however, that the 2.0 μg/m3 standard 
was not fully protective. As CBD and BeS were 
diagnosed in an increasing number of workers 
with low exposures, this conclusion became more 
difficult to avoid. 
As this evidence accumulated, the beryllium 
industry had a strong financial incentive to 
challenge the data, and to oppose regulatory action 
that would result in a lower exposure limit. It 
appears this incentive shaped the interpretation 
given to scientific evidence by scientists employed 
by the beryllium industry. 
This, then, is the second lesson of the case study: 
interpretation of scientific data by those with 
financial incentives for misinterpretation must be 
discounted. Scientists employed by the beryllium 
industry defended the 'taxicab standard' long 
after it was correctly recognised as inadequate 
by independent scientists. In particular, work 
by scientists employed by firms specialising in 
product defence and litigation support must be 
seen for what it is: advocacy, rather than science. 
This study illustrates the practice of 'manufacturing 
uncertainty' — the strategy used by some polluters 
and manufacturers of hazardous products to prevent 
or delay regulation or victim compensation (Michaels 
and Monforton, 2005; Michaels, 2008). The public 
health paradigm requires that the best available 
evidence be used to protect the public. By the early 
1990s, the accumulated evidence was sufficient for 
public health officials to justify a more protective 
workplace beryllium exposure limit. In response, the 
industry manufactured and magnified uncertainty, 
producing a series of arguments about why the old 
standard should not be changed. Extensive research 
has subsequently confirmed the inadequacy of the 
OSHA standard; a more protective standard will 
help prevent CBD and save lives. 
Finally, the findings of this case study underscore 
the importance of considering the hazards 
associated with a toxic material throughout the 
entire life cycle of the product. While primary 
producers of beryllium products may be able to 
control exposures in their own facilities, it is unlikely 
that many secondary users and recyclers have the 
expertise, resources and knowledge to prevent 
beryllium disease in exposed workers and residents 
in nearby communities. As a result, it would be 
prudent public health policy to end industrial 
use of beryllium, except in circumstances where 
substitution is impossible. 
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(3) This text is an adaptation of a critical review prepared for the European Environmental Agency, Copenhagen, as part of Late lessons 
from early warnings.
Corporate behaviour in the regulation 
of beryllium: could there have been a 
different outcome if the company had 
room to turn around?
Tee L. Guidotti (3)
The response of commercial organisations to 
uncertainty with respect to environmental and 
occupational risks continues to challenge regulators 
and parties interested in a regulatory intervention in 
the face of corporate resistance. 
Viewed from within the organisation, corporate 
objectives and protection align with other seemingly 
valid reasons to oppose change and create a stronger 
argument from within than may be perceived 
from the outside. One suspects that most corporate 
leaders involved in situations like this live in a 
world of cognitive dissonance and denial rather than 
cupidity. Few people, other than sociopaths, tolerate 
the belief that they cause harm and suffering. Rather, 
most people with strong personalities tend to deny 
their role in a bad situation and the consequences of 
their actions, and to believe the denial. Reinforced 
by group-think, rationalisation, corporate culture, 
and a technical staff able and willing to provide 
justification for the denial, such behaviour becomes 
normative. The challenge is not to condemn the 
behaviour — that is easy. It is to understand it in 
order to control it. (Prevention is probably not 
possible given human nature.) 
Beryllium: a case study
Michaels and Monforton (2008 and present volume) 
have published a comprehensive history of the 
occupational exposure standard for beryllium in the 
US and its failure to adequately protect workers. 
Their work is a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the beryllium issue, about which 
there have been a number of serious misconceptions 
(Guidotti, 2008).
The only significant manufacturer and supplier of 
beryllium metal in the US, Brush Wellman, used 
various arguments to rationalise opposition to the 
proposed beryllium standard, first asserting that 
2 μg/m3 was adequate, then playing on uncertainty, 
challenging the data on which the proposals were 
grounded, first for beryllium disease and later for 
carcinogenicity. In this they were initially abetted by 
the US Department of Energy (DOE), which initially 
resisted an evidence-based precautionary protective 
standard, presumably to protect the nuclear 
industry. There were many allegations of scientific 
malfeasance and inappropriate political influence. 
Notwithstanding the fact that both DOE and the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists, a major voluntary body recommending 
exposure guidelines, have proposed lower 
occupational exposure limits, the federal regulator, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
has still not proposed a new 'permissible exposure 
limit' for beryllium after at least 35 years of 
deliberation. 
Brush Wellman was, and still is, a highly profitable 
company that had, and still has, a near monopoly on 
the product. At the time it had little other business, 
although it is now more diversified. The company 
stands accused by Michaels and Monforton of 
cupidity and arrogance in resisting a protective 
federal standard in the face of steadily accumulating 
evidence for the toxicity and carcinogenicity of 
the metal. Doubtless, the company has a different 
narrative, but this panel is not about the company's 
culpability. Seen another way, the story of Brush 
Wellman, and other companies, is a case study in 
organisational behaviour and response. However, 
it may also be read slightly differently to be about 
pathway dependence and how the initial worldview 
of a highly organised institution may commit it to a 
line that ultimately proves disgraceful for itself and 
tragic for the victims of occupational hazard. 
The doctrine of 'shareholder value' and resistance to 
changing course
Michaels and Monforton assume throughout that 
the reluctance of Brush to accept new findings 
regarding Be risk was motivated by the desire to 
maintain corporate revenues. To set the stage, it is 
important to realise that, in the US, there appears to 
be no recognised legal responsibility of corporations 
other than to shareholders and to obey the law. The 
concepts of corporate responsibility and of corporate 
beneficence have been litigated many times and 
decisions have consistently upheld the interests of 
shareholders above all other stakeholders (Pérez 
Carolli, 2007). The most famous example of this is a 
1919 Michigan Supreme Court decision that blocked 
Ford Motor Company from reducing the price 
of Model T automobiles as a public benefit (and 
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to create a larger consumer class) at the expense 
of paying dividends to shareholders. Some legal 
scholars have argued, persuasively, that this ruling 
has been misunderstood and its significance has 
been exaggerated (Stout, 2008). However, there 
have been many other decisions that have had the 
collective impact of emphasising that although a 
corporation may act in a beneficent manner, it is 
not entitled to do so at the expense of shareholder 
interests, at least not without their permission. 
From the legal point of view, and at least from a lay 
reading of the legal situation, which is at least what 
corporate officers would have understood in the 
1950s and 1960s, corporations appear to be obliged 
to optimise value, profits, and shareholder interest, 
not community or social benefits except insofar as 
they advance the interests of the corporation and 
therefore the interests of the shareholders who own 
it. This reality can be lamented and argued, but it 
is deeply grounded in American jurisprudence and 
business culture. 
The point to be made before further discussion is not 
that this concept is, or can be, abusive and antisocial 
— that it can be is obvious. It is that it was believed 
and that, notwithstanding waves of management 
interest in 'corporate responsibility' (most notably in 
the 1960s), this belief has been assumed in corporate 
culture and was part of a management philosophy 
of maximising 'shareholder value' for the last thirty 
years. Under US law, a corporation cannot be faulted 
for maximising profits, as long as they are within 
the law, just as an individual cannot be faulted for 
trying to minimise the taxes he or she pays, as long 
as the taxpayer is within the law. Whether Brush 
Wellman violated the law is outside the scope of this 
panel and is not directly addressed by Michaels and 
Monforton (2008).
Likewise, there is also the influence in business 
circles of the parallel and highly influential 
argument of Milton Friedman and the Chicago 
School of economists that the purpose of business 
is to increase wealth and that social benefit is a 
question of how that wealth is invested, a decision 
that the owners of the wealth should make, not 
the corporation (Friedman, 1970). One answer to 
Friedman would be that corporations are given 
a franchise to perform socially useful functions, 
providing goods and services in exchange for 
making profit, but this is not the forum to argue this 
point. 
One obvious legal solution is for the interest of 
stakeholders to be revisited. If the corporation faces 
catastrophic sanctions if it admits it was wrong, 
then the interest of the shareholders in a corporation 
should be for it to capitulate. However, in the real 
world, fines are too low, sanctions are too weak, and 
legal actions too likely to settle for the anticipated 
consequences to force changes in corporate 
behaviour. The executives of a bad corporation are 
usually better off seeing the issue through to the 
end and then, if the consequences are dire, changing 
management, taking golden parachutes, and leaving 
the task of refurbishing the image of the company to 
the next executive team. 
Another legal solution should be possible, however. 
If a corporation has the option of ending a course of 
action that would lead to consequences so serious that 
shareholders' interests would be compromised, they 
would then have a fiduciary and legal responsibility 
to their shareholders to retreat from an untenable 
position and accept the need to change course. 
Opportunities coming at key times in the narrative 
to change direction without onerous consequences 
could have made it possible for corporate leaders 
to drop their resistance to the proposed standard 
without admitting they were wrong. Creating such 
opportunities might make it possible for the leaders 
of such companies to change course on a pragmatic 
basis on the grounds that they are minimising loss 
to shareholders and reducing potential punitive 
damages that the company would have to pay. 
Whether this policy would motivate corporate 
leaders on a destructive track to change course on 
their own initiative is uncertain, although it is likely 
that it would if the consequences are high. These are 
not stupid people, after all. What is certain is that 
legislation, regulatory policy, or a judicial opinion to 
this effect would create grounds for shareholders to 
take legal action against the officers of a corporation 
and put enormous pressure on them to change 
their position when it became untenable. Another 
advantage of such a policy is that it is consistent 
with conservative business values of responsibility 
to shareholders and maintaining shareholder value, 
and therefore hard to argue against. 
National security and rationalisation
People tend to believe what is aligned with their 
own interest and do not recognise these beliefs 
as rationalisation. It is quite likely that corporate 
leaders of the day saw reasons other than corporate 
protection that aligned with their financial interests 
of profit maximisation. The sequence of events takes 
on new significance when seen from the perspective 
of the times. 
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Initially, the trade-off as seen from the ramparts of 
the military-industrial complex involved a risk/risk 
calculation in which the perceived security 
consequences would have been catastrophic 
and the potential for harm to workers seemed 
remote and uncertain. Issues of workers' rights to 
know, the sustainability of the industry without 
occupational health controls, and the uncertainty 
of risk from Be were undoubtedly secondary to 
security issues as they were understood at the 
time. In hindsight, this was highly unfortunate 
but at the time it was not unreasonable, given that 
the world was in a bipolar 'Cold War' between 
two nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the 
US, together with its nuclear-armed allies France 
and the United Kingdom. Later, the rationale 
for opposing revision of the standard seems to 
have been based on a calculus of risk/benefit, in 
which the perceived risks of inadequate military 
defence with nuclear weapons was replaced by the 
perceived benefit to society of Be alloys. 
In the context of an industry central to national 
security, it is not clear that the issue could have 
played out in any other way, unless there was some 
means of making a gradual transition to a more 
protective standard or resolving the uncertainties 
over the standard test for Be sensitivity (which in 
combination with a positive chest film or CT scan 
or biopsy results makes the diagnosis of beryllium 
disease) at an earlier stage. The 2 μg/m3 standard 
is widely recognised as not adequately protective 
and was shown to be so at the time. However, once 
it was established, it took on a life of its own and 
became 'sticky' — that is, difficult to dislodge — 
until the evidence became overwhelming. This may 
have been, in part, because the leap to 0.5 μg/m3 was 
or appeared to be too great technically and raised 
fears that the defence industry would be disrupted, 
leaving the country unacceptably vulnerable. 
However, reluctance to accept that a change was 
needed appears to have been driven mostly by 
uncertainties over the blood test (BeLPT), which was 
still in development and was perceived as unproven, 
a perception helped along by its alignment with 
financial interests. 
Toward the end, it is clear that the emerging 
motivation for delay was perceived risk to the 
company. Here again there is another, unstated 
side to the story. It is clear that much of the 
opposition was self-serving but the company could 
legitimately have been seen at the time to be what 
is now called in 'homeland security' terminology a 
'critical industry', providing an essential service or 
product. This dynamic would have, again, conflated 
the company's interests with the national interest 
(along the lines of 'what's good for us is good for the 
nation') and provided a rationale for maintaining the 
status quo on the grounds (specious but persuasive) 
that the company needed to stay in business and 
profitable to meet a national need. 
Acceptable risk and accountability in risk 
assessment
It became apparent as the issue dragged on that 
no standard was fully protective, because of the 
stochastic (probabilistic, rather than deterministic) 
nature of the immune response. When this is true, 
as it is of many allergens, of fine particulate air 
pollution, and of lead exposure in children, the 
problem becomes one of determining 'acceptable 
risk' based on social criteria. Modern societies 
usually choose one in a million risk of a serious 
outcome or death as the acceptable risk, although 
in practice risks on the order of one in a thousand 
are the norm in occupational health. In this case, 
the company management was trying to make 
this determination alone, without collective input, 
because they (corporately) believed that they 
understood the problem best. However, they did 
not, and they were working in a social vacuum, 
focused on the company's priorities and beliefs. In 
a democracy, the question of 'who gets to decide' 
is answered formally by 'the representative of the 
people', that is, the government, and informally by 
who has possession of the data. 
In the event, the initial standard of 2 μg/m3 
obviously worked well to reduce pressure to lower 
the standard. (It has since been reduced, first to 
0.5 μg/m3 in 1998 and then to 0.2 in 1999 but only 
as an internal standard within the Department of 
Energy, not through adoption by OSHA.) Although 
the story (told by Merril Eisenbud, who was 
involved in its formulation) that the initial 2 μg/m3 
was worked out in a taxicab on the way to the 
decisive meeting and was revised upward at the 
last minute, suggests an overly casual approach, in 
the absence of scientific evidence for a threshold or 
a 'no-observed adverse effects level' a reasonable 
consensus based on informed opinion is not a 
bad substitute for data. It certainly worked to 
eliminate acute Be disease, which was initially the 
concern. A standards-setting committee consisting 
of informed experts is not unlike a Delphi group, 
making sequential estimates based on feedback 
from the scientific literature and from their peers. It 
resembles (imperfectly) the estimation of an a priori 
probability in Bayesian statistics. Insisting on the 
inadequacy of a standard which was lacking more 
rigorous science, when evidence did not exist, is like 
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applying the legal and political standards of today 
to ancient history. It is also difficult to find experts 
with practical experience outside the industry or with 
no interest in the outcome of deliberations, making 
conflict of interest a given and a matter of degree. 
Michaels and Monforton make the blanket statement 
that 'The interpretation of scientific data by those with 
financial incentives must be discounted.' However, 
financial incentives attach to almost everyone who 
has a professional interest in a particular topic, 
including those who receive support, to be critical 
of a position and offer expensive tests. Thus, the 
essential problems, beyond disclosure, are not the 
financial incentives but the degree of influence 
exerted on the investigator, the completeness of 
reporting, and the validity of the information. The 
validity question can be further unpacked into issues 
of honesty and integrity, data quality, methodological 
issues, bias, handling of uncertainty, correct scientific 
interpretation of complicated evidence, and whether 
selection or misclassification bias is introduced due to 
business or other activities that attach to the position 
of the party involved. (For example, workers at a 
particular plant in the Be industry may be different 
from other workers or workers in other plants, such 
that a study sponsored by the company may have 
a bias. But the same may also be true of a study 
performed by an academic researcher.) Professional 
and personal incentives, which may be as powerful 
as financial incentives, attach to everyone involved 
because once a position is taken publicly it is human 
nature to be emotionally invested in defending it.
To their credit, Michaels and Monforton use the 
term 'discounted' rather than 'ignored', but in 
practice few who advocate tighter regulation 
may make the distinction. In fact, exclusion of 
corporately-sponsored research and the 'grey 
literature' risks losing an immense body of valuable 
information. Society is already denied significant 
benefit by obstacles to accessing proprietary 
information. Current practices within the insurance 
industry, for example, together with rules against 
collusion and price-fixing, militate against sharing 
information that would be highly useful in 
establishing the health risk of various groups, such 
as workers covered by workers' compensation 
(Guidotti, 2000).
Seen in this light, and assuming that accountability 
is not possible in the adversarial setting of business 
interests, the issue reduces to one of transparency. 
Can the data be audited and the analysis 
reconstructed? Who will ensure the integrity of 
the auditors? In this regard the experience of the 
Health Effects Institute (HEI) is pertinent. HEI 
routinely commissions a reanalysis of data from 
the most significant studies it supports on air 
pollution health effects, a process that to date has 
confirmed the original findings in every case but is 
considered essential to acceptance of the findings by 
industry (in this case, the automobile manufacturing 
industry). This model is not so easily to apply to 
corporately sponsored research, however, because 
there is no external mechanism for guaranteeing 
quality assurance and no contractual obligation 
to cooperate with an audit or means of ensuring 
transparency. 
Another model that may be applicable is the current 
drive to require drug companies to register clinical 
trials, so that those that have negative results or 
that demonstrate harmful effects cannot be buried. 
Establishing a data repository is a logical step in 
this process but there would of course be legitimate 
issues of business knowledge, anti-trust prohibitions, 
and proprietary information to navigate. How such 
an arrangement could be enforced when applied 
to corporately-sponsored research is not clear but a 
voluntary approach led by responsible companies 
would place considerable pressure on those that did 
not participate. 
However, these are technical solutions and partial 
at best. The deeper issue is one of organisational 
behaviour and commitment to a wrong decision in 
the face of diminishing room to manoeuvre. 
One could have made the point in 1983 that 
acceptance of the BeLPT, the blood test for immune 
sensitivity, would have protected the company 
through demonstration of due diligence, but at 
the time a consensus on the validity of the assay 
had not emerged. (As Michaels and Monforton 
pointed out, it was impeded by the machinations 
of a cooperative academic. Even today, the BeLPT 
has to be positive in two tests before a diagnosis is 
considered to be confirmed.) Michaels and Monforton 
make a major case for the idea that 'the absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence', however in 
the case of the BeLPT there was abundant evidence 
but the performance of the test was disputed. Until 
the test was validated, it was not unreasonable for 
non-scientists to be sceptical. The deeper question is 
who determines when a method is valid: scientists, 
regulators, or corporate interests? Likewise, who 
determines when data are sufficient and when 
evidence is actually absent? 
Faced with uncertainty and bolstered by 
intimations that the test may not be definitive, 
it was actually a logical (and, from their point 
of view, probably responsible) decision for 
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the company to delay and to require further 
information. As time went on, this position may 
have become untenable scientifically but the 
stakes were also rising. A late admission that the 
assay was valid would have been tantamount 
to admitting that the company had stalled and 
allowed further cases. In short, the company was 
pulled along in a situation in which, as uncertainty 
over the test diminished, the stakes increased, 
perhaps exponentially, making it increasingly 
difficult to accept or stop questioning the test and 
making it paradoxically more attractive to defend 
their earlier position. Small wonder that, in a classic 
demonstration of organisational behaviour, the 
company leadership did not want to admit, and 
as individuals probably truly did not believe, that 
they had erred. 
Lessons learned
The Brush Wellman experience demonstrates that 
a significant internal disincentive of companies 
to accept new findings is fear of liability and 
reputational damage. Add to this the perceived 
fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, the shame 
of admitting that decisions may have harmed 
workers, and the (probably inflated) costs of 
installing more stringent controls and it is easy 
to see how denial and rationalisation would be 
the mode of behaviour. In the case of Be, these 
measures were relatively expensive: separation of 
sensitised workers through Be-free buffer zones 
and containment and reassignment of sensitised 
workers. 
Seen in that light, and assuming that the Brush 
Wellman leadership was generally honest in 
their own terms (on the face of it, a problematical 
assumption), the company could be viewed as 
being pulled along by events into an increasingly 
untenable situation, until their position was 
completely indefensible. It would be going too far 
to characterise this as a 'tragedy' for them, in the 
dramatic sense of a fatal flaw that brings down 
the protagonist. However, it is apparent that one 
problem with the narrative is that there was never 
a moment at which Brush Wellman could change 
direction without paying what it considered to be an 
unacceptable penalty. Because of legacy liabilities, 
the deep investment the company had in believing 
otherwise, and the slow evolution of the science, 
the management of the company appears to have 
been slogging through a tunnel of diminishing 
dimensions, seeing no exit and no path except what 
lay ahead. At the beginning, the issue was cost 
(probably overestimated, as it usually is), loss of 
market share, and saving face. At the end, it may 
have been massive financial and legal liability.
Perhaps the key issue is at what point an 
organisation can change course, when it is 
allowed to do so, and how it can do so given its 
internal drivers and culture. The question may 
need to be recast as how information controlled 
by the company can be effectively accessed, with 
protection, so that the leadership has a viable escape 
route from an impossible situation.
The essential question for reconstructing the 
company's behavioural and motivational history 
is, therefore, was there ever a point along the way 
where it was 'safe' for Brush to change course? Was 
there an opening that allowed internal forces within 
the company that might have better understood 
the issue to break with the management line 
and to accept the health risks of Be at low levels 
without what they perceived to be unacceptable 
consequences (and psychic pain)?
This does happen. Liggett & Myers, the American 
tobacco company, made a dramatic break with 
the rest of the industry in 1996 and both settled 
tobacco-related cases and unilaterally declared that 
it accepted that smoking is addictive (Borio, 2003). 
It did so because it saw a window of opportunity 
to reduce its risk and because it recognised that the 
industry position had become untenable. (There 
is no reason to think that they did so because it 
was right or for the greater good. It was a business 
decision, pure and simple.) 
If one expects corporations, and the attitudes of 
corporate leadership, to change in response to new 
information, rather than to fight new information 
because of fear, denial, or risk of loss, there must 
be exit or escape opportunities. This may mean 
unpalatable choices and bright lines where today the 
picture is murky, such as opportunities to forgive 
legacy liabilities, legal defences (such as a clear 
definition of when due diligence has been achieved), 
and a threshold for sufficient knowledge (a clear 
standard of when knowledge about risk is sufficient 
to act, not just first awareness that there may be 
a problem). Organisations cannot be expected 
to change their positions unless they are given a 
'way out' that may involve forgiving past liability 
and reducing punitive damages. (This is largely 
what happened with the DOE contract worker's 
compensation programme.) 
The threat of strong grounds for legal action or 
board action by dissident shareholders introduces 
a new counterweight to the equation and is a 
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bigger stick than it might first appear. It is also not 
necessary to assume that shareholders would force 
management to choose the path of conciliation 
out of self-interest to protect their equity, or that a 
righteous shareholder rebellion would be provoked 
by outrage over corporate behaviour. After all, 
most shareholders are apathetic and unengaged in 
corporate governance. Rather, management would 
know that if they did not act appropriately, dissident 
shareholders or hostile suitors could use their failure 
to act opportunistically for their own purposes, 
using the argument that they were destroying 
shareholder value and should be replaced. Also, 
large shareholders (such as pension funds) are 
interested in stability and yield and are likely 
to avoid investing in companies that fail to take 
opportunities to reduce their risk exposure.
The lessons from the Be case are unpleasant but clear: 
if corporations are expected to reverse course, there 
must be room for them to turn around. Pressure 
builds resistance and ultimately denial and may be 
counterproductive at times. Perception and judgment 
align with interests, and people on different sides of 
an issue see the problem differently. Correcting the 
system to facilitate resolution may require trade-offs 
with unpleasant implications. The opening of 
opportunities for bad corporations to escape legal or 
financial consequences is not an attractive solution 
from the moral perspective but may lead to the 
greatest good for the greatest number. 
Another lesson from the Be case is that once a 
standard is set, it becomes 'sticky'. It develops 
a constituency and an infrastructure to support 
it. Changing a standard has to overcome inertia 
and the accumulated weight of experience and 
acceptance. A policy of sequential standard-setting 
based on scientific evidence is inherently flawed. 
There will always be new scientific information. 
It is more reasonable to expect that standards will 
become more stringent and to accept a realistic 
policy of continuous improvement, anticipating 
that standards evolve rather than pretending 
that each standard is definitive. Standards can be 
as much impediments as instruments of worker 
protection. A policy of continuing improvement 
and progression over time in reducing exposures is 
the natural alternative approach, although perhaps 
unattainable in the current political context. The 
problems with such a policy lie in initiating it and 
sustaining it in an equitable manner. 
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This chapter differs in some ways from the others in Volume 2 of Late lessons from early 
warnings. The history of 'second hand', 'passive' or 'environmental tobacco smoke' (ETS), to 
which non-smokers are exposed overlaps with the history of active smoking. Those affected 
include the partners and children of smokers, and the bartenders and other workers who have to 
work in smoky environments.
The focus in this chapter is on the strategies used by the tobacco industry to deny, downplay, 
distort and dismiss the growing evidence that, like active smoking, ETS causes lung cancer 
and other effects in non-smokers. It does not address the history of scientific knowledge about 
tobacco and how it was used or not used to reduce lung cancer and other harmful effects 
of tobacco smoke. There is much literature on this (2) and a table at the end of the chapter 
summarises the main dates in the evolution of knowledge in this area. 
The chapter concentrates on the 'argumentation' that was used to accept, or reject, the growing 
scientific evidence of harm. Who generated and financed the science used to refute data on 
adverse health effects? What were the motivations? What kind of science and information, tools 
and assumptions were used to refute data on the adverse health of tobacco?
The release of millions of internal tobacco industry documents due to law suits in the US has 
given insights into the inner workings of the tobacco industry and revealed their previously 
hidden involvement in manipulating research. However, this insight is not available for most 
corporate sectors. The chapter discusses the possibilities of 'full disclosure' of funding sources 
and special interests in research and risk assessment in order to secure independence and 
prevent bias towards particular viewpoints. 
While smoking bans are now being introduced in more and more countries, other industries are 
drawing inspiration from tobacco company strategies, seeking to maintain doubt about harm in 
order to keep hazardous products in the marketplace.
The chapter also includes a summary of the tobacco industry's role in shaping risk assessment in 
the US and Europe to serve its own interests.
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7�1 Introduction
This chapter describes the strategies that the 
tobacco industry has used to influence the design, 
conduct and publication of scientific research on 
second-hand smoke; and how the tobacco industry 
used this research in attempts to influence policy. 
It represents an expansion of an earlier article, 
'Tobacco industry manipulation of research' by Bero 
(2005).
The primary motivation of the tobacco industry 
has been to generate controversy about the health 
risks of its products. The industry has used several 
strategies including: 
1. funding and publishing research that supports 
its position; 
2. suppressing and criticising research that does 
not support its position;
3. changing the standards for scientific research; 
4. disseminating interest group data or 
interpretation of risks via the lay (non-academic) 
press and directly to policymakers. 
The strategies used by the tobacco industry have 
remained remarkably constant since the early 1950s 
when the industry focused on refuting data on the 
harmful effects of active smoking, through to the 
1990s, when the industry was more concerned with 
refuting data on the harmful effects of second-hand 
smoke. Tobacco industry lawyers and executives, 
rather than scientists, have controlled the design, 
conduct and dissemination of this research. 
When data on risk appear to be controversial, 
users of the data should investigate the sources of 
controversy. This can be done only if interest group 
involvement in all steps of the risk determination 
process is transparent and fully disclosed. Since the 
tobacco industry's efforts to manipulate research are 
international endeavours and are shared by other 
corporate interests, individuals around the world 
should be aware of the strategies that the industry 
has used to influence data on risk.
Communicating accurate information on risk is 
essential to risk perception and risk management. 
Research findings, often from basic science, 
epidemiology and exposure or engineering research, 
provide the basis for information on risk. These 
research findings or 'facts' are, however, subject 
to interpretation and the social construction of 
the evidence (Krimsky, 1992). Research evidence 
has a context. The roles of framing, problem 
definition and choice of language influence risk 
communication (Nelkin, 1985). Furthermore, 
scientific uncertainties allow for a wide range of 
interpretation of the same data. Since data do not 
'speak for themselves' interest groups can play a 
critical role in generating and communicating the 
research evidence on risk. 
An interest group is an organised group with 
a specific viewpoint that protects its position 
(Lowi, 1979). Interest groups are not exclusively 
business organisations; they can comprise all kinds 
of organisations that may attempt to influence 
governments (Walker, 1991; Truman, 1993). Therefore, 
interest groups can be expected to select and interpret 
the evidence about a health risk to support their 
predefined policy position (Jasanoff, 1996). For 
example, public health interest groups are likely to 
communicate risks in a way that emphasises harm 
and, therefore, encourages regulation or mitigation of 
risk (Wallack et al., 1993). Industry interest groups are 
likely to communicate risks in a way that minimises 
harm and reduces the chance that their product is 
regulated or restricted in any way. Disputes about 
whether a risk should be regulated or not are 
sometimes taken to the legal system for resolution 
(Jasanoff, 1995). Thus, interest groups often have two 
major goals: to influence policy-making and litigation. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the tobacco industry 
influenced the collection, interpretation and 
dissemination of data on risks of exposure to 
second-hand smoke. The analysis below suggests 
that this was history repeating itself; in the 1950s, 
the tobacco industry had used similar strategies to 
manipulate information on the risks of smoking. 
Moreover, other corporate interest groups appear to 
use similar tactics (Special Issue, 2005; White et al., 
2009).
Many of the strategies available to interest groups — 
for example sponsoring, publishing and criticising 
research — are costly. Industry might therefore be 
expected to dominate examples of such activities 
because corporate interest groups are more likely to 
have the resources to launch expensive, coordinated 
efforts. In contrast, public health groups, which tend 
to act independently, are less likely to command 
such resources (Montini and Bero, 2001). 
Industry examples may also predominate because 
some interest group activities have come to light 
through the documents released during the 
'discovery' process in law suits. For example, the 
asbestos and tobacco industries were required to 
release large amounts of internal correspondence 
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when they were sued by groups attempting to show 
that they were harmed by industry products.
7�2 Scientific community knowledge 
about the hazards of second-hand 
smoke exposure
Environmental tobacco smoke, or second-hand 
smoke, is a complex mixture of thousands of gases 
and fine particles emitted by burning tobacco 
products and from smoke exhaled by smokers, as 
well as smoke that escapes while the smoker inhales 
and some vapour-phase related compounds that 
diffuse from tobacco products. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, data on the harmful effects of exposure 
to second-hand smoke began to be published in 
the scientific literature. Seminal epidemiological 
studies in 1981 demonstrated that second-hand 
smoke exposure was associated with lung cancer 
(Hirayama, 1981). United States Surgeon General 
and National Academy of Sciences reports in 1986 
concluded that second-hand smoke was a cause of 
disease (US DHHS, 1986; NRC, 1986). 
A landmark European epidemiological study on 
lung cancer and second-hand smoke was initiated 
by the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer (IARC) in 1988 and published in 1998. The 
publication reported a 16 % increase in lung cancer 
risk for non-smoking spouses of smokers and a 17 % 
increase for non-smokers who were exposed in the 
workplace (IARC, 1998).
In 1992, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) released a risk assessment classifying ETS 
as a Group A human carcinogen (US EPA, 1992). 
The tobacco industry criticised the methodology of 
the US EPA risk assessment for its study selection 
and statistical analysis. The industry also criticised 
the epidemiological design of the studies included 
in the risk assessment, the ways that these studies 
controlled for bias and confounding, and measured 
ETS exposure (Bero and Glantz, 1993). The EPA 
revised the report in response to valid criticisms 
and the report was approved by the Scientific 
Advisory Board. The report was improved but the 
sheer volume of tobacco industry comments that 
required consideration probably delayed its release. 
Although the science was valid, the tobacco industry 
successfully attacked the US EPA risk assessment in 
court on procedural grounds (Flue-Cured Tobacco 
Co-op vs. US EPA, 1998) and the tobacco industry 
had similar procedural objections to the report of 
Australia's National Health and Medical Research 
Council, 'The health effects of passive smoking' 
(NHMRC, 1997). 
In 1997 the California EPA published the final 
report of a risk assessment entitled 'Health Effects 
of Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke' 
(Cal-EPA, 1997). The California risk assessment was 
more comprehensive than the US EPA's assessment 
because it examined the association of second-hand 
smoke exposure, lung cancer and respiratory 
illness, as well as cardiovascular, developmental, 
reproductive and childhood respiratory effects. 
The California EPA risk assessment also addressed 
criticisms brought by the tobacco industry against 
the US EPA risk assessment. The California risk 
assessment was the result of a collaborative effort 
between the Office of Environmental Health Hazard 
Assessment (OEHHA) and the Air Resources Board 
(ARB), two of the six constituent organisations of 
the California EPA. The Scientific Review Panel that 
endorsed the report concluded that second-hand 
smoke is 'a toxic air contaminant' that 'has a major 
impact on public health' (Cal-EPA, 1997). 
In June 2005 the California Scientific Review Panel 
approved an updated draft report on Identification 
of Environmental Tobacco Smoke as a Toxic Air 
Contaminant (Cal-EPA, 2005). The report concluded 
that second-hand smoke exposure is causally 
associated with developmental effects (e.g. inhibited 
foetal growth, sudden infant death syndrome, 
pre-term delivery), respiratory effects (e.g. asthma, 
acute and chronic respiratory symptoms in children, 
middle ear infections in children), carcinogenic 
effects (e.g. lung cancer, nasal sinus cancer, breast 
cancer in younger, premenopausal women) and 
cardiovascular effects (e.g. heart disease mortality, 
acute and chronic heart disease, morbidity). 
The growing evidence documenting the adverse 
health effects of second-hand smoke was clearly a 
threat to the tobacco industry as early as the 1970s. 
Restrictions on smoking could lead to reduced daily 
consumption of cigarettes and a decline in sales. The 
tobacco industry responded with its own science to 
the independently generated data on tobacco-related 
adverse health effects.
7�3 Tobacco industry strategies to 
subvert scientific knowledge
Policymaking is facilitated by consensus (Kingdon, 
1984; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Sabatier, 
1991). Scientific research, on the other hand, is 
characterised by uncertainty. The uncertainty 
that is familiar to scientists poses problems when 
decision-making occurs in a public forum. Thus, it 
is often to the benefit of corporate interest groups to 
generate controversy about evidence of a product's 
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health risks because such controversy is likely to 
slow or prevent regulation of that product. Similarly, 
scientific debate over the data and methods used 
in risk assessment, for example, can hinder the 
development of the risk assessment (Stayner, 1999). 
The release of previously secret internal tobacco 
industry documents as a result of the Master 
Settlement Agreement in 1998 has given the 
public health community insights into the tobacco 
industry's motives, strategies, tactics and data (Bero, 
2003). These documents show that for decades the 
industry has been motivated to generate controversy 
about the health risks of its products. They have 
also revealed that the industry was concerned about 
maintaining its credibility as it manipulated research 
on tobacco (Bero, 2003).
The strategies used by the tobacco industry have 
remained remarkably constant since the early 
1950s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the tobacco 
industry focused on refuting data on the adverse 
effects of active smoking. The industry applied the 
same tools it developed during that period when 
it subsequently refuted data on the adverse effects 
of second-hand smoke exposure during the 1970s 
through the 1990s. 
A 1978 report prepared by the Roper Organization 
for The Tobacco Institute noted that the industry's 
best strategy for countering public concern about 
passive smoking was to fund and disseminate 
scientific research that countered research produced 
by other sources:
'The strategic and long-run antidote to 
the passive smoking issue is, as we see it, 
developing and widely publicizing clear-cut, 
credible, medical evidence that passive 
smoking is not harmful to the non-smoker's 
health' (Roper Organization, 1978).
Philip Morris promoted international research 
related to passive smoking in order to stimulate 
controversy, as described in the notes of a meeting 
of the UK [Tobacco] Industry on Environmental 
Tobacco Smoke, London, 17 February 1988:
'In every major international area (USA, 
Europe, Australia, Far East, South America, 
Central America and Spain) we are proposing, 
in key countries, to set up a team of scientists 
organized by one national coordinating 
scientist and American lawyers, to review 
scientific literature or carry out work on ETS to 
keep the controversy alive' (emphasis added) 
(Boyse, 1988).
The tobacco industry organised teams of scientific 
consultants all over the world with the main goal 
of stimulating controversy about the adverse health 
effects of second-hand smoke (Barnoya and Glantz, 
2006; Chapman, 1997; Muggli et al., 2001; Grüning 
et al., 2006; Assunta et al., 2004).
A variety of studies show that industry sponsorship 
of research is associated with outcomes that are 
favourable for the industry (Lexchin et al., 2003; 
Barnes and Bero, 1998; Barnes and Bero, 1997). 
One possible explanation for this bias in outcome 
is that industry-sponsored research is poorly 
designed or of worse 'methodological quality' 
than non-industry-sponsored research. However, 
there is no consistent association between industry 
sponsorship and methodological quality (Lexchin 
et al., 2003). 
Factors other than study design can affect the 
outcome of research, including: 
•	 the	framing	or	social	construction	of	the	research	
question; 
•	 the	conduct	of	the	study;
•	 the	publication	(or	not)	of	the	study	findings.	
The tobacco industry has manipulated these 
other factors in a variety of ways. First, by using 
its funding mechanisms to attempt to control the 
research agenda and types of questions asked 
about tobacco. Second, the industry's lawyers and 
executives have been involved in the design and 
conduct of industry-supported research. Third, the 
tobacco industry has sponsored publications of its 
own funded research, and suppressed research not 
favourable to the industry. 
Box 7.1 summarises the range of strategies that the 
tobacco industry has used for decades to manipulate 
information on the risks of tobacco. These strategies 
are described in more detail in the remainder of this 
section.
7.3.1 Strategy 1: fund research that supports the 
interest group's position
The first element in the tobacco industry's strategy 
to influence data on risk has been to sponsor 
research designed to produce findings that are 
favourable to the industry. 
Funding research can stimulate controversy in 
multiple ways. First, it can put the research agenda 
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Box 7�1 Tobacco industry strategies to manipulate data on risk
1. Fund research that supports the interest group position.
2. Hide industry involvement in research.
3. Publish research that supports the interest group position.
4. Suppress research that does not support the interest group position.
5. Criticise research that does not support the interest group position.
6. Change scientific standards.
7. Disseminate interest group data or interpretation of risk in the lay press.
8. Disseminate interest group data or interpretation of risk directly to policymakers.
in the control of the interest group. Second, it can 
produce data to refute research on risk conducted 
by others. In addition to stimulating controversy, 
funding research serves other useful purposes for the 
tobacco industry. The research can be disseminated 
directly to policymakers and the lay press. It can 
provide good public relations for the tobacco industry 
by establishing it as a philanthropic body that funds 
scientific research. Similarly, funding research can 
increase the industry's credibility. One of the criteria 
that the Philip Morris Worldwide Scientific Affairs 
Programme considered when deciding whether to 
fund a research application was whether the research 
would enhance the credibility of the company 
(Malone and Bero, 2003).
The US tobacco industry funded research through its 
trade association, The Tobacco Institute (Bero et al., 
1995; Hanauer et al., 1995), internally (e.g. internal 
company research), externally (e.g. by supporting 
the research of scientific consultants) and through 
sponsored research organisations. Tobacco industry 
lawyers and executives were involved in selecting 
which research to fund. Most of the research did not 
undergo any form of independent scientific peer 
review but was funded on the basis of its potential 
to protect the interests of the companies. 
Lawyer involvement in research
In the mid-1990s, internal tobacco industry 
documents were circulated by industry 
whistle-blowers. By 1998, the availability of tobacco 
industry documents increased exponentially as 
a result of the settlement of a suit by the State of 
Minnesota and Blue Cross/Blue Shield against the 
major tobacco companies. The Master Settlement 
Agreement between the attorneys general of 46 states 
and Brown & Williamson/British American Tobacco, 
Lorillard, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, the Council 
for Tobacco Research and The Tobacco Institute 
released millions of additional documents to the 
public. These documents provide an unprecedented 
look at how tobacco industry lawyers were involved 
in the design, conduct and dissemination of tobacco 
industry-sponsored research (Bero, 2003). By 
involving lawyers in research, the tobacco industry 
protected their research activities from public 
discovery and kept their lawyers informed about 
science relevant to litigation.
The internal tobacco industry documents include 
descriptions of research that was funded directly by 
law firms. For example, the law firms of Covington 
and Burling, and Jacob and Medinger, both of 
which represent a number of tobacco company 
clients, funded research on tobacco (Bero et al., 
1995). Lawyers selected which projects would be 
funded. The supported projects included reviews 
of the scientific literature on topics ranging from 
addiction to lung retention of particulate matter. 
The law firms also funded research on factors 
potential confounding the adverse health effects 
associated with smoking. For example, projects 
examined genetic factors associated with lung 
disease or the influence of stress and low-protein 
diets on health (Bero et al., 1995). Thus, some of the 
research funded by law firms served the purpose of 
deflecting attention away from tobacco as a health 
hazard and protecting the tobacco companies from 
litigation.
Other research was funded directly by the tobacco 
companies but lawyers were involved in selecting 
and disseminating these projects. For example, 
tobacco companies funded individuals to serve 
as consultants to prepare expert testimony for 
Congressional hearings, attend scientific meetings, 
review scientific literature or conduct research on 
the health effects of tobacco or second-hand smoke 
(Hanauer et al., 1995). At one tobacco company, 
Brown & Williamson, the legal department 
controlled the dissemination of internal scientific 
reports (Hanauer et al., 1995). The lawyers at Brown 
& Williamson developed methods for screening 
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scientific reports from their affiliated companies 
in order to ensure that scientific information 
related to tobacco and health would be protected 
from discovery by legal privileges. In a memo 
dated 17 February 1986, J. K. Wells, the Brown & 
Williamson corporate counsel, outlined one method 
for protecting industry produced research data:
'The only way BAT [British American Tobacco] 
can avoid having information useful to 
plaintiff found at B&W is to obtain good legal 
counsel and cease producing information in 
Canada, Germany, Brazil and other places that 
is helpful to plaintiffs' (Wells and Pepples, 
1986).
Although tobacco industry public statements 
claimed that the tobacco companies were funding 
objective research to gather facts about the health 
effects of smoking, lawyer involvement in the 
research served to control the scientific debate on 
issues related to smoking and health and protect 
from discovery scientific documents that were 
potentially damaging to the industry. 
Research organisations
The tobacco industry also formed research funding 
organisations, which gave the appearance that 
the research they supported was independent of 
influence from the industry. 
The Council for Tobacco Research (CTR) was 
formed by United States tobacco companies in 1954 
as the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC). 
The industry stated publicly that it was forming 
the TIRC to fund independent scientific research 
to determine whether there was a link between 
smoking and lung cancer. However, internal 
documents from Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Company have shown that the TIRC was actually 
formed for public relations purposes, to convince 
the public that the hazards of smoking had not been 
proven (Glantz et al., 1996). 
Research that is sponsored by federal organisations 
or large foundations is typically peer reviewed 
by other researchers before funding is approved. 
Although the Council for Tobacco Research had 
a Scientific Advisory Board consisting of well 
respected researchers, not all of the research 
funded by the CTR was peer reviewed by this 
board. Beginning in 1966, tobacco industry lawyers 
became directly responsible for many of the funding 
decisions of the CTR. Between 1972 and 1991, the 
CTR awarded at least USD 14 636 918 in special 
project funding (Bero et al., 1995). Lawyers were not 
only involved in selecting projects for funding but 
also in designing the research and disseminating the 
results (Bero et al., 1995). 
The research funded by CTR, although initially useful 
for public relations, became increasingly important 
for the tobacco industry's activities in legislative and 
legal settings. This evolution is described in a memo 
dated 4 April 1978 from Ernest Pepples, Brown & 
Williamson's vice president and general counsel, 
to J. E. Edens, chairman and CEO of Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Company:
'Originally, CTR was organized as a public 
relations effort. … The research of CTR 
also discharged a legal responsibility. … 
There is another political need for research. 
Recently it has been suggested that CTR or 
industry research should enable us to give 
quick responses to new developments in the 
propaganda of the avid anti-smoking groups. 
… Finally, the industry research effort has 
included special projects designed to find 
scientists and medical doctors who might 
serve as industry witnesses in lawsuits or in a 
legislative forum' (Pepples, 1978).
The Pepples memo gives insight into why lawyers 
became increasingly involved in the selection of 
research projects for CTR. 
The Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) was 
formed by Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company and Lorillard Corporation in 1988 (CIAR, 
1988). The founding companies were joined by 
Svenska Tobaks A.B., a Swedish domestic tobacco 
company in 1994 (CIAR, 1994). The stated mission 
of CIAR was 'to create a focal point organisation 
of the highest caliber to sponsor and foster quality, 
objective research in indoor air issues including 
environmental tobacco smoke, and to effectively 
communicate research findings to a broad scientific 
community' (CIAR, 1989). CIAR's mission statement 
was modified in 1992 to eliminate the words 
referrring to environmental tobacco smoke (CIAR, 
1992a; CIAR, 1992b). The elimination of research on 
second-hand smoke from the mission statement was 
followed by a shift in the research agenda of CIAR 
to one that would prevent it investigating the health 
effects of second-hand smoke.
Similar to the CTR, CIAR awarded 'peer-reviewed' 
projects, which were reviewed by a Science Advisory 
Board, and 'special-reviewed' projects, which 
reviewed by its Board of Directors consisting of 
tobacco company executives (Barnes and Bero, 1996). 
From 1989 to 1993, CIAR awarded USD 11 209 388 
for peer-reviewed projects and USD 4 022 723 for 
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special-reviewed projects (Barnes and Bero, 1996). 
Seventy per cent of the peer-reviewed projects funded 
by CIAR examined indoor air pollutants other than 
tobacco smoke. Thus, the industry appeared to be 
financing peer-reviewed projects through CIAR to 
enhance its credibility, to provide good publicity and 
to divert attention away from second-hand smoke as 
an indoor air pollutant.
In contrast to the peer-reviewed projects, almost 
two-thirds of CIAR's special-reviewed projects were 
related to second-hand smoke (Barnes and Bero, 
1996). In addition, most special-reviewed projects 
studied exposure rather than health effects. It is 
therefore possible that the tobacco industry was 
funding research through CIAR to develop data it 
could use to support its frequent claim that persons 
are not exposed to sufficient levels of passive smoke 
to cause any serious adverse health effects (Tobacco 
Institute, 1986).
The tobacco industry may have also been funding 
special-reviewed research through CIAR to develop 
scientific data that it could use in legislative and 
legal settings. Six CIAR-funded investigators 
have testified at government hearings. All of the 
statements submitted by them supported the tobacco 
industry position that second-hand smoke exposure 
is not harmful to health. Data from two of CIAR's 
special-reviewed projects were presented at hearings 
held by the United States Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) regarding its 
proposed indoor air quality regulation. Data from 
a third special-reviewed project was presented at a 
Congressional hearing related to a proposed ban on 
smoking on commercial aircrafts. One CIAR-funded 
study was investigated extensively by the United 
States Congressional Subcommittee on Health and 
the Environment after it was cited in testimony before 
numerous government agencies. The CIAR-funded 
study had concluded that, with good building 
ventilation, clean air could be maintained with 
moderate amounts of smoking (Turner et al., 1992) 
and was used to support testimony that indoor 
smoking restrictions are not necessary. However, the 
Congressional Subcommittee found that data for this 
study had been altered and fabricated. An earlier 
CIAR-funded study by the same organisation was 
also severely compromised because The Tobacco 
Institute selected the sites where passive smoking 
levels were measured for the study (Barnes and Bero, 
1996). 
The Center for Indoor Air Research was disbanded 
as part of the US Master Settlement Agreement in 
1998. However, in 2000, Philip Morris re-created an 
external research programme called the 'Philip Morris 
External Research Program' (PMERP) with a structure 
similar to that of CIAR. Like CIAR, PMERP's grant 
review panel consisted of a cohort of external peer 
reviewers, a science advisory board, and an internal, 
anonymous review and approval committee. Three 
of the six advisory board members had a previous 
affiliation with CIAR. The majority of the named 
reviewers also had previous affiliations with the 
tobacco industry (Hirschhorn et al., 2001).
Research is an international endeavour
The tobacco industry applied the strategy of 
covertly funding research on an international scale. 
In Latin America and Asia, tobacco companies, 
working through the law firm Covington and 
Burling, developed a network of physician and 
scientist consultants to prepare and present data 
to refute claims about the harms of second-hand 
smoke (Assunta et al., 2004; Barnoya and Glantz, 
2002). In Germany, tobacco companies and the 
German Association of the Cigarette Industry 
developed a similar team of consultants and funded 
research through various foundations and research 
organisations (Grüning et al., 2006). In many cases, 
the industry employed the next strategy discussed 
below: hiding its support for the research. 
In summary, funding research serves multiple 
purposes for the tobacco industry. The research 
that is directly related to tobacco has been used to 
refute scientific findings suggesting that the product 
is harmful and sustain controversy about adverse 
effects. Tobacco industry-supported research has 
been used to prepare the industry for litigation or 
legislative challenges. The industry may also have 
funded research not directly related to tobacco in 
order to generate good publicity, enhance industry 
credibility and to distract from tobacco products as a 
health problem. 
7.3.2 Strategy 2: hide industry involvement in 
research
A defining characteristic of the tobacco industry's 
response to independent evidence of the harms of 
second-hand smoke has been attempts to hide its 
involvement in refuting this evidence. In both of 
the cases described below, tobacco companies were 
secretly involved in generating data to suggest 
that second-hand smoke was not harmful and 
suppressing data suggesting that it was.
Philip Morris European research programme on 
second-hand smoke
As early as 1968, executives at Philip Morris began 
planning a new biological research facility that 
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would focus on examining the effects, including 
carcinogenic effects, of second-hand smoke 
exposure in various animal species. In 1970, 
Philip Morris purchased a research facility in 
Germany, Institut für Industrielle und Biologische 
Forschung GmbH (INBIFO) (Diethhelm et al., 
2004). Philip Morris hired Ragnar Rylander, a 
Swedish university professor, as the coordinator 
of INBIFO. Rylander communicated INBIFO's 
research findings to Philip Morris executives 
in the United States, who would then decide 
whether to disseminate the research more 
widely or keep it secret. Research that remained 
unpublished included studies providing evidence 
that 'sidestream smoke' (which enters the air 
from a burning cigarette, cigar or pipe) is more 
toxic than 'mainstream smoke' (which is inhaled 
directly) (Diethhelm et al., 2004). Published 
research included an epidemiological study 
suggesting an association between lung cancer and 
green tea, a finding that would be useful to the 
tobacco industry in distracting from the harms of 
second-hand smoke (Tewes et al., 1990). 
One of the most striking features of the INBIFO 
programme was that its coordinator, Ragnar 
Rylander, had long-standing and secret links to 
the tobacco industry. Thus, he conferred a false 
sense of credibility to the programme. Professor 
Rylander's association with the tobacco industry 
was investigated by an official university committee, 
the Fact Finding Commission of the University of 
Geneva. The committee concluded that Rylander 
was acting as a sponsored agent of the tobacco 
industry, rather than as an independent researcher 
when he testified as a scientific expert, organised 
scientific congresses and directed research at 
INBIFO (Fact Finding Commission, 2004). An 
extensive analysis of internal tobacco industry 
documents found that Rylander took no initiatives 
'in the area of [second-hand smoke research] without 
first consulting extensively with his contacts within 
the tobacco industry'(Fact Finding Commission, 
2004). 
Tobacco industry creation and dissemination of 
a study on second-hand smoke
The tobacco industry's development of the Japanese 
Spousal Smoking Study provides another example 
of industry involvement in designing, conducting 
and disseminating research, and its efforts to hide 
this involvement. 
In 1981, Takeshi Hirayama published an influential 
study showing an association of second-hand smoke 
exposure and lung cancer (Hirayama, 1981). The 
Hirayama study has been voted the most influential 
paper ever on second-hand smoke (Chapman, 
2005) and was the most frequently cited study 
in regulatory hearings on smoking restrictions 
(Montini et al., 2002). In these hearings, tobacco 
industry representatives have argued that the 
Hirayama study is flawed due to misclassification 
bias (Bero and Glantz, 1993; Schotland and Bero, 
2002). Furthermore, analysis of internal tobacco 
industry documents by Hong and Bero (2002) has 
shown how the tobacco industry hid its involvement 
in creating a study, the Japanese Spousal 
Smoking Study, to support its arguments about 
misclassification bias.
The tobacco industry documents reveal that 
although the Japanese Spousal Smoking Study 
was undertaken by named Japanese investigators, 
project management was conducted by Covington 
and Burling (a tobacco industry law firm), the 
research was supervised by a tobacco industry 
scientist and a tobacco industry consultant assisted 
in reviewing the study design and interpreting 
the data (Hong and Bero, 2002). The documents 
show that the tobacco companies that funded 
the study did not want any of these individuals 
named as co-authors on any of the resulting 
scientific publications. Although the tobacco 
companies considered using the Center for Indoor 
Air Research (CIAR) as 'a cover' to fund the study, 
three companies agreed to fund the study directly. 
Progress reports for the study were prepared on 
Covington and Burling stationery. When the study 
was prepared for publication, the tobacco industry 
consultant was the sole author (Lee, 1995). The 
publication acknowledged 'financial support from 
several companies of the tobacco industry' (Lee, 
1995). This acknowledgement tells the reader little 
about who was actually involved in the design, 
conduct and publication of the study. The hidden 
roles of the tobacco company lawyers and scientist 
raise questions about who was accountable for the 
research (Hong and Bero, 2002).
The analysis of tobacco industry documents (Hong 
and Bero, 2002) was noticed by Dr E. Yano, one 
of the Japanese investigators who was originally 
involved in the Japanese Spousal Smoking study. 
Dr Yano had been unaware that Dr Lee had 
published the study. He had retained the original 
data from the study and has reported that Dr Lee's 
published analysis excluded data that did not 
support misclassification bias (Yano, 2005). Dr Yano 
demonstrated that using the full data from the 
Japanese Spousal Smoking Study changes the 
conclusion of Lee's published report. After 10 years, 
the scientific community was able to obtain data that 
had been suppressed by the tobacco industry. 
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7.3.3 Strategy 3: publish research that supports the 
interest group position
Research has little impact unless it can be cited. The 
tobacco industry has realised that funding research 
that supports its interests must be followed by the 
dissemination of such research in scientific literature. 
The tobacco industry uses several vehicles to publish 
the findings of its sponsored research, including 
funding the publication of symposia proceedings, 
books, journal articles and letters to the editors of 
medical journals. To suggest that the research it funds 
meets scientific standards and that there is substantial 
support for its position, the tobacco industry then 
cites its industry-funded, non-peer-reviewed 
publications in scientific and policy arenas.
Symposium proceedings
Scientific meetings or symposia often result in 
the publication of books or journal articles that 
summarise the research presented there. The 
pharmaceutical industry, for example, publishes 
reports of symposia containing poor quality and 
unbalanced articles favourable to particular drugs 
(Bero et al., 1992; Rochon, 1994). The tobacco industry 
has sponsored numerous symposia on second-hand 
smoke (Bero et al., 1994) and paid for scientific 
consultants to organise and attend these meetings 
(Barnoya and Glantz, 2002, 2006; Muggli et al., 2001). 
Between 1965 and 1993, reports on 11 symposia on 
passive smoking were published. Six were published 
as special issues of medical journals, while five were 
published independently as books. None of the 
symposia was peer reviewed; six were sponsored 
by the tobacco industry or its affiliates such as the 
Center for Indoor Air Research, The Tobacco Institute 
and Fabriques de Tabac Reunies. Two of the six 
industry-sponsored symposia did not explicitly 
acknowledge industry sponsorship. The tobacco 
industry sometimes sponsored conferences through 
independent organisations so that their sponsorship 
would be hidden (Bero et al., 1995; Bero et al., 1994).
The symposia on passive smoking were attended by 
an international group of scientists and held across 
the world, including Europe, the United States, 
Canada, Japan and Argentina. One symposium report 
was published in Spanish. CTR special projects were 
often used to support scientists to prepare talks for 
conferences and to send scientists to conferences 
(Glantz et al., 1996). 
On the surface, articles from symposia look like 
articles from peer-reviewed journals. To test the 
hypothesis that symposium articles on second-hand 
smoke differ in content from articles on second-hand 
smoke appearing in scientific journals, Bero et al. 
(1994) compared the symposia articles to a random 
sample of articles on passive smoking from the 
scientific literature and to two consensus reports on 
the health effects of passive smoking (US DHHS, 
1986; NRC, 1986). Of the symposium articles, 
41 % (122/297) were reviews, compared with 10 % 
(10/100) of journal articles. Symposia articles were 
significantly more likely than journal articles to 
agree with the tobacco industry position that 
tobacco is not harmful (46 % compared to 20 %), 
less likely to assess the health effects of passive 
smoking (22 % compared to 49 %), less likely to 
disclose their source of funding (22 % compared 
to 60 %), and more likely to be written by tobacco 
industry-affiliated authors (35 % compared to 6 %). 
Symposium authors published a lower proportion of 
peer-reviewed articles than consensus report authors 
(71 % compared to 81 %) and were more likely to be 
affiliated with the tobacco industry (50 % compared 
to 0 %) (Bero et al., 1994).
Symposia proceedings can potentially influence 
policy because they are often cited as if they are 
peer-reviewed articles and balanced reviews of 
the scientific literature, with no disclosure of 
their industry sponsorship. For example, tobacco 
industry-sponsored symposia on second-hand 
smoke have been used to attempt to refute both 
peer-reviewed journal articles and risk assessments 
of second-hand smoke (Bero and Glantz, 1993; 
Schotland and Bero, 2002; Chapman et al., 1990). 
Symposia articles have also been cited in tobacco 
industry public relations materials and the press 
(e.g. Tobacco Institute, 1986); and as the consensus 
of a gathering 'of leading experts from around the 
world' who disagree with the published literature on 
passive smoking (Johnston and Sullum, 1994).
In summary, tobacco industry-sponsored symposia 
articles on second-hand smoke consist, in large part, 
of review articles that reach different conclusions 
about the health effects of passive smoking than 
peer-reviewed journal articles or consensus reports. 
Furthermore, symposia are more likely to publish 
research that discusses issues that distract from 
tobacco as a health problem. The tobacco industry 
affiliations of symposia authors suggest that industry 
control over publication and research funding is 
likely to influence the presentation of findings. 
Quality of tobacco industry-funded symposium 
publications
When policymakers, judges, lawyers, journalists 
and scientists are presented with tobacco 
industry-sponsored symposium articles, they must 
decide whether to incorporate these publications into 
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their deliberations. Although the lack of balance and 
peer review suggests that tobacco industry-sponsored 
literature may lack scientific rigour, the issue of peer 
review and study quality is a contentious subject. 
Methodological quality is determined by the presence 
or absence of study design characteristics aimed at 
reducing bias, such as blinding, follow-up, controlling 
for confounding and controlling for selection bias. 
Barnes and Bero (1997) assessed the methodological 
quality of the research presented at symposia. 
As articles from pharmaceutical industry 
sponsored symposia have been found to be of poor 
methodological quality (Rochon, 1994; Cho and 
Bero, 1996) it was hypothesised that articles from 
tobacco industry-sponsored symposia would be 
poorer in methodological quality than peer-reviewed 
journal articles. Other characteristics of articles were 
evaluated that might be associated with quality, such 
as disclosure of the source of research sponsorship 
and the study's conclusions, topics and design. 
Original research articles on the health effects of 
second-hand smoke published in peer-reviewed 
journals were compared to those published in 
non-peer-reviewed symposium proceedings from 
1980 to 1994. 
The study found that peer-reviewed articles were 
better quality than symposium articles independent 
of their source of funding, their conclusions on the 
health effects of second-hand smoke and the type of 
study design. Peer-reviewed articles received higher 
scores than symposium articles for most of the criteria 
evaluated by the quality assessment instrument. 
Quality of tobacco industry-sponsored review 
articles
Policymakers and clinicians often rely on review 
articles to provide accurate and up-to-date 
overviews of a topic of interest (Montini and Bero, 
2001). As already noted, a large proportion of 
symposium articles are reviews of the health effects 
of second-hand smoke (Bero et al., 1994) and are 
frequently cited in response to government requests 
for information (Bero and Glatz, 1993; Montini 
et al., 2002; Schotland and Bero, 2002). In view of 
their importance in guiding policy, it is somewhat 
disconcerting that published review articles often 
reach markedly different conclusions about the 
adverse health effects of second-hand smoke.
Barnes and Bero (1998) conducted a study to evaluate 
the quality of review articles on the health effects 
of passive smoking and to determine whether 
the conclusions of review articles are primarily 
associated with their quality or with other article 
characteristics. The a priori hypotheses were that 
review articles concluding that passive smoking is not 
harmful would tend to be poor in quality, published 
in non-peer-reviewed symposium proceedings 
and written by investigators with tobacco industry 
affiliations. The topic of the review and the year 
of publication were also reviewed as potential 
confounding factors.
In the sample of 106 review articles, the only factor 
associated with concluding that passive smoking is 
not harmful was whether the author of the review 
article was affiliated with the tobacco industry 
(Barnes and Bero, 1998). As shown in Table 7.1, 
review articles concluding that passive smoking is 
not harmful were about 90 times more likely to be 
funded by the tobacco industry than those concluding 
that second-hand smoke is harmful. Methodological 
quality, peer-review status, outcomes studied 
in the reviews, and year of publication were not 
associated with the conclusions of the articles. Thus, 
sponsorship of review articles by the tobacco industry 
appears to influence the conclusions of these articles, 
independent of methodological quality. 
The tobacco industry has argued that independent 
reviews of second-hand smoke are flawed because 
studies with statistically significant results are more 
likely to be published than studies with statistically 
non-significant results (Dickersin et al., 1992; Shook, 
Hardy and Bacon, 1993). The industry argues that 
publication bias — the tendency to publish work 
with statistically significant results — prevents the 
identification of all relevant studies for reviews of the 
health effects of second-hand smoke (e.g. Armitage, 
1993). Bero et al. (2004) conducted a preliminary Photo: © istockphoto/Richard Clark  
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Table 7�1 Factors associated with review articles concluding that passive smoking is not 
harmful to health: multiple logistic regression analysis
Factor Odds ratio (95 % CI) P value
Quality score 1.5 (< 0.1–67.5) 0.83
Not peer reviewed v. peer reviewed 1.3 (0.3–5.4) 0.70
Tobacco industry sponsored v. not tobacco industry sponsored 88.4 (16.4–476.5) < 0.001
Outcomes — lung cancer v. other clinical outcomes 1.6 (0.2–10.3) 0.63
Heart disease v. other clinical outcomes 1.6 (0.2–14.7) 0.67
Year of publication 1.1 (0.9–1.3) 0.45
Source:  Barnes and Bero, 1998.
study of publication bias showing that statistically 
non-significant studies are published: approximately 
20 % of the published peer-reviewed articles on passive 
smoking present statistically non-significant findings. 
By interviewing investigators studying second-hand 
smoke and health effects, Misakian and Bero 
(1998) determined that studies with statistically 
non-significant results take about two years longer to 
be published than those with statistically significant 
results. For studies conducted in humans, only 
statistical significance was predictive of time to 
publication, not study design or sample size. Thus, 
the tobacco industry's argument that statistically 
non-significant results are not published is invalid. 
Since statistically non-significant results are published 
but take longer to be published than statistically 
significant results, reviews of research should attempt 
to include unpublished data and be periodically 
updated. Reviews conducted by the Cochrane 
Collaboration, for example, attempt to identify 
unpublished studies and include them in reviews 
if they meet quality standards. Cochrane reviews, 
which are published online, are also regularly 
updated (Bero and Rennie, 1995). 
7.3.4 Strategy 4: suppress research that does not 
support the interest group position 
Interest groups are eager to fund and publish 
research that supports their position and hesitant 
to publicise research that does not. In some 
cases, tobacco industry lawyers and editors have 
edited their externally funded scientific research 
publications; in other cases they have prevented 
publication of the research (Hong and Bero, 2002; 
Muggli et al., 2001; Barnoya and Glantz, 2002). 
Editing has included attempts to obscure evidence 
on adverse health effects by using the code word 
'zephyr' for 'cancer' in internal memos about health 
effects research (Glantz et al., 1996; BAT, 1956). 
Research conducted internally by tobacco companies 
or through industry-controlled research organisations 
is likely to be suppressed if it is unfavourable to 
the industry. For example, the German tobacco 
industry-supported research organisation, INBIFO, 
did not publish its research showing that sidestream 
smoke is more toxic than mainstream smoke 
(Grüning et al., 2006). 
Tobacco companies have also conducted internal 
research on the use of chemical additives to reduce, 
mask or otherwise alter the visibility, odour, irritation 
or emission of second-hand smoke. Some of these 
studies showed that the additives increased emissions 
of toxins such as carbon monoxide or the carcinogenic 
substances, N'-nitrosoniornicotine and benzo(a)
pyrene (Conolly et al., 2000). Virtually none of this 
research has been published in scientific literature, 
however, and data on additives is not typically 
available to public health policymakers.
7.3.5 Strategy 5: criticise research that does not 
support the interest group position
Another strategy that the tobacco industry has used 
to stimulate controversy about research on risk has 
been to criticise research that is not favourable to 
its position. Science is improved by constructive 
criticism. However, the tobacco industry has misused 
legitimate means of scientific debate, such as letters 
to the editor of scientific journals and editorials. 
The tobacco industry has also used less legitimate 
methods to criticise research, including attacking the 
integrity of researchers or obtaining data through 
lawsuits and reanalysing it using inappropriate 
techniques (Barnes et al., 1995). 
In order to get its views into public commentary on 
risk assessments (Bero and Glantz, 1993; Schotland 
and Bero, 2002) or the lay press (Chapman et al., 
1990), the tobacco industry has frequently cited 
letters to the editor as if they were peer-reviewed 
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journal articles. Letter authors affiliated to the tobacco 
industry often fail to disclose their affiliation. These 
findings support the suggestions by a number of 
journal editors that letter writers should disclose 
potential conflicts of interest and that journals should 
peer review letters (Rennie, 1993).
As mentioned above, the tobacco industry has 
maintained large teams of international scientific 
consultants (Chapman, 1997; Muggli et al., 2001; 
Barnoya and Glantz, 2002). A major goal of the 
tobacco industry's scientific consultancy programme 
was to refute data about the harmful effects of 
tobacco. Industry consultants were paid to criticise 
independent research on tobacco and second-hand 
smoke via participation in scientific conferences; 
publications such as conference proceedings, journal 
articles and books; media appearances; testimony at 
tobacco litigation trials; forming a scientific society on 
indoor air; and preparing statements for government 
committees. The industry consultant programmes 
were international and were used to discredit 
research conducted by non-industry scientists around 
the world (Chapman, 1997; Muggli et al., 2001; 
Barnoya and Glantz, 2002).
7.3.6 Strategy 6: changing scientific standards
As described above, the tobacco industry has devoted 
enormous resources to attacking and refuting 
individual scientific studies. In addition, the industry 
has attempted to manipulate scientific methods and 
regulatory procedures for its benefit. The tobacco 
industry has influenced the debate around 'sound 
science' (Ong and Glantz, 2001), standards for 
risk assessment (Hirschhorn and Bialous, 2001), 
international standards for tobacco and tobacco 
products (Bialous and Yach, 2001) and laws related to 
data access and quality (Baba et al., 2005). 
The tobacco industry has played a major role in 
developing ventilation standards for indoor air 
quality and in establishing international standards 
for tobacco and tobacco products. The International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) develops 
international standards for tobacco and tobacco 
products, including the measurement of tar and 
nicotine yield. The tobacco industry, working through 
the Cooperation Centre for Scientific Research 
Relative to Tobacco (CORESTA) gathered scientific 
evidence for ISO and suggested the standards 
that were adopted (Bialous and Yach, 2001). These 
standards incorrectly imply that there are health 
benefits from low-tar and low-nicotine products 
(Djordjevic et al., 1995). The tobacco industry 
has also been involved in developing ventilation 
standards for over 20 years. The industry influenced 
the development of ventilation standards by the 
American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air 
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) by generating 
data and presenting it to the committee (Bialous and 
Glantz, 2002). This resulted in a standard that ignores 
the health effects of second-hand smoke exposure, 
concentrating instead on a 'comfort' standard. 
In the early 1990s, the tobacco industry launched a 
public relations campaign about 'sound science' and 
'good epidemiological practices' (GEP) and used this 
rhetoric to criticise government reports, particularly 
on the harms of environmental tobacco smoke. All 
scientists agree that research should be rigorously 
conducted. But the 'sound science' and 'GEP' 
campaigns were public relations efforts controlled 
by industry executives and lawyers to promote 
unreasonably high standards of proof about the harm 
caused by the industry's products. For example, 
'sound science' rhetoric argues that epidemiological 
studies can never establish evidence of harm because 
they cannot 'prove' causality. This approach ignores 
the fact that a comprehensive assessment of risk 
involves considering all the evidence related to a 
toxin, not just the epidemiology (Ong and Glantz, 
2001). 
The tobacco industry also developed a campaign 
to criticise the technique of risk assessment of low 
doses of a variety of toxins (Hirschhorn and Bialous, 
2001). The tobacco industry worked with the 
chemical, petroleum, plastics and chlorine industries 
to develop its criticisms of risk assessment. In fact, 
the first version of GEP was drafted by the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association. After about ten years, by 
the late 1990s, the industry's 'sound science' public 
relations campaign ended. The tobacco industry 
then turned to advancing the 'sound science' concept 
through legislation (Baba et al., 2005).
One major goal of the tobacco industry has been to 
obtain data from independent studies and reanalyse 
it using 'sound science' criteria to reach different 
conclusions. Philip Morris, for example, used a 
three-step strategy to obtain data: 
1. asking the researchers for the data directly; 
2. litigation;
3. encouraging the enactment of policies that release 
data (Baba et al., 2005). 
The industry's efforts resulted in 'sound science 
legislation': laws that influenced access to data and 
standards for data analysis. 
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In 1998, the United States Congress enacted a data 
access law as a rider to the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act (US Congress, 1999). The law, 
for the first time, made all data produced under 
federally funded research studies available on 
request through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) (Zacaroli, 1998). Two years after the adoption 
of the data access provision, another amendment 
was added to the 2001 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act. The Data Quality Act (2000) requires the 
Office of Management and Budget to develop 
government-wide standards for data quality in the 
form of guidelines. Individual federal agencies must 
promulgate their own conforming guidelines based 
on OMB's model and adopt standards that 'ensure 
and maximise the quality, objectivity, utility and 
integrity of information disseminated' by federal 
agencies (OMB Watch, 2002). The standards to be 
adopted were created by the industry sponsors, not 
independent researchers.
While the public had an opportunity to comment 
on implementing the laws, these amendments 
were initially passed and adopted without a 
legislative hearing, committee review or debate 
(Renner, 2002). The scientific, academic research 
and public health communities voiced concerns 
during the public comment period about 
potential problems with confidentiality of medical 
information, discouragement of research subjects, 
misinterpretation of incomplete or prematurely 
released data sets, delay of research, protection of 
national security information, and administrative 
and financial burdens (AAAS, 1999). The research 
community was also concerned that these measures 
were supported by industry groups seeking to 
contest environmental and other regulations 
(Zacaroli, 1998). 
Although the tobacco industry intended to hide 
its involvement in the data access and quality acts, 
internal industry documents reveal that these policies 
were driven by tobacco industry efforts to coordinate 
corporate interests. Tobacco industry strategies to 
advance sound science legislation included (Baba 
et al., 2005):
•	 demonstrating	that	the	public	cares	about	the	
issue by sponsoring a poll on issues of data access 
and rules of epidemiological studies that can be 
made public;
•	 leveraging	allies	and	groups	that	have	already	
taken a stand on the issue;
•	 using	scientists	and	technical	conferences	to	focus	
on the issue;
•	 encouraging	a	small	group	of	members	of	
Congress to take a stand on the issue;
•	 encouraging	the	Administration	to	take	a	stand	
for sound science;
•	 mobilising	allied	industries	(i.e.	fishing,	utilities,	
waterworks) to lobby their local representatives;
•	 helping	to	organise	coalitions	for	other	
epidemiological issues coming up soon 
(e.g. fishing industry, mercury, methyline 
chloride);
•	 educating	and	mobilising	the	business	
community on sound science v. junk science and 
the federal legislative/regulatory process;
•	 using	states	to	generate	action	—	conducting	
briefings in states on epidemiological studies 
and the need for uniform standards and 
encouraging the passage of state laws;
•	 developing	broad	bipartisan	support	for	
'freedom of information' with regards to the data 
behind regulations and laws;
•	 leveraging	lobbyists	to	contact	key	legislative	
members;
•	 briefing	the	media;
•	 briefing	business	coalitions	on	the	need	for	data	
access;
•	 using	the	Congressional	Science	Committee	to	
influence Congress.
Together, the data access and data quality acts 
provide a mechanism for challenging the scientific 
merit of data outside scientific journals and other 
channels of scientific review (McGarity, 2004; 
Kaiser, 1997). As scientists, legal experts and 
environmentalists have pointed out, however, 
the data access and data quality riders have the 
potential to block agencies from using emerging 
science from non-industry sources and to slow the 
regulatory process (Kaiser, 2003; Hornstein, 2003; 
Shapiro, 2004). The laws can be used to prevent 
future policies and to repeal existing policies that 
do not meet the data quality standards. The laws 
could shift the scientific standards of data used for 
policy purposes to favour standards promulgated 
by industry. Finally, access to data and quality 
standards are not applied equitably; they only apply 
to data generated with government funding, not 
industry funding.
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Panel 7�1 Shaping risk assessment in the US and the EU: the role of the tobacco industry 
 
Katherine Smith, Anna Gilmore and Gary Fooks
The interest of Philip Morris in shaping risk assessment was precipitated by the US EPA risk assessment 
of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), which resulted in ETS being categorised as a class A human 
carcinogen (Hirschhorn and Bialous, 2001). Philip Morris challenged the assessment as part of its broader 
'sound science' campaign (Ong and Glantz, 2001). This involved lobbying for laws requiring that: 
• epidemiological studies meet a particular set of criteria or standards before they can officially inform 
policy decisions; 
• epidemiological data used in publicly funded studies be made available through freedom of information 
requests.
 
Although the tobacco industry's campaign was ultimately unsuccessful in overturning the EPA's 
classification of ETS, it did manage to place 'a cloud over its validity' until 2002 (Muggli et al., 2004), 
leading to delays in subsequent introduction of protective legislation. Further, Philip Morris had some 
success in introducing data access laws and shaping the Data Quality Act (2000) (Baba et al., 2005). 
Philip Morris believed that a similar campaign might be even more effective in Europe, where officials had 
not yet taken up the scientific threat of ETS to the same extent. From the mid-1990s onwards, therefore, 
it focused its campaign more heavily on Europe. Here, informed by what the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association had termed 'good epidemiological practice' (GEP), Philip Morris concentrated on lobbying for a 
mandatory set of criteria or standards that epidemiological studies would have to meet before they could 
be officially considered by policymakers in Europe (Ong and Glantz, 2001). The Philip Morris standards for 
'good epidemiological practice' included a requirement for evidence relating to relative risks of less than 
2.0 to be disregarded as too weak to warrant policy intervention. 
As of late 2000 Ong and Glantz (2001) concluded that, despite the efforts of Philip Morris, 'no European 
Union resolution on GEP had been produced'. As far as we are aware, this remains the case.
British American Tobacco (BAT) managers studied the Philip Morris campaigns carefully and from 
1995 onwards considered lobbying for a mandatory requirement for 'structured risk assessment' in 
EU policymaking because they believed it could be used to prevent the introduction of public smoking 
restrictions (Smith et al., 2010; BAT, 1995 and 1996). By this stage, the industry was well aware 
of the negative health impacts of second-hand smoke and was simultaneously trying to influence 
the evidence-base on this issue. BAT managers believed that 'a legislated demand for structured 
risk assessment', governed by strict 'rules for the assessment of epidemiological and animal data' 
would 'remove the possibility of introducing public smoking restrictions that are based on risk claims' 
(BAT, 1995). 
Our analysis of BAT's internal documents has not yet established precisely what BAT managers meant 
when they used the term 'structured risk assessment'. All of the documents with titles indicating that they 
include detailed information on this issue have been redacted (3).
A 1995 BAT document makes it clear that the company's interpretation of 'risk assessment' involved a 
set of 'rules for the assessment of epidemiologic and animal data', which BAT managers believed would, 
if applied, make it 'apparent that ETS has not been proven to be a cause of disease in non-smokers' 
(BAT, 1995). 
BAT managers wanted to use risk assessment as a way of limiting officials' discretion. For example, a 
document discussing the company's efforts to influence risk assessment says: 'The challenge will be 
to persuade government departments to subordinate policy or judgemental considerations in favour of 
scientific rigour in risk assessment' (Gretton, undated [circa 1995]). 
(3) See for example BAT (1991 and 1996). The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website, which hosts these documents, states that 
the term 'redacted', 'Indicates whether the document contains words or sentences that were erased (redacted) by the tobacco 
company due to confidentiality issues (i.e. trade secrets, attorney/client privileges) before the document was publicly released' 
(University of California, 2011).
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Panel 7�1 Shaping risk assessment in the US and the EU: the role of the tobacco industry   
 (cont�)
In practice, this constituted a way of undermining the precautionary principle as a basis for policy 
decisions.
The key innovation of BAT's European campaign was the decision to focus on promoting risk assessment 
within a framework of 'cost-benefit analysis', a term that BAT used interchangeably with business 
impact assessment (see Smith et al., 2010). This had the additional effect of embedding economic 
considerations into the risk assessment process, which would also require interventions to protect the 
public against particular risks to be justified on the basis of economic costs (BAT, 1996; European Policy 
Centre, 1997).
BAT initially sought advice on how to shape risk assessment in the EU from the US advisers to Philip 
Morris, Covington and Burling (Covington and Burling, 1996). They advised BAT that although there was 
little interest in risk assessment within the European Commission at the time it might be possible to 
include 'structured risk assessment' in detailed guidance for business impact assessments, which had been 
flagged as a priority for the European Commission in 1996. 
BAT was aware that a campaign for regulatory reform with known links to the tobacco industry was 
unlikely to succeed (Honour, 1996). It had been advised to work through a 'front group' and to recruit 
other companies with similar interests, such as other large firms in regulated sectors (MacKenzie-Reid, 
1995). Following this advice, BAT approached the European Policy Centre (a prominent Brussels-based 
think tank with strong links to the Commission) to lobby for regulatory reforms on its behalf (Smith et al., 
2010). BAT and the European Policy Centre then jointly set about recruiting other business interests to this 
campaign (Smith et al., 2010). These companies, which included large corporations from the oil, chemical 
and pharmaceuticals sectors, established an invitation-only sub-group within the European Policy Centre, 
known as the Risk Forum (Smith et al., 2010). 
These efforts contributed to certain amendments to the Treaty on European Union (EU, 1997), placing a 
legal duty on the Commission to 'consult widely' and to minimise the potential 'burden' of policy changes 
on 'economic operators' and others (EU, 1997). BAT interpreted this to mean that business impact 
assessment and risk assessment were now mandatory within EU policymaking. The company perceived 
this as 'an important victory' (BAT, undated). 
The guidelines for EU officials on how to undertake impact assessment have been revised several times 
since and now incorporate guidance on undertaking risk assessment (European Commission, 2009). 
In 2006–2007, under pressure to open up to civil society organisations and other members of the 
European Policy Centre (which was under new leadership), the coalition of companies involved in the 
think tank's Risk Forum left and established a separate organisation called the European Risk Forum. This 
group describes itself as 'an expert led, not-for-profit think tank' (European Risk Forum, 2008a), despite 
solely representing corporate interests, virtually all of which are connected to the chemical and tobacco 
industries. This was confirmed via personal correspondence from the Forum's chair, Dirk Hudig, in February 
2010. The European Risk Forum is now actively encouraging the European Commission to adopt a more 
structured approach to risk assessment and risk management (European Risk Forum, 2008b), although it 
remains unclear precisely what this involves. 
Recent analyses suggest that these corporate efforts have been somewhat successful in redefining 
policymakers' understandings of and responses to risks, including those that limit use of the precautionary 
principle in the EU (Löfstedt, 2004) and the United Kingdom (Dodds, 2006). However, as risk assessment 
continues to be actively debated in Brussels, it is not yet possible to assess the success of the BAT or Philip 
Morris campaigns. 
It is of course legitimate for corporate interests to contribute to discussions on assessing scientific evidence 
and weighing up risks. However, it is important to ensure that this influence is transparent, is not excessive 
in comparison to other stakeholders, and does not compromise public welfare. 
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7.3.7 Strategy 7: disseminate interest group data 
or interpretation of risk in the lay press
While the tobacco industry appears to have 
recognised the importance of publishing work that 
supports its position in the scientific literature, 
the industry also seems aware of the need to get 
research data directly into the hands of the public 
and policymakers. How, then, were the public 
and other stakeholders involved in generating, 
presenting, understanding, communicating and 
using science to refute data on the adverse health 
effects of tobacco?
The important role of the media in communicating 
risk has been extensively studied (Nelkin, 1985; 
Raymond, 1985). The tobacco industry has been 
active in stimulating controversy in lay print media 
about the health effects of second-hand smoke. In 
a cross-sectional sample of 180 North American 
newspaper and 95 magazine articles reporting on 
second-hand smoke research between 1981 and 
1995, Kennedy and Bero (1999) found that 66 % of 
newspaper articles and 55 % of magazine articles 
left readers with the impression of continuing 
controversy about second-hand smoke research. 
However, the proportion of those articles concluding 
that the research was controversial remained 
relatively constant.
Although tobacco industry-sponsored research 
studies were not widely cited in lay press articles, 
tobacco industry affiliated individuals were often 
cited (Kennedy and Bero, 1999; Malone et al., 
2001). Among the 180 newspaper articles examined 
by Kennedy and Bero (1999), 52 % cited tobacco 
industry officials, whereas 56 % cited government 
officials and 46 % cited independent scientists. This 
citation of tobacco industry officials as experts on 
scientific studies on second-hand smoke could have 
contributed to the emphasis on controversy. 
7.3.8 Strategy 8: present interest group data 
or interpretation of risk directly to 
policymakers
The last strategy in the tobacco industry's effort 
to stimulate controversy about data on risk has 
been to get its funded research directly into the 
hands of individuals who are likely to influence 
policy. A series of in-depth case studies have 
been undertaken, examining the role of research 
evidence in the development of two risk assessments 
of second-hand smoke, two state indoor air 
regulations and two United States federal tobacco 
regulations (Schotland and Bero, 2002; Roth et al., 
2003, Bero et al., 2001; Bryan-Jones and Bero, 
2003). Each study addressed the role of the tobacco 
industry in developing risk assessments and 
regulations by analysing archival data, including 
written commentary and hearing transcripts, and 
interviewing key policymakers. 
In the United States, the processes for developing 
these risk assessments and regulations involves 
the appropriate government agency reviewing the 
relevant scientific literature, preparing a draft report, 
collecting written and oral public commentary, and 
revising the report based on that public commentary 
(Jasanoff, 1987 and 1996, Silbergeld, 1993). Public 
participation in the process is important for 
shaping the findings of the final risk assessment 
or regulation, and for public acceptability of the 
findings (Jasanoff, 1987). Furthermore, public 
commentary could help prevent the 'capture' of the 
risk assessment process by interest groups (Wilson, 
1989). 
Risk assessments of second-hand smoke
As noted earlier in this chapter, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) published a risk assessment 
of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) in 1992, 
which concluded that passive smoking is associated 
with lung cancer in adults and respiratory disease 
in children. The risk assessment's development 
was considerably delayed by the tobacco industry's 
criticisms of the report (US EPA, 1992). Sixty-four 
per cent (69/107) of submissions received by the 
EPA during the public commentary period claimed 
that the conclusions of the draft were invalid and, 
of these, 71 % (49/69) were submitted by tobacco 
industry-affiliated individuals (Bero and Glantz, 1993). 
The tobacco industry-affiliated reviewers supported 
their criticisms of the risk assessment by selectively 
citing non-peer-reviewed literature, especially articles 
from symposium proceedings (Bero and Glantz, 1993). 
Thus, tobacco industry-sponsored research that was 
not published in the peer-reviewed scientific literature 
was submitted directly to the EPA for review.
Schotland and Bero (2002) examined the 
development of the California risk assessment, 
revealing that participation in the public 
contribution process was not balanced among 
all interested parties, and was dominated by the 
tobacco industry. Critics and supporters of the risk 
assessment used different criteria to evaluate the 
science, suggesting that they were constructing 
the evidence to support their predefined positions. 
Similar to the US EPA risk assessment, the tobacco 
industry was able to use its funded research to 
support its arguments against the California risk 
assessment. 
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Indoor air regulation
During the 1990s, the Washington and Maryland 
Occupational Safety and Health Administrations 
each promulgated regulations restricting smoking 
in private workplaces. The US Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration also proposed 
a workplace smoking restriction but this failed. 
Internal tobacco industry documents show that one 
strategy the industry used to defeat the proposed 
federal regulation was to 'produce data to counter 
the findings about the adverse health effects of 
second-hand smoke' (Bryan-Jones and Bero, 2003). 
Despite the tobacco industry's use of this strategy 
and others to defeat the Maryland and Washington 
regulations, the state regulations were passed 
(Mangurian and Bero, 2000). 
The two states' regulatory development processes 
required a public commentary period. Opposition 
to the regulation came primarily from the 
tobacco industry, small businesses, and business 
organisations and appeared to be coordinated (Bero 
et al., 2001). Much of the business group opposition 
was supported by the tobacco industry, although 
this support was not disclosed in the public 
commentary (Mangurian and Bero, 2000). Although 
arguments not related to science were more 
common than scientific arguments as a whole, 
arguments about science were used more often 
by opponents than supporters of the regulations 
(Bero et al., 2001). As in the other examples cited 
in this chapter, opponents of regulation, primarily 
the tobacco industry, cited industry-sponsored 
symposium proceedings or peer-reviewed journal 
articles of low methodological quality to support 
their criticisms of the science on which the 
regulations were based.
Apparent disagreement among experts during 
public testimony reinforces uncertainty about 
the data underpinning risk estimates or 
regulations. The studies of the Washington and 
Maryland regulations suggest, however, that 
the industry-supported experts used different 
criteria to evaluate the science, different bodies 
of evidence to support their claims and relied 
on arguments about specific studies rather than 
emphasising the body of evidence as a whole. 
In general, the involvement of tobacco industry 
lawyers and executives in the design, conduct 
and dissemination of research has an impact on 
how controversy can influence public opinion and 
policy decisions.
Box 7.2 describes how the tobacco industry worked 
to undermine tobacco control activities at the 
World Health Organization.
7�4 Lessons learned
The tobacco industry has had a long-standing 
strategy of funding research and disseminating 
it through their sponsored, non-peer-reviewed 
publications. These strategies have remained 
relatively consistent as the industry has evolved 
from refuting research on active smoking to 
refuting research on second-hand smoke. Despite 
the questionable conduct of much of this research, 
the tobacco industry has widely disseminated it to 
lay journalists and policymakers. In addition, the 
tobacco industry has a record of suppressing and 
criticising research that is unfavourable to its position. 
Tobacco industry lawyers and executives, rather than 
scientists, have been in control of the design, conduct 
and dissemination of this research, thereby protecting 
the research from public discovery. Since the 
tobacco industry's efforts to manipulate research are 
international endeavours, there is a need for global 
awareness of the strategies that the industry has used 
to influence data on risk.
When data on risk appear to be controversial, 
users of the data should investigate the sources of 
the controversy. Does the controversy exist only 
because the findings of interest group-funded 
research are contrary to data collected by others? Is 
the controversy supported primarily by evidence 
published in interest group-supported publications? 
Is the controversy supported primarily by research 
publications of low scientific quality? Is the 
controversy perpetuated in the lay press through 
citation of interest group-affiliated individuals? Are 
the data that suggests a controversy presented to 
policymakers only by the interest group?
Policymakers should apply these questions to all 
situations in which a company has an interest in 
creating controversy about the risks of its products. 
The tobacco industry differs substantially from other 
industries in the deadly nature of its products when 
used as directed, and the historical lack of regulation 
of tobacco products. However, the tobacco industry's 
methods for influencing the design, conduct and 
publication of research are similar to those of other 
corporate interests. For example, studies examining 
the association of pharmaceutical industry funding 
and research outcomes suggest that such funding 
produces studies with outcomes that are favourable 
to the sponsor (Lexchin et al., 2003; Cho and Bero, 
1996; Bekelman et al., 2003). The reasons for this 
observed association of funding and outcome are 
not clear (Bero and Rennie, 1996). For example, the 
funding source does not appear to influence the 
methodological quality of the published research 
(Lexchin et al., 2003). Therefore, biased outcomes may 
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Box 7�2 Tobacco industry strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World  
 Health Organization
'Tobacco industry documents reveal that, for many years, tobacco companies have deliberately subverted the 
efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO) to control tobacco use. The attempted subversion has been 
elaborate, well financed, sophisticated and usually invisible.
The release of millions of pages of confidential tobacco company documents as a result of lawsuits against 
the tobacco industry in the United States has exposed the activities of tobacco companies in resisting tobacco 
control efforts. That tobacco companies resist proposals for tobacco control comes as no surprise. What is 
now clear is the scale and intensity of their often deceptive strategies and tactics.
The tobacco companies' own documents show that they viewed the WHO, an international public health 
agency, as one of their foremost enemies. The documents show further that the tobacco companies instigated 
global strategies to discredit and impede the WHO's ability to carry out its mission. The tobacco companies' 
campaign against the WHO was rarely directed at the merits of the public health issues raised by tobacco use. 
Instead, the documents show that tobacco companies sought to divert attention from the public health issues, 
to reduce budgets for the scientific and policy activities carried out by the WHO, to pit other UN agencies 
against the WHO, to convince developing countries that the WHO's tobacco control programme was a 'first 
world' agenda carried out at the expense of the developing world, to distort the results of important scientific 
studies on tobacco and to discredit the WHO as an institution.
Although these strategies and tactics were frequently devised at the highest levels of tobacco companies, 
the role of tobacco industry officials in carrying out the strategies was often concealed. In their campaign 
against the WHO, the documents show that tobacco companies hid behind a variety of ostensibly independent 
quasi-academic, public policy and business organisations, whose tobacco industry funding was not 
disclosed. The documents also show that tobacco company strategies to undermine the WHO relied heavily 
on international and scientific experts with hidden financial ties to the industry. Perhaps most disturbing, 
the documents show that tobacco companies quietly influenced other UN agencies and representatives of 
developing countries to resist the WHO's tobacco control initiatives.
That top executives of tobacco companies sat together to design and set in motion elaborate strategies to 
subvert a public health organisation is unacceptable and must be condemned. The Committee of Experts 
believes that the tobacco companies' activities slowed and undermined effective tobacco control programmes 
around the world. 
Given the magnitude of the devastation wrought by tobacco use, the Committee of Experts is convinced 
that, on the basis of the volume of attempted and successful acts of subversion identified in its limited 
search, it is reasonable to believe that the tobacco companies' subversion of the WHO's tobacco control 
activities has resulted in significant harm. Although the number of lives damaged or lost as a result of the 
tobacco companies' subversion of WHO may never be quantified, the importance of condemning the tobacco 
companies' conduct, and taking appropriate corrective action, is overriding'.
be the results of how the research questions are asked, 
how the research is actually conducted and whether 
the results are published (or not published). Food 
industry funding for research has also been shown to 
produce outcomes favourable to the sponsor (Nestle, 
2002; Levine et al., 2003). 
A report by the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(2007) has documented how ExxonMobil has used 
the tactics of the tobacco industry to stimulate 
controversy about climate science. ExxonMobil 
has raised doubts about the evidence, hidden 
involvement behind front groups, sponsored 
scientific spokespersons to criticise the science and 
attempted to shift the focus away from existing 
evidence to the need for 'sound science'.
The public health community must learn more about 
the internal behaviour of corporations other than the 
tobacco industry in order to make conclusions about 
similarities in corporate behaviour. The release of 
millions of internal tobacco industry documents has 
given the public health community insights into the 
inner workings of the tobacco industry and revealed 
Source: Summary of a report of the WHO Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents (CETID, 2000).
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their previously hidden involvement in manipulating 
research (Bero, 2003). However, this insight is not 
available for most corporate sectors. 
In some of the few other analyses of internal 
industry documents, Markowitz and Rosner 
describe how the chemical, asbestos and lead 
industries manipulated research about the harms of 
their products (Markowitz and Rosner, 1991, 2000, 
2002). Their analysis reveals that these industries 
used the same tactics as tobacco companies to 
create controversy about the health effects of 
tetraethyl lead, asbestos, polyvinyl chloride and 
other chemicals. A recent issue of the International 
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 
relies heavily on internal company documents that 
the authors obtained by serving as expert witnesses 
in litigation (Special Issue, 2005). It describes how 
a variety of chemical companies and their trade 
organisations have used the strategies outlined in 
this article: 
1. funding research that supports the interest 
group's position; 
2. hiding industry involvement in research; 
3. publishing research that supports the interest 
group's position; 
4. suppressing research that does not support the 
interest group's position; 
5. criticising research that does not support the 
interest group's position; 
6. changing scientific standards;
7. disseminating interest group data or 
interpretation of risk in the lay press; 
8. disseminating interest group data or 
interpretation of risk directly to policymakers. 
The role of the sponsor in designing, conducting 
and disseminating research can be evaluated only 
if interest group involvement in all steps of the risk 
determination process is fully described. Thus, 
funding sources for all published research should 
be fully disclosed. Our analyses show, however, 
that disclosure of funding sources often provides 
incomplete information about the involvement of 
the sponsors in the research process. The tobacco 
industry has a long history of hiding the involvement 
of its lawyers and executives in the designing, 
conducting and disseminating research. If internal 
tobacco industry documents had not been made 
available to the public, much of what is known about 
the industry's manipulation of research would have 
remained undiscovered. 
Disclosures should not be limited to describing 
the roles of the research funders in all stages of the 
research process. Personal financial ties between 
investigators and corporate interests (such as 
consulting fees, stock ownership, honoraria etc.) 
should also be fully disclosed. Personal financial 
ties are increasing (Boyd and Bero, 2000) and are 
associated with favourable research outcomes 
for the corporate interest, even if the corporate 
interest is not funding the research (Lexchin et al., 
2003). Experts who criticise research describing 
the harms of a company's product should also 
fully disclose their financial ties with the company. 
These complete and accurate disclosures should be 
found in scientific publications (including research 
articles, letters to the editor and editorials), 
citations in the lay press, and testimony in policy or 
legal settings. 
Full disclosure of a sponsor's role in designing, 
conducting and publishing a study could also 
improve the peer-review process. Peer reviewers are 
typically limited by the information available in the 
article they are reviewing. The peer review process 
itself should be conducted by individuals with 
adequate expertise and be independent of industry 
sponsors.
The findings presented in this chapter also have 
implications for how experts should be selected 
to participate in the risk assessment process. As 
suggested by others, professional competence, 
diversity of political views, disciplines, opinions 
and attitudes are important (von Winterfeldt, 1992). 
However, consideration should also be given to 
affiliation or interest group bias and how this will 
affect risk assessment. Encouraging transparency 
regarding the roles of interest groups in developing 
and disseminating data on risk will not prevent 
their involvement in the process. However, such 
transparency will make it easier to determine which 
strategies, if any, an interest group has been using to 
influence the data. 
Detailed and accurate financial disclosures of 
research funding and financial ties are necessary, but 
not sufficient, for safeguarding the integrity of the 
research record. One possible benefit of disclosure 
is that it might discourage scientists from entering 
into financial relationships that could detract from 
the perceived integrity of their research. Another 
possible benefit is that transparency might improve 
public trust in research (Cho, 1998). Krimsky 
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(2003), however, has described disclosure as a 
'rationalisation for creating more serious conflicts'. 
He points out that disclosure is a 'public relations' 
response to dealing with corporate influence on 
research and not a way of potentially decreasing the 
effect of the corporate sponsor on research integrity. 
Although greater transparency about industry 
involvement in research could facilitate evaluation 
of biases in the design, conduct and reporting that 
might be introduced by such sponsorship, it will 
not eliminate the biases. Furthermore, if researchers 
and institutions are concerned that the public 
views industry-sponsored research as less credible, 
regardless of any effect on bias, eliminating financial 
ties may be the best way to deal with the issue. 
A number of scholars have argued that there should 
be a total ban on clinical investigators' financial ties 
to companies that fund their research (Krimsky, 
2003; Dana, 2003). These proposed bans eliminate 
the need for oversight committees to 'manage' the 
conflict of interest and protect against even the 
appearance of conflict. 
Schafer (2003) supports the 'sequestration thesis', 
which would eliminate direct corporate sponsorship 
of research and financial ties of investigators. 
Sequestration could be achieved by forming 
an independent research institute, funded by 
companies, to support research. Shamoo and 
Resnik (2003) have noted, however, that eliminating 
financial ties and corporate funding may not be 
realistic today. Some investigators advocate 'self 
regulation': voluntary compliance with professional 
society guidelines, or adaptation of the federal 
conflict of interest policy to clinical trials funded by 
private sponsors (Boyd et al., 2003).
Support for banning corporate funding of research 
is most developed among academic institutions that 
have policies prohibiting researchers from accepting 
tobacco industry funding for research. For example, 
some academic institutions, particularly schools of 
medicine and public health, have developed bans on 
tobacco industry funding (Herman, 2002). Examples 
include Harvard University and the University 
of Sydney. Some funding agencies (e.g. Legacy 
Foundation) have developed policies that require 
such bans as a condition for receiving funding 
(Shield, 2001). 
Bans on tobacco industry support for research 
are warranted in view of the industry's history of 
deception about its role in designing, conducting 
and disseminating industry-supported research. 
They are further justified by the tobacco industry's 
motives for funding research, which include 
distracting attention from tobacco's health risks, 
gaining credibility and using the research for public 
relations (Cohen, 2003). 
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Table 7.2 Key dates relating to knowledge of harm from active and second-hand smoke 
1604 King James I of England wrote 'A Counterblaste Against Tobacco' expressing his distaste for tobacco, particularly 
tobacco smoking. This was one of the earliest anti-tobacco publications
1903–1908 In the United Kingdom, the Boer War Recruits Health Report led, in 1908, to restrictions on the sale of tobacco to 
children under 16 and empowered police to confiscate cigarettes from children smoking in public places
1931 Argentinian oncologist Angel Roffo (1931) produced skin tumours in rabbits with tobacco tar, building on similar work 
on tars and skin cancer that began with Percival Pott's UK studies of scrotal cancer and chimney sweeps (1775)
1936 US physician Alton Ochsner (1973) sees nine cases of lung cancer in six months after not seeing one in 20 years. 
Noting that all the patients had begun smoking during World War I, he suggested that smoking was the cause
1938 US statistician Raymond Pearl (1938) uses insurance records to show increased death rates of smokers
1939 Franz Müller (1939) uses 86 cases of lung cancer compared to controls to show that heavy smokers had 16 times the 
lung cancer deaths than non-smokers: a 'one in a million chance' finding leading to the conclusion that tobacco was 
the 'single most important cause of the rise in lung cancer'
1930–1941 Schairer and Schöniger (2001) studied 195 lung cancer cases using two control groups (other cancers and no 
diseases), showing that only three lung cancer cases had not smoked and that a statistical association between 
tobacco and lung cancer was 'likely'
1942–1944 Seven dissertations were published on tobacco and health effects at the German National Scientific Institute for 
Research on Tobacco, Jena (Zimmermann et al., 2001)
1946 Percy Stocks (1947), UK chief medical statistician to the General Register Office, noted a 'startling' six-fold increase in 
male lung cancer between 1930 and 1944
1947 The UK Medical Research Council (MRC) met to discuss action and was attended by Bradford Hill, Alice Stewart, Ernest 
Kennaway and others. Several possible causes of lung cancer were discussed: tar from roads, urban air pollution, 
traffic fumes and smoking. These were all probably 'factors which prepare the soil rather than sow the seed' (Tudor 
Edwards, 1946; Keeting, 2009)
1948 In an MRC study by Doll and Bradford Hill, preliminary results on 156 interviews with patients showed 'definite 
association' between lung cancer and smoking, although the lack of a link between inhaling and cancer was 'surprising' 
(Pollock, 1999). This was to provide the eminent statistician, Sir Ronald Fisher, with his denial of the association 
between smoking and lung cancer for many years
1950 Five papers were published showing the dangers of smoking. Wynder and Graham (1950) 
(concerning military veterans in the US), Doll and Bradford Hill (1950) (concerning hospital patients in the United 
Kingdom) concluded that smoking was 'an important factor' in the 'induction/production' of lung cancer. Of 647 cases 
in the Doll and Bradford Hill study only 0.3 % were non-smokers: a 'one in a million' chance finding. Heavy smokers 
had 16 times the lung cancer deaths than non-smokers. But this result was 'largely doubted and generally ignored' by 
the medical establishment (Keating, 2009)
1953 A UK Government Advisory Committee concluded that the 'association was causal' and 'young people should be 
warned' (Ministry of Health, 1953a, 1953b and 1954)
1954 Preliminary results were released from the study of Doll and Hill (1954) of 40 000 doctors which was to last 50 years. 
Data on 39 lung cancer cases out of 769 deaths confirmed their earlier findings and now revealed a dose/response 
effect and an association with heart disease. In the US, Hammond and Horn's (1954) study of 5 000 deaths showed 
similar results
1954 Publication of scientific studies documenting tobacco's role in cancer and other fatal illnesses together with subsequent 
media coverage and declining sales was referred to internally by the tobacco industry as the '1954 emergency'. The 
industry responded with a public relations campaign led by Hill and Knowlton to 'manufacture doubt' about the link 
between smoking and lung cancer, without actually denying it
1964 A US Surgeon General report, 'Smoking and Health', based on 29 studies, concluded that 'there is a causal relationship 
between excessive smoking and lung cancer' (US DHEW, 1964)
1970–1980s The first studies were published showing that second-hand smoking is associated with lung cancer. A US Surgeon 
General report in 1986 concluded that the link is causal (US DHHS, 1986)
1993–1998 Tobacco industry subverts the WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) study and evaluation of 
second-hand smoking as a human carcinogen
Source:  EEA, based on Keating, 2009 and Ong and Glantz, 2000.
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8 Vinyl chloride: a saga of secrecy
Morando Soffritti, Jennifer Beth Sass, Barry Castleman and David Gee (1)
  
This chapter is about how early warnings in the 1950s and 1960s concerning the short-term 
harm of vinyl chloride (VC) to the skin and bones of workers, and to the livers of laboratory 
animals, were initially hidden from other workers and regulators. This was despite some early 
misgivings by company experts whose advice was initially ignored by their employers. This 
pattern was repeated when the later, more devastating news of a rare liver cancer in workers 
was revealed by long-term animal studies and by an attentive and concerned company physician.
Unlike many other histories, however, this story features a very prompt response from the 
global chemical industry to the publication of the liver cancer evidence, a response that included 
funding cancer testing and later compliance with a large reduction in the permissible exposure 
limits. The case also provides early evidence of reproductive effects of vinyl chloride monomer 
(VCM). 
Other features of this story presage the later and common responses of the corporate world to 
heightened public awareness and pressure from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
trade unions, including greatly exaggerated estimates of the likely costs of complying with tighter 
pollution controls; a frequent mismatch between the position of the trade association and that 
of many, more progressive companies within the association; but also some relatively quick 
corporate responses to public, NGO and regulatory pressure. 
The chapter also features two legal aspects, which, though more common in the US, are also 
valuable for Europeans. First, the potentially positive role that judicial review of regulatory 
proposals can play in providing a societal judgement about the behaviour of corporations. This 
can embrace not just moral judgements but also judgements about the state of the science and 
what society should do with it. 
Second, the role that document discovery in legal compensation cases can play in revealing 
the real and until then secret activities of corporations. Any proposals to promote justice for 
victims of environmental and health harms via no fault administrative arrangements need to be 
accompanied by other measures to extract information about corporate behaviour.
The chapter is followed by a panel analysing the value of animal testing for identifying 
carcinogens.
(1) Authors would like to thank Professors David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz for providing original copies of original documents. 
Many of the documents used to prepare this paper are a part of the collection of the Cesare Maltoni Cancer Research Center in 
Bentivoglio, Italy. The original industry documents cited by Markowitz and Rosner in their book, Deceit and Denial, are available to 
the public at http://www.deceitanddenial.org.
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8�1 A veil of secrecy
In January 1973 the US National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) issued 
an official 'request for information' to the public, 
including the chemical industry, requiring that all 
information relevant to the hazards of vinyl chloride 
be submitted to the government. Compliance was 
mandatory. 
The 'request' put the US chemical industry (both 
users and manufacturers) in a difficult position. 
Dow Chemical and other US manufacturers had 
signed a 'secrecy agreement' (see Figure 8.1) in 1972 
with European chemical companies (Markowitz and 
Rosner, 2002, p. 182–183). The signed agreements, 
which were collected by Imperial Chemical 
Industries Ltd (ICI), United Kingdom, obliged 
signatories to hold in confidence new animal 
testing research from Italy, which would eventually 
contribute to more protective workplace standards. 
The US and European chemical companies met 
in Washington DC on 14 November 1972 at the 
headquarters of the US Manufacturing Chemists 
Association (MCA), the trade association of 
industrial chemical manufacturers. 
The scientific findings revealed at the meeting came 
from a medieval castle in Bentivoglio, Bologna, 
Italy, equipped with a modern scientific laboratory, 
world-class animal testing facilities and top-notch 
scientific staff. Seated at microscopes, a scientific 
team, led by Professor Cesare Maltoni, was the first 
in the world to see evidence of cancer in the liver 
and kidneys of laboratory animals that had been 
exposed to inhalation of a daily concentration of 
vinyl chloride of 250 ppm — half the level allowed 
in workplace air at the time. 
While the companies did not doubt the evidence 
from these studies, the Secrecy Agreement did 
not allow them disclose it. Such was the concern 
about leaks to the public that Mr D. M. Elliott of ICI 
'insisted that the work tables be swept clear of paper 
for note taking before he would discuss anything 
regarding the European group's efforts. Such was 
done' (Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 183).
In fact, Professor Maltoni's work was not the first 
indication that industry standards were inadequate 
and risked grievous harm to workers. The MCA 
had set an upper workplace limit for vinyl chloride 
concentration of 500 parts per million (ppm) in 1954. 
And despite a growing body of evidence that it 
was unsafe, this limit remained unchanged for two 
decades. 
Internal corporate documents reveal that in the 
1950s the industry already had animal testing 
data showing the workplace limit to be excessive. 
By 1961 company toxicologists were internally 
recommending a limit no higher than 50 ppm. Only 
in 1974 did the newly established Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issue 
a new standard of 1 ppm. In the interim, workers 
were exposed to vinyl chloride concentrations that 
caused excruciatingly painful bone disease and 
cancer. 
This chapter provides a summary of the early 
warnings and late responses to the dangers of vinyl 
chloride. 
8�2 1930–1999: rapid growth in PVC 
output
Industrial output of VC began in the 1930s, mainly 
to support manufacture of polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) products as diverse as shower curtains, 
food containers, floor coverings, pipes, packaging 
and wire coating. Since the Second World War, the 
largest use of VC has been in producing PVC and 
copolymer resins (HSDB, 2006). 
Vinyl chloride is used primarily (> 95 %) in the 
manufacture of PVC (IARC, 2008). The main uses of 
Figure 8�1  Image of the Secrecy Agreement
Source:  Markowitz and Rosner, 2002.
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PVC are now in building and construction: window 
and door profiles, pipes and ducts, flooring and 
wall coverings, wiring and cable insulation, and 
stadium roofing. With the addition of 'plasticiser' 
chemicals to make it more flexible, it is also 
widely used in medical applications (tubing, bags, 
containers and other medical equipment, including 
the tubing in heart-lung bypass machines, catheter 
tubing, containers for intravenous solutions, blood 
storage bags, tubing for dialysis); electrical cable 
insulation; consumer products (inflatable children's 
toys, sports bags); vehicles (underbody coatings, 
sealants and floor modules, cable insulation, door 
panels and arm rests, weather strips and window 
sealing profiles); and packaging (bottles, toothpaste 
tubes, food packaging).
Global VC production (which is approximately 
equal to PVC production (IPCS, 1999)) grew swiftly 
from 450 tonnes per year in 1933 to 54 000 tonnes 
during the Second World War. By 1952 production 
was 145 000 tonnes and in 1971 it stood at around 
7 million tonnes (IARC, 1974). Total annual world 
production in 1985 was about 17 million tonnes 
and in 1999 it was 26 million tonnes (IPCS, 1999). 
Global production and consumption of VC in 2010 
was approximately 34 million metric tonnes. Global 
VC consumption is estimated to have increased 
by 4.6 % in 2010. Demand is expected to average 
growth of around 4.7 % per year from 2010 to 2015, 
and 4.2 % from 2015 to 2020 (SRI Consulting, 2011).
In 2005, production in Asia had outgrown that in 
both Western Europe and North America. 
The Asia-Pacific region now accounts for around 
54.8 % of the global installed VC capacity. The 
capacity and production of VC has grown very 
rapidly in China in the past decade. The export 
market of China for VC has also grown very 
rapidly. The country has emerged as the largest 
producer and exporter of VC in the world. Europe 
has the second largest VC capacity in the world and 
North America stands third. The VC capacity in 
Europe and North America is expected to be almost 
stagnant in the coming years (GBI Research, 2010).
An increasing number of workers worldwide 
are exposed to vinyl chloride during either its 
production, the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride 
or polyvinyl chloride processing. Since the late 1970s 
when the closed-loop polymerization process was 
introduced, the concentrations to which workers 
are exposed have decreased substantially in North 
America and Western Europe. Levels before that 
time had been higher than 38 ppm (100 mg/m3) (2). 
In low and medium-resource countries, older 
technologies have continued to be used and therefore 
high exposures probably occur. Exposures in 
polyvinyl chloride processing plants are usually 
considerably lower than those in vinyl chloride 
monomer and polyvinyl chloride production; in 
Western Europe and North America, current exposure 
levels are generally below 0.4 ppm (1 mg/m3). 
Concentrations of vinyl chloride monomer in ambient 
air are normally below 0.004 ppm (0.01 mg/m3), 
but higher concentrations have been measured in 
the vicinity of vinyl chloride/polyvinyl chloride 
production plants (IARC, 2008).
Until the mid-1970s, VC gas was also used as a 
propellant in a wide variety of aerosols including 
hair spray by Clairol, leading to elevated exposures 
and eventually cancer in hairdressers (Castleman, 
1981; Infante et al., 2009). In 1974 the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) noted that using such 
products in small rooms could result in airborne 
levels far exceeding the workplace limit at the time. 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
issued an emergency suspension of its use as a 
propellant in pesticide sprays in 1974, and the US 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 
banned its use in consumer aerosol products in 
1978. 
In May 1973, citing the 1958 Delaney amendment 
of the Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act (which 
prohibited the use of any food additive which 
was demonstrated to cause cancer in humans or 
animals), the US FDA suspended approval for 
using PVC bottles for alcoholic beverages (Food 
Chem. News, 1973; US FDA, 1973). As a result 
of PVC food packaging, VC used to be detected 
in a wide range of foods, including edible oils, 
vinegars, margarines and bottled water (Page 
and O'Grady, 1977; Van Lierop, 1979; Benfenati 
et al., 1991). However, the US government now 
limits vinyl chloride to no more than 1 ppm in 
PVC food packaging materials, so it is no longer 
detected in food (ATSDR, 2006). VC is not known 
to occur naturally. Unintentional formation of the 
compound can occur in landfills where VC forms as 
a degradation product of chlorinated hydrocarbons 
used as solvents, and may subsequently be emitted 
as an air pollutant and to groundwater. VC is also 
found in tobacco smoke (IPCS, 1999).
(2) 1 ppm = 2.6 mg/m3.
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Vinyl chloride (VC) is a gaseous chemical 
intermediate (its boiling point is – 14 °C) used 
in a number of final products. Even after being 
polymerised into polyvinyl chloride plastics 
(PVC), residual unreacted monomers in the 
plastic can still pose dangers. The VC copolymer 
'vinyl chloride-vinyl acetate' is primarily used to 
produce films and resins, while another copolymer, 
'vinylidene chloride-vinyl chloride', is used mainly 
in food packaging and metal coatings in storage 
tanks. 
8�3 1930–1961: early warnings from 
animals and humans meet industry 
indifference
8.3.1 Earliest warnings
The short-term (acute) toxicity of VC was tested 
by inhalation in animals in the 1930s. It induced 
drowsiness, loss of coordination and loss of 
consciousness (i.e. it was a narcotic) at doses 
ranging from 5 000 to 120 000 ppm depending on 
the species tested (Patty et al., 1930; Peoples and 
Leake, 1933; Oster et al., 1947). In rats, congestion 
of internal organs (particularly the lungs, liver and 
kidneys) and fluid-filled lungs were observed after 
inhaling VC at high concentrations (Patty et al., 1930, 
Mastromatteo et al., 1960; Lester et al., 1963; Prodan 
et al., 1975). In dogs, severe heartbeat irregularities 
occurred under narcosis (Oster et al., 1947).
In humans, acute VC intoxication induces giddiness, 
nausea and headaches. At higher concentrations 
narcotic effects were also observed (Peoples and 
Leake, 1933). In a case of accidental poisoning in a 
PVC plant, VC caused almost immediate death of 
workers following loss of consciousness (Danzinger, 
1960). Accidental spraying of VC caused effects 
ranging from skin rash to second-degree burns 
(Harris, 1953).
The first evidence of long-term (chronic) toxicity 
in workers was reported in the late 1940s by 
Soviet scientists who expressed concerns about 
hepatitis-like liver inflammation found in 
15 workers (out of 48) exposed to VC (Tribukh et al., 
1949). Further studies conducted in PVC factories 
in the USSR showed cases of vascular disease 
(angioneuropathy) in workers exposed to VC at 
levels as low as 5–15 ppm (Filatova and Gronsberg, 
1957). Following these observations, technological 
improvements were made and in 1966 VC levels 
measured at USSR PVC plants dropped from 
40 ppm (100 mg/m3) to 4–15 ppm (10–40 mg/m3) 
(Filatova, 1966).
8.3.2 Ignoring evidence from animal studies 
In 1954, the US Manufacturing Chemists Association 
(CMA) established the workplace threshold limit 
value (TLV) of 500 ppm, and it remained at that 
level for two decades despite mounting evidence 
of its inadequacy. Since the US Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) would 
not be established for another 17 years (1971), 
the TLVs were set by the American Conference 
of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), 
which was then as it is now a volunteer organisation 
with no formal ties to the government. Its members 
include federal, state, and local government officials, 
as well as academics and industry consultants 
(Castleman and Ziem, 1988). Before OSHA, TLVs 
were often based on inadequate health information, 
and represented what the industry felt was 
achievable but not necessarily health protective 
(Markowitz and Rosner, 2002; Castleman and Ziem, 
1988). 
A turning point in the history of VC should 
have occurred by 1961 at the latest. In that year 
researchers from Dow Chemical published the 
results of a study on animals (rats, guinea pigs, 
rabbits and dogs) exposed to VC for seven hours 
per day at levels ranging from 50 to 200 ppm for 
six months, and at 500 ppm for 4.5 months. Dow 
reported liver abnormalities in male and female rats 
exposed to 500 ppm and an increase in liver weight 
in rats treated at 100 ppm. Liver enlargement and 
microscopic degenerative changes at 200 ppm were 
also observed in rabbits (Torkelson et al., 1961). 
In fact, the key conclusions were already known at 
least two years earlier. Writing to Union Carbide 
Medical Director Thomas Nale in November 
1959, Union Carbide consultant Henry Smyth had 
remarked that based on an 'off-the-record phone call' 
from Dow toxicologist V. K. Rowe, it was apparent 
that vinyl chloride was 'more toxic than has been 
believed'. 'Even 100 ppm produced organ weight 
changes and gross pathology', he wrote (Smyth, 
1959). According to Smyth, Dow was considering 
whether this would have 'any bearing on the safety 
of (food) packaging uses' involving vinyl chloride 
exposure. 
Noting that the 500 ppm TLV was based on a 
single guinea pig inhalation study from the 1930s, 
Smyth asked that the information reported remain 
confidential until published by Dow (Smyth, 1959).
In a letter dated May 1959, V. K. Rowe had likewise 
indicated to W. E. McCormick at US chemicals firm 
B. F. Goodrich that the current TLV of 500 ppm 
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would cause 'appreciable injury' to full-time workers 
and raised particular concerns about the hazards of 
long-term exposures (Rowe, 1959). 
The MCA in effect set the TLV in 1954 at 500 ppm, 
and it would remain so until it was lowered to 
200 ppm in 1971 and finally to 1 ppm in 1974. The 
first OSHA limits adopted were the 1968 TLVs, so 
the permissible exposure limit in the US industries 
remained at 500 ppm until new rulemaking in 1974.
8.3.3 1963–1971: secrecy over evidence of bone 
disease in workers
Evidence of the risks of bone disease from VC 
exposure was not limited to animal studies. In 
1963, Suciu et al. published the results of clinical 
observations of 168 workers engaged in PVC 
production, which described for the first time 
the role of VC in causing acroosteolysis — an 
extremely rare bone disease characterised by 
excruciatingly painful bone reabsorption, skin 
changes (scleroderma-like lesions) and vascular 
changes associated with Raynaud's syndrome and 
hepatomegaly and splenomegaly (Suciu et al., 1963). 
At around the same time the Belgian chemical 
company Solvay observed two cases of 
acroosteolysis among workers in one of its 
factories in Belgium and informed other VC/PVC 
manufacturers. The same pathology was observed 
among workers in another factory of the same 
company in Romania. Between 1962 and 1965 
several cases of acroosteolysis were observed in 
other Solvay VC/PVC factories (Maltoni, 1974a). 
However, no reports were made public, or to the 
independent scientific community, governments or 
workers. 
In 1964 Dr John Creech, a physician who was doing 
regular medical checks for the US chemical company 
B. F. Goodrich, followed up a worker's complaint 
about painfully tender fingers and found four cases 
of acroosteolysis in workers that all worked in the 
same area of the VC/PVC plant. For Creech, this 
seemed to be obvious evidence of a link to their 
workplace conditions (Markowitz and Rosner, 
2002, p. 173; MMWR, 1974). Goodrich asked Robert 
Kehoe of the Kettering Laboratory to investigate (3). 
Kehoe concluded that acroosteolysis was an 'entirely 
new' occupational disease. The medical Director of 
Goodrich asked a company physician at another 
Goodrich plant to 'determine as quietly as possible 
(3) Kehoe also played an important role in the story of lead in petrol, described in the Chapter 3 on lead in petrol.
whether similar conditions existed at his plant', 
adding that 'We do not wish to have this discussed 
at all and I request you maintain this information 
in confidence' (Markowitz and Rosner, p. 174; MCA 
papers, 12 November 1964).
Other chemical companies took the same line. 
A Monsanto official, following the decision to x-ray 
exposed workers, said that 'I am sure that Dr Nessel 
can prepare these people with an adequate story so 
that no problem will exist' (Markowitz and Rosner, 
2002, p. 174, MCA papers, 7 January 1966). The 
secrecy strategy extended to trying to restrict news 
of the disease in Europe. On hearing that a doctor 
from Solvay Chemical was about to publish his 
finding of workers with the same bone destruction 
seen in the B. F. Goodrich cases, the corporate vice 
president of Goodrich attempted to 'discourage or 
edit' the publication but was ultimately unsuccessful 
(Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, 174, MCA papers, 
7 January 1966). 
Although the public, government regulators, and 
workers were all kept in the dark, the news about 
acroosteolysis was shared widely among European 
and American chemical companies who learned 
at a private meeting of industry medical staff in 
June 1966 that 1 % of PVC plant workers and 6 % 
of the workers who cleaned out the vinyl chloride 
monomer (VCM) vats suffered from acroosteolysis. 
Goodrich asked companies to 'use discretion in 
making the problem public' (Markowitz and Rosner, 
2002, p. 175, MCA papers, 17 October 1966). The 
industry was particularly concerned that the media 
and the public could have concluded that PVC 
products, especially those used in food packaging, 
may also be hazardous, which 'would have been 
very damaging for industry' (Markowitz and 
Rosner, 2002, p. 175, MCA papers, 24 January 1967). 
In 1967 Goodrich researchers prepared a scientific 
article reporting 31 cases of acroosteolysis among 
vinyl chloride workers (Markowitz and Rosner, 
2002, p. 176. Ref 40). According to later legal 
testimony from Dr Creech, the first draft of the 
article that he saw specifically identified VC as the 
cause of acroosteolysis, but this information was not 
included in the final version (Markowitz and Rosner, 
2002, p. 176, Ref 41). 
Two years later, in early 1969, the results from an 
MCA-funded study of acroosteolysis by the Institute 
for Industrial Health at the University of Michigan 
were presented confidentially to the MCA. The report 
Lessons from health hazards | Vinyl chloride: a saga of secrecy
216 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
found that acroosteolysis could affect connective 
tissue and bones beyond the fingers; that the odour of 
VC could only be detected at 4 000 ppm, not 400 ppm 
as previously thought, and was therefore an indicator 
of much more hazardous exposure than had been 
thought; that it could not be assumed that workers 
would be safe from disease at the exposure limit of 
500 ppm; and that 'sufficient ventilation should be 
provided to reduce the VC concentration to below 
50 ppm' (Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 177, Ref 45). 
As this recommendation implied that VC was the 
cause of the disease, the MCA Occupational Health 
Committee voted seven to three to refuse acceptance 
of the report as written, and voted unanimously to 
accept it only when the report stated that 'Inasmuch 
as the etiologic agent of the disease is unknown, a 
level of vinyl chloride below 50 ppm should be used 
as an index of adequate ventilation' (Markowitz and 
Rosner, 2002, p. 177, Ref 46).
This 50 ppm recommendation in Spring of 1969 came 
after the same recommendation was made by Dow 
Chemical toxicologists in 1961 based on their own 
studies showing pathological changes in the livers 
of rabbits that they had been studying (Torkelson 
et al., 1961). Upon the recommendation of Robert 
Scala (Esso) in 1965 the ACGIH proposed lowering 
the TLV to 50 ppm based on the 1961 animal data of 
Dow scientists Torkelson and V.K. Rowe (Torkelson 
et al., 1961; Castleman and Ziem, 1988) But then, in a 
meeting with the ACGIH TLV Committee Chairman 
Stokinger in 1966, 50 member companies said 50 ppm 
was too low. Thus, the proposed change to the TLV 
was put off, according to an unpublished report of a 
discussion held at Mellon Institute on 1–2 February 
1966 (Castleman and Ziem, 1988). 
The ACGIH did not lower the TLV until 1971, 
and then only to 200 ppm based on unpublished 
evidence of liver damage in workers (Castleman and 
Ziem, 1988). Although Dow claims that the company 
reduced its workplace exposure limit to 50 ppm 
in 1961, it is known that this limit was exceeded 
(Castleman and Ziem, 1988).
These recommendations by corporate toxicologists 
and doctors went unheeded repeatedly, allowing 
continued excessive exposure of workers to 
continue. That is because the toxicologists and 
company doctors do not run the companies; 
corporate toxicological policy decisions are made 
by corporate executives as business decisions. 
Thousands of plants were melting and shaping 
PVC resins into credit cards, phonograph records 
and countless other products. No effort was made 
to limit the amount of residual VC monomer left 
in those resins. An official evaluation that worker 
exposures must be limited to 50 ppm could increase 
costs for the giant firms that made PVC polymer 
resins and some of the many plastic product 
manufacturers. Disclosure and recognition of the 
toxicity of VC could also endanger sensitive markets 
for PVC food packaging and medical applications. 
Then, there were aerosol products in which VC was 
used as a propellant.
The final report on acroosteolysis from the Michigan 
researchers was ultimately published in 1971 in 
the Archives of Environmental Health. It made no 
mention of the earlier view that the exposure limit 
of 500 ppm was not likely to be protective. It omitted 
reference to the inadequacy of the odour threshold. 
It said that the cause of acroosteolysis was unknown. 
Although it recommended further research, this was 
in fact unlikely; B.F. Goodrich executives explicitly 
decided not to accept any proposals for additional 
research into the causes of acroosteolysis. This 
enabled Goodrich and the rest of the industry to 
act as if the cause was 'unknown' (Markowitz and 
Rosner, 2002, p. 177).
8.3.4 1970–1983: recognising VC as a carcinogen
As reported by Maltoni (1974a), recognition of vinyl 
chloride's carcinogenicity began in the late-1960s. 
At that time, Solvay Chemical Company asked 
Prof. P. L. Viola, the company doctor at its VC/PVC 
factory in Livorno, Italy, to perform a long-term 
experiment to study acroosteolysis. 
It was 1967 when Prof. Viola of the Regina Elena 
National Cancer Institute in Rome started the 
experiment exposing rats to 30 000 ppm VC 
vapours for four hours a day, five days a week, for 
12 months. The results were a surprise. As Prof. 
Viola reported at the 10th International Cancer 
Congress held in Houston, Texas in May 1970, the 
study showed that after a period of 10 months, 70 % 
of rats treated developed malignant tumours of 
the skin and lungs (Viola, 1970; 1971). Immediately 
following the May 1970 communication, Prof. 
Cesare Maltoni, then Director of the Addari Institute 
of Oncology in Bologna, Italy, contacted Prof. Viola 
to discuss the findings. 
While Prof. Viola was conducting his research, 
Prof. Maltoni and his group had launched an 
extensive programme of medical surveillance on 
workers of several chemical industries. In 1970 
Maltoni started to detect a higher rate of abnormal 
cells in the saliva samples collected from workers 
exposed to VC in the Italian plastics industry 
(Maltoni et al., 1974b). 
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On the basis of Viola's experimental results and 
Maltoni's surveillance of VC/PVC workers, it 
became urgently necessary to conduct a large-scale 
experimental research project to better evaluate the 
carcinogenic potential of VC. Since Maltoni's institute 
specialised in occupational cancer prevention and 
rodent cancer bioassays, the major Italian VC/PVC 
producer at the time, Montedison, expressed interest 
in supporting research on the potential carcinogenic 
effects of VC. Later, other European PVC producers 
joined Montedison, namely ICI (the United 
Kingdom), Solvay (Belgium) and Rhône-Prugil 
(France), giving rise to the European Cooperative 
Group for the study of biological effects of VC. 
In July 1971, Maltoni began a large project of 
multiple integrated experiments to study the 
carcinogenicity of VC in a laboratory at the Castle 
of Bentivoglio in the province of Bologna, Italy. 
This was partly funded by The Bologna Hospital 
Administration of which the Institute of Oncology 
'F. Addarii' was a part. The project involved 
administering VC by different routes of exposure, 
at different doses/concentrations and for different 
periods to animals of both sexes, of various species 
(rat, mouse, hamster), strains and ages. The project 
lasted ten years and encompassed the use of more 
than 7 000 animals observed until spontaneous 
death; more than 200 000 histological slides were 
examined. 
The financial resources required at the time 
amounted to more than USD 2 million which came 
mainly from public institutions and also from the 
chemical industry (Maltoni et al., 1981). The main 
results of the experiments were as follows:
1. VC was carcinogenic in all tested animals (rats, 
mice, and hamsters), producing tumours in the 
mammary gland, lung, zymbal gland (a gland 
not present in humans), skin, angiosarcomas of 
the liver, and others (Table 8.1);
2. VC was carcinogenic when administered by 
inhalation, ingestion, prenatal exposure (4) and 
possibly by intraperitoneal and subcutaneous 
injection;
3. a correlation existed between concentration, 
daily dose and length of exposure, and tumour 
incidence;
4. newborn rats were more susceptible to the 
carcinogenic effects of VC on the liver;
Table 8�1 Correlation of tumours in rodents to VC exposure
  Rat Mouse Hamster
Mammary malignant tumours (mainly carcinomas) + +  
Zymbal gland carcinomas +
Nephroblastomas +
Liver angiosarcomas, angiomas and fibroangiomas + + +
Angiosarcomas, angiomas and fibroangiomas of other sites + + (+)
Hepatomas + (+)
Encephalic neuroblastomas +
Forestomach papillomas and acanthomas + (+) +
Lung adenomas + +
Cutaneous epithelial tumours (+) (+) (+)
Melanomas (+)
Acoustic duct epithelial tumours +
Lymphomas and leukemias (+)
Note: + denotes 'clear evidence of carcinogenicity'; (+) denotes 'borderline evidence of carcinogenicity'.
Source:  Maltoni et al., 1984.
(4) Experimental animal studies gave an early indication of foetal toxicity, which is an issue that emerges from several chapters 
e.g. Chapter 5 on Minamata; Chapter 7 on tobacco and Chapter 10 on BPA in this volume as well as the chapters on DES, radiation 
and PCBs in vol. 1 (EEA, 2001). This issue is also taken up in Chapter 26 on science for precautionary decision-making.
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5. in rats multiple organs were sometimes affected 
by the carcinogenic effects of VC;
6. later it was shown that VC induced the onset 
of tumours at concentrations as low as 10 ppm 
by inhalation and 0.3 mg/kg body weight 
by ingestion. Although these did not reach 
statistical significance, they were considered to 
be biologically relevant (Maltoni et al., 1977).
Maltoni presented his early results to the scientific 
community at the 2nd International Symposium on 
Cancer Detection and Prevention, held in Bologna 
in April 1973. This presentation does not appear 
to have attracted the attention of government 
regulators or the general scientific community. 
Manufacturers aware of Maltoni's findings were still 
operating under the 'secrecy agreement' and would 
continue to do so until 1974. In fact, a meeting 
between NIOSH and the industry representatives 
from Dow, Ethyl, Union Carbide and the MCA took 
place on 17 July 1973 but failed to include mention 
of Maltoni's presentation at the Bologna Conference 
a few months earlier. Viola's finding of cancers at 
exposures of 30 000 ppm was mentioned at the 
NIOSH meeting but not the evidence of cancer 
at 250 ppm in Maltoni's studies (Markowitz and 
Rosner, 2002, p. 189, Ref 106). The latter findings 
were not published until 1974 in the proceeding of 
the Conference (Maltoni, 1974b). 
It was not until 22 January 1974 that B.F. Goodrich 
alerted the government and the next day issued a 
public press release announcing it was investigating 
the deaths of three workers at its VC/PVC plant in 
Louisville, Kentucky who had died of an otherwise 
extremely rare cancer called liver angiosarcoma 
(Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 191, 192). In fact, 
Dr John Creech, who had identified the rare bone 
disease acroosteolysis among Goodrich workers ten 
years earlier had now identified not three but four 
cases of angiosarcoma deaths from 1968 to 1973; all 
were among men working in the PVC polymerisation 
section of the factory (Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, 
p. 192; MMWR 1974). This time he was sounding an 
alarm about worker deaths from a cancer so rare that 
it accounted for just two dozen deaths in the whole 
country annually — making four deaths among the 
several hundred plastics workers akin to an epidemic. 
More damning still, this rare cancer was also showing 
up in Maltoni's experimental animals at exposures 
that were half the workplace exposure limit (Creech 
and Johnson, 1974).
Creech ultimately identified seven cases of liver 
angiosarcomas in the Goodrich plant between 1964 
and 1974, all among 'pot cleaners' who were lowered 
into polymerisation reactor tanks 10 feet deep, with 
no more than a six foot opening for fresh air, to chip 
polymerised residue off the tank insides (Markowitz 
and Rosner, 2002, p. 192, 193).
8�4 1974: governments swift response
In the US, governmental response was swift. 
OSHA held a fact-finding hearing on the possible 
hazards of manufacturing and using VC and PVC 
in Washington DC on 15 February 1974. Prof. 
Maltoni was invited to give an oral presentation of 
his experimental results — the first time that his 
findings came officially to the attention of the public 
and government officials. At the end of the hearing, 
Dr Selikoff of Mount Sinai Medical School in New 
York stood up and said 'no question, but I rise 
merely to voice the thanks of the American scientific 
community for the beautiful piece of work you have 
done' (Maltoni, 1974c). Shortly thereafter, Creech 
and the B.F. Goodrich Director of Environmental 
Health published the medical report of the four 
deaths from liver angiosarcomas in workers 
employed in the Louisville plant in 1968, 1971, and 
two deaths in 1973 (Creech and Johnson, 1974). 
A footnote by the editor noted that Prof. Maltoni 
was the first to show the relationship between 
exposure to VC and angiosarcoma in mammals. 
Indeed, it is evident that the notification of liver 
angiosarcoma in workers exposed to VC by B.F. 
Goodrich to employees, to NIOSH and to the public 
was influenced by Maltoni's experimental data. The 
first results of Maltoni's work were published in 
1974 (Maltoni, 1974b). Results of the full project were 
published in 1981 and 1984 (Maltoni et al., 1981 and 
1984).
On 5 April 1974 OSHA established that the 
occupational environment in VC plants should be 
monitored so that no employee was exposed to VC 
at a concentration exceeding 50 ppm (127.0 mg/m3) 
(Federal Register, 1974). A few months later 
the OSHA standard was lowered again to a 
ceiling of 1 ppm, following Maltoni's May 1974 
communication at the New York Academy of 
Sciences that VC was even carcinogenic when 
administered to rats via inhalation at 50 ppm 
(Maltoni and Lefemine, 1975). Later, in 1976 Maltoni 
reported the onset of tumours considered biologically 
correlated (but not statistically significant) in 
rats exposed to low dose of VC, namely: liver 
angiosarcoma and Zymbal gland carcinoma down 
to 10 ppm by inhalation and 1 mg/kg by ingestion. 
None of the specifically VC-related tumours 
were found at doses of 1 ppm (by inhalation) and 
0.03 mg/kg by ingestion (Maltoni et al., 1977). 
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Subsequent VC carcinogenicity bioassays on 
rodents confirmed the results of Maltoni's project 
(Keplinger et al., 1975; Lee et al., 1978; Feron and 
Kroes, 1979). Despite this very strong evidence 
the US plastics industry lodged an appeal against 
the OSHA 1 ppm standard. They lost the case in 
January 1975 and received a scathing condemnation 
from the judge (see Box 8.1). 
Industry responded quickly and easily to the new 
standard. An analysis in 2000 found that the costs of 
industry compliance with the 1 ppm standard were 
only USD 278 million. Industry had earlier estimated 
that it would cost them up to USD 90 billion and 
2 million jobs. As the New York Times noted, 'not one 
of the doomsday predictions (from industry) has 
proven accurate', noting also that supplies of VC had 
expanded, prices had not increased and the industry 
was expanding, not contracting (Rattner, 1975).
This public relations tactic of using an industry trade 
association to threaten and sue regulators and issue 
claims no member company would dare make in its 
own name would become more familiar after 1974 
(see Chapter 3 on lead in petrol and the tobacco case 
studies in Chapter 7).
Industry has generally exaggerated the projected 
costs of meeting new regulations, see Chapter 23 on 
understanding and accounting for costs of inaction.
Angiosarcoma of the liver is considered very rare in 
humans, with only 20–30 cases per year reported 
 
Box 8�1 The judicial critique of industry's lack of action on VCM
In January 1975 Justice Tom Clark, retired from the US Supreme Court, heard the appeal against OSHA 
for the US Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. Noting the industry policy of delay, feigned ignorance and 
irresponsibility, he rejected all of the basic arguments of the industry and observed that 'strong warning 
signals … of long before' had been ignored. Despite years of warnings and research since 1949, including 
the AOS episode, 'nothing was done' (Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 222–223).
The judge also noted that the ultimate facts regarding the proper standard for protecting workers were 'in 
dispute' and 'on the frontiers of scientific knowledge' but that 'the factual finger' pointed to the need for a 
low exposure limit, based on the animal evidence. The OSHA standard came into effect on 1 April 1975. 
This favourable ruling for workers and the public, however, was followed by a setback in the US Supreme 
Court decision of 2 July 1980 in the benzene case which forced OSHA to provide quantitative evidence that 
there would be a 'significant risk of material health impairment'. OSHA lost its case for a 1 ppm standard 
for benzene. Dissenting Judge Thurgood Marshall noted that this placed 'the burden of medical uncertainty 
squarely on the shoulders of the American worker' (Landrigan and Nicholson, 1998). The precautionary 
principle is designed in part to reverse this burden of proof of harm so that risk makers, not risk takers, 
have to show, at least beyond reasonable doubt, that chemicals and other stressors are acceptably safe for 
workers, consumers, and the environment.
in the US (Gehring et al., 1978; ATSDR, 1995). In 
the years 1975–1978, immediately following Creech 
and Johnson's first reports of liver angiosarcomas 
in workers, medical records, pathological material 
and medical surveillance revealed other liver 
angiosarcomas in workers exposed to VC, both 
in the US and in other countries. According to 
the Liver Angiosarcoma Registry maintained by 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the United 
Kingdom 103 cases of liver angiosarcoma were 
reported among workers exposed to VC in various 
countries in the period 1974–1983 (Stafford, 1983). 
VC liver cancer deaths have also been reported 
in Europe and Asia (see Box 8.2 on the IARC 
Monograph). 
Industry responded to these initial cases of liver 
cancer by commissioning an epidemiological 
study of the cancer risk in VC-exposed workers. It 
concluded that 'the overall mortality (of workers 
in the vinyl industry) was 75 % of what would be 
expected in a comparable population of US males' 
and that 'no cause of death showed a statistically 
significant excess over what would be expected in 
a comparable US male population' (Tabershaw and 
Gaffey, 1974; Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 227). 
However, it did note that, 'cancers of the digestive 
system (primarily angiosarcomas) respiratory 
system, brain, and cancers of unknown site, as well 
as lymphomas, occurred more often than expected 
in those members of the study population with the 
greatest estimated exposure' (Tabershaw and Gaffey, 
1974; Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 227).The study 
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was criticised by experts at NIOSH for not including 
some 75 % of workers with the longest exposure 
(e.g. for over 20 years) where the greatest cancer risk 
was to be expected. When more of these were found 
by independent investigator Dr Joseph Wagoner, 
he calculated that there was a 57 % excess of cancer 
deaths in the workers (Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, 
p. 227). Wagoner explained to a Senate Committee 
that the Tabershaw-Cooper study had diluted the 
cancer risk by including recently hired workers with 
only a year or two of exposure. In his study Wagoner 
only included workers who had been exposed for 
over 15 years since he knew that 'we were looking 
for the latent effects or the effects of a carcinogen 
which appear many years after a person was initially 
employed' (Senate Committee on Commerce, 1974). 
Other experts pointed out that comparing 
workers' death rates with all US males was likely 
to underestimate the risk as workers were mainly 
fit whereas all males included the unfit, the 
unemployed and the disabled. This is called the 
'healthy worker effect' which means, in general, 
that the expected cancer mortality rate for workers 
with sufficiently long exposure time for cancer 
latency if there were no occupational cancer risk 
should be around 75–80 % of the rate expected for 
all males in the population from which they came 
(Fox et al., 1982) (see Chapter 26 on science for 
precautionary decision-making which identifies 
these and other methodological limitations of much 
of the health and environmental sciences which try 
to avoid wrongly labelling an agent as hazardous (a 
'false positive') more than trying to avoid wrongly 
labelling an agent as being safe (a 'false negative')). 
See also Chapter 2 on the precautionary principle 
and false alarms.
8�5 1974–present: does VCM cause 
brain cancer, other cancers and 
reproductive effects?
Although by the 1970s the industry was no longer 
able to deny evidence of liver angiosarcoma, Sass 
et al. (2005) document continued efforts to suppress 
or play down the evidence of other cancer types, 
particularly brain cancers. 
In an internal memo in 1976, Ethyl Corporation 
acknowledged risks for liver angiosarcoma, brain, 
and lung cancers (Sass et al., 2005). A review by 
the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) in 1979 determined that VC exposure 
was a known human carcinogen (Group 1) 
associated with cancers of the liver, brain, lung and 
haemo-lymphopoietic system, and that there was 
no exposure level below which an increased risk 
of cancer would not occur in humans, that is, no 
threshold or safe level of exposure (IARC, 1979). 
A second IARC review in 1987 and a third update 
in 2007 re-confirmed the previous evaluations 
and updated the scientific references supporting 
their conclusions (IARC, 1987; 2008). The most 
recent IARC update additionally noted that animal 
studies suggest a higher susceptibility to cancer 
when exposures take place early in life (Grosse 
et al., 2007; IARC 2008).
A 1991 study of a VC-exposed worker cohort by 
Wong and co-workers at first reported an, 'excess 
in cancer of the brain' (Wong et al., 1991). However, 
at the request of the chemical industry, which had 
funded this study, two of the authors made a public 
retraction two years later, saying that, 'We conclude 
that our finding of an excess of brain cancer among 
US vinyl chloride workers reported earlier was not 
likely related to the chemical' (Wong and Whorton, 
1993; Sass et al., 2005; Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, 
p. 229, 230).
In 2010 The Center for Public Integrity's Jim Morris 
reported on a lawsuit concerning a brain cancer 
cluster surrounding a chemical plant operated 
by Rohm and Haas, now a subsidiary of Dow 
Chemical Co. In their defence, 'Experts for Rohm 
and Haas argue that the link (with brain cancer) 
is tenuous at best and concede only that vinyl 
chloride in high doses can cause a rare liver cancer 
called angiosarcoma' (Morris, 2010). Morris's 
report of the proceedings states, however, that 
the industry-funded study that Rohm and Haas 
relied on 'failed to include as many as two dozen 
fatal cases of brain cancer' — which significantly 
compromised the ability of the study to detect an 
elevated brain cancer risk (Morris, 2010). 
Reports of excessive deaths from liver carcinoma 
in workers exposed to vinyl chloride have been 
published since the mid-1970s in the US (Mundt 
et al., 2000), France (Saurin et al., 1997), Germany 
(Weihrauch et al., 2000), the European four-country 
study (the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, 
Norway) (Ward et al., 2001), Taiwan (Wong, 2002); 
Italy (Pirastu et al., 2003) and Japan (Makita et al., 
1997). 
Panel 8.1 provides a personal reflection of some 
events in the United Kingdom following the 
Goodrich announcement. 
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Panel 8�1 VCM: a personal perspective of a year in the United Kingdom after the Goodrich 
 announcement of 1974
Charlie Clutterbuck
After the Goodrich announcement about their three workers with liver cancer, some very expensive 
and comprehensive measures were taken to deal with the VC hazard. In the United Kingdom, the 
Employment Medical Advisory Service (EMAS), with the help of the Factory Inspectorate and industry 
initiated many studies (Forman et al., 1985). The PVC manufacturing units were the subject of closest 
examination. VCM production plants and PVC fabrication processes were also investigated; so too were 
warehouses storing PVC, transportation services, meat packers using PVC wrappers, drinks contained in 
PVC bottles, and emissions into the atmosphere. 
Later there would be research into the incidence of liver cancer in the vicinity of VCM plants, where some 
plants were clearly more dangerous than others (Elliot and Kleinschmidt, 1997). Initially monitoring was 
carried out irregularly, and then accurate to only about 200 ppm. Later this improved to 10, then 1 ppm, 
then 1 ppb. Within a few years, it was carried out continuously, in such a way that the levels were known 
to workers immediately. Soon after alarm systems were introduced control engineering concentrated on 
improved ventilation systems, reducing leakages at valves and finding ways of cleaning the autoclaves 
where the vinyl chloride is polymerized, using high pressure water systems. 
Within the first year, GBP 9 million was spent on re-organising and improving plant design in the United 
Kingdom. A further GBP 4 million was estimated to have been lost in production. There may have been 
the same exaggeration of costs beforehand that there was in the US, but it was all less transparent in 
the United Kingdom. While much of this cost would have been unnecessary if control measures had 
been built in at the design stage, it must be granted that the industry did undertake expensive control 
procedures. Why were these extensive measures undertaken? Coal miners and coke oven workers never 
got that sort of investment, despite their dust diseases and lung cancers. 
There are perhaps two main reasons. Angiosarcomas develop so gradually that they are often well 
established by the time of diagnosis. The combination of aggressive growth, few treatment options, 
and extreme rarity makes angiosarcoma one of the deadliest cancers. The moral obligation was clear, 
especially considering the industry's failure to spot it previously. The rarity of the disease also meant 
that the causal connection with vinyl chloride was undisputed. What if VCM had caused lung cancer? We 
may not know even today. And it would have been disputed for many years. 
The second reason was that the nature of the plastics industry meant that the hazard was controllable. 
There were six VC fabrication plants, and a similar number of PVC manufacturing plants. The costs of 
control, though high, were relatively low in such a capital-intensive industry. If the chemical was widely 
distributed — like VC's close relative, trichloroethylene (trike), which was found in every engineering 
shop in the country, it would have been much harder to control. 
Until the VC cancers, the plastics industry was perceived as 'clean'; a lot cleaner than the mines or the 
mills around. But just because there was no evidence of harm the lack of evidence did not mean there 
was no hazard. This worried the toxicologists and epidemiologists who have since been more alert to 
toxic possibilities.
The reaction of the trade unions was different in the United Kingdom to that in the US. In the US the 
main union the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) had already been on strike for improved 
health and safety so they took up the campaign vigorously. Their role was critical in the setting of the 
new Threshold Limit Values — the concentrations workers were allowed to be exposed to. 
In the US there were transparent court hearings, where the unions went for a 'no detectable level'. The 
court decided the level should be 1 ppm, with a 15 minute excursion to 15 ppm allowed, and that that 
was technically feasible. However in the United Kingdom there was a tripartite committee of the TUC, 
CBI and government which produced a Code of Practice. This is less legally binding, and it recommended 
working to 25 ppm. 
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Panel 8�1 VCM: a personal perspective of a year in the United Kingdom after the Goodrich 
 announcement of 1974 (cont�)
Action taken by workers in the United Kingdom was varied. At ICI Runcorn, spasmodic strike action was 
taken over a period of nine months for 'danger money'. At Vinatex, Chesterfield, concern was centered 
mainly on the risk of acreosteolysis, as 20 men suffered from this, and in getting compensation for 
it. This was typical of UK trade unions at that time, where compensation was more important than 
prevention. 
Elsewhere the workers left it to their national unions to deal with. The national TGWU officer told me 
that 'they were already looking after everything'. This struck me as odd in comparison to the US union 
reaction. None of the three main UK unions — GMWU, TGWU, and ASTMS then had their own Health 
and Safety Officers (5). The GMWU made the most effort to inform, using the information from the 
International Chemical Federation. The TUC's Medical Adviser, Dr Robert Murray said: 'What you've got 
to say to the workers is that the risk is small; that apart from the risks involved when he drives a car 
and eats too much, and drinks too much, here is another risk which he has got to live with' (Nature, 
15 February 1974) (6). 
I contacted the local unions at BP Baglan Bay — and later at ICI Hillhouse. While visiting Baglan Bay, one 
of the managers said to me 'Actually we are quite pleased about vinyl: it's the only issue that we are in 
agreement on with the unions'. I knew there must be something wrong with communications, so made 
sure the unions got all the information coming from the US and the scientific press, both directly and 
indirectly through programs like TV 'World in Action'. The attitude changed dramatically. The local unions 
invited me on site. Now I was refused entry by the management. The workers threatened a 24-hour 
strike — a massive ordeal for a petrochemical plant. But eventually we had to meet outside the plant 
— and on the TV programme on an 'Open Door' programme. TU reps at ICI Runcorn said that the same 
thing happened there — that once they were informed by organisations outside their traditional union 
sources, they could look after their members' interests better.
The petrochemical industry was successful in removing the grosser hazards while keeping the issue 
confined to the risk of rare cancer. The arguments were not taken up about related chemical — like 
trichloethylene, nor did the industry accept that other cancers were causally related. The arguments also 
confined the fears mainly to the fabrication units, less to those handing the finished product PVC. Over 
the years the consumer lobby has made sure that residual VC in PVC is cleaned out, and there has been 
replacement of PVC in food wrapping.
Among the lessons learnt for us 'radical' scientists was the role of science in health matters (Clutterbuck, 
1986). Good scientific work could be left in academic filing cabinets, having no impact on people's 
health. We needed to translate that work, without twisting it, to what people would understand. As a 
result of the VC experience, a group of scientists at the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science 
set up the magazine Hazards Bulletin: it is still alive and well after 35 years but now known simply as 
'Hazards'.
(5) The 1974 Health & Safety Act made provision for the trade unions to appoint their own safety representatives from amongst the 
employees and provided for their offsite training by the TUs. This led to ASTMS and GMWU appointing their first National H&S 
Officers in 1977/1978.
(6) Dr Murray had previously played down the risks from the potent occupational carcinogen BCME three times in 1969, 1971 and 1974 
when the trade union safety representative, Andrew Tree, sent him the US studies and his own analysis of lung cancer deaths in 
some young, non-smoking men in his BCME exposed colleagues. It was to be 1982 before the UK BCME workers at Mr Tree's Welsh 
plant were told of the risks, some eight years after the US OSHA had labelled BCME as a human carcinogen (Doyal et al., 1983).
Lessons from health hazards | Vinyl chloride: a saga of secrecy
223Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
In summary, VC exposure has been associated with 
the following, in addition to angiosarcoma of the 
liver: 
•	 brain	cancer	(Byren	et	al.,	1976;	CMA,	1998;	
Monson et al., 1975; Weber et al., 1981; 
Environmental Health Associates, 1986; Wong 
et al., 1991; Mundt, 2000; Lewis and Rempala, 
2003; IARC, 2008); 
•	 hepatocellular	carcinoma	(Byren	et	al.,	1976;	
CMA, 1998; Pirastu et al., 1990, 1998; Simonato 
et al., 1991; IARC, 2008); 
•	 hemolymphoreticular	neoplasias	(Simonato	
et al., 1991; Weber et al., 1981); 
•	 lung	cancer	(Buffler	et	al.,	1979;	Monson	et	al.,	
1975);
•	 liver	cirrhosis	(Ward	et	al.,	2001);	
•	 birth	defects	near	PVC	manufacturing	plants	
(Infante, 1975);
•	 miscarriages	among	VC-exposed	workers'	wives	
(Infante et al., 1976a, b; NIOSH, 1977; ATSDR, 
2006).
 
Box 8�2 Conclusions of 2008 IARC Monograph on VCM and related compounds
VCM causes angiosarcoma and heptacellular cancer and the evidence is sufficient to categorise it as a 
known (Class 1) human carcinogen. 
For other cancers 'the Working Group did not find strong epidemiological evidence for associations of 
exposure to vinyl chloride with cancers of the brain or lymphatic and haematopoeitic tissue or melanoma. 
Although the associations found for these cancers in specific studies may reflect true increases in risk, the 
findings were inconsistent between studies, no clear exposure–response relationships were found in the 
European multicentric study and, for several of the sites, the numbers of observed and expected cases 
were small' (IARC, 2008).
The report also uses chemical 'analogy' when evaluating the cancer evidence on vinyl bromide, a chemical 
cousin of VC but for which there is very much less evidence available than for VC. 'Analogy' is one of the 
nine criteria that epidemiologist Bradford Hill set out to help experts and others to move from merely 
observing an association between an exposure and a health effect, like cancer, to concluding that the 
association is causal (Bradford Hill, 1965).
'In making the overall evaluation the (IARC) Working Group took into consideration the fact that all 
available studies showed a consistently parallel response between vinyl bromide and vinyl chloride … 
For practical purposes, vinyl bromide should be considered to act similarly to the human carcinogen, vinyl 
chloride'. IARC concluded that vinyl bromide is 'probably' carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A) (IARC, 2008).
This reasoning is based in part on 'analogy', a basis for helping to infer likely causality when evidence is 
scarce. Experience has shown that similar chemical structures commonly exhibit similar toxic effects. Acting 
on this knowledge enables us to best utilise the very limited data base in toxic substances control. 
In 2008 IARC published an updated Monograph on 
vinyl chloride and related compounds such as vinyl 
bromide, confirming previous assessments (IARC, 
2008) (see Box 8.2). 
8�6 Some late lessons from vinyl 
chloride
1. The most important things that changed 
between 1959 (when internal company advice 
to lower exposure limits was ignored) and 1974, 
was that four deaths from a rare liver cancer 
from one company were publicised (unlike 
other earlier warnings); that this evidence was 
supported by strong animal evidence; and 
that public awareness and concern about toxic 
chemicals in the environment ensured that this 
evidence led to quick and radical regulatory and 
company action, at least in the US. The creation 
of new US government regulatory agencies 
— OSHA and the EPA — at the start of the 
1970s, in a climate of union and environmental 
activism and media interest, helped to create this 
strong and prompt public health response. 
2. It turned out that a simple engineering 
solution had been available all along to 
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lower worker exposures and environmental 
emissions dramatically. Steam-stripping 
PVC in polymerisation reactors reduced 
levels of residual VC in PVC resins by 
99 %, dramatically lowering exposures in 
polymerisation plants and PVC fabrication 
plants. OSHA moved to reduce its enforceable 
Permissible Exposure Limit from the 1968 
TLV of 500 ppm to 1 ppm in the workplace air. 
The EPA followed with emission standards 
that greatly reduced the 4 % loss of VC to the 
environment during PVC production. The 
VC/PVC industry was easily able to comply 
and keep growing to this day. It was finally a 
regulatory success story and another example 
of how clear and challenging regulations can 
stimulate innovation (7) (Ashford and Hall, 
2011; 2012).
3. Although it was threatened that a decrease 
in worker exposure levels to 1 ppm would 
cause the collapse of the VC/PVC industry, 
resulting in losses of USD 60 million annually 
and 2 million jobs (Washington Post, 1974), an 
important lesson learned was that technological 
innovation to reduce exposure levels can 
indeed be accomplished in a short time without 
catastrophic consequences on production or 
employment (Sass et al., 2005).
4. Based on information available to major 
companies using VC in the 1950s, toxic 
exposures should have been lowered and 
applications restricted. However, industry 
resistance to a discretionary increase of 
production costs, with the possibility of 
lost markets as well as decreased profits, is 
rarely if ever overcome merely by corporate 
conscience (corporate social responsibility is the 
current term for this concept). To the business 
executives who decide what will be made and 
how, the immediate prospects of regulation, 
liability and market losses to an informed 
public are much more persuasive and likely to 
prompt significant change.
5. The story of the carcinogenicity of VC showed 
without a doubt the validity of long-term 
bioassays in predicting not only the general 
carcinogenicity of industrial agents, but even 
specific target organs and tissues affected. 
(7) The link between challenging regulations and the stimulus of innovation was described some years ago (Porter, 1995). It has since 
been investigated more closely and seems to hold up in many but only specific circumstances (Porter, 2011).
(8) Extensive research efforts are underway to minimise the use of animals whilst retaining, or improving upon, their value in 
identifying carcinogens.
(Maltoni et al., 1984; Soffritti et al., 2002; Huff 
et al., 2002). See Panel 8.2 on the value of animal 
tests in identifying carcinogens without waiting 
for them to appear in humans (8).
6. Although the lowering of the worker 
exposure level from 500 ppm to 1–3 ppm 
was undoubtedly a great achievement in 
1974, these levels did not continue to be 
lowered despite experimental evidence which 
demonstrated even then the risks of exposure 
at concentrations of 50 ppm and less. The 
approach to setting exposure levels should be 
a dynamic one, in which levels are constantly 
lowered throughout time in light of scientific 
evidence and technological achievements. 
This is a lesson that is also found in Chapter 3 
on lead in petrol, Chapter 5 on mercury and 
Chapter 6 on beryllium. 
7. The epidemiological evaluation of the 
carcinogenic effects of VC has certainly 
underestimated the risk of this compound. 
From the beginning, attempts were made 
to reduce the quantification of risk to a few 
dozen cases of liver angiosarcoma, cases which 
were discovered often thanks to observations 
made by workers and clinicians. Beyond liver 
angiosarcomas however, epidemiological data 
from the 1970s reported an association between 
VC and lung cancer, hepatocarcinomas etc. 
Unfortunately, not enough weight was ever 
given to these studies, and the 1988 review 
by Richard Doll, which was widely accepted, 
concluded that for workers exposed to VC 
there was no evidence of risk of any other type 
of tumour than angiosarcoma and a modest 
risk of lung cancer in workers heavily exposed 
(Doll, 1988). Doll reported an excess of brain 
cancers which he dismissed as not statistically 
significant. However, even in the largest and 
most well-documented epidemiological study 
of VC exposure, the average age of the cohort 
was only 54 years (US EPA, 2000). Given that 
80 % of cancer diagnoses are in persons over 
the age of 55 (ACS, 2005), the absence of a 
longer time horizon means that not only can 
we not rely exclusively on epidemiological 
evidence, but to do so would be a failure of 
public health, ignoring laboratory evidence 
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while we count the bodies until they become 
statistically significant. 
8. Finally, as stated by Cesare Maltoni, 'the 
history of VC carcinogenicity has brought 
forth an important lesson: the studies in the 
field of environmental and occupational 
carcinogenesis, particularly in industrialized 
countries, must … represent an important 
Table 8�2 Early warnings and actions
1930s–1959 Acute toxicity of VCM demonstrated in animals and workers in USA, Europe and Russia (where limit of 
500 ppm (10) exposure was established)
1959 Consultant tells Union Carbide that VCM is more toxic than believed and Dow's toxicologist says 
500 ppm limit would lead to 'appreciable' harm
1963 Acroosteolysis (AOL) is observed in workers in Belgium and Romania
1964 Dr John Creech followed up a worker's complaint at US chemical company Goodrich about painfully 
tender fingers and found four cases of AOL clearly linked to workplace exposure to VC
1965 Esso toxicologist recommends to the ACGIH that VC exposure limit should be 50 ppm. ACGIH accepts 
industry claims that this is too low and costly and the TLV is left at 500 ppm (Castleman and Ziem, 
1988)
1966 European and US chemical companies told that 6 % of VC vat workers had AOL. The results were not 
shared with regulators or workers
1967 Scientific article by Goodrich researchers identifying 31 AOL cases; first draft mentioned VC as the 
cause but published article did not. Recommended that workplace exposure be reduced to 50 ppm
1968–1970 Prof. Viola demonstrates 70 % of rats with cancer of skin and lungs at high doses of VCM, 
i.e. 30 000 ppm over 12 months
1970 Prof. Maltoni finds abnormal cells in workers' saliva
1971 Prof. Maltoni begins large-scale, long-term cancer studies in rats, mice and hamsters (from prenatal 
exposure to natural death) and TLV in US is lowered to 200 ppm based on non-cancerous liver effects 
in workers
1973 Maltoni released his first results to the scientific community in the context of the 2nd International 
Symposium on Cancer Detection and Prevention held in Bologna
1974 Four deaths from rare liver disease (angiosarcoma) at PVC plants of Goodrich, USA, reported to the 
government and in the media. US government orders lowering of exposure limit to 50 ppm and then 
to 1 ppm after Maltoni's report of liver cancer at 50 ppm in rats
1979 International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) confirms VC as Category 1 human carcinogen for 
liver, brain, lungs and blood-forming system and found no safe exposure level
1982 IARC re-confirms 1979 conclusions
(9) The Quakers and some others in the early days of the industrial revolution were pioneers in what, for those times, was progressive 
business. For example, Josiah Wedgewood on noting the passing of the first effective Factories Act to constrain the excesses of 
capitalism in 1833, wrote to the UK government asking for similar laws to be applied to his pottery industry.
(10) Based on one small guinea pig study sponsored by the Bureau of Mines in 1930s which was assumed to provide sufficient evidence 
to protect workers at an exposure limit of 500 ppm (Markowitz and Rosner, 2002, p. 172). This represents an example of the 
'unsubstantiated authoritative assertion'. See Chapter 3 on lead in petrol for other examples.
component of the decision-making processes 
which regulate the developmental trends of 
society' (Maltoni et al., 1984).
This issue of slow or hostile corporate responses to 
early warnings is further examined in Chapter 25 
'Why did bisiness not react with precaution to early 
warnings?' Of course there are, and always have 
been cases of 'progressive business' (9). 
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Panel 8�2 Value of animal testing for identifying carcinogens
James Huff 
Results of laboratory animal tests to predict human cancer is effective in identifying potential human 
carcinogens before human exposure, permitting measures to be taken to prevent that exposure, a 
foolproof way to prevent human cancer.  
David Rall, former Director of National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) and creator 
of the National Toxicology Programe (NTP) (Rall, 2000).
Certain chemicals, mixtures of chemicals, exposure circumstances, lifestyles and personal or cultural 
habits, occupations, viruses, living conditions, and physical agents have been causally associated with 
cancers in humans (CalEPA, 1986; RoC, 2011 and IARC Monographs (11)). Most, however, are not 
considered potentially carcinogenic and the proportion of 'agents' eventually identified to cause cancer 
is projected to be relatively low, likely less than 10–15 %. However this is still a large overall number 
considering approx. 100 000 chemicals in commerce, with an ever larger number of formulations and 
myriad of products containing these chemicals. Examples of human carcinogens in different categories are 
listed, with those covered in this volume and EEA, 2001 in bold:
1) Defined chemicals — benzene, butadiene, formaldehyde, vinyl bromide/chloride/fluoride; 
2) Mixtures of chemicals — agent orange (TCDD), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); 
3) Pharmaceuticals — diethylstilbestrol (DES), estrogens, phenacetin; 
4) Cancer chemotherapeutics — azathioprine, busulphan, chlornaphazine, MOPP; 
5) Lifestyles — alcoholic beverages, sunning/tanning, tobacco products; 
6) Industrial exposures — acid mists, coke ovens, iron and steel founding, leather and wood dusts, rubber 
industry; 
7) Manufacturing processes — aluminium, auramine, coke production;
8) Occupations — chimney sweeps, hair dresser/barber, painters, wood workers;
9) Biologic agents — Epstein-Barr virus, hepatitis B and C viruses, human papilloma virus;
10) Metals and compounds — arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, nickel;
11) Physical agents — asbestos, ionizing/ultraviolet radiations, UV tanning devices.
For larger and more detailed listings see CalEPA, 1986; CMCRC, 2012; Soffritti et al., 2002; IARC, 2012; 
NTP TRs, 2012; RoC, 2011. 
Operational definition of a carcinogen
A chemical, substance, mixture, agent, or exposure circumstance will be designated as a carcinogen by 
inducing tumours as evidenced by one or more of these experimental observations:
1) Increased incidence of organ/tissue tumour type(s) compared to controls;
2) Occurrence of tumours earlier than in controls (reduced latency);
3) Development of tumour types not seen or rarely occurring in controls;
4) Increased multiplicity of organ/tissue tumours in individual animals;
5) Increased incidence of total primary tumours: malignant, benign, and/or combined;
6) Increased ratio of total malignant to total benign tumours.
In this operational perspective tumours may be benign, malignant or an appropriate combination of both 
types (Huff et al., 1989). In some cases preneoplastic lesions (hyperplasia, metaplasia) may be combined 
with tumours for evaluation, especially with evidence of progression. 
These categories also fit into the overall schema of mammalian, including human, carcinogens, yet for 
humans less is known about these individually; in fact typically only items 1 and 3 are used to associate 
human cancers with exposures to a carcinogen, with 2 being less common. 
1) Increased incidence of tumour type(s) in exposed population compared to unexposed controls 
(benzene, metals, tobacco);
2) Occurrence of tumours earlier than in controls (BCME, lung cancer in young workers; DES, clear cell 
vaginal cancers in young girls); 
(11) IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, vol. 1–100, http://monographs.iarc.fr/ published by 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
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Panel 8�2 Value of animal testing for identifying carcinogens (cont�)
3) Development of tumour types not typically seen or occurring only rarely in human controls or populations 
(asbestos, DES, VCM).
Current methods to identify carcinogenic potential of chemicals
These rely largely on: 
1) Short-term in vitro and in vivo tests;
2) Mid- and long-term in vivo bioassays;
3) Epidemiological investigations;
4) Molecular mechanisms or modes-of-action;
5) Structural-activity-effect-relationships;
6) In vitro robotic high-throughput screening (in development);
7) Individual or group scientific interdisciplinary expertise.
Primary prevention was … implemented on the basis of the capacity of long-term experimentation in 
animals to predict similar effects in humans, taking into account biological plausibility but independently 
of the extent of understanding of the underlying mechanisms.  
Lorenzo Tomatis, who created IARC Monographs and second Director of IARC (Tomatis, 2006).
Thus, scientific, public health and regulatory communities must continue to utilise all available means and 
strive to develop newer methods and tools to more easily, quickly, cheaply and reliably identify carcinogens 
in the human milieu. In particular, there is a need to reduce numbers of animals used in testing for 
carcinogenic activity and in general to encourage their replacement with other, equally effective, non-animal 
methods. 
This effort continues. However, since adequate human studies are typically absent, are costly and 
time-consuming or of low power or sensitivity, and alternatives to animals have so far proven unsuccessful, 
the most useful time-proven method for identifying potential human carcinogens continues to be long-term 
carcinogenesis experiments (Huff, 1999; Rall, 2000; Tomatis, 2006). 
Of approx. 120 recognised human carcinogens (IARC lists 107, RoC 54; with duplications), as well as those 
probably (61 agents, IARC) or reasonably anticipated (186 agents, Report on Carcinogens (RoC)) to be 
carcinogenic to humans, all that have been tested adequately are likewise carcinogenic in mammalian cancer 
bioassays (IARC, 2012; RoC, 2011). Many were identified first in animals and only subsequently in humans 
(Huff, 1993, 1999). This knowledge, together with similarities in mechanisms of carcinogenesis across 
species, led to the scientific logic and public health strategy that chemicals shown clearly to be carcinogenic 
in animals should be considered as being likely and anticipated to present cancer risks to humans; e.g. IARC 
Monographs Preamble 2012 (12); RoC (13).
The central aim of hazard identification efforts is cancer prevention, largely by reducing or eliminating 
exposures to chemicals that cause or are suspected of causing cancer and other diseases (Huff, 2011; 
Tomatis, 2000). 
'Primary prevention has the double ethical privilege of intervening for the purpose of avoiding damage to 
health for the present and future generations' (Tomatis et al., 1997).
Value and validity of animal bioassays for predicting human cancers
Long-term carcinogenesis bioassays using experimental animals are the most predictive method for 
identifying likely human carcinogens (Tomatis, 1979; Huff, 1999a; Huff and Melnick, 2006). Since the 1960s, 
bioassays have proven a mainstay for identifying chemical carcinogens, establishing occupational exposure 
standards and primary cancer prevention (Tomatis and Huff, 2001). Most importantly, long-term bioassays 
are both predictive (prospective) and confirmatory (retrospective) for human carcinogens (Fung et al., 1993, 
1995). The value and validity of long-term chemical carcinogenesis bioassays centre on the following nine 
facts (Fung et al., 1993; Huff, 2010; Maltoni, 1976, 1976a; Tomatis, 1979, 2000; Tomatis et al., 1989, 1997, 
2001) (list modified from Huff, 2010): 
(12) http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/index.php.
(13) http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/?objectid=03C9AF75-E1BF-FF40-DBA9EC0928DF8B15.
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Despite the predictive success of cancer bioassays using laboratory animals there is vested interest 
opposition to their use in identifying carcinogens for preventing cancer:
Primary prevention of cancer has stumbled from the very beginning because of the interference of 
powerful economic interests which perceived that any data indicating a possible cancer risk after 
exposure to industrial chemicals jeopardises their profits, the protection of which being more important 
than the protection of human health.  
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The history of public health is characterised by persistent struggles between short-term economic interests 
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efforts are underway to minimise the use of animals whilst retaining, or improving upon, their value in 
identifying carcinogens. 
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Dibromochloropropane (DBCP) is a pesticide used against nematodes (roundworms or 
threadworms) that damage pineapples, bananas and other tropical fruits. It was introduced 
into US agriculture in 1955 and approved for use as a fumigant in 1964. By 1961 laboratory 
experiments had shown that it made the testicles of rodents shrink and significantly reduced the 
quantity and quality of sperm. Nonetheless, the compound was widely marketed and became a 
commercial success.
In 1977, workers at a production plant became worried that they were unable to father children. 
An emergency study by a US government agency discovered that in many cases the workers 
were suffering from deficient or absent sperm. While controls were improved at US facilities, the 
product continued to be marketed and sprayed in Latin America, the Philippines, some African 
countries, and elsewhere.
By the 1990s, tens of thousands of plantation workers in these countries had allegedly suffered 
adverse reproductive effects from DBCP use. The story continues today with contentious legal 
claims for compensation, contamination of drinking water and industry attempts to prevent a 
Swedish documentary on the issue from being screened.
This chapter looks at the knowledge available about the hazards and the actions taken, or 
not taken, to avert them. The DBCP story is significant as it is the first clear example of 
reproductive damage to workers who manufactured and used a synthetic chemical. This is one 
of many examples supporting the growing concerns about increasing rates of reproductive and 
developmental disease, and about the endocrine disrupting chemicals that seem to be playing a 
role in these disorders.
Protecting production workers, users, consumers and the environment from chemicals that may 
damage reproduction demands closer integration of scientific disciplines, as well as government 
action. The lessons of DBCP may help in ensuring timely protection from harm, based on 
precautionary approaches to scientific evidence. 
Eula Bingham and Celeste Monforton
9 The pesticide DBCP and male infertility 
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'If anyone wants to use a male birth control 
drug, I think we have identified one, but it is 
not very pleasant to use.' 
— Dr Charles Hine, Shell Contractor, c. 1960, 
quoted in Goldsmith (1997).
9�1 The discovery 1977: 'our union 
members are sterile'
In July 1977, one of the authors of this chapter (Eula 
Bingham, then US Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health) was contacted 
by Tony Mazzocchi, Vice President of the Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union 
(OCAW) in the United States. He wrote:
'In a chemical factory in California during 
a lunch hour, several workers confided to 
each other that they were worried about not 
having children. One worker had a child, 
but had been trying for another for almost 
two years and two other young workers had 
no children and were concerned that there 
was something wrong. Their wives had been 
examined and now they thought it might be 
that they themselves had a problem. When 
the concerns were passed to other workers, 
the union arranged for the seven of them to 
have sperm counts performed. The sperm 
counts were either zero, or so low, that 
they showed the men sterile and the union 
was contacting the US National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to 
perform a Health Hazard Evaluation'.
The chemical responsible for causing sterility 
in the workers at the California chemical plant 
was 1,2-Dibromo-3-Chloropropane (DBCP). The 
compound was first produced in the United States 
in 1955 and used as a soil fumigant to control 
nematode worms in the soil. DBCP products 
carried trade names such as Fumazone, Nemagon, 
Nemaset, and Nematox (US EPA, 1979; OSHA, 
1977a and 1977b; Misko et al., 1993; Clark and 
Snedeker, 2005; NIOSH, 1977) and were primarily 
used to protect crops, such as pineapple, bananas, 
sugar cane and other produce, mostly in the 
tropics. As a soil fumigant, DBCP was applied at 
a rate of 10–125 kg/ha, either injected directly into 
the soil or added to irrigation water. 
The three main US manufacturers were Dow 
Chemical Company, Shell Chemical Company and 
Occidental Chemical Company, but DBCP was also 
produced in Europe (by International Chemical 
Company in the United Kingdom) and in Japan. At 
its peak an estimated 14.7 million kg of DBCP were 
used annually prior to its suspension in 1977. Most 
production was used in the US, Latin America, the 
Philippines and some African countries. 
9�2 Early warnings: 1961–1975
The earliest research on DBCP toxicity was carried 
out by two chemical companies producing the 
compound for use as a nematocide. By 1958, both 
Shell and Dow had obtained toxicological data 
from experiments on rats showing that DBCP was 
absorbed through the skin and by inhalation and 
affected the liver, lung, kidney and testes. 
Charles Hine, working then under contract for 
Shell, reported a variety of adverse effects in 
laboratory animals, depending on the dose of 
DBCP vapour administered. At an exposure to 
5 ppm (5 parts of the chemical in one million parts 
of air), the testes in male rats shrank, at 10 ppm 
most of the male rats had testes half the normal 
size and at 20 ppm all the male rats were sterile. 
An internal memorandum prepared by Shell noted: 
'We understand that Dow Chemical Company have 
similar data and are very upset by the effects noted 
on the testes' (Lykken, 1958). 
At that time, scientists working for these companies 
were clearly worried about the results. John 
Goldsmith, epidemiologist, later wrote: 'I recall a 
conversation with the late Dr Charles Hine from 
the University of California at San Francisco about 
1960 at a party, when he said, "If anyone wants 
to use a male birth control drug, I think we have 
identified one, but it is not very pleasant to use"' 
(Goldsmith, 1997). 
In 1961, the industry toxicologists published their 
data from experimental studies (NIOSH, 1977), 
supporting the initial observations (see Box 9.1). 
These studies revealed that DBCP had two 
outstanding toxic effects: an antispermatogenic 
effect in males and damage to kidneys in both sexes 
of the rat. 
9�3 Pesticide registration and 
inadequate 'hazard control'  
1961–1977
The years 1958–1961 were a critical period for 
decisions on hazard protection and for the use 
and marketing of DBCP in the United States and 
globally. Charles Hine, working as an expert 
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Box 9�1 Animal toxicity data for DBCP: 1958–1975 
Torkelson et al. (1961) evaluated the effects of exposing rats to DBCP by inhalation for seven hours a day, 
five days a week for 10 weeks. The lowest concentration, 5 ppm (parts per million), produced an 18.6 % 
decrease in the mean weight of the testes, which was not statistically significant. Exposure to 10 ppm 
resulted in a statistically significant decrease (49 %) in the mean weight of the testes and a significant 
increase in the weight of the kidney (31.7 %). 
In another study reported by Torkelson et al. (1961) male and female rats were exposed to 12 ppm DBCP 
for seven hours a day, five days a week for 10 weeks. Degenerative changes occurred in the tissue where 
sperm are formed, reducing the number of sperm cells and increasing the proportion of abnormal sperm 
cells. Significant increases in the weights of the kidneys occurred in both sexes and there were changes in 
the kidneys of the males. Changes in the livers of both sexes were also noted. 
Exposing guinea pigs and rabbits to 12 ppm DBCP vapour inhalation resulted in statistically significant 
decreases in the mean weights of the testes in both species (Torkelson et al., 1961).
Toxicological studies by European laboratories also reported around 50 % reductions in the weight of testes 
and in sperm counts and motility (Rakhmatulayve, 1971; Reznik and Sprinchan, 1975). In female rats, the 
reproductive cycle was disrupted.
consultant for Dow and Shell, supported a request 
for the US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) 
to register DBCP as an approved pesticide. His 
report called for workplace concentrations to 
be less than 1 ppm and impermeable protective 
clothing to be used if skin contact was likely. 
In a series of discussions between the USFDA, 
Shell and Dow, the regulator noted that at the 
lowest exposure level studied, 5 ppm, there were 
adverse effects after repeated exposures and that 
the current safety precautions therefore appeared 
inadequate. However, the Shell representative 
considered the Hine recommendations to be 
impractical. 
By 1961, Torkelson, Hine and colleagues (Torkelson 
et al., 1961) recommended that occupational 
exposure to DBCP should be limited by keeping 
the airborne concentration below 1 ppm, and 
stressed that suitable analytical methods rather 
than sensory perception should be depended upon 
for control. These authors had interviewed men 
who had been briefly exposed to 1.7 ppm of DBCP 
and they described a definite, not unpleasant odour 
(NIOSH, 1978).
In 1961 the US Food and Drug Administration 
approved and registered DBCP as a pesticide 
and recommended the exposure limit of 1 ppm. 
Thereafter the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) was asked to approve the product 
labelling, which simply stated: 'Do not breathe 
vapours, use only in a well-ventilated area and 
avoid prolonged breathing'. As such, the warning 
label included no reference to testicular damage.
The USDA initially expressed reservations regarding 
the warnings on the label but Shell argued that at 
5 ppm no adverse effects had been reported and that 
the odour threshold of 1.7 ppm therefore provided 
an adequate 'warning' of excessive exposure 
(Thrupp, 1991). USDA accepted these reassurances 
even though no studies had been performed to 
indicate that this approach was safe. Virtually no 
attempts were made to determine if the measures 
adopted were indeed safe for manufacturing 
workers or pesticide sprayers. Neither group was 
subjected to medical surveillance.
In fact, the 'odour threshold' for DBCP exposure was 
too high to ensure reliable protection against the 
toxicity reported in the animal studies. DBCP fumes 
are only a mild irritant and unlikely to be reported 
as potentially harmful. Workers could therefore 
be exposed to dangerous amounts of the chemical 
without being aware of it. 
The labelling and workplace exposure precautions 
were therefore inadequate from the 1950s until 
1977, failing to provide accurate information about 
the potential health effects of DBCP or to ensure 
safe working conditions, in the light of the animal 
evidence. The toxicological data available in 1961 
on the potential adverse health effects of DBCP was 
sufficient to have required specific health warnings, 
personal protective equipment and medical 
surveillance. None was provided. 
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9�4 Actions to reduce exposure in 
DBCP manufacturing: 1977 and 
1978
The National Institute for Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) was created in 1970. Responding to the 
suspicions of the DBCP manufacturing workers 
and a request by their trade union, OCAW, for 
government help, NIOSH (1977) conducted a health 
hazard evaluation at the Occidental Chemical 
Company's Lathrop plant. It reported airborne 
DBCP concentrations of 0.29–0.43 ppm, measured 
as an eight-hour time-weighted average. Of 
13 workers in the production area, nine had no 
sperm (azoospermia) and another four workers 
had very reduced sperm counts (oligospermia). 
The researchers conducting the evaluation for 
NIOSH found a 'clear increase in the prevalence of 
oligospermia with increasing exposure' to DBCP 
(Whorton et al., 1977). These exposure levels were 
far below those used in the toxicological studies 
and also below the recommended 'safe' levels for 
workers of 1 ppm. 
With this alarming information, the President of 
OCAW formally petitioned the US Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on 
23 August 1977 to take action to limit worker 
DBCP exposure to 1 part per billion (1 ppb) parts 
of air and to conduct medical testing to identify 
cases of sterility and cancer among exposed 
workers. This call for action was met with a flurry 
of activity at the federal government level. OSHA 
issued an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) 
on 9 September 1977 and proposed a permanent 
standard in November. Public hearings were held in 
December 1977 and a final standard was published 
in the Federal Register on 11 March 1978. 
The results of the medical examinations of the 
OCAW workers provided compelling evidence for 
OSHA action, but the Administration also evaluated 
all other available information on DBCP as part of 
the rulemaking process. This included, for example, 
data from the Dow Chemical facility in Magnolia, 
Arkansas, where DBCP was manufactured. Air 
sampling results revealed concentrations of 
0.04 ppm to 0.4 ppm of DBCP calculated as an 
8-hour time-weighted average. Furthermore, 
medical tests revealed that 50 % of the 106 workers 
examined there had either oligospermia or 
azoospermia. 
These data suggested that exposures below 1 ppm 
were associated with adverse reproductive effects. 
However, because DBCP is also absorbed through 
the skin, dermal exposures may have contributed an 
unknown but potentially significant amount to the 
workers' total dose of DBCP. 
Based on the evidence of the serious adverse 
reproductive health effects in animals and humans, 
and its carcinogenicity in animals (see below), 
OSHA issued a final standard to limit workers' 
DBCP exposure to 1 ppb (based on an 8-hour 
time-weighted average), and to 10 ppb over any 
15-minute period. OSHA also required employers to 
provide initial and annual medical examination for 
DBCP-exposed workers, respiratory protection and 
training, among other provisions. 
The new rules took effect in April 1978 and were not 
effectively challenged by any interested party. The 
US National Peach Council did, however, attempt 
to delay the regulation with a direct plea to OSHA, 
expressed in a letter to Eula Bingham, co-author of 
this chapter. The Council argued that: 
'While involuntary sterility caused by a 
manufactured chemical may be bad, it is not 
necessarily so. After all, there are many people 
who are now paying to have themselves 
sterilized to assure they will no longer be able 
to become parents. How many of the workers 
who have become sterile were of an age that 
they would have been likely to have children 
anyway? How many were past the age when 
they would want to have children? These, too, 
are important questions. 
'If possible sterility is the main problem, 
couldn't workers who were old enough that 
they no longer wanted to have children accept 
such positions voluntarily? They could know 
the situation and it wouldn't matter. Or could 
workers be advised of the situation and some 
might volunteer for such work posts as an 
alternative to planned surgery for a vasectomy 
or tubal ligation, or as a means of getting 
around religious bans on birth control when 
they want no more children. We do believe 
in safety in the work place, Dr Bingham, but 
there can be good as well as bad sides to a 
situation' (US National Peach Council, 1977).
This argument found little favour with OSHA.
Meanwhile studies on exposed production workers 
were conducted in Israel. In a series of publications 
researchers discovered DBCP-induced sterility in 
the six workers at a DBCP-production facility that 
had been exposed for two to ten years (Potashnik 
et al., 1978). The workers also had an elevated 
serum concentration for one sex hormone (follicular 
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stimulating hormone, FSH, which increases with 
testicular damage) and damage to the testicular 
tissue responsible for producing sperm cells. 
In a related study, 18 of 23 workers (78 %) involved 
in DBCP production had abnormal sperm counts, 
including 12 workers with azoospermia. After 
several years without exposure to DBCP, some of the 
workers' testicular function improved but the men 
exposed for more than 120 hours experienced no 
improvement (Potashnik, 1984). Similarly, 17 years 
after being exposed to DBCP the extent of recovery 
from sperm damage was mixed (Potashnik and 
Porath, 1995). 
9�5 DBCP and cancer?
In 1975, as part of a programme to test pesticides 
for carcinogenicity, the National Cancer Institute 
reported that DBCP was carcinogenic in rats 
and mice. Industry representatives criticised the 
study at an OSHA hearing in 1977 because of the 
high doses used. Subsequently, a rodent study 
of both sexes using much lower doses by Dow 
Chemical at the Hazleton Laboratory in 1977 
resulted in carcinomas of the stomach, liver and 
renal tubules at the highest dose and a statistically 
non-significant increase in carcinomas at the two 
lower doses. 
Today, animal experiments using high exposure 
levels are still employed to evaluate the safety of 
many chemicals. Industry and other interested 
parties often assert that such experiments are 
irrelevant to human exposures, which are usually 
much lower. There are, however, good reasons to 
doubt these claims. The small number of animals 
used in experiments (e.g. usually 20 per exposure 
group) mean that the doses have to be high in 
order to reveal any possible hazard that thousands 
of workers (or many more consumers) face at much 
lower exposure levels. As a result, high doses have 
been shown, in very many cases, to be reliable 
predictors of the hazards humans face at much 
lower doses. 
Since 1992, the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has classified DBCP as a 'probable 
human carcinogen' (1). The International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC) assessed the evidence 
as sufficient in experimental animals to classify 
DBCP as a 2B ('possible') carcinogen (IARC, 1999).
(1) http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/dibromo-.html.
9�6 DBCP risks: from manufacturing to 
pesticide spraying 
While OSHA was attempting to protect workers 
manufacturing DBCP, the US EPA took steps to 
protect the health of workers using the pesticide. 
In September 1977, US EPA administrator Douglas 
M. Costle announced that under the authority 
granted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) he was suspending 
distribution of DBCP. Costle noted that he had this 
special authority 'in situations where the use of that 
pesticide appears likely to pose an unreasonable 
risk to man during the period necessary to conduct 
and complete a more lengthy administrative 
proceeding.'
The US EPA examined the scientific evidence and, 
even though early studies of DBCP sprayers in 
California and Israel had produced mixed results 
(Glass et al., 1979; Karraazi et al., 1980), determined 
that the risk of harm was sufficient to take 
emergency temporary action to protect workers 
spraying the pesticide. The US EPA prohibition 
on using DBCP became permanent in November 
1979 and applied to all crops, except for pineapples 
grown in Hawaii. In 1985 the US also prohibited 
use of DBCP on pineapples. 
9�7 DBCP exports from 1969 to the 
1980s: spreading sterility?
DBCP was developed for use against nematodes 
that attack pineapple plants, so it was not 
surprising that it was also effective on another 
tropical fruit: bananas. In the mid-1960s, the 
Standard Fruit Company began testing DBCP 
on its banana plantations in Central America; by 
1969, DBCP was in full-scale use in Costa Rica 
and Honduras. The pesticide containers were 
boldly marked with the brand names Fumazon 
and Nemagon but, like containers in the United 
States, provided no warnings to workers about 
the risk of sterility. Moreover, the labels on the 
pesticides exported were in English. Even if they 
had been written in Spanish, there is no guarantee 
that pesticide sprayers could have read them, since 
many were illiterate. 
The US EPA regulatory ban on using DBCP 
pesticide in the US did not ban Shell and Dow from 
manufacturing it and the Standard Fruit Company 
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Box 9�2 The Swedish film documentary, the Dole lawsuit and freedom of speech 
Maria Albin 
'Bananas!', a 2009 documentary by independent Swedish filmmaker Fredrik Gertten, addresses the 
attempts of 12 banana plantation workers in Nicaragua to sue Dole Food Company (previously named 
Standard Fruit) for DBCP-induced sterility. The film closely follows the workers and the controversial 
personal injury Californian lawyer, Juan Dominguez, who took on their claims. 
In July 2009 Dole sued Gertten and the film's producer Margarete Jangard, claiming defamation and 
seeking a permanent injunction against them screening 'Bananas' in public, displaying the film website 
or giving interviews promoting the film 'in which any portion of the accusations made against Dole in the 
documentary film Bananas are republished'. 
The lawsuit followed other steps by Dole to obstruct the film's release. Dole sought to have the film 
withdrawn from the Los Angeles film festival where it was due to be shown in June 2009 (it was moved 
to a 'special case study screening' to avoid possible legal action). Dole also sent a letter to the Swedish 
ambassador Jonas Hafström in Washington, asking him to take 'appropriate steps to limit its damaging 
impact, including urging the filmmakers, WG Film AB and Mr Gertten to act responsibly and halt 
dissemination of this film in the United States of America and Europe.
The media's response to Dole's efforts was robust. Filmmakers launched a petition for free speech 
during the Los Angeles film festival. The CEO of the German Documentary Film Association wrote a letter 
demanding that Dole cease its 'attacks on the freedom of information as well as stop your company's 
inhuman practices in Latin America which the film "Bananas" criticizes.' The International Federation of 
Journalists likewise condemned the use of the law to evade media scrutiny and public accountability as an 
unforgiveable violation of free speech. 
Gertten and Jangard regarded Dole's lawsuit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) 
— a deliberate attempt by a wealthy party to silence its critics by outspending them in launching a legal 
action. Accordingly, the filmmakers filed an anti-SLAPP motion and a cross-complaint.
Swedish reaction was strong and media coverage was extensive. The film was shown in Sweden's 
parliament, causing an exchange of letters between the executive vice-president of Dole and the two MPs 
responsible for the screening, Mats Johansson of the Conservative Party and Luciano Astudillo of the Social 
Democrats. Their unusually frank letter reflects Swedish public opinion at that stage: 
'It seems clear to us that you are misled by your PR-firm on how to influence Swedish opinion, with a poor 
understanding of our tradition of free speech during more than two hundred years. As the saying goes: all 
business is local. We strongly recommend a change of bureau and tactics, if you are at all interested in the 
Swedish market. But first and most we urge you — in the name of free speech — to withdraw your lawsuit 
against Mr Gertten.' 
MPs signed a cross-party petition urging Dole to withdraw their legal action in the name of free speech, 
and they were joined in these demands by the CEOs of leading food chains. The action was sufficient to 
make Dole withdraw its legal action in October 2009. It stated that it made its decision in view of the free 
speech concerns being expressed in Sweden, although it continued to believe in the merits of its case. The 
filmmakers withdrew their counter-claim but demanded that their legal fees be reimbursed. However, the 
threat that Dole would reinstitute the action hampered the distribution of the film.
In 2010, a Los Angeles court decided in favour of the filmmakers, stating that the lawsuit had been what is 
commonly known as a SLAPP, awarding them almost USD 200 000 in fees and costs and enabling Bananas! 
to be released in the US. 
Having made a film about Dole being sued, Gertten has now made a new film about being sued by Dole. 
'Big boys gone bananas!' premiered in October 2011 at the International Documentary Film Festival in 
Amsterdam.
Sources: http://www.bananasthemovie.com/wp-content/uploads/resources/slapp_ruling_nov17_10.pdf; 
http://www.bananasthemovie.com/wp-content/uploads/resources/bananas_defamation_complaint_july8_09.pdf; 
http://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/ombudsnet/docs/doctrina/doc_ccpdh_resoluciones/resolucion%20nicaragua%20final.htm; 
http://www.bananasthemovie.com/wp-content/uploads/resources/letter_dole-hafstrom_june5_09.pdf; 
http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-condemns-attempts-by-embattled-food-company-to-censor-free-speech-in-us.
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and other growers continued to use it. When 
Dow informed Standard Fruit that it was halting 
shipments of DBCP, Standard Fruit threatened 
Dow with a claim of breach of contract. To settle 
the matter, Standard Fruit Company agreed to 
indemnify Dow for any injuries resulting from 
exposure to DBCP and implement 'applicable work 
standards in respect of protective clothing, training 
etc.' as outlined in the OSHA standard. 
Shipping records and billing invoices made 
available through litigation on behalf of 
DBCP-injured workers reveal that Shell Chemical 
also sold the pesticide to growers in the Ivory 
Coast from 1977 to 1980. Another US manufacturer, 
Amvac Chemical Corporation, sold DBCP in 
1979 to companies in the Philippines, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. DBCP was still used in Central 
American banana plantations until at least 1985 
(New York Times, 2003). 
In the Philippines, workers employed by 
subcontractors of Standard Fruit used DBCP until 
about 1986. According to reports collected by 
lawyers, some of these workers became sterile and 
reported that they had not been informed about the 
risk of using the chemical and had not been given 
appropriate personal protective equipment. In 
Costa Rica too, there was inadequate protection of 
DPCP sprayers (Thrupp, 1991).
Similarly, medical evaluations of 28 Panamanian 
banana workers in August 1993 diagnosed 25 with 
damaged sperm (Navaro, 1993). 
9�8 Banana workers bring 
compensation cases: 1990–2010 
In the early 1990s, more than 16 000 banana 
plantation workers from Central America and 
the Philippines filed a class action lawsuit in 
Texas against US fruit and chemical companies, 
demanding compensation for permanent sterility 
linked to DBCP. A 1992 settlement in Costa Rica 
provided USD 20 million for 1 000 workers. 
In another lawsuit involving 26 000 workers 
employed in Latin America and elsewhere, the 
total settlement in 1997 of USD 41 million provided 
an average compensation of USD 1 500 to each 
Photo: © istockphoto/Francisco Orellana
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worker. In 2002, a national tribunal in Nicaragua 
sentenced the American multinational companies 
to pay USD 489 million in damages and interest 
to 450 workers affected by Nemagon. In a lawsuit, 
filed on behalf of 13 Nicaraguan banana plantation 
workers, Amvac Chemical agreed in April 2007 to a 
total compensation of USD 300 000 to the now-sterile 
workers. 
These settlements came 20 years after each of these 
firms knew about the potential reproductive health 
risks to DBCP pesticide spray workers, which had 
stopped their use in the US. Nevertheless, the firms 
marketed and sold DBCP abroad without ensuring 
that worker health would be adequately protected. 
Tens of thousands of banana workers still have suits 
pending in courts in the US and elsewhere but many 
of the relevant facts are still unclear and contested by 
the growers. 
9�9 Environmental pollution of soils and 
water by DBCP 
DBCP is a persistent and mobile chemical and has 
been found in the soil, and in ground and surface 
water in areas where it has been used. Torkelson et al. 
(1961) noted that 'its relatively low vapour pressure 
and high density assures a long residence in the soil', 
depending on the method of application. 
Although DBCP has been banned for use in 
agriculture for more than 20 years it persists in the 
environment and in water supplies. Underground 
aquifers in the Sacramento Valley of California are 
contaminated with DBCP and, depending on the 
temperature and pH, the chemical can persist for over 
a century (Peoples et al., 1980; Burlington et al., 1982; 
California Environmental Protection Agency, 1999). 
It was the most frequently detected contaminant in 
California wells in the early 1990s (Bartkowiak et al., 
1995).
The 2010 update of the California Well Inventory 
Database reported DBCP detections in 254 of 
1 312 wells sampled. Concentrations of DBCP found 
ranged from 0.01–1.7 ppb compared to the US EPA 
and Californian maximum contaminant level of 
0.2 ppb. Between 1986 and 2009 DBCP concentrations 
declined in about half of the wells sampled from 49 % 
above the maximum concentration level (MCL) of 
0.2 ppb to 25 % being above the MCL.
The US-based interest group Environmental Working 
Group (EWG) analysed 20 million tap water quality 
tests performed by water utilities between 2004 and 
2009 (EWG, 2009). Their investigations identified 
191 water systems in 18 states with DBCP levels 
in drinking water above health guidelines set by 
federal and state health agencies. Of these, 48 water 
utilities had DBCP levels above the US EPA's legally 
enforceable maximum contaminant level of 0.2 ppb. 
The World Health Organization's guideline value for 
drinking water quality is 1 ppb (WHO, 2003). 
More than 20 years after DBCP was banned, levels 
continue to exceed health limits in the tap water of 
over 4 million Californians. 
EWG also noted that 'in 38 communities, the levels of 
DBCP in tap water are above the so-called 'negligible' 
risk for carcinogens. In 31 communities, the levels 
ranged from 20–200 times the amount associated with 
a 'negligible' risk. A particular concern raised was in 
the case of infants drinking formula prepared with 
the tap water.'
9�10 Some late lessons
Lessons for science
1. DBCP exposures below the lowest dose tested 
in animal studies were mistakenly assumed to 
be safe. 
2. While adverse effects on crude testicular 
morphology and sperm counts were 
documented, further studies were not carried 
out to determine the exposure levels that could 
have provided more subtle indicators of early 
stage infertility. 
3. The early toxicity studies were carried out 
before modern protocols became available, but 
continued application of DBCP in developing 
countries did not lead to the use of updated 
protocols to assess the toxicity in further detail. 
4. Evidence of harm in animals was not seen by 
many scientists as relevant to humans. 
5. Human reproduction may be sensitive to subtle 
derangements of physiological processes, 
thereby causing sub-fertility or infertility in the 
absence of obvious pathology. 
6. No attention was paid to the possible effects on 
sons of exposed women. 
7. Routine medical records and health statistics 
can be of limited use in regard to adverse 
effects on reproduction. 
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8. Skin exposure can contribute significant 
doses of DBCP: air monitoring alone, as with 
other skin penetrating chemicals, therefore 
underestimated total doses received.
9. Independent expert assessments e.g. by the 
US governmental body, NIOSH, were needed to 
identify harm and to better protect employees.
Communication and use of research evidence
1. The original evidence for DBCP effects on 
human male sterility came from the lay and 
local knowledge of the workers and their wives. 
2. It was confidentially asserted that DBCP was 
safe to use without there being any studies 
of workers or relevant animal studies to 
confirm this assumption: an example of the 
'authoritative assertion but without evidence' 
which appears in other chapters. 
3. The toxicity information was translated 
only into very general warnings on labels: 
no translations were provided for products 
exported. 
4. The animal toxicological findings did not lead 
to any surveillance studies of men exposed 
to DBCP at the production plants until after 
evidence was observed by the workers. 
5. No action was taken to avoid the earlier 
biological 'effects' in animals until they had 
become 'adverse effects' in people.
6. The application of DBCP was considered 
essential by growers, including multinational 
companies, and they considered the toxicity 
concerns were too small to be significant. 
7. The early scientific warnings were not widely 
reported but confined to specialist scientific 
journals or internal company communications.
8. Knowledge from the manufacturing risks did 
not get taken up by the companies responsible 
for user risks. 
9. National standards to control the risks of DBCP 
were not transferred into international standards 
to protect workers from globalised exposures to 
hazardous chemicals. 
10. Early warnings about the persistence of DBCP 
in soils and water did not get acted upon until 
many years later. 
Compensation for victims
1. Much information about the responses of DPCP 
producers and user companies only emerged via 
legal procedures in the compensation cases. 
2. Compensation cases in the law courts can be 
difficult, expensive and very time consuming 
to pursue (see Chapter 24 on protecting early 
warners and late victims). 
9�11 Conclusion
There is now widespread concern about male 
infertility, and related reproductive problems, such 
as testicular cancer and developmental defects, in 
wildlife, workers and consumers (e.g. WHO, in 
press; EEA, 2012; BCPT, 2008).
The lessons of DBCP are very relevant to these 
concerns and to the current exposures of many 
workers and consumers to the endocrine disrupting 
substances (EDSs) which seem to be playing a role 
in the reproductive ill health of both humans and 
wildlife (see also Chapter 13 on ethinyl oestradiol in 
the aquatic environment and Chapter 10 on BPA). 
Protecting production workers, users, consumers, 
and the environment from chemicals that may 
damage reproduction needs the closer integration 
of scientific disciplines, and government actions 
if the timely protection from harm, using 
precautionary approaches to the evidence from 
science, is to be achieved. The lessons of DBCP may 
help in this. 
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10 Bisphenol A: contested science, 
divergent safety evaluations
(1) This paper is based on the scientific opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the 
institutions they are working for.
  
Bisphenol A (BPA) is currently one of the world's best-selling chemicals and primarily used 
to make polycarbonate plastics. It is widely used in common products such as baby bottles, 
household electronics, medical devices and coatings on food containers. BPA is known to mimic 
the female hormone oestrogen and has been found to leach from the materials where it is used.
Studies have suggested that even exposure to low doses of BPA may cause endocrine 
disrupting effects. As with other hormones, it appears that an organism is most sensitive during 
development but that effects are often not observed until much later in the lifecycle. This means 
that at the time when the effects become detectable, the chemical exposure has vanished. This 
makes it extremely difficult to link exposure to effects in humans.
This chapter maps some of the findings in studies of rodents and humans. It also discusses 
the challenges of evaluating scientific findings in a field where industry-sponsored studies and 
independent scientific research seem to deviate strongly. The authors offer suggestions for ways 
to uncouple financial interests from scientific research and testing.
A widely used and dispersed industrial chemical like Bisphenol A is a controversial example of 
an endocrine disrupting substance that has implications for policymakers. Different approaches 
to risk assessment for BPA by US and European authorities are presented. It throws light on the 
ways in which similar evidence is evaluated differently in different risk assessments and presents 
challenges for applying the precautionary principle.
The intense discussion and scientific work on BPA have slowly contributed to a process of 
improving test strategies. While traditional toxicology has relied on a monotonic increasing dose-
response relationship as evidence that the effect is caused by the test agent, studies on BPA and 
other endocrine disruptor chemicals (EDCs) have demonstrated the limitations of this approach 
and adjustments have been made in some cases. 
It has also been widely accepted that effects cannot be predicted by simply thinking of BPA 
as a weak oestrogen and extrapolating from what is observed for more potent endogenous 
oestrogens. This lesson is particularly evident in the intense pharmaceutical interest in selective 
oestrogen response modifiers (SERMs).
The chapter is followed by a panel analysing the value of animal testing for identifying 
carcinogens.
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10�1 The first known endocrine 
disruptor: early warnings
Bisphenol A (BPA) is one of the industrial chemicals 
often referred to as 'emerging environmental 
substances'. This categorisation is in fact somewhat 
euphemistic. BPA was probably the first synthetic 
substance known to mimic the natural female sex 
hormone oestrogen. As early as 1934, Dodds and 
Lawson (1936, 1938) were searching for synthetic 
chemicals that could replace expensive natural 
oestrogen in pharmacological applications. They 
identified BPA as a weak functional oestrogen, 
utilising rat test systems that are still in use today. 
It failed to make a career as a medicine. Later, 
other substances like Diethylstilbestrol (DES) were 
discovered by the same team of British scientists 
(Dodds et al., 1938). The synthetic oestrogen 
DES was much more potent than BPA and was 
subsequently used as a pharmaceutical that showed 
severe side effects (Meyers, 1983).
Not suitable as a pharmaceutical, BPA was 
marketed as an industrial chemical. In 1957 BPA 
was polymerised with phosgene, resulting in what 
is known today as polycarbonate. That started the 
plastics revolution that has changed the lives of 
people around the world. At that time everyone 
thought that plastics, particularly polycarbonate, 
were significant advances that would improve our 
lives.
10�2 A growing problem
BPA is currently one of the world's best selling 
chemicals, with a total annual production of 
3.8 million tonnes in 2006 (Association of Plastics 
Manufacturers, Polycarbonate/BPA group, 2007). 
In 2005 and 2006, about 1.15 million tonnes were 
consumed within the European Union (European 
Commission, 2008). These figures reflect an increase 
in consumption of 69 % over a seven year period, 
an annual increase of 7 to 8 %. Most BPA is used 
to produce plastics, mainly polycarbonate (66 %) 
and epoxy resins (33 %) (Association of Plastics 
Manufacturers, Polycarbonate/BPA group 2007). 
Many other uses have been identified, such as an 
ingredient in thermal paper. This is why BPA is 
regularly found in recycled paper (Terasaki et al., 
2007; Vinggaard et al. 2000), which is frequently 
used to produce food containers (Ozaki et al., 2006; 
Lopez-Espinoza et al., 2007). 
It should be noted that the European Risk 
Assessment Document was not able to identify the 
purpose of use of more than 7 000 tonnes of the BPA 
that is consumed annually within the European 
Union (European Commission, 2008). Commercial 
BPA contains up to 16 different phenolic impurities 
that show structural features of oestrogenic 
chemicals but have never been toxicologically 
characterised. These 'minor impurities' represent 
another 10 000 tonnes annually (Terasaki et al., 
2004). 
Leaching from plastics
Two out of three tonnes of BPA produced are used to 
manufacture polycarbonates. This clear hard plastic 
material is increasingly used where transparent and 
low-weight synthetic materials are wanted; DVDs, 
modern car roofs and headlight covers, baby bottles 
and plastic dishes for use in microwave ovens are 
all made of polycarbonate. These plastic materials 
can easily be identified by the recycling code 07 
in a triangle or the letters PC. Though BPA is a 
covalently-bound building block of polycarbonates, 
the monomer is subsequently released over time 
from the plastic material (Krishnan et al., 1993; Tan 
and Mustafa, 2003). Leaching of BPA is increased 
by the age of the material, alkaline conditions and 
heating. All polycarbonate items are probably a 
source of BPA. This gives rise to the concern that a 
growing stock of material has been built up in our 
homes and in the environment that is a potential 
continuous source of BPA exposure.
Polycarbonates are probably the main but not the 
only source of BPA. It also leaches from dental 
sealants (Joskow et al., 2006), inner coatings of cans 
and microwave containers (Brotons et al.,1994; 
Mariscal-Arcas et al., 2009), and in relatively 
high concentration from medical devices used in 
intensive care units (Calafat et al., 2009). Thus BPA is 
found in many matrices including house dust (Butte 
et al., 2001), indoor air, hand wipes, solid food, 
liquid food (Wilson et al., 2007) and drinking water 
(Shao et al., 2008). The European Union Directive 
90/128/EEC includes BPA in the list of chemicals 
with a specific migration limit in food, set at 3 mg/kg 
(European Commission, 1990). BPA has been found 
in canned food at concentrations up to 380 μg/kg 
(Goodson et al., 2002), but only up to 4.5 μg/kg in 
canned drinks (Cao et al., 2009).
It is not surprising that BPA is one of those 
ubiquitous chemicals that are a real nightmare 
for analytical chemists. The substance can leach 
easily from plastic laboratory equipment and thus 
contaminate samples that are to be analysed. As 
with softeners such as phthalates, great care has to 
be taken to avoid such contamination. 
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10�3 Identifying the risk was an 
accident, not the result of a 
regulatory process 
In 1991, a conference taking place in Wingspread 
Racine, Wisconsin used the phrase 'endocrine 
disruptor' for the first time (Markey et al., 2002). 
In 1992 the first scientific paper using this was 
published by Bason and Colborn (1992). It described 
indicators of hormonal de-regulation in wildlife 
and humans and suspected mainly pesticides as the 
cause of these emerging effects. BPA was added to 
the list of potential endocrine disruptors one year 
later. It was by accident that the risks associated 
with it were re-discovered. In 1993 a team of 
endocrinologists at Stanford University found an 
unknown oestrogenic substance that contaminated 
their assays. Finally they identified BPA leaching 
from their polycarbonate cell culture dishes when 
they were autoclaved (Krishnan et al., 1993). It may 
be surprising that neither any governmental nor 
any industry programme for risk identification or 
risk assessment identified BPA as a problematic 
hormonally-active substance although such 
programmes had been run in Europe since 1982 
with considerable financial and intellectual input 
from governments and industry. Although several 
European chemical companies had a history of 
hormone research over decades, they did not play 
a role in identifying and assessing environmental 
chemicals with hormone-disrupting properties. 
Industry missed a chance to care for their products 
responsibly.
In 1995 a number of workshops took place in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany and the 
United States to discuss the upcoming issue of 
hormonally-active environmental chemicals. One 
year later the book by Colborn, Dumanowski and 
Myers (1996) 'Our stolen future', with a foreword 
by former US Vice-President Al Gore, put this issue 
on the global political agenda. Meanwhile, in the 
second half of the 1990s, BPA became the most 
prominent example of an endocrine disruptor in the 
scientific and public debate.
10�4 Bisphenol beyond Paracelsus
In the past 100 years almost no toxicological 
textbook failed to quote Philippus Aureolus 
Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim, better 
known by his nickname Paracelsus:
'Alle Ding sind Gift und nichts ist ohn Gift; 
alein die Dosis macht das ein Ding kein Gift 
ist' (Paracelsus, 1539)
(All things are poison and nothing is without 
poison, only the dose permits something not to 
be poisonous).
Probably all students of toxicology were taught 
by their professors that sugar and salt and even 
water can be a poison if the dose is high enough. 
BPA challenged our belief that high doses produce 
more serious effects than low ones. Instead, 
BPA, like natural hormones, frequently produces 
dose-response curves that are non-linear. In such 
experiments very low doses or concentrations 
show a small effect, intermediate doses cause the 
most serious effects while high concentrations 
again show no or only moderate effects. These 
dose-response curves resemble an upside-down 
'U' and are therefore called inverted u-shaped 
dose-response curves (Sonnenschein et al., 1989). 
Such dose-response curves occur when tumours 
are induced in transgenic mice (Jenkins et al., 2011), 
in snail test systems with regard to clutch size 
(Schulte-Oehlmann et al., 2001), serum estradiol 
levels in rats (Akingbemi et al., 2004), calcium influx 
in rat pituitary cells (Watson et al., 2007), effects on 
pupal weight and sex ratio in the housefly (Izumi 
et al., 2008), and reproductive performance in female 
mice (Cabaton et al., 2011) when these animals are 
exposed to BPA (Figure 10.1). 
Several mechanisms have been hypothesised to try to 
explain this phenomenon. The global assessment of 
state-of-the-science of endocrine disruptors published 
on behalf of the International Programme for 
Chemical Safety (IPCS) of the WHO (Damstra et al., 
2002) pointed out that no common dose-response 
mechanism can be expected when endocrine 
disruptors are under study. These chemicals often 
mimic naturally-occurring hormones or antagonise 
them. So they interfere with a naturally-activated 
system that may be stimulated by low doses and 
inhibited by over-dosing because receptor-mediated 
responses saturate (Welshons et al., 2003). Several 
different mechanisms involving activation of 
different genes may be involved in the expression 
of one visible effect. An endocrine-disrupting 
mechanism resulting in a u-shaped dose response 
curve may be the result of two or more effects with 
different dose-response characteristics each, as 
demonstrated in experiments using cell line models. 
These non-monotonic effects have been shown 
experimentally in many in vivo and in vitro systems 
(Vandenberg et al, 2012). Although the Endocrine 
Society, the largest professional organisation of 
endocrinologists, points out in a recent statement 
that non-traditional dose-response relations are 
very common in the action of hormones (Diamanti-
Kandarakis et al., 2009), the existence and plausibility 
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of such effects are still disputed by some scientists 
and members of regulatory bodies (Sharpe, 2010).
Deviations from monotonic dose-response curves for 
hormone action are very frequent. Neither do they 
seem to be rare in toxicology. In 2001, Calabrese and 
Baldwin analysed 668 dose-response curves that were 
published in toxicological or eco-toxicological papers 
in three major journals from 1962–1998: 37 % of the 
curves were non-monotonic and exhibited a u-shaped 
form.
This kind of curve is much more than a curiosity. 
What toxicology did in past centuries was to 
extrapolate from high doses with frequent and 
serious effects to low doses where only small effects 
were expected. A prerequisite for doing this is that 
the curve is monotonic. The central paradigm of 
Figure 10.1 Examples of non-monotonic dose-response curves for BPA
Note:  In the test systems shown, small doses show small effects, intermediate doses cause the most pronounced effects while high 
doses cause no change or even a decrease in effect.
 Schematic graphs adopted from the papers, for data and details see the original references.
Source:  a) Data from Cabaton et al., 2010; b) Data from Jenkins et al., 2011; c) Data from Wetherill et al., 2002;  
d) Data from Marmugi et al., 2011
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toxicological assessment was: if a high dose of a 
chemical does not cause harm, then a low dose will 
not either. Obviously this does not hold true at least 
for physiological responses to endocrine disruptors. 
After 500 years it has become clear that Paracelsus's 
paradigms do not contribute to the protection of 
human health and environment if they are applied to 
risk assessments in a naive way. 
1997 Colerangle and Roy reported that a low dose of 
BPA induced a proliferative effect in breast tissue and 
that BPA was much more potent than expected from 
its oestrogen-receptor binding profile. Science reacted 
immediately and since then hundreds of papers on 
low-dose effects have been published (see Table 10.1). 
These further demonstrate that the organism is most 
sensitive during development, that effects are often 
not observed until later in the lifecycle, and that 
conventional toxicology testing could be insensitive 
to BPA if it fails to include in-utero dosing and later 
life follow-up of appropriate endpoints. The papers 
also support the observation of non-monotonic 
dose-response curves for BPA and other hormones, 
reflecting feedback mechanisms, receptor saturation, 
and multiple mechanisms of action (Vandenberg 
et al., 2012). Within the scientific community, there 
is far-reaching agreement on these concepts and 
findings. However BPA industry organisations 
continue to claim that these findings are invalid as 'no 
study purporting to show low-dose effects has been 
replicated in a second lab, despite repeated efforts to 
do so' (Polycarbonate/BPA Global Group, 2012).
10�5 The time makes the poison
The proper development of an organism is an 
extremely complex process, dependent on external 
and internal cues and hormonal regulation. Not only 
the chemical characteristic and the internal dose are 
important but also the exact timing of the stimulus 
(Neubert, 1997). For BPA, so far, it has been shown 
that irreversible developmental effects are caused 
during the foetal, neonatal or juvenile period in test 
animals (Palanza et al., 2008) and that the effects 
observed may be different if the organism is exposed 
during early or later life-stages (Richter et al., 2007). 
Assessing the effects of endocrine disruptors is 
extraordinary difficult because the time of exposure 
is not necessarily the time when the effects can be 
detected. Perinatal exposure to BPA has been shown 
to affect females: it alters ovarian cyclicity and 
induces early cessation of oestrus cycles, impairs 
reproduction, interferes with sexual differentiation 
of the brain, alters behaviour, alters mammary gland 
development and induces mammary gland neoplasia 
(Soto and Sonnenschein, 2010). It has also been shown 
that BPA can interfere with normal spermatogenesis, 
reducing sperm numbers later in life in rodents and 
when the mothers of the pups are dosed during 
pregnancy and lactation (vom Saal et al., 1998; 
Okada et al., 2008a). If this also happens in humans, 
the effects of exposure of the foetus or the newborn 
may only be seen more than a decade later when the 
boys reach puberty and sperm becomes available 
for characterisation. This temporal disconnection 
between exposure and effect is even larger when 
the effect observed is breast cancer, because the age 
of prevalence for this disease is 50–60. For example, 
prenatal exposure to synthetic oestrogens like DES 
(Hoover et al., 2011) increase the incidence of breast 
cancer at 40 years of age or older. At the time when 
the effects become detectable the chemical exposure 
has vanished. This makes it extremely difficult to 
apply epidemiological methods to link exposure to 
effects in humans. For a realistic risk assessment it 
is also crucial to characterise the exposure to BPA 
at the appropriate life stage. Young children have 
the highest rate of daily ingestion of this chemical 
(European Commission, 2008) and the internal 
concentrations of free and toxicologically-active BPA 
may be much higher than in adults because of their 
different metabolic capacity (Edginton and Ritter, 
2009). 
These examples illustrate that dose is only one of 
the factors that make a poison. Equally important 
are the time of exposure and the time when effects 
become visible. For a long time BPA has been 
erroneously viewed as only a weak oestrogen (Völkel 
et al., 2005; Goodman et al., 2009). Indeed, in vitro 
studies indicated that BPA competes with estradiol 
to bind the oestrogen receptors alpha and beta. In 
these tests relative binding affinities were at least a 
thousand-fold lower than that of estradiol (Kuiper 
et al., 1998). Recent results from in vivo and in vitro 
studies indicate that BPA can act via a number of 
different additional cellular target systems, including 
binding to a non-classical membrane-bound 
oestrogen receptor (ncmER) (Nadal et al., 2000, 2004; 
Alonso-Magdalena et al., 2005), an orphan nuclear 
receptor called oestrogen-related receptor gamma 
ERR-γ	(Okada	et	al..	2008b),	a	seven-transmembrane	
oestrogen receptor called GPR30 (Thomas and Dong, 
2006), and the aryl hydrocarbon receptor (AhR) 
(Kruger et al., 2008).
In vitro studies also show that BPA can act as an 
androgen receptor antagonist. BPA can also interact 
with thyroid hormone receptors (TRs) (Moriyama 
et al., 2002; Zoeller et al., 2005). These multiple modes 
of action have recently been reviewed in a number of 
papers (NTP, 2008; Chapin et al., 2008; Wetherill et al., 
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Box 10�1 Good Science and Good Laboratory Practice
Science is a self-regulating system. To ensure high quality standards, scientists have developed rules for 
themselves on how to perform scientific work. These have been laid down by international organisations like 
WHO (2006) or national scientific societies like DFG (1998) in Germany in comprehensive guidance documents. 
A peer-review system is the core instrument for safeguarding these rules. As a prerequisite for publication, 
results and scientific papers are reviewed by peer scientists. In prestigious journals more than three out of four 
papers are not accepted for publication. This system is a very rigorous form of quality control.
For regulatory purposes, particularly for the testing of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, not all results and 
procedures need to be published and peer-reviewed. As a reaction to low quality and fraud, a different system 
of quality control has been established. The system of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) (OECD, 1998) has been 
tailor-made for commercial research laboratories, and regulatory agencies worldwide require that this system 
is applied for tests conducted to fulfil regulatory requirements. GLP regulates how to conduct protocols and 
report tests. GLP can give technical advice but cannot judge whether a test is appropriate to solve a problem 
or whether, for example, the relevant outcomes have been studied. GLP does not indicate that good science 
has been performed or that the scientific results are adequate and sufficient to protect human health and the 
environment (for comprehensive discussion, see also Myers et al., 2009).
2007). In some of these systems BPA can exhibit equal 
or even stronger potency than the naturally occurring 
hormones (Wozniak et al., 2005; Watson et al., 2007).
For a long time influential scientists claimed that 
low-dose findings were neither credible nor plausible 
because, from the relative binding strength of 
oestrogen and bisphenol, considerably lower effects 
of BPA would have been expected (Greim, 2004). 
Today we know that their expectations were based 
on inappropriate assumptions. Recent experiments 
showing that low-dose effects of BPA are abolished in 
null mutants of nuclear oestrogen receptors provide 
irrefutable evidence in this regard (Soriano et al., 
2012).
Nowadays there is widespread agreement that BPA 
is an endocrine-active chemical with multiple modes 
of action. A recent paper from US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)'s high throughput testing 
group, ToxCast, showed that BPA was active in a 
wide variety of mechanistic assays — one of the most 
active chemicals tested (Judson et al., 2010) — and 
a literature review from a US National Toxicology 
Program (NTP) draft report on obesity provides an 
excellent review of BPA's multiple modes of action 
(NIEHS/NTP, 2011).
10�6 Concern or no concern: that is the 
question
When BPA was polymerised to make polycarbonate, 
neither the data on non-monotonic dose responses 
nor the deleterious effects of foetal exposure to DES 
were known or commonly recognised in science. In 
addition, since BPA seemed to be a weak oestrogen 
with activity 1 000–10 000 fold less than estradiol, 
and since it was assumed that the BPA monomer 
would not be released from the polycarbonate 
plastic (Biles et al., 1997), there was no real concern 
about human exposure and thus toxicity. 
The complexity of the exposure assessment, the 
toxicological profile of BPA, and probably the high 
economic importance of this substance may have 
contributed to the fact that risk assessments for this 
substance differ more markedly than for any other 
chemical. A number of scientific and regulatory 
bodies and committees have published risk 
assessments for BPA. The identified acceptable doses 
for humans differ by many orders of magnitude. 
10�7 BPA reviews and risk assessments
BPA is regulated as a food contaminant and thus 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the US and the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in the EU. Both 
agencies have provided risk assessments over 
the past decade, all based on toxicity tests in 
experimental animals. These regulatory agencies 
have essentially used Good Laboratory Practice 
(GLP) guideline studies as the only source of data on 
the toxicity of BPA (see Box 10.1 for GLP and Good 
Scientific Practice). 
Let's take a look at the GLP guideline studies 
that have been done to assess BPA toxicity and 
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that have been pivotal in the FDA and EFSA risk 
assessment. There are two multigenerational 
reproduction studies in rats (Tyl et al., 2002) and one 
multigenerational mouse study (Tyl et al., 2008) that 
were regulatory guideline studies done according 
to GLP. These studies all showed only non-specific 
toxicity (number of live pups per litter) and they 
were used to identify a Lowest Observed Adverse 
Effect Level (LOAEL) of 50 mg/kg body weight 
per day (bw d) and a No Observed Adverse Effect 
Level (NOAEL) of 5 mg/kg bw d. At least in the 
rat study there were significant effects below this 
level (Heinze and Chahoud, 2003). These effects 
were regarded as not relevant by the authors. 
The studies have been criticised because they use 
traditional toxicological endpoints that cannot detect 
subtle developmental changes and effects caused 
by hormones (Myers et al., 2009). Recently a large 
independent trans-generational study (Ryan et al., 
2010) also could not find effects at low doses on 
behaviour, puberty and fertility of female rats.
On the other hand there are many in vivo studies 
describing developmental effects in rodents at very 
low doses (Table 10.1). The effects under study were 
reproductive organ morphology, neurodevelopment 
and behaviour, male reproductive health, and 
immunology. At least 46 peer-reviewed published 
studies report effects at oral doses of 50 μg/kg bw d 
or less (see Table 10.1) (for review, see Gies, 2007). 
This dose has been regarded as a safe Acceptable 
Daily Intake (ADI) in the recent European 
assessment of the European Food Safety Agency 
(EFSA, 2010).
Recently a working group of the French health 
agency ANSES (2011) carefully re-examined all 
animal studies with low doses of BPA, assessed 
their quality and compared their results. The panel 
concluded that animal experiments show effects 
that could be confirmed on male sperm production, 
induction of ovarian cysts, endometriosis, and 
advanced puberty in females. Behavioural effects 
have been confirmed for maternal behaviour and 
sexual dimorphic behaviour such as anxiety. Effects 
on lipogenesis, immune behaviour and breast 
development were also regarded as confirmed.
An important aspect of dose-response assessment 
is that it is still not clear what is a no-effect level for 
BPA's most sensitive end-points. Further research 
is needed to continue refining methods to reliably 
assess sensitive endpoints and to conduct the 
studies with a sophisticated approach to connecting 
internal free BPA dose with effects. As these studies 
are pursued, we may find that effects of BPA occur 
in the low or sub- pg/ml range, the same range 
as estimates of current human exposure. It is 
clear that most sensitive endpoints include effects 
on mammary gland development (Rudel et al., 
2011b) and neuro-behavioural endpoints that are 
not commonly assessed in toxicity studies, even 
those recently adopted for testing endocrine-active 
chemicals.
The different assessment documents weight this 
evidence differently. The main areas of controversy 
are:
•	 Do	any	of	the	non-GLP	peer-reviewed	papers	
that show effects of BPA at low doses contain 
sufficiently reliable information to be considered 
in the risk assessment? Putting this question the 
other way: is the study sponsored by The Society 
of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (Tyl et al., 2002) and 
the study of Ryan et al. (2010) so reliable that 
nearly all other studies can be dismissed?
•	 Are	there	any	relevant	concentrations	of	free	
BPA in the body that can cause biological effects 
or is this substance so readily metabolised that it 
cannot harm humans?
The assessment of the European Food Safety Agency 
(EFSA) 2010 and the Risk assessment report of the 
European Union (European Commission, 2008) state 
that none of the low dose studies has the quality 
to provide data for the risk assessment. All these 
studies have been dismissed. The reasons given 
were:
•	 only	one	or	two	doses	tested;
•	 low	number	of	animals;
•	 inadequate	statistical	processing	of	the	data;
•	 results	not	consistent	with	other	studies.
The application of these criteria was used to exclude 
or ignore significant peer-reviewed scientific results. 
The fact that they were peerreviewed and published 
in reputable scientific journals indicates that the 
members of the scientific community that reviewed 
all these many papers do not agree with the criteria 
chosen by EFSA.
10�8 EFSA and EU risk assessments
EFSA identified the study of Tyl et al. (2002) as 
pivotal. With an assessment factor of 100 applied 
to the No Observed Adverse Effect Level (NOAEL) 
an Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) of 50 μg/kg bw d 
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was derived. It should be noted that the assessment 
of the EFSA and other regulatory bodies is based 
on arbitrarily selected data from this study. The 
original data from this study showing a significant 
increase in anogenital distance (AGD) in males 
but not in females were not taken forward to the 
risk assessment (Heinze and Chahoud, 2003). 
Although AGD is not a validated endpoint for 
regulatory studies, it is an important marker of 
sexual development in rodents and humans. 
Changes in AGD show that sexual development 
has been disturbed (Swan et al., 2005; Longnecker 
et al., 2007). An increase in AGD is considered a 
surrogate for virilisation, while a decrease indicates 
de-masculinisation. In humans, a lower AGD has 
been shown to be a predictor of poor semen quality 
in later life (Mendiola et al., 2011). Similar changes 
of AGD due to low doses of BPA have been found 
in independent studies in rodents by Gupta (2000) 
and Somm (2009). In a recent paper, Tyl (2009) the 
principal author stated that no low-dose effects have 
been found in this study. This is not in line with the 
data presented.
EU Risk Assessment Report (RAR)
In contrast to the majority of EU Member 
States, some Nordic Countries regarded four 
neuro-behavioural studies as valid for risk 
assessment (Negishi et al., 2004; Carr et al., 2003; 
Ryan and Vandenberg, 2006; Adriani et al., 2005). 
In a footnote to the assessment document they 
proposed to take these as pivotal studies. The 
lowest effective concentration in these studies was 
described by Adriani as 40 μg/kg bw d. With a factor 
of three for extrapolation from LOAEL to NOAEL 
and an extrapolation factor of 100 this would result 
in an ADI of 0.13 μg/kg bw d. This ADI would be 
lower by a factor of 380 than that of EU RAR.
The National Toxicology Program (NTP) of the 
United States of America (NTP, 2008). The NTP 
assessment concluded that BPA was clearly toxic 
at high doses over 5 mg/kg bw d. In contrast to 
the EU RAR, NTP does include the results of the 
low-dose studies in their assessments. Although it 
states that low-dose effects are difficult to interpret 
in many cases, NTP concludes that these results 
should not be dismissed. The low-dose studies 
provide limited evidence that human health may 
be affected and there is some evidence that human 
health may be at risk at current exposure levels. 
NTP does not indicate a 'pivotal' study but in their 
risk characterisation they base their estimates on 
developmental effects reported from mice studies 
at a dose of 2.4 μg/kg bw d.
NTP did not calculate a Tolerable Daily Intake 
(TDI) in its assessment. If one applies routine 
methods to derive an Acceptable Daily Intake 
(ADI), with a factor of 3 for extrapolation from 
LOAEL to NOAEL and an extrapolation factor of 
100, this would result in an ADI of 0.008 μg/kg bw 
d. This ADI would be a factor of 6 250 lower than 
that derived by the EFSA.
Environment Canada and Health Canada 
(2008). The 2008 Canadian assessment states that 
'collectively these (low dose) studies provide 
evidence that exposure to BPA during gestation 
and early postnatal life may be affecting neural 
development and some aspects of behaviour 
in rodents, the overall weight of evidence was 
considered limited from the perspective of rigour'. 
Nevertheless, taking a precautionary approach, the 
Canadian authorities decided to characterise BPA 
as a substance that may constitute a risk to humans. 
So the precautionary risk assessment is based on 
low-dose neuro-developmental studies. It is not 
stated which of the studies are taken as decisive. In 
2010 the Canadian government listed BPA as a toxic 
substance. 
The Chapel Hill Consensus statement (vom 
Saal et al., 2007) is not a risk assessment in the 
classical sense. Thirty-eight scientists, including 
most of the leading scientists working on BPA, 
expressed confidence that low doses of BPA disrupt 
development in many animal models. Their key 
message is that action is warranted when internal 
exposure of humans reaches or exceeds the levels 
that cause serious effects in experimental animals 
in low dose studies. This consensus statement 
clearly points to the developing gap between 
scientific knowledge about BPA and the published 
opinions of regulatory committees. 
The US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA, 2008, 2010). In 2008 the FDA issued its 
risk assessment of BPA which stated that the 
'no observable adverse effect' level of 5mg/kg 
bw d was an adequate margin of safety. The 
scientific committee of the FDA established a 
subcommittee in 2008 to review this assessment. 
The subcommittee harshly criticised the FDA 
assessment. In particular, it did not agree that 
the large number of non-GLP studies should be 
excluded from the safety assessment. 
It stated that the weight of the evidence provided 
scientific support for use of a point of departure 
substantially (i.e. at least one order of magnitude) 
lower than the 5 mg/kg bw d level selected in the 
draft FDA assessment.
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In summary the Subcommittee concluded: 'Coupling 
together the available qualitative and quantitative 
information (including application of uncertainty 
factors) provides a sufficient scientific basis to 
conclude that the Margins of Safety defined by FDA 
as 'adequate' are, in fact, inadequate.' The Scientific 
committee of the FDA later adopted this opinion 
of its subcommittee. Such an explicit statement 
fundamentally criticising the work of an agency by 
its scientific advisors is unprecedented.
The report of its scientific advisory committee 
resulted in the FDA changing its position. On 
10 January 2010, the FDA stated that they now 'have 
some concern about the potential effects of BPA on 
the brain, behaviour and prostate gland in foetuses, 
infants and younger children' (FDA, 2010). Thus, for 
the first time, while it did not change its actual risk 
assessment of the acceptable daily intake level, it did 
acknowledge the existence and possible importance 
of investigator-initiated studies. At that time there 
were more than 800 investigator-initiated studies 
published on BPA toxicity. 
European Food Safety Authority 2010 BPA Risk 
Assessment (EFSA, 2010). In 2010 EFSA released 
an updated risk assessment of BPA. They basically 
reiterated what they stated in 2006, that BPA was 
safe to human health and noted that there had been 
no new compelling non-GLP studies published 
on BPA. At that time there were more than 800 
investigator-initiated studies that were not included 
in the BPA risk assessment, each one discarded for 
not meeting specific guidelines. 
Thus at that time, the FDA and EFSA still relied 
exclusively on a handful of GLP multi-generational 
studies done in contract laboratories that assessed 
only reproduction, body and organ weights, clinical 
chemistry and organ histopathology using H&E 
staining. The same endpoints had been used for 
the past 50 years: before endocrine disruptors were 
known, before the developmental basis of disease 
and gene expression and epigenetics were known, 
and before low-dose and non-monotonic dose 
responses were known. 
It is remarkable that the FDA and EFSA used 
guideline studies to indicate that BPA is safe while 
ignoring over 800 peer-reviewed studies that 
showed toxicity of BPA at exposure levels below the 
level of human exposure. 
Certainly there are data gaps, but the practice of 
regulatory agencies of disregarding, or worse, 
declaring unfit every peer-reviewed study that 
does not follow the guideline study design cannot 
be defensible. The scientific literature needs to 
be assessed on the basis of the strength of the 
individual studies and the overall strength of the 
evidence of all the studies in order to show the 
same or similar effects across doses and times and 
species. 
The German Federal Environment Agency 
(UBA) (2010). The view of the German Federal 
Environment Agency (UBA) is that there are 
sufficient grounds for concern. Numerous studies 
present, on the whole, a consistent picture, so 
that, despite uncertainties and gaps in knowledge 
concerning risk assessment and levels of exposure, 
there is need for action. The UBA is therefore in 
favour of precautionary action and restrictions on 
the use of certain products that contain BPA.
The French Agency for Food, Environmental and 
Occupational Health and Safety, ANSES (2011). 
Based on an analysis of all the available scientific 
literature, an ANSES scientific expert group found 
'that there were proven effects in animals (effects 
on reproduction, effects on the mammary gland, 
effects on metabolism, the brain and behaviour) 
and other suspected effects in humans (effects on 
reproduction, the metabolism of sugars and fats, 
and cardiovascular diseases). These effects were 
demonstrated at doses that were significantly 
lower than the reference doses used for regulatory 
purposes, especially during certain periods of life 
characterised by susceptibility to the effects of BPA 
(pregnancy, pre- and post-natal periods)' (ANSES 
2011). This assessment questions parts of EFSA's 
current assessments. 
A joint ANSES and EFSA paper has recently been 
prepared (EFSA and ANSES 2011). This paper 
shows that differing assessments persist, partly 
because they evaluated evidence at different stages 
of the risk assessment and partly because they use 
different study quality criteria (2). 
10�9 Bisphenol A in human bodies
There is little controversy about the external exposure 
of humans to BPA. The EU Risk Assessment Report 
(2) ANSES and EFSA agree that they have covered different stages of the risk assessment process: ANSES a hazard identification and 
EFSA a hazard characterisation (2010) and a full risk assessment (2006) from dietary exposure to BPA (2006). This represents one 
of the reasons for the divergences between their respective work in 2011 and 2010. They recognise that their selection of critical 
effects is not based on the same study evaluation criteria e.g. routes of exposure (EFSA and ANSES, 2011).
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(European Commission, 2008) used two exposure 
models to estimate human daily intake. One of 
these was for regional exposure and one for local 
exposure near a BPA production plant. Total human 
exposure was calculated by the regional model to 
be 1.49 μg/kg bw d, and by the local model to be 
43 μg/kg bw d. Estimates of daily BPA intake in 
adults fell within the range 0.008–1.5 μg/kg bw d. 
Worst-case scenarios for young children estimated 
up to 11–13 μg/kg bw d. These data, calculated from 
exposure scenarios, are well in accordance with daily 
intake figures recalculated from concentrations in 
urine. Daily intakes estimated from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey (CDC NHANES) 
bio-monitoring data range from 0.15–0.22 μg/kg bw d 
for adults aged 20–60+ years at the 95th percentile 
(this means that 95 % of the people had 
concentrations at or below this value) (LaKind and 
Naiman, 2011). In German children aged 3 to 14, the 
95th percentile of the daily intake recalculated from 
urine concentrations was 0.37 μg/kg bw d and the 
maximum value among 599 children was 7 μg/kg bw 
d (Becker et al., 2009). These intakes were similar to 
those found in children aged 6 to 11 in the US (Calafat 
et al., 2008). Bottle-fed infants have two times higher 
urine BPA levels than breast-fed infants (Völkel et al., 
2011). Children in neonatal intensive care units have 
median urinary BPA concentrations about ten times 
higher than in children aged 6–11 (Calafat et al., 2008; 
2009) and 20 participants eating food with limited 
packaging for three days showed a 66 % reduction 
in urinary BPA (Rudel et al., 2011a). In studies that 
report both conjugated and free BPA in urine, > 90 % 
is conjugated, including in neonates (Calafat et al., 
2009). This indicates that there are particularly 
highly exposed risk groups in vulnerable life phases 
that have not yet been recognised in current risk 
assessments. A recent analysis of NHANES data 
showed that BPA levels did not decline rapidly 
with fasting time as expected. This suggests 
significant levels of exposure not related to food, or 
accumulation in body tissues. The recent finding of 
transdermal exposure points to additional sources 
of exposure, and thus to a higher than expected total 
BPA exposure (Stahlhut et al., 2009) 
Major differences exist concerning internal exposure. 
Only free bisphenol is believed to be biologically 
active while its conjugated metabolites are probably 
inactive; however, it should be considered that 
conjugated metabolites that may be found in the 
blood can be de-conjugated in peripheral tissues and 
thus become re-activated. Human bio-monitoring 
studies from Germany and the US (Schönfelder 
et al., 2002a; Padnmanabhan et al., 2008) found 
4–6 ng/ml free bisphenol in the blood of mothers. 
These results are almost identical although the 
studies used totally different techniques. However 
pharmacokinetic studies (Doerge et al. 2011a), 
together with data from bio-monitoring studies 
and model calculations, resulted in estimates of 
free BPA levels in human blood between 0.1 and 
10 pg/ml (Fisher et al., 2011), around three orders 
of magnitude lower than the above-mentioned 
directly measured ones. 
No free BPA above the detection limit of 2 ng/ml 
was found in the blood of nine volunteers dosed 
intentionally with 5 mg/person (Völkel et al., 2002). 
This study is still the basis of the risk assessment 
of the EFSA suggesting that no relevant internal 
concentrations of free BPA can be found in humans. 
In summary, the EU Risk Assessment report 
states: 'Considering the evidence as a whole, EFSA 
concluded that the validity of the reported high 
blood levels of BPA in unintentionally exposed 
human subjects is questionable.' Again EFSA 
ignores consistent results from peer-reviewed 
scientific work. 
New pharmacokinetic studies (Prins et al., 2011; 
Doerge et al., 2010, 2011; Taylor et al., 2011) show 
that caveats in this field are legion. Of particular 
relevance, the Taylor et al study shows that BPA 
pharmacokinetics is similar in primates and 
rodents and thus that rodents are suitable models. 
Moreover routes of exposure, such as dermal 
exposure (Stahlhut et al., 2009; Liao and Kannan, 
2011a, b) and excretion, such as sweat (Genuis 
et al., 2012), have recently been recognised but have 
not yet been quantified and thus are additional 
sources of uncertainty.
Risk assessment is only a protocol used by 
the regulatory community, not science per se. 
Uncertainty has to be taken into account and has 
to be quantified. The plethora of peer-reviewed 
research showing low-dose effects indicates that 
applied test protocols and regulatory procedures 
are not suitable for assessing endocrine disruptors. 
A recent review extensively discusses the relevance 
of measurements of free and conjugated BPA in 
human blood (Ginsberg and Rice, 2009). Many 
peripheral organs, including the placenta, show 
high activity of glucuronidases and sulphatases 
that are able to cleave conjugated BPA to its free 
and metabolic active form. Finding the conjugated 
form in the blood does not predict that the 
substance is biologically inactive in the tissue. The 
assumption of EFSA that rapid conjugation protects 
humans from adverse effects is far from being 
precautionary.
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In contrast the National Toxicology Program (NTP) 
recognises the possibility that the published values 
of free BPA may, in some cases, not accurately 
represent the 'true' concentrations of free BPA in 
the blood or body fluids of humans or laboratory 
animals. However, because of the similarity 
between values reported with different analytical 
methods, the NTP accepts the published values as 
sufficiently reliable for use in this evaluation.
10�10 Spheres of influence
In the case of BPA, a large body of scientific 
literature obviously indicates deleterious effects 
in rodents at low doses. The effective doses in 
these studies overlap the doses of current human 
intake. Most of the European, American and Asian 
authorities declare BPA to be safe. Industries 
rely on these risk assessments. Massive pressure 
from consumers and politicians has forced many 
companies, for example the major American baby 
bottle manufacturers and a European aluminium 
drinking bottle manufacturer, to withdraw their 
BPA-releasing products from the market. Without 
doubt, this has had considerable negative effects 
on the image of the companies, the reputation 
of their brands and on the earnings of these 
branches. For many people the question arises 
whether BPA-producing industries had previously 
influenced the assessment processes. Such 
industrial influences on scientists and authorities 
have been well documented for the risk assessment 
of tobacco smoke and second-hand smoking in 
particular (Grüning et al., 2006).
At least one consulting company that had been 
active for the tobacco industry, the Weinberg 
Group, has been successfully hired by the BPA 
industry to influence the European assessment, in 
particular the classification and labelling (C&L) 
which is a key instrument for the risk management 
of chemicals. In its internet presentation the 
Weinberg Group itself proudly admits:
'In Europe, THE WEINBERG GROUP and its 
associates have had a five-year long history of 
working on the polycarbonates/BPA issue… It 
also includes identification of opponent's likely 
arguments, and formation of responses to counter 
these arguments. THE WEINBERG GROUP 
contributed its academic and regulatory network 
to the advocacy effort. This approach proved 
very effective, as ultimately the C&L working 
group did not follow the recommendation of the 
Rapporteur Member State to classify BPA as a 
Category 2 reproductive toxicant, agreeing instead 
on the more benign Category 3 classification .We 
have a long-term relationship with this client, 
and will continue to support this industry as it 
faces persistent NGO attacks on its products' (The 
Weinberg Group, 2005).
Classification as a category 2 reproductive toxicant 
would have required labelling this substance with 
a skull and bones sign as toxic. Moreover under 
the new chemical legislation of the European 
Community, every use of BPA would have required 
a formal authorisation.
Science is vulnerable. It is based on the 
independence of scientists and of science itself. In 
the committee of the European Food Agency AFC 
— (Panel on additives, flavourings, processing 
aids and materials in contact with food) nine of 
the 21 members stated, in the conflict of interest 
statements they supplied to the agency, that 
they had worked for at least one company or 
association under the influence of the industry 
or for industry itself or had strong links with 
associations like Greenfacts or ILSI Europe that 
are dependent on financial support or industries 
including BPA producers. One member received 
financial benefits from industry for writing a 
review (Dekant and Völkel, 2008) on BPA for a 
scientific journal. 
Meanwhile the European Food Safety Authority 
made considerable efforts to strengthen 
transparency and scientific independence, as 'the 
value of its scientific advice is directly linked to the 
level of trust held in it by the public and therefore 
seeks to guarantee independence in all aspects of 
its governance and scientific activities (EFSA, 2012). 
New rules for independence policy have been 
launched by EFSA recently.
Without doubt, working for the chemical industry 
and its organisations or other NGOs is a job like 
any other. Whether it is wise to give people who 
are directly or indirectly paid by industry the task 
of controlling industry may be questioned. 
Various scientific papers have investigated whether 
the outcomes of scientific studies are dependent of 
the source of funding. In most cases, a significant 
association has been found (Lesser et al., 2007; 
Moses et al., 2005; Blumenthal, 2003). An 
association of funding and outcome can also been 
detected for studies on BPA (Table 10.2). 
Since EFSA reassessed BPA in Europe in 2006 and 
increased the tolerable daily intake by a factor 
of five, scientific evidence has accumulated that 
Lessons from health hazards | Bisphenol A: contested science, divergent safety evaluations
258 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
shows low dose toxicity and doubts have occurred 
whether EFSA's decision was unbiased:
•	 At	least	ten	additional	peer-reviewed	papers	were	
published showing effects in rodent offspring at 
oral doses lower than the Tolerable Daily Intake 
set by the EFSA (see Table 10.1). BPA has been 
shown to influence body weight and metabolism 
(Somm, 2009; Rubin et al., 2001) and may be one 
of the factors contributing to the increasing rates 
of obesity in humans.
•	 Numerous	other	in vivo and in vitro studies 
indicate that BPA may not be safe at doses we are 
currently exposed to.
•	 Bio-monitoring	studies	showed	that	some	
European and American children are exposed to 
doses that can produce adverse effects in rodents 
(for review, see Betts, 2010).
•	 Vulnerable	and	highly	exposed	subgroups,	
like children in intensive care units, that are 
not sufficiently covered by current exposure 
assessments, have been identified (Calafat et al., 
2009).
•	 New	sources	of	BPA	have	been	identified	like	
pacifiers and warm-water tubes (Shelby, 2008). 
•	 Epidemiological	studies	show	that	higher	
exposure of mothers to BPA is associated with 
increased aggressiveness of daughters when they 
are two years old (Braun et al., 2009). Like other 
cross-sectional studies, these associations are not 
a proof of causation but should be regarded as 
additional warning signs.
•	 Free	BPA	concentrations	are	associated	with	
oocyte quality (Fujimoto et al., 2011) and embryo 
quality indicators (Bloom et al., 2011) during 
human in vitro fertilisation.
•	 BPA	levels	in	the	blood	of	workers	are	negatively	
associated with male sexual function (Li et al., 
2010).
•	 Higher	BPA	exposure	is	associated	with	obesity	in	
the general population in the US (Carwile et al., 
2011).
•	 BPA	exposure	in	workers	is	negatively	correlated	
with the birth weight of their offspring (Miao 
et al., 2011).
•	 Gestational	BPA	exposure	affected	behavioural	
and emotional regulation at three years of age, 
especially among girls (Braun et al., 2011). 
•	 EFSA's	assumption	that	internal	doses	of	free	
BPA are lower in humans than in rodents at 
comparable doses is unproven (Gies et al., 2009).
•	 The	European	Union	has	banned	baby	bottles	
containing BPA. This ban became effective in 2011 
(EU, 2011).
10�11 Lessons to be learned
The 'late lesson' with respect to BPA is the 'same 
old story' of putting a chemical into widespread 
use without understanding its health implications, 
and then trying to resolve public health questions 
while facing the intense pressure of serious 
economic consequences. The competing urgency 
of public health and economic stakes puts the 
scientific process under enormous pressure. In 
this perspective the story of BPA resembles those 
of asbestos, polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) and 
Diethylstilboestrol (DES).
Best science and transparency
In Europe it is timely to dare to start again with 
the risk assessment of BPA. This assessment must 
be transparent and conducted by the scientists 
authoring the papers with high scientific impact 
in this field. Stakeholder conferences may serve 
as a forum to make the interests and influence of 
industry and other NGOs transparent.
Precaution
Until final decisions are made, precautionary 
measures should be taken to lower human 
exposures to well below those that cause adverse 
effects in rodents and behavioural changes in 
humans in epidemiological studies. This would 
mean terminating those uses of BPA involving close 
contact with humans via food or the environment.
Towards more independent science
The new European chemicals legislation REACH 
(Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemical substances) relies on the 
activities of the industry for most risk assessments 
and toxicity test data. The case of BPA clearly 
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Table 10�1 Summary of mammalian studies on BPA with effect levels at or below  
50 µ/kg bw d, oral administration
Dose 
(µg/kg bw d)
Organism, age at dosing Effect Reference
0.2 Rat, 2-generation study Anogenital distance in F 1 males, 2 µg/kg in F1 
females and 20 µg/kg in F2 females
Ema et al., 2001
0.2 Rat, male adult Superoxide dismutase, catalase, glutathione 
reductase and glutathione peroxidase activity in 
liver ↓, H2O2, lipid peroxides ↑
Bindhumol et al., 2003
0.2 Rat, male adult Prostate size ↑, Testis, epididymis size ↓ H2O2, 
lipid peroxides ↑
Chitra et al., 2003
0.6 Mouse, pregnancy Effects on mammary gland development Ayyanan et al., 2011
1 Rat, 3-generation study Paired ovary weight in F2 generation ↓, uterine 
weight in F0 ↓, anogenital distance in female F2 ↓ 
(Effects were not regarded as relevant by the 
authors)
Tyl et al., 2002
1.2 Rat, 3-generation study Litter size ↓, sperm number and motility ↓, post 
implantation loss ↑
Salian et al., 2009
2 Mouse, pregnancy Testis and epididymal weights ↑ in offspring Ashby et al., 1999
2 Mouse, gestation day 11–17, 
offspring 
Aggression ↑, testis weight ↓ in offspring Kawai et al., 2003
2 Mouse, gestation day 11–17, 
offspring
Prostate weight ↑, epididymis weight ↓ vom Saal et al., 1998
2 Gerbil, females, 3 weeks after 
pairing
Changed maternal behaviour Razzoli et al., 2005 
2 Mouse, prenatally, early postnatally Anxious behaviour ↑ in offspring Ryan et al., 2006
2 Rat, 3-generation study Spermatogenesis, sperm quality Peknicova et al., 2002
2.4 Mouse, gestation day 11–17 Vaginal opening, first oestrus in offspring Howdeshell et al., 1999
2.4 Rat, male, Postnatal day 21–35 LH, Testosterone and oestrogen levels ↓ Akingbemi et al., 2004
2.5 Mouse, 5 wk Immune, IFN-gamma and IgG2a ↓ Sawai et al., 2003
2.5 Mouse, pregnancy and lactation Brain, kidney liver and testes weight ↓, oxidative 
stress markers ↑ in offspring
Kabuto et al., 2004
2.5 Transgenic mice Tumour development ↑ Jenkins et al., 2011
5 Mouse, adult male Testis and seminal vesicle weights ↓ Al-Hiyasat et al., 2002
10 Mouse, gestation day 14–18 Maternal behaviour in offspring Palanza et al., 2002
10 Mouse, gestation day 14–18 Number and size of dorsolateral prostate ducts in 
offspring ↑
Timms et al., 2005
10 Mouse, gestation day 11–18 Long-term alteration in neurobehavioral functions 
in females
Laviola et al., 2005
10 Mouse, gestation day 11–day 8 
post partum
Decreased sex differences in behaviour Gioiosa et al., 2007
10 Rat Increased prostate hyperplasia Wu et al., 2011
10 Rat, neonatal Increased oestrogen-induced prostate 
intraepithelial neoplasia
Prins et al., 2011
15 Rat, last week of pregnancy Male behaviour in 6-9 week old offspring altered Fujimoto et al., 2006
20 Mouse Chromosomal aberrations, aneuploidy ↑ Hunt et al., 2003
20 Rat, 13 wk Spermatogenesis ↓ Sakaue et al., 2001
20 Rat, pregnancy Vaginal morphology in offspring Schönfelder et al., 2002b
25 Mouse, gestation day 8–23 Structural and histological changes of prostate in 
offspring
Ramos et al., 2001
25 Mouse, female adult Number of embryo resorptions ↑, uterine 
weights ↑
Al-Hiyasat et al., 2004
25 Rat, lactating DMBA induced carcinogenicity in breast tissue of 
offspring
Jenkins et al., 2009
25 Mouse, pregnancy DMBA induced carcinogenicity in breast tissue of 
offspring
Weber Lozada and Keri, 
2011
30 Rats during pregnancy and lactation Less pronounced sexual behaviour in male 
offspring, reversed sex differences in brain 
development
Kubo et al., 2003
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Dose 
(µg/kg bw d)
Organism, age at dosing Effect Reference
30 Mouse Immune responses ↑ Yoshino et al., 2003
40 Rat, gestation day 14–postnatal 
day 6
Sex associated behavioural changes in offspring ↑ Dessí-Fulgheri et al., 
2002
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Aggression behaviour in offspring Farabollini et al., 2002
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Pain sensitivity (hyperalgesia) in offspring Aloisi et al., 2002
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Changes in spontaneous and amphetamine 
induced behaviour in offspring
Adriani et al., 2003
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Decrease of playful interactions in offspring Porrini et al., 2005
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Changes in maternal behaviour in adult females Della Seta et al., 2005
40 Rat, male PND 23–30 Brain estrogen receptor number altered, 
testosterone ↓
Ceccarelli et al., 2007
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Spatial recognition memory impaired in offspring, 
changes in female exploration behaviour
Poimenova et al., 2010
40 Rat, pregnancy and lactation Impairment of memory, sexual behaviour and 
locomotor activity in offspring
Goncalves et al., 2010
40 Mouse, day 32–87 Elimination of sex differences in non-reproductive 
behaviour
Xu et al., 2011
45 Mouse, gestation and weaning Memory impairment associated with reduction of 
acetylcholine production in the hippocampus in 
the male offspring
Miyagawa et al., 2007
 45 Mouse, gestation and weaning ↑ Morphine-induced hyperlocomotion and 
rewarding effect in offspring
Narita et al., 2006
50 Mouse, gestation day 16–18 Anogenital distance and prostate size ↑, 
epididymal weight ↓ in offspring
Gupta, 2000 
50 Rat, gestation and lactation Deficits in male sexual behaviour in adulthood Jones et al., 2010
50 Rat, gestation and lactation Body weight ↑, impaired glucose tolerance, 
serum insulin ↓
Wei et al., 2011
Table 10�1 Summary of mammalian studies on BPA with effect levels at or below  
50 µ/kg bw d, oral administration (cont)
Note: This table is not comprehensive. Many other studies with other application routes show similar effects. These studies should 
also not be dismissed for risk assessment purposes as it has been shown that other routes of exposure result in similar 
internal exposures in the animals.
Source: Taylor et al., 2008, modified from Gies, 2007. 
Source of funding Harm No harm
Government 94 (90.4) 10 (9.6)
Chemical corporations 0 (0) 11 (100)
Table 10�2 Outcome of studies on BPA and source of funding
Note: Number of studies and percentage in brackets.
Source: Data from Hughes and vom Saal 2005, including studies published until 2004. 
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shows that the results of industry-sponsored 
studies and independent scientific studies deviate 
strongly. Independent science and regulatory 
toxicology seem to speak different languages. 
Numerous papers from different laboratories 
indicate risks at low doses, BPA industry-sponsored 
studies need doses orders of magnitude higher to 
produce any effects and if effects are detected they 
are not taken forward to the risk assessment. 
Independent science is interested in finding 
the effects of a substance and publishing these 
findings. Independent laboratories usually 
specialise in a biological system and often have 
decades of experience in this field. Contracting 
laboratories have to cover a broad range of 
endpoints with different chemicals. Thus academic 
laboratories may be better qualified for testing for 
subtle changes such as those in early development 
and behaviour. Also, contract laboratories are 
per se not economically independent from the 
producers of a chemical. This has to be considered 
when weighing the evidence produced by 
academic research and by contract laboratories.
Independence of scientific advisors to regulatory 
agencies has been a controversial issue within the 
scientific community. These problems are obviously 
not restricted to the case of BPA. A number of 
measures have been proposed to strengthen 
scientific independence within the risk assessment 
process (Holland et al., 2012).
Uncoupling of financial interests and scientific 
and regulatory research and testing seems to be 
necessary. Chemical regulation should be based on 
science and the basis of science is independence. 
This independence of researchers can be achieved 
if laboratories are not contracted directly by 
industry. Research laboratories could be paid by a 
fund that is financed by the industry, over which 
industry has no control and which is managed by 
governments. 
The case of BPA shows that results of independent 
science are of great value and should have an 
adequate weight within the decision-making 
process. Without doubt, standard testing 
by contract laboratories has its value in risk 
assessment procedures and regulations but their 
results must not outweigh those from independent 
academic laboratories. However, there is a need 
to update the standard testing procedures to 
incorporate the new knowledge acquired through 
independent research.
Strengthening the independence of scientific 
advisors is necessary and timely. Close cooperation 
with industry or industry-dominated bodies like 
the International Life Science Institute (ILSI) may 
be regarded as incompatible with the degree of 
independence required for advisory bodies.
Transparent and reliable documentation of possible 
conflicts of interest has not yet been achieved in all 
cases.
Performing or reviewing risk assessments for 
public agencies is time-consuming. Experts have to 
be paid adequately for doing this work. This would 
allow attracting the best qualified and independent 
scientists. Both testing and assessment can be 
financed by charging industry a fee. The employers 
of these qualified members of the scientific 
community (universities, research institutions) 
should be required by government agencies to 
decrease the workload of these scientists so that 
they can perform this important service to society.
10�12 Lessons learned
The intense discussion and scientific work on BPA 
have slowly contributed to a process of improving 
test strategies. While traditional toxicology has 
relied on a monotonic increasing dose-response 
relationship as evidence that the effect is caused by 
the test agent, studies on BPA and other endocrine 
disruptor chemicals (EDCs) have demonstrated 
the limitations of this approach and adjustments 
have been made in some cases. For example, the US 
NTP Expert Panel report on BPA (NTP-CERHR, 
2007) and the report of the French ANSES 2011 
included both single dose and multiple dose 
studies in their compilations of studies that are 
useful for evaluating the risks of BPA (Arnich et al., 
2011). It has also been widely accepted that effects 
cannot be predicted by simply thinking of BPA as 
a weak oestrogen and extrapolating from what is 
observed for more potent endogenous oestrogens, 
and this lesson is widely evident in the intense 
pharmaceutical interest in selective oestrogen 
response modifiers (SERMs), although some 
investigators persist in referring to BPA simply as a 
weak oestrogen.
Under its testing guideline programmme, 
OECD is currently modifying its guidelines and 
incorporating many new endpoints that are 
sensitive to hormonal perturbation, such as timing 
of vaginal opening, and anogenital distance. 
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'There was a strange stillness. The birds for example — where had they gone? Many people 
spoke about them, puzzled and disturbed. The feeding stations in the backyards were deserted. 
The few birds seen anywhere were moribund: they trembled violently and could not fly. It was a 
spring without voices ... only silence lay over the fields and woods and marsh.'
The book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson is mainly about the impacts of chemicals (in particular 
in particular dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane also known as DDT) on the environment and human 
health. Indeed, the close association between humans and birds remains very apt. Representing 
the only two warm-blooded groups of life on Earth, mammals and birds share the same 
environments and threats.
Carson's claim that she lived in 'an era dominated by industry, in which the right to make a dollar 
at whatever cost is seldom challenged' still resonates strongly with the problems that societies 
face all over the world. One chapter heading, 'The obligation to endure', derived from the French 
biologist and philosopher Jean Rostand's famous observation that, 'the obligation to endure gives 
us the right to know'. United States President John F. Kennedy responded to the challenge posed 
by Carson by investigating DDT, leading to its complete ban in the US. The ban was followed 
by a range of institutions and regulations concerned with environmental issues in the US and 
elsewhere, driven by public demand for knowledge and protection.
DDT was the primary tool used in the first global malaria eradication programme during the 
1950s and 1960s. The insecticide is sprayed on the inner walls and ceilings of houses. Malaria 
has been successfully eliminated from many regions but remains endemic in large parts of the 
world. DDT remains one of the 12 insecticides — and the only organochlorine compound — 
currently recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), and under the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, countries may continue to use DDT. Global annual 
use of DDT for disease vector control is estimated at more than 5 000 tonnes.
It is clear that the social conscience awakened by Rachel Carson 50 years ago gave momentum 
to a groundswell of actions and interventions that are slowly but steadily making inroads at 
myriad levels. Chapter 17 of her book, 'The other road' reminds the reader of the opportunities 
that should have been seized much earlier. With more than 10 % of bird species worldwide now 
threatened in one way or another, it is clear that we missed early warnings or failed to act on 
them. Will we continue to miss signposts to 'other roads'? Are our obligations to endure met by 
our rights to know? As Carson said 50 years ago: 'The choice, after all, is ours to make.'
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11�1 Introduction
'There was a strange stillness. The birds 
for example — where had they gone? 
Many people spoke about them, puzzled 
and disturbed. The feeding stations in the 
backyards were deserted. The few birds seen 
anywhere were moribund: they trembled 
violently and could not fly. It was a spring 
without voices. ....only silence lay over the 
fields and woods and marsh.'
This narrative by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring 
(1962) (2) of an imagined town and surroundings, 
representing thousands such all over America, 
frames the context of one of the 20th century's most 
powerful books on humans and the environment. 
Fifty years on, with an enduring and strengthening 
message, Rachel Carson's Silent Spring is an 
unmistakeable icon for early environmental 
awareness and current concern. 
Silent Spring is mainly about the impacts 
of chemicals — with an emphasis on 
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) — on the 
environment and human health. Its impact is as 
strong now as then. Indeed, the close association 
between humans and birds remains very apt; 
representing the only two warm-blooded groups 
of life on earth — mammals and birds — we share 
the very same environments and threats. Carson's 
realisation of humankind-in-nature, arguably as 
important as humankind-in-cosmos, contributed 
significantly to modern and enduring environmental 
and even social movements, resulting in regulations 
and restrictions on activities and practices that now 
exceed chemicals alone. In her second chapter, The 
obligation to endure, Carson points a finger which 
then, and indeed still now, resonates strongly with 
problems that societies face all over the world, 'it 
is also an era dominated by industry, in which the 
right to make a dollar at whatever cost is seldom 
challenged'. Carson took her chapter heading and 
context from the French biologist and philosopher 
Jean Rostand's famous thought, 'the obligation 
to endure gives us the right to know'. United 
States President John F. Kennedy responded to 
the challenge posed by Carson by investigating 
DDT, eventually leading to its complete ban in 
the United States. Despite many counter-claims 
and arguments from various sources, the ban on 
DDT and other chemicals resulted in the return 
of the bird chorus to affected areas. The ban was 
followed by a range of institutions and regulations 
(2) All quotations are taken from the 1972 reprint of Silent Spring by Hamish Hamilton, London.
concerned with environmental issues in the United 
States and elsewhere, driven by a public demand for 
knowledge and protection.
The right to know and the willingness to endure, so 
crucial to advancing civilisation and freedom, poses 
interesting and challenging issues that continue to 
face humanity on many economic, political, social, 
and environmental fronts. Indeed, DDT remains 
part of the conundrum of 'enduring yet knowing', a 
situation described in more detail below.
11.2 History
The DDT molecule was first synthesized in 1873 
(Zeidler, 1874), a time when organic chemistry 
was still a young discipline, and the synthesis was 
performed to study what happens when different 
reagents are mixed under specific conditions with 
no notion of what the product could be used for. 
It was not until 1939 that Paul Müller showed the 
insecticidal property of DDT (Nobelprize.org, 
2012a). The first DDT formulations marketed 
in the United States against a variety of insect 
pests drew the attention of the military; means 
to combat insect-borne diseases in the theatres of 
World War II were in great demand. The key event 
to popularise DDT was an outbreak of typhus in 
Naples, Italy, in October 1943. By January 1944, and 
after treating 1 300 000 people over a three week 
period with DDT, the epidemic was brought under 
control (Nobelprize.org, 2012b). Based on work 
by De Meillon (1936), indoor residual spraying 
(IRS) with DDT to interrupt malaria transmission 
was introduced in South Africa in 1946, achieving 
complete coverage of malaria areas by 1958 (Sharp 
and le Sueur, 1996). 
Paul Müller was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Medicine or Physiology in 1948, but already in 
the prize presentation speech, problems with flies 
developing resistance to DDT were mentioned. 
However, resistance development was not viewed in 
any environmental light but rather as an opportunity 
to develop new chemical pesticides to solve the 
problem (Nobelprize.org, 2012b). There was no 
mention in the prize presentation speech of potential 
environmental concerns, rather, the persistence 
of DDT, today considered as one of the main 
environmental concerns, was viewed as positive for 
the practical use of the insecticide (Nobelprize.org, 
2012b), and the early recommendations on how 
to use DDT were, to modern eyes, staggeringly 
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indiscriminate, with much dusting of both 
individuals and food without any precaution (West 
and Campbell, 1946). However, some restrictions 
on indiscriminate use came already in 1948, the 
same year as the Nobel Prize, when use of DDT 
inside dairies was prohibited (American Journal of 
Public Health, 1949). In Sweden, cases in the 1950s 
were reported of flies dying after contact with dairy 
products with very high DDT content (Löfroth, 1971).
Arguably, the publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 
1962) triggered the development of environmental 
chemistry as an academic discipline. Technical 
developments in analytical chemistry during the 
1950s were prerequisites for development of the 
discipline, and, indeed, for the writing of the book, 
as these instrument developments were necessary to 
identify DDT and other organochlorine pesticides as 
potential environmental problems. However, it was 
Silent Spring that made the potential environmental 
problems everyone's concern and pressured resource 
allocation into environmental chemistry. In Sweden, 
for example, the government gave special funding to 
Stockholm University to set up a laboratory for the 
analysis of DDT in the environment (Bernes, 1998). 
These activities started in 1964, less than a year after 
the book was published in Swedish, and led, inter 
alia, to the identification of polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCB) as environmental contaminants in 1966 (Jensen, 
1966). It is difficult to envisage this development had 
it not been for the impact of Silent Spring.
That DDT was the first organic environmental 
pollutant that came under scrutiny was probably 
not only due to it being the first organochlorine 
pesticide to gain wide use. Another reason was 
probably that the negative effects first reported were 
on birds as many people were (and are) interested 
in birds, particularly large birds, and declines in 
the populations of birds of prey were observed 
in many places of the world and tied to eggshell 
thinning after bioaccumulation of DDT (Bernes, 
1998; Bernes and Lundgren 2009). In addition, 
DDT was a pesticide deliberately released into 
the environment, which is why its presence in the 
environment was no great surprise. In comparison, 
PCB was put into production earlier than DDT, 
but as it was used in industry and not actively 
released into the environment, its presence in the 
environment was much of a surprise. In addition, 
there was no great incentive among the public to 
observe the negative effects of PCB as these were 
most severe in fish-eating mammals such as seals 
(Bernes, 1998; Bernes and Lundgren, 2009). The only 
people to regularly observe seals were fishermen, 
who mainly regarded them as a pest that competed 
for the fish. Thus, looking at the time-line for DDT 
and PCB (Figure 11.1), DDT was identified as a 
Note: The dashed portion of the line is estimated from museum material (seals), while the solid lines are based on data on 
Guillemot eggs analysed in the Swedish National Environmental Programme. Most uses of DDT were banned in Sweden 
around 1970. 
Source:  Bernes and Lundgren, 2009.
Figure 11�1 The development of DDT concentrations in the Baltic Sea in relation to historical 
events, the development of environmental awareness and legal measures 
restricting their use
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possible environmental problem much sooner after 
it was taken into use than PCB. In addition, although 
DDT and PCB were banned at about the same time 
in Sweden, the decline of DDT concentrations was 
more rapid as there were many remaining diffuse 
sources of PCB contamination, but for DDT the only 
use was as an insecticide (Bernes, 1998; Bernes and 
Lundgren, 2009).
Based on the increasing amount of data on 
environmental effects, restrictions on the use of 
DDT were put in place in different countries from 
the early 1970s, but the use and misuse of DDT 
continued. In Bangladesh, for example, fish intended 
for human consumption was until recently dried in 
DDT to avoid fly infestation in the market (Amin, 
2003), even though DDT was banned in Bangladesh. 
With the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention, 2004), 
which came into force in 2004, new means to assist 
developing countries to reduce problems with DDT 
and other persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have 
come into place. However, the convention recognises 
the need to use DDT for malaria vector control until 
other practical and economically viable methods 
have been developed.
11�3 Current uses
11.3.1 DDT and malaria control
DDT was the primary tool used in the first global 
malaria eradication programme during the 1950s 
and 1960s. The insecticide was used to spray the 
walls and ceilings of houses and animal sheds with 
coverage of entire populations. Early mathematical 
modelling had convincingly shown that indoor 
residual spraying with insecticides, such as DDT, to 
kill adult mosquitoes had a major impact on malaria 
transmission (MacDonald, 1956). The insecticides 
prevented the female mosquitoes from surviving 
long enough to become infective, since it takes 
around 12 days for malaria parasites to migrate 
to the mosquito's salivary glands and, hence, only 
mature female mosquitoes can infect humans. 
Malaria has been successfully eliminated from many 
regions, but remains endemic in large parts of the 
world (Mendis et al., 2009).
The development of insect resistance to DDT, 
reported as early as 1951 (with even earlier 
indications in 1948 house flies in Sweden), became 
an obstacle in the eradication of malaria, and was 
one of the reasons behind the abandonment of 
the global malaria eradication campaign in 1969 
(Najera et al., 2011). Amidst concerns about the 
safety of DDT during the 1970s, the insecticide was 
banned for use in agriculture in many countries. 
Nevertheless, DDT remained effective in a number 
of countries and continues to be used for malaria 
control today (van den Berg et al., 2012). 
The negotiations that led to the inclusion of DDT as 
one of the initial twelve chemicals restricted under 
the Stockholm Convention sparked a debate about 
the continued need for DDT to control malaria 
(Curtis and Lines, 2000). An important series of 
developments took place over the same period. 
After South Africa had banned the use of DDT for 
malaria control in 1996, the highly effective malaria 
vector Anopheles funestus was able to reinvade the 
country because it had developed resistance to the 
pyrethroids that were being used, but not to DDT 
(Hargreaves et al., 2000). This situation, which 
was unique to South Africa, resulted in serious 
outbreaks of malaria, forcing the government to 
revert to DDT, after which the number of malaria 
cases declined. When simultaneously a global ban 
on DDT use was being proposed, fierce debates 
emerged over the benefits and adverse effects of 
DDT (The Lancet, 2000). In the final negotiations that 
led to the Stockholm Convention, an exception was 
made for DDT with an acceptable purpose for use 
in disease vector control. Thus, under the Stockholm 
Convention, countries may continue to use DDT, in 
the quantity needed, provided that the guidelines and 
recommendations of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the Stockholm Convention are met, 
and until locally appropriate and cost-effective 
alternatives become available for a sustainable 
transition from DDT. 
DDT is one of the 12 insecticides, and the only 
organochlorine compound, currently recommended 
by the WHO for use in indoor residual spraying 
for disease vector control (WHO, 2006). Other 
recommended compounds are organophosphates, 
carbamates and pyrethroids. DDT has the longest 
residual efficacy, reportedly from 6–12 months, 
when sprayed on the walls and ceilings of traditional 
housing and, hence, one or two applications per 
year suffice to provide continuous protection to 
populations at risk. In the past few years, however, 
increased monitoring has shown that resistance 
of malaria vectors to DDT, and to other available 
insecticides, is now widespread in sub-Saharan 
Africa and India (WHO, 2011a). 
11.3.2 Trends in production and use 
Currently, DDT is produced only in India, from 
where it is exported as a pure (also called 'technical') 
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or as a commercially formulated product to other, 
mostly African, countries (UNEP, 2010). China has 
recently stopped production of DDT but South 
Africa formulates DDT using technical product 
from India, and exports the formulated product 
to several other African countries. DDT can be 
produced at low cost, which is relevant because 
it has been recommended for use at a dosage 
that is on average 60 times higher than that for 
pyrethroid insecticides. As a consequence of these 
differences in application rates, 71 % of the global 
annual amount of insecticides used for vector 
control is DDT, even though pyrethroids are much 
more widely used in terms of surface area covered 
(van den Berg et al., 2012). DDT is used mostly 
for malaria control, but 19 % of the global share is 
sprayed to control leishmaniasis transmission by 
sandflies.
Global annual use of DDT for disease vector control 
is estimated at more than 5 000 tonnes of active 
ingredient. The amount has fluctuated during the 
past decade but has not declined substantially 
since the Stockholm Convention was enacted 
(van den Berg et al., 2012). India has the lion's 
share, with 82 % of global use. African countries 
also significantly increased their DDT use until 
2008 (Figure 11.2) because of countries either 
scaling-up indoor residual spraying programmes 
using DDT or re-introducing its use. Only four 
African countries reported using DDT in 2000, 
compared to nine in 2008: Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe (WHO, 2011b). 
More recently, however, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
and Uganda have reportedly stopped using DDT 
because of either policy change away from DDT 
or the development of insecticide resistance. It 
remains to be seen whether the decline in DDT use 
in Africa in 2009 is part of a new trend. 
In DDT-using countries, it is of utmost importance 
that DDT is used for its acceptable purpose only. 
However, a recent global survey in countries at 
risk of vector-borne diseases revealed critical 
deficiencies in the capacity for regulatory control 
and management of pesticides, which include 
DDT, thus increasing the risks of adverse effects 
on human health and the environment (Matthews 
et al., 2011; van den Berg et al., 2011). For example, 
there are clear indications that DDT has been 
illegally traded on local markets for use in 
agriculture and termite control and there is also 
information to suggest that DDT is, or has been, 
widely used in agriculture in the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (van den Berg, 2009). 
11�4 Current human health concerns 
Carson (1962) devoted Chapter 12 of Silent 
Spring to a summary of the environmental health 
Figure 11�2 Trends in the global use of DDT 
Source:  van den Berg et al., 2012.
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effects associated with DDT, as then known. Very 
perceptively, Carson said, 'even research men 
suffer from the handicap of inadequate methods 
of detecting the beginnings of injury. The lack of 
sufficiently delicate methods to detect injury before 
symptoms appear is one of the great unsolved 
problems in medicine'. Since then, research men 
and women have added much to the arsenal of 
tools available, and a short summary of some 
follows.
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR) report on DDT (2002) discussed 
in detail the acute exposure effects on the nervous 
system, the effects of chronic exposure to small 
amounts of DDT being almost limited to changes in 
liver enzymes. However, in the environment DDT is 
transformed to DDE which is even more persistent, 
leading to concerns that elevated concentrations 
of p,p'-DDE in human breast milk shortened the 
period of lactation and increased the chances of a 
pre-term delivery (see Box 11.1 for terminology on 
DDT and its related compounds). The International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified 
DDT as possibly carcinogenic to humans. Two 
recent publications extensively reviewed the 
human health consequences of DDT exposure 
(Eskenazi et al., 2009) and the human health aspects 
of IRS associated with DDT use (WHO, 2011). 
When the transplacental transfer of DDT and the 
exposure of the new-born child through breast 
milk became clear, there were concerns that DDT 
or its metabolites might affect, in particular, the 
reproductive and nervous systems. Moreover, some 
of these health effects may not become evident 
immediately but only long after exposure. Carson 
said, 'when one is concerned with the mysterious 
and wonderful functioning of the human body, 
cause and effect are seldom simple and easily 
demonstrated relationships. They may be widely 
separated in space and time'.
11.4.1 Breast cancer
The human female breast seems particularly 
vulnerable to environmentally-induced 
carcinogenesis during several critical periods such 
as in utero and before puberty (Eskenazi et al., 2009). 
Evidence that adult DDT exposure is associated with 
breast cancer was equivocal until Cohn et al. (2007) 
reported DDT levels in archived serum samples 
collected between 1959 and 1967, peak years of DDT 
use, from pregnant women participating in the 
Child Health and Development Studies (CHDS). 
Considering	women	≤	14	years	old	in	1945	when	
DDT was introduced, subjects with levels in the 
highest tertile were five times more likely to develop 
breast cancer than those in the lowest tertile. 
Moreover, in women exposed after the age of 14, 
there were no associations between the risk of breast 
cancer and p,p'-DDT levels. Therefore, exposure 
to p,p'-DDT during the pre-pubertal and pubertal 
periods is the critical exposure events to risk the 
development of breast cancer later in life. 
11.4.2 Endometrial cancer
Sturgeon et al. (1998) reported on possible 
associations between endometrial cancer (cancer that 
starts in the lining of the uterus) and DDT serum 
levels, but the findings were inconclusive (Sturgeon 
et al., 1998). However, Hardell et al. (2004) found 
weak but significant associations with serum DDE 
levels and the topic needs further investigation.
 
Box 11.1. DDT-compounds
When DDT is produced the technical mixture, 'technical DDT', mainly consists of two compounds, 
approximately 80% p,p'-DDT (1,1,1-trichloro-2,2-bis(4-chlorophenyl) ethane), the insecticidal component, 
and 15% o,p'-DDT (1,1,1-trichloro-2-(2-chlorophenyl)-2-(4-chlorophenyl) ethane). The major degradation 
products in the environment of p,p'-DDT are p,p'-DDE (1,1-dichloro-2,2-bis(4-chlorophenyl) ethene) and 
p,p'-DDD (1,1-dichloro-2,2-bis(4-chlorophenyl) ethane). The major degradation products of o,p'-DDT are 
o,p'-DDE (1,1-dichloro-2-(2-chlorophenyl)-2-(4-chlorophenyl) ethene) and o,p'-DDD (1,1-dichloro-2-(2-
chlorophenyl)-2-(4-chlorophenyl) ethane).
In environmental samples the concentrations of all these compounds are often added to a total DDT (ΣDDT) 
concentration. Generally, the p,p'-isomers are more persistent than the o,p'-isomers, and p,p'-DDE is the 
most persistent of all these compounds. Therefore, high DDT/DDE or DDT/ΣDDT ratios indicate a recent 
release of DDT while low ratios are typical of old releases of DDT or that DDT has undergone long-range 
transport.
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11.4.3 Male reproductive effects
There is increasing evidence suggesting that DDT 
and metabolites have harmful effects on the quality 
of human semen and sperm function, particularly 
in young adult healthy men from an endemic 
malarial area with very high DDT and DDE levels 
(Aneck-Hahn et al., 2007). Sperm DNA integrity in 
this population was also adversely affected (De Jager 
et al., 2009). 
Bornman et al. (2010) determined the association 
of external urogenital birth defects (UGBD) in 
newborn boys from DDT-sprayed and non-sprayed 
villages in a malarial area. Between 1995 and 2003, 
mothers living in villages sprayed with DDT had a 
33 % greater chance of having a baby with a UGBD 
than mothers whose homes were not sprayed. 
A stay-at-home mother significantly increased the 
risk of having a baby boy with a UGBD to 41 %. 
Further studies are necessary to determine possible 
causal relationships with DDT and any possible 
genetic or epigenetic predispositions.
11.4.4 Testicular germ cell tumours
Concentrating on a selection of recent studies, 
McGlynn et al. (2008) found some evidence of an 
association between DDE and testicular germ cell 
tumours. There was a positive, but not statistically 
significant, association between DDE and testicular 
cancer. However, similar associations were also 
found for other chemicals such as chlordane, 
PCB, and some insecticides (Purdue et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the implications of DDE associated with 
testicular germ cell tumours need further studies. 
Cohn et al. (2010) examined maternal serum levels of 
DDT-related compounds in relation to sons' risk of 
testicular cancer 30 years later. Mothers of testicular 
cancer cases had lower levels of p,p′-	DDT,	o,p′-DDT	
and p,p′-and	DDE,	but	a	higher	DDT/DDE	ratio,	than	
their matched controls. However, the possible role of 
DDT in the development of testicular cancer is still 
not clear (Hardell et al., 2006).
11.4.5 Diabetes
Various studies reported findings suggesting 
that body burdens of DDT and/or DDE may 
be associated with the prevalence of diabetes 
(1980 Morgan et al., 1980; Rylander et al., 2005; 
Rignell-Hydbom et al., 2007). However, a variety of 
other persistent environmental chemicals are also 
associated with diabetes prevalence and the WHO 
(2011d) concluded that the evidence is inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, the findings of Turyk et al. (2009) of 
an association between DDE exposure and diabetes 
incidence warrants further research to define the 
specific contributions of DDT and DDE. 
Ukropec et al. (2010), in a cross-sectional study from 
Eastern Slovakia, investigated possible links between 
environmental pollution and pre-diabetes/diabetes 
(Type 2 diabetes). The prevalence of pre-diabetes 
and diabetes increased in a dose-dependent 
manner, with individuals with highest DDT 
levels showing striking increases in prevalence of 
pre-diabetes. PCBs showed comparable associations, 
but increased levels of hexachlorobenzene (HCB) 
and	β-hexachlorocyclohexane	β-HCH	seemed	
not to be associated with increased prevalence of 
diabetes. The synergistic interaction of industrial 
and agricultural pollutants in increasing prevalence 
of pre-diabetes or diabetes is likely. For Type 1 
diabetes, Rignell-Hydbom et al. (2010) found no 
evidence that in utero exposure to DDT could 
predispose the development of the disease.
11.4.6 Pregnancy 
Women exposed to DDT had shorter menstrual 
cycles (Onyang et al., 2005) and both DDT and DDE 
reduced progesterone and estrogens (Windham 
et al., 2005; Perry et al., 2006). Other studies, 
however, found no relationship between menstrual 
abnormalities or cycle length and DDE or DDT 
exposure (Yu et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2005). There 
is limited evidence that DDT/DDE can increase 
the risk of miscarriage and the risk of preterm 
delivery. In the U.S. Collaborative Perinatal Project, 
high DDE concentrations were associated with an 
increased risk of foetal loss in previous pregnancies 
(Longnecker et al., 2005). Each 1 ng/g increase in 
serum DDE was associated with a 1.13 increased 
odds of miscarriage (Korrick et al., 2001). Venners 
et al. (2005) studied Chinese textile workers with 
comparable DDE concentrations and reported a 
similar increased odds of 1.17 for each 10 ng/g 
serum increase in total DDT. Together the two cohort 
studies (Longnecker et al., 2005; Venners et al., 2005) 
indicated an association between increasing DDT 
and DDE levels and foetal loss. In the Longnecker 
et al. (2001) study, the odds of preterm delivery 
were 3.1 times higher in women with serum 
DDE	≥	60	μg/L	than	in	those	with	DDE	<	15	μg/L	
during pregnancy. Inconsistent results on the 
possible association between DDT/DDE levels and 
gestational age were reported in other studies. 
Taken together, the positive dose-response 
relationships for these endocrine-regulated 
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end-points raise concern for effects of exposure 
to DDT on female reproductive health. It should 
be noted that the 'high' DDE serum may be 
substantially lower than in populations where 
indoor residual spraying is still occurring, 
emphasising the need for research in the context 
of IRS (WHO, 2011d). In some studies the onset of 
menopause was associated with DDT/DDE studies 
(Cooper et al., 2002; Akkina et al., 2004; Eskenazi 
et al., 2005), but in the Agricultural Health Study 
DDT exposure was associated with slightly older 
age at menopause (Farr et al., 2006).
11.4.7 Breast milk
DDT may shorten (Gladen and Rogan, 1995; 
Kostyniak et al., 1999; Rogan et al., 1987; Rogan and 
Gladen, 1985), prolong (Weldon et al., 2006), or have 
no effect (Cupul-Uicab et al., 2008) on the duration 
of lactation, due to the endocrine disruptive 
properties of DDT isomers (Wetterauer et al., 2012). 
It is not clear whether DDT or DDE exposure per 
se is linked to the duration of lactation. However, 
a recent study from an area where DDT is sprayed 
as IRS for malaria control showed no differences 
in lengths of lactation between three DDT sprayed 
villages and a reference village where no DDT has 
ever been applied (Bouwman et al., 1012).
Infant exposure to DDT is directly related to intake 
through breast milk and milk levels are linked to 
IRS spraying for malarial vector control. Bouwman 
et al. (1990b) analysed breast milk from mothers 
visiting baby clinics, in one regularly IRS controlled 
area and in a control area, ten years after DDT use 
in agriculture was banned in South Africa. Parity, 
maternal age, infant age, and percentage of milk 
fat between the two groups were similar. DDT 
was detected in all samples analysed, while DDE 
levels were significantly lower in the non-exposed 
group. It should be noted that in South Africa, 
as in many parts of Africa, extended periods of 
breastfeeding (up to two years) seems the norm in 
rural communities (Bouwman et al., 2006). Since 
there is no maximum residue level (MRL) for breast 
milk (FAO, 2005), comparing it to bovine milk 
MRLs found that, based on the volume of 800 mL 
of breast milk consumed by a 5-kg infant, the MRL 
for	total	DDT	(ΣDDT)	in	cow's	milk	is	notably	
exceeded (Bouwman et al., 2006). 
First-born infants receive much higher levels of 
DDT in breast milk than their siblings (Bouwman 
et al., 2006; Gyalpo et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2001), 
but recently it became clear that there are also 
differences in pollutant levels and effects on male 
and female infants (Gascon et al., 2011; Grimalt 
et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2010; Jusko et al., 2006; 
Ribas-Fitó et al., 2006). Therefore, infant gender may 
somehow affect levels of pollutants in breast milk 
by a mechanism that is not immediately clear. One 
gender being exposed to higher levels than the other 
would add to concern about possible effects of DDT 
on development as result of endocrine-disruptive 
properties of DDT chemicals, a situation already 
suspected in South Africa (Bornman et al., 2010). 
A recent study has shown indications of gender 
involvement (Bouwman et al., 2012).
11.4.8 Neurodevelopment
The main mode of action of DDT as an insecticide 
is disruption of the nervous system. In other animal 
studies, DDT is a neurodevelopmental toxicant 
(ATSDR 2002). In mice, particular exposure to DDT 
during sensitive periods such as prenatal (Craig 
and Ogilvie, 1974) and neonatal periods (Eriksson 
and Nordberg, 1986; Eriksson et al., 1990; Johansson 
et al., 1996) affected development of the nervous 
system and caused behavioural and neurochemical 
changes into adulthood (Eskenazi et al., 2009). 
Eskenazi et al. (2006) was the first study to show 
that prenatal exposure to DDT, and not only to DDE, 
was linked to neurodevelopmental delays during 
early childhood. Ribas-Fito et al. (2006) assessed 
neurocognitive development relative to DDT levels 
in cord serum of 475 children. At age 4, the level of 
DDT at birth was inversely associated with verbal, 
memory, quantitative and perceptual performance 
skills, and the associations were stronger among 
girls. Torres-Sanchez et al. (2007) found that the 
critical window of exposure to DDE in utero may 
be the first trimester of the pregnancy, and that 
psychomotor development in particular is targeted 
by the compound. The authors also suggested that 
residues of DDT metabolites may present a risk of 
developmental delay for years after termination of 
DDT use. 
Sagiv et al. (2008) demonstrated an association 
between low-level DDE exposures and poor attention 
in early infancy. In a follow-up study, they found 
that prenatal organochlorine DDE was associated 
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
behaviour in childhood (Sagiv et al., 2010). 
11.4.9 Immune effects
Cooper et al. (2004) demonstrated that DDE 
modulates immune responses in humans with 
evidence of potential immunosuppression and 
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immune-mediated health effects such as infectious 
diseases and autoimmune diseases. Higher levels 
of prenatal DDE were associated with an increased 
incidence of otitis media in a study of Inuit infants 
(Dewailly et al., 2000). Workers directly exposed 
to DDT and lindane for 12–30 years, compared to 
a control population of individuals, had a higher 
prevalence of infectious diseases and of upper 
respiratory tract infections such as tonsillitis, 
bronchitis, and pharyngitis (Hermanowicz et al., 
1982).
11.4.10 Recent health assessments of DDT
Two recent assessments of DDT and human health 
indicated issues that need attention. Eskenazi et al. 
(2009) found after reviewing 494 recent studies: 
'The recent literature shows a growing body of 
evidence that exposure to DDT and its breakdown 
product DDE may be associated with adverse 
health outcomes such as breast cancer, diabetes, 
decreased semen quality, spontaneous abortion, and 
impaired neurodevelopment in children'. Focusing 
on DDT used in IRS, Bouwman et al. (2011) found 
that: 'The evidence of adverse human health effects 
due to DDT is mounting. However, under certain 
circumstances, malaria control using DDT cannot 
yet be halted. Therefore, the continued use of DDT 
poses a paradox recognized by a centrist-DDT 
position. At the very least, it is now time to invoke 
precaution. Precautionary actions could include 
use and exposure reduction.' They concluded that 
'There are situations where DDT will provide the 
best achievable health benefit, but maintaining that 
DDT is safe ignores the cumulative indications of 
many studies. In such situations, addressing the 
paradox from a centrist-DDT position and invoking 
precaution will help design choices for healthier 
lives.' This was however, challenged by others (Tren 
and Roberts, 2011).
11.4.11 Carson on human health
The following quotations from Carson (1962) on 
the relationship between humankind and chemicals 
illustrate the concerns that are still with us today, 
but care should be taken not to interpret them out of 
context.
'Their [chemicals including pesticides] presence 
casts a shadow that is no less ominous because it is 
formless and obscure, no less frightening because it 
is simply impossible to predict the effects of lifetime 
exposure to chemical and physical agents that are 
not part of the biological experience.'
'The whole problem of pesticide poisoning is 
enormously complicated by the fact that a human 
being, unlike a laboratory animal living under 
rigidly controlled conditions, is never exposed to 
one chemical alone.'
'Some of the defects and malformations in 
tomorrow's children, grimly anticipated by the 
[US] Office of Vital Statistics, will most certainly be 
caused by these chemicals that permeate our outer 
and inner worlds.'
'The most determined effort should be made to 
eliminate those carcinogens that now contaminate 
our food, our water supplies, and our atmosphere, 
because these provide the most dangerous type of 
contact — minute exposures, repeated over and over 
throughout the years.'
11�5 Current human exposure
11.5.1 DDT used for indoor residual spraying
Following the essentially global ban on DDT use in 
agriculture, the only remaining repeated exposure 
of people to DDT is via IRS. It is otherwise assumed 
that illegal use is irregular and decreasing as stocks 
are dwindling. With between 2–3 grams of DDT 
applied per square metre on indoor walls, rafters, 
and outside under eaves, an average house may 
receive between 64–128 g/year, applied prior to the 
malaria transmission season. As DDT is long-lasting, 
the residual effect interrupts malaria transmission 
from an infected to an unaffected person by killing 
the female mosquito vector that rests indoors. It also 
acts as a contact irritant or spatial repellent (Grieco 
et al., 2007). 
Arguably, the millions of people living in 
dwellings treated by DDT to protect them from 
malaria could be the largest non-occupationally 
exposed community in the world. The exposure is 
non-intentional, but inevitable (Bouwman et al., 
2011). A closer look at how people are exposed in 
a domestic environment may indicate options for 
reduction in exposure and amounts applied. Such 
an exercise would be generic for any chemical used 
in similar ways. Again, despite the decades of DDT 
used as IRS, very little has been published on this 
subject.
11.5.2 DDT in air
DDT in ambient air is decreasing worldwide as its 
production and use has decreased dramatically 
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with the ban on its use in agriculture (Schenker 
et al., 2008). Background levels in air for the general 
population are therefore low, with a concomitant 
reduction in risk. However, DDT, applied repeatedly 
on various indoor and associated surfaces of 
dwellings as IRS, remains continuously available. 
Because DDT has to interrupt transmission by the 
vectors, it must remain bio-available for six months 
or longer. Sereda et al. (2009) proposed a process of 
continuous indoor sublimation, revolatilsation, and 
re-deposition of DDT, effectively redistributing the 
DDT throughout the treated dwelling. Transport 
via air, airborne dust, as well as regular sweeping 
and removal of house dust to the outside results 
in DDT pollution of the outdoor environment. 
Applied DDT therefore, does not remain stationary. 
For spatial repellence of mosquitoes to remain 
effective for months also implies that DDT remains 
in the indoor air for substantial periods. Van Dyk 
et al. (2010) presented evidence that DDT remains 
detectable in indoor air for at least 84 days after 
application. DDT in indoor air, and probably 
at lower concentrations in outdoor air near the 
homesteads, therefore remains chronically available 
for inhalation by all homestead residents. Recently, 
Ritter et al. (2011) modelled air and human intake in 
an IRS situation and found inhalation exposure to 
DDT as an important route of uptake. A particular 
concern are individuals who remain close to home 
for long periods, such as infants, children, the 
elderly, pregnant mothers, and those with domestic 
responsibilities. 
11.5.3 DDT in food and water
Van Dyk et al. (2010) reported on levels of DDT in 
various environmental matrixes, food, and human 
serum from a DDT-sprayed village in South Africa. 
High levels of DDT were found, especially in food 
items such as chickens and outdoor soil, but less 
so in vegetables and water. The patterns of DDT, 
DDD, and DDE (breakdown products of DDT; 
DDD is dichlorodiphenyldichloroethane) were 
also such that it seems far more likely that DDT in 
humans was derived from home-produced animal 
foods and outdoor soil rather than from air, indoor 
dust, and water. Elsewhere it was also found that 
DDT in fish was less likely to contribute towards 
DDT burdens in humans under IRS conditions 
(Barnhoorn et al., 2009; Bouwman et al., 1990a). 
DDT uptake by humans living in dwellings treated 
by IRS with DDT is therefore mainly through DDT 
entering the food chain in the immediate environs 
of the sprayed dwellings themselves. This differs 
from the situation where DDT is used on crops 
as insecticide, and the human route of uptake 
is mainly via treated crops, dairy products, or 
contaminated fish. A situation can be envisaged 
where both types of exposures occur, but large 
commercial agriculture was and is rarely found 
in malaria areas. It seems that people living in 
DDT-treated dwellings have a greater DDT burden 
than those exposed otherwise (Eskenazi et al., 
2009). Gyalpo et al. (2012) using models based 
on data showed that primiparous mothers have 
greater DDT concentrations than multiparous 
mothers, which causes higher DDT exposure of 
first-born children. The DDT in the body mainly 
was found to be mainly from diet, likely derived 
from the immediate environment of the homestead 
(van Dyk et al., 2012).
The results presented in the previous paragraph 
point towards options for exposure reduction to 
all chemicals used in IRS, not only DDT. For such 
options to be investigated, the dynamics of the 
IRS chemicals, inhabitants, and vector mosquitoes 
need to be better understood. The procedures 
involving IRS have remained static since their 
introduction in the early 1940s. In the meanwhile, 
much more knowledge has become available about 
environmental chemistry, health impacts, and 
vector behaviour. It is clear that, where possible, all 
measures should be taken to reduce the exposures 
of the inhabitants to IRS chemicals as far as possible. 
A Total Homestead Environment (THE) approach 
has been proposed whereby these interactions are 
studied with the aim of identifying opportunities 
of exposure reduction (Bouwman et al., 2011; 
Bouwman and Kylin, 2009; Sereda et al., 2009).
11.5.4 Legacy issues
Except for use in disease vector control, any 
other current use of DDT is illegal (Section 1.3.2). 
Although global production of DDT may 
gradually be declining, legacy sources remain 
a problem. With vast amounts of DDT having 
been manufactured in industrial countries, it 
comes as no surprise that wastes and emissions 
resulted in large pollution problems near factories 
that are now closed down. On the Pine River 
in Michigan, United States, for instance, even 
though a Superfund site, DDT is still found in the 
environment, and health concerns persist (Eskenazi 
et al., 2009). A no-consumption of fish advisory is 
still in effect, and clean-up of nearby residential 
properties is scheduled for 2012, among a whole 
range of other protective and mitigating measures 
(EPA, 2012c). Likewise, previous mitigation of 
sediments at the DDT formulation site of United 
Heckathorn Co. in Richmond Harbor, California, 
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which went bankrupt in 1966, seems not to have 
been as effective as anticipated and high levels of 
DDT in sediments and water persist (EPA, 2012b). 
An advisory against fish consumption (initially 
due to mercury but now for multiple pollutants) 
has been in effect since 1972. A search of the EPA 
Superfund site (EPA, 2012a) reveals 213 sites under 
United States jurisdiction that list DDT in one way 
or another at various stages of intervention. 
Other legacy issues remain. DDT can undergo 
long-range transport via, air, water, and biota, 
contaminating areas where it has not been used or 
released (Bailey et al., 2000; Beyer et al., 2000; Iwata 
et al., 1993; O'Toole et al., 2006). Residues in glaciers 
are now being released as a result of climate change 
(Bettinetti et al., 2008; Geisz et al., 2008). 
11.5.5 Effects of mixtures of chemicals
Legacy situations relating to DDT and malaria 
control hardly ever concern DDT only. With many 
commercial chemicals available, DDT now occurs 
together with many other pollutants in all manner 
of media and biota. Carson, after deliberating on 
combinations of pesticides in a common salad bowl 
said: 'Residues well within legally permissible 
limits may interact.', then said: 'What of other 
chemicals in the normal human environment? 
What in particular of drugs?' Later she brought 
in other chemicals: 'Added to these are the wide 
variety of synthetic oestrogens to which we are 
increasingly exposed — those in cosmetics, drugs, 
food, and occupational exposures. The combined 
effect is a matter that warrants the most serious 
concern.' Now, 50 years later, the issue of mixture 
effects, referred to in the Stockholm Convention 
as 'toxicant interactions', pharmaceuticals and 
personal care products (PPCPs) is a major area of 
research. 
Scientific advances are finding ever more effects 
associated with chemicals in more and more 
biological systems; some effects such as endocrine 
disruption was barely understood at the time of 
Rachel Carson. This is evident from her statement: 
'The ultimate answer is to use less toxic chemicals 
so that the public hazard from their misuse is 
greatly reduced. Such chemicals already exist. …
the pyrethrins, rotenone, ryania, and other derived 
from plant substances.' We now know that even 
pyrethroids have health concerns (Bouwman and 
Kylin, 2009) and may interact with DDT (Eriksson 
et al., 1993). Even if DDT is not the major component 
of the cocktail of pollutants in many areas, it poses 
a legacy that cannot be ignored. Now that DDT 
is universally distributed in the biosphere, its 
interactions with other pollutants cannot be ignored, 
and will occupy science for many years to come, 
long after the final batch of DDT has been produced. 
11�6 Future directions
11.6.1 Malaria, DDT, and the Stockholm Convention
Carson devoted relatively little space to DDT and 
malaria, but highlights the problem of development 
of resistance to DDT: 'Malaria programmes are 
threatened by resistance among mosquitoes.', and 
describes a number of instances around the world, 
including behavioural resistance. 'Apparently the 
adult mosquitoes had become sufficiently tolerant 
of DDT to escape from sprayed buildings.' The 
reverse of this situation, of pyrethroid-resistant 
mosquitoes re-invading South Africa when DDT 
was withdrawn, puts this issue into a new context. 
DDT had to be re-introduced to return to pre-1996 
levels of morbidity and mortality. DDT resistance in 
South Africa and many other African countries was 
absent, not detected, or not strong enough to result 
in a breakdown of control. Whether behavioural 
resistance to DDT — where mosquitoes leave treated 
houses or fail to enter — effectively interrupts 
transmission is still not adequately resolved. 
As described in Sections 11.2 and 11.3.1 above, DDT 
is one of the chemicals restricted by the Parties to the 
Stockholm Convention. The text of the convention 
is provided in Box 11.2. The provisions in the 
Convention regarding DDT can be seen as balancing 
the need for the continued use of DDT for malaria 
control where alternatives are not yet effective or 
proven, with an (undated) eventual aim of banning 
it. However, the experience in South Africa with 
pyrethroids (Maharaj et al., 2005) failing as an 
alternative to DDT in IRS has probably increased the 
threshold of expectation of proof of sustainability, 
especially regarding the requirements of viable 
alternatives listed in paragraph 5 (b) of the Stockholm 
Convention (see Box 11.2). No Party would want to 
revert to DDT if the alternatives are not as effective 
or better, measured by increased morbidity and 
mortality. The Stockholm Convention is driving 
various activities that can be followed on their 
website (www.pops.int). 
11.6.2 Integrated vector management
The urgency of developing and establishing suitable 
alternatives to DDT for disease vector control is now 
widely recognised. Indeed the need for alternatives 
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Box 11�2 DDT in the Stockholm Convention, Annex B� Restriction, Part II
1. The production and use of DDT shall be eliminated except for Parties that have notified the Secretariat 
of their intention to produce and/or use it. A DDT Register is hereby established and shall be available 
to the public. The Secretariat shall maintain the DDT Register.
2. Each Party that produces and/or uses DDT shall restrict such production and/or use for disease vector 
control in accordance with the World Health Organization recommendations and guidelines on the use 
of DDT and when locally safe, effective and affordable alternatives are not available to the Party in 
question.
3. In the event that a Party not listed in the DDT Register determines that it requires DDT for disease 
vector control, it shall notify the Secretariat as soon as possible in order to have its name added 
forthwith to the DDT Register. It shall at the same time notify the World Health Organization.
4. Every three years, each Party that uses DDT shall provide to the Secretariat and the World Health 
Organization information on the amount used, the conditions of such use and its relevance to that 
Party's disease management strategy, in a format to be decided by the Conference of the Parties in 
consultation with the World Health Organization.
5. With the goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating the use of DDT, the Conference of the Parties shall 
encourage:
(a) Each Party using DDT to develop and implement an action plan as part of the implementation plan 
specified in Article 7. That action plan shall include:
(i) Development of regulatory and other mechanisms to ensure that DDT use is restricted to 
disease vector control;
(ii) Implementation of suitable alternative products, methods and strategies, including resistance 
management strategies to ensure the continuing effectiveness of these alternatives;
(iii) Measures to strengthen health care and to reduce the incidence of the disease.
(b) The Parties, within their capabilities, to promote research and development of safe alternative 
chemical and non-chemical products, methods and strategies for Parties using DDT, relevant to 
the conditions of those countries and with the goal of decreasing the human and economic burden 
of disease. Factors to be promoted when considering alternatives or combinations of alternatives 
shall include the human health risks and environmental implications of such alternatives. Viable 
alternatives to DDT shall pose less risk to human health and the environment, be suitable for 
disease control based on conditions in the Parties in question and be supported with monitoring data.
6. Commencing at its first meeting, and at least every three years thereafter, the Conference of the 
Parties shall, in consultation with the World Health Organization, evaluate the continued need for DDT 
for disease vector control on the basis of available scientific, technical, environmental and economic 
information, including:
(a) The production and use of DDT and the conditions set out in paragraph 2;
(b) The availability, suitability and implementation of the alternatives to DDT; and
(c) Progress in strengthening the capacity of countries to transfer safely to reliance on such alternatives.
7.  A Party may, at any time, withdraw its name from the DDT Registry upon written notification to the 
Secretariat. The withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified in the notification.
to DDT has been one of the drivers that led the WHO 
to develop a global strategic framework on integrated 
vector management (IVM) (WHO, 2004). IVM is a 
strategy for the optimal use of vector control methods, 
procedures and resources aiming to improve the 
efficacy, cost-effectiveness, ecological soundness 
and sustainability of vector control (WHO, 2012). 
Development of alternative insecticides is one way 
to address the problem of insecticide resistance, and 
it is probable that improved formulations of existing 
insecticide molecules will be available soon although 
new insecticide molecules will take considerably 
longer to come to the market (Hemingway et al., 
2006). However, evolutionary selection for resistance 
will continue against any new modes of action 
unless the selection pressure on vector populations is 
substantially reduced (Read et al., 2009).
It is therefore critical that the choice of vector control 
methods should be carefully based on the evidence 
of their effect on transmission reduction and their 
appropriateness in the local context. Combinations of 
methods, including house screening, environmental 
management, repellents, trapping, and biological 
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control, with insecticide-treated bed nets or indoor 
residual spraying, may provide superior control while 
reducing reliance on single modes of action (Takken 
and Knols, 2009). For example, the use of IRS or 
insecticidal bed nets could usefully be complemented 
by larval source management or repellents, 
particularly where part of the vector population bites 
outdoors (Fillinger et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2007).
In its implementation, vector control should not be 
combined only with disease control programmes. 
Integrated vector management would benefit 
substantially from integration within the health 
sector, collaboration between sectors and active 
participation of communities (WHO 2012; Chanda 
et al., 2008; Beier et al., 2008). 
11.6.3 Malaria, DDT, and the World Health 
Organization
The WHO has a major commitment to combating 
malaria using prompt treatment of cases, and 
vector control by insecticide-treated bed nets and 
IRS, implemented within an integrated vector 
management strategy. The summary of the latest 
WHO position statement on DDT (WHO, 2011c) 
is provided in Box 11.3, confirming that DDT 
is still required for malaria control. The WHO 
also introduced a global strategic framework for 
integrated vector management, expanded on in the 
previous section. 
Recent unease with safety issues about DDT also 
prompted the WHO to reassess the potential health 
impact of DDT used for IRS (WHO, 2011d). The 
Consensus statement concluded: 'For households 
where IRS is undertaken, there was a wide range 
of DDT and DDE serum levels between studies. 
Generally, these levels are below potential levels of 
concern for populations. Considering the ranges of 
exposures in treated households that are summarised 
in Table 11.1, in some areas, the exposures in treated 
 
Box 11�3  Global Malaria Programme: The use of DDT in malaria vector control. WHO position 
statement, 2011
DDT is still needed and used for disease vector control simply because there is no alternative of both 
equivalent efficacy and operational feasibility, especially for high-transmission areas. The reduction and 
ultimate elimination of the use of DDT for public health must be supported technically and financially. It is 
essential that adequate resources and technical support are rapidly allocated to countries so that they can 
adopt appropriate measures for sound management of pesticides in general and of DDT in particular. There 
is also an urgent need to develop alternative products and methods, not only to reduce reliance on DDT and 
to achieve its ultimate elimination, but also to sustain effective malaria vector control (WHO, 2011e).
residences have been higher than potential levels 
of concern. Efforts are needed to implement best 
practices to protect residents in treated households 
from exposures arising from IRS. Of particular 
concern would be women of childbearing age who 
live in DDT IRS-treated dwellings and transfer of 
DDT and DDE to the fetus in pregnancy and to 
the infant via lactation.' The WHO has a number 
of initiatives and programmes relating to malaria 
control and IRS, which can be followed on their 
website (http://www.who.int/malaria/en/).
11.6.4 Likely future developments
It is clear that there is a roadmap for the exit of 
DDT. There remains the need to find, further 
refine, convincingly demonstrate sustainability, 
and implement alternatives. Although there is a 
roadmap, there is no timetable. The pieces need to 
be found and fitted within the budgetary constraints 
and competing agendas. Given the current climate 
regarding research and development budgets and 
interfacing political agendas, the final demise of 
DDT still seems some way off. However, DDT has 
taught us a lot. It is probably the most widely known 
quintessential environmental pollutant. It will remain 
a model molecule and benchmark against which 
many others will be compared. It has shown the good 
and bad side of what can be done by chemicals. One 
thing is for certain — DDT will remain a source of 
contention for some time to come. It will probably 
remain in inert environmental media for decades to 
come, but there may come a time when it will only 
be found in books, such as Silent Spring, to be read in 
gardens with birds. 
11�7 The legacy of Rachel Carson
It is clear that the social conscience awakened by 
Rachel Carson 50 years ago gave momentum to a 
groundswell of actions and interventions that is 
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slowly but steadily making inroads at a myriad of 
levels addressing human and environmental concerns 
about chemicals. Reading Silent Spring, one is struck 
by how modern and current many of the issues that 
she raised are, although some are now described 
by other terminology. Resistance development, 
genetic damage, genetic modification, cancer, 
effects of mixtures, the need for more and improved 
biomarkers, sterile male techniques, push-pull 
biological control, ethical choices, and the need for 
concerted action at all levels, are just some of these. 
Although not yet aware of endocrine disruption as 
a mode of action of pesticides, effects such as cancer 
involving reproductive hormones was one of the 
issues she addressed. Not only did she attack the 
indiscriminate use of pesticides, she also proposed 
forms of integrated pest/vector management and 
biological control in chapter 17 that seem so modern 
and obvious today, but conceptually are more than 
50 years old. Long-range transport of chemicals 
through air was also not well understood at the time 
of Silent Spring.
The heading of Chapter 17 — The Other Road — 
elicits a strong feeling that we have not taken the 
road that we should have taken much earlier on, an 
opportunity that was missed, an option not taken that 
will resonate for decades to come. Carson opined in 
her last sentence of Silent Spring: 'The concepts and 
practices of applied entomology for the most part 
date from the Stone Age of science. It is our alarming 
misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself 
with the most modern and terrible weapons, and that 
in turning them against the insects it has also turned 
them against the earth.' Applied entomology has long 
since incorporated pest control measures other than 
chemicals and one can but ponder how much this was 
due to Silent Spring?
With more than 10 % of bird species worldwide now 
threatened in one way or another, and some already 
gone since Silent Spring, the silence that Carson called 
upon to illustrate the impact of chemicals has now also 
crossed into other realms of environmental impact. 
Radiation (also addressed by Carson), climate change, 
habitat destruction, economic mismanagement of 
the environment, human population expansion, and 
more — all of them have Other Roads, and we missed 
the obvious early signposts or failed to act upon them. 
Will there be more signposts to Other Roads that we 
will miss? Two final thoughts on this. Paraphrasing 
Jean Rostand; are our obligations to endure met by 
our rights to know? As Carson said 50 years ago: 'The 
choice, after all, is ours to make.'
Table 11�1 Early warnings and actions
1873 The DDT molecule was first synthesised
1939 Paul Müller showed the insecticidal property of DDT
1943-44 Typhus broke out in Naples, Italy in October 1943. By January 1944, and after treating 1 300 000 persons over a 
three week period with DDT, the epidemic was brought under control
1946 Indoor residual spraying (IRS) with DDT to interrupt malaria transmission was introduced in South Africa
1948 Paul Müller was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine or Physiology. Already in the prize presentation speech 
problems with flies developing resistance against DDT was mentioned
1948 Use of DDT inside dairies in the US was prohibited
1950s-60s DDT was the primary tool used in the first global malaria eradication programme. The insecticide was used to spray 
the walls and ceilings 
of houses and animal sheds with coverage of entire populations
1951 First reports of the development of insecticide resistance to DDT. This became an obstacle in the eradication of 
malaria, and was one of the reasons behind the abandonment of the global malaria eradication campaign
1958 Complete coverage of malaria areas in South Africa via indoor residual spraying with DDT achieved
1962 The novel Silent Spring was published, drawing attention to the impacts of chemicals on the environment and human 
health. Special emphasis was given to DDT
1964 Stockholm University, Sweden, set up a laboratory for the analysis of DDT in the environment. These activities led, 
inter alia, to the identification of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) as environmental contaminants
1970s Based on the increasing amount of data on environmental effects, restrictions on the use of DDT were set in place in 
different countries, but still, the use and miss-use of DDT continued. Amidst concerns about the safety of DDT, the 
insecticide was banned for use in agriculture in many countries
1996 South Africa discontinued the use of DDT for malaria control and introduced pyrethroids on a large scale
2000 South Africa re-introduced DDT after failure of pyrethroids in many areas. Pyrthroids are used where viable
2004 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants came into force eliminating the production and use of 
DDT except for disease vector control where safe, effective and affordable alternatives are not available
2010 DDT is now only produced in India, from where it is exported to other, mostly African, countries. China has recently 
stopped its production of DDT. South Africa formulates DDT with the technical product from India, and exports the 
formulated product to several other African countries.
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12 Booster biocide antifoulants: is history 
repeating itself?
  
Tributyltin (TBT) was widely used as an effective antifouling agent in paints for ships and 
boats until the European Community restricted its use in 1989 because of its proven harm to 
the environment and shellfisheries. Thereafter, booster biocides were introduced to enhance 
the performance of antifouling paints. They were believed to be less damaging to aquatic life 
than TBT. Subsequently, however, it has been established that booster biocides can also create 
significant environmental risks.
This chapter outlines the background to booster biocide use, the early warnings about their 
potential physiological and ecological impacts on non-target species, and the actions taken 
in response. The science that set some alarm bells ringing is described, along with lessons 
that could influence the future of an industry still searching for less environmentally invasive 
solutions.
Booster biocide antifouling agents threaten a variety of habitats — from coral reefs and seagrass 
beds to open moorings — within the EU and globally. Their primarily herbicidal properties mean 
that coral zooxanthellae, phytoplankton and periphyton are particularly vulnerable. Compared to 
TBT, an antifouling agent with a quite specific action, booster biocides have more broad-spectrum 
impacts. The wider ecological effect of shifting to booster biocides remain poorly understood but 
of considerable concern because they may affect the base of marine food chains.
From a toxicological viewpoint, booster biocides do not threaten to have endocrine disrupting 
properties similar to TBTs. At current environmental concentrations, however, some can damage 
primary producers and some are persistent. While legislation has been introduced to control their 
use, the rigour of regulations varies between countries. These geographical disparities need to 
be addressed, and future biocidal products and novel approaches to antifouling should be better 
appraised.
For policymakers, the challenge is to protect non-target biological communities from selective 
change resulting from booster biocide use. Persistence, bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT) 
criteria can be used to evaluate the relative potential impact from the available biocides, and 
consequently target appropriate legislation. Nevertheless, lateral thinking, aiming to identify 
novel materials and strategies to address antifouling, could pay dividends in the future.
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12�1 Introduction
12.1.1 The need for antifoulants
Preventing plants and animals from growing on and 
fouling the hulls of boats is essential for the shipping 
industry and boating communities. The application 
of coatings to vessel hulls to prevent fouling 
organisms from settling dates back to Ancient 
Greece (Yebra et al., 2004) and possibly even earlier. 
Protecting the hull was initially the principal 
concern and the earliest antifoulants often acted 
more as physical barriers than chemical toxicants. 
They prevented the isopod crustacean 'gribble' 
(Limnoria) and the infamous Teredo worm (actually a 
mollusc) from reducing hardwood planking to pulp 
within a matter of months. However, hull damage 
was not the only concern. Fouling organisms 
made sailing ships sluggish and severely limited 
their capacity to sail to windward. For naval and 
fighting ships, severely reduced speed and impaired 
manoeuvrability could mean losing sea battles (1). 
Fouling organisms create 'hull roughness', 
increasing friction between the hull and the water 
(Evans et al., 2000). Combined with the weight of 
fouling organisms attached to the hull, this can 
lead to considerable increases in fuel consumption. 
A layer of algal slime only 1 mm thick will increase 
hull friction by 80 % and cause a 15 % loss in ship 
speed, while a 5 % increase in fouling for a tanker 
weighing 250 000 deadweight tonnes will increase 
fuel usage by 17 % (MER, 1996; Evans et al., 2000). 
Antifouling agents, applied as paint, are the most 
economically efficient solution found so far. Yet 
they come at an environmental cost, as graphically 
illustrated by the organotin compound tributyltin 
(TBT). 
12.1.2 The rise and fall of TBT
Shortly after World War II, TBT became a common 
additive in antifouling paints, especially in 
'self‑polishing' formulations which, by design, 
release toxic persistent substances into the 
environment. The use of powerful antifoulants 
enabled the periods between dry‑docking for 
repainting to be extended and TBT was particularly 
valued because it does not cause galvanic corrosion 
to aluminium hulls. By the 1980s, however, TBT 
had been recognised as a global pollutant and its 
environmental effects on non‑target organisms are 
now infamous (Santillo et al., 2002).
TBT's effects include shell malformations in oysters, 
which can render the produce worthless. In Arcachon 
Bay (France) alone TBT caused an estimated loss 
of USD 147 million through reduced production of 
the oyster Crassostrea gigas (Alzieu, 1991). A more 
serious and pervasive impact was 'imposex' — 
the development of male sexual organs in female 
marine gastropods. Worldwide, imposex has been 
documented for around 150 species (Vos et al., 2000). 
This endocrine disruption was first discovered in the 
early 1970s (reviewed in Santillo et al., 2001). Because 
of limited analytical capabilities, however, the 
physiological and ecological consequences were only 
attributed to TBT in the 1980s when many gastropod 
populations had declined. Importantly, mollusc 
species can be affected at very low concentrations — 
less than 10 billionths of a gram per litre (10 ng/L). 
By the late 1980s, the TBT problem was global. 
Steps were taken to ban TBT because of its 
unacceptable toxic effects on commercial shellfish 
(especially oysters) and other non‑target organisms. 
Regulatory controls included the EC Directive 89/677/
EEC (1989) banning TBT use on small boats (< 25 m, 
primarily pleasure craft). Important legislation 
to phase out TBT use on larger vessels includes 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
International Convention on the Control of Harmful 
Anti‑fouling Systems (IMO, 2008). Santillo et al. 
(2001) provide further insights into the complexities 
surrounding TBT, its ban and the delay in controls 
Barnacles on a boat. Application of coatings is used to prevent 
plants and animals from fouling on the hulls of boats.
Photo:  © istockphoto/Carsten Madsen
(1) Yebra et al. (2004) provide additional information on the historical development of antifouling systems.
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coming into force. The extent of hazard was initially 
underestimated for both technical and socioeconomic 
reasons. Specifically:
•	 it	was	incorrectly	assumed	that	an	environmental	
quality target (EQT) of 20 ng/l would be 
sufficiently protective; 
•	 persistence,	accumulation	and	wider	
dissemination in the environment were 
underestimated;
•	 organotin	bioaccumulation	was	underestimated	
(Labare et al., 1997); 
•	 the	geographical	scale	of	the	problem	was	not	
fully appreciated (inadequate data collection);
•	 imposex	observed	in	1970	in	predatory	
gastropods in Arcachon Bay was considered 
acceptable — it had no immediately obvious 
economic cost — whereas the failure of the oyster 
stocks soon after was not acceptable;
•	 the	transboundary	nature	of	the	problem	was	not	
fully appreciated until continuing TBT problems 
in Japan (despite a national ban in the late 1990s) 
highlighted the issue.
Many of these findings from TBT are useful 
reminders for managing booster biocides. They 
highlight the value of recognising potential 
environmental hazards early, and introducing 
protocols for monitoring and appropriate regulatory 
measures.
12.1.3 Effects of the TBT ban 
EU and national legislative prohibitions on using 
TBT for small craft reduced pollution substantially. In 
Arcachon Bay, for example, concentrations fell from 
900 ng/L in 1983 to below 10 ng/L in the late 1980s. 
The oyster beds recovered and commercial harvesting 
resumed during the same period. The (limited) 
controls imposed were hailed by some as a 'solution' 
to the TBT problem. Evans et al. (2000) reported a 
general recovery of dogwhelk populations in the 
United Kingdom, partially confirming this claim. 
However, in other European areas recovery appears 
to have been mixed, or slower than expected, despite 
the imposition of regulations for small craft (see 
Santillo et al., 2001). 
Experience in New Zealand is one of several 
examples illustrating the complex interactions 
between TBT inputs, concentrations, accumulation 
and biological effects and, most importantly, the 
beneficial effects of legislation (Table 12.1).
On the other hand, the ban on TBT does not seem 
to have been very effective everywhere. Levels are 
still going up in Asia, implying either that it is still 
being used or that there are issues surrounding 
persistence and transportation that are not yet fully 
understood.
12�2 Early warnings, actions and 
inactions
Booster biocides were developed, at least initially, 
for the 'small boat' market, following the European 
Community ban on TBT for vessels of less than 25 m 
in 1989. A wide range of booster biocide compounds 
have been used or promoted (Box 12.1). Whilst 
the list is substantial, not all products have been 
marketed and some newly introduced compounds 
such as phenylborane pyridine, Econea, capsaicin and 
medetomidine (Thomas and Brooks, 2010) are not 
included. 
For example, in the United Kingdom during 
the 1990s, antifouling agent use was massively 
dominated by copper(I) oxide, followed by (in 
order of use) diuron, Irgarol 1051, zinc pyrithione 
and dichlofluanid. Some of these are now banned 
(see Section 12.4.1). The organic biocides included 
agrochemicals (e.g. diuron), other compounds 
that were previously registered as biocides 
(e.g. Irgarol 1051) and personal care products such as 
the anti‑dandruff agent zinc pyrithione. 
Contamination of coastal waters by booster biocides 
was first reported in the early 1990s. Irgarol 1051 
concentrations of up to 1700 ng/L were reported 
around the Cote d'Azur on the French Riviera 
(Readman et al., 1993). These high levels were 
actually discovered during a survey of agricultural 
triazine herbicides, which are measured using the 
same analytical protocol. That study triggered 
subsequent research, which confirmed broad 
contamination of boating areas in Europe, Bermuda, 
the United States of America, Japan, Singapore and 
Australia (Konstantinou and Albanis, 2004; Readman, 
2006; Scarlett et al., 1999). Interestingly, Irgarol 1051 
was detected in Australia, despite not being used in 
Australia's boating industry. 
Readman et al. (1993) was followed by the 
pioneering studies of Dahl and Blanck (1996) on 
Irgarol 1051's toxicity to periphyton communities. 
These algae and microbes live in a surface film 
attached to submerged surfaces including plants, 
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Table 12�1 Complexities associated with TBT accumulation and legislative controls for leisure 
boats and ships in New Zealand from studies in 1988/1989 and 1994/1995
Issue Environmental and governance implications
Imposex measured at different resolution (% imposex,  
or penis length in females relative to males)
Judging the effect of TBT on gastropods depends partly on the 
sensitivity of the measure used
Re-release of TBT residues in sediments and long half-life  
of TBT (2.5–3 years) in sediments
Can obscure actual TBT levels and the effectiveness of legislation
1989 legislation (TBT ban on < 25 m leisure craft)
No fall in % imposex at Evans Bay marina in Wellington 
harbour, despite TBT ban for small craft, due to close proximity 
of commercial Burnham Warf and leaching of TBT. Continual 
monitoring needed to determine the effectiveness of legislation 
for larger ships 
1993 legislation (TBT banned completely for New Zealand  
vessels but not for foreign ships)
Sampling strategy (e.g. presence of commercial ships near  
leisure craft)
Source:  Smith, 1996.
 
Box 12�1 Examples of booster biocides used or promoted as agents in antifouling paints
•	 2-methylthio-4-tertiary-butylamino-6-cyclopropylamino-s-triazine	(Irgarol	1051)
•	 1-(3,4-dichlorophenyl)-3,3-dimethylurea	(diuron)
•	 4,5-dichloro-2-n-octyl-4-isothiazolin-3-one	(Sea-Nine	211)
•	 N-dichlorofluoromethylthio-N',	N'-dimethyl-N-phenylsulphamide	(dichlofluanid)	
•	 2,4,5,6-tetrachloro	isophthalonitrile	(chlorothalonil)
•	 bis(1hydroxy-2(1H)-pyridethionato-O,S)-T-4zinc	(zinc	pyrithione)
•	 2-(thiocyanomethylthio)benzthiazole	(TCMBT)
•	 2,3,5,6-tetrachloro-4-(methyl	sulphonyl)	pyridine	(TCMS	pyridine)
•	 cuprous	thiocyanate
•	 4-chloro-meta-cresol
•	 arsenic	trioxide
•	 cis1-(3-chloroallyl)-3,5,7-triaza-1-azonia	adamantanechloride
•	 zineb
•	 folpet
•	 thiram
•	 oxy	tetracycline	hydrochloride
•	 ziram
•	 maneb
rocks and the hulls of boats. Periphyton is also an 
important indicator of water quality. The authors 
demonstrated the potential for ecological effects to 
occur at the concentrations of Irgarol 1051 present 
in coastal waters. Together, these studies raised 
concerns and inspired other scientists to conduct 
more in‑depth research.
Besides antifouling paints, however, booster 
biocides in aquatic environments derive from a 
variety of other sources, including:
•	 agricultural	and	domestic	uses	of	
chlorothalonil, dichlofluanid and diuron as 
agents to deal with weeds, fungi and other 
unwanted plant growth;
•	 some	anti-dandruff	shampoos,	in	which	zinc	
pyrithione (ZPT) is the active agent against the 
scalp fungus, Malasseziaglobosa.
A comprehensive picture of booster biocide 
distributions and concentrations in European 
waters emerged from the Assessment of 
Antifouling Agents in Coastal Environments (ACE) 
project, which ran from 1999 to 2002. In the course 
of the project, water samples (and sediments from 
some areas) were collected from marinas, harbours, 
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estuaries and coastal waters, covering diverse 
European coastal systems (ACE, 2002; Readman, 
2006). Of the major booster biocides, diuron was 
found in the greatest mean concentrations, with 
the highest levels in north‑western Europe. Irgarol 
1051 was present at lower mean concentrations than 
diuron, with Mediterranean coastal environments 
the most contaminated. Chlorothalonil, dichlofluanid 
and Sea‑Nine 211 were sporadically encountered, 
primarily in the Mediterranean. In isolated cases, 
however, high concentrations were recorded. 
Measurable concentrations of the degradation 
products of Irgarol 1051 and diuron were also 
recorded, albeit at lower levels than the parent 
compounds.
Globally, data for the most common biocides (diuron, 
Irgarol 1051 and Sea‑Nine 211) are available for 
Europe, North America and Japan, while negligible 
data are available for other regions. Konstantinou and 
Albanis (2004) summarise data on Irgarol 1051 levels 
in water and sediment samples reported in the 
literature. More recently, booster biocides have been 
detected in the remotest part of the Indian Ocean, 
although at negligible concentrations. Indeed, of the 
substances sought, only Irgarol 1051 was detected. 
Moreover, it was only encountered in two of the 
31 samples analysed, at concentrations of 2 ng/L and 
8 ng/L (Guitart et al., 2007).
12�3 Early warnings: the science on 
antifouling agents
12.3.1 Persistence and toxicity
Concerns about the potential environmental impacts 
of booster biocides arose because of the high 
concentrations reported at an increasing number 
of areas, coupled with findings regarding their 
toxicity to periphyton (at equivalent concentrations). 
The high concentrations in coastal environments 
are maintained by leaching from vessels, 
although dilution and degradation act to reduce 
concentrations (see below). While some antifouling 
biocides have other uses (e.g. as agrochemicals), 
in marinas and harbours antifouling use normally 
dominates the total input (Konstantinou and 
Albanis, 2004). Compounds can be removed 
from the water column through, for example, 
biotic degradation, photo‑degradation, chemical 
hydrolysis, attachment to particulates followed by 
sedimentation, volatilisation or bioaccumulation 
(Readman, 2006). 
The MAM‑PEC model (van Hattum et al., 1999) was 
developed to predict environmental concentrations of 
antifouling agents in the marine environment. It has 
been validated using the data set collected during the 
ACE project and can now be applied to predict future 
concentrations. 
The half‑lives of booster biocide compounds vary 
and can be considerable. The abiotic and biotic 
half‑lives for these booster biocide agents, examined 
in laboratory studies and under controlled field 
conditions, indicated that diuron and Irgarol 1051 
were substantially resistant to degradation in 
comparison with other agents. Thomas et al. (2002) 
and Thomas and Brooks (2010) have reported the 
following highly variable half‑lives for booster 
biocides:
•	 Irgarol	1051:	100	days;
•	 dichlofluanid:	18	hours;
•	 chlorothalonil:	1.8	days;
•	 Sea-Nine	211:	<	24	hours;
•	 zincpyrithione:	<	24	hours;
•	 TCMTB:	740	hours;
•	 zineb:	96	hours;
•	 diuron:	no	degradation	over	42	days	in	
seawater when associated with antifouling 
paint particles (without this particle association 
it has a 14‑day half‑life).
More worrying still were the toxic effects that 
scientists were beginning to identify, reviewed 
in studies such as Jones (2005), Yamada (2006) 
and more recently by Thomas and Brooks (2010). 
The herbicidal properties of most antifoulants 
mean that marine plants appear to be particularly 
vulnerable to many of these biocides. As noted 
above, the first published study on the herbicidal 
properties of booster biocides was by Dahl and 
Blanck (1996), addressing the toxicity of Irgarol 
1051 to periphyton communities. Long‑term effects 
were detected at 0.25–1 nM (63–250 ng/L), which 
is within the range of concentrations reported for 
coastal waters. Later studies (Okamura et al., 2003; 
Jacobson and Willingham, 2000; Fernandez‑Alba 
et al., 2002) have confirmed the vulnerability of 
algae/phytoplankton to booster biocides. 
Using natural populations of phytoplankton, 
Readman et al. (2004) reported toxic effects of 
Irgarol 1051 at low concentrations with a 72‑hour 
half maximal effective concentration (EC50) of 
Emerging lessons from ecosystems | Booster biocide antifoulants: is history repeating itself?
302 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
70 ng/L (2). The endpoint used in this study was the 
selective reduction in 19'‑hexanoyloxyfucoxanthin. 
Again, this concentration is well within the range of 
concentrations reported in coastal waters. 
Devilla et al. (2005) provide some insights into 
relative susceptibilities to a range of booster 
biocides. Growth inhibition results following 
72 hours of exposure indicated that Synechococcus 
sp. was more tolerant to zinc pyrithione (NOEC (3) 
of 1 000 ng/L) and Sea‑Nine 211 (NOEC of 900 ng/L) 
than E. huxleyi (EC50 of 540 and EC50 of 350 ng/L, 
respectively). In contrast, Synechococcus sp. was 
more sensitive to diuron (EC50 of 550 ng/L) than 
E. huxleyi (EC50 of 2 260 ng/L), whereas exposure 
to Irgarol 1051 similarly impacted both species 
(EC50 of 160 and 250 ng/L, respectively).
Endocrine disruption was also assessed within the 
ACE Project. None of the antifoulants evaluated 
(Irgarol 1051, Sea‑Nine, chlorothalonil, diuron, 
dichlofluanid, maneb and ziram) showed a strong 
estrogenic response. Thomas et al. (2001) identified 
persistence and toxicity as critical features in the risk 
evaluation of booster biocides. 
Despite accumulating substantial information, 
Voulvoulis et al. (2002) considered that additional 
data would still be required to properly evaluate 
the risks associated with widespread use of the 
booster biocides Irgarol 1051, diuron, Sea‑Nine 
211 and chlorothalonil. They cautioned against the 
use of TCMS pyridine, TCMTB and dichlofluanid, 
although again identified a lack of appropriate data. 
And in their initial risk evaluation, zinc pyrithione 
and zineb appeared to be the least hazardous 
options for the aquatic environment. However, 
analytical constraints for these latter booster biocide 
compounds render environmental assessment 
difficult.
12.3.2 Adverse ecological effects on corals
The herbicidal (chlorophyll photosystem 
II‑inhibiting) mode of action of Irgarol 1051 also 
raises concerns regarding the potential impact on 
zooxanthellae — the symbiotic microalgae that live 
within warm water corals to the mutual benefit 
of both the coral polyps and the algae. This has 
important implications for the growth, survival 
and health of corals, already rendered vulnerable 
by events such as the 1998 coral bleaching episode 
in the Indian Ocean. That event arose from 
exceptional seawater warming in 1997–1998 and led 
to massive coral mortality. Most island archipelagos 
were severely affected, with mortality of over 90 % 
to considerable depths in the Maldives, Seychelles 
and Chagos (Sheppard et al., 2002). 
During bleaching events coral expel, to a greater 
or lesser extent, their symbiotic algae known as 
zooxanthellae. In extreme events, as occurred in 
1998, zooxanthellae are totally evicted from their 
host. All that remains is dead white coral skeletons 
or, worse still, rubble and debris — something 
very different from a vibrant, living reef attached 
firmly to the seabed (see Price, 2009). Recent 
publications have shown that Irgarol 1051 inhibits 
the photosynthesis of both zooxanthellae isolated 
from the coral tissues and also zooxanthellae still 
within the host (coral) tissues (i.e. in symbio) at 
environmentally relevant concentrations (as low as 
60 ng/L) (Owen et al., 2002; Owen et al., 2003; Jones, 
2005). Studies at many harbours in the world report 
concentrations of Irgarol 1051 at or above this level 
(Konstantinou and Albanis, 2004). This creates the 
possibility that antifouling agents will disperse to 
offshore sites, including coral reefs.
'Coral bleaching' — the dissociation of symbiosis 
between corals and algae — is a common but 
significant sub‑lethal stress response requiring 
many months to recover. It is generally considered 
to be caused by elevated water temperatures but 
diuron and Irgarol 1051 will also cause bleaching 
and, like warm water bleaching, they may operate 
by affecting algal/zooxanthellae photosynthesis 
(Jones, 2005). The notion that Irgarol and diuron 
contamination could exacerbate bleaching caused by 
elevated water temperatures has not yet been tested.
Jones (2005) points out that at low levels and over 
short exposure periods, the coral‑bleaching effects 
of herbicides can be reversible (i.e. when corals are 
returned to clean seawater) and vary according to 
type of herbicide. However, on exposure to higher 
concentrations in the light or over longer exposure 
periods, sustained long‑term reduction of the 
photochemical efficiency of the algae (symptomatic 
of chronic photo‑inhibition) follows. 
Corals and reefs in European waters lack symbiotic 
microalgae, meaning that booster biocide toxicity 
(2) The EC50 is the concentration of a toxicant that induces a response halfway between the baseline and maximum after a specified 
exposure time.
(3)	 NOEC	denotes	'no	observable	effect	concentration'.	
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to coral microalgae is not directly relevant within 
the EU. However, several European countries have 
dependent territories with significant coral reefs. 
In some cases (e.g. France, the Netherlands and 
some UK dependent territories), the environmental 
legislation of the dependent territories is closely 
allied to that of the European country. In others, 
such as Chagos, British Indian Ocean Territory, 
environmental legislation is more independent. 
Chagos happens to lie in the remotest part of the 
Indian Ocean and studies more than 10 years 
ago revealed that these atolls and islands were 
virtually pristine and contaminant free (Everaarts 
et al., 1999; Readman et al., 1999), despite the fact 
that the biggest atoll and island, Diego Garcia, 
is an important military base. Booster biocide 
concentrations from the atolls of Chagos were 
determined during early 2006 as part of an 
international environmental research effort (Guitart 
et al., 2007). This has provided a useful international 
baseline or standard, against which biocide 
concentrations in European waters and elsewhere 
could be compared. More generally, studies have 
recently highlighted the scientific importance of 
Chagos as a 'clean' control site for monitoring 
environmental change (SOFI, 2009; Sheppard 
et al., 2009). Environmental monitoring is also an 
important requirement of national, European and 
international agreements to which the British Indian 
Ocean Territory is party.
12�4 The lessons drawn
12.4.1 Permitted agents
Controls and legislation have been developed to 
address the accumulation of booster biocides in 
the marine environment and the marked toxicity 
of certain agents. The booster biocides permitted in 
 
Box 12�2 Case study — Bermuda 
In June 1995, Readman visited Bermuda and analysed seawater samples for antifouling agents including 
booster biocides. Levels of Irgarol were high in some harbour areas and sparked fears of damage to coral 
endosymbiotic algae (Readman, 1996). Extended data were later published (Connelly et al., 2001). 
The Bermuda Government (Ministry of the Environment) funded toxicological studies at the Bermuda 
Biological	Station	for	Research	that	demonstrated	the	vulnerability	of	the	corals	(Owen	et	al.,	2002	
and	2003).	On	1	July	2005,	Irgarol-	and	diuron-based	antifouling	paints	were	banned	in	Bermuda	by	
amendment to the Bermuda Statutory Instrument BR 20/1989 Fisheries (Anti-Fouling Paints Prohibition) 
Regulations 1989.
European waters and the legislative situation, as of 
2002, are listed in Tables 12.2 and 12.3. This shows 
that several agents previously permitted for small 
craft in the United Kingdom, including diuron and 
Irgarol 1051, are now prohibited. In the United 
Kingdom, only three organic booster biocides 
are permitted. In Sweden there is even greater 
restriction. In the Netherlands, France, Greece and 
Spain, a greater number of agents are permissible. 
In the Netherlands, files for antifouling agents are 
being reviewed. In Denmark, diuron and Irgarol 
1051 were banned for use on pleasure craft in 
2000. Results from an environmental risk analysis 
of Sea‑Nine 211 and zinc pyrithione in Danish 
waters demonstrated that, in most cases examined, 
the PEC/PNEC (predicted environmental 
concentration/predicted no effect concentration) 
ratio was less than 1, indicating an acceptable risk. 
The Biocidal Products Directive (98/8/EC) provides 
for the authorisation of biocidal products within 
the European Union. The Directive harmonises the 
data requirements for existing and new biocides 
within the EU, including antifouling agents 
(product type 21). Any company seeking to register 
an antifouling agent was required to submit a 
notification in 2002 and provide a base set of data. 
Time scales for submitting additional necessary 
data have not been established.
National legislative positions on antifoulings are 
presented in IYP (2008) and Thomas and Brooks 
(2010) provide a review of the current legislative 
position. 
Experiences in Bermuda provide insights that 
may have useful applications elsewhere. Within a 
period of 10 years, harmful booster biocides were 
identified in some harbour areas and, because of 
their potential harm to corals, were banned in the 
entire territory (Box 12.2).
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Table 12�2 Use of metallic antifoulants and organic booster biocides on yachts < 25 m in 
European waters
United 
Kingdom
France (a) Greece (a) Spain (a) Sweden Denmark (b) Netherlands (b)
Copper(I) oxide + + + + + (c) + +
Copper thiocyanate + + – – + (c) + +
Cu powder – – – – + (c) + –
Chromium trioxide – – – – – – +
Diuron – + + + – – +
Irgarol 1051 – + + + + – +
Zinc pyrithione + + + + – +
Dichlofluanid + + + + – – +
TCMTB – – – – – – –
Chlorothalonil – + + – – – –
TCMS pyridine – – – – – – –
SeaNine 211 – – – + – + (d) –
Ziram – – + – – – +
Zineb + – – – – – +
Folpet – – + – – – –
Total (booster 
biocides)
3 5 (a) 7 (a) 5 (a) 1 2 5
Note: (+) Agent permitted. 
(–) Agent not permitted. 
(a)  Very limited/no approval scheme (in principle, all can be used). 
(b)  Regulations currently under debate. 
(c)  Leach rate regulated on west coast; banned on east coast. 
(d)  Although approved, product not used on pleasure craft.
Source:  ACE, 2002, cited in Readman, 2006.
Table 12�3 Legislative position of EU Member States, October 2008 update
European Union Member 
States
Antifoulings	applied	in	EU	Member	States	must	be	notified	or	authorised	for	use.	Products	sold	in	Austria,	
Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom must be registered 
under national pesticide laws.
The Biocidal Products Directive (98/8/EC) is now in force and a review of all antifouling biocides 
submitted for approval is well under way. Decisions on the acceptability of these biocides are expected 
shortly. If a biocide is deemed 'acceptable' under the directive, EU Member States will then re-review the 
antifouling products containing biocides that are on the market. If acceptable, a product registration will 
be issued allowing sale and application of the product. Products deemed 'unacceptable' will be removed 
from the EU market.
In the interim period before all products on the market are reviewed, the directive has required 
manufacturers of antifouling paints to notify details of antifouling products on the market in each 
EU Member State.
Restrictions Application of TBT antifoulings to all vessels is forbidden in all EU Member States under the Marketing 
and Use Directive (76/769/EEC).
Under	Regulation	(EC)	No	782/2003,	application	of	TBT	antifoulings	on	all	ships	and	boats	flying	flags	
of EU countries are also banned and those with active TBT antifoulings are forbidden from entering 
European	ports	and	harbours.	Ships	over	400	gross	tonnage	flying	flags	of	EU	Member	States	must	be	
surveyed	and	carry	certificates	of	compliance	with	the	Regulation.	Ships	over	24	m	in	length	and	less	
than 400 gross tonnage must self-certify as compliant.
Sweden Use of antifouling products is evaluated on a case-by-case basis using risk assessment to determine if 
the paint's use is acceptable.
Denmark Import,	marketing	and	use	of	biocidal	antifouling	paint	with	release	of	copper	exceeding	200	μg	Cu/cm2 
after	the	first	14	days	and	350	μg	copper/cm2	after	the	first	30	days	are	banned	for	pleasure	crafts	of	
200 kg and above that are mainly used in saltwater.
Import, marketing and use of biocidal antifouling paint for use on pleasure crafts less than 200 kg and 
mainly used in salt water is banned. This does not apply for wooden boats and it does not apply for 
pleasure	craft	belonging	to	harbours	classified	as	A	or	B	for	insurance	purposes.
Use of Irgarol 1051 and diuron in antifoulings applied to pleasure craft is banned.
United Kingdom Use of the organic biocides Irgarol 1051 and diuron in antifoulings is banned.
Netherlands Use of diuron in antifoulings is banned.
Source:  IYP, 2008.
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12.4.2 Effects of banning selected booster biocide  
agents
While the positive impact of banning TBT has 
been well demonstrated in European waters 
and elsewhere, the effectiveness of legislation 
outlawing specific booster biocides has been 
determined only recently. The following 
summarises key findings of a study by Cresswell 
et al. (2006). 
In 2001, the United Kingdom introduced 
legislative measures restricting the antifouling 
agents that could be used in paints for small 
(< 25 m) vessels to three substances: dichlofluanid, 
zinc pyrithione and zineb. This removed the 
previously popular booster biocides diuron and 
Irgarol 1051 from the market (for small vessels) 
on the grounds of environmental concerns. To 
investigate the impact of this legislation, water 
samples were taken from locations where previous 
biocide levels were well documented. Results 
from analyses demonstrate a clear reduction in 
water concentrations of Irgarol 1051 (by 10–55 % 
of levels in pre‑restriction studies), indicating 
that the legislation appears to have been effective 
(Cresswell et al., 2006). No comparable data were 
reported for diuron. Although other booster 
biocides were screened for (chlorothalonil, 
dichlofluanid and Sea‑Nine 211), they were below 
the limits of detection (< 1 ng/L) in all samples. 
It is unclear whether the Irgarol 1051 remaining 
resulted from some ongoing use, continued 
presence on pre‑painted hulls, continued use 
on non‑UK vessels entering UK ports or simply 
persistence of the chemical in the environment, 
even after use stopped completely. It is likely to be 
a combination of all these factors.
The reduced concentrations are attributed to 
changes regulating the distribution, advertising, 
sale and use of the booster biocide. A survey of 
antifouling paint retailers revealed that small 
amounts of Irgarol 1051‑based paints were 
still being sold and that there was no routine 
monitoring of retailers. However, by regulating 
the production and distribution of Irgarol 1051 
at the manufacturer level, the UK Health and 
Safety Executive has been successful in reducing 
environmental concentrations of the compound 
to below the proposed Environmental Quality 
Standard, EQS, of 24 ng/L. The survey of chandlers 
and discussions with legislative authorities 
supports these results and concurs with removing 
Irgarol 1051‑based paints from the market using 
simple regulations targeted at manufacturers 
(Cresswell et al., 2006).
12.4.3 History repeats itself?
The development and use of booster biocides has 
followed a very similar pattern to the evolution and 
demise of organotin and earlier antifoulants:
•	 identification	of	new	antifouling	agents	to	
replace older supposedly more toxic or less 
effective products (although the relative efficacy 
and toxicity of antifouling paints can only 
be determined by subsequent monitoring to 
establish whether initial suppositions/hypotheses 
were correct);
•	 monitoring	of	distribution,	accumulation	and	
toxicity of the new agent(s) to determine whether 
the initial supposition or hypotheses about the net 
benefits of new products were correct;
•	 concern,	debate	and	review	of	the	new	
antifouling agent(s);
•	 banning	of	the	most	harmful	agents;
•	 search	for	less	toxic	solutions	to	the	problem	of	
biofouling communities on hulls of small craft 
and ships. 
Detailed toxicity tests have not been undertaken 
for all booster biocides. There is evidence, however, 
for example for diuron and Irgarol 1051, that 
non‑target organisms are exposed and potentially 
vulnerable. Concern arises because, as noted 
above, photosynthesis can be affected by booster 
biocides at extraordinarily low concentrations, 
i.e. in the 'parts per trillion' (ng/L) range. Effects 
may be reversible over short exposures, but higher 
concentrations and long‑term exposure can lead to 
reduced photochemical efficiency of algae (Jones, 
2005). In corals this may lead to breakdown of 
the coral‑zooxanthellae symbiosis (bleaching), 
demanding lengthy recovery times. This has certainly 
been the case following coral bleaching induced 
by seawater warming, for example in 1998. Hence, 
booster biocides can impact the base of food chains, 
which are linked to seafood production and many 
other ecosystem services. 
A particularly significant aspect of booster biocides 
is that the most popular ones act herbicidally. Both 
diuron and Irgarol 1051 act at the herbicide binding 
site (by definition) of PSII, affecting the primary 
photochemical reactions of photosynthesis via the QB 
binding site on the D1 protein. This is a remarkably 
conserved area (the amino acid sequence of D1 has 
a 98 % homology between different higher plants 
and 85–90 % between PSII containing species). This 
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conservation, and the fact that it is the base of the 
food chain, means that, like TBT, booster biocides can 
potentially have far‑reaching consequences. Whereas 
TBT acted quite specifically in causing imposex and 
shell abnormalities, through endocrine disruption, 
the booster biocides that replaced TBT have more 
broad‑spectrum impacts. 
The wider ecological impacts of the above finding 
and the transition to booster biocides remain poorly 
understood but of considerable potential concern. The 
message is clear: there is a need to develop and apply 
non‑toxic and less toxic solutions to the problem of 
biofouling on vessel hulls. 
12.4.4 Why monitoring should continue
Monitoring should continue for several reasons: the 
legacy of TBT, our understanding now that booster 
biocides are far from 'risk free', and the recognition 
that developing non‑toxic alternatives may take years 
or decades. One key lesson is that there is a need to 
monitor at least selected constituents of the newer 
antifouling agents. Both the chemical and ecological 
aspects are, and will remain, an important marine 
and environmental indicator within European 
waters. Monitoring design will need to be sufficiently 
robust to identify, and quantify, temporal and spatial 
trends with an appropriate degree of precaution. 
This is necessary to ensure that any 'clean bill of 
health' given to existing and new booster biocides 
is environmentally warranted. And while several 
booster biocides have already been banned in parts 
of Europe, monitoring of both banned and permitted 
antifouling agents will help determine whether 
further legislation is needed as an additional measure 
of precaution.
The present report's chapter on methyl mercury 
pollution in Minamata Bay, Japan, demonstrates that 
it is not always easy to identify pollution‑free sites 
to serve as an 'international baseline'. For booster 
biocides, one possible reference area has recently been 
established in Chagos (Guitart et al., 2007), one of 
the world's essentially pristine and remotest marine 
areas. In Chagos, concentrations of Irgarol 1051 and 
other booster biocides screened for were extremely 
low. Over the coming years, monitoring of these 
antifouling agents will be necessary in both affected 
and reference or 'control' areas. 
Price and Readman (2006) outlined an approach for 
establishing a monitoring procedure and an indicator 
for booster biocides in European waters. Essentially 
this could be a scaled down version of the ACE project 
(ACE, 2002). Sampling is recommended in sites in the 
regions of Norway and the Faroe Islands, the Baltic, 
the North Sea, the Mediterranean (north and south), 
the Black Sea, the Barents Sea, the English Channel, 
the Celtic region and Irish Sea, and the Iberian 
Peninsula. 
Monitoring efforts should focus initially on Irgarol 
1051, in view of its widespread use, marked toxicity 
and other factors. Extensive data are available for 
Irgarol 1051 and it can be traced to antifouling paints 
since it is not used as a herbicide (unlike diuron). 
The 800 samples collected and analysed during the 
ACE project represent a valuable resource, providing 
baseline data that should help determine temporal 
and spatial patterns in booster biocide accumulation 
and toxicity. Sampling from one of the world's 
least contaminated ocean areas (Guitart et al., 2007) 
might provide a valuable international standard or 
benchmark to determine the contamination of other 
marine and coastal areas.
Any future monitoring programme should be firmly 
linked to an action plan and catalyse management 
activities if contaminant levels or other metrics 
of ecosystem health fall to some predetermined 
threshold level(s). Otherwise, monitoring can easily 
become an essentially scientific or academic pursuit. 
For example, physical, chemical, ecological and visual 
criteria have been developed to determine when 
(if at all) to begin and when to end oil spill clean‑up. 
Monitoring therefore informs clean‑up, by helping 
determine environmental situations in which clean‑up 
is and is not appropriate. Similar considerations may 
be needed for regulating and controlling biocides. 
On the other hand, the detection of imposex at least 
partly resulted from initially academic work, rather 
than monitoring of toxic effects. Academic activities 
may thus play a role, not least in identifying possible 
emerging issues.
12.4.5 New-age antifouling: is there a non-toxic way?
Given the undeniable (and necessarily) toxic nature 
of biocidal antifouling agents, there is a case for 
further research and fast‑track development of more 
environmentally benign solutions. The controlled, 
slow release of agents regulated through polymer 
design (Readman, 2006) is seen as one approach. 
However, this represents only a 'stop‑gap' and far 
from an optimal environmental solution given the 
undesirability of releasing toxic substances into 
the water column and environment, even slowly. 
Arguably, it might be better for these substances to 
be retained permanently in the paint, assuming they 
could still be sufficiently effective, to enable recovery 
and disposal on land.
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An alternative strategy makes use of natural products 
(or synthesised analogues). These compounds 
normally act enzymatically by interfering with the 
metabolism of fouling organisms or dissolving 
their adhesive materials. Structures include 
terpenoids, steroids, heterocyclics, alkaloids and 
polyphenolics. This approach to preventing fouling 
has not, however, been commercially exploited 
(Readman, 2006). Although not all natural products 
are hazard‑free — strychnine and aflatoxins are 
two examples that are not used in antifouling 
preparations — the release and occurrence of 
natural antifoulant compounds derived from 
marine organisms is not perceived to pose a serious 
environmental threat by the general public.
Non‑stick fouling‑residue coatings that prevent 
adhesion by fouling organisms are another approach. 
At present the choice of materials is restricted to 
fluoro‑polymers and silicones (Readman, 2006). 
From an environmental perspective, this option 
is appealing. Results from performance tests 
for currently available coatings indicate modest 
performance, requiring relatively high speeds 
to remove fouling organisms. A number of such 
formulations are already on the market and in use 
for some classes of vessels. Coupled with expense, 
however, poor adhesion qualities to the hull and 
susceptibility to damage mean that widespread 
commercial application seems unlikely without 
further advances in technology (Readman, 2006).
The Biocidal Products Directive (98/8/EC) and other 
legal instruments give consideration to substitutes 
and alternatives. However, it is normally existing 
manufacturers of antifouling products that seek to 
innovate in response to such instruments and they 
tend to devise solutions with which they are familiar 
— typically more biocide. The result is incremental 
change, such as the shift to booster biocides after TBT 
use was outlawed. As noted, relatively undeveloped 
alternatives exist, such as non‑stick coatings and 
polishing robots, but the companies that could 
develop more innovative solutions are generally 
unaware of the emerging market. 
12.4.6 Hindsight, foresight and conclusions
Table 12.4 provides a summary of the historical use of 
antifouling agents and the main early environmental 
warnings and actions. TBT, now in demise, has been 
a highly effective antifouling agent but is among the 
most toxic synthetic compounds ever produced. Use 
on small crafts was banned in European waters in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Prohibition has taken 
longer on ships. Through an international convention, 
and European legislation linked to this, a total ban 
has come into force. 
For technical and socioeconomic reasons, the extent 
of TBT hazards was initially underestimated. Many 
of the warnings serve as important reminders for 
booster biocides, in terms of the value of early 
recognition of potential environmental hazards, 
protocols for monitoring and appropriate regulatory 
measures. Uncertainties regarding the geographical 
scale of the problem of TBT (e.g. the limited 
sensitivity of analytical methods and imperfect 
baseline data) do not constrain understanding of 
antifouling residues as they did twenty or more years 
ago. 
Recent research has demonstrated the significant 
toxicity of booster biocides at extremely low 
concentrations. Of the major booster biocides, 
diuron has been encountered in the highest mean 
concentrations, particularly in north‑western 
Europe (ACE, 2002). Irgarol 1051 has normally 
been identified at lower mean concentrations, 
with most contamination in Mediterranean coastal 
environments. Globally, data are available for the 
biocides most commonly used in Europe, North 
America and Japan (i.e. diuron, Irgarol 1051 and 
Sea‑Nine 211), while negligible data are available for 
other biocides. Significant endocrine disruption, the 
major problem associated with TBT, was not found 
for booster biocides (ACE, 2002). Instead, booster 
biocides are often photosystem II inhibitors; by 
impairing photosynthesis they can impact the base 
of food chains and their dependencies (e.g. symbiotic 
algae and host corals).
Despite accumulating substantial information on 
adverse environmental side effects, some experts 
(Voulvoulis et al., 2002) consider that additional 
data are needed to evaluate properly the risks of 
widespread use of Irgarol 1051, diuron, Sea‑Nine 211 
and chlorothalonil. They caution against using 
TCMS pyridine, TCMTB and dichlofluanid, again 
identifying a lack of appropriate data. In their 
initial risk evaluation, zinc pyrithione and zineb 
appeared the least hazardous options for the aquatic 
environment. 
Like several other countries, the United Kingdom has 
taken precautionary action, introducing legislation 
in 2001 to restrict the use of antifouling agents in 
paints on small (< 25 m) vessel to dichlofluanid, zinc 
pyrithione and zineb. The previously popular booster 
biocides diuron and Irgarol 1051 were banned. Recent 
research (Cresswell et al., 2006) indicates that this 
legislation appears to have been effective in reducing 
environmental concentrations.
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Table 12�4 Early warnings and actions
Early maritime to late-1600s 
~ 2–3 thousand years 
Ancient Greece: lead sheathing and copper nails caused no environmental concern
~ 800 AD Arab ships: lime and mutton fat coating caused no environmental concern
Late 1400s Columbus: pitch and tallow coating caused no environmental concern
1600s  UK navy: tar, grease, sulphur pitch coating caused no environmental concern
Late 1700s Copper sheathing caused no environmental concern
Mid 1800s → Copper paints caused no or limited environmental concern
Mid 1900s Copper, arsenic and mercury paints caused no or limited environmental concern
Late 1950s/early 1960s–1990s Organotin	compounds	such	as	tributyl	tin	(TBT)	caused	increasing	environmental	
warnings and actions (see EEA, 2001, Ch. 13)
1989 EC Directive 89/677/EEC bans TBT on small boats (< 25 m), triggering the 
development and use of booster biocides
1993 First report of booster biocides in coastal waters (Irgarol 1051)
1996 First report on the toxicity of booster biocides at environmental levels (Dahl and 
Blanck, 1996)
1997 Previous events trigger expanded environmental research
1999 European Commission funds ACE Project (ACE, 2002)
2000 Under the Biocidal Products Directive (98/8/EC) the European Commission began 
reviewing all biocides used in all biocidal products, including antifouling paints. It 
entered into force on 14 May 2000
2000 UK Health and Safety Executive began phasing out all booster biocides except 
dichlofluanid, zinc pyrithione and zineb for small vessels (< 25 m)
2002–2005 Concern raised over toxicity of booster biocides to coral zooxanthellae at 
extremely	low	concentrations	(e.g.	Owen	et	al.,	2002,	2003;	Jones,	2005)	leading	
to bans on specific agents in several countries
Today Development of new technologies/non-toxic alternatives:
•	potential	for	natural	products	(disturbing	foulant	metabolism	or	dissolving 
• foulant adhesives) 
•	potential	for	fluoro-polymers	and	silicones	(non-stick	coatings)
Even for prohibited (but still used) toxic substances, 
it is fair to assume that a release into the environment 
is often inevitable. The preference should always 
be for non‑toxic, competitively priced alternative 
approaches, rather than adding toxic contaminants to 
the environment.
Booster biocides must be monitored to gather more 
data on accumulation, toxicity and the impact of 
legislation. Given the undeniable (and necessarily) 
toxic nature of antifouling agents, however, there 
appears to be a strong case and market demand for 
further research and fast‑track development of more 
environmentally benign solutions to biofouling, such 
as natural products and non‑stick coatings.
Thomas and Brooks (2010) indicate that even today 
DDT is used in China as an antifoulant. Meanwhile, 
novel compounds, such as phenylborane pyridine, 
Econea, capsaicin and medetomidine, are almost 
uninvestigated, with very little information available 
on them in the public domain.
In conclusion, booster biocide antifouling agents 
threaten a variety of habitats — from coral reefs and 
seagrass beds to open moorings — within the EU 
and globally. Their primarily herbicidal properties 
mean that coral zooxanthellae, phytoplankton and 
periphyton are particularly vulnerable. Compared 
to TBT — an antifouling agent with a quite specific 
action — booster biocides have more broad‑spectrum 
impacts. The wider ecological effect of shifting to 
booster biocides remain poorly understood but of 
considerable concern because they may affect the 
base of marine food chains.
For policymakers, the challenge is to protect 
non‑target biological communities from selective 
change resulting from booster biocide use. Policy 
has proven effective in, for example, Bermuda 
and the United Kingdom, where banning selected 
agents lowered concentrations and limited 
adverse ecological impacts. Clearly persistence, 
bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT) criteria can be 
used to evaluate the relative potential impact from 
the available biocides, and consequently target 
appropriate legislation. Nevertheless, lateral thinking, 
aiming to identify novel materials and strategies 
to address antifouling, could pay dividends in the 
future.
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13 Ethinyl oestradiol in the aquatic 
environment
  
Many decades of research have shown that when released to the environment, a group of 
hormones known as oestrogens, both synthetic and naturally occurring, can have serious 
impacts on wildlife. This includes the development of intersex characteristics in male fish, which 
diminishes fertility and fecundity. Although often sublethal, such impacts may be permanent and 
irreversible. 
This chapter describes the scientific evidence and regulatory debates concerning one of these 
oestrogens, ethinyloestradiol (EE2), an active ingredient in the birth control pill. First developed 
in 1938, it is released to the aquatic environment via wastewater treatment plants. Although it is 
now clear that wildlife species are exposed to and impacted by a cocktail of endocrine disrupting 
chemicals, there is also reasonable scientific certainty that EE2 plays a significant role, and at 
vanishingly low levels in the environment. 
In 2004 the Environment Agency of England and Wales accepted this, judging the evidence 
sufficient to warrant consideration of risk management. In 2012, nearly 75 years after its 
synthesis, the European Commission proposed to regulate EE2 as a EU-wide 'priority substance' 
under the Water Framework Directive (the primary legislation for protecting and conserving 
European water bodies). This proposal was subsequently amended, delaying any decision on a 
regulatory 'environmental quality standard' until at least 2016.
This is in part because control of EE2 will come at a significant price. Complying with proposed 
regulatory limits in the environment means removing very low (part per trillion) levels of EE2 
from wastewater effluents at considerable expense. 
Is	this	a	price	we	are	willing	to	pay?	Or	will	the	price	of	precautionary	action	be	simply	too	
high — a pill too bitter to swallow? To what extent is society, which has enjoyed decades of 
flexible fertility and will also ultimately pay for the control and management of its unintended 
consequences, involved in this decision? And what could this mean for the many thousands 
of other pharmaceuticals that ubiquitously infiltrate our environment and which could have 
sublethal effects on aquatic animals at similarly low levels?
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13�1 Introduction
A large body of scientific data built up over many 
decades indicates a cause‑effect link between 
exposure to a complex cocktail of chemicals and 
the feminisation and demasculinisation of wildlife 
species, particularly those living in or around the 
aquatic environment (reviewed in Lyons, 2008). 
Some scientists also relate exposure to hormonally 
active chemicals (so‑called 'endocrine disruptors', 
including alkylphenols, bisphenol‑A, phthalates, 
flame retardants and many other chemicals in 
everyday use) to declining sperm counts, increased 
incidence of male genital abnormalities, testicular, 
breast and prostate cancer in human populations 
(Lyons, 2008; Sharpe, 2009), breast growth in young 
men (Henley et al., 2007), and early onset of puberty 
in young girls (Den Hond and Schoeters, 2006; 
Jacobson‑Dickman and Lee, 2009). 
Over the last 50 years, since the publication of 
Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 1962, we have 
learned that chemicals in food, household products, 
medicines and cosmetics, can be and are harmful to 
wildlife at very low levels. Many of these chemicals, 
each present at vanishingly low (parts per trillion) 
concentrations, can together have additive biological 
effects — producing 'something from nothing' in 
the words of Silva et al. (2002). Awareness of this 
reality has awoken scientists and the public to an era 
of possible harms from low‑level, chronic chemical 
pollution (e.g. from human pharmaceuticals). 
These chemicals may not have obvious catastrophic 
effects such as those observed for the endocrine 
disrupting anti‑foulant tributyltin (TBT), which 
devastated commercially important oyster 
populations (see EEA, 2001, Ch. 13 on TBT and Gee, 
2006). They can, however, have less obvious effects 
that nonetheless cause irreversible harm to individual 
organisms. This raises difficult questions concerning 
the relationship between these damaging but 
sub‑lethal impacts on wildlife and their connections 
to ecological (e.g. population level) impacts, 
and to human health. It also raises issues for the 
precautionary principle, which states that where there 
is evidence of damage and irreversible harm, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not excuse inaction 
(UN, 1992). As we shall describe, the evidence 
suggests that it is entirely reasonable to invoke the 
precautionary principle and introduce regulation to 
limit aquatic exposure to EE2. But this is no trivial 
matter, and the reasons for this raise serious questions 
for the precautionary principle itself.
This is the story of one of these chemical pollutants, 
the	contraceptive	pill	hormone	17α-ethinyloestradiol	
(EE2) as it has unfolded in the United Kingdom 
from the 1970s to today
13.1.1 The contraceptive pill
The first orally active synthetic steroidal oestrogen, 
EE2 (1), was synthesised by Hans Herloff Inhoffen 
and Walter Hohlweg at Schering AG in Berlin 
(Inhoffen and Hohlweg, 1938; Maisel, 1965) in 1938. 
EE2 was invented at a time when scientists across 
the world were intensifying their research into sex 
hormones as a means of controlling fertility and 
gynecological disorders. They were inspired by the 
remarkable successes achieved during the 1920s in 
using insulin to treat diabetes, thyroxine to alleviate 
thyroid deficiencies and metabolic disorders, and 
by the discovery of progesterone, the ovulation 
preventing hormone in 1934 (Sneader, 1985). 
At a similar time, Edward Charles Dodds, a 
British medical researcher, discovered the potent 
oestrogenic properties of diethylstilbesterol 
(Dodds et al., 1938; EEA, 2001, Ch. 8) and those 
of bisphenol‑A and 4‑nonylphenol (Dodds et al., 
1936), now well known endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. While BPA (see Chapter 10 on BPA) 
and 4‑nonylphenol never found uses as drugs 
(their future was to be in plastics and detergents, 
respectively), for many medical practitioners and 
scientists there seemed no limit to the extent to 
which artificial oestrogens could be put to good 
medical use. EE2 was first marketed by Schering 
as Estinyl in 1943 and initially used to manage 
menopausal symptoms and female hypogonadism. 
It appeared to be readily absorbed orally and very 
resistant to degradation and metabolism by the gut. 
The stability and effects of EE2 paved the way for 
developing oral contraceptive pills ('the pill'), which 
eventually occurred in the 1950s and 1960s (Medical 
News, 1961). 
The development of the pill was powerfully 
intertwined both with concerns about 
overpopulation and the 'sexual revolution' of the 
1960s. Symbolically, it was much more than a tool 
for contraception. From the start it was linked with 
the hopes that it could curb population growth 
and bring about world stability. The first version 
of the contraceptive pill (Enovid) contained the 
hormones mestranol (the methyl ether of ethinyl 
oestradiol) and norethynodrel (a progesterone‑like 
(1)	 17α-ethinyloestradiol	is	the	17α-ethinyl	analogue	of	the	natural	female	hormone,	17β-oestradiol.	
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hormone). As Dr John Rock, a catholic obstetrician‑
gynecologist who ran some of the first clinical trials 
of the birth control pill, noted in 1967, 'If taken as 
it should be … it will stop ovulation 100 per cent' 
(CBC digital Archives, 1964). 
Today the mechanisms of action of synthetic 
oestrogens and progestogens (2) are well 
understood. They are taken up by the cells in 
the reproductive system, pituitary, bone, liver 
and other tissues and bind to oestrogen and 
progesterone receptors, triggering increases or 
decreases in the expression of genes regulated 
by these hormones, in turn controlling gender, 
sexual development and reproduction. When taken 
correctly in the contraceptive pill, they interfere 
with the normal monthly cycle of a woman, 
preventing pregnancy by stopping the ovaries from 
releasing an egg, making it difficult for sperm to 
enter the womb (by thickening mucus in the cervix) 
and making the lining of the womb too thin for a 
fertilised egg to implant. 
The American Food and Drug Administration 
approved the pill for use in the US in early 1961 
and on 4 December 1961, Enoch Powell, then 
Minister of Health, announced that it could be 
prescribed through the UK National Health Service 
at a subsidised price of two shillings per month 
(Time, 1961). Take up of the pill was fast. Between 
1962 and 1969, the number of UK users rose from 
approximately 50 000 to one million (out of an 
estimated 10 million users worldwide), generating 
an enormous social impact and earning it a place 
on the front cover of Time Magazine in April 1967 
(Time, 1967) (3). The pill is hailed as playing a 
major role in the women's liberation movement 
and greater sexual freedom (Asbell, 1995; Goldin 
and Katz, 2002). Its availability, particularly in 
the developed world, has made a significant 
and dramatic impact on women's lives: giving 
unprecedented control over fertility, preventing 
pregnancy, and so avoiding the mortality and 
morbidity associated with pregnancy, childbirth 
and termination. 
The pill now comes in 32 different forms and is 
used by more than 100 million women worldwide. 
Usage varies widely by country (UNPD, 2006; 
Leridon, 2006), age, education, and marital status. 
One quarter of women aged 16–49 in Great Britain 
currently use the pill — either the combined pill, 
progesterone‑only pill or 'minipill' (Taylor et al., 
2006) — compared to only 3 % of women in Japan 
(Hayashi, 2004; Hayes, 2009), which, in 1999, 
became the last country in the developed world to 
legalise the pill.
13.1.2 Evidence of environmental harm from 'the 
pill'
In the 1970s some scientists began speculating 
that using the contraceptive pill might cause 
environmental problems (e.g. Tabak and Bunch, 
1970). They realised that oral medications, 
including contraceptives, are in fact rather 
inefficient methods for administering drugs to 
the body, since it takes a lot of drug administered 
orally to get a little into the bloodstream. The 
rest of the medicine passes right through the 
body and into wastewater in urine and faeces. 
Since water and waste treatment plants were 
not designed to remove pharmaceuticals (or 
indeed other man‑made chemicals), it was likely 
that the contents of our medicine cabinets were 
unintentionally being passed on directly into the 
environment, and eventually, even into drinking 
water supplies. 
EE2 is excreted as conjugates of sulphates 
and glucuronides, along with the natural 
steroid hormones oestrogens oestrone (E1), 
17β-oestradiol(E2)	and	oestriol(E3)	that	occur	
naturally in humans. The synthetic EE2 shares 
a common hormonal mode of action with these 
natural oestrogens, which also means that, when 
released into the environment, the oestrogenic 
endocrine disrupting effects of EE2, and the natural 
steroid oestrogens in combination are additive. 
EE2, the synthetic oestrogen, is however by far the 
most potent of the four.
The data supporting the need for risk management 
of EE2 and the most potent of the three other 
steroid oestrogens (E2 and E1), due to their 
endocrine disrupting effects in the environment, 
are now comprehensive and compelling (Gross‑
Sorokin et al., 2006; Caldwell et al., 2008). 
Based on data amassed over many decades, the 
mechanism of toxicity of EE2, E2 and E1 is now 
well understood. They are continuously, and 
widely, released into the aquatic environment 
and are persistently present, having a half life 
in fresh water of between less than a day and 
approximately 50 days under aerobic conditions. 
(2) Progestogens (also spelled progestagens or gestagens) are a group of hormones including progesterone.
(3) Front cover of Time Magazine's April 1967 edition can be viewed at: http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19670407,00.html.
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They have been shown to cause endocrine 
disrupting effects at environmentally relevant 
concentrations in controlled laboratory studies 
(e.g. Lange et al., 2001; Nash et al., 2004, reviewed 
in Caldwell et al., 2008), in field studies of fish 
placed downstream of sewage treatment works 
with various types of secondary treatment 
technologies (Harries et al., 1996 and 1997) and in 
whole experimental lake studies dosed with EE2 
(Kidd et al., 2007). 
In some UK rivers, 100 % of wild male fish of the 
species Rutilus rutilus (roach, a common freshwater 
fish of significance to anglers) sampled between 
1995 and 2002 had female characteristics (Jobling 
et al., 1998) and intersex has now been reported in 
many fish of a number of freshwater and marine 
species, in more than 10 countries (Tyler and 
Jobling, 2008; Hinck et al., 2009). Models predicting 
exposure of riverine fish to EE2, E2 and E1 in the 
United Kingdom have also been shown to correlate 
well with impacts observed in fish populations 
in the field (Jobling et al., 2006). These impacts 
damage fish reproductive health, for example 
affecting fertility and fecundity (Jobling et al., 
2002a and 2002b; Harries, Hamilton et al., 2011) 
and are in some cases irreversible (Rodgers‑Gray 
et al., 2001). 
Risk characterisation of EE2 and the other two 
non‑synthetic steroid oestrogens, E2 and E1, 
in the aquatic environment is possibly one 
of the most comprehensive for any chemical 
pollutant. Many millions of euro have been 
spent on this research over many decades. The 
chemical industry has concluded that 'endocrine 
disruption is undoubtedly occurring in wild fish 
populations' and that the evidence that wildlife 
has been impacted adversely following exposure 
to endocrine disrupting substances is 'extensive' 
(Webb et al., 2003). The pharmaceutical industry, in 
particular, has carried out and funded some of the 
key lab studies showing that EE2 plays a key role 
in causing these effects (e.g. Lange et al., 2001). 
In response to this evidence, in 2004 the 
Environment Agency of England and Wales (EA) 
concluded that risk management was needed for 
steroid oestrogens (Gross‑Sorokin et al., 2006). In 
2012 the European Commission proposed EE2 as 
a Priority Substance (i.e. a substance requiring 
control across Europe) under the Water Framework 
Directive, one of the most important pieces of 
legislation for protecting European surface and 
ground waters, proposing regulatory limits in 
the aquatic environment for EE2. At present, 
this is only a proposal, with formal processes of 
agreement required before regulation can occur. 
In July 2012 an amendment to this proposal was 
tabled. This delays review of a proposal for a 
regulatory limit until 2016 (rather than 2012), 
which (if adopted) would then have to be complied 
with by 2027. Nevertheless nearly 75 years after its 
initial development, during which time some of the 
most comprehensive and compelling evidence of 
environmental impact for any chemical has been 
amassed, a decision to regulate of EE2 is finally 
under serious consideration. Why has this taken so 
long? And what lessons can we learn?
The example of EE2 and endocrine disruption in 
the aquatic environment, and the questions and 
dilemmas it raises, is in many ways a test case 
for many thousands of low‑level pollutants that 
infiltrate our environment ubiquitously, many of 
which have chronic impacts that go beyond the 
acute polluting effects of past industrial chemicals. 
13�2 Early warnings
13.2.1 Early warnings from wildlife: 
the UK experience
The earliest concerns about possible hormone 
contamination of water (from contraceptive pills 
and other sources) related to impacts on male fish 
reproductive health in UK rivers. In 1978, Tony 
Dearsley, a Thames water area biologist in the 
United Kingdom, found eggs developing in the 
testes of five out of 26 male fish of the commonly 
caught species Rutilus rutilus (the roach) while 
conducting a routine health check on a small 
sample of fish from the River Lea. 
As Dearsley's manager, Roger Sweeting, then 
Senior Scientist at Thames Water, noted, 'It was 
amazing to see macroscopically hermaphrodite 
fish that were both male and female all at the same 
time'(Sweeting, pers. comm.). It was not until 
a year later, however, after reading a paper by 
Jafri and Ensor (1979), that Sweeting telephoned 
David Ensor, who confirmed that the findings 
were highly unusual. Jafri and Ensor had reported 
a normal incidence of hermaphroditism of 1 in 
1 000, in the same species of fish (Jafri and Ensor, 
1979), more than 100 times lower than found in 
the fish collected from the Lower River Lea (see 
Figure 13.1). 
Larger samples of fish confirmed the earlier 
observations. It was also observed that the 
incidence of feminisation varied with the age of 
the fish, with the highest proportion (20 %) found 
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in the older fish (aged more than six years). Roger 
Sweeting reported that this suggested a 'cumulative 
effect with time' (Sweeting, 1981).
Thames Water, at the time a government‑owned 
company, was proactive in researching the 
matter further to gain a better understanding of 
its relevance to public health. It was reasoned 
that 'some risk of endocrine disturbance in 
human consumers of the water could be implied' 
(Sweeting, 1981) as it was known that the River 
Thames received discharges from numerous 
wastewater treatment plants (352 according to 
Williams et al. (2008)) and that it also served as 
a major potable water source for North London. 
Water abstracted from the river was purified, used 
by people, or industry, and then disposed of to 
sewage treatment works, where it was 'cleaned' 
before being discharged (as effluent) back into the 
river, only to be abstracted, used and cleaned a 
second or subsequent time downstream. (For this 
reason, it is a commonly said that when you drink 
a glass of water in London, the water has already 
passed through several pairs of kidneys). 
Thames Water's concerns for public health led 
to further studies (never published) under a 
research contract given to Liverpool University. 
Water samples were taken directly from the River 
Lea at the drinking water abstraction point and 
transported on a train to Liverpool University, 
where they were given to rats to drink. Derek 
Tinsley (a PhD student at the time who now works 
for the Environment Agency of England and Wales) 
recalls visiting the station at regular intervals to 
collect the water. The studies showed clearly that 
giving female rats this water to drink for 12 months 
induced persistent oestrous.
Further studies showed, however, that water 
samples taken part way through the drinking 
water treatment process had no effects on the rats. 
Moreover autopsies of small mammals (water 
voles and wild rats) trapped around the sewage 
works revealed no obvious gross reproductive 
abnormalities. Derek Tinsley recalls that he felt 
'relief that there were no signs of any effects of 
the treated drinking water on the rat reproductive 
system, and therefore no apparent risks to the 
consumer' (4). 
Thames Water officials felt confident enough to 
present Tinsley and Ensor's results to a standing 
committee of the Department of Health, which, 
after conducting further studies, agreed that there 
was enough information to discount any possibility 
of risk to human consumers of water abstracted 
from the Lower Lea. It is striking that such a rapid 
decision was made on the basis of this small set of 
studies. This, as we will go on to discuss, is in stark 
contrast to decision‑making regarding protection 
of aquatic wildlife from the effects of EE2 and other 
oestrogens, despite the many studies indicating 
adverse health effects related to oestrogen exposure.
The possibility that the contraceptive pill hormone 
might well be causing intersex in fish was not 
formally stated in any of the scientific reports 
circulated between the government and the water 
industry. Nor was any link made with the reports 
of occurrence of steroidal oestrogens in wastewater, 
river and potable waters (Tabak and Bunch, 1970; 
(4) Personal communication from Derek Tinsley.
Note: Image (1) shows a female-like ovarian cavity in an otherwise normal testis. Image (2) shows a severely intersex gonad 
following	exposure	to	sewage	effluent	with	a	testis	containing	a	large	number	of	primary	oocytes	at	a	single	focus.	
Image	(3)	shows	the	intersex	gonad	of	a	wild	fish	caught	from	the	River	Aire,	the	United	Kingdom.	Tl	denotes	'testis	lobule'.	
PO	denotes	'primary	oocyte'.
Figure 13�1 Histological sections showing intersex phenotypes in roach
Emerging lessons from ecosystems | Ethinyl oestradiol in the aquatic environment
316 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Tabak et al., 1981; Aherne et al., 1985). At least 
one of those studies had recognised that steroidal 
oestrogens could potentially have adverse effects, 
even if none were identified:
'the concentrations found are far below 
therapeutic doses and there appears to be 
no evidence of adverse effects from reused 
water resources which may be contaminated 
from the normal use of such highly active 
therapeutic agents' (Aherne et al., 1985). 
Aherne and colleagues could not have known 
about the Thames Water studies as they were 
confidential. Moreover, the significance of their 
work and the earlier studies by Tabak and 
colleagues was not recognised, because the human 
health agencies responsible for international drug 
regulation at the time usually had limited expertise 
in environmental issues; consideration of these 
was not formally required. The situation is today 
very different, with environmental exposure now 
recognised as a key consideration (for example in 
European Medicines Agency guidelines (EMA, 
2006) (5). Moreover, until the 1990s, any concerted 
chemical analytical efforts to look for drugs in 
the environment achieved limited success. This is 
because the requisite chemical analysis tools (with 
sufficiently high separatory powers to identify 
the drugs amid a plethora of other natural and 
anthropogenic substances in the environment, and 
sufficiently low detection limits (i.e. nanograms 
per litre or parts per trillion)) were not commonly 
available.
Now there is considerable concern about the 
increasing amounts of pharmaceuticals that are 
being consumed and found in the environment 
(Kümmerer, 2004 and 2007; Apoteket AB et al., 2006 
and 2009; EEA, 2010; German Advisory Council on 
the Environment 2007; Mistrapharma, 2011). With 
an ageing population the UK Office of National 
Statistics predicts that the country's medicine usage 
will more than double by 2050 (Nature, 2011).
13.2.2 More evidence of an environmental problem 
In the mid‑1980s, fisheries scientists working for 
the UK Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and 
Food, or MAFF (Dr Colin Purdom, Dr Vic Bye 
and Dr Alex Scott) were asked to comment on the 
evidence collected to date. Quite independently, 
one of their colleagues, Dr John Sumpter, had 
found high levels of a female‑specific yolk protein 
(vitellogenin or VTG) in the blood of male fish 
kept at an experimental fish farm rented by MAFF. 
VTG is under strict oestrogen control and as males 
have extremely low (often undetectable) levels of 
oestrogen in their blood, they can only produce 
VTG if they are exposed to an oestrogen (Sumpter 
and Jobling, 1995). The scientists wondered 
whether the fish were being supplied with water 
contaminated with oestrogens originating from the 
treated sewage effluent entering the river upstream 
of the fish farm, and whether oestrogens in the 
water might also explain the discovery of feminised 
wild male fish in the River Lea. 
Field trials in the late 1980s, funded by the 
Department of the Environment (DoE), confirmed 
that VTG levels in male trout placed for just two 
weeks in the sewage treatment plant effluent from 
Rye Meads sewage treatment works (which entered 
the River Lea) underwent a 100 000 fold increase, 
reaching levels equivalent to those in mature 
females. These results provided the impetus for a 
nationwide survey of effluents (conducted between 
1987 and 1990) by Brunel University (John Sumpter 
and Charles Tyler) and MAFF (Colin Purdom, 
Vic Bye, Sandy Scott and Peter Hardiman), with 
funding from the DoE. The results of this survey 
proved beyond doubt that oestrogenic effluents 
entering rivers were widespread throughout 
England and Wales (Purdom et al., 1994). 
By the late 1980s, therefore, there was already 
evidence that wastewater from sewage treatment 
plants was having harmful effects on aquatic 
wildlife, and that at least one possible culprit was 
EE2. This information was not widely circulated 
beyond government and industrial organisations. 
Indeed, the results were not published until 1994 
(Purdom et al., 1994), because of the contractual 
agreement between the DoE, MAFF and Brunel 
University. There was little action: policymakers 
of that era perhaps preferred to wait until the level 
of proof linking cause with effect was beyond 
reasonable doubt, reflecting a wider resistance at 
the time to precautionary action in the absence of 
higher levels of proof. 
Subsequent research has proven EE2's presence in 
effluents and natural waters, and established that it 
(5) More recent guidance from the European Medicines Agency states that if the estimated environmental concentration (i.e. predicted 
surface water concentration) of a medical product is below 0.01ppb and 'no other environmental concerns are apparent' then no 
further actions are needed in terms of environmental risk assessment, i.e. no action needed by a pharmaceutical company.
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is highly likely that it is contributing significantly 
to the damaging effects seen in wild fish (Caldwell 
et al., 2009). Moreover, studies carried out in 
Canada have confirmed large effects associated 
with very low concentrations in a multi‑year study 
in which fish living in a large experimental lake 
were exposed to introduced EE2 (Kidd et al. (2007): 
6.1 ng/L (+/– 2.8) during the first year, 5.0 ng/L 
(+/– 1.8) during the second year and 4.8 ng/L 
(+/– 1.0) during the third year of. This low level 
introduction of oestrogen provoked a large surge 
in fish plasma VTG levels, followed by complete 
collapse of the fish population. The fundamental 
conclusion, that EE2 and other hormones in 
wastewater, both natural and synthetic, are 
harming aquatic wildlife, particularly downstream 
of wastewater plants with low dilution, has not 
changed since the late 1980s. Only the level of 
uncertainty has reduced. 
13.2.3 Widespread endocrine disruption in wild 
fish and growing evidence of problems in 
other wildlife
The discovery in the 1980s that oestrogenic 
effluents were widespread led logically to more 
caged fish trials that illustrated the extent of the 
oestrogenic pollution at greater distances from the 
sewage treatment works (Harries et al., 1996 and 
1997). Extensive field trials in the United Kingdom 
between 1995 and 2000 also showed unequivocally 
that intersex in wild roach was widespread and 
especially prevalent up to 10 km downstream of 
medium‑ to large‑sized sewage treatment works 
(serving populations of 50 000 to 675 000) and 
where dilution of their effluents in receiving river 
waters was less than 10‑fold (Jobling et al., 1998). 
In addition, studies on estuarine species of fish 
illustrated clearly that the effects of oestrogenic 
contaminants extended beyond the rivers into 
estuaries (Lye et al., 1997 and 1998; Allen et al., 
1999) Feminisation and sub‑fertility were also 
reported in additional wildlife species, especially 
those living in or around the aquatic environment 
(reviewed in Lyons, 2008). Specifically: 
•	 amphibians	were	found	to	have	abnormal	
production of VTG by males and ovotestes/
intersex features; 
•	 reptiles	were	found	to	have	abnormal	production	
of VTG by males: sex hormone disruption; 
ovotestes; smaller phallus in alligators and shorter 
estimated penis length in turtles; decreased 
hatching; and decreased post hatch survival; 
•	 birds	were	found	to	have	abnormal	VTG	
production in males; deformities of the 
reproductive tract; embryonic mortality; reduced 
reproductive success including egg‑shell thinning 
and poor parenting behaviour;
•	 otters	and	mink	were	found	to	have	reduced	
penile bone length; smaller testes; and impaired 
reproduction;
•	 seals	and	sea	lions	were	found	to	have	impaired	
reproduction (including implantation failure, 
sterility, abortion, premature pupping); 
•	 cetaceans	were	found	to	have	reduced	
testosterone levels; impaired reproduction; and 
hermaphrodite organs;
•	 polar	bears	were	found	to	have	intersex	features	
and deformed genitals; reduced testes and 
baculum length; low testosterone levels in adult 
males; and reduced cub survival. 
In none of these cases was a link with exposure to EE2 
investigated and/or proven.
13.2.4 Wildlife as sentinels for human reproductive 
health 
Beyond the aquatic environment, the feminising 
syndromes found in wildlife appeared to mirror 
reports of male infertility, genital abnormalities 
and testicular cancer observed in the human male 
population, collectively termed Testicular Dysgenesis 
Syndrome (TDS; see Box 13.1). If testicular dysgenesis 
syndrome was occurring in humans due to 
environmental pollutants, then genital disruption 
should have been found in wildlife exposed to 
those pollutants. This did indeed seem to be the 
case. The question arose whether the effects seen 
in wildlife and in humans shared a common cause: 
environmental oestrogens including EE2. There had 
already been evidence of human health impacts 
associated with another synthetic oestrogen created in 
the same year as EE2: diethylstilbestrol (DES). From 
the 1940s to the early 1970s, pregnant women in the 
US (and beyond) were commonly prescribed DES in 
the mistaken belief that it could prevent miscarriage. 
Some of the sons of these DES mothers developed 
low sperm counts, undescended testicles and 
deformations of the penis (Ibaretta and Swan, 2001).
The steepest declines in male reproductive health 
appear to have taken place in most countries between 
the 1960s and the 1980s, coinciding not only with 
the introduction and take up of the contraceptive 
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Box 13�1 Human health concerns
The first indications that something might be wrong with human sperm came in 1974, when Kinloch Nelson 
and Bunge produced a small study of the semen quality of men who were about to undergo vasectomies. 
They found that only 7 % had sperm concentrations above 100 million (Kinloch Nelson and Bunge, 1974), 
which is well below the 65 % reported earlier by pioneering andrologist, John Macleod (MacLeod and Heim, 
1945). 
Kinloch Nelson and Bunge speculated that 'an environmental factor to which the entire population has been 
exposed' might be causing the low sperm counts. These studies were discredited by John MacLeod himself 
in 1979. While acknowledging a decline in sperm counts in fertile males since the 1930s, MacLeod and 
Wang (1979) rejected the notion of a larger, overall decline, citing analytical errors in the Nelson and Bunge 
study and suggesting a concentration of 20 million per ml should be the lower limit for the normal sperm 
count.	This	limit	was	adopted	in	the	WHO	guidelines	for	semen	analysis	in	1980	(WHO,	1980).	
Nothing more was reported until 1992, when Danish clinician Niels Skakkebaek and Elizabeth Carlsen 
published their ground-breaking paper on studies of sperm counts around the world. In 61 studies going 
back as far as 1938, they found a decline in average sperm density from 113 million per millilitre in 1940 
to 66 million in 1990 (Carlsen et al., 1992). These findings made some scientists wonder whether the 
human species was approaching a fertility crisis. Debate on this issue was intense and opinion was divided 
regarding the validity of the apparent fall in global sperm counts (e.g. Swan et al., 1997; Paulsen et al., 
1996; Fisch et al., 1996). 
The approach taken in Europe (led by Skakkebaek) followed the reasoning that 'if sperm counts have fallen 
then the average should be lower in men born most recently than they were in the past'. More recent 
investigations in seven European countries involving more than 4 000 young men have shown that in 
most of the countries investigated 20 % or more of young men have a subnormal sperm count (less than 
20 mn per ml) and the average sperm count is 45–65 million (Jorgensen et al., 2006). This is consistent 
with sperm counts having fallen, as suggested by the meta-analysis studies. More importantly, it shows that 
male subfertility is likely to be a common issue for current and future generations, with widespread societal 
and economic consequences.
The importance of declining semen quality lies partly in its possible link with other problems of male 
reproductive organs, especially the rise in the incidence of testicular cancer (Adami et al., 1994; 
Wanderas et al., 1995; Bergstrom et al., 1996; Moller, 2001; McGlynn et al., 2003; Richiardi, 2004) 
and in congenital malformations of the male reproductive system such as cryptorchidism (undescended 
testis)	and	hypospadias	(penis	malformation)	(Hohlbein,	1959;	Sweet	et	al.,	1974;	WHO,	1991;	Matlai	
and Beral, 1985; Paulozzi et al., 1997; Lund et al., 2009). These diseases often occur together (Prener, 
1992; Berthelsen, 1984; Petersen et al., 1999; Schnack et al., 2009) and may have the same underlying 
pathology — testicular dysgenesis syndrome (TDS) (Sharpe and Skakkebaek, 1993; Skakkebaek, 1998) 
with a common origin in fetal life (see Figure 13.2). 
Source: Sharpe and Skakkebaek, 1993.
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Figure 13�2 Testicular dysgenesis syndrome
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Box 13�1 Human health concerns (cont�)
Unlike in the case of intersex in fish, there has never been one widely accepted theory regarding the cause 
of the decline in male reproductive health. Instead, a bewildering array of hypothetical culprits have been 
posited, including not only the residues of birth control pills in drinking water or inadvertent pill taking during 
pregnancy, but also a range of anti-androgenic industrial chemicals (male hormone lowering or blocking) 
and non-chemical stressors that have been shown in laboratory studies to induce TDS when exposure takes 
place during early pregnancy (Sharpe, 2009). The research in this field has been challenged by the lack of 
human exposure information and the absence of results of past testing of industrial chemicals for endocrine 
disruption and other adverse effects that may affect the development of the male reproductive system. Even 
if animal testing is performed, the results cannot directly be translated to humans because, for example, a 
chemical may reduce sperm counts by 80–90 % in rats before male fertility is affected. 
The net result is that no systematic effort has been made to prevent infertility, despite the substantial 
potential	societal	consequences	associated	with	its	widespread	occurrence.	Indeed,	the	official	WHO	
response to male infertility has been to redefine the ill people as 'normal' by changing the lower reference 
value for a 'normal' sperm concentration first from 60 mn/ml in 1940s to 20 mn/ml in 1980 and then to the 
current	15	mn/ml	(WHO,	2010),	making	it	of	little	use	in	helping	society	recognise	that	there	is	a	problem	
(Skakkebaek, 2010). 
pill but also with the entry of many other synthetic 
chemicals into the environment, the Clean Water 
Act in 1972 and subsequent upgrading of sewage 
treatment plants to secondary treatment. Thus, 
endocrine disruption in the developing child could 
have occurred through the inadvertent consumption 
of pills in the first trimester of pregnancy (Smithells, 
1981, although refuted by Joffe, 2002). Alternatively, 
or additionally, it could have resulted from drinking 
water containing residues of contraceptive pill 
hormones and a whole plethora of industrial 
chemicals. Or it could have resulted from inadvertent 
exposure to these chemicals via application to the 
skin (cosmetics), inhalation or diet. A more recent 
report highlights a relationship between modern 
contraceptive pill use and prostate cancer (Margel 
and Fleshner, 2011), another hormone‑dependent 
male reproductive disease.
In the case of the contraceptive pill, one might 
expect the exposure to have been higher in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s than in later years as the first pill 
formulations contained up to 100 μg of oestrogen, at 
least five times higher than current formulations. If 
exposure to the contraceptive pill was a significant 
risk factor in causing TDS, the effects should show up 
in statistics on male reproductive health. 
Examination of historical contraceptive pill usage in 
various countries does indeed suggest higher rates of 
use (allowing a 30–35 year time lag between exposure 
of the developing child and the later appearance of 
testicular cancer) in some countries where rates of 
testicular cancer and hypospadias are higher, such as 
Denmark, Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom 
and USA, than in countries where rates are lower, 
such as Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and Spain and Japan (Leridon et al., 2006). 
These associations may well be coincidental, however, 
as the available evidence in support of the oestrogen 
theory is not entirely convincing (Raman‑Wilms 
et al., 1995; Toppari et al., 1996; Martin et al., 2008). 
Indeed, recent animal experimental studies suggest 
that industrial chemicals that block the action of male 
hormones (anti‑androgens) are more likely culprits 
of declines in male reproductive health and could 
even act in combination with oestrogens to induce 
a proportion of the cases of TDS seen in humans. 
So far, however, 'there is no human or experimental 
animal data to support this' (Sharpe, 2009). The lack 
of cause‑effect, especially in human epidemiological 
studies, could easily be wrongly interpreted as ruling 
out involvement of endocrine disruptors in TDS. 
Several factors complicate analysis, including the 
long latency between exposure and effect and the 
possibility that the effects may be caused by multiple 
chemicals in combination, while exposure to each 
chemical individually may not be insufficient to cause 
damage. This is also why Bradford Hill's criteria, 
when invoked in the 2002 WHO report on endocrine 
disruption (WHO, 2002), rejected the hypothesis 
of an impact on male reproductive function. These 
criteria are not suited for determining causation by 
environmental toxicants because such exposures are 
simply too complex. Perhaps we should abandon the 
unrealistic hope of achieving more certainty prior to 
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policymaking about human male reproductive health 
and use wildlife as sentinels instead? 
The case for endocrine disrupting chemicals causing 
male sterility in humans and wildlife, showing 
wildlife were sentinels for human health, was 
beautifully presented in the British Broadcasting 
Company's award‑winning Horizon documentary 
'Assault on the male', written and produced by 
Deborah Cadbury and screened in 1993. The world 
began to sit up and take notice. Mounting concern 
in Europe was such that between 1998 and 2007 the 
European Commission invested over EUR 150 million 
into researching endocrine disruption. This research 
provided the basis for testing both existing chemicals 
and those planned for introduction to the market 
in the future for their endocrine disrupting effects. 
It also furthered understanding of the effects 
of mixtures of endocrine disrupting chemicals, 
identification of vulnerable life stages and impacts 
on male reproductive health. The new data showed 
that a wide range of chemicals could have endocrine 
disrupting effects, with a wide range of health 
impacts. 
13�3 The hunt for the culprit chemicals
Against the backdrop of growing global awareness 
of endocrine disruption, attention focused on the 
chemicals responsible for the feminised male fish 
observed in UK rivers. Laboratory studies showed 
clearly that male fish were extremely sensitive 
to the presence of EE2 in the water at low ng/L 
concentrations (Sheahan et al., 1994). Until the 
mid‑1990s, however, few were convinced that this 
or any other hormone was present in wastewater in 
sufficient amounts to cause the effects seen in fish.
Coincidentally, during that time information 
was emerging from the US that, in addition to 
pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals in everyday 
use could mimic oestrogens. Although this was first 
shown by Charles Dodds in the 1930s (Dodds et al., 
1936), widespread awareness of this possibility was 
instigated by John McLachlan, one of the pioneers 
of research into environmental oestrogens and the 
organiser of the first meeting on the topic in 1979 
(McLachlan, 1980). 
It now seemed possible that effects seen in 
aquatic and other wildlife were actually more 
likely to be a result of exposure to cocktails of 
'endocrine‑disrupting' industrial chemicals, 
(Clement and Colborn, 1992) than to the 
contraceptive pill hormone. In 1988 Theo Colborn, 
in her research on the environmental condition 
of the North American Great Lakes, showed 
that persistent, man‑made chemicals were being 
transferred from top predator females to their 
offspring, undermining the construction and 
programming of their youngsters' organs before 
they were born. In 1991, Theo convened a meeting 
('The Wingspread Meeting') of 21 international 
scientists from 15 different disciplines to share 
relevant research on the topic and it was during 
this meeting that the term 'endocrine disruption' 
was coined. 
It was also in 1991 that Dr Ana Soto published a 
paper about the oestrogenic effects of nonylphenol, 
a chemical compound used in manufacturing a 
large group of industrial detergents (Soto et al., 
1991). Some detective work by Susan Jobling (then 
a student of John Sumpter) at Brunel University 
revealed that the environmental chemist Walter 
Giger had identified these chemicals in sewage 
treatment works effluents, sewage sludge and river 
water (Giger et al., 1984) at concentrations that 
Jobling later confirmed were oestrogenic to fish 
exposed to the chemicals in the laboratory (Jobling 
and Sumpter, 1993; Jobling et al., 1996). 
An earlier report of the oestrogenic activity of 
4‑nonylphenol, was published in 1936 by Charles 
Dodds when he was trying to synthesise one of the 
first synthetic oestrogens, diethylstilbesterol (6). 
The detergent industry may have been unaware of 
this literature when it embarked on the largescale 
manufacture and sale of nonylphenol ethoxylates 
as detergents in the 1940s, leading to the 
contamination of many rivers and estuaries with 
these oestrogenic chemicals. 
While the causal links between exposure to 
industrial chemicals and endocrine disruption 
in most wildlife species were still unclear in the 
1990s, further research in the United Kingdom 
and other European countries showed that 
nonylphenolic chemicals were causing at least part 
of the problem in wild fish in some, but not all, 
areas (Sheahan et al., 2002a and 2002b). However, 
more sophisticated studies employing chemical 
fractionation and screening of effluents using an 
in vitro oestrogenicity screen showed that naturally 
occurring and synthetic steroid oestrogens (EE2, E2 
(6) Interestingly, Dodds identified another controversial compound at the same time — the environmental endocrine disruptor 
bisphenol-A (Dodds, 1938). See also Chapter 10 on BPA.
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and E1) were in fact the most potent oestrogenically 
active substances present in domestic effluents 
(Desbrow et al., 1998; Routledge et al., 1998; 
Snyder et al., 2001), responsible for much of the 
oestrogenic activity found in wastewaters and 
rivers throughout most of the world. Of these, EE2 
was by far the most potent: the pill was once again 
under the spotlight. 
13�4 Government and industry action in 
the 1990s
Enormous efforts were made in the 1990s to assess 
and manage the risks of alkyphenols, not only 
because of their endocrine disrupting effects but 
also their wider toxicity to aquatic life:
Following recommendations of the UK Chemicals 
Stakeholder Forum, the UK government negotiated 
a voluntary agreement with the suppliers of 
nonylphenols, octylphenols, and their respective 
ethoxylates. Suppliers thereby agreed not to 
promote octylphenol (another endocrine disruptor 
also found in sewage effluent) as a substitute 
for nonylphenols, not to manufacture or import 
new formulations or products containing those 
substances, and to reformulate existing products 
to remove those substances as a matter of urgency. 
This was a constructive application of the 
precautionary principle (Lokke, 2006), which has 
not been extended to EE2. 
Similarly, in mainland Europe, the European Union 
undertook a risk assessment of nonylphenols and, 
as a result, restrictions on using nonylphenol have 
been imposed across Europe. 
At the same time, continued uncertainty about 
exposure to chemical pollutants in the environment 
and their effects on the human population 
(particularly regarding reproductive health) 
were highlighted during discussions at a major 
European workshop at Weybridge, the United 
Kingdom (7), on endocrine disrupting chemicals 
held in December 1996 and jointly sponsored by the 
European Commission, the European Environment 
Agency, the European Centre for Environment and 
Health and the WHO (EU, 1996). An EU strategy 
on endocrine disruptors was launched in 1999 to 
begin to address the problem (EU, 1999) but still no 
action was taken on EE2.
13�5 The last decade of research 
Since the mid‑1990s, oestrogenic sewage‑treatment 
works effluents have been identified more widely 
across Europe, and globally, e.g. in Denmark 
(Bjerregaard et al., 2006), Germany (Hecker et al., 
2002), the Netherlands (Vethaak et al., 2005), 
Portugal (Diniz et al., 2005), Sweden (Larsson et al., 
1999), Switzerland (Vermeirssen et al., 2005), China 
(Ma et al., 2005), Japan (Higashitani et al., 2003) 
and the United States (Folmar et al., 1996). More 
extensive evidence has also emerged from around 
the world showing widespread endocrine disruption 
in fish in rivers (Hinck et al., 2009; Bjerregaard et al., 
2006; Blazer et al., 2007; De Metrio et al., 2003; Hinck 
et al., 2009; Penaz et al., 2005; Vajda et al., 2008), 
estuaries (Allen et al., 1999) and oceans (Cho et al., 
2003; Ohkubo et al., 2003; Fossi et al., 2004; Kirby 
et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2006 and 2007). 
In general, the situation in other countries appears 
to match that found in the United Kingdom. The 
incidence and severity of endocrine disruption 
appears to relate largely to the size of the sewage 
works (treatment type is also important), most 
importantly, and the dilution of its effluent in 
the receiving water. This leads to generally lesser 
effects in fish inhabiting large rivers with high 
dilution factors (a common scenario in the US and 
parts of Europe, for example) compared with those 
in smaller rivers with little dilution (a common 
scenario in the United Kingdom and other parts 
of Europe). In Japan, where contraceptive pill 
hormone use is probably the lowest anywhere in the 
developed world and where endocrine disruption 
in fish is reported to be quite rare (Tanaka et al., 
2001; Higashitani et el., 2003), the greater mean river 
flow, and hence available dilution per capita (five 
times more than in the United Kingdom), suggests 
that combined steroid estrogen potency will be 
less across its rivers than in the United Kingdom. 
Even if the Japanese population were to take up the 
contraceptive pill to the extent of use in England 
then widespread endocrine disruption in fish would 
still not be predicted because of the large amount of 
available dilution (Johnson et al., 2012). 
A growing body of evidence also shows that the 
harm caused by exposure to endocrine disrupting 
chemicals early in development is, in many cases, 
irreversible. In fish, as in humans and rodents, 
feminisation of the male reproductive tract occurs 
early in development and produces a fish with 
(7)  In 2006 the 10th anniversary of Weybridge was marked with a conference organised by the Academy of Finland, the European 
Commission (DG Research), and the EEA. The EEA has updated and published the papers from that meeting (EEA, 2012).
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both an oviduct and a sperm duct. Depuration 
in clean water does not correct this condition, 
indicating that feminised ducts seen in wild roach 
are likely to be a permanent feature (Rodgers‑Gray, 
2001). Considerable evidence also shows that both 
the prevalence and the severity of feminisation 
in wild roach increases with age (Jobling et al., 
2006), in extreme cases resulting in a 100 % female 
population after three years of continuous exposure 
to treated sewage effluents or EE2 (Lange et al., 
2009). 
Population‑relevant effects of EE2 have also been 
documented, including a complete fish life cycle 
test carried out by the original manufacturers of 
EE2, Schering (Lange et al., 2001), which showed 
inhibition of breeding at concentrations exceeding 
the environmentally relevant concentration of 
2 ng/L and full sex reversal of males producing 
an all female population at 4 ng/L. This effect was 
corroborated by Kidd et al., (2007), who (as we 
have already noted) dosed an entire lake with EE2, 
causing a population collapse at concentrations of 
approximately 5–6 ng/L.
Improvements in analytical power, lower analytical 
instrument detection limits and innovative 
modelling approaches have led to the discovery of 
other steroid oestrogens in the environment, such 
as equine oestrogens used in hormone replacement 
therapies (Tyler et al., 2009). There are now also 
more accurate measurements (Williams et al., 
2003; Kanda and Churchley, 2008) and credible 
modelled estimates (Hannah et al., 2009) of steroid 
oestrogen concentrations present in sewage effluents 
and in rivers . This has caused a mixture of doubt 
and amazement at the possibility that EE2 could 
be causing endocrine disruption at the very low 
concentrations at which it is present. 
The last decade has also brought the realisation 
that risk assessments for mixtures of hormonally 
active chemicals are not adequately protective if 
based on data for individual substances. Mixtures of 
synthetic and natural oestrogens (EE2, E2, E1) each 
at or below their individual 'no effect' concentration 
were shown to be particularly potent when present 
in combination (Silva et al., 2002; Thorpe et al., 2003; 
Brian et al., 2005 and 2007) or with other industrial 
chemicals with anti‑androgenic (male‑hormone 
blocking) activity. These findings confirmed 
concerns originally mooted by Rachel Carson in 
1962 in her book, Silent Spring.
More recent reports show an almost concurrent 
incidence of anti‑androgenic chemicals and 
oestrogens in treated wastewater throughout the 
United Kingdom. Statistical modelling of exposure 
and effect data suggest that these chemicals (although 
not yet identified) could play a pivotal role in causing 
feminising effects in male fish in UK rivers. Until now 
it was thought that such effects were caused only by 
oestrogens found in contraceptive pills and some 
industrial chemicals (Jobling et al., 2009).
There may be a further twist in the story. Synthetic 
progesterones (which complement synthetic 
oestrogen in the contraceptive pill) have been 
identified in natural waters (Standley et al., 2008; 
Kuster et al., 2008) and reported to cause effects in 
fish when present at ng/L concentrations (Paulos 
et al., 2010; DeQuattro et al., 2012). Ironically, despite 
the history of their combined use, oestrogens 
and progesterones have yet to be tested in fish 'in 
combination', despite the fact that human females 
have been carrying out this 'test' for 50 years. 
13�6 From risk assessment to risk 
management 
In 2004, some 25 years after initial observations 
of intersex in fish, the UK government accepted 
the weight of evidence that EE2, E2 and E1 in 
combination posed a significant risk to aquatic 
life through their endocrine disrupting effects 
(Gross‑Sorokin et al., 2006). The long journey to 
this point was passionately championed by Geoff 
Brighty, Science Manager at the Environment Agency 
of England and Wales. His team, in collaboration 
with others, built and defended the evidence‑based 
case against steroid oestrogens and other endocrine 
disrupting chemicals in UK rivers.
As Brighty remarked in 2004, 'We now have enough 
data to act as a policy trigger for taking action' 
(ScienceBlog, 2004).
End‑of‑pipe treatment of effluent by water companies 
was chosen as the risk management approach, 
in comparison to alternative approaches (such as 
pharmaceutical industry action to develop substitutes 
for the active ingredient (EE2) in the pill). This may 
have partly reflected awareness of the public health 
benefits of the oral contraceptive, the fact that both 
naturally‑excreted and synthetic oestrogens posed 
risks via their endocrine disrupting effects (i.e. that 
both would need to be removed) and that other 
priority hazardous chemicals would also be reduced 
with the end‑of‑pipe treatment approach.
This would place the responsibility for risk 
management on the water industry and (ultimately) 
the cost of treatment of the tax paying public. In 
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2007 the Environment Agency began to develop a 
(draft) technical environmental quality standard 
(EQS) — a target concentration which could be 
used for regulatory compliance for EE2‑ based on a 
predicted no effect concentration of 0.1ng/L (Young 
et al., 2004, Figure 13.3). The Environment Agency 
also identified the EU Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) as an appropriate legislative mechanism 
within which the EQS could be enforced. Options 
for control under the WFD might be to propose EE2 
either as a nationally important 'specific pollutant, 
or an EU‑wide 'priority substance' requiring control 
across Europe. The WFD is the most important 
EU legislation for managing water resources 
and had already been used to regulate other 
endocrine disrupting chemicals such as TBT and 
nonylphenol. Since additional endocrine disrupting 
chemicals were likely to be proposed as 'specific 
pollutants' or 'priority substances' in order to 
decrease their overall environmental burden, this 
was a reasonable option for the steroid oestrogens. 
At this point, no other country in the world had 
Environmental Quality Standards for any of these 
substances (8).
Before introducing risk management of this type 
there is an important step known as risk evaluation, 
which quantifies the wider consequences and costs 
to society of the proposed management approach 
and balances them against the benefits. The various 
options on how to proceed are then evaluated 
and a decision made. For example, a regulatory 
impact assessment may be undertaken to evaluate 
the implications of bringing in regulation and 
implementing an EQS. 
In the case of EE2 and the other two steroid 
oestrogens it was necessary to understand the 
efficiency of various treatment approaches in 
removing these substances from sewage treatment 
plant final effluents. The approaches included both 
existing and new (advanced) treatment methods: 
these would need to be quantified in terms of both 
financial and carbon costs. 
In 2004 the UK water industry, in collaboration 
with the Environment Agency and the 
UK government, and under the watchful eye of 
the independent auditor Ofwat, commenced a 
comprehensive and lengthy work programme 
to address this goal. The so‑called 'National 
Demonstration Programme' (Gross‑Sorokin, 2006) 
was budgeted at GBP 25–40 million and was 
not welcomed by the UK water industry, which 
financed most of the costs. All ten water companies 
in England and Wales were involved. 
In the first phase of the programme fourteen sewage 
treatment plants were used to evaluate the efficiency 
of oestrogen removal through 'conventional' 
treatment technologies. These consisted of primary 
or chemically aided primary sedimentation with 
secondary treatment by nitrifying, non‑nitrifying 
activated sludge (ASP) or biological filtration and 
in some cases tertiary sand or biologically aerated 
filtration. In the second phase, two so‑called 
'full‑scale' plants were used to evaluate the most 
promising new technology as an additional 
Note:  In rivers and streams coloured red the suggested 
Predicted No Effect Concentration (PNEC) for EE2 
of 0.1 ng/L is exceeded. In rivers coloured green 
the combined concentrations of steroid oestrogens 
(in EE2 equivalents) are less than the suggested PNEC.
Figure 13�3 UK rivers and streams exceeding 
the Predicted No Effect 
Concentration (PNEC) for EE2
(8) In the US, for example, the FDA regulates pharmaceutical manufacture and the EPA regulates discharge under the Clean Water Act. 
However, these limitations may not be strict enough to protect the environment because they are technology-based and do not rely on 
environmental data. As explained later, there is no treatment technique currently available that comprehensively deals with EE2.
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advanced tertiary effluent treatment: granular 
activated carbon (GAC).
The first phase of the Demonstration Programme 
was completed in mid‑2008 (UKWIR, 2009). Results 
showed that while existing treatment approaches 
were effective for removal of oestrone and oestradiol, 
particularly using nitrifying activated sludge 
treatment, EE2 was far harder to remove. The most 
efficient treatment, nitrifying ASP, removed some 
54 %, with tertiary treatments accounting for a further 
reduction of 0–38 % of that remaining, depending on 
the form of tertiary treatment.
These results are completely in line with the 
consensus seen in current international scientific 
literature, as comprehensively reviewed by Racz and 
Goel (2010). Wastewater treatment plants with long 
retention times (greater than 10 days), especially 
those performing nitrification, seem to be generally 
more effective at removing oestrogens because they 
allow the enrichment of slow‑growing bacteria, 
such as nitrifying bacteria, and the establishment 
of a more diverse ecological community including 
species capable of degrading EE2. For this reason, 
expensive membrane bioreactors with microfiltration 
and ultrafiltration as well as long retention times 
have been shown to effectively degrade and reduce 
the concentrations of oestrogens in effluents, 
including EE2. 
In general, however, EE2 is not nearly as easily 
biologically removed as the other oestrogens. The 
ethinyl group of EE2 is thought to hinder EE2 
sorption and metabolism. Furthermore, EE2 often 
exists in the aquatic environment at concentrations 
below those at which a substrate can support bacterial 
growth. Biodegradation studies at EE2 concentrations 
greater than those found in natural environments 
(mainly conducted at such concentrations due 
to limitations in analytical chemistry techniques) 
may therefore lead to erroneous conclusions about 
the occurrence, rates and products of microbial 
transformation of EE2 and the other steroid 
oestrogens. 
As a consequence of removal inefficiencies, the 
proposed EE2 Predicted No Effect Concentration 
(PNEC) of 0.1 ng/L is exceeded in many UK final 
effluents entering the aquatic environment, 
irrespective of conventional treatment type (see 
Figure 13.3). The results of the second phase of the 
UK Demonstration Programme were reported in 
May 2010 (NDP, 2010). They showed that additional 
treatment using a novel approach called granular 
activated carbon (GAC) can be effective at removing 
EE2, producing final effluents below the EE2 PNEC 
and with no significant induction in fish VTG or 
intersex (Filby et al., 2010; Baynes et al., 2012). GAC 
could therefore offer the most promising route for 
preventing EE2's entry into the aquatic environment 
at harmful levels (noting that in one study 
reproduction in fish was slightly, but significantly 
impacted by effluent subjected to GAC treatment). 
The Demonstration Programme showed, however, 
that GAC suffers from a fundamental problem: it is 
expensive to implement.
For a small town with a 50 000 population 
equivalent (PE) sewage treatment plant, the capital 
costs alone of setting up additional GAC were 
calculated as being over EUR 3 million. That rose to 
over EUR 8 million for a 250 000 PE works serving a 
large town such as Swindon, which was one of the 
sites chosen in the United Kingdom for assessing 
the technology. Operating costs per annum were 
calculated as being EUR 800 000 for a 250 000 PE 
sewage treatment plant, but this would depend 
on the life of the granular activated carbon. Costs 
were calculated to approximately 14 kg of CO2 per 
person per year. Provisional estimates by the UK 
government showed that, in total for England and 
Wales, this would translate into costs of between 
EUR 32 and 37 billion for the approximately 
1 360 sewage treatment works that would require 
additional treatment (Owen and Jobling, 2012). 
Again, these findings are in line with the findings 
of Racz and Goel (2010), who concluded that 'Much 
attention has also been placed on studying methods 
of removing oestrogens prior to discharging 
effluent or disposing waste sludge. While advanced 
treatment systems such as chemical removal, 
activated carbon, chlorination, ozonation, ultraviolet 
irradiation, membrane separation, and other novel 
approaches may be effective, their current capital 
and operation costs may make them not viable 
options.' 
Faced with this information, those tasked with 
implemention of an EQS for EE2 (for example as 
a 'priority substance' under the Water Framework 
Directive, see below) increasingly began to worry 
about two important considerations: technical 
feasibility and disproportionate cost. It confirmed 
what they had suspected for many years: EE2 was 
potent and hard to get rid of. 
Evaluation of risk management costs, which 
have to be calculated at a national scale given 
the widespread nature of endocrine disruption 
(Figure 13.4), is however only one half of the cost 
benefit equation. They must be balanced against the 
(often intangible) benefits of risk management to 
key stakeholders, such as the angling community, 
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and the public, who will ultimately have to pay 
for it. This has been a highly contested and often 
acrimonious area of debate, with highly charged 
discussions about what constitutes harm at the 
level of individual fish and what it means for (more 
ecologically important) fish populations. Adding 
to this debate is the fact that the costs associated 
with removing EE2 and E2 should not be seen in 
isolation: treatment such as GAC would also quite 
possibly serve to reduce/remove other substances 
posing risks to the environment and requiring 
control. Why should such removal costs not be 
considered for all such chemicals as a whole: is it 
scientifically incorrect to blame just EE2 for the 
costs? 
Another consideration is how such costs might 
scale at an EU‑wide level, where EU‑wide 
regulation might occur. One European Commission 
estimate for this is EUR 11–18 per person per 
annum (EC, 2012). EUREAU (European Federation 
of National Associations of Water and Wastewater 
Services) however estimates that these costs 
are much higher; 25–50 % of the current annual 
sewerage charges per year (EUREAU initial position 
paper on amending Directives 2000/60/EC and 
2008/105/EC as regards priority substances in the 
field of water policy). There is clearly considerable 
uncertainty here.
The costs at an individual country level are likely 
to vary on a country by country basis, for example 
varying with the population density, status of 
wastewater treatment and size of rivers. In some 
cases individual country costs may be substantially 
lower than those estimated for the United Kingdom 
(e.g. see EU project Neptune and the Swiss project 
Micropoll; Eawag, 2009). Many European countries 
have lower population densities and much greater 
dilution of effluents in their receiving rivers than 
seen in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the total 
national costs of complying with any regulation 
concerning EE2 could be considerably lower in these 
countries than in the United Kingdom. In addition, 
the quality of treatment plants in mainland Western 
Europe is in general higher than in the United 
Kingdom. In Germany, for example, most sewage 
treatment plants have three stages and some even 
have a fourth stage, whilst in the United Kingdom, 
two stages are most commonly encountered. As 
we have already noted, the addition of a third 
stage, whether it be GAC, mild ozonation or simple 
sand filtration could cause dramatic reductions 
in estrogen concentrations and their biological 
effects on fish. As recently demonstrated by Baynes 
et al. (2012) using biological effects rather than 
chemical concentrations as measures of effective 
risk reduction, sand filtration following activated 
sludge treatment was almost as effective as GAC at 
preventing the feminisation of male fish albeit it was 
two thirds cheaper. 
For a number of years the decision of whether or not 
to regulate EE2 appeared to stall in the still waters of 
cost‑benefit analysis, with little chance of resolution 
and little movement forward. Then, in January 2012, 
the European Commission proposed a revised list 
of 'priority substances' for the Water Framework 
Directive (EC 2012). This included the oestrogens 
17β-oestradiol	and	17α-ethinyloestradiol.	The	
proposed regulatory EQS for EE2 was 0.035 ng/L 
for inland surface waters (e.g. rivers and lakes): 
this is the annually‑averaged limit in these water 
bodies. If this proposed EQS is adopted (a first 
vote on which occurs in the European Parliament's 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
Committee in November 2012), it could be taken 
into account in the 2015 updated River Basin 
Management Plans and associated 'Programmes of 
Measures' across Europe, with enforcement required 
by 2021. But even now, nearly 75 years after its 
Figure 13�4 Extent of sexual disruption in 
roach in English rivers
Note:  Intersex was present at 44 (86 %) of 51 sites 
surveyed, with an aggregate incidence of intersex of 
23 % of sampled males. Coloured symbols indicate 
incidence of intersex at the different river sites 
surveyed. 
Source: Taylor et al., 2005.
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initial manufacture in 1938, and decades of research 
concerning its environmental endocrine disrupting 
effects, this remains a proposal requiring agreement: 
the decision to regulate or not is yet to be made and 
may be stalled by recent representations to the EC 
from both the water and pharmaceutical industries 
(EUREAU, 2012).
Indeed in July 2012 an amendment to this proposal 
was tabled, stating 'It is appropriate not to specify 
the EQS for certain substances of pharmaceutical 
relevance that have been added to the list of priority 
substances' and that 'The Commission should 
propose the EQS for these substances in the next 
review of the list in 2016, and appropriate measures 
should be introduced…with the aim of meeting the 
EQS by 2027' (9).
13�7 Late lessons
Ethinyloestradiol, the active ingredient in the 
birth control pill, has allowed women to control 
their fertility reliably on a global scale. But it has 
come at a price to the environment. As mixtures, 
EE2 and other oestrogens, both synthetic and 
natural, have been shown to have serious impacts 
on wildlife — impacts that can be associated with 
early life exposure but manifest themselves later 
in adult life. Such impacts are often sub‑lethal but 
may be permanent and irreversible. They may also 
serve as sentinels for impacts on human health 
via environmental oestrogen or other endocrine 
disrupting chemical exposure. 
Since wildlife is exposed to a cocktail of endocrine 
disrupting chemicals, it is naive to conclude that 
EE2 alone is the culprit. It is, however, the most 
potently oestrogenic of the steroid oestrogens, 
occurring widely in effluents entering the 
environment, at concentrations that can frequently 
exceed the Predicted No Effect Concentration 
of 0.1 parts per trillion (UKWIR, 2009). There is 
reasonable certainty, based on sufficient scientific 
evidence, that EE2 plays a significant role in 
causing the reproductive health impacts observed 
in fish. The need for risk management has been 
accepted by both the Environment Agency of 
England and Wales (Gross‑Sorokin et al., 2006) and 
by the European Commission through its proposal 
for EE2 to become a priority substance requiring 
control (EC, 2012).
But this is a story that is far from over, and is one 
that continues to raise important questions that will 
apply not only to EE2 but to any other pollutants 
exerting damaging but often sub‑lethal effects at 
very low concentrations. For a decision to regulate 
EE2 has not been agreed. A critical question 
is whether we as a society are willing to pay a 
potentially very high premium to be precautionary 
and exclude EE2 from the environment. 
Alternatively, would we, as a society, prefer to live 
with the impacts of EE2 and other oestrogens on 
wildlife; are they acceptable risks? To what extent 
is society, which ultimately bears the benefits of 
flexible fertility but also the costs of cleaning up 
its unintended consequences on the environment, 
having a say on this decision?
This historical retrospective allows us to identify 
several important lessons, which are central 
not only to regulation of EE2 and other steroid 
oestrogens but also for many other low‑level 
chemical pollutants in the environment with 
sublethal effects, alone or in combination, now and 
in the future. 
13.7.1 Lesson 1: for low-level pollutants in 
the environment, is the price of being 
precautionary simply too high?
With regulation of EE2 now a serious proposal 
in Europe, the water industry, regulators and 
national governments are faced (as will be the case 
with many other low‑level pollutants) with risk 
management that will be a costly process if EE2 is 
to be removed from sewage treatment works final 
effluents to the vanishingly low levels that will be 
required for compliance. The target level proposed 
by the EC for EE2 as an annual EQS has been set at 
0.035 ng/L for inland surface waters (e.g. rivers and 
lakes). This is the regulatory concentration in the 
water body itself, not in the final effluent discharged 
from the sewage treatment works. However, as the 
UK Demonstration Programme has shown, reducing 
levels of EE2 in final effluents via end‑of‑pipe 
treatment to enable compliance with this EQS 
(e.g. for those water bodies with low dilution 
receiving large volumes of oestrogenic effluent) 
will be extremely difficult, The most promising 
technology, granular activated carbon, might achieve 
this, but it is expensive and may have a potentially 
large carbon footprint. Mild ozonation may also be 
(9) Draft report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2000/60/EC and 
2008/105/EC as regards priority substances in the field of water policy (17.07.2012). Proposer Richard Seeber, European Member 
of Parliament.
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effective, but this will still be expensive in terms of 
capital set up costs (10).
Measuring compliance with the low EQS for EE2 and 
E2 will also be a significant challenge. The techniques 
available to measure such very low levels of EE2 in 
natural waters and effluents are hardly routine. Some 
efforts have been made to develop more amenable 
enzyme‑linked immunoassay analysis methods but 
these have been fraught with issues around selectivity 
and sensitivity at the very low levels of detection 
required. This leaves both the water industry and 
regulators with a fundamental problem: it will be 
costly to remove EE2 to enable compliance with the 
target EQS, and costly to monitor and demonstrate 
legal compliance itself. So while it is technically 
possible to develop an EQS, in practice it may be 
very hard to implement. The widespread nature of 
contamination has only added to the problem: this 
is unlikely to be an issue in one isolated location, but 
one with significant cost implications across Europe 
and beyond. 
What other options might there be? Since EE2 is 
both the most potent of the steroid oestrogens 
and, seemingly, the most difficult to remove by 
conventional sewage treatment, could there be an 
argument for substituting this as the active ingredient 
in the contraceptive pill, leaving the remaining 
oestrogens to be removed conventionally at less cost? 
But what would replace it? If there were sufficient 
demand or need, the pharmaceutical industry could 
continue to provide women with access to birth 
control and reproductive choice while substantively 
altering the design of pharmaceuticals to protect the 
environment from unnecessary harm. This would 
represent a constructive precautionary approach (11). 
Is this option preferable?
13.7.2 Lesson 2: low-level pollutants with sublethal 
effects present fundamental issues for the 
precautionary principle
A number of definitions and interpretations of 
the precautionary principle exist (see Weiner 
and Rogers, 2002; Gee, 2006), of which the Rio 
Declaration (UN, 1992) is one that is widely cited:
'Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost‑effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation' (12).
The chapter on the precautionary principle (PP) in 
this volume, provides different definitions of the 
PP taken from other international treaties and the 
European Court of Justice, including the working 
definition proposed by the EEA which is designed to 
improve common understanding about the meaning 
and application of the PP. 
However, for this chapter it will be useful to consider 
the constituent parts of the Rio definition, the first 
of which deals with threats of serious or irreversible 
damage. 
It is not in dispute that intersex in fish represents 
both serious and irreversible damage to fish and 
that exposure to environmentally relevant levels 
of EE2 has adverse effects on fish reproduction, 
an ecologically relevant measure of impact. 
Uncertainties remain, particularly around fish 
population level effects, but the precautionary 
principle aims to promote action in the face of such 
uncertainties, when there is evidence of serious 
environmental damage that is irreversible. In fact, 
the level of scientific certainty concerning the 
risks (or threats) posed by oestrogens as mixtures 
to aquatic life, mediated through their endocrine 
disrupting effects is extremely high and there 
seems to be little or no doubt that there is sufficient 
evidence to justify applying the precautionary 
principle (Gross‑Sorokin et al., 2006). Responding 
to this evidence of harm, the water and chemical 
industries (and indeed some scientists) have 
increasingly asked the question, 'so what?' There 
may be male fish with eggs in their testes and this 
might be unpleasant, irreversible and widespread. 
But does it seriously damage fish populations? 
(Webb et al., 2003). Why pay potentially vast sums 
(10) It should be noted that some European countries have decided to clean up wastewater, even in the absence of regulation of EE2 
and E2, but in recognition of contamination of wastewater by pharmaceuticals, pesticides and endocrine disruptors. Full-scale 
treatments will be installed on more than 100 Swiss WWTP treating about 80 % of the Swiss municipal wastewater. The first 
full-scale ozonation plant will go in operation in Spring 2013 and will cost only 5 EUR/person/year including both capital and 
operational costs, because sand filtration already exists on this plant.
(11) There has been some research towards development of contraceptive formulations such as the progesterone-only pill, which do not 
contain oestrogen and instead target the female reproductive cycle more specifically (Lakha et al., 2007).
(12)  A European Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC, 2000) sets out guidance on when to apply the 
precautionary principle e.g. 'where there are reasonable grounds for concern'. The Communication sets out a set of general 
principles underpinning application of the PP This includes 'examining costs and benefits' which 'entails comparing the overall 
cost to the Community of action and lack of action, in both the short and long term. This is not simply an economic cost-benefit 
analysis: its scope is much broader, and includes non-economic considerations, such as the efficacy of possible options and their 
acceptability to the public' (p. 4). It also includes the need for the decision-making process to be 'transparent'.
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of money for risk management when the seriousness 
of such population — level effects is uncertain? 
These populations might collapse in the future, as 
indicated in the Great Lakes study of EE2 (Kidd 
et al., 2007), but maybe they will not. Is intersex an 
unpalatable but acceptable harm?
But even if the seriousness of the harmful threats 
is accepted, the precautionary principle's Achilles 
heel, however, as defined in the Rio Declaration, 
lies in the words 'cost effective'. The central issue 
for oestrogens (and quite possibly for many other 
chemicals that cause sublethal impacts at very low 
levels) is that any risk management measures are 
likely to be very costly, and as we have discussed 
above, this may be a price too high to pay.
The potentially high costs of risk management 
have combined with protracted debates about 
what constitutes acceptable harm to seriously 
delay decision‑making about the regulation of 
EE2 and other steroid oestrogens. This has been 
compounded by a precautionary principle whose 
definition includes issues of disproportionate 
cost and cost effectiveness, either explicitly or 
implicitly (13). Defined in this way the precautionary 
principle may be logical and rational, but it can also 
paradoxically become a perfect excuse for inaction 
or, at best, seriously delayed action. It is therefore 
perhaps no surprise that eight years after the 
UK government officially recognised EE2 and other 
steroid oestrogens as posing a risk to wildlife that 
should be managed, and some 30 years after the first 
observations of their effects in wild fish populations, 
that the regulation of EE2 is still undecided. And 
even if the EC proposal is agreed, it will not come 
into force until at least 2015.
Such long delays have, one might argue, been 
completely within the spirit of the precautionary 
principle at least as defined in the Rio declaration. 
The precautionary principle is well intended and 
should expedite decision‑making in the face of 
uncertainty. But in reality decision‑making has been 
painfully slow. We are left with the uncomfortable 
knowledge of a serious environmental issue that has 
been, and continues to be, unresolved: one which 
we may have to live with if the price of precaution is 
deemed too high. This is a bitter pill to swallow.
13.7.3 Lesson 3: the need for an open debate on 
precaution and decision-making 
Our environment is full of low‑level pollutants 
present as mixtures that cause sublethal effects. 
The European Inventory of Existing Commercial 
Chemical Substances (EINECS) lists over 
100 000 chemical compounds and little is known 
about the toxicity of about 75 % of them. Several 
hundred new substances are marketed each year after 
some basic premarket toxicity testing and these are 
registered in the European List of Notified Chemical 
Substances (ELINCS), which currently contains about 
2 000 chemicals. 
In 2007 the new chemicals EU regulation, REACH 
(Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
restriction of CHemicals) was enacted. This 
reformed chemicals laws and set up procedures and 
responsibilities to address the backlog of untested 
chemicals, focusing on some 30 000 substances 
now being evaluated by industry and the new 
EU chemicals agency ECHA. Hazard identification 
and quantification is challenging however, and 
implementing monitoring programmes and 
conducting risk assessments for this whole 'chemicals 
universe' is unfeasible. Moreover, we do not have 
the tools to fully analyse how mixtures of these 
chemicals behave. The only logical way forward 
seems to be to reduce exposure as much as possible 
— to be precautionary. But this comes at a price 
and raises ethical questions of where responsibility 
should lie. Do we want the water industry to reduce 
exposure through costly treatment? Do we want the 
pharmaceutical industries to invest in developing 
new, less harmful contraceptive pills? Either way, are 
we as a society, prepared to pay for it? Do we care? 
The average fish in a stream or person in the street 
now has hundreds of novel compounds in their 
bodies that were not there 60 years ago. We can 
measure them in adult and foetal tissue. We know 
they have detrimental effects such as intersex in fish. 
We have changed the chemical environment of the 
developing organism. EE2 is a perfect case study 
of how we are responding as a society to difficult 
decisions regarding the need for, and challenges of, 
risk management for these low‑level pollutants with 
chronic sublethal effects. 
(13) The EU communication on the precautionary principle also recommends an 'Examination of the benefits and costs of action and lack 
of action'. This 'examination of the pros and cons should include an economic cost benefit analysis where this is appropriate and 
possible.However, such an 'examination of the pros and cons cannot be reduced to an economic cost-benefit analysis'. It is wider in 
scope and includes non-economic considerations (EC, 2000). The EEA working definition of the PP also uses the broader 'pros and 
cons' rather than 'costs and benefits' for similar reasons, including the importance of the non-quantifiable 'cons' such as the melt 
down of public trust in scientists and policticians which occurred in the BSE saga (see EEA, 2001, Ch. 15 on BSE).
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A key observation from this case study is that the 
public has been and continues to be silent witnesses. 
A key lesson learnt from previous case studies 
(EEA, 2001; Gee, 2006; Lokke, 2006) has been that 
the process of applying precaution must encourage 
public participation, such that the costs of action 
(e.g. risk management) and potential costs of inaction 
are debated. This enables value judgements and 
decisions to be made in an open and democratic 
way. Transparency of decision‑making and the need 
to involve all interested parties as early as possible 
is a central tenet of the European Commission 
communication on the precautionary principle 
(EC, 2000), which states that:
'All interested parties should be involved 
to the fullest extent possible in the study of 
various risk management options that may 
be envisaged once the results of the scientific 
evaluation and/or risk assessment are available.'
The US National Academy of Sciences has also 
repeatedly stressed the importance and need 
for stakeholder involvement at all stages of the 
risk‑based decision‑making process (NAS, 2009.) 
Prior to this, in 1998 the UK Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution published a report on 
Setting Environmental Standards (RCEP, 1998) in 
which it emphasised that decisions must be informed 
by an early understanding of peoples values, with 
a process that ensures transparency and openness. 
This is a view that is shared by the chemicals industry 
(Webb et al., 2003). 
The Royal Commission also identified specific 
mechanisms by which this could be achieved. It 
stated that those affected have a right to make 
their views known before a decision is made and 
that 'it is no longer acceptable for decisions to be 
negotiated privately between the regulator and 
polluter' (RCEP, 1998). This was fully endorsed 
by the UK government in their response to the 
Commission's report. But this endorsement is yet to 
translate into action. Opportunities for engagement 
and consultation that do exist are insufficient (14).
Decisions regarding regulation of EE2 and its sister 
oestrogens, and the dilemmas and issues these 
pose, have been, and continue to be undertaken 
in a poorly understood, closed process that has 
little engaged the public. It is vitally important 
that decision‑makers understand about the 
acceptability of risk, appetite for precaution and 
the willingness to pay for being precautionary. 
The views and concerns of the public have to 
date however gone largely undocumented. This 
is not an academic exercise: it is fundamental 
to making a decision on such a complex and 
potentially costly issue, a point emphasised by 
the Royal Commission in 1998 and the European 
Commission in 2000. Without public support the 
costs of risk management, of regulation of EE2, 
may be seen by policy makers as disproportionate. 
It might be that the weight of evidence suggests 
that public opinion is not on the side of risk 
management, that we are prepared to live with 
endocrine disruption in the environment as 
collateral damage associated with flexible fertility 
in our own species. But what is very clear is that 
without asking the public it will be far easier to 
come to a conclusion based largely on costs alone. 
This loads the dice before they are thrown. 
(14) For example in the development of the next round of River Basin Management Plans across the EU under the Water Framework 
Directive. 
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1938 17α-ethinyl estradiol (EE2) synthesised
1943 EE2 marketed as a contraceptive
1962–1969 USFDA approve the birth control pill and the United Kingdom allows it to be prescribed through its National Health 
Service
1970 Pill users increase in number from 50 000 to 1 million
1976 First speculation that oral contraceptives might pass through sewage treatment works (STWs) into the aquatic 
environment
1979 Kinloch Nelson and Bunge publish a study showing low sperm counts in 93 % of men about to undergo vasectomies
1982 Routine	health	checks	of	male	fish	(roach)	in	a	UK	river	show	the	presence	of	oocytes	in	testes	(intersex).	The	rate	
of hermaphroditism is very high in comparison to the norm
Mid-1980s First reports of contraceptive pill hormones in river water
1985 High	levels	of	female-specific	yolk	protein	(vitellogenin)	found	in	blood	of	male	fish	in	a	fish	farm	receiving	effluent	
containing river water
1985 Nonylphenols	discovered	in	sewage	effluents	and	in	sludge
1991 National	survey	shows	that	oestrogenic	effluents	are	widespread	in	England	and	Wales
1991 4-Nonylphenol is rediscovered as an oestrogen
1992 Meta-analysis of 61 studies shows sperm counts have declined 50 % in the preceding 50 years
1993 Theo Colborn and Clement publish 'The Wildlife Human Connection' suggesting widespread endocrine disrupting 
effects in wildlife and humans as a result of exposure to chemicals
1994–1996 Sharpe and Skakkebaek publish a hypothesis that testicular cancer, hypospadias, cryptorchidism and lowered semen 
quality are part of a syndrome caused by exposure to environmental oestrogens during foetal life
1993 BBC Horizon screens the award-winning documentary 'Assault on the male'
1995–1996 Surveys	show	that	intersex	is	widespread	in	roach	and	is	especially	prevalent	downstream	of	STWs	with	low	effluent	
dilution. Feminising syndromes in other wildlife species are reported
1996 Major European workshop on endocrine disruptors are held, jointly sponsored by the European Commission, the 
European	Environment	Agency,	the	European	Centre	for	Environment	and	Health	and	the	World	Health	Organization
1998 Steroid oestrogens, and EE2 in particular, are shown to be the most potent oestrogenically active substances in 
domestic	effluent
1998 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution publishes a report Setting environmental standards, in which it 
emphasises that decisions must be informed by an early understanding of people's values. It is endorsed by the 
United Kingdom government
1999 European Union launches a Strategy on endocrine disrupters
2001 Feminisation is shown to be a permanent phenomenon that is progressive with age i.e. duration of exposure
2001 Schering publish a whole life-cycle study showing EE2 causing full sex reversal of males to females at concentrations 
> 2 ng/L
2002 Silva et al. show additive effects of oestrogenic endocrine disrupting chemicals in vitro: 'something from nothing'
2002-2003 More	widespread	surveys	show	intersex	fish	are	present	throughout	the	United	Kingdom.	Widespread	anti-
androgenic	activity	is	discovered	in	sewage	effluents
2003 Nonylphenol and nonyphenol ethoxylates are banned in the European Union as a hazard to human and 
environmental safety. Serious evaluations of other endocrine disruptors such as BPA take place
2004 Predicted No Effect Concentration (PNEC) of 0.1 ng/L derived for EE2
2004 UK	Endocrine	Disruption	Demonstration	Programme	commences,	evaluating	the	efficiency	of	removing	oestrogens	
from sewage treatment processes 
2007 Draft environmental quality standard for EE2 prepared by the Environment Agency of England and Wales
2008 Experimental	lakes	study	in	Canada	reports	a	population	crash	of	fish	after	exposure	to	EE2	at	6	ng/L
2009 UK	Demonstration	Programme	reports	first	phase	results	showing	difficulty	removing	EE2	to	the	PNEC	using	
conventional sewage treatment approaches
2012 European Commission publishes proposals to regulate EE2 as a 'Priority Substance' under the EU Water Framework 
Directive, which if accepted may come into force after 2015. An amendment to this proposal is tabled in July 2012 
which proposes delay of setting EQS until 2016, with the aim of meeting this by 2027'
Table 13�1 Early warnings and actions
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for helping to prepare the manuscript.
  
The first scientifically credible early warning about the possible dangers of climate change due to 
carbon	dioxide	(CO2) emissions from burning fossil fuels came in 1897. While the basic physical 
principles of global warming are simple, however, the more detailed science of climate change 
is exceedingly complicated. Even now, more than a hundred years since the first early warning, 
many important details of climate change cannot be predicted with certainty. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the science of climate change and questions about the true value of burning 
fossil fuels have fostered sustained scientific and political controversy.
When the first volume of Late lessons from early warnings was drafted there appeared to be too 
much legitimate controversy about climate change for the issue to be included. A case study 
could have led to arguments that distracted attention from the valuable and robust lessons from 
more established issues such as asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and the ozone-hole, X-rays and acid rain. This decision was taken despite the then 
widespread acceptance that 'the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on 
global climate' (IPCC, 1995a).
Over	a	decade	later	and	after	two	more	reviews	by	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	
Change (IPCC) of a much greater volume of climate change science it seemed appropriate to 
include climate change in this volume, despite some continuing controversy. The evidence that 
human activities are having a dangerous impact on the climate has strengthened since 1995. 
By 2007, the IPCC was able to conclude with 'very high confidence that the global net effect 
of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming' (IPCC, 2007a). Given the size and 
irreversibility (on human time scales) of many of the harmful effects of human-induced climate 
change,	there	is	an	urgent	need	for	action	to	reduce	CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases. 
Some contrarian views persist, however, as the authors illustrate.
This chapter summarises the history of growing knowledge about human-induced climate change 
and of the main actions, or inactions that accompanied it. Like many other chapters, it reflects 
the lifelong commitment of both authors to trying to understand and mitigate the effects of 
human-induced climate change. It concludes with some lessons and insights that are relevant to 
many other environmental and health issues.
Also included is a panel text describing how the IPCC's approach to assessing uncertainty evolved 
between its first to its fifth assessment reports.
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14�1 Introduction
The climate provides the background for the 
development of human civilisation. Historically, it 
has been a decisive factor determining where and 
how people live, what they eat, how they clothe 
themselves, how they structure their activities, 
where and why they travel, what hazards they 
face, and how they organise their response to those 
hazards. In fact, almost every aspect of human and 
social life is closely linked to climatic factors. 
At the same time, the goal of becoming less 
dependent on the climate's vagaries has been an 
important driver for the development of human 
civilisation. Humans have learned how to construct 
shelters to protect themselves and their belongings 
from cold and rain, how to build irrigation systems 
that allow food production despite erratic rainfall, 
how to conserve and store food to prevent starvation 
at times when there are few natural food sources 
available, and so on. 
Growing use of fossil fuels since the industrial 
revolution has arguably been the key factor enabling 
humankind to separate decisions about where and 
how to live from the local climatic conditions. Today, 
fossil fuels allow a significant fraction of humankind 
to heat or cool a building at the press of a button, to 
pump water over long distances and even between 
watersheds, to transport food across continents, 
often in artificially cooled environments, and to fly 
to holiday destinations with particularly attractive 
climates. 
During recent decades, a rapidly increasing body 
of scientific knowledge has identified unexpectedly 
close links between these two major driving forces 
of social and economic development: the climate 
and burning fossil fuels. We now know that the 
use of fossil fuels, which has allowed the wealthy 
part of humankind to become less dependent 
on climate factors, is substantially changing the 
radiative properties of the atmosphere. It is thereby 
causing changes to the global climate system that are 
unprecedented at least since the end of the last ice 
age. 
Ironically, or tragically, the societies that have 
contributed most to the problem of anthropogenic 
(i.e. man‑made) climate change are generally least 
affected by its impacts, and vice versa. The massive 
use of fossil fuels — and the economic wealth that 
typically goes with it — allow fossil fuel‑intensive 
societies to largely protect themselves from the 
vagaries of climate variability and weather extremes. 
In contrast, poor people who use little fossil fuels 
and who have contributed least to the problem have 
limited resources to cope with the hazards brought 
about by anthropogenic climate change. Worse still, 
they often live in regions with an already marginal 
climate. 
It is not surprising that the strong links between 
these two fundamental drivers of human societies 
and their evolution have brought about an 
unprecedented level of interest, debate and conflict 
in the public, the media and at all political levels. 
Climate change policy has become a key item 
on the agenda of many high‑level international 
meetings. In fact, the fifteenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP15) 
in Copenhagen in December 2009 was the second 
largest assembly of Heads of State and Heads of 
Government ever to occur outside the New York 
Headquarters of the United Nations (after the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992).
Anthropogenic climate change is in many ways 
a unique problem. First, the anticipated (and 
increasingly observed) effects of climate change 
and of climate protection policies are very large 
and widespread. Second, the expected 'winners' 
and 'losers' from climate change and from climate 
policies are very unequally distributed across 
the world and across time, which raises difficult 
questions of international and intergenerational 
equity. Third, the science of climate change and 
its interactions with other social and economic 
developments is extremely complex, which prevents 
clear‑cut answers on many questions of particular 
relevance for decision‑makers (e.g. on specific local 
and regional impacts of climate change). 
Against the backdrop of an increasingly charged 
public and political environment, the science 
of climate change is continuously developing, 
producing robust results and identifying key 
uncertainties. In parallel to the evolution of science, 
unique institutions have been created to facilitate the 
transfer of scientific knowledge to decision‑makers. 
Other forces have developed to obstruct this 
knowledge transfer by creating unfounded 
confusion even around robust scientific findings. As 
a consequence, climate scientists find themselves in 
an increasingly politicised environment.
Climate change is, of course, not the only global 
problem undermining the planet's ecosystems and 
economies. The loss of biodiversity, increasing 
water scarcity, dispersion of toxic chemicals, loss of 
productive land due to erosion and overgrazing, and 
the depletion of natural resources are, like climate 
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change, the result of human societies' unsustainable 
practices. A global response was formulated at the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 
with the adoption of Agenda 21 for sustainable 
development (UN, 1992). The subsequently adopted 
Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2000) establish 
a clear link between eradicating widespread 
poverty (Goal 1) and ensuring environmental 
sustainability (Goal 7). This development dimension 
is fundamental to dealing effectively with climate 
change, although in practice much of the scientific 
and policy discussion on climate change has been 
narrowly focused.
This chapter attempts to shed light on the 
co‑evolution of climate change science and 
international climate policy by presenting key 
events, important actors and institutions, and the 
main conflicts. The focus is on the science‑policy 
interface, the role of the precautionary principle 
in helping to deal with scientific and social 
uncertainties of long‑term climate change, the link 
with the broader sustainable development agenda 
and the lessons that can be drawn so far. 
14�2 Early development of the scientific 
knowledge base on human-induced 
climate change until the 1970s
First hints of the greenhouse gas effect
The greenhouse effect, as currently understood, is 
described in Box 14.1. The first hint of its existence 
dates back to the 1800s. Based on observations by 
Saussure from the late 18th and early 19th century, 
the Frenchman Joseph Baptiste Fourier correctly 
understood the observed atmospheric vertical 
 
Box 14�1 The greenhouse effect (IPCC definition)
Greenhouse gases effectively absorb thermal infrared radiation, emitted by the Earth's surface, by the 
atmosphere itself due to the same gases, and by clouds. Atmospheric radiation is emitted to all sides, 
including downward to the Earth's surface. Thus greenhouse gases trap heat within the surface-troposphere 
system. This is called the greenhouse effect. Thermal infrared radiation in the troposphere is strongly 
coupled to the temperature of the atmosphere at the altitude at which it is emitted. In the troposphere, 
the temperature generally decreases with height. Effectively, infrared radiation emitted to space originates 
from an altitude with a temperature of, on average, – 19 °C, in balance with the net incoming solar 
radiation, whereas the Earth's surface is kept at a much higher temperature of, on average, + 14 °C. An 
increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases leads to an increased infrared opacity of the atmosphere, 
and therefore to an effective radiation into space from a higher altitude at a lower temperature. This 
causes a radiative forcing that leads to an enhancement of the greenhouse effect, the so-called enhanced 
greenhouse effect. 
Source: IPCC, 2007d.
temperature gradient (i.e. the observation that upper 
layers of the atmosphere are colder than lower 
layers) to be similar to the observed strong heating 
caused by a glass plate on an insulated box (Fourier, 
1824). Up until that time, the absorption properties 
of atmospheric gases had been completely 
unknown. 
Absorption of heat radiation by atmospheric trace 
gases
Nearly 40 years later, in 1863, John Tyndall, an 
Irishman working in Great Britain, published a 
remarkably precise description of the atmospheric 
greenhouse effect, which comes close to modern 
definitions: 
'The solar heat possesses the power of crossing 
an atmosphere, but, when the heat is absorbed 
by the planet, it is so changed in quality that 
the rays emanating from the planet cannot get 
with the same freedom back into space. Thus 
the atmosphere admits the entrance of the 
solar heat but checks its exit, and the result is 
a tendency to accumulate heat at the surface of 
the planet' (Tyndall, 1863a).
Tyndall based his definition on his own observations 
of the absorption characteristics of atmospheric trace 
gases, including the key absorption bands of water 
vapour and carbon dioxide, which account for about 
80 % of the total atmospheric greenhouse effect 
according to current knowledge.
The first scientist identifying fossil fuel use as a 
potential reason for climate change
In 1896, the Swede Svante Arrhenius used the 
knowledge of carbon dioxide absorption bands 
published by American scientist Samuel Langley to 
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argue that increased combustion of coal — at that 
time mainly in Great Britain — could lead to higher 
surface temperatures. He stated: 
'if the quantity of carbonic acid [i.e. carbon 
dioxide] increases in geometric progression, 
the augmentation of the temperature will 
increase nearly in arithmetic progression' 
(Arrhenius, 1896). 
The modern formulation of this still valid 
relationship is that 'the temperature increase 
is proportional to the logarithm of the carbon 
dioxide increase'. Arrhenius's estimate that the 
global surface temperature would rise by 3–5 °C if 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations doubled 
is close to present day knowledge. For example, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2007a) has projected a 2.0–4.5 °C increase. 
Arrhenius was not alarmed about the warming due 
to an enhanced atmospheric greenhouse effect, since 
his initial concern was the negative consequences 
for Scandinavia if cooling were to occur.
Early anthropogenic climate change debates until 
1940
The issue of anthropogenic climate change was 
raised in the late 19th century by Eduard Brückner, 
although his interest was not the greenhouse effect. 
Instead his focus was the effects of deforestation 
and cultivation of land on the reflectivity of the 
land surface and its evaporation, given the huge 
changes people have made to vegetative cycles 
(Penck and Brückner, 1901–1909). Arrhenius, 
as already described, was the first to consider 
anthropogenic emissions and the greenhouse 
effect but the lack of accurate measurements of 
trace gas concentrations prevented a continuing 
debate except for a few follow‑up papers by 
Arrhenius (e.g. in 1899). Even some decades later 
Callendar (1938) was only able to give a range of 
274 to 292 parts per million volume (ppmv) for the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration at the turn of the 
century. 
Guy Stewart Callendar's 1938 paper published in 
the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological 
Society marked a milestone in the history of 
understanding anthropogenic climate change. He 
was the first to establish the full link from trace gas 
concentration change, observed only for carbon 
dioxide, via changed radiation fluxes from the 
atmosphere to the surface, to observed global mean 
warming for the period from 1900 to 1938. The 
following year he went further, stating: 
'As man is now changing the composition 
of the atmosphere at a rate which must be 
very exceptional on the geological time scale, 
it is natural to seek for the probable effects 
of such a change. From the best laboratory 
observations it appears that the principal 
result of increasing carbon dioxide […] 
would be a gradual increase in the mean 
temperature of the colder regions of the 
Earth' (Callendar, 1939).
Callendar's paper failed to raise a major scientific 
debate even though the first (albeit rather 
inaccurate) measurements of CO2 concentration 
changes were available, a major global mean 
warming episode had occurred between 1900 
and 1940, and spectroscopy of trace gases had 
advanced. One reason why Callendar did not 
succeed in spreading his message, even among 
the scientific community, was because his 
meteorological colleagues did not believe the 
CO2 concentration changes he claimed to have 
been observed (2). A second reason was the poor 
knowledge that most meteorologists then had of 
radiative transfer of heat radiation (also called 
terrestrial, or thermal infrared, or long‑wave 
radiation) through the atmosphere.
From theoretical considerations on the transfer of 
energy in the global atmosphere to quantification 
in computer models
While the mechanisms underlying the transfer 
of energy around the global atmosphere are 
simple to understand in principle, quantifying 
this in a computer model remains far from 
easy. Accurate radiative transfer calculations in 
a spherical atmosphere require sophisticated 
numerical codes, as the basic equation fully 
established by Chandrasekhar (1950) is a so‑called 
integro‑differential equation that can only be 
solved numerically, demanding high performance 
computing facilities. Even today a comparably 
large amount of computing time is devoted to the 
'brute force' calculation of a still very simplified 
radiative transfer in a climate model. 
(2)  For accurate trace gas measurements, groups of laboratories have to measure concentrations of gases in samples given to them 
within	an	international	comparison	in	order	to	eliminate	larger	systematic	errors.	Reliable	change	estimates	for	CO2 were not 
available until the 1960s and data for the other two naturally occurring long-lived trace gases, N2O	and	CH4, were not available until 
the late-1980s.
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Chandrasekhar's work allowed a more accurate 
calculation (at first only in atmospheres without 
clouds) of the increased downward thermal 
radiation and hence the global mean warming 
estimates, following any increase in greenhouse 
gases. In the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s 
such estimates for a doubling of CO2 concentrations 
evolved steadily from original estimates without 
cloud influence reaching 2.5 °C (Plass, 1956). Adding 
the influence of clouds reduced this to less than 2 °C 
(Kaplan, 1960) but attempts to account for water 
vapour influence, via fixed relative humidity led 
to very high temperature increases (Möller, 1963). 
These were strongly disputed because the positive 
water vapour effect amplified the estimated impact 
of a doubling of CO2 concentrations to nearly 10 °C 
warming.
Establishment of long-term time series of 
greenhouse gas measurements
The International Geophysical Year from 1957 to 
1958 marked the start of long‑term monitoring 
Figure 14�1 Carbon dioxide (CO2) mixing ratio at the Mauna Loa station on Hawaii
Scripps Institution of Oceanography
NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory
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Note:  The yearly averages and the annual cycle rise continually in the 50 year period. The annual cycle is caused by biomass 
growth during the Northern Hemisphere summer and the decay of biomass in the winter.
Source:  NOAA,	2011.
of the most important anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas, carbon dioxide (CO2). The US scientist David 
Keeling established two monitoring stations in 
very remote locations — Mauna Loa on Hawaii 
(Figure 14.1) and Antarctica — to measure the 
background concentration of CO2 without the 
influence of nearby anthropogenic sources. These 
time series soon revealed the annual seasonal 
'breathing' of the northern hemisphere (caused by 
the growth of biomass during the warm months and 
its decay during cold months). This annual cycle is 
weak at the South Pole, at the point furthest from the 
seasonal influence. It was this time series which, by 
1970, had demonstrated a clear rising trend in global 
CO2 concentration of some 0.4 % per year. The full 
trend curve can be found in NOAA (2011). 
First calculations with global circulation models
Computers have had a huge impact on our ability 
to understand the atmospheric greenhouse 
gas effect. The advent of the first global 
three‑dimensional atmospheric general circulation 
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models (AGCMs) for weather forecasting came 
with the first electronic computers in the late 
1950s. By the early 1960s, an AGCM roughly 
representing the present day climate had also been 
run with doubled or quadrupled atmospheric CO2 
concentration. 
These AGCMs rapidly reached a new higher 
equilibrium for surface temperature because the 
effect of the ocean, represented merely as a rather 
thin boundary of several 10s of metres in the 
model, was a poor representation of reality. Oceanic 
circulation — particularly vertical mixing — has 
a major impact, delaying the rise in global mean 
warming by at least several decades under present 
CO2 concentration increases. Climate system 
sensitivity — the change in temperature resulting 
from a net change in incoming and outgoing 
energy at the top of the atmosphere (3) — has been 
investigated ever since such the first AGCM efforts 
of the mid‑1960s. 
The role of clouds
Simulations by AGCMs consistently indicated a 
surface temperature increase of around 1 °C for a 
net increase in energy flux of one watt per square 
metre at the top of the atmosphere, if the effect of 
clouds were trivial. Clouds cover more than 60 % 
of the Earth's surface, however, and their effect 
is far from trivial. They can reflect up to 80 % of 
solar radiation and they decouple thermal infrared 
emission from the surface into space. High clouds 
very often add to the greenhouse effect but low 
clouds lower it. Schneider (1972) was the first to 
realise that increasing cloud top height by 600 m 
is equivalent to a temperature increase of 2 °C. 
Reducing cloud cover by 8 % has a similar effect. 
Clouds are also influenced by air pollution, leading 
to higher reflectivity for geometrically thin water 
clouds and lower reflectivity for geometrically and 
optically thick water clouds, if they contain some 
black carbon.
It rapidly became evident that understanding 
cloud properties and the consequences of any 
changes in these, was a crucial element in predicting 
greenhouse gas effects. However, it proved very 
difficult to quantify what the net effect of these 
various changes would be.
(3)  Radiative forcing is the rate of energy change per unit area of the globe as measured at the top of the atmosphere or at the 
tropopause level (the latter has been adopted by IPCC), if a certain radiatively active constituent of the atmosphere is altered and 
others remain fixed. It is measured in watts per square metre (Wm-2), and positive values lead to surface warming. According to 
the IPCC, 'The radiative forcing of the surface-troposphere system due to the perturbation in or the introduction of an agent (say, a 
change in greenhouse gas concentrations) is the change in net (down minus up) irradiance (solar plus long-wave; in Wm-2) at the 
tropopause AFTER allowing for stratospheric temperatures to readjust to radiative equilibrium, but with surface and tropospheric 
temperatures and state held fixed at the unperturbed values.'
Air pollution and climate change
The absence of obvious atmospheric warming from 
the late 1940s until the 1970s, despite the increase 
in greenhouse gases, revealed yet another facet of 
the anthropogenic climate change 'puzzle': that 
surface cooling could occur as a result of increased 
atmospheric turbidity, both in clear and cloudy 
atmospheres. This is because turbidity arising from 
anthropogenic air pollution affects the radiative 
transfer of energy in the following, sometimes 
unexpected, ways:
•	 it	increases	local	planetary	albedo	(reflectivity)	
over dark surfaces like the ocean but decreases 
local planetary albedo over bright surfaces 
like sand dunes and snow (Yamamoto, 1972; 
Eschelbach, 1973);
•	 it	strongly	reduces	solar	irradiance	at	the	Earth's	
surface — also called 'global dimming';
•	 it	enhances	cloud	reflectivity	for	water	clouds,	
especially for weakly absorbing minute, so‑called 
'aerosol' particles — the Twomey effect (Twomey, 
1972 and 1974) — and reduces cloud reflectivity 
for optically thick water clouds, if black carbon 
or soot particles are part of the aerosol particles 
(Grassl, 1975).
As stated in IPCC's fourth assessment report (IPCC, 
2007a), the latter two effects have remained a key 
uncertainty within the anthropogenic climate change 
debate, and are now estimated to mask the enhanced 
greenhouse effect by about one third.
Summary
By the end of the 1970s, it was known that the CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere was increasing 
by about 0.4 % per year; that a doubling of CO2 
concentration in climate models would lead to a mean 
global warming of several degrees centigrade; and 
that the water cycle contains two positive feedbacks 
(increasing the key greenhouse gas, water vapour, 
and lowering the reflectivity of earlier ice and snow 
surfaces), which act as an amplifier. 
With that, most of the main elements of our current 
technical understanding of the issues were in place. 
It was not known, however, whether systematic 
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changes of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
concentrations were taking place. Nor could CO2 
concentrations before industrialisation be determined. 
14�3 Scientific breakthroughs regarding 
human-induced climate change 
during the 1980s
The 1980s brought scientific breakthroughs with 
respect to a number of the remaining uncertainties. As 
outlined below, these included historical greenhouse 
gas concentrations derived from air bubbles in ice 
cores, the emergence of coupled three‑dimensional 
ocean‑atmosphere‑land models, and the clear signal 
of observed global mean warming in near‑surface 
temperatures. These breakthroughs were largely 
the result of global change research coordination, as 
discussed in Section 14.4.
Trace gas history from air bubbles in ice cores
The air inside a snow pack in areas without summer 
melt, i.e. in the large inner parts of the two major ice 
sheets in Greenland and Antarctica, is trapped in 
small air bubbles within older snow that becomes 
progressively compacted. These tiny bubbles still 
exist in deep layers of an ice shield after several 
hundred thousand years. 
During the 1980s, Swiss and French scientists (Neftel 
et al., 1985; Jouzel et al., 1987) were the first to 
determine the CO2 concentration in these air bubbles 
of ice cores with enough precision to reconstruct 
the long‑term history of greenhouse gases (CH4 and 
N2O concentrations could also be determined later). 
These findings established the strong correlation 
between CO2 concentrations and the temperature 
at precipitation formation. However, the processes 
causing this correlation are still debated today. 
Greenhouse gases were clearly a global player in 
glacial cycles but the lower and upper limits of CO2 
concentration at about 190 to 200 ppmv for glacial 
maxima and about 280 ppmv during interglacials are 
still unexplained today. 
It also became clear that the start and end of 'glacial' 
periods were initiated by the insolation changes in the 
Northern Hemisphere caused by long‑term changes 
in the Earth's orbit around the sun. The consequences 
of these changes in the Northern Hemisphere climate 
are then amplified and made global by changing 
levels of greenhouse gases and by the ice‑albedo 
feedback (Hansen, 2010). 
Emergence of coupled atmosphere-ocean models
At the end of the 1980s, the first coupled 
atmosphere‑ocean models emerged. These models 
included a three‑dimensional representation of the 
ocean, which for the first time allowed simulations 
of the dynamic interactions between atmosphere 
and ocean under increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations. The models, based on natural laws, 
are the only way for a look into the future, based on 
assumptions about human behaviour with respect 
to population changes, energy supply systems, 
land use change and global economic development. 
These first coupled models were, however, in 
need of 'flux corrections'. Flux corrections imply 
deliberately changing the energy and momentum 
fluxes at the air‑ocean interface to prevent climate 
drift, i.e. a change in climate, in a constant 
greenhouse gas concentration scenario. It was not 
until the IPCC's third assessment report in 2001 
that these flux corrections were no longer needed 
by some more advanced climate models. 
One robust and anticipated result of these early 
coupled models was the delay of the full climate 
change signal by many decades compared to 
AGCMs due to the high heat capacity of the ocean. 
The models predicted that in a period with strong 
greenhouse gas concentration increase, such as 
now, less than two thirds of the mean warming that 
is inevitable due to the past concentration increase 
can be seen. Another important implication of the 
considerable inertia in the global climate systems 
is that the effects of policy measures taken now 
can only be detected after several decades. The 
progress in climate modelling during recent 
decades is depicted in Figure 14.2.
Detection of increased global mean air temperature
A further major development during the 1980s 
concerned temperature trends. While various 
regional air temperature trends had been published 
over the years, the first global trend analyses 
covering a full century only emerged during 
the 1980s (Groisman et al., 1987; Hansen et al., 
1988). They were still rather uncertain, partly 
because there were gaps in the 'quality assurance' 
of observations from thousands of stations. 
Temperature time series can be inhomogeneous 
for many reasons, including changes in 
instrumentation, changed vegetation or buildings 
in the neighbourhood of the station, changed 
observers and infrequent calibration. 
Other developments
Also in the mid‑1980s, the 14th Ozone Report 
(WMO, 1984) provided the first more or less 
comprehensive list of the many artificial substances 
found in the atmosphere, subsequently known as 
the 'greenhouse gang', that apparently were very 
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Figure 14�2 Evolution of global climate change models
Note:  The complexity of climate models has increased over the last few decades. The additional physical, chemical and biological 
processes incorporated in the models are shown pictorially by the different features of the modelled world. 
Source:  IPCC, 2007a.
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strong greenhouse gases. Amongst them were 
the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which were later 
found to be responsible for the hole in the ozone 
layer over Antarctica. That phenomenon became 
widely known only in 1985, although it had started 
several years earlier. That 14th Ozone Report could 
not, however, quantify the increase of methane and 
nitrous oxide concentration because the monitoring 
time series were too short given the accuracy of 
concentration measurements at that time.
14�4 Start of global coordination or 
climate change research and 
dissemination of findings on 
human-induced climate change 
During the 1980s the climate change issue 'broke 
out' from being a largely scientific issue to a matter 
of concern for environmental policymakers. That is 
not to say that governments had totally ignored the 
issue previously. Much of the research on climate 
change had, in fact, been funded by governments. 
However, the warnings of global anthropogenic 
climate change by groups of leading scientists, 
speaking as an increasingly coordinated and 
unified voice, often reinforced and broadcasted by 
environmental non‑governmental organisations 
such as the Climate Action Network, played a 
crucial role in raising the issues prominence. This 
knowledge transfer from science to policy became 
formalised with the establishment of a then unique, 
remarkable and authoritative scientific global 
climate change assessment body — the IPCC — in 
November 1988. 
14.4.1 World Climate Research Programme 
The first World Climate Conference in 1979, 
organised by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), a specialised UN agency, 
agreed a World Climate Programme (WCP). Its 
research component, the World Climate Research 
Programme (WCRP), started in 1980 based on an 
agreement between WMO and the International 
Council for Scientific Unions (now named the 
International Council for Science) to organise 
and co‑finance the first global change research 
programme. 
The International Geosphere Biosphere Programme 
(IGBP), established in 1986, together with WCRP, 
now provides the main global organising and 
coordinating framework underpinning the 
bulk of scientific progress in understanding the 
functioning of the global system. A large part of the 
research assessed today by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), was initiated in 
1980 under the WCRP, which, for example, had 
by 1997 completed the first global survey of the 
physical status of the world oceans via its World 
Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE). The 
observations from this survey in turn allowed it to 
determine that the oceans absorb about 2 billion 
tonnes of carbon from anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide emissions per year, as presented in the 
IPCC's third assessment report (IPCC, 2001a, 2001b 
and 2001c).
14.4.2 Villach Conferences in 1980 and 1985
After two scientific conferences in the Austrian 
town of Villach in the early and mid‑1980s, groups 
of high‑ranking scientists issued initial warnings 
of the potential consequences of anthropogenic 
climate change. The scientists had been invited 
to Villach by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the International Council 
for Scientific Unions. In October 1985, these 
warnings culminated in the observation that:
'Many important economic and social 
decisions are being made today on long‑term 
projects [...], all based on the assumption that 
past climatic data, without modification, are a 
reliable guide for the future. This is no longer 
a good assumption since the increasing 
concentrations of greenhouse gases are 
expected to cause a significant warming of 
the global climate in the next century. It is a 
matter of urgency to refine estimates of future 
climate conditions to improve these decisions' 
(WMO, 1986).
This paragraph captured one of the key threats 
of global climate change, namely that important 
features of our society, such as key infrastructure, 
may no longer be well adapted to prevailing 
climate conditions. Scientists, such as Scientific 
Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE 29, 
1988) highlighted that anthropogenic climate 
change could affect not only average conditions 
but also climate variability and weather extremes. 
Many extreme weather events might become 
more frequent and even new, more devastating 
extremes might occur as a result of changes in the 
distribution of climate parameters. 
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Box 14�2  Why do most policymakers accept IPCC statements as the most authoritative voice 
on climate change?
In all areas of science, reviews by authoritative groups of established scientists have for a long time been 
the preferred method of informing the scientific community and the public at large about the current state 
of knowledge. In the case of the IPCC, however, such assessments were lifted to a level never reached 
before in any field of science. The reasons primarily structural but also related to individuals, most notably 
the first IPCC chairman, Bert Bolin. 
The structural advantages of the IPCC include the following: 
•	 it	is	sponsored	by	well	accepted	institutions	of	the	United	Nations:	the	World	Meteorological	Organization	
(WMO),	a	technical	agency	in	charge	of	climate	matters,	and	the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	
(UNEP); 
•	 it	is	intergovernmental,	i.e.	government	representatives	are	members	of	the	national	IPCC	delegations;	
•	 scientists	and	governments	select	the	groups	of	authors	for	each	chapter	drawing	from	lists	given	by	
countries and accepting contributions by other experts in a certain subsector of climate research; 
•	 the	reviewing	process	is	elaborate	and	involves	the	scientific	community	first	and	government-named	
experts in a second round, with all critical remarks and proposals for improvement judged by established 
scientists who are not authors of the chapters themselves. 
A further essential part is the approval of the summary for policymakers 'sentence by sentence'.
14.4.3 Establishment of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change
The IPCC originated from proposals of presidents 
of national meteorological services, put forward 
at the Tenth Congress of the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) in Geneva in May 1987. 
That Congress established an intergovernmental 
mechanism charged to deliver an authoritative 
assessment of knowledge about anthropogenic 
climate change, without which government 
attention was unlikely. 
The Executive Council of WMO proceeded jointly 
with the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) towards establishing an intergovernmental 
panel of experts. This led, in November 1988, to the 
first meeting of the IPCC at the Geneva Congress 
Centre. Three working groups were formed. 
Working Group I assesses the physical scientific 
aspects of the climate system and climate change. 
Working Group II assesses the vulnerability of 
society and nature to climate change, and means 
of adaptation, while Working Group III examines 
mitigation measures for limiting or preventing the 
effects of greenhouse gases. 
More specifically the IPCC's tasks are:
•	 to	identify	human	induced	influences	on	the	
climate and to compare these with other external 
influences and natural variability. 
•	 to	address,	through	process	studies	and	
observations, effects on the climate system of 
important feedbacks, both positive (enhancing 
change) and negative (reducing change), for 
instance those due to water‑vapour, clouds and 
ocean circulation.
•	 to	combine	these	influences	and	effects	by	means	
of numerical computer models simulating past 
and present climates and projecting future 
climate. 
•	 to	compare	model	simulations	from	different	
modelling groups with observations related to 
past and present climates, and so estimate the 
contributions to climate change from natural and 
human induced influences, together with their 
associated uncertainties. These computer models 
provide the only means of adding together 
all the non‑linear processes involved in the 
evolution of climate.
•	 to	describe	the	likely	future	impact	on	human	
communities and ecosystems. 
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All chapters of IPCC reports are reviewed, first by 
a limited number of expert scientists, then by the 
international community of climate scientists and 
others with an interest in reviewing, and finally by 
governments.
When the working groups meet in plenary, they 
consist of government representatives, generally 
both scientists and policymakers, which is a 
remarkable development in itself. However, 
the actual assessment work is done by selected 
scientists only. The overall IPCC structure has 
been judged successful and has been retained 
(see Bolin, 2008) although in 2010–2011 several 
changes were implemented to address criticism 
(see Section 14.6.4). 
The creation of the IPCC represented a decisive 
turning point in recognition of the scale of the 
climate change problem, at least amongst technical 
and policy experts. The IPCC was immediately 
under pressure to publish its first full assessment 
of knowledge on (anthropogenic) climate change 
in time for the Second World Climate Conference 
(SWCC), scheduled for October 1990. 
The IPCC first assessment report, 1990
The IPCC finished its first assessment report in 
June 1990. The report stated that:
•	 there	is	a	natural	greenhouse	effect	of	the	
atmosphere which already keeps the Earth 
warmer than it would otherwise be;
•	 there	is	a	strong	increase	of	concentrations	
of all three long‑lived naturally occurring 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O), which is 
due to anthropogenic activities;
•	 global	mean	near-surface	air	temperature	has	
risen by 0.3 to 0.6 °C during the 20th century;
•	 in	the	past	there	has	been	a	strong	correlation	
between greenhouse gas concentrations and 
 
Box 14�3 Evidence of anthropogenic climate change
In March 1995, a pre-print of a peer-reviewed scientific paper (Hegerl et al., 1997) claiming that 
anthropogenic climate change had been detected was announced at a press conference in Hamburg, 
Germany. The founding director of the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Klaus Hasselmann, 
presented the work of his research group, which was based on four types of evidence: time series of 
long-lived greenhouse gas concentrations, observed geographical patterns of temperature anomaly time 
series, transient runs of a coupled atmosphere-ocean-land model, and the so-called fingerprint method 
(Hasselmann, 1997) searching for anomaly patterns attributable to distinct processes. The wide media 
coverage of this very unusual event emphasised the significance of the findings.
the global mean temperature, as shown by 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in air 
bubbles from the last 160 000 years contained in 
ice cores in Antarctica.
In addition, the IPCC report also pointed to 
other observed changes in the climate system, 
including a rise in the mean sea level, the retreat of 
mountain glaciers in most regions, changes in the 
regional redistribution of precipitation, and other 
significant changes in climate parameters. On the 
basis of the evidence before them, however, and 
the level of proof that is required to conclude that 
observed climate change is significantly beyond the 
level of natural variability, the IPCC could not yet 
state that observed climate change has a man‑made 
origin. 
The IPCC Response Strategies Working Group 
concluded in 1989 that the potentially serious 
consequences of climate change justified the 
immediate adoption of response strategies, such 
as limiting emissions and preparing adaptation 
measures. The Working Group suggested that the 
United Nations agree on a framework convention 
that later could be supplemented with specific 
protocols, following the approach taken with the 
Vienna Convention on Protecting the Ozone layer 
and its Montreal Protocol. It also suggested setting 
goals for reducing emission levels in an equitable 
manner and listed many specific options for doing 
so across economic sectors.
The IPCC second assessment report, 1995
In 1995, the IPCC published its second assessment 
report. The Working Group I volume (IPCC, 1995a), 
agreed in November 1995, stated that 'The balance 
of evidence suggests a discernible human influence 
on global climate.' This was the first time that 
scientific evidence enabled the human‑induced 
change signal to be perceived against the 
background of natural climate variability. This 
conclusion strengthened the urgency of calls to 
address climate change. 
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The Working Group II volume, covering impacts, 
adaptation and mitigation of climate change 
(IPCC, 1995b), presented a wealth of information. 
It indicated that impacts of anthropogenic climate 
change were already occurring and would pose 
serious risks in the future. 
The Working Group III report, covering the 
economic and social dimensions of climate change, 
showed that there were many options available, 
both in terms of low‑emitting technologies and 
available policy instruments to reduce GHG 
emissions significantly in all countries and 
economic sectors. The report also pointed to the 
importance of early mitigation efforts to improve 
flexibility in stabilising atmospheric greenhouse 
gas concentrations as a risk management approach.
The IPCC third assessment report, 2001
The IPCC published its third assessment report 
in 2001 (IPCC, 2001a, 2001b and 2001c). The role 
of human activity in causing climate change was 
further clarified: 'There is new and stronger evidence 
that most of the warming observed over the last 
50 years is attributable to human activities.' Evidence 
of climate change impacts around the world had 
strongly increased and projections of climate change 
impacts in the future were much more serious than 
in the past. The potential for strong reductions in 
global GHG emissions was clearly demonstrated 
and the costs of these reductions were shown to 
be modest compared to the projected increase in 
wealth. Insights into effective climate policies had 
grown significantly.
The IPCC fourth assessment report, 2007
On 2 February 2007 Working Group I of IPCC 
(2007a) stoked the political debate by clearly 
pointing out humankind's responsibility for the 
observed mean global warming:
'The understanding of anthropogenic warming 
and cooling influences on climate has 
improved since the third assessment report, 
leading to very high confidence that the global 
net effect of human activities since 1750 has 
been one of warming, with a radiative forcing 
of 1.6 Wm-2 (uncertainty range 0.6 to 2.4 Wm-2)'.
This statement strengthened the claim that an 
anthropogenic climate signal had been detected 
in the second and third assessments. The IPCC's 
Working Group II report in April 2007 (IPCC, 
2007b) concluded that the extent of climate impacts 
on natural systems had further increased and that 
risks of future impacts were considered higher 
than in previous assessments, including an onset of 
negative impacts at lower temperature changes (see 
also Smith et al., 2009) than previously assumed. 
It included for instance the observation that:
'Approximately 20–30 % of plant and animal 
species assessed so far are likely to be at 
increased risk of extinction if increases in 
global average temperature exceed 1.5–2.5 °C.'
In May 2007 Working Group III on mitigation 
of climate change (IPCC, 2007c) made it clear 
that global emissions need to peak not later 
than 2015 to have a 50 % chance of keeping 
long‑term temperature increase below 2 °C above 
pre‑industrial levels. If peaking were delayed to 
2025 the world would be committed to at least 3 °C 
warming in the long term. The report confirmed 
that ample options for reducing GHG emissions 
are available at modest costs. The report also 
suggested that the costs and benefits of mitigation 
are broadly comparable, even for the most stringent 
stabilisation of GHG concentrations studied 
(i.e. 450 ppm CO2‑eq.). 
The Stern review on the economics of climate change 
(Stern, 2007) published at about the same time 
was more unequivocal. It stated that the costs of 
aggressive mitigation action are substantially lower 
than the costs of climate impacts and adaptation 
measures. It should be noted that the benefits of 
avoided climate change are notoriously difficult 
to estimate, since many impacts cannot easily 
be translated into monetary terms. In addition, 
co‑benefits of reducing emissions, such as health 
benefits due to reduced air pollution from coal or 
increased energy security due to lower imports of 
fossil fuels, are not included in these calculations. 
The outcomes of the Stern review were influenced 
by the choice of discount rates, which determine 
the weighting of future benefits and costs in 
decision‑making. The Stern review employed very 
low discount rates and argued why that was the 
right choice. Not all economists agree with the 
approach used (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007). 
One of the reasons for the stark messages about 
the urgency of reducing emissions was the higher 
estimate for so‑called 'climate sensitivity', compared 
to previous reports. Working Group I stated 
that the 'best estimate' for a doubling of the CO2 
concentration compared to pre‑industrial levels 
is a 3 °C increase in the mean global temperature, 
with a lower bound of + 2 °C and an upper bound 
of + 4.5 °C at two standard deviations. More recent 
studies confirmed this range (Rummukainen et al., 
2010). The third assessment report had estimated 
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climate sensitivity as 2.5 °C (without providing 
upper and lower bounds). As a consequence, GHG 
concentration levels for avoiding a particular 
temperature increase have to be lower than 
previously indicated. In particular, the European 
Union had originally estimated that a CO2 
concentration of 550 ppmv would be compatible 
with its goal of limiting the increase in global mean 
temperature to 2 °C above preindustrial levels. 
According to the new assessment, staying within 
this temperature limit requires greenhouse gas 
concentrations to remain below about 450 ppm 
CO2‑eq., which in turn implies a maximum 
concentration for CO2 alone of about 400 ppm 
(compared to measured 380 ppm in 2007). To 
achieve that, CO2 emissions would have to be 
reduced by 50–85 % from 2000 to 2050 globally, and 
by 80–95 % in industrialised countries. 
Such a goal may appear Herculean. Nevertheless, 
many scenarios have been developed that achieve 
such a low carbon future using different portfolios 
of measures. Some scenarios still allow for relatively 
high shares of fossil fuels (coal and gas) for electricity 
production but require power plants to be equipped 
with CO2 capture and storage. Other scenarios rely on 
a large share of nuclear power and yet others bring 
emissions to very low levels by moving to producing 
80–100 % of electricity from renewable sources 
(e.g. WBGU, 2003; Greenpeace/EREC, 2007; van 
Vuuren, 2007; IEA, 2009 and 2010; IPCC, 2011).
IPCC special report on renewable energy sources 
and climate change mitigation
The Working Group III special report, Renewable 
energy sources and climate change mitigation (IPCC, 
2011), is an assessment of the literature on the 
scientific, technological, environmental, economic 
and social aspects of the contribution of six 
renewable energy sources to mitigating climate 
change, published in 2011. Some of the main 
messages are: 
•	 'A	significant	increase	in	the	deployment	of	
renewable energy by 2030, 2050 and beyond is 
indicated in the majority of the 164 scenarios 
reviewed in this special report';
•	 In	2008,	total	renewable	energy	production	
was roughly 64 EJ/year (12.9 % of total primary 
energy supply) with more than 30 EJ/year of this 
being traditional biomass. The global primary 
energy supply share of renewable energy differs 
substantially among the scenarios. More than 
half of the scenarios show a contribution from 
renewable energy in excess of a 17 % share of 
primary energy supply in 2030 rising to more 
than 27 % in 2050. The scenarios with the highest 
RE shares reach approximately 43 % in 2030 and 
77 % in 2050.
14�5 Emerging climate change policy 
The foregoing sections of this chapter presented 
the evolution of science regarding the enhanced 
greenhouse gas effect and its projected impacts. 
The remainder focuses on how the political process 
dealt with this emerging scientific knowledge base. 
The power to determine the ends and means of 
public policy is widely though not equally shared, 
and different groups will of course seek to shape 
perceptions of truth, information or analysis 
(Gregory, 1989). Among the various stakeholders 
that seek to influence government policy 
development are environmental NGOs and business 
organisations. Their influence is mentioned briefly 
here but is not analysed in detail in order to limit the 
length of the chapter. 
Some environmental NGOs like the Climate Action 
Network (CAN, 2012) aim to influence the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) policy process directly by providing 
detailed feedback through newsletters during the 
negotiations. Others focus on awareness campaigns 
(e.g. Greenpeace, 2012) and others provide summary 
information on scientific aspects (e.g. WWF, 
2012). Some businesses (e.g. parts of the fossil fuel 
industry) have aimed to influence the negotiations 
directly or through lobby groups (e.g. the former 
Global Climate Coalition) or have questioned the 
underlying science (as discussed below). Other 
businesses have focused on the opportunities 
provided by climate policy, for example members 
of the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD, 2012). It appears that 
the perspective of many businesses has changed 
somewhat over the years from being against action 
on GHG emission reductions to being in favour 
of measures such as regulation, either to provide 
investment security or because certain industries see 
opportunities (e.g. the renewable energy industries).
14.5.1 The 1980s: initiatives to stimulate political 
debate on how to deal with climate change 
The late‑1980s saw several initiatives to stimulate 
political debate on how to deal with climate 
change. There was intense public debate in some 
industrialised countries on climate change, 
illustrated by reports from some national advisory 
bodies to governments and legislative bodies, such 
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as in Germany (WBGU, 1993) and other countries 
(Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005). In 1987, scientists 
and policymakers discussed matters at workshops in 
Villach and Bellagio, leading to recommendations to 
formulate policy targets (Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 
2005). 
Two conferences in Toronto (1988) and Noordwijk 
(1989) provided opportunities to enhance the 
scientific input into political decision‑making and 
came up with proposals that would become the 
heart of the legal climate change regime later on. 
This was made possible by the mix of government 
representatives, international agency staff and 
scientists participating in these conferences.
Encouraged by the international agreement on 
the Montreal Protocol on protecting the ozone 
layer in 1987, which set targets for phasing out 
ozone‑depleting substances, many of which are 
also powerful greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2005a), 
the Canadian government hosted an international 
conference in Toronto in 1988. The Toronto 
Declaration (WMO, 1989) makes extensive reference 
to the signals of a changing climate and the 
projections of future changes. It calls for an action 
plan, including a framework convention on climate 
change and the stabilisation of GHG concentrations 
in the atmosphere, and calls for domestic action 
on reducing CO2 emissions. The action plan set 
a political target of a 20 % reduction of global 
CO2 emissions by 2005 from 1988 levels, with 
industrialised countries taking responsibility for 
most of it. It further called for the establishment of a 
global atmosphere fund.
The Noordwijk conference, bringing together a 
group of 67 concerned countries at ministerial level 
in November 1989, was provided extensive scientific 
information on climate change, its impacts and 
strategies to bring it under control. This led to a 
ministerial declaration, which called for atmospheric 
GHG concentrations to be stabilised 'within tolerable 
limits', reflecting the concern about increasing 
negative impacts of climate change. It asked the 
IPCC (which was working on its first assessment) 
to report on the best scientific knowledge to help 
define what that level should be. It also stated 
that GHG emissions should be reduced and sinks 
increased to a level consistent with the natural 
capacity of the planet, allowing for ecosystems 
to adapt naturally, food production not to be 
threatened and economic activity to develop in a 
sustainable manner (Oppenheim and Petsonk, 2005). 
This would provide the foundation for the later 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.
These events demonstrate the willingness of some 
political actors to take action based on emerging, 
but certainly not complete knowledge on climate 
change and its impacts: the precautionary principle 
in action.
14.5.2 The 1990s: establishment of the framework 
of international law for dealing with 
climate change
In the field of climate policy, the 1990s saw the 
establishment of the framework of international 
law for addressing climate change. 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
The IPCC finished its first assessment report in 
June 1990 and was asked to present its findings at 
the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC), 
which took place in Geneva, Switzerland, 
in October 1990. The World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) had changed the earlier 
main topic of the SWCC, climate variability, to 
anthropogenic climate change, indicating the 
increasing priority being given to the issue. The 
presentation of the first full assessment of scientific 
knowledge on climate change by the IPCC during 
the first part of SWCC in 1990 had a major impact 
on the later ministerial part. 
As a result, ministers from 134 countries called for 
a framework convention on climate change, to be 
ready for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro, in June 1992. They urged the inclusion of a 
global objective of stabilising GHG concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
'dangerous interference with climate' (language 
used in the Noordwijk Declaration) and, as a first 
step, to halt the growth of global GHG emissions. 
As a result of the Ministerial declaration of 
the SWCC, the UN General Assembly decided 
in December 1990 to set up an international 
negotiating committee, consisting of government 
representatives of all UN member countries, to 
work out an agreement. To serve the negotiations, 
the IPCC brought out a supplementary report 
in early 1992 (IPCC, 1992) to provide a synthesis 
of the latest scientific knowledge about climate 
change. The work of the negotiating committee 
resulted in agreement on the text of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC, 1992) in May 1992, just 
before the World Summit in July 1992, where it 
was signed by 153 countries and the European 
Communities. 
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Box 14�4 Four major science questions associated with the central goal of the UNFCCC
•	 What	is	dangerous	interference	with	the	climate	system?	In	other	words,	what	climate	change	impacts	
constitute a danger? This is obviously a value judgement that cannot be made on scientific grounds alone 
but science has an important role to play in providing relevant information.
•	 How	fast	may	the	climate	change	while	still	allowing	for	ecosystems	to	adapt	naturally?	This	seems	
largely a scientific question. However, any level of change will cause responses in ecosystems. Whether 
these responses are still considered as 'adaptation' or already as 'impacts' is partly a value judgement, 
which in turn may be influenced by considerations about how much these responses matter — e.g. fish 
stocks that we eat versus marine species that we do not.
•	 At	which	redistribution	of	precipitation	and	at	which	warming	level	is	food	production	threatened?	Again,	
it initially seems a scientific question but in effect it also requires value judgements, asking for political 
decisions related to e.g. food distribution and the population size of an area facing food insecurity.
•	 At	what	degree	and	rate	of	climate	change	is	economic	development	going	to	be	affected	negatively?	
But also, what is the speed at which emissions reduction and adaptation measures can be taken so as 
to avoid disrupting economic development? Here scientific and economic knowledge is needed to inform 
politics.
Interestingly, the Convention explicitly mentions 
several underlying principles, including, in 
Article 3.3, the precautionary principle: 
'The Parties should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize 
the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures, taking 
into account that policies and measures to deal 
with climate change should be cost‑effective 
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 
possible cost.'
The central goal (or 'ultimate objective') of the 
UNFCCC reads as follows:
'The ultimate objective of this Convention […] 
is to achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such 
a level should be achieved within a time 
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure food 
production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.'
This article clearly shows the central role given to 
science, which was supposed to inform politics 
about the level of action to be taken. Specifically, this 
article raises four major questions (Box 14.4). Science 
had not progressed to provide definite and clear 
information on all these questions, so they were 
essentially unanswered when the UNFCCC came 
into force. 
Operationally, the UNFCCC contains clauses in 
which industrialised countries commit themselves to:
'adopt national policies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of 
climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting 
and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs. These policies and measures will 
demonstrate that developed countries are 
taking the lead in modifying longer‑term 
trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent 
with the objective of the Convention, 
recognising that the return by the end 
of the present decade to earlier levels of 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to 
such modification'. 
This text is a complicated and not really legally 
binding way of saying that developed countries will 
try to stabilise GHG emissions by the end of the 
century at the level of some prior year. The vague 
formulation already reflected the trouble of getting 
all industrialised countries (and particularly the 
US) to agree on a binding formulation to stop the 
growth of emissions. Box 14.5 sets out the other 
key elements of the Convention. The UNFCCC was 
rapidly ratified. It became binding on 21 March 
1994, 90 days after the threshold of 55 countries had 
been reached on 21 December 1993. 
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Box 14�5 Key elements of the UNFCCC
Principles:
•	 'common	but	differentiated	responsibility'
•	 special	consideration	for	vulnerable	developing	countries
•	 'precautionary	principle'
•	 'polluter	pays'
•	 promoting	sustainable	development
Goals: the ultimate goal (Article 2) is to 'stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, 
to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.'
Participation: almost universal (191 countries and the European Union, as of 1 September 2008).
Actions required:
•	 All	countries	must	minimise	emissions	and	protect	and	enhance	biological	carbon	reservoirs,	so	called	
'sinks'. Industrialised countries ('Annex I countries') must take action to stop growth of emissions before 
2000.
•	 All	countries	must	promote	development,	application	and	transfer	of	low-carbon	technologies.	Annex	I	
countries must assist developing countries.
•	 Cooperate	in	preparing	for	adaptation.
•	 Promote	and	cooperate	in	research	and	development.
•	 Report	on	emissions	and	other	actions	(so	called	'national	communications'),	annually	for	Annex	I	
countries and less frequently for others.
•	 Rich	industrialised	countries	('Annex	II	countries')	must	assist	developing	countries	financially	in	their	
actions.
Compliance: reports are reviewed by the secretariat and by visiting expert review teams.
Institutions:
•	 The	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP)	is	the	supreme	decision-making	body.	Its	rules	of	procedure	for	
decisions have never been agreed.
•	 The	Bureau	(comprising	officials	elected	by	the	COP)	is	responsible	for	overall	management	of	the	
process.
•	 Two	subsidiary	bodies	(for	implementation	and	for	scientific	and	technological	advice)	prepare	decisions	
of	the	COP.
•	 The	financial	mechanism	is	operated	by	the	Global	Environment	Facility	of	the	World	Bank,	the	United	
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNEP, and replenished by Annex II countries on a 
voluntary basis. Two special funds — a least developed country fund and a special climate change fund 
— mainly finance adaptation plans and capacity-building but also provide for technology transfer and 
economic diversification.
•	 Expert	groups	exist	on	technology	transfer,	developing	country	national	communications,	least	developed	
country national adaptation plans.
•	 The	Secretariat	is	located	in	Bonn,	Germany.
Other elements: a requirement to review the need for further action regularly.
Source:  Metz, 2010.
Kyoto Protocol
At the time the UNFCCC entered into force 
(end‑1994), the IPCC was still working on its 
second assessment report. Enhanced scientific 
understanding of climate change and stronger 
evidence of its man‑made causes was becoming 
more widely known. At the first session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP1), 
in Berlin from end‑March to the early‑April 1995, 
the vague and not legally binding commitment of 
industrialised countries to try to stabilise emissions 
by 2000 was recognised as being far from sufficient. 
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The Conference of the Parties therefore adopted 
the so‑called Berlin Mandate, which contained as 
its key provision the need for a legally binding 
intergovernmental agreement to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by industrialised countries, ready in 
time for COP3 in 1997. 
Developing countries pushed hard to be left out 
of this strengthening of commitments. Under 
the UNFCCC they are only subject to general 
obligations on matters such as taking national 
action to combat climate change and reporting 
their emissions. Their arguments were based 
on the principle of 'common but differentiated 
commitments and respective capabilities' in 
UNFCCC Article 3.1. The COP agreed that in 
the UNFCCC context this approach implied that 
industrialised countries should take the first 
step but that all countries would step up their 
commitments to address the problem over time, 
albeit maintaining proper differentiation of actions.
The demand expressed in the 'Berlin Mandate' 
for a binding legal agreement for greenhouse 
gas emission reductions was met at COP3 in 
Kyoto, Japan, with the unanimous adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC by more than 
150 countries on 10 December 1997 (UNFCCC, 1997). 
Industrialised countries agreed to reduce their GHG 
emissions, using a basket of six GHGs, to about 
5 % below their 1990 level by the 2008–2012 period. 
This was a substantial deviation from the business 
as usual situation which, despite the commitments 
made in the UNFCCC, still showed strongly 
increasing GHG emissions from industrialised 
countries. The aggregate 5 % reduction was to 
be achieved by differentiated emission targets 
for each country, taking into account specific 
national circumstances. The principles of the 
Convention, including the precautionary principle 
and the principle of 'common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities' apply to 
the Protocol. Other key elements are presented in 
Box 14.6.
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
Four years of negotiations and four further sessions 
of the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
(COP4 to COP7) were needed to get the full 'small 
print' of the Kyoto Protocol finalised. It was not 
until ratification by the Russian Federation on 
16 February 2005 that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
became binding, which required ratification by 
55 countries representing more than 55 % of 
the total emissions in 1990 from countries with 
reduction commitments. Ratification by Russia was 
critical for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force 
after the single most important emitter, the US, 
withdrew from the Protocol in 2001.
Will industrialised country ('Annex B') Parties 
achieve their collective target of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 5 % below 1990 on 
average over the 2008 to 2012 period? Projected 
emission levels in the period 2008–2012, based on 
country reporting as of 2007 show that, other than 
Canada and New Zealand, most Parties are likely 
to meet their targets after accounting for emissions 
and removals from land‑use change and credits 
from the Kyoto flexible mechanisms (UNFCCC, 
2011a). Emission levels in 2009 of all Annex B 
Parties to the Protocol were about 22 % below the 
base year, in part due to the economic recession of 
2008 (Figure 14.3).
The EU‑15 (4) is on track to achieve its commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol of reducing emissions 
by 8 % compared to base‑year levels. This is 
due to a combination of domestic measures, 
EU‑wide policies and measures, carbon sinks and 
Kyoto mechanisms. The closing of coal mines 
in the United Kingdom in 1985 and the German 
reunification after the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989 have helped these countries deliver on their 
respective 12.5 % and 21 % individual reduction 
targets. In recent years emissions were also reduced 
because of the short‑term effects of the global 
economic crisis. 
EU actions have included establishing the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme; promoting renewable 
energy sources; promoting energy efficiency 
increases in the energy, transport and industry 
sectors; reducing methane from landfills; and 
cutting emissions of industrial fluorinated gases 
(EC, 2010; EEA, 2010; EEA, 2011).
Countries of the former Soviet Union and eastern 
European countries are significantly overachieving 
their targets because emissions fell dramatically 
after the breakup of the Soviet bloc and the 
expected rebound of emissions after economic 
recovery did not occur as a result of changes in 
their economic structure and modernisation of their 
industries. Collectively they are at around 35 % 
below their 1990 level.
(4) The EU comprised 15 Member States when it agreed to a collective 8 % reduction target in 1997. That is still the basis for 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol obligations, although the EU now has 27 Member States.
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Box 14�6 Key elements of the Kyoto Protocol 
Principles: same as the Convention
Goals: same as the Convention
Participation: 180 countries and the European Union (United States are not a Party)
Actions:
•	 Annex	I	countries	jointly	reduce	emissions	to	5	%	below	the	1990	level,	on	average	over	the	period	
2008–2012. Specific emission caps are set for individual countries (UNFCCC, 2012).
•	 Option	to	use	flexible	mechanisms,	i.e.	international	trading	of	emission	allowances	(not	to	be	confused	
with domestic emission trading systems), using the emissions reductions from projects in developing 
countries (through the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM) or other Annex I countries ('Joint 
Implementation').
•	 Option	to	develop	coordinated	policies	and	measures.
•	 Strengthened	monitoring	and	reporting	requirements	for	countries	with	reduction	obligations.
Compliance: failures to achieve emission reduction targets are to be compensated in the period after 
2012, with a 30 % penalty.
Institutions:
•	 COP	of	the	UNFCCC,	acting	as	the	Meeting	of	the	Parties	of	the	Protocol,	serves	as	the	primary	
decision-making body.
•	 All	other	UNFCCC	institutions	are	used.
•	 Compliance	Committee,	with	consultative	and	enforcement	branch.
•	 Executive	Board	for	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism.
•	 Joint	Implementation	Supervisory	Committee.
•	 Adaptation	Fund,	managed	by	the	Adaptation	Fund	Board	and	administered	by	the	GEF.	The	Fund	gets	
its money from a 2 % levy on CDM projects.
Other elements: a requirement to review the need for strengthening actions.
Source:  Metz, 2010.
At the same time, however, global emissions 
increased from about 38 Gt CO2‑equivalent in 1990 
to about 50 Gt CO2‑equivalent in 2010 (UNEP, 
2011b), largely because developing countries 
increased their emissions as a result of spectacular 
economic growth. Compared to developing country 
emissions growth, the fact that the US stayed out of 
the Kyoto Protocol played a minor role in aggregate 
emissions growth. The global increase till 2012 was 
deliberately accepted (although underestimated at 
the time) in the design of the Kyoto Protocol, in line 
with the 'polluter pays' principle and the need to 
deal with equity concerns on the side of developing 
countries. The expectation was that in subsequent 
periods all countries would strengthen their actions 
to bring global emissions under control.
The Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol was increasingly employed. It allows 
developing countries to 'sell' reductions obtained from 
specific projects to industrialised countries and aims 
to support sustainable development in the 'selling' 
developing country. As of 1 January 2009, there 
were 4 474 CDM projects in the pipeline (i.e. either 
submitted to or registered by the CDM Executive 
Board). Of these, 1 370 had been registered and 
465 certified emission reductions (CERs) had been 
issued. Together they equate to a reduction of about 
0.3 Gt CO2‑equivalent per year in the period 2008–2012 
and about 0.7 Gt CO2‑equivalent per year from 2013 
to 2020. Given their relatively low price, it is very 
likely that Annex I countries will buy all the CERs 
originating from the CDM to meet their obligations. 
To put things in perspective: the 0.3 Gt CO2‑equivalent 
per year is about 50 % of the total emission reduction 
(compared to the base year) that Kyoto Annex I 
countries are supposed to achieve. In other words, 
domestic emissions reductions in these countries will 
be only half of what they would have been without 
the CDM, if all available CERs are indeed bought 
(Metz, 2010). 
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Figure 14�3 Emission levels of Kyoto Protocol Annex B Parties in 2008 and 2009 (excluding 
land-use change emissions), compared to the base year
Source: UNFCCC, 2011b.
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CDM projects cover a wide range of mitigation 
activities. The number of projects on renewable 
energy is the highest, with much smaller numbers 
for landfill gas (methane) recovery and destruction 
of HFC‑23 at HCFC plants and N2O at chemical 
plants. In terms of tonnes of CO2‑equivalent reduction 
expected before the end of 2012, however, renewable 
energy projects represent 36 % and HFC‑23 and N2O 
projects 26 %, which reflects the high global warming 
potential of HFC‑23 (Metz, 2010). 
Although the CDM is one of the successes of the 
Kyoto Protocol there are also some weaknesses. 
An example is the approval of some renewable 
energy projects (e.g. hydropower) but also efficient 
('super critical') coal‑fired power plants projects, 
where it is hard to prove that emission reductions 
are 'additional'. In other words, these projects 
possibly would have happened anyway without 
CDM credits. Another example is the approval of 
various industrial destruction projects of HFCs, 
which are emitted as a by‑product of manufacturing 
the refrigerant gas HCFC‑22, for companies that 
thus made profits selling credits. Such weaknesses 
are being addressed in current negotiations on a 
new international agreement for the period after 
2012. 
The US went its own way in dealing with climate 
change, as did Australia until December 2008 when 
it ratified the Protocol. Domestic climate action 
at federal level was given low priority in the US 
until the Bush administration concluded at the end 
of 2008. Although some action was taken at State 
and local level across the US, GHG emissions kept 
rising and net emissions were about 15 % above 
1990 levels in 2008 (EPA, 2010b). After the election 
of President Obama at the end of 2008 there was 
hope that federal US GHG emission reduction policy 
would change, but this has not happened. Australia, 
although not part of the Kyoto Protocol until 
December 2008, nevertheless took domestic action in 
line with its Kyoto commitment. Australia is more or 
less set to meet its Kyoto target.
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and the EU 
two-degree target
It seems highly probable that the statement that 
'The balance of evidence suggests a discernible 
human influence on global climate' in the IPCC 
second assessment report and the information 
on climate impacts and emission reduction 
options both played a strong role in facilitating 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 by 
all countries attending the third session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. The 
resistance that emerged in the US Congress prior to 
COP3 was primarily focused on the design of the 
Protocol, particularly its exemption of countries 
like China, and on the perceived risk for the US 
economy if significant emissions reductions were 
made (Byrd‑Hagel Resolution, 1997).
In terms of the precautionary principle, political 
action was indeed strengthened at a time when 
scientific knowledge had improved but was still far 
from certain on the causes of climate change, the 
expected impacts and the feasibility and costs of 
emission reductions. It was not possible, however, 
to achieve political agreement on the exact meaning 
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of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, i.e. what 
constitutes a 'safe' level of GHG concentrations 
in the atmosphere. In other words, there was no 
clear idea how big the challenge actually was and 
how fast global emission reductions would have to 
occur. 
In 1996 an important decision was taken by the 
Council of Environment Ministers of the European 
Union. They decided that in the light of the 
scientific evidence as reflected in the IPCC second 
assessment report, global average temperatures 
should not be allowed to rise more than 2 °C 
above the pre‑industrial level. This was a political 
decision, based on scientific evidence about the 
risk of expected climate change impacts on one 
hand and the perceived feasibility of deep emission 
reductions on the other. It would become the focus 
for EU climate policy for the next decade and 
beyond.
The decision was based on the following global risk 
management approaches (Metz, 2010):
•	 Cost-effectiveness	approach: first determine 
what a 'tolerable' risk of climate change impacts 
is (a political judgement based on scientific 
evidence), then determine how this level can be 
achieved at the lowest possible costs, and finally 
consider whether this is politically feasible.
•	 Cost-benefit	approach: perform a cost‑benefit 
analysis that attempts to compare the monetised 
climate change damages with the cost of taking 
action, ensuring that the benefits of an action 
exceed its costs. As noted in Section 14.4.3, 
estimating these future costs and benefits poses 
some significant challenges.
The EU's 2 °C decision was arguably based on a 
mix of the two approaches. It was obvious that 
a 2 °C warming would still mean a significant 
increase of the risks of climate change with serious 
consequences in vulnerable countries. It was 
regarded as unrealistic, however, to turn around 
global emission trends fast enough to limit the 
temperature increase further. It was also felt that 
setting a maximum tolerable level of warming 
should not be based on an uncertain and disputed 
comparison with the monetised costs of climate 
change impacts. The precautionary element was to 
set a clear limit, despite the continuing scientific 
uncertainty about climate change impacts, and the 
costs and feasibility of drastic emission reductions.
Scientific literature published since the IPCC 
second assessment report confirmed that 
limiting global warming to less than 2 °C above 
pre‑industrial temperatures would considerably 
reduce the risk of triggering irreversible large‑scale 
changes in the climate system, such as a complete 
melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which would 
lead to large adverse impacts in many world 
regions. Nevertheless, significant risks would 
remain even in the event of a 2 °C increase 
above pre‑industrial temperatures (IPCC, 2007b; 
CCSEG, 2010). This recently led to a large group of 
developing countries challenging the adequacy of 
the 2 °C limit, arguing for the necessity of a 1.5 °C 
limit, as discussed in the next section.
14�6 Debate on further international 
action after 2012
14.6.1 The post-Kyoto UNFCCC process
At COP11 in 2005 a decision was taken to start two 
processes: a negotiation among Kyoto Parties about 
a second commitment period (following the first 
period from 2008–2012), and a so called 'dialogue' 
among all UNFCCC Parties about the future 
evolution of international climate action under the 
UNFCCC. 
The IPCC published its fourth assessment report 
in 2007 and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in November 2007, together with Al Gore. With 
the messages from IPCC being discussed widely, 
it was possible at COP13 in Bali in December 2007 
to formally start negotiations on a new agreement 
for the period after 2012. A complex two‑track 
negotiating structure emerged. The negotiations on 
a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
continued with all countries except the US. A new 
track was also started, known as the 'long‑term 
cooperative action', which covered all countries and 
aimed to enhance national and international action 
to achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. 
COP13 agreed the 'Bali Action Plan', which called 
for negotiations to be completed at COP15 in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. 
14.6.2 Copenhagen 2009
COP15 in Copenhagen failed to reach agreement 
on a legally binding agreement for the post‑2012 
period, jeopardising effective global action. The 
COP 'took notice' of the Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2010), a political declaration by more 
than 140 countries. The Accord includes the goal 
of keeping global temperature increase below 2 °C 
or possibly even 1.5 °C, it promises substantial 
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financial resources from industrialised countries, 
and it contains an annex in which countries can 
include their intended national actions. 
Although the COP did not formally endorse the 
Accord, it does reflect some significant progress 
regarding the policy response to climate change, 
including the endorsement of the 2 °C limit. It 
demonstrated the almost unanimous support for 
the 2 °C limit first proposed in 1996 by the EU. And 
the Accord even recognises that the climate change 
risks implied in this limit may already be going 
beyond what vulnerable regions, countries and 
people can tolerate and that a 1.5 °C limit might be 
needed.
The specific actions that have subsequently 
been pledged by almost 100 industrialised and 
developing countries show the intent of many 
countries to take domestic action to combat climate 
change. The EU specified internally agreed climate 
and energy targets to be met by 2020: reducing 
EU greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20 % 
below 1990 levels; providing for 20 % of EU energy 
consumption from renewable resources; and 
reducing primary energy use by 20 % compared 
with projected levels, to be achieved by improving 
energy efficiency (EU, 2012). It also pledged a 
30 % reduction of emissions, provided other major 
emitters would made comparable efforts. 
Unfortunately, the sum of these national emission 
reduction pledges for 2020 does not add up to what 
is needed to be on track to limit global temperature 
increase to 2 °C. In fact, current pledges imply a 
2.5–5 degree trajectory, depending on how pledges 
for 2020 are implemented and what happens after 
2020 (UNEP, 2010a and 2010c).
In Figure 14.4, the top coloured bands illustrate 
emission pathways over the 21st century, generated 
using integrated assessment modelling (IAM). The 
pathways were grouped based on ranges of likely 
temperature increase in the 21st century. Emissions 
corridors correspond to the 20th to 80th percentile 
range of emissions. The median of the Copenhagen 
Accord Pledge cases in 2020 is represented by the 
black bar.
The two bottom figures illustrate temperature 
increases associated with the different emissions 
pathways in the years 2020 (left) and 2050 (right): 
Thick, black lines show the median values, dark 
shaded areas represent the 20th to 80th percentile 
range, and light shaded ones the minimum/
maximum range. 
14.6.3 Cancun and Durban
COP16 in December 2010 took place in Cancun, 
Mexico. It was the culmination of a year of very 
active diplomacy and consensus was reached among 
all Parties to the UNFCCC on a series of decisions 
that formalised the elements of the Copenhagen 
Accord as official UNFCCC decisions and agreed a 
number of organisational provisions on finance and 
technology transfer. This meant that the long‑term 
goal for limiting global warming and the pledges 
made by countries to reduce their emissions were 
formally decided. However, the most contested issues 
in the negotiations, such as the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the legally binding character of a new treaty, 
commitments from major developing countries, the 
provisions on monitoring, reporting and verification 
and the provision of financial support to developing 
countries, were not addressed. 
Despite difficult preparations, the next COP17 
in Durban in 2011 delivered a series of decisions, 
although these did not include a new agreement for 
the period 2012–2020. Many countries were satisfied 
with the voluntary pledges that had been made 
in Copenhagen and Cancun. Only some Annex B 
countries agreed to put these pledges into a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. It was 
agreed to hold workshops to clarify the pledges and 
were encouraged to strengthen the pledges, since 
the existing commitments would lead to a 3–4 °C 
trajectory, making it impossible to meet the 2 °C limit 
(UNEP, 2011b). 
COP17 decided to start negotiations for a new legally 
binding agreement that would cover the period after 
2020 and to complete negotiations by 2015 (UNFCCC, 
2011d). Businesses require long‑term agreements 
extending beyond 2020 to inform their investment 
decisions. Governments likewise need time to 
translate international agreements into national 
legislation and policies. In the short term, however, 
there is also a need for more ambitious action in 
the period up to 2020 if the 2	°C limit is to be taken 
seriously. 
14.6.4 Creating doubt on the scientific knowledge 
base
Looking back at the 2000–2010 decade we see that 
international political action on climate change is 
moving forward only slowly. This is at odds with 
the increasingly strong messages from the scientific 
community about the man‑made causes of climate 
change, the current and expected impacts of climate 
change, the urgency of deep reductions of global 
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Figure 14�4 Projected emission pathways over the 21st century
Note:  In	the	above	figure,	the	top	coloured	bands	illustrate	emission	pathways	over	the	21st	Century,	generated	using	integrated	
assessment modelling (IAM). The pathways were grouped based on ranges of likely temperature increase in the 21st Century. 
Emissions corridors correspond to the 20th to 80th percentile range of emissions. The black bar represents emissions in 2020 
resulting from pledges.
 The	two	bottom	figures	illustrate	temperature	increases	associated	with	the	different	emissions	pathways	in	the	years	2020	
(left) and 2050 (right): Thick, black lines show the median values, dark shaded areas represent the 20th to 80th percentile 
range, and light shaded ones the minimum/maximum range.
Source: UNEP, 2011b.
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GHG emissions and the feasibility of specific actions 
and technologies to realise such reductions. 
One factor that caused this, although not the only 
one, is the doubt that was created about scientific 
knowledge on climate change. Other reasons, such as 
global economic and political developments and the 
growing ineffectiveness of the current approach to 
international agreements, have certainly contributed 
but are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Proper scientific conduct requires assumptions and 
findings to be challenged continuously in order to 
advance scientific knowledge. The IPCC has invested 
a lot in accurately reflecting in its assessments the 
certainty of findings and the continuing uncertainties 
(see Panel 14.1 on the IPCC and Uncertainty) — and 
it is important that these uncertainties be explored. 
While scientific method demands close scrutiny of 
certainties and uncertainties alike, however, honest 
scientists would not blatantly deny where the 
preponderance of evidence leads (Schneider, 2009). 
That is precisely what 'climate change deniers' or 
'contrarians' are doing. 
The science of climate change in general and the 
conclusions of the IPCC in particular have often been 
attacked by interested political actors and in the past 
years increasingly through a range of internet blogs, 
often in order to create doubt about the scientific basis 
for climate protection policies. These attacks have 
occurred despite significant scientific progress and 
despite the IPCC having stimulated research on topics 
that were identified as key uncertainties in earlier 
IPCC reports. Political lobbies supported by very few 
scientists — mostly from fields unrelated to climate 
change and without a publication record on climate 
issues — have often received prominent attention in 
the media, merely by opposing settled knowledge. 
Media in Anglo‑Saxon countries have been much 
more inclined to support such attempts than in other 
countries (Painter, 2011). These campaigns have been 
able to delay the political process, in particular in 
the US, but also at the global level. It seems that the 
message that nothing has to be done is preferred to a 
call for global action.
The fossil fuel industry, for example, financed the 
'Global Climate Coalition' in the US from 1989 to 
2002. This group ran multi‑million dollar advertising 
campaigns just before the Kyoto negotiations, which 
certainly had an impact on public opinion. These 
efforts have continued in different forms until now, 
the latest incarnation being a full 'denial industry' 
(Hoggan and Littlemore, 2009; Dunlap and McCright, 
2010). Parallels between the climate change debate and 
earlier controversies over tobacco smoking, acid rain 
and the hole in the ozone layer have been identified, 
showing that spreading doubt and confusion was a 
basic strategy of those opposing action in each case 
(Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
Another line of attack on addressing climate change 
has come from economists who argue that climate 
change is not the most important problem ('not the 
end of the world') and that tackling it would divert 
scarce resources from resolving problems such as 
poverty, hunger, malaria and HIV/AIDS that claim 
more lives (Lomborg, 2007; Copenhagen Consensus 
Center, 2009). 
Just before COP15 in Copenhagen, another 
attack on climate science was launched, accusing 
climate scientists that had worked for the IPCC of 
manipulating their results and keeping unwanted 
papers from scientists with different views out of the 
IPCC report. This accusation, dubbed 'Climategate' in 
the press, was based on a series of hacked emails from 
the computers of the University of East Anglia (UEA) 
in the United Kingdom. This attack was followed 
soon by the discovery of two mistakes in the Working 
Group II contribution to the 3 000 page IPCC fourth 
assessment report. Due to an erroneous statement on 
the melting rate of Himalayan glaciers, this problem 
became known as 'Glaciergate'. Attackers suggested 
that IPCC authors had deliberately manipulated the 
assessment to make it scarier than was warranted. 
A delayed and defensive reaction from the IPCC 
management to these accusations made things worse.
A number of different investigations in the United 
Kingdom of the behaviour of the involved scientists 
at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the UEA 
cleared them from scientific misconduct (Russell 
et al., 2010; Oxburgh et al., 2010; House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee, 2010). One of the 
recommendations given by the investigators was that 
climate scientists should take even more steps to make 
all their supporting data available — right down to the 
computer codes they use — in order to make research 
findings properly verifiable. The CRU (and other 
organisations) have meanwhile started activities to 
make more climate data accessible (e.g. UEA, 2010).
Investigations of the claimed mistakes in the IPCC 
report showed that only very few things needed 
correction and that they did not have any impact 
on the major conclusions contained in the Synthesis 
Report and the summaries of the working group 
reports (e.g. NEEA, 2010; EPA, 2010a). A review of 
the IPCC procedures and management structure 
requested by the UN Secretary‑General and the IPCC 
suggested several changes to avoid similar problems 
in the future (InterAcademy Council, 2010). 
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Panel 14�1 The evolution of the IPCC's approach to assessing 'uncertainty' 
Malcolm MacGarvin
Dealing with uncertainty has been a fundamental issue in assessing and communicating climate change. 
The IPCC generally distinguishes between 'statistical', 'value' or 'probabilistic' uncertainty (referred to as 
'quantifiable risk' in Late lessons from early warnings) and 'systemic' or 'structural' uncertainty (termed 
'unquantifiable uncertainty', 'ignorance' and 'indeterminacy' in Late lessons from early warnings). 
The first and second IPCC assessments use terms such as 'almost certain', 'likely' and 'doubtful' 
inconsistently, even within each assessment. In preparation for the third assessment report, the IPCC 
therefore produced guidance for authors addressing the issue of reporting uncertainty. This included material 
on underlying theory, the practical pitfalls for authors and editors, and the communication of uncertainty 
to the wider world. The IPCC has since revisited its guidance on uncertainty for both the fourth and fifth 
assessments. This panel charts the various landmarks in the IPCC's evolving approach to uncertainty.
Guidance for the third assessment
The third assessment report's guidance on uncertainties (Moss and Schneider, 2000) — which lists 
37 reviewers, including some still influential in IPCC work — noted that uncertainty results from a lack 
of information, and disagreement about what is known or even knowable. Uncertainty exists even in 
carefully controlled laboratory studies. For climate research, however, this is compounded by factors such 
as the global scale and low frequency variability, with characteristic times greater than the length of most 
instrumental records; the impossibility of before-the-fact experimental controls; and the (particularly tricky) 
issue of long time lags between climate forcing and response. According to the third assessment report 
guidance, assessing the probability of events will inevitably be subjective. It reflects the 'degree of belief that 
exists among lead authors and reviewers that the event will occur, given the observations, modelling results 
and theory currently available.' 
Other	challenges	include	how	best	to	represent	differences	in	expert	opinion;	how	to	alert	readers	to	
'long tail' events (outcomes believed to be unlikely but with serious implications should they occur); and 
'poorly managed' projected ranges in impact assessments that may propagate a 'cascade of uncertainty'. 
Evidently there are communication and credibility challenges in emphasising quantified probabilities, while 
simultaneously communicating these as provisional and liable to (perhaps dramatic) change. The guidance 
stresses that it is vital that the specialists should quantify the probabilities to the best of their abilities 
because otherwise others, less expert, would do so on their behalf. The guidance introduced a five-point 
scale to categorise quantitative probabilities (presented on the left side of Figure 14.5). 
The guidelines acknowledged that some reviewers and potential users of the guidelines were 'uncomfortable' 
with the quantitative ranking of uncertainty. It therefore proposed a qualitative scheme, based on the 
amount and strength of evidence of various types, and the level of consensus between experts (as shown on 
the right side of Figure 14.5). Together, these could be used to express high, medium or low confidence in 
particular findings, with specific formulations of words for various combinations. The guidance maintained, 
however, that this should be supplementary to the quantitative assessment, because qualitative terms 'do 
not always map well onto a quantitative scale', increasing the likelihood of inconsistent usage.
Figure 14�5 Quantitative and qualitative expressions of uncertainty as categorised in the third 
assessment report guidance
(0.95)–(1.00)	'Very	High	Confidence'
(0.67)–(0.95)	'High	Confidence'	
(0.33)–(0.67)	'Medium	Confidence'
(0.05)–(0.33)	'Low	Confidence'
(0.00)–(0.05)	'Very	Low	Confidence'
Source: Moss and Schneider, 2000.
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Panel 14�1 The evolution of the IPCC's approach to assessing 'uncertainty' (cont�)
A separate practical dimension of the third assessment report guidelines is their acknowledgement 
of human shortcomings in producing assessments. The guidance notes that the means for ensuring 
consistency in assessing and reporting on uncertainty had not previously received much attention in 
IPCC reports and that lead authors need to be aware of bias. Group dynamics add complexity to report 
drafting and that lead authors 'need to guard against the potential for 'gaming' or strategic behaviour' from 
contributors negotiating a text. Uncertainty within a group arising from conflicting strongly held individual 
views is qualitatively different from that of a group of collectively uncertain individuals, and report users 
need this information. Moreover, lead authors should be aware of history, that overconfidence biases 
experts' judgements: experts 'are correct less often than their confident assessments imply'. 
For all these reasons, the third assessment report guidelines advise the preparation of a 'traceable 
account', describing the 'reasons for adopting a particular probability distribution, including important 
lines of evidence used, standards of evidence applied, approaches to combining/reconciling multiple lines 
of evidence, explicit explanations of methods for aggregation, and critical uncertainties.' For particularly 
important outcomes, the guidelines suggest the use of formal decision analytic techniques, which may 
achieve 'a more consistent assessment of the subjective probability distribution'.
Learning from third assessment report and preparing for the fourth
Following the third assessment report, an IPCC workshop on uncertainty and risk again reviewed the issues 
(Manning et al., 2004). The workshop report states that: 
 'probability is the basic language of uncertainty and was originally developed to describe the chance of 
different outcomes for processes that are stationary over time (such as throws of dice) where observed 
frequencies are equivalent to probabilities. In general, assigning probabilities to future outcomes cannot 
assume stationarity or be based entirely on past observations. This leads to the subjective view of 
probability as a statement of the degree of belief that a person has, that a specified event will occur 
given all the relevant information currently known by that person. Such subjective probabilities have 
wider utility and are more relevant to the climate change context.' 
Nevertheless, 'cognitive bias' will exist, influenced by a person's (selective) awareness of past events 
and future expectations; the roots of their perceptions; and the analogies that spring to their mind. 
A distinction was also drawn between 'likelihood' and 'levels of confidence'. Likelihood was 'the chance of 
a defined occurrence or outcome' whereas the 'level of confidence' refers to a broader 'degree of belief or 
confidence in a science community of the amount of evidence or information available and the degree of 
consensus in the interpretation of that information'. 
The workshop also reported on how the third assessment report working groups had diverged 
from the guidance. Working Group I (addressing the physical science basis) had generally used 
mathematical-statistical methods and estimates of uncertainty in raw data, using likelihood 'as a basis for 
approaching uncertainty focused on the probability of outcomes'. It 'was clearly intended to be interpreted 
in that way despite the definition in the Working Group I Summary for Policymakers as 'judgemental 
estimates of confidence''. Working Group I never used the qualitative confidence terms introduced in the 
guidance because of 'discomfort' with the wording. Members agreed, however, that it was appropriate 
to provide separate indications of the amount of information and the degree of unanimity in the expert 
community on its interpretation. 
Working Group II (addressing impacts, adaptation and vulnerability) addressed less material based on 
statistical methods, instead giving levels of confidence focused on the degree of understanding and 
consensus among experts. At times this was used as a proxy for the probability of outcomes. Chapter 
authors had exercised discretion in using qualitative or quantitative assessments. 
Working Group III (addressing mitigation of climate change) did not adopt the guidelines, asserting that it 
was challenging for economists and social scientists to attempt to use a scale such as those employed by 
Working Groups I and II, and that there was very little literature to support such estimates for mitigation 
potentials and estimates of future emissions or drivers.
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Panel 14�1 The evolution of the IPCC's approach to assessing 'uncertainty' (cont�)
According to the workshop report, 'structural' uncertainty had not been adequately addressed in the third 
assessment report. This applied to physical measurements (such as interpreting temperature trends from 
satellite data) and to biological consequences (such as significant differences between crop yield models, 
indicating structural uncertainties). Even less account had been taken of structural uncertainties for natural 
(unmanaged) ecosystems. Similarly, socio-economic structural uncertainties underlying future scenarios and 
the treatment of adaptive and mitigated capacity had not been explained well in the TAR. 
While acknowledging that assessing structural uncertainty 'is generally more difficult and can normally only 
be done to a limited extent', the workshop concluded that there had nevertheless been a demonstrable 
tendency for it 'to be overlooked by expert groups'. Indeed 'structural uncertainties associated with analysis 
techniques … were not considered explicitly. This may have lead to more apparent certainty being given to 
results where only one or very few independent analyses had been carried out'. There is 'an obligation to 
identify what we are unlikely to be able to know before the changes actually occur'. So far 'the assessment 
community has not done very well' in addressing this point.
The workshop was clear that decision-makers need to be aware of events with low probabilities but large 
impacts, even though these are 'necessarily based on subjective views, usually of a group of experts, on 
how the future may evolve'. Qualitative explanations of uncertainties associated with costs and benefits, 
mitigation and adaptation potentials, and scenarios, may be more appropriate than quantitative confidence 
or likelihood estimates. Providing context will sometimes be more relevant to policymakers than trying to 
quantify the uncertainties. This includes indicating how robust predictions are, under different assumptions; 
identifying and explaining sources of uncertainty, including how the variables are defined; assumptions 
regarding system boundaries; and competing conceptual frameworks. Indeed, giving statements about 
confidence in probabilistic projections of likelihood raises basic issues, such as how do we measure 
confidence in unfalsifiable probabilities of future climate change, and to what extent convergence of models 
can actually be assumed to indicate increasing confidence. Given such deep uncertainties, it was argued, 
robust strategies that appear to work reasonably well across a wide range of outcomes should be favoured.
Fourth assessment guidance
Following the workshop, the Guidance note on addressing uncertainties for the fourth assessment report 
(IPCC, 2005) was drafted. In part drawing on the earlier work, the fourth assessment guidance was intended 
to 'assist' lead authors to have a consistent approach to uncertainty 'where possible', while acknowledging 
that there will be a 'diversity of approaches'. These, the guidance suggested, should be considered early, 
using a balanced process that reflects any divergence of views, and addressing value and structural 
uncertainty as well as fundamental unpredictability. Where expert judgements are made, their basis and the 
critical assumptions, should be traceable. Lead authors should be aware of group dynamics converging and 
becoming overconfident in an expressed view, or unjustifiably anchored on previous versions or values.
The guidance noted that the appropriate level of precision should be used to describe findings and it 
proposed a six-point linear 'typology of uncertainties'. This ranged from (A) 'Direction of change is 
ambiguous or the issue assessed is not amenable to prediction' to (F) 'A probability distribution can be 
determined for changes in a continuous variable either objectively or through use of a formal quantitative 
survey of expert views'. Three sets of terminology were given 'to describe different aspects of confidence and 
uncertainty and to provide consistency across the fourth assessment report':
•	 The	first	was	essentially	the	same	qualitative	assessment	of	confidence	(evidence	versus	level	of	
agreement) set out in the third assessment report guidance, although this time accompanied by instruction 
that this should only be used to supplement quantitative assessment.
•	 Similarly,	the	second	was	the	five-point	quantitative	confidence	scale	ranging	from	'very	high	confidence'	
to 'very low confidence' from the third assessment report guidance. This could 'be used to characterise 
uncertainty that is based on expert judgement as to the correctness of a model, an analysis or a 
statement'.
•	 The	third	was	a	'likelihood'	scale,	intended	to	serve	as	'a	probabilistic	assessment	of	some	well	defined	
outcome having occurred or occurring in the future', based on 'quantitative analysis or expert views'. This 
ranged from 'virtually certain, greater than 99 % probability of occurrence' to 'exceptionally unlikely, less 
than 1 % probability'.
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Panel 14�1 The evolution of the IPCC's approach to assessing 'uncertainty' (cont�)
The guidance did not specify how to ensure that the third assessment report's weaknesses in addressing 
structural uncertainty were rectified in the fourth report, other than to repeat the third assessment report 
guidance that 'structural uncertainty tends to be underestimated by experts'. Indeed, the proposed linear 
'typology of uncertainties' proposed has the potential to contribute to this confusion as any classification will 
contain contingent elements of structural uncertainty. A situation classified as (F) inevitably includes elements 
of classification (A) — categorisation is neither linear nor exclusive. 
That such dilemmas exist should not lead to policy paralysis, nor necessarily mean that the best option 
is further research to 'reduce' uncertainty. Moss and Schneider (2000), the 2004 IPCC workshop report, 
volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings and the general literature on uncertainty all contain numerous 
proposals, such as weighing up the pros and cons of action or inaction.
Inter-Academy Council (IAC) review
Following 'Climategate', a critical Dutch review, and the revelation of an error regarding the fate of Himalayan 
glaciers (actually raised but unaddressed during the fourth assessment report review process) the IPCC asked 
the IAC to review the IPCC process. Issues raised (IAC, 2010) relevant to uncertainty included the need 
to improve on transparent selection criteria for authors; demonstrably improved and formalised handling 
of alternative viewpoints; the advantages of an open review process; policies and resources for handling 
the volume of comments likely to arise, including any orchestrated efforts, by those with strong views, to 
overwhelm the system; and demonstrable independence of the review process. Structural uncertainty was not 
raised.
The IAC recommended that all working group reports should use the qualitative level-of-understanding scale 
in their summaries for policymakers and technical summaries, 'as suggested in' the fourth assessment report 
guidance. Actually the guidance was ambiguous on this (c.f. paragraphs 7 and 11–12). 
The IAC concurred with the IPCC's aspiration that the basis of the assessments should be fully traceable — 
although this has resource implications for expert authors and for recovering the information if queried. The 
IAC also argued that requiring quantitative levels of overall confidence, and a likelihood scale for specific 
observations,	was	redundant,	noting	'One	could	have	high	confidence	that	obtaining	two	sixes	when	rolling	a	
pair of fair dice is extremely unlikely. But why not just say that obtaining two sixes when rolling a pair of fair 
dice is extremely unlikely'.
Fifth assessment guidance
The IPCC has now produced a Guidance note for lead authors of the IPCC fifth assessment report on 
consistent treatment of uncertainties (Mastrandrea et al., 2010), taking into account the recommendations of 
the IAC review. The guidance states that: 
'The fifth assessment report will rely on two metrics for communicating the degree of certainty in key findings: 
•	 Confidence	in	the	validity	of	a	finding,	based	on	the	type,	amount,	quality,	and	consistency	of	evidence	
(e.g. mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. 
Confidence is expressed qualitatively. 
•	 Quantified	measures	of	uncertainty	in	a	finding	expressed	probabilistically	(based	on	statistical	analysis	of	
observations or model results, or expert judgment).' 
To avoid any doubt about the strength of this guidance, the IPCC subsequently stated, in a response to the 
IAC report (IPCC, 2011), that working groups were now 'instructed to make this evaluation of evidence 
and agreement the basis for any key finding, even those that employ other calibrated language (level of 
confidence, likelihood), and to provide a traceable account of this evaluation in the text of their chapters.' 
This, nominally at least, represents a significant evolution in the approach to uncertainty by IPCC since the 
third assessment report guidelines.
The approach to communicating the certainty of key findings in the fifth assessment report is presented in 
Figure 14.6. The accompanying explanation in the guidance describes this as 'A depiction of evidence and 
agreement statements and their relation to confidence. 
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Panel 14�1 The evolution of the IPCC's approach to assessing 'uncertainty' (cont�)
Confidence increases towards the top-right corner 
as suggested by the increasing strength of shading. 
Generally, evidence in most robust when there are 
multiple, consistent independent lines of high-quality 
evidence.'
Whereas the fourth assessment report guidance 
employed three sets of terminology to describe 
confidence and uncertainty, this is reduced to two 
for the fifth assessment. The five-point quantitative 
confidence scale is deleted, leaving only the 
likelihood scale to 'provide calibrated language for 
describing quantified uncertainty'. 
For the first time, the fifth assessment report 
guidance asks authors to 'be aware that findings can 
be constructed from the perspective of minimising false positive (type I) or false negative (type II) errors'. 
Traditionally, academic science places its emphasis on avoiding false positives (falsely concluding that a 
result is significant, when it is not), and these form the basis of most statements of quantitative likelihood 
or confidence. Although the fifth assessment report guidance does not discuss it in such terms, from a 
precautionary perspective one is also interested in type II errors (concluding that a result is not significant, 
when it is), which requires a different approach. In essence, it can mean assuming that it is more important 
to be safe than to be right. 
In other respects, as might be expected given the earlier effort, the fifth assessment report guidance largely 
reflects previous IPCC guidance, with some differences of emphasis and re-ordering of text. The guidance 
again refers to the importance of communicating low probability outcomes with significant impacts; the 
need to communicate the full range of views where expressing collective viewpoint is inappropriate; the 
need to make expert judgements and provide a traceable account of their derivation; the tendency of 
groups to converge on a viewpoint and become overconfident in it; the need to be wary of how the wording 
of statements affects interpretation by the reader; and the need for lead authors to ensure that they have 
considered all 'plausible' sources of uncertainty and to be aware that experts underestimate structural 
uncertainty arising from incomplete understanding.
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The IPCC has started implementing reforms 
based on these suggestions. In May 2011 the IPCC 
adopted guidance on a communications strategy; 
recommendations on how best to handle 'grey' 
literature; protocols on how to handle scientific 
uncertainties and corrections of errors in reports; and 
a conflict of interest policy. The IPCC also agreed to 
establish an Executive Committee to strengthen the 
overall management structure (IPCC, 2010).
Polls have shown that these attacks and other 
developments have had an impact on public opinion 
regarding the urgency of taking action, even though 
the accusations were shown to be unsubstantiated. 
In Europe in 2011 only 34 % of citizens consider 
climate change to be one of their five major concerns, 
compared to 57 % in 2007 (EC, 2011a), although 
95 % of EU citizens still feel that protecting the 
environment is important to them personally. Media 
coverage of climate change has also decreased since 
2009, although there are differences across the world 
(CSTPR, 2011). A survey in 15 countries (covering 
about 50 % of the global population) shows that 
climate change was still one of the top three concerns 
in 2010 (HSBC, 2010). But doubts about the reality 
of climate change have increased in the general 
population, and the pressure on politicians to take 
action on climate change has decreased. 
This is not to say that the scientific community is 
completely free of blame for the situation. Scientists 
and the IPCC should be open to consider criticism 
seriously, even if it appears to be scientifically 
unfounded. In the attacks on the IPCC mentioned 
above, the response of the IPCC and individual 
scientists was defensive, which was one reason 
why the Inter‑Academy Council recommended 
a more transparent communication practice for 
IPCC. Scientists in general are not necessarily good 
communicators, lacking understanding on how to 
communicate effectively to decision‑makers and the 
general public. A lot can be improved here (Bowman 
et al., 2010).
14�7 Discussion
Can	the	evolution	of	climate	change	policy	be	
understood	as	an	application	of	the	precautionary	
principle?	
Climate change science has evolved over time. The 
IPCC was established to provide comprehensive 
policy‑relevant assessments of the scientific 
knowledge relevant for developing climate change 
policies. These developments clearly had an effect 
on climate policymaking. IPCC assessment reports 
played an important role in raising awareness of risks 
as well as explaining potential solutions and their 
estimated costs.
At the international level, however, this science‑policy 
dialogue can only be regarded as a partial success. 
Current policies will not achieve the emission 
reductions that scientists consider necessary to 
achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, as 
confirmed in the Cancun agreements concluded at 
COP16. Hence, the sum of international political 
action over the last 20 years is inconsistent with a 
strict interpretation of the precautionary principle, 
which would require taking necessary action in the 
absence of full information. 
A key question is the level of scientific certainty that 
the international policymaking community needs 
to act to address climate change. The five criteria 
presented below correspond to increasing evidence 
that humankind is significantly altering the climate 
on a global scale, starting with the most basic criterion 
and ending with the most demanding one. The 
more society and its leaders are willing to adopt a 
precautionary approach, the fewer criteria have to be 
fulfilled before actions are implemented.
•	 Criterion	1:	Observation	of	a	long-term	increase	of	
long‑lived greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere.
•	 Criterion	2:	Observation	of	mean	global	warming	
derived from nearly global long‑term nearsurface 
air temperature measurements.
•	 Criterion	3:	Paleo-climatic	evidence	of	global	
warming caused by an enhanced greenhouse 
effect of the atmosphere.
•	 Criterion	4:	Detection	of	a	significant	
anthropogenic contribution to observed mean 
global warming using validated climate models 
and statistical fingerprint methods.
•	 Criterion	5:	Attribution	of	specific	aspects	of	
climate change to anthropogenic causes. Examples 
include attributing thermal expansion of ocean 
water, the most important contribution to sea level 
rise, to mean global warming at the surface and 
strong cooling of the upper stratosphere and the 
mesosphere due to increased CO2 concentration.
Criterion 1 was satisfied as far back as the late‑1960s, 
although only for CO2. For concentration increases 
of the other two long‑lived greenhouse gases, CH4 
and N2O, the 1990 report of IPCC Working Group I 
(climate science) presented the evidence. The 
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halocarbons as new, artificial long‑lived greenhouse 
gases became known as contributors to the enhanced 
greenhouse effect in the ozone assessment reports by 
WMO and NASA (WMO, 1986). 
Criterion 2 was satisfied by the first assessment report 
of IPCC (IPCC, 1990). Criterion 3 was arguably also 
fulfilled by the first IPCC report from 1990, which 
showed very high correlation between greenhouse 
gas concentrations and temperatures (during snow‑
formation) for a 160 000 year record of air bubble 
composition and oxygen isotope content in Antarctic 
ice cores. 
Criterion 4 was fulfilled by the sentence 'the balance 
of evidence suggests a discernible human influence 
on global climate', published in December 1995 in the 
Working Group I's summary for policymakers in the 
IPCC's second assessment report. 
Criterion 5 was fulfilled by the IPCC's third 
assessment report in 2001. This report showed that 
the observed cooling in the lowest stratosphere is 
predominantly caused by depletion of ozone as a 
consequence of chlorofluorocarbon decomposition in 
the stratosphere and less by the enhanced greenhouse 
effect, which is the key reason for cooling in the upper 
stratosphere (above 30 km height) and mesosphere 
(above 50 km height). In addition, the IPCC fourth 
assessment report of Working Group I, published in 
February 2007, cites several new links such as 'sea 
level rise is largely a consequence of the warming of 
sea water in the upper ocean layers' (IPCC, 2007a). 
An important factor in the IPCC successfully 
fulfilling the criteria above was the development of 
guidelines for assessing and expressing uncertainty 
systematically. As a result, important statements on 
the knowledge about changes in the climate system 
could be given qualifications such as 'as likely as 
not' (33–66 % probability it is true), 'likely' (67–90 % 
probability), 'very likely' (90–99 % probability) or 
'virtually certain' (99–100 % probability).
In summary, for all these criteria scientific proof is 
by now largely or completely available at a high 
confidence level. Hence we are far beyond the 
knowledge level where the precautionary principle 
would still be needed for any action in the global 
climate change context — at least, if the precautionary 
principle is interpreted as referring to major 
anthropogenic changes to the global climate system. 
Obviously, the list above considers neither the 
impacts of changes in the climate system on 
humans and ecosystems nor the costs and impacts 
of climate change policies. Some would say that 
attempts to consider the costs and impacts of 
alternative policies (including doing nothing) go 
beyond the precautionary approach — instead 
being characteristics of a comprehensive risk 
management approach. However, most authorities 
accept that precautionary policy actions need to take 
account of the pros and cons of action and inaction 
(See Chapter 27 on the precautionary principle).
It seems that when the precautionary approach has 
been applied in environmental policymaking in the 
years since the Rio Declaration, it has mostly occurred 
at regional scales and addressed air and water 
pollution. The stakes were much lower than in the 
case of global climate change and those implementing 
policies were generally also the ones benefitting from 
them. Global climate change is very different in many 
ways: 
1. Climate change and climate policies have strong 
impacts on all of us. There is no readily available 
solution that could easily reduce the problem to a 
safe level. 
2. Climate change is a global problem and efforts 
to reduce GHG emissions are cost‑effective only 
if they are part of an agreement with others to 
act in a comparable manner. Furthermore those 
countries and population groups most negatively 
affected by climate change are generally poor 
countries and population groups who have 
contributed little to its causation. Hence, the 
motivation for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
can differ substantially depending on the 
underlying ethical perspective. In the particular 
case of climate change, it appears that increasing 
information on the expected distribution of 
impacts, i.e. on expected 'winners' and 'losers', 
has unfortunately decreased the momentum for 
international climate policy. 
3. Climate change is a problem characterised by 
the very long atmospheric life times of many 
greenhouse gases (from a decade to millennia) 
and a long inertia in the climate system (mostly 
due to the large heat capacity of the ocean). 
As a result, emissions reductions of long‑lived 
greenhouse gases now will only have significant 
climatic effects after several decades. Hence, 
the moral dilemma outlined in the previous 
bullet point is even larger: the costs and benefits 
of emission reductions are not only unequally 
distributed across countries but also over time. 
Primarily self‑interested high emitters have little 
incentives for costly emission reductions because 
they will experience only a small fraction of 
their benefits, if their scope is only the present 
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generation. However many emission reductions 
provide substantial non‑climatic benefits in 
the short term, including reduced air pollution 
and reduced costs for importing fossil fuels. 
Contrastingly, self‑interested motivation is 
particularly low for GHG reduction measures 
such as carbon capture and sequestration that do 
not provide large non‑climatic benefits. 
Apparently the precautionary principle did play 
a role when the UNFCCC was agreed after the 
IPCC first assessment report in 1990 (criteria 4 and 
5 above were not yet fulfilled). If the UNFCCC 
had already contained binding emission reduction 
goals for industrialised countries, it would have 
provided evidence of full acceptance of the principle 
in the climate change context. The influence of 
the precautionary principle diminished however 
with subsequent actions. Now precautionary 
arguments appear to have only little, if any, effect on 
internationally coordinated climate policy action. 
Is	a	risk	management	framework	better	for	
understanding	the	evolution	of	climate	policy?	
The history of climate change policy suggests that 
arguments based on a risk management framework 
had a much stronger impact on political action 
than arguments based mainly on a precautionary 
framework. In a risk management framework, it is 
necessary to know the risks of climate change impacts 
and the risks, costs and benefits of taking mitigation 
and adaptation action, including their distribution 
across regions and over time. Countries have only 
committed to significant action at the national 
level (in the context of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
subsequent pledges under the Copenhagen Accord) 
after having satisfied themselves that emissions 
reductions are technically feasible, and that they 
can be implemented at reasonable costs and in a 
politically acceptable way. In addition, cost‑benefit 
analysis (such as the Stern review) is sometimes 
applied to evaluate how far mitigation measures 
should go in the light of the avoided climate change 
impacts. 
So risk management approaches have been applied 
but other key factors are also important, including the 
perception of risk. Risks, costs and benefits of climate 
change depend on assumptions about future social, 
economic and technical developments and on the 
evaluation of uncertainties that cannot be presented 
in strict scientific terms. Perceptions of risks, costs 
and benefits of climate change and climate protection 
policies vary significantly across different people and 
stakeholders. In addition, risk perception depends 
on factors such as how the scientific community 
communicates its findings and interacts with 
stakeholders, how credible it is perceived to be, how 
the media handle the information, as well as human 
psychology and behaviour, cultural background, 
world views and political affiliations (Weber and 
Johnson, 2012; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). 
The importance of risk perception became obvious in 
the uproar surrounding the attacks on climate science 
and the IPCC in 2009–2010. The public in several 
countries became less concerned about climate 
change and this affected the political prioritisation of 
action. The 'blogosphere' generates a huge amount 
of (dis)information, in which scientific arguments 
often are characterised as 'just another opinion'. This 
undermines the authority of bodies like the IPCC 
(Giddens, 2009), further altering risk perception. 
Misperceptions of risk partially, but not wholly, 
explain why climate change policy has so far been 
inadequate.
From threat to opportunity
Perhaps the biggest problem with establishing 
effective climate policy at the national and 
international levels has been the focus on avoiding 
climate change risks. Climate policy appears to 
require short‑term sacrifices from particular economic 
actors and changes in the costs of services and human 
activities. Benefits accrue decades later in the form of 
avoided climate change impacts. Even if the benefits 
in monetary terms outweigh the costs measured over 
a long period of time, such propositions are not very 
attractive or understandable for many people. Those 
that could be worse off in the short term will lobby 
against a proposed policy. The focus on avoiding 
climate change risks does not appeal to immediate 
self‑interest, at least not directly. A lot rests on 
solidarity with future generations.
What could be highlighted more both at the 
international and national levels is the fact that many 
interventions to stimulate development, wellbeing 
and economic growth, if well targeted, can contribute 
to a low emissions and climate resilient economy. 
Energy efficiency in industry, transport and buildings 
is good economic policy, leading to lower energy 
bills and lower greenhouse gas emissions. Renewable 
energy can provide much needed modern energy in 
rural areas, improve air quality and health, reduce 
dependency on imported energy, create new jobs 
and contribute to emissions reduction. Building 
new infrastructure, development of coastal areas, 
increasing food production — all good investments in 
development — can be done in such a way that they 
are more resilient against future floods and drought 
that result from climate change, and maximise the 
preservation of carbon stocks. 
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So if climate change is integrated into the agenda 
of development and economic growth, it aligns the 
benefits for the stakeholders interested in positive 
economic activities with the benefit of avoiding 
climate change damage. Climate change can be more 
mainstreamed into core economic decisionmaking, 
making it more likely that the necessary action will 
be taken. Rather than looking at positive economic 
and social effects as a co‑benefit of reducing climate 
change risk, climate change risk reduction becomes a 
co‑benefit of development and economic growth.
There is now a trend emerging to consider climate 
change as an integral element of socio‑economic 
decisionmaking. New paradigms of 'low carbon 
growth' or 'low emissions development', 'climate 
compatible development' or in a broader sense 'green 
growth' are being adopted in many countries. The 
European Commission's statement in October 2011 is 
a good illustration: 
'Just two weeks ago, the European Commission 
announced proposals on resource efficiency. 
Together with our proposals on a low carbon 
economy, they set out what is needed to 
transform Europe's economy to be sustainable 
by 2050. This package is our approach to green 
growth, and it builds on the efficient and 
sustainable management of our resources.' 
(EC, 2011b).
More and more countries see low‑carbon growth, 
low emissions development or green growth as a 
promising way of integrating climate change action 
into core socio‑economic decision‑making. The green 
economy was one of the key issues for the Rio+20 
meeting in 2012. UNDP, UNEP, the Organisation for 
Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) 
and the World Bank, among others, have set up 
strong programmes to promote this development 
(OECD, 2011; UNDP, 2011; UNEP, 2011a; World Bank, 
2009 and 2010a).
As a result, the main question for policy becomes 
'how can we achieve the socio‑economic goals of 
growth and development, while addressing climate 
change risks?' This question in turn demands 
answers to scientific questions: 'how can dependence 
on energy imports be reduced by developing 
domestic renewable energy resources?', 'how can air 
quality be improved to eliminate health hazards by 
shifting from fossil fuel‑based energy production 
and transport systems to clean energy and electric 
cars?' and 'how can agriculture be made more 
productive and less vulnerable to climate change 
by sequestering more carbon in agricultural soils?' 
These questions require a more integrated analysis 
and assessment than earlier questions that regarded 
climate change mitigation as largely separate from 
other policy areas.
Such questions are also critical for determining the 
different technological pathways to the 2050 goal of 
a green economy that is not dependent on fossil fuels 
— pathways that must be determined, in part, by 
means of greater public engagement. 
Table 14�1 Early warnings and actions
1896 Svante	Arrhenius	(Sweden)	calculated	that	a	doubling	of	CO2 in the atmosphere from coal burning 
could lead to an increase in average global temperature of 3–5 °C. (In 2007 IPCC estimated that 
this would be 2.4–4.5 °C). 
1938 Guy	Stewart	Callendar	(United	Kingdom)	concluded	that	'the	principle	result	of	increasing	CO2 
… would be a gradual increase in the mean temperature of the colder regions'.
1958–1970 David Keeling (US) established two long term monitoring stations in 1958 in Mauna Loa on Hawaii 
and	at	the	South	pole	to	measure	the	background	concentration	of	CO2 without the influence of 
nearby anthropogenic (human) sources. By 1970 the Mauna Loa monitoring station showed clear 
rising	trend	in	global	CO2 of 0.4 % per year.
1970s Schneider, Twomey and Grassl identified critical interactions of clouds and air pollution that amplified 
or dampened the human induced greenhouse effect.
1980 The World Climate Research Programme organised and co-financed by the World Meteorological 
Organization	and	the	International	Council	for	Scientific	Unions	became	the	first	global	change	
research programme.
1980s Models of atmospheric changes showed that both greenhouse effects and measures to avert them 
would take decades to be clearly seen because of inertia in the systems caused principally by the 
oceans. 
1985 Neftel	et	al.	(Switzerland)	and	Jouzel	et	al.	(France)	were	the	first	to	determine	the	CO2 
concentration in air bubbles of ice cores with enough precision to reconstruct the long-term history 
(160 000 years) of greenhouse gases. 
1987/1988 Groisman and Hansen publish the first trend analyses of global mean air temperature covering a full 
century. 
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Table 14�1 Early warnings and actions (cont�)
1980 and 
1985
At two scientific conferences at Villach (Austria) climate change scientists concluded that 'the 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are expected to cause a significant warming of the 
global climate in the next century'.
1987 The global Montreal Protocol on protecting the ozone layer sets targets for phasing out 
ozone-depleting substances, many of which are also powerful greenhouse gases
1988 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed focusing on climate change 
science, the vulnerability of society and nature to climate change and means of adaptation, and on 
mitigation measures for limiting or preventing greenhouse gases and their effects. 
1988 SCOPE	scientists	warn	that	human	induced	climate	change	could	cause	increases	in	climate	
variability and of extreme weather events.
1988/1989 Scientific conferences in Toronto and Nordwijk call for a global action plan, a Framework Convention 
from	1988	levels	and	for	a	reduction	of	20	%	in	global	CO2 by 2003.
1990 The IPCC published its first assessment report concluding that:  
'there is a natural greenhouse effect of the atmosphere which already keeps the Earth warmer than 
it would otherwise be'; 
'there is a strong increase of concentrations of all three long-lived naturally occurring greenhouse 
gases	(CO2, CH4, N2O),	which	is	due	to	anthropogenic	activities,	global	mean	near-surface	air	
temperature had risen by 0.3 to 0.6 °C during the 20th century, there was evidence of a rise in 
mean sea level, of retreats in mountain glaciers and changes in regional precipitation'.
1990/1992 The UN 2nd World Climate Conference called for a Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) which was later signed by 153 countries and the European Communities in Rio in 1992.
1995 The IPCC published its second assessment report stating that 'The balance of evidence suggests 
a discernible human influence on global climate.' This was the first time that scientific evidence 
enabled the human-induced change signal to be perceived against the background of natural climate 
variability. It also stated climate change impacts were happening and could pose serious risks in the 
future; and that policy measures were available to reduce GHG emissions. 
1995 At	the	first	session	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	UNFCCC	(COP1)	the	Berlin	Mandate	was	
adopted, which recognised the need for a legally binding intergovernmental agreement to reduce 
greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	industrialised	countries,	to	be	ready	in	time	for	COP3	in	1997.
1996 The Council of Environment Ministers of the European Union decided that global average 
temperatures should not be allowed to rise more than 2 °C above the pre-industrial level. 
1997 The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted by more than 150 countries. Industrialised countries 
agreed to reduce their GHG emissions, using a basket of six GHGs, to about 5 % below their 1990 
level by the 2008–2012 period.
2001 IPCC's third assessment report in 2001 concluded that 'There is new and stronger evidence that 
most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.' Projections 
of climate change impacts in the future were much more serious than in the past. The potential 
for strong reductions in global GHG emissions was clearly demonstrated and the costs of these 
reductions were shown to be modest compared to the projected increase in wealth. 
2001 The USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol.
2005 The Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol which then became binding having required 
ratification by 55 countries representing more than 55 % of the total emissions in 1990 from 
countries with reduction commitments. 
2007 IPCC fourth assessment report concluded that 'the understanding of anthropogenic warming and 
cooling influences on climate has improved ... leading to very high confidence that the global net 
effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming'.
2007 The UK Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change stated that the costs of aggressive 
mitigation action are substantially lower than the costs of climate impacts and adaptation measures.
2008 Australia signs the Kyoto Protocol.
2010/2011 Some minor errors, and deficiencies in the handling of scientific uncertainty, in the 3 000-page 
2007 IPPC report were identified but these did not affect its main conclusions. Recommendations 
were made to make all climate change data freely available so that research findings can be further 
verified. IPCC improves its communications and its guidance on handling scientific uncertainties. 
2011 COP17	in	Durban	in	2011	agreed	to	start	negotiations	for	a	new	legally	binding	agreement	for	
after 2020 and to complete negotiations by 2015; acknowledged that businesses require long-term 
agreements extending beyond 2020 to inform their investment decisions and recognised the need 
for more ambitious action by 2020 if the 2 °C limit is to be taken seriously.
2011 Canada withdraws from the Kyoto Protocol.
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(1) The author gratefully acknowledges valuable comments from five reviewers, Keith Beven, Jim Hall, Irina Krasovskaia, Edmund 
Penning-Rowsell, and Bellie Sivakumar. They helped the author to improve and enrich the chapter.
(2) The work on this chapter was carried out within the WATCH (Water and Global Change) Integrated Project of the European Union's 
6th Framework Programme.
  
Floods are an increasingly acute problem. Intense precipitation has become more frequent and 
more intense, growing manmade pressure has increased the magnitude of floods that result from 
any level of precipitation, and flawed decisions about the location of human infrastructure have 
increased the flood loss potential.
Unlike most other case studies presented in this report, this chapter focuses on flooding as a 
phenomenon and the requirements for effective early warning systems, rather than addressing a 
particular event and the lessons that can be learned.
Flooding cannot be wholly prevented. The occurrence of a flood need not be considered a 
'failure' and, conversely, minimisation of losses may constitute a 'success'. There are lessons 
to be learned from every flood and it is important to use them in preparing for the next flood. 
Once	we	accept	that	no	flood	protection	measures	can	guarantee	complete	safety,	a	general	
change of paradigm is needed to reduce human vulnerability to floods. The attitude of 'living with 
floods' and accommodating them in planning seems more sustainable than hopelessly striving to 
eradicate them.
Flood forecasting and warning systems fail because links in the chain perform poorly or fail 
completely. A single weak point in a system that otherwise contains excellent components may 
render the overall system performance unsatisfactory. A successful system requires sufficient 
integration of components and collaboration and coordination between multiple institutions.
The chapter deals primarily with the challenges of fluvial (river) floods. It is complemented 
by three short supplementary texts. The first highlights the complex, dynamic and diverse 
ecosystems of river floodplains, which are often degraded during construction of flood defences. 
Despite their huge economic value, near-natural floodplains are among the most threatened 
ecosystems globally. 
The second discusses uncertainties in anticipating rainfall patterns and intensity, and their 
relationship to flood levels during extreme flows. Such uncertainties present challenges for 
scientists and decision-makers alike. 
The third addresses the increasing risks of coastal flooding due to factors such as climate change 
and sea-level rise, and reviews European experience with precautionary action.
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'And the rain was upon the earth forty days 
and forty nights … And the waters prevailed 
exceedingly upon the earth; and all the high 
hills that were under the whole heaven were 
covered' (Genesis 7:12, 19).
'We have first raised the dust and then 
complain we cannot see' (George Berkeley).
15�1 River floods and early warnings
The term 'flooding' denotes a potentially destructive 
abundance of water in a normally dry location. 
Various categories of flood exist. They include, for 
example, situations where intense precipitation 
overwhelms urban sewer and drainage systems. 
In contrast, groundwater flooding occurs when the 
water table reaches the ground surface in a location 
where it does not normally do so. And coastal and 
estuary flooding occurs when high sea levels (due 
to high tides, storm surges or tsunamis) cause the 
coastal line to recede. 
This chapter addresses river (fluvial) floods, 
although Panel 15.3 contains information on coastal 
flooding. River floods occur when water inundates 
areas outside the river channel, where there is 
potential to cause damage. They can be caused 
by several mechanisms, such as rain (intense or 
long‑lasting), snowmelt (possibly with rain), glacier 
melt, glacial lake outbursts, dam breaks (breach) and 
tidal surges. Unexpected flow obstructions such as 
landslides, ice jams, beaver dams or debris can also 
cause flooding upstream. 
Floods differ considerably from some of the other 
hazards addressed in this report. Floods are 
intermittent events. They usually recur rarely in a 
given location, although they can be commonplace 
at some sites, for example occurring every spring 
when snow cover melts. This contrasts with hazards 
that affect the environment continuously and can 
impose cumulative 'pressures'. 
River floods are natural phenomena, manifesting 
the natural spatial and temporal variability of 
the river water level and discharge, which can 
take on extremely high values from time to time. 
River floods, jeopardising settlements located in 
floodplains, have been a continued hazard for 
humanity and can be identified in old myths and 
narratives. For millennia, people have settled in river 
valleys to till fertile soils, benefit from flat terrain, 
access water supplies easily and use water for 
transport. Riparian people have historically lived in 
harmony with nature, benefiting from benign floods 
and the valuable services they provide to fisheries, 
wetlands, wildlife and agriculture.
The notion of 'early warning of floods' can be 
interpreted in at least two ways that are relevant to 
this chapter. The first refers to a short‑term flood 
preparedness system, where a 'flood warning' is 
a technical term, denoting a means of reducing 
flood damage to people and property. In this 
sense, a flood warning contains specific timely 
information, based on a reliable forecast, that a 
high water level is expected at a particular location 
and time. It aims to ensure that emergency actions, 
such as strengthening dikes or evacuation, can be 
undertaken. 
A 'flood alert', usually issued before a 'flood 
warning', is less specific and has the broader aim 
of raising vigilance. A warning should be issued 
sufficiently early prior to the potential inundation 
to allow adequate preparation. The appropriate 
timeframe is affected by the catchment size relative 
to the vulnerable zones. The warning should also 
be expressed in a way that persuades people to take 
appropriate action to reduce damage and costs of 
the flood.
The other interpretation of 'early warning' in the 
context of floods is a statement that a high water 
level or discharge is likely to occur more frequently 
in the future. Technically, this constitutes a 
'prediction' of a change in flood frequency compared 
to a reference period, such as the 30‑year climate 
normals 1961–1990. An early warning of this type 
could, for example, predict that at a site of concern 
the current 100‑year flood (river flow exceeded once 
in 100 years on average) may become a 50‑year flood 
within some defined future time horizon. Such an 
early warning, over a longer time scale, is (or should 
be) an important signal for decision‑makers that 
the required level of protection is unlikely to be 
maintained in the future unless flood preparedness 
is improved. 
Floods continue to be a problem and we clearly do 
not cope with them satisfactorily. In fact, they are an 
increasingly serious problem. Flood risk has been 
greatly intensified by humans, who — to use the 
language of mechanics — have increased the load 
and decreased the resistance of the system. In many 
places, humans have increased the flood magnitude 
for any level of precipitation and have amplified the 
flood damage potential. Severe floods cause rising 
material damage worldwide and continue to cause 
a considerable death toll. Annual global economic 
losses from extreme weather events, including 
floods, increased ten‑fold between the 1950s and 
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River floodplains (including deltas) extend from the edge of permanent water bodies to the edge of 
uplands. Because of their unique position at the deepest location in the landscape, floodplains integrate 
and accumulate upstream and catchment processes. 
In their natural state, floodplains are disturbance-dominated ecosystems tightly linked to fluvial and 
geomorphic processes, thereby creating some of the most complex, dynamic and diverse ecosystems 
globally — landscapes that were once comparable in diversity with tropical rain forests or coral reefs 
(Junk et al., 1989; Naiman et al., 2005; Tockner et al., 2002 and 2008). This diversity has, and continues 
to be, deeply degraded, a fact that has so far captured remarkably little attention at the policy level. 
Paradoxically, a good deal of this damage is done by hydrological engineering for flood defences that 
reduces the ecological integrity of floodplains, while other actions (in the floodplains and elsewhere in the 
catchments) simultaneously remove natural flood-mitigation features.
Worldwide, floodplains cover only about 2 % of the land surface (although an accurate estimation of 
their extent remains difficult). Nevertheless, they are calculated to provide about 25 % of all continental 
ecosystem services, which is more than any other continental ecosystem type (Costanza et al., 1997; 
Oppermann	et	al.,	2008;	Tockner	et	al.,	2008).	Major	services	include	flood	regulation,	drinking	water	
supply (including recharging groundwater) and waste treatment. Daily nitrogen removal ranges from 
0.5 to 2.6 kg N per ha (although wasting nutrients is undesirable, current systems would otherwise 
require considerable expenditure to remove them, e.g. from drinking water). Floodplains also provide 
opportunities for recreation and, in areas such as the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, fishing. In Europe 
and elsewhere, benefits also include natural fertilisation, providing grazing land and firewood. 
The multiple services provided by floodplains have favoured the development of civilisations along the Nile, 
Euphrates, Indus, Amazon, Yangtze, and Mississippi Rivers; and many indigenous human societies are well 
adapted to the conditions of flooding. Floodplains continue to be preferred sites for human occupation. For 
example, about half of the human population in Europe and Japan lives on (former) floodplains (Nakamura 
et al., 2006, Tockner et al., 2009). Bangladesh, the most densely populated country worldwide, is almost 
entirely covered by a vast deltaic floodplain (accounting for about 80 % of the country's area). 
As described in the present chapter, floods are among the most costly natural disasters worldwide (see 
also Tockner et al., 2008). To reduce these costs, Switzerland has declared the remarkable intention 
(probably unique in Europe) to restore the ecological integrity of its river floodplains and their natural flood 
mitigation properties. This commitment was made because flood-related costs in Switzerland have been 
increasing since 1970, resulting in an accumulated cost of more than CHF 15 billion over the past 35 years 
(BUWAL and BWG, 2003). At the same time, Switzerland had the highest global expenditure per capita on 
traditional hydraulic engineered flood control measures (CHF 45 billion between 1970 and 2005). This was 
unaffordable. 
In response, the Swiss government fundamentally altered its river management strategy. Future flood 
control measures are now required by law to be linked to a concurrent improvement of the integrity of 
river floodplain ecosystems. It has been estimated that about 22 000 ha of cultivated land need to be 
converted back to dynamic floodplains; about 11 000 km of streams and rivers need to be restored. The 
current restoration rate ranges between 15 and 28 km per year; and 50 000 barriers must be removed 
(Armin Peter, personal communication; EAWAG, 2006). At present, more than 95 % of former floodplains 
have been converted to industrial, agricultural, and urban areas.
Despite their huge economic value for flood mitigation and other services and benefits, near-natural 
floodplains are among the most threatened ecosystems globally. In Europe, North America, and Japan, 
more than 90 % of former floodplains are functionally extinct or have been converted into cropland and 
urban areas. Conserving the remaining unimpaired floodplains as strategic global resources and restoring 
degraded floodplains are of the highest priority for future ecosystem management. There are major 
limitations, however, in implementing successful conservation and restoration strategies. Today, many 
river floodplains have been altered to such an extent that they must be considered as novel or emerging 
ecosystems where a mixture of native and non-native species, assemblages lacking a joint evolutionary 
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history, dominate. For example, up to 80 % of the benthic invertebrates collected along the Upper Danube, 
the Rhine or the Elbe Rivers are already of non-native origin (Sommerwerk et al., 2010). 
The rapid biotic turnover observed along regulated river corridors results from a combination of 
species decrease, species spread, and climate-induced species distribution shifts, although the relative 
contribution of these three components to the total turnover rate remains largely unknown. In central 
Europe, 28 000 km of navigation canals and navigable rivers connect 24 countries, creating a biological 
'super-catchment' covering an area of 2.45 million km2. This dense navigation network artificially 
facilitates the exchange of organisms across biogeographic barriers, thereby contributing to the increasing 
homogenisation of the European freshwater fauna and flora. 
There is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive overview of river floodplains, their environmental 
state and anticipated pressures. Such an overview is a prerequisite for prioritising conservation and 
management. Further research should focus on: 
•	 understanding	the	formation	and	dynamics	of	novel,	emerging	ecosystems	and	associated	biotic	
communities; 
•	 quantifying	the	ecological	and	evolutionary	consequences	of	novel	communities;	
•	 quantifying	the	ecosystem	services	provided	by	novel	ecosystems;	
•	 measuring	and	predicting	the	resilience	of	ecosystems	and	species	assemblages	along	human	impact	
gradients; 
•	 assessing	the	evolutionary	potential	of	an	ecosystem,	i.e.	its	genetic	diversity	and	genetic	connectivity,	
as a complementary tool in biodiversity conservation planning; 
•	 developing	and	testing	new	indicators	of	biodiversity	change	and	impacts.	
One	of	the	best	documented	examples	of	a	long-term	and	fundamental	modification	of	a	river	floodplain	
is the Upper Rhine valley between Basel (Switzerland) and Worms (Germany). More than 150 years ago, 
Tulla's regulation of the Upper Rhine was a technical masterpiece and one of the largest construction 
projects worldwide during the nineteenth century. The river was shortened from 345 to 273 km, 
2 200 islands were removed — an area of more than 100 000 ha between Basel and Strasbourg 
alone — and 240 km major dikes were constructed (Blackbourn, 2006). As a consequence, the Rhine 
floodplain has been converted from a fishery and waterfowl paradise to a productive agricultural area. 
Reconstruction of the native biodiversity is difficult because a first systematic inventory of the benthic 
invertebrate community was compiled at the beginning of the twentieth century, decades after the end 
of the 'rectification' of the Upper Rhine valley (Lauterborn, 1905). The rich biodiversity that still exists in 
the remnant floodplain channels and riparian forests along the Upper Rhine is most likely a legacy of past 
hydrogeomorphic processes. At the same time, however, the reduction in natural retention areas has led to 
an increase in flood peaks in the downstream sections of the Rhine valley. 
A lack of adequate reference conditions restricts the development of guiding images for conservation 
and restoration, and limits implementation of the Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000), which strongly 
depends on defined reference standards for assessing alterations. Even the best protected floodplains 
in	Europe	such	as	the	Alluvial	Zone	National	Park	(Danube,	A),	the	Odra	National	Park	(Odra,	D)	or	the	
Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, have been irreversibly modified. Traditional conservation and restoration 
strategies will simply not maintain their rich biodiversity and ecosystem processes and services in a 
sustainable way. Adaptive management strategies must manage these floodplains actively as coupled 
ecological-social-technological systems for the benefit of humans and nature. Active manipulation to 
deliver multiple ecosystem services is also needed to create the environmental conditions for rich (albeit 
largely non-native) floodplain communities (Dufour and Piegay, 2009). 
At the European level, it is crucial to establish synergies among the partly contradictory requirements of 
the Water Framework Directive, the Habitats Directive (EU, 1992) and the Floods Directive (EU, 2007). 
Furthermore, we urgently need a European competence network that focuses on large rivers, including 
their role as long-distance migration and dispersal corridors linking various biomes; as key storage and 
transformation areas for carbon and nutrients; as centres for evolutionary processes; and as coupled 
social-ecological ecosystems. 
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1990s in constant prices (IPCC, 2001b). Data compiled 
by Munich Re (Kron, 2005) indicate that the number 
of great flood disasters (requiring international or 
interregional assistance) has grown significantly in 
recent decades, as have the economic impacts and the 
insured damage. 
Several recent river flood events have caused material 
losses exceeding USD 10 billion. The death toll has 
been considerable, with individual events in less 
developed countries causing more than 1 000 fatalities 
(Kundzewicz et al., 2010a). The highest material 
losses, in the order of USD 30 billion, were recorded 
in China in the 1998 floods. Destructive floods 
are commonplace in many developing countries, 
in particular in the Asian continent (especially 
Bangladesh, China and India) and South America, 
yet numerous deluges have hit virtually all parts of 
the world, including Europe. As reported by Barredo 
(2007), a rising number of flood disasters have been 
observed in Europe in recent years and high‑impact 
floods are occurring more frequently. The material 
flood damage recorded in Europe in 2002 (above 
EUR 20 billion) was higher than in any previous year. 
Recognising that flood damage has increased 
worldwide, it is interesting to understand the reasons 
for this growth. Several factors may be responsible, 
including changes in socio‑economic, terrestrial and 
climate systems: 
•	 Socio-economic	changes include increasing 
exposure and potential damage due to 
population growth and economic development 
in flood‑prone areas; land‑use change (such as 
urbanisation and deforestation) and changing 
perceptions of risk. 
•	 Changes	in	terrestrial	systems include changes 
in hydrological systems and ecosystems, driven 
by land‑cover change, the regulation of river flow 
through such measures as channel straightening 
and shortening, and the construction of 
embankments. Conditions that determine the 
transformation of precipitation into runoff in 
the river basin also change. Draining wetlands 
and eliminating natural vegetation, alongside 
expanding impermeable areas, lead to reduced 
water storage capacity and consequently a higher 
flood peak and a shorter time to peak. 
•	 Finally, climate	changes are important, even 
if they may not always be detectable in the 
historical record. They include increased 
water‑holding capacity and water content of the 
atmosphere in a warmer climate, increases in 
the frequency of heavy precipitation, changes in 
snow cover, and changes in seasonality and in 
atmospheric circulation patterns.
Human encroachment into floodplains has increased 
exposure to floods. Encroachment may increase as 
people become wealthier and technology or economic 
imperatives help populate more flood‑prone areas. 
Many flawed decisions have increased the flood 
loss potential. The assets at risk from flooding can 
be enormous. For instance more than 10 million 
people live in areas at risk of extreme floods along 
the Rhine and the potential damage from floods there 
has been estimated at EUR 165 billion (EU, 2007). 
In some less developed countries, the portion of the 
population living in flood‑prone areas is very much 
higher. The hope of overcoming poverty drives 
poor people to migrate to informal settlements in 
endangered, flood‑prone zones around mega‑cities 
in developing countries, which have previously been 
left uninhabited on purpose because effective flood 
protection cannot be assured.
Future changes in flood risks may be complex. In 
many places, flood risk is likely to grow due to a 
combination of anthropogenic and climatic factors. 
Quantifying flood statistics is difficult, however, and 
subject to high uncertainty. As stated in IPCC (2001a), 
'the analysis of extreme events in both observations 
and coupled models is underdeveloped'. Recent 
modelling studies show that plausible climate change 
scenarios project future increases of both amplitude 
and frequency of rain‑caused flooding events. Yet no 
conclusive and ubiquitous climate change trend in the 
flood behaviour has been found, based on the global 
data on high river flows observed so far (Kundzewicz 
et al., 2005; Svensson et al., 2005).
Detecting climate change at global or regional scales 
(let alone within catchments) is inherently difficult 
because of the low signal‑to‑noise ratio. The relatively 
weak climate change signal (if any) is superimposed 
on a strong natural variability of rainfall and river 
discharge, which is further confounded by land‑use 
change. Hence, Wilby et al. (2008) speculate that 
statistically robust trends are unlikely to be apparent 
for several decades. 
Although land use management and land cover 
change have an important effect on flood risk, it 
is less significant in the case of very high‑intensity 
rainfall, which causes high flood runoff in both urban 
and forested basins. 
There is always potential for floods that are higher 
than those recorded in the past, even under 
stationary conditions — i.e. without climate change. 
This is simply a sampling effect and its significance 
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depends on the length of the historic record; as 
records get longer, the probability of record high 
precipitation occurring in an area with high damage 
potential increases. Flood defences are typically 
designed to withstand an event with a return period 
of 100 years, perhaps with some additional safety 
margin. However, the discharge for this return period 
is generally estimated from records gathered over an 
inadequately short interval and is therefore uncertain. 
The highest point precipitation amounts ever 
recorded for different time intervals are 1 340 mm in 
12 hours, 1 825 mm in one day and 3 847 mm in eight 
days (WMO, 1986). If precipitation of a similar scale 
occurred over (or directly upstream from) a large city, 
the result could be expected to be utter destruction.
It is important not to forget that, in addition to 
negative effects, floods can generate benefits. For 
example, the fertile Nile floods were crucial to the 
development of ancient Egypt. In some areas, floods 
are an important means of recharging groundwater 
aquifers. Floods may strengthen community solidarity 
and can enhance economic activity (related to flood 
preparedness and recovery). Any benefits that could 
be lost also need to be taken into account when 
considering flood prevention measures and options.
15�2 Flood forecasting and warning
Flood alerts, forecasts, warnings and responses 
are very important components of modern flood 
preparedness systems. They fall into the category 
of non‑structural flood protection measures, 
which can save lives and reduce material losses 
and human suffering. An effective system should 
embrace detection of the risk of a flood‑triggering 
situation, quantitative flood forecasting (with 
adequate lead time), development of a reliable 
warning message, issuing and disseminating the 
warning to communities at risk, adequate actions by 
communities to reduce losses and, finally, post‑hoc 
audits to learn lessons and improve the system for the 
future. 
Flood warning has existed for thousands of years. The 
Old Testament mentions the oldest 'early warning', 
received by Noah from God; archaeologists have 
revealed other, even earlier, accounts of a similar 
story. For centuries, floods were believed to be a 
divine punishment for the sins of mankind. In 1523, 
a forecast anticipating a flood in February 1524 was 
published in Augsburg, based on a quasi‑scientific 
speculation: a peculiar conjunction of planets in the 
constellation Pisces. The forecast turned out to be 
false (Brázdil et al., 2005). 
15.2.1 Flood forecasts
A flood forecast should ideally deliver reliable and 
accurate information on the future development 
of an event, enabling an alert and warning to be 
issued. A forecast expresses when a flood is expected 
to occur (ranging from minutes to days or even 
weeks ahead), its location and its intensity. Flood 
magnitude is determined by the stage, discharge, 
inundated area and duration of flooding. A forecast 
also conveys how a flood will travel downstream 
and evolve and what secondary effects it may cause.
In order to detect the risk of a flood‑triggering 
situation occurring, a meteorological and 
hydrological monitoring system should be in place. 
Forecasting, based on mathematical modelling, 
allows experts to convert the information on rainfall, 
hydrological status of soil moisture and snow cover 
into a forecast of river discharge, water level and 
inundated area for a future time horizon. 
For small or urban catchments and for flash floods 
in steep and rapid mountain streams, the time lag 
between an intense precipitation and the resulting 
river flood peak is very short (minutes to hours). 
In these circumstances, observations of rising river 
water levels may come too late for a useful flood 
forecast. Weather radar data (which brings its 
own issues) or quantitative precipitation forecasts 
are therefore required to estimate future river 
flows with sufficient lead time to provide a useful 
warning. 
At the other extreme, the formation of a flood 
wave in a large river may take several weeks, 
allowing ample time for response to a flood forecast. 
A hydrodynamic flood‑routing model can be used, 
allowing visualisation (via GIS) of the forthcoming 
inundation in downstream cross‑sections of the 
river. Many activities are under way to improve 
forecast accuracy and to extend the forecast lead 
time. In this context, two important factors are data 
assimilation and adaptive forecasting, which makes 
use of current measurements to reduce forecast 
errors (Young, 2002).
15.2.2 Flood warnings
Flood warnings should contain more information 
than flood forecasts. This includes recommendations 
or orders for affected populations to take actions, 
such as evacuation or emergency flood‑proofing, 
specifically designed to safeguard life and property 
(Smith and Ward, 1998). According to Nigg (1995), 
warning systems must fulfil two basic functions: 
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•	 assessment	(from	the	moment	that	a	specific	
hazard is detected to the point when a risk 
message is developed for the threatened 
locality); 
•	 dissemination	(issuing	and	transmitting	the	
warning message to a target audience). 
A warning, converting scientific forecasts into lay 
language, is a communication that a hazard will 
produce specific risks for a specific population 
(Nigg, 1995). Affected communities should not 
just be told about the hazard but also informed in 
such a way that they are persuaded to take specific 
remedial action in time. Such warnings should be 
'populist' in tone and communication but their 
design is actually a skilled task requiring careful 
forethought and design. 
There is an important difference between flood 
alerts and flood warnings. The latter have much 
shorter lead times that must be accurate to 
maintain public confidence. In Vaison‑la‑Romaine 
in 1992, Meteo‑France issued two (accurate) flood 
alerts based on heavy rainfall predictions 12 and 
24 hours ahead but because the local authorities 
did not know which catchment would be affected 
no warning was issued and many people died. The 
European Flood Alert System (EFAS) at the European 
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) now 
produces flood alerts for the whole of Europe (JRC, 
2011).
It is often noted that forecasts have advanced 
markedly, while progress in warnings has lagged 
behind despite recent advances in some countries, 
such as automatic telephone and text‑messaging 
services and the provision of detailed forecasting 
services on the internet. 
Nigg (1995) argues that to formulate warning 
messages:
•	 the	basis	of	the	warning	must	be	credible;
•	 the	warning	message	must	explain	the	degree	to	
which a specific area is at risk;
•	 people	must	be	told	what	they	can	do	to	reduce	
their exposure to danger.
Speed of reaction to warnings is essential because 
there may be a short time to implement emergency 
pre‑flood actions, such as strengthening or deploying 
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defences and evacuation, before the risk becomes 
high. Other useful criteria or indicators of warning 
quality are the penetration of the warning (the 
proportion of those who need information that 
receive it) and degree of satisfaction.
15.2.3 Flood warning errors
Two types of warning errors occur: 
•	 first,	when	a	warning	is	issued	but	the	risk	does	
not materialise; 
•	 second,	when	no	warning	is	issued	but	a	risk	and	
the ensuing disaster occur. 
The first does not include situations where the risk 
has materialised but the disaster has not. For instance, 
flood warning in the Netherlands in January 1995 
resulted in massive evacuation. A disaster did not 
arrive, as the levees withstood the high water load 
but the warning and the evacuation were justified 
and perceived by the population as the right decision. 
The risk of dike failure was high. Similarly, during 
the summer 1997 flood on the Odra (see Box 15.1), the 
Polish	town	Słubice	was	evacuated	due	to	high	risk	of	
inundation. As a result of major dike‑strengthening 
action, however, and dike breaches upstream in 
Germany,	which	reduced	the	load,	Słubice	was	not	
inundated.
As noted by Nigg (1995), officials often hesitate to 
issue warnings due to fear of error, especially when 
warning systems are just developing or when there is 
still a great deal of uncertainty about the occurrence 
of the future event.
15.2.4 Credibility and efficiency of flood warnings
The more personal the manner in which a message 
is delivered, the greater its credibility. In principle, 
person‑specific warnings may trigger more urgent 
responses than communication directed at the 
general public. There can be challenges, however, 
in establishing more focused communication 
mechanisms. In the United Kingdom people in 
flood risk zones can sign up to receive warnings by 
telephone, text message or email but the take‑up has 
not been high. This is partly because many people 
do not want to recognise that they are in a flood risk 
zone because of a fear of reduced house prices or the 
inability to acquire insurance. 
Factors influencing the efficiency of message 
dissemination include the credibility of the 
source (which may vary according to the 
recipient of the message); the accessibility of the 
chosen communication channel; the usefulness 
or redundancy of the information; and the 
communication of a system's resistance to floods. 
Essentially, the information should be conveyed 
in wording that the public can understand and 
empathise with and via channels that the public finds 
credible.
15.2.5 Long-term early warnings
In addition to short‑term (real‑time) warnings related 
to a specific, forthcoming flood event, recent work 
has also emphasised the need to issue another type 
of early warning if the projections (predictions) of 
flood hazards in the more distant future indicate 
considerable changes in the anticipated risk (Hall 
et al., 2003, 2005; Hirabayashi et al., 2008; Dankers 
and Feyen, 2008; Kundzewicz et al., 2010a, 2010b). 
Early warnings of increasing flood risk in the decades 
ahead are necessary to upgrade defence strategies, 
for example by undertaking the time‑consuming and 
resource‑intensive task of strengthening levees. 
Climatic and non‑climatic factors affect future flood 
risk and adaptation needs. For example, land‑cover 
changes and urbanisation can increase flood risk 
regardless of any change in climate. Observations 
and climate projections show widespread increases 
in the contribution of very wet days to total annual 
precipitation in the warming atmosphere (Trenberth 
et al., 2007). Increasing flood magnitudes are 
projected in areas where floods result from heavy 
rainfall; decreasing flood magnitudes are anticipated 
where they result from spring snowmelt. Winter 
(rain‑caused) flood hazard is likely to rise for many 
catchments under several climate scenarios. However, 
global warming may not necessarily reduce snowmelt 
flooding everywhere. Since an increase in winter 
precipitation is expected, snow cover may actually 
increase in cold areas where the temperature remains 
below 0 °C. 
Floods corresponding to a 100‑year return in the 
control period may become more or less frequent in 
the future climate. Where they increase, upgraded 
flood prevention measures will be needed to 
ensure the required protection level. Projections 
by Hirabayashi et al. (2008) and by Dankers and 
Feyen (2008) indicate that in much of Poland, 
France, the United Kingdom, southern Sweden and 
northern Italy, today's 100‑year floods will occur 
more frequently in 2071–2100. They are projected to 
occur less frequently over most of Finland and the 
European part of the Russian Federation. These two 
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studies show that, in aggregate terms, the control 
100‑year flood is projected to become more frequent 
over more than 40 % of Europe, and that over 30 % of 
Europe the mean recurrence interval of such floods 
is projected to decrease from 100 years to below 
50 years by 2071–2100 (Kundzewicz et al., 2010b). 
Systems continue to be designed and operated 
assuming stationarity (the past is the key to the 
future). Since this assumption is clearly incorrect due 
to both non‑climatic and climatic changes (Milly et al., 
2008), existing design procedures need to be revised, 
accounting for land‑cover change, climate change 
and other changes of relevance. Otherwise, systems 
will be under‑ or over‑designed and either not serve 
their purpose adequately or be overly costly (with 
excessive safety margins). 
Difficulties in isolating the greenhouse signal in river 
flow observation records, coupled with the large 
uncertainty in projections of future precipitation and 
related variables, mean that no precise quantitative 
information can be delivered for long‑term flood 
preparedness planning. Nevertheless, water 
managers in some countries, including Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have begun to 
take account of these early climate change warnings 
explicitly in flood protection design codes. 
In Bavaria, for example, flood design values now 
take into account projections of a 40–50 % increase 
in small and medium flood discharges by 2050, and 
an increase of around 15 % in 100‑year floods. In the 
United Kingdom, the precautionary allowance of the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra, 2006) includes projections of increased peak 
river flow volumes (10 % up to 2025 and 20 % after 
2085), to reflect the possible effects of climate change, 
based on early impact assessments. A 'climate change 
factor' is to be reflected in any new plans for flood 
control measures in the Netherlands. Measures are 
planned to manage the Rhine's increased discharge 
in the Netherlands resulting from climate change. By 
2015, the measures implemented should increase the 
design discharge from 15 000 to 16 000 m3/s and this 
should increase further to 18 000 m3/s in the longer 
term (Kundzewicz et al., 2007). 
15�3 Flood preparedness systems — the 
science and its use
Complete flood safety is impossible in low‑lying 
areas adjacent to rivers. Flood risk can be 
considerably restricted, however, if an adequate 
preparedness system is built, consisting of a 
site‑specific mix of measures. Flood‑related research, 
financed by regional, national and international 
funding institutions, administrative authorities, water 
agencies, and the insurance and reinsurance industry, 
is indispensable to optimise preparedness systems.
In Europe, important research initiatives have been 
undertaken at the international and national levels. 
A prominent example of integrated international 
action is the interdisciplinary FLOODsite project 
(Klijn, 2009) within the Sixth Framework Programme 
of the European Union. FLOODsite developed 
integrated flood risk analysis and management 
methods, covering the physical, environmental 
and socio‑economic aspects of floods from rivers, 
estuaries and the sea. It integrated different scientific 
disciplines, spatial planning and management and 
considered flood risk as a combination of hazard 
sources, pathways and consequences for people, 
property and the environment. 
The EU Floods Directive (EU, 2007; Box 15.2) 
explicitly refers to FLOODsite as the largest 
ever EU flood research project. The FLOODsite 
project dealt with detection and forecasting of 
hydro‑meteorological conditions and timely warning 
of the relevant authorities and the public. The 
research aimed to enhance the performance and 
shorten the lead time of flash‑flood forecasting by 
linking rainfall‑runoff models to real‑time remotely 
sensed (radar and satellite) data. A system for 
detecting and estimating extreme storm rainfall was 
developed and tested and the uncertainty of the radar 
rainfall estimates was assessed.
15.3.1 Protect, adapt, retreat
An example of national flood‑related research 
initiatives is the UK's Foresight Project (Evans 
et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2005), dealing with flood and 
coastal defence. The project's aim was to forecast 
changes in flood risks in the United Kingdom over 
the next 100 years and to identify the best options 
for responding to future challenges. The key finding 
was that if existing policies are continued the flood 
risks in 2080 could increase substantially. Projected 
changes range from little increases above current 
expected annual damage in an optimistic scenario 
to a 20‑fold increase under another scenario. The 
projections suggest that it will be necessary to choose 
between investing more in sustainable approaches to 
flood management or learning to live with increased 
flooding. An integrated portfolio of responses 
can reduce future risk by an order of magnitude, 
although the relative effectiveness of response 
measures depends very much on the scenario 
considered. 
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The current strategy for flood preparedness in 
Europe can be summarised as 'protect as far as 
technically possible and affordable' and otherwise 
'adapt and accommodate'. This has also been 
expressed as 'living with floods' (Germany, 
Netherlands) and 'making space for water' 
(Netherlands, the United Kingdom). If a necessary 
level of protection cannot be achieved and 
accommodation (living with floods) is not possible, 
then another option is retreat. 
Decisions have to be made about how to design 
protection systems and how to control the damage 
potential, for example by enforcing zoning, 
banning floodplain development and moving 
out of the harm's way. Flood protection measures 
may either modify flood waters or modify the 
system susceptibility. They depend on the rate 
of recurrence of floods: natural measures (such 
as enhancing wetlands and floodplains) are 
appropriate for frequent floods; engineering 
measures are suitable for rare floods; residual risk 
management is essential for very rare floods (Kron, 
2005). This latter category contains extreme but 
possible floods, and those beyond the limits of past 
experience.
15.3.2 Structural and non-structural flood 
protection measures
A range of flood protection and management 
measures exist, falling into structural ('hard') or 
non‑structural ('soft') approaches. The former refer 
to large‑scale defences, such as dikes, dams and 
flood control reservoirs, diversions and floodways, 
and improving drainage channel capacity. 
Structural defences have a very long tradition, with 
dams and dikes having been built for millennia. 
Constructing reservoirs where excess water can be 
stored allows a regulated temporal distribution of 
streamflow, reducing the natural peak flow. 
The physical dimensions of structural flood 
protection measures, such as levees, are based on 
probability theory to withstand a predicted 'design 
flood' of a certain magnitude, e.g. a 100‑year flood 
(although this is difficult to determine in practice), 
in a given location. The longer the assumed return 
period of the design flood, the better the level of 
protection and the greater the costs. This raises 
various value judgements, such as whether to 
design dikes to withstand a 100‑year flood or 
perhaps a 1 000‑year flood. The latter solution 
would give better protection but be far more costly. 
Moreover, it is misleading to expect complete flood 
protection or total certainty of outcomes. 
Dikes protect well against small‑ and medium‑size 
floods but when a deluge is of disastrous size and 
dikes break, losses in a levee‑protected landscape 
can be higher than in the absence of a levee due 
to the false feeling of security that levees can 
generate among the riparian population and the 
high damage potential in apparently (but not 
completely) safe areas. No matter how high a 
design flood is, there is always a possibility of a 
greater flood occurring, inducing losses. A dike 
designed for a 100‑year flood is likely to fail if a 
1 000‑year flood occurs. 
In the United Kingdom, the 2005 Carlisle flood 
occurred when the plans for the new Carlisle flood 
defences were out for public consultation. The 
planned defences would have met the UK standard 
of the 100‑year return period and if built they 
would have been breached because the 2005 event 
had a return period in excess of 150 years. After the 
event, the defences were therefore redesigned to 
address a 200‑year return period.
Several developed countries have costly structural 
protection facilities to withstand a high, rare flood. 
Reinforced dikes or super‑dikes of 300–500 meters 
width play an important part in flood protection 
of major cities in Japan, where a very high level of 
safety must be assured (Kundzewicz and Takeuchi, 
1999). Even higher protection levels are achieved in 
the low‑lying Netherlands. The Flood Defence Act 
of 1996 set high safety standards with the return 
period of design flood set at 1 250 years for middle 
to upper rivers in the Netherlands and 2 000 years 
for lower river reaches (Pilarczyk, 2007).
'Soft' non‑structural flood protection measures 
include source control (watershed management), 
laws and regulations, zoning, economic 
instruments, efficient flood forecast warning 
systems, flood risk assessment systems, 
awareness‑raising information and flood‑related 
databases. Source control modifies the formation 
of floodwater by catching water where it falls, 
enhancing infiltration, reducing impermeable 
areas and increasing storage in the watershed. 
These measures counteract the adverse effects of 
urbanisation, such as reduced storage potential, 
growth in the runoff coefficient and flood peak, 
and acceleration of a flood wave. Restoring, 
retaining or enhancing water storage capacity 
in the river system (floodplains, polders and 
washlands) is also important.
Appropriate schemes of insurance, which distribute 
risks and losses over many people and over a 
longer time, coupled with aid that can compensate 
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Panel 15�2 Uncertainty in predicting floods (and other environmental variables) 
 
Keith Beven
In its report on the causes of the Mississippi floods in 1993, the US Interagency Floodplain Management 
Review Committee's major conclusion was that the rainfalls were 'without precedent' (Galloway, 1995). 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom the Pitt Report described the summer 2007 rainfalls and floods as 
'exceptional' and noted widespread demand for better warnings to provide the public more time to prepare 
and protect their property (Pitt, 2007).
The demand for better warnings appears to pose a relatively simple problem for hydrological science. 
With some knowledge of the pattern of heavy rainfalls, it should be possible to predict river flows and, 
during	extremes,	the	likely	extent	of	flooding.	Of	course,	there	are	also	organisational	and	social	problems	
in conveying flood warnings to the public but here we will concentrate on the scientific problem. It is an 
example of the type of predictions about environmental variables that are increasingly demanded and 
extend all the way up to predictions about the future climate based on global atmosphere and ocean 
circulation models.
In fact, many of these apparently simple science problems turn out to be complex and fraught with 
uncertainties that are difficult to evaluate. In the case of floods, measurement technique limitations 
mean that there is uncertainty about the pattern and intensity of rainfall and the relationship between 
discharge and flood levels during extreme flows. There is uncertainty about how much rainfall will reach 
a river and when — in part because there is a highly non-linear relationship between the wetness of a 
catchment before an event and runoff generation processes. Many major floods (examples from the United 
Kingdom include the summer 2007 floods, the Lynmouth flood in 1952, the Boscastle flood in 2004, the 
Carlisle flood in 2005 and the Cumbria floods in 2009) were preceded by prior wetting, which increased 
subsequent runoff. Hydrological models can simulate and predict runoff generation but they can only 
approximate, thereby introducing further uncertainty.
There are also important modelling uncertainties in predicting the frequency with which a flood of a given 
magnitude will occur, how that might change in the future as a result of climate variability or change, 
and the impacts of land management changes on runoff generation. It is therefore unsurprising that 
uncertainty estimation has been an important research topic in hydrological modelling in the last two 
decades. This has included analysis of how the nature and magnitude of predictive uncertainties should be 
communicated to decision-makers and stakeholders (e.g. Faulkner et al., 2007; Beven, 2009). 
This research has determined that there is still significant debate about how the effects of relevant 
uncertainties should be estimated, with the literature revealing a range of strongly held opinions and some 
interesting debates. The failure to reach more general consensus over this period may appear surprising 
but there are some fundamental issues involved, which apply much more generally in environmental 
modelling (see Beven, 2002, 2006a and 2006b). 
Disagreement centres on the types of uncertainties involved. Aleatory uncertainties, arising from 
natural variability, can be distinguished from epistemic uncertainties, which result from the limitations 
of our knowledge about the system under study. Inherent unpredictability of nature and unrecognised 
uncertainties ( 'unknown unknowns') may also influence the errors in model predictions but cannot be 
treated explicitly because, by definition, they are not accessible for analysis (Sivakumar, 2008). 
It is commonly assumed that most sources of uncertainty can be treated as aleatory, which is 
advantageous because such uncertainties can be treated in terms of probabilities and the full panoply 
of statistical theory can be used in analysis and prediction. Beven (2006b) argues, however, that this 
only applies in 'ideal cases'. Most of the uncertainties involved in hydrological and other environmental 
models have an epistemic as well as an aleatory component. Treating the sources of uncertainty as if they 
were aleatory in non-ideal cases will produce over-confidence in the model predictions because of the 
time-variable nature of epistemic uncertainties. 
There is no general theory of how to handle epistemic uncertainties and some debate has focused on 
whether	it	is	always	appropriate	to	estimate	uncertainties	based	on	probabilities.	Other	frameworks,	such	
as the possibilities of fuzzy set theory, allow more flexibility but introduce more subjectivity into the
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Panel 15�2 Uncertainty in predicting floods (and other environmental variables) (cont�)
associated assumptions. Probability theory has the attraction of being logically consistent and objective 
— but if and only if the assumptions about the nature of the errors can be shown to be consistently valid 
and this is rarely the case. Even in models it can be shown that small departures from the ideal can lead to 
overconfidence in predictions (e.g. Beven et al., 2008).
In real applications, most sources of uncertainty have both aleatory and epistemic components, but it will 
often be the epistemic component that dominates. In predicting floods, rain gauges, radar and numerical 
weather prediction can be used to measure or forecast rainfall over a catchment area and provide inputs 
to hydrological models of runoff generation. All will be subject to epistemic errors. Numerical weather 
prediction is useful for identifying potential flood events but does not (yet) give generally reliable rainfall 
forecasts. Such forecasts are essential for flood warning, especially for flash floods in small basins with 
short response times, since there is no other way to provide warnings to the public with sufficient lead 
time. They will, however, be uncertain and not just in aleatory ways. 
In larger basins, measurements of rainfall will be sufficient as an input to warning models. However, a rain 
gauge network may not always provide a good estimate of that input, particularly for localised convective 
cells or orographic effects, because the spatial pattern of the gauges may not properly represent the 
spatial pattern of the rainfall. Radar gives relatively good spatial coverage but does not measure rainfall 
directly and there may be epistemic uncertainties in the corrections and reflectivity-rainfall intensity 
relationship used, which will vary from event to event. 
Similar arguments apply to other types of uncertainties in flood forecasting and frequency estimation.
There is no question that it is better to estimate some form of uncertainty for these predictions than to 
ignore the uncertainties. But this creates certain challenges. For the scientist, the problem is how best to 
deal with epistemic uncertainties. For the decision-maker, who depends on model predictions, the problem 
is how to understand and interpret the uncertainty estimates associated with a prediction — and under 
what circumstances not to rely on model predictions when making a decision. 
Flood	forecasting	poses	additional	difficulties.	One	is	the	issue	of	conveying	the	meaning	of	flood	warnings	
when the uncertainties in the forecasting process might result in one or a succession of false alarms. 
Furthermore, as Kundzewicz notes in the present chapter, there is also a need to explain to the public (and 
even to some decision-makers) that there is a finite possibility that even a new flood defence scheme may 
be breached by the next flood event (or, as in Carlisle in January 2005, before the new design has been 
built). 
Estimating uncertainty associated with these types of predictions can have important consequences if 
it alters the resulting decision. Understanding such estimates is easier for users with a clear theoretical 
foundation in probability (Hall et al., 2007; Todini and Mantovan, 2007; Montanari, 2007) but, as already 
noted, estimates can be misleading if they lead to overconfidence in the outcomes. 
Essentially, science lacks a theory of the true information content of data that is subject to epistemic 
uncertainties (Beven, 2008). That will take time to develop but in the meantime there are some practical 
ways	of	proceeding.	One	is	to	involve	potential	users	of	model	predictions	earlier	in	the	prediction	process	
so that decisions can be taken about how to evaluate model performance and handle different sources of 
uncertainty. The Environment Agency of England and Wales is starting to implement this approach within 
the framework of 'guidelines for good practice' for incorporating risk and uncertainty into different areas of 
flood risk management. 
This type of stakeholder involvement in the prediction process has been advocated for some time 
(e.g. Stirling, 1999; EEA, 2001). The guidelines concept provides a framework for agreeing on reasonable 
assumptions about both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. It should provide a good basis for assessing 
the value of different types of model prediction in the decision-making process.
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for uninsurable losses, are additional important 
components of flood preparedness. Flood‑risk 
maps developed for the insurance industry are 
used to help estimate insurance premiums for 
properties in the United Kingdom. Post‑flood 
disaster aid, based on voluntary solidarity 
contributions, national assistance and international 
help, is essential to restore the livelihoods of 
survivors.
Despite some encouraging examples, such as in the 
US after the 1993 flood, the permanent evacuation 
of floodplains is virtually unthinkable in most 
countries. This is definitely true for Bangladesh, a 
densely populated and low‑lying country, which 
ranks as the most flood‑prone country on earth. 
The people of Bangladesh, growing rapidly in 
number, have to live with regular floods. Most 
of the country is made up of floodplains and soil 
fertility depends on regular flood inundation. 
In 1998, more than two thirds of the country 
were inundated. New flood embankments, even 
if affordable, would occupy scarce and highly 
demanded land. Thus, the options include 
reinforcing the existing structural defences and 
enhancing and optimising non‑structural measures, 
including the forecast‑warning system. As this 
example makes clear, optimum strategies for flood 
protection must be site‑specific.
15.3.3 Uncertainty in flood risk assessment
Notwithstanding major research efforts, there is 
much uncertainty in the hydrological studies that 
underpin flood risk assessment and management 
(e.g. in determining a 100‑year flood). Various 
studies (e.g. Beven, 2006a; Hall et al., 2007; 
Sivakumar, 2008) have judged the uncertainty 
analysis in hydrological studies to be highly 
unsatisfactory. Although disagreeing in significant 
respects, all called for the promotion of uncertainty 
analysis of measurements and modelled results in 
hydrological studies; uncertainty analysis should 
not be an add‑on element — an afterthought of 
little importance. This is easier said than done, 
however, as there is considerable uncertainty 
regarding uncertainty estimation. 
A good start would be greater rigour and 
consistency in analysing and reporting 
uncertainties. One weakness arises from the 
deficiencies of hydrological models and available 
observation records for model validation. There 
is an overwhelming scarcity of homogeneous 
long‑term observation records. The inherent 
uncertainty in analysing any set of flood flows also 
stems from the fact that directly measuring the 
range of extreme flows can be challenging because, 
for example, rating curves are not available for 
the high flow range, gauges are destroyed by 
flood waves or observers are evacuated. Recourse 
to indirect determination is therefore necessary 
(Kundzewicz et al., 2010b).
Uncertainty in future projections of river flooding 
is very high (see Kundzewicz et al., 2010b), and 
grows the further we look into the future. In 
the near‑term (e.g. the 2020s), climate model 
uncertainties play the dominant role, while 
over longer time horizons uncertainties due 
to greenhouse gas emission scenarios become 
increasingly significant. Uncertainty in practical 
flood‑related projections is also due to a spatial and 
temporal scale mismatch between coarse‑resolution 
climate models and the finer scale of a drainage 
basin. Scale mismatch renders downscaling 
(disaggregation) necessary. In fact, much more 
refined data are necessary for the 'point' scale of a 
locality (e.g. a small riparian town), which is the 
level at which costly adaptation is undertaken.
15�4 Lessons from floods
Flooding cannot be totally prevented. The occurrence 
of a flood need not be considered a 'failure' and, 
conversely, minimisation of losses may constitute 
a 'success'. The first lesson is that there are always 
lessons to be learned, from every flood. An example 
of lessons learned from a single, destructive, flood on 
the Odra in 1997 is presented in Box 15.1.
Learning a lesson means building awareness 
and understanding of the reasons for a system's 
failure or inadequate performance, and identifying 
weak points using an holistic perspective. Flood 
forecasting and warning systems fail because 
links in the chain perform poorly or not at all. 
The observation system may fail, the forecast may 
be grossly in error, the warning message may be 
wrong, the communication of a warning may be 
deficient and the response may be inadequate. 
A single weak point in a system, which otherwise 
contains many excellent components, may render 
the overall system performance unsatisfactory. 
The components in flood forecasting and warning 
systems must be adequately integrated but 
responsibility for them may reside with different 
agencies. This necessitates adequate collaboration 
and coordination between multiple institutions, 
which can be challenging. In emergency situations, 
it may become evident that distribution of roles of 
Emerging lessons from ecosystems | Floods: lessons about early warning systems
392 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
agencies is unclear and possibly redundant. The 
institutional framework is a key socio‑economic 
determinant of a nation's vulnerability against 
natural disasters (Raschky, 2008). 
People's experience of flooding may reduce damage 
in the next flood. Where large floods occur in the 
same location twice in a short time period (e.g. on 
the Rhine in Cologne in December 1993 and January 
1995), losses during the second flood are typically 
far lower than those during the first (Munich Re, 
1997; Kundzewicz and Takeuchi, 1999). The first 
flood will provide lessons for diverse groups: 
riparian homeowners; farmers with fields on the 
floodplain; professionals in the affected water 
district; legislators; spatial planning (zoning) 
officers; and public administrators at the country, 
province, town and community levels. 
Although flood events and human failures provide 
valuable lessons, memories can fade quickly after 
a flood. Typically, a destructive flood generates 
enthusiasm for strengthening flood preparedness 
systems and heavy expenditure follows. Following 
a deluge, the relevant authorities elaborate 
ambitious plans and launch works but lessons are 
soon forgotten. After some time without flooding, 
willingness to pay for flood preparedness decreases 
sharply and projects are downscaled or suspended. 
When the next deluge comes, it acts as a reminder 
and starts a new cycle. This vicious turn of events, 
known as the 'hydro‑illogical cycle' (a concept 
introduced in the drought context by Donald Wilhite 
in the mid‑1980s) is a general principle, valid across 
different political and economic systems. The return 
period of a destructive flood is usually much greater 
than the political horizon of decision‑makers and the 
 
Box 15�1 Lessons learned from the 1997 Odra flood
The	dramatic	Odra	flood	in	July	1997	occurred	after	a	long	flood-free	period	and	revealed	the	weaknesses	
of the existing flood preparedness system in Poland, in particular the deficiencies of relevant legislation 
(Kundzewicz et al., 1999). 
The flood occurred during a period of legal transition, as the previous regime's laws were essentially 
abandoned and many new acts were passed during a short time. The distribution of responsibilities was 
ambiguous and conflictual, with complicated links between different participants in flood defence activities. 
The law at the time provided that low-level authorities were not entitled to announce a flood alert or the 
alarm status. Such decisions had to be issued by the provincial anti-flood committees and were delayed as 
a result. Local authorities typically resorted to common-sense decisions, without waiting for instructions 
from above. 
The information flow was similarly deficient. Hydrometeorological stations reported to the regional branches 
of the hydrometeorological service, although also making information available, on request, to local 
authorities. Some forecasts proved to be of low accuracy. 
Responsibilities and cost coverage for the army, police and fire brigades were also not clearly defined. Polish 
civil defence was geared to act in the event of a war, rather than to deal with a peacetime emergency. In 
addition, telecommunication support proved vulnerable as some 189 000 telecommunication links were 
disconnected. Mobile phones provided more reliable communication, but network limitations were also 
revealed.
Advance	warning	on	the	Odra	was	available	for	the	medium	and	lower	course	when	the	flood	occurred	in	
headwaters in Czech Republic and Poland. In principle, the State of Brandenburg in Germany had ten days 
before the arrival of the floodwater. Even so, detailed forecasts were difficult to obtain due to problems such 
as	the	interruption	of	observations	in	several	gauges	and	flooding	of	the	flood	information	office	in	Wrocław.
Consequently, the need for numerous improvements was recognised, such as building the network of 
weather radars; automating observations and data transmission; technical upgrading of flood warning 
centres, including telecommunication facilities (enabling phone, radio and fax to work without mains 
electricity supply); upgrading and modernising the warning system; enhanced regional, interregional and 
international flows of flood-related information; and building more suitable forecast models. 
Considerable investments were made to improve many of these systems. The nation and the relevant 
services learned a lesson. When a second flood wave occurred in July 1997 the preparedness and flood 
management were far better than during the first crest when the nation had largely been taken by surprise.
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Box 15�2 EU Floods Directive
Between 1998 and 2004, Europe suffered over 100 major destructive floods, including the 
record-breaking August 2002 flood on the Danube, the Elbe and their tributaries. In response to these 
floods and projections of growing flood risks in Europe, in April 2007 the European Union adopted 
Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks (EU, 2007), commonly known 
as the Floods Directive. The directive embraces river floods, flash floods, urban floods, sewer floods 
and coastal floods; its objective is to reduce and manage the risks of floods to human health, the 
environment, infrastructure and property. It provides that EU Member States shall undertake, for each 
river basin or other management unit:
•	 a	preliminary	flood	risk	assessment,	including	a	map	of	the	river	basin;	a	description	of	past	floods;	 
a description of flooding processes and their sensitivity to change; a description of development plans;  
an assessment of the likelihood of future floods based on hydrological data, types of floods and the 
projected impact of climate change and of land use trends; and a forecast of the estimated  
consequences of future floods;
•	 flood	hazard	maps	and	flood	risk	maps	(damage	maps),	for	high	risk	areas,	i.e.	those	that	could	be	
flooded with a high probability (a 10-year return period), with a medium probability (a 100-year  
return period) and with a low probability (extreme events);
•	 preparation	and	implementation	of	flood	risk	management	plans,	aimed	at	achieving	the	required	
levels of protection.
Noting the diversity across the EU, the Floods Directive affords Member States flexibility to determine 
the level of protection required, the measures needed to achieve that level of protection (taking into 
account the work already done at national and local levels) and the timetables for implementing flood 
risk management plans.
The directive is probably the most advanced flood protection and preparedness legislation worldwide and 
implementation should considerably reduce flood risk throughout the 27 EU Member States. Mandatory 
activities, including assessing, mapping and managing flood risk in the river districts are expected to 
result in an unprecedented multinational upgrading of preparedness systems. The directive foresees 
that 'the potential future damage to be expected if no action is taken distinctly outweighs the costs' of 
implementation.
electorate, which is determined by terms of office and 
electoral cycles. Of course, the hydro‑illogical cycle is 
also at odds with the precautionary principle.
In some countries, codifying preparedness in 
legislation helps overcome the hydro‑illogical cycle. 
A prominent example is the European Union's Floods 
Directive (Box 15.2).
Interestingly, an important turning point in the 
development of flood protection strategy can be 
traced back to the mid‑19th century in the US 
(Williams, 1994) when Congress looked into the 
problem of the Mississippi floods. The two options 
considered were: 
•	 using	large	areas	of	the	Mississippi	floodplains	as	
flood storage and overflow areas; 
•	 attempting	to	control	floods	by	embanking	the	
River Mississippi in a single channel isolated 
from its floodplain. 
Congress selected the latter option and the 
decision has remained influential on flood 
protection policy in the US and elsewhere, leading 
to the transformation of rivers and reduction of 
wetlands worldwide. In 1936, the US Federal 
Government assumed primary responsibility 
for flood damage reduction across the nation 
and, over the next half a century, embarked on 
a multibillion dollar programme of structural 
defences (Galloway, 1999). 
Another paradigm shift resulted from the great 
1993 US mid‑west flood, which proved that 
structural 'hard' defences cannot guarantee 
absolute protection. As a result, the US Interagency 
Floodplain Management Review Committee 
recommended that the administration should 
fund acquisition of land and structures at risk 
from willing sellers in the floodplains, and many 
vulnerable families have been relocated from risky 
areas (Galloway, 1999). However, this response is not 
universal. In most countries, people who suffer in a 
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flood rebuild their houses (possibly more robustly) 
and their livelihoods in the place devastated by the 
flood, rather than moving elsewhere. The hazard 
may not have decreased, however, and floods could 
recur in that location.
People also take lessons from the failures of past 
policies. For example, some flood protection 
infrastructure has been criticised from a sustainable 
development perspective because it limits options 
for future generations and introduces disturbances 
in ecosystems. According to the Environment 
Agency of England and Wales (1998), sustainable 
flood defence schemes should protect the present 
generation from destructive floods but also 'avoid 
as far as possible committing future generations to 
inappropriate options for defence'. Renaturalising 
rivers and flood plains and reconstructing wetlands 
have been discussed for many years and is now 
actually likely to come about. Similarly, some 
large reservoirs, whose construction required the 
inundation of large areas or the displacement of 
many people, certainly did not match the principles 
of sustainable development (Kundzewicz, 1999). 
Studies on decommissioning reservoirs are now 
under way and in some cases decommissioning 
has already taken place, for example in France 
(Kernansquillec, Maisons‑Rouges and St Etienne du 
Vigan). 
Looking back at past developments often reveals 
that major decisions, such as regarding the 
construction of a large dam, are based on one‑sided 
arguments with important aspects neglected. 
This bias can result from a lack of knowledge and 
understanding at the time that the decision was 
taken, as well as the evolution of value judgements 
over time.
15�5 Conclusions: living with floods
Floods are natural events that cannot be avoided. 
We should protect ourselves against floods up to 
an agreed safety level, this being a compromise 
between the desired level of safety and the 
accepted willingness to pay for protection. Once 
we accept that no flood protection measures can 
guarantee complete safety, a general change of 
paradigm is needed to reduce human vulnerability 
to floods. The attitude of 'living with floods' and 
accommodating them in planning seems more 
sustainable than hopelessly striving to eradicate 
them (Kundzewicz and Takeuchi, 1999). There 
must be action plans for events exceeding the 
design flood (i.e. when defences are bound to fail) 
and in this context early warning can save lives.
Misconceptions and myths about floods and flood 
protection are deeply rooted in society — among 
the general public, politicians and decision‑makers. 
Some people naively believe that floods occur at 
large and regular time intervals — that terms such as 
'return period' and 'recurrence interval' can be taken 
literally (rather than understood as averages) — and 
that embankments offer perfect safety.
Each tick of the clock marks the passage of time 
since the last flood and the countdown to the next. It 
is therefore important to prepare using a variety of 
different means, notably: 
•	 rigorous	implementation	of	zoning	—	using	
regulations to develop flood hazard areas 
and leaving floodplains with low‑value 
infrastructure; 
•	 strengthening	existing	defences;	
•	 building	or	enhancing	flood	mitigation	
monitoring systems; 
•	 forecasting;	
•	 issuing	and	disseminating	warnings;	
•	 evacuation;	
•	 relief	and	post-flood	recovery;	
•	 flood	insurance;	
•	 capacity-building	(improving	flood	awareness,	
understanding and preparedness);
•	 enhancing	a	participatory	approach,	including	
consultation on the preparedness strategy and 
the level of flood protection, and household‑level 
flood‑proofing and mitigation measurements for 
both newly built and existing properties. 
Only informed stakeholders can make rational 
decisions and agree on an acceptable flood 
protection strategy, being aware of both costs and 
benefits. There may be conflicting interests between 
those living in floodplains and demanding efficient 
and very costly protection, and the rest of the 
nation.
Efficient actions aimed at awareness‑raising can 
reduce flood losses. Many past fatalities could 
have been avoided with greater awareness. In 
some developed countries such as the US, most 
flood fatalities involve vehicles whose drivers 
underestimate the danger.
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Coastal storm surges and floods are the most frequent and costly extreme weather events occurring in 
Europe, representing 69 % of the overall natural catastrophic losses (CEA, 2007). In 2010, for example, 
France was the European country hit hardest by the winter storm Xynthia, with 51 casualties and damages 
of more than EUR 1.5 billion. Many of the country's sea walls, including those around the Isle de Re off the 
country's west coast, were damaged or washed away (AIR, 2010). 
Other	low-lying	coastal	regions	in	Europe	have	endured	similar	experiences.	In	1953	the	winter	storm	that	
hit coastal stretches around the North Sea, especially in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, killed 
more than 2 000 people. Areas around Hamburg and Bremen and parts of the Baltic coast are frequently 
hit by coastal storm surges. And although the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea are generally 
steep, the river deltas of the Rhone, the Po, the Danube and many other smaller deltas experience floods 
from time to time. The 'Aqua Alta' in Venice Lagoon is a well known phenomenon.
The risk from coastal flooding is expected to increase in the future. First, climate change and sea-level rise 
is expected to increase the frequency and severity of flood events. Sea levels on average have already 
risen by about 10 cm per century over the last two to three centuries and are expected to rise at even 
higher rates in coming centuries (IPCC, 2007). This trend is exacerbated by land subsidence, which is 
determined by soil quality and the degree of water extraction in some low-lying coastal areas in Europe. 
The economic impact of natural catastrophes is also increasing due to the growing number of people living 
in areas with high risk levels, and increased economic activity in these regions (Bouwer et al., 2007).
History suggests that the human population is usually taken by surprise by coastal floods due to their 'low 
probability and high impact' character. Vulnerability to such events increases very gradually through slow 
sea-level rise and socio-economic developments. There is never an acute reason for strengthening the 
coastal protection system or for elevating settlements until the area and its population are hit by a major 
flood with significant loss of lives and economic damage. 
The records of major coastal flooding episodes in the Netherlands, for example, illustrate that people have 
been taken by surprise about once every hundred years for the last 1 000 years. Apparently after some 
50 years the flood disaster tends to disappear from the collective memory and flood protection measures 
are insufficiently maintained as a consequence. While the sea level keeps on rising and settlements keep 
expanding, a new high water event starts a new cycle of disaster and renovation of coastal protection 
works. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom only began investing in large-scale storm surge barriers 
after the devastating storm in 1953. The challenge for low-lying countries now is to anticipate climate 
change and accelerated sea-level rise.
The concept of measures to reduce the risk of flooding varies over time and by region. It ranges from local 
small-scale embankments to large-scale reclamation works and tidal barriers to lower the probability of 
coastal flooding. For example, London, large parts of the Netherlands, St. Petersburg in Russia and more 
recently Venice either have developed or are developing large-scale tidal storm surge barriers. These 
large engineering projects are expensive but protect population and capital investments up to a certain 
standard, usually in the order of withstanding the most extreme conditions statistically expected to occur 
once in a thousand or so years.
On	the	other	hand,	the	closure	of	environmentally	rich	coastal	areas	such	as	estuaries	through	dams	and	
barriers can harm biodiversity and water quality. Hence, flood protection through 'building with nature' has 
recently gained interest. Examples are periodic beach nourishment and coastal marshland development 
as ways to protect land and create buffer zones to lower wave impact (Day et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
coastal zone management strategies in, for example, the United Kingdom and France also aim to reduce 
the impact of coastal flooding by developing stringent building codes (flood proofing buildings) and zoning 
regulations (limiting urban expansion). 
In France, a system of community-based prevention plans for natural risks addresses floodreducing 
measures. The possibility of gaining more favourable flood insurance terms provides an incentive for 
implementing such plans (Letermy, 2009). Innovative examples are found in the cities of Hamburg and 
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Rotterdam. These cities have chosen to develop new residential areas on old port facilities located outside 
the main flood defences and hence prone to flooding but are elevating the buildings to safe levels. In 
Hamburg even public roads and bridges will be elevated to the height of 7.5 m above sea level to ensure 
unrestricted access for the fire and emergency services in the event of an extreme storm tide (Aerts et al., 
2009).
Future projections of sea-level rise and human exposure to flood risk are inherently uncertain, necessitating 
new flood management methods and strategies. The 'climate proofing' concept has been developed to deal 
with sea-level rise and greater uncertainty about extreme weather events (Kabat et al., 2005). For example, 
levees and storm surge barriers are currently designed according to deterministic principles, using relatively 
short historic records and extrapolation methods to determine maximum surge heights. Extreme events 
are rare, however, and data on these events are sparse. Hence, new probabilistic methods are needed that 
provide engineers with a range of possible scenarios and may support a more robust protection designs. 
Other	'climate	proofing'	measures	include	broadening	levees	to	form	'superlevees',	which	can	be	used	as	
ground for urban development (Vellinga et al., 2009). Such unbreachable dikes were developed in Japan 
near Tokyo, to protect against the potentially very high seas caused by tsunamis. They are now being 
considered by many water boards in the Netherlands as a way to deal with higher flood levels. For sandy 
beaches, the existing practice of beach nourishment (with sand) has become more sophisticated, such that 
the sand can be placed on the foreshore, creating a buffer against continuously rising seas. Finally, spatial 
planners, developers and insurers are actively engaged in reconsidering current regulations in order to 
ensure more flood- and climate-proof development of vulnerable coastal areas (Burby, 2001).
Despite their shortcomings, hard structural flood 
protection measures, such as dams and levees, will 
be needed to safeguard existing developments, 
in particular in urban areas. An effective flood 
protection system is generally a mix of structural 
and non‑structural measures, with the latter 
approaches normally conforming better to the spirit 
of sustainable development. 
Mitigating flood risks requires a change from 
reaction to anticipation. An immediate challenge 
is to improve flood forecasting at a range of time 
horizons of concern, from short‑term weather 
forecasting and quantitative precipitation forecasts 
(useful for flash floods) to longer‑term forecasting, 
useful for large basins. In this we should be 
encouraged that, thanks to improvements in the 
advance time and accuracy of forecasts, it has 
already been possible to reduce the number of flood 
fatalities in many countries.
Smith and Ward (1998) identify the development 
of infrastructure on floodplains as the major factor 
increasing flood risk (in terms of both hazard and 
vulnerability). Floods constitute a danger to life 
and property only when humans encroach into 
flood‑prone areas and become vulnerable. This has 
already happened in many locations in Europe. If 
endangered locations have already been developed, 
a remedy is that humans, and infrastructure, move 
out of harm's way. In many countries the strategy of 
retreat is unpalatable, however, favoured by neither 
the broader population nor decision‑makers. In 
some countries, such as Bangladesh, it is simply not 
an option. 
Modern flood risk management comprises 
pre‑flood prevention, risk mitigation measures 
and preparedness, followed by pre‑planned flood 
management actions during and after an event. The 
risk‑based approach to flood management is based 
on analysing the probability and consequences 
of flooding across the full range of severity, and 
implementing mechanisms to manage all possible 
events. Modern flood management also looks to the 
future and flood risk managers should continuously 
acquire and update evidence about long‑term 
changes in flood risk. 
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16 Seed-dressing systemic insecticides and 
honeybees
  
In 1994 French beekeepers began to report alarming signs. During summer, many honeybees 
did not return to the hives. Honeybees gathered close together in small groups on the ground or 
hovered, disoriented, in front of the hive and displayed abnormal foraging behaviour. These signs 
were accompanied by winter losses.
Evidence pointed to Bayer's seed-dressing systemic insecticide Gaucho®, which contains the 
active substance imidacloprid. This chapter presents the historical evolution of evidence on the 
risks of Gaucho® to honeybees in sunflower and maize seed-dressing in France, and analyses the 
actions in response to the accumulating evidence regarding these risks.
The social processes that ultimately lead to application of the precautionary principle for the 
ban of Gaucho® in sunflower and maize seed-dressing are described, with a focus on the ways 
in which scientific findings were used by stakeholders and decision-makers to influence policy 
during the controversy.
Public scientists were in a difficult position in this case. The results of their work were central to a 
social debate with high economic and political stakes. In certain cases their work was not judged 
according to its scientific merit but based on whether or not it supported the positions of some 
stakeholders. This situation tested the ability and courage of researchers to withstand pressure 
and continue working on imidacloprid.
Other	European	countries	also	suspended	neonicotinoid	seed-dressing	insecticides.	Evidence	
of the toxicity of neonicotinoids present in the dust emitted during sowing of coated seeds 
supported such decisions. Most important, the French case highlighted the major weaknesses 
of regulatory risk assessment and marketing authorisation of pesticides, and particularly 
neonicotinoids. These insights were recently confirmed by work by the European Food Safety 
Authority. 
From this case study eight lessons are drawn about governance of controversies related to 
chemical risks. The study is followed by two additional texts. A first panel presents Bayer Crop 
Science's comments on the analysis in this chapter. A second contains the authors' response to 
the Bayer comments.
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16�1 Introduction
Insecticides come in various forms. Many coat the 
surface of plants but systemic insecticides work 
differently, entering a treated plant's sap via the 
leaves or roots and coming into contact with insects 
when they feed on the plant. Seed‑dressings and 
soil treatments operate in precisely this way. The 
active ingredient enters the roots and disperses to 
the aerial parts of the plant during growth, offering 
long‑lasting protection from aerial and soil pests. 
Some systemic insecticides are 
neonicotinoids, which have been widely used in 
seed‑dressing and soil treatment since the early 
1990s but can also be applied by spraying crops. 
Over the past decade they have become the most 
widely used class of insecticides worldwide, 
with total sales of EUR 1.5 billion in 2008 (24 % 
of the global insecticide market). By 2010, the 
first neonicotinoid, imidacloprid, was registered 
in more than 120 countries for foliar and seed 
treatment (Jeschke and Nauen, 2008; Jeschke et al., 
2010).
In some situations, authorised doses of systemic 
insecticides can affect beneficial insects like 
honeybees, bumblebees, biological control agents 
(Smith and Krischik, 1999; Kunkel et al., 2001; 
Desneux et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2007; Katsarou 
et al., 2009; Mommaerts et al., 2009), birds (Berny 
 
Box 16�1 Honeybees, wild bees and other pollinators
In Europe, pollination (i.e. the transport of pollen from producing anthers to receiving stigma) is mainly 
achieved by three means:
•	 passive	self-pollination (direct contact between anthers and stigma or transfer through gravity), which 
is rarely the dominant pollination route;
•	 transport	by	the	wind, which is the dominant pollination route for about 10 % of flowering plants;
•	 pollination	by	animals,	particularly	insects, which is the dominant pollination route for the other 
flowering plant species — 87 of the leading global food crops depend on animal pollination, compared 
to 28 crops that do not (Klein, 2007). 
Worldwide, honeybees have a major role in pollinating:
•	 vegetable	crops, such as watermelon, cantaloupe, melon, cucumber, gherkin, pumpkin, squash, gourd, 
marrow and zucchini; 
•	 fruit	crops,	such as apple, peach, nectarine, kiwi fruit, mango, avocado, plum, pear, sweet cherry, sour 
cherry, apricot, mirabelle, raspberry, blackberry, cloudberry, dewberry, rowanberry, cranberry, greengage, 
sloe, carambola, starfruit, durian, loquat, Japanese plum, Japanese medlar, rose hips and dogroses; 
•	 nut	crops, such as almond, cashew nut, cashew apple and macadamia;
•	 edible	oil	and	proteinaceous	crops, such as canola and turnip rape;
•	 spices	and	condiments, such as coriander, cardamom and fennel (Klein et al., 2007).
et al., 1999) and earthworms (Luo et al., 1999; 
Kreutzweiser et al., 2008; Capowiez et al., 2009). More 
than 25 000 species of bees exist and are crucial for the 
survival and evolution of about 80 % of the flowering 
plant species that depend on animal pollination 
(FAO, 2011).
The widespread use of systemic insecticides raises 
serious concerns about their threat to wild pollinators 
(EPA, 2003; Greatti et al., 2006; Bortolotti et al., 2002; 
Desneux et al., 2007). Declines in wild pollinators 
are reported worldwide (Allen‑Wardell et al., 1998; 
Steffan‑Dewenter et al., 2005; Biesmeijer et al., 2006), 
which is particularly worrying since they are essential 
for 35 % of global crop output (by weight) (Klein 
et al., 2006). This has lead to growing concern about 
agriculture's dependence on pollinators and fears of 
a global pollination crisis (Ghazoul, 2005a and 2005b; 
Klein, 2008; Aizen and Harder, 2009).
Many factors influence the state of honeybees and 
pollinators more generally. Land use practices 
and agrochemicals are regarded as particularly 
important (Kuldna et al., 2009). This chapter 
focuses on the risk to honeybees resulting from 
the seed‑dressing systemic insecticide Gaucho®, 
whose active substance is imidacloprid. Specifically, 
it examines the vehement controversy in France 
over the use of Gaucho® and the justifications that 
ultimately lead to banning its use on sunflower 
and maize seed‑dressing in that country. Another 
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seed‑dressing insecticide, Régent TS® (which 
contains the active substance fipronil) is also 
addressed, although not extensively as telling its 
story would require a chapter of its own.
In this chapter we describe and analyse the social 
processes that lead to the application of the 
precautionary principle in France. Scientific data 
played an important role in these processes. We 
describe the ways in which stakeholders have used 
scientific findings to influence policy during the 
controversy. The scientific data considered in this 
chapter are thus not exhaustive but selected to reflect 
the French debate. 
The French ban on Gaucho® is significant because 
insecticides containing imidacloprid are among the 
most used globally (Jeschke et al., 2010) and have 
a wide range of uses. At its launch, Gaucho® was 
marketed as a means of reducing aerial pollution 
because it was supposedly confined to the soil 
and very small amounts are applied to seeds. 
For sunflower the application was 0.7 mg/seed, 
which amounts to 56–70 g of imidacloprid per 
 
Box 16�2 The life of a honeybee
An adult summer worker honeybee lives about four or five weeks. Three days after being laid, the egg 
becomes a larva, which in turn becomes a nymph after about six more days. During the following 12 days, 
the nymph transforms into an adult honeybee. 
During its adult life, the honeybee fulfils several roles. At first it stays in the hive as a nurse, cleaning the 
hive and nourishing the larvae. After 10–14 days it stores the collected nectar and pollen, ventilates the hive, 
covers the cells, secretes beeswax and builds new cells. At the end of the period spent inside the hive, it can 
be a guard. After about three weeks inside the hive and until death, the honeybee is a forager, and works 
outside the hive, collecting pollen, nectar, water and propolis. The division of tasks and the age for going from 
one task to another can vary, depending on the needs of the colony.
Honeybees feed exclusively on pollen, nectar and honey. It is estimated that most of the foraging activity is 
undertaken within 6 km of the hive, although honeybees can forage up to 12 km from the hive (von Frisch, 
1967; Seeley, 1985; Winston, 1987). 
Pollen foragers collect pollen on flowers and carry it to the hive on their posterior legs. Nectar foragers 
transport nectar in their crop and bring it to the colony. It can be consumed immediately or transformed into 
honey by water evaporation and changes in sugar composition. Pollen and honey are stored in the hive and 
can be consumed later. 
Nectar and pollen are consumed differently by honeybees of different ages:
•	 Larvae	essentially	consume	jelly,	which	is	secreted	from	the	glands	in	nurses'	heads	and	also	some	pollen,	
depending on their age. 
•	 Nurses	consume	pollen,	essentially	to	develop	their	hypopharyngeal	and	mandibular	glands	and	to	produce	
jelly. 
•	 Adult	honeybees	consume	different	quantities	of	nectar/honey,	depending	on	the	tasks	they	perform.	Large	
amounts of nectar/honey are consumed for wax production, heat production in the hive (brood-attending 
bees and winter bees) and for foraging (Rortais et al., 2005; Benjamin and McCallum, 2008). 
hectare (Belzunces and Tasei, 1997). For maize the 
application was 0.98 mg/seed. 
Despite these claimed advantages, France banned the 
insecticide's use in sunflower and maize seed‑dressing 
due to concerns about its risks to honeybees. In this 
chapter, we present the historical evolution of the 
evidence regarding the risks of Gaucho® to honeybees 
in sunflower and maize seed‑dressing and analyse 
the actions taken in response to the accumulating 
evidence regarding these risks. 
Knowledge can vary in its relevance for supporting 
an action such as banning imidacloprid. Different 
stakeholders may perceive the relevance differently, 
with three factors playing a key role: 
1. The scientific quality of the knowledge 
(substantive	quality), which includes technical 
aspects (is the measurement accurate?), 
methodological aspects (is a particular method 
appropriate for the intended use?) and 
epistemological aspects (is enough knowledge 
available?).
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Box 16�3 Uses of imidacloprid in France
In July 2010, imidacloprid was authorised in France to treat fruit trees such as apricot, peach, pear, quince, 
apple and plum trees. It is also present in products for disinfecting storage facilities, shelters for domestic 
animals,	storage	and	transport	material,	treatment	facilities	for	waste	and	transport	material.	Other	uses	
include insecticidal treatment of rose bushes.
In France, imidacloprid is currently banned for seed-dressing of sunflower and maize but it is still used in 
seed-dressing for sugar beet, wheat and barley (Ministère de l'Agriculture, 2011). Residues subsisting in 
the soil might potentially be taken up by the crops cultivated after the seed-treated crop, or by wild plants 
(Bonmatin et al., 2005).
2. The quality of the research processes that 
have generated the knowledge and the expert 
processes that are used to assess its relevance to 
support an action (procedural	quality) (1). This 
relates to researchers' and experts' competence, 
field experience, institutional affiliation, 
well‑being at work, financial dependencies and 
other kinds of relationships among themselves 
and with other stakeholders (for instance, 
whether or not local knowledge is incorporated in 
the research). 
3. The social	quality, associated to the value 
judgments influencing the communication 
and use of scientific information by experts 
themselves and by stakeholders, in political 
debates.
In Sections 16.2, 16.3 and 16.4, we present the 
development of knowledge in these three areas. The 
first part of this chapter (Section 16.4.3 included) 
describes in detail the French controversy until the 
ban of Gaucho® on maize in 2004. Sections 16.4.4 and 
16.4.5 are less exhaustive and result essentially from 
reactions to the different comments made during the 
reviewing process. 
Many scientific and grey references have been 
produced in the world since 2004 and we could 
not include them all, in order not to loose focus but 
also for reasons of space limits. We have included 
post‑2004 references if: 1) they were produced in 
France and 2) they were produced in European 
countries where regulatory decisions have been taken 
to ban imidacloprid. 
The analysis yields lessons about the quality 
and use of knowledge in risk assessment and 
management (2), which are presented in Section 16.5. 
Conclusions and prospects are presented in 
Section 16.6. 
16�2 Development of scientific 
understanding of the issue
16.2.1 Technical and epistemological quality of the 
evidence
1994: early warnings
In France, dressing seeds with Gaucho® was 
authorised in 1991 for sugar beet, in 1992 for maize 
and in 1993 for sunflower. Gaucho® was first used 
in sunflower farming in 1994. After that year, 
beekeepers started to report alarming clinical signs. 
After several days of foraging during the sunflower 
flowering, many honeybees did not return to 
their hives. Bee behaviour also caused concern: 
honeybees gathered close together in small groups 
on the ground or hovered disoriented in front of 
the hive; foraging behaviour was abnormal; and 
queens produced increased amounts of brood to 
compensate for the loss of foragers. In certain cases, 
dead honeybees were also reported in front of the 
hives. 
In affected apiaries, most hives were impacted. 
Those apiaries suffered a 40–70 % loss in sunflower 
honey yield in the years after 1994, relative to the 
average yield obtained in previous years. Before 
1994, the annual yield variation had been ± 10 %. 
At the end of winter, losses were up to 30–50 % 
of the hives, compared with the usual 5–10 % 
(personal communications from 20 beekeepers; 
Coordination des Apiculteurs, 2001; Alétru, 2003). 
(1)  For example, the expert process by which the 'acceptability' of a calculated risk is assessed in official commissions or working 
groups. Such an assessment determines an action, that is, the use or not of a substance in crop protection.
(2)  For more details on the case, see Maxim and Van der Sluijs, 2007.
Some emerging issues | Seed-dressing systemic insecticides and honeybees
405Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
In the following years the beekeepers reported 
the same clinical signs and their specific impacts 
on honeybees foraging in sunflowers and maize 
areas (e.g. Belzunces and Tasei, 1997; CNEVA 
Sophia‑Antipolis, 1997; Pham‑Delègue et Cluzeau, 
1998; Coordination des Apiculteurs, 2001; Alétru, 
2003). The intensity of the clinical signs in France 
fluctuated, both temporally (from year to year) and 
spatially. They seemed to depend on factors such 
as the proportion of the different food resources 
present in the honeybees' environment (CST, 2003). 
Appreciable declines in sunflower honey harvest 
were reported, implying major economic losses. 
Searching for possible causes, the beekeepers found 
that Gaucho® had been first used as a seed‑dressing 
in sunflower farming in 1994. They reported 
honeybee problems increasing concomitantly 
with the area of Gaucho®‑dressed sunflower 
(Chauvency, 1997; Belzunces and Tasei, 1997; 
CNEVA Sophia‑Antipolis, 1997; Pham‑Delègue 
and Cluzeau, 1998). Consequently, beekeepers 
asked Bayer (which manufactures Gaucho®) for 
information about the potential toxicity of the active 
substance imidacloprid for honeybees (Coordination 
des Apiculteurs, 2000). 
This request was the start of a long series of scientific 
studies (3) involving Bayer‑funded scientists, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the French Food Safety 
Agency (AFSSA), beekeepers, and researchers 
working in public institutes (4) (henceforth 'public 
scientists'). 
Evolution of knowledge over time 
When Gaucho® was launched commercially, the 
manufacturer considered that it posed no risk to 
honeybees, provided it was applied as seed‑dressing 
(Bayer, 1992). 
Bayer's reaction to the beekeepers demand was 
to conduct field and semi‑field (under‑tunnel (5)) 
research. According to Bayer these studies showed 
that Gaucho® posed no risk to honeybees (Belzunces 
and Tasei, 1997). 
(3)  In the following, we have selected the data that played an important role in the debate, rather than uselessly trying to inventory all 
the data available. The complete list of the results available before 2003 is available in CST (2003).
(4)  In France, scientists working in national research institutes (e.g. INRA, CNRS) and universities are public servants. Their entire 
salaries and a part of their functioning (sometimes equipment) expenses are funded by the public institution.
(5)  A tunnel is a tent of several meters, which allows air to pass through and isolates the honeybee colony being used for testing from 
the exterior. The purpose of a tunnel is to ensure that honeybees only feed on the source chosen for the experiment (e.g. plants 
contaminated with imidacloprid), while simulating field conditions.
(6)  The unit 'ppb' (parts per billion) is used for very low mass concentrations, more precisely 10‑9 (e.g. 1 ppb = 1 µg/kg).
(7) In the original French: 'sans toutefois descendre à une valeur inférieure à 0.01 mg/kg'.
(8)  In the original French: 'il n'est pas utile de chercher à travailler avec la limite de détermination la plus basse possible'.
(9)	 Centre	Technique	Interprofessionnel	des	Oléagineux	Métropolitains.
However, the clinical signs continued. Bayer's 
experiments were presented at the Fourth 
International Conference on Pests in Agriculture, 
held in Montpellier on 6–8 January 1997, and also 
during a meeting organised by the Association de 
Coordination Technique Agricole (ACTA) in October 
1997. They were criticised (ACTA, 1997; Belzunces 
and Tasei, 1997), so public scientists were also asked 
to research the issue. 
Honeybee exposure to imidacloprid: 1993–1999 
One of the main issues in assessing exposure to 
Gaucho® was the precision of measuring very 
low concentrations of imidacloprid in pollen and 
nectar. In 1993, the detection limit established by 
Bayer‑funded scientists for measuring the presence 
of imidacloprid in plants was 10 ppb (6) (Placke and 
Weber, 1993). However, it was later found that much 
lower detection limits (DL) were needed to identify 
imidacloprid's presence in pollen and nectar. 
The studies undertaken by Bayer during this period 
either could not detect imidacloprid in pollen 
and nectar, or detected it but could not quantify it 
(CST, 2003). In 1999, a study quantified the substance 
in sunflowers treated with Gaucho® to be 3.3 ppb in 
pollen and 1.9 ppb in nectar (Stork, 1999).
When public research started (1997–1998), the 
General Directorate for Food of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (DGAL) demanded analyses using 
'the lowest detection limit possible', but 'without 
going below 0.01 mg/kg' (10 ppb) (7). For the 1998 
programme DGAL noted that 'it is not useful to 
try to work with the lowest detection limits' (8). 
This DL corresponded to the characteristics of the 
Bayer method (Pflanzenschutz Nachrichten Bayer, 
46.1993.2 inverse chromatography in liquid phase and 
UV detection). Bayer representatives also participated 
in the committee charged with developing the 
research protocol. 
At the time that the DGAL demanded the analysis, 
CETIOM (the Technical Center for Oilseed Crops (9)) 
had already estimated that detection limits much 
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lower than 10 ppb — about 1.4 ppb — were necessary 
to find imidacloprid in nectar. 
Print media learned of the DGAL's recommendation 
and of Bayers implications in drafting the protocol, 
raising doubts about the DGAL's impartiality with 
respect to Bayer and about its willingness to find 
relevant results (Libération, 1999a). 
These first studies of public researchers reported the 
presence (< 10 ppb) of imidacloprid in sunflower leafs 
and pollen but did not quantify it (Pham‑Delègue and 
Cluzeau, 1998). 
The findings from research 'raised suspicions about 
the effects of the product, without formally proving 
its responsibility' (10) (Ministère de l'Agriculture, 
2001b). Doubts about the harmlessness of Gaucho® 
led to the application of the precautionary principle. 
In January 1999 the Minister of Agriculture, 
Jean Glavany, decided to ban the use of Gaucho® in 
sunflower seed‑dressing (Libération, 1999b). 
This ban was renewed in 2001 for two years, again in 
2004 for three years and at present, February 2012, it 
is still in force. 
Honeybee exposure to imidacloprid: 2000–2002
Beekeepers continued to report clinical signs of 
intoxication after Gaucho® use in sunflowers was 
suspended in 1999. Three explanatory hypotheses 
were proposed: 
•	 honeybees	were	still	being	exposed	to	the	pollen	
of maize treated with Gaucho® (sunflower and 
maize are in flower in the same time); 
•	 imidacloprid	persists	in	soil	after	treatments	
of other crops (such as sugar beet, wheat 
and barley) and was taken up by untreated 
sunflowers grown one or more years after a 
seed‑dressed crop;
•	 honeybees	were	affected	by	the	dressing	of	
sunflower seeds with RégentTS®, which had 
been provisionally authorised in December 1995. 
Following the extension of the ban on using 
Gaucho® on sunflower and the refusal to ban it on 
maize, in 2001 (Ministère de l'Agriculture, 2001a; 
Conseil d'Etat, 2002), the Ministry of Agriculture 
established a Scientific and Technical Committee 
(10)  In the original French: 'Les résultats ont généré des suspicions sur l'effet du produit, sans pour autant prouver formellement sa 
responsabilité.'
(11)  Comité Scientifique et Technique de l'Etude Multifactorielle des Troubles des Abeilles.
for the Multifactor Study of the Honeybee Colonies 
Decline (henceforth the 'CST' (11)). 
Between 2000 and 2002, using different methods 
and lower detection limits, public scientists 
identified 2–4 ppb of imidacloprid in seed‑dressed 
sunflower and maize pollen (Bonmatin et al., 
2001 and 2002; Bonmatin and Charvet, 2002), 
13.3 ppb of imidacloprid in seed‑dressed sunflower 
pollen (Laurent and Scalla, 2001) and 1.6 ppb in 
seed‑dressed sunflower nectar (Lagarde, 2000). 
During these years, it was understood that 
honeybees could collect imidacloprid‑contaminated 
nectar and pollen for up to a month of sunflower 
and maize flowering. Bees could show the effects 
of repeated consumption of contaminated pollen 
and nectar almost immediately or some days or 
weeks later because pollen and nectar are stored in 
the hive. Furthermore, different categories of bees 
could be exposed in different ways and to varying 
extents. For example, pollen foragers (which differ 
from nectar foragers) do not consume pollen, merely 
bringing it to the hive. The pollen is consumed by 
nurse bees and to a lesser extent by larvae (Rortais 
et al., 2005). 
The exposure of nectar foragers to imidacloprid 
contained in the nectar they gather can vary 
depending on the resources available in the hive 
environment. In addition, foragers take some 
nectar or honey already stocked in the hive before 
they leave for foraging. Depending on the distance 
from the hive where they forage, the honeybees 
are obliged to consume more or less of the nectar/
honey taken from the hive and/or of the nectar 
collected, for energy for flying and foraging. They 
can therefore ingest more or less imidacloprid.
In 2002, Bayer publicly declared that the levels of 
exposure of honeybees to imidacloprid present 
in pollen and nectar ranged between 0 and 5 ppb 
(AFSSA, 2002).
Honeybee exposure to imidacloprid: 2003–2006
Based on exposure assessments and using scientific 
quality criteria to select among the available 
measurements, CST validated the findings of 3.3 ppb 
of imidacloprid in the pollen of Gaucho®‑treated 
sunflowers, 3.5 ppb in pollen of Gaucho®‑treated 
maize, and 1.9 ppb in the nectar of Gaucho®‑treated 
sunflowers (CST, 2003). 
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After seed treatment, imidacloprid transforms 
in the plant (metabolised) into many derivatives 
(metabolites), more or less completely. The 
main metabolites are 5‑hydroxy‑imidacloprid, 
4‑hydroxy‑imidacloprid, 4‑5 hydroxy‑imidacloprid, 
olefin, imidacloprid‑guanidine, imidacloprid‑urea 
and 6‑chloronicotinic acid.
Although two (12) of these metabolites show 
acute toxicity for honeybees (olefin and 
5‑hydroxy‑imidacloprid), no study measuring 
metabolites in sunflower nectar or in sunflower 
and maize pollen, could be validated by the CST. 
For this reason, this committee recommended 
the development of detection and quantification 
limits low enough for their identification and 
quantification in pollen and nectar. 
Lethal and sublethal effects 
Pesticides can produce four types of effects on 
honeybees: acute or chronic lethal effects and acute or 
chronic sublethal effects. 
•	 Acute	lethal	effects are expressed as the 
lethal dose (LD) at which 50 % of the exposed 
honeybees die within 48 hours: abbreviated to 
'LD50 (48 hours)'. 
•	 Chronic	lethal	effects refer to honeybee mortality 
that occurs after prolonged exposure (e.g. about 
10 days). 
In contrast to acute lethal effects, there were no 
standardised protocols for chronic lethal effects. 
Therefore, for imidacloprid, they were expressed in 
three ways:
•	 LD50: the dose at which 50 % of the exposed 
honeybees die within 10 days;
•	 NOEC (No Observed Effect Concentration): the 
highest concentration of imidacloprid producing 
no observed effect;
•	 LOEC (Lowest Observed Effect Concentration): 
the lowest concentration of imidacloprid 
producing an observed effect. 
Sublethal effects are modifications of factors such as 
honeybee behaviour, physiology and immune system. 
They do not directly cause the death of the individual 
or the collapse of the colony but may become lethal in 
time and/or may make the colony more sensitive (for 
example, more prone to diseases), which may lead to 
its collapse. For instance, an individual with memory, 
orientation or physiological impairments might fail 
to return to its hive, dying from hunger or cold. This 
would not be detected in standard pesticide tests, 
which focus on acute mortality. In addition, a key 
aspect in honeybee biology is that the colony behaves 
as a 'superorganism' (13). Hence, sublethal effects 
affecting individuals performing specific functions 
can influence the functioning of the whole colony. As 
was the case for chronic lethal effects, standardised 
protocols for sublethal effects were lacking. 
•	 Acute	sublethal	effects of imidacloprid and its 
metabolites were assessed by exposing honeybees 
only once to the substance (by ingestion or by 
contact), and observing them for some time 
(variable from one laboratory to another, from 
several minutes to four days). 
•	 Chronic	sublethal	effects were assessed by 
exposing honeybees more than once to the 
substance during a certain period of time (for 
example, each 24 hours, for 10 days). 
Both acute and chronic sublethal effects are expressed 
as NOEC and/or LOEC.
Studies of lethal and sublethal effects: 1997–2000
Whereas intoxication by sprayed pesticides is usually 
confirmed by the numerous dead and moribund 
honeybees in front of the hives, beekeepers reported 
disappearance of most foragers in many hives. This 
lead them to hypothesise that imidacloprid was 
affecting the general mobility and/or orientation of 
the honeybees. 
From 1999 onwards, Bayer‑funded	scientists also 
conducted studies on chronic lethal and sublethal 
effects. They found much lower values of LOEC for 
imidacloprid than previously reported. Whereas 
three Bayer scientists (Ambolet, Crevat and Schmidt) 
(12)  The other four metabolites do not show any particular toxicity for honeybees.
(13)  Moritz and Southwick (1992) define superorganisms as 'superorganismic units with organisms arranged in at least two non-uniform 
types and differentiated into sterile and reproductive organisms with different functions' (p. 4). They highlight that superorganisms 
should not be confounded with social groups because, among other things, 'superorganisms need a sufficient membership so that 
the number of organisms involved in a task rather than the individual quality of how a task is performed becomes important' (p. 5). 
These numerous colony members function as a cooperative unit. Superorganisms maintain intraorganismic homeostasis (food 
storage, nest hygienic) and they are either well armed or highly cryptic. Superorganisms only originate from other superorganisms. 
For example in the case of bees a large part of a colony with a fertile queen undergoes 'fission' from the initial population and forms 
a swarm. 'In the end, however, only one feature really counts. It makes absolutely no sense invoking such a definition if natural 
selection does not act upon the superorganism itself. As long as natural selection is only working on individuals we have no need for 
such an additional perspective' (p. 6).
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had reported a LOEC value of 5 000 ppb at the Fourth 
International Conference on Pests in Agriculture 
(6–8 January 1997), the new estimates were just 
20 ppb, equivalent to 0.5–1.4 ng per honeybee 
(Kirchner, 1998, 1999 and 2000). 
Other values found in 1999 and 2000 by 
Bayer-funded	scientists, for the highest	
concentrations	which do	not	produce sublethal 
effects (NOEC) ranged from 0.25–0.7 ng/honeybee 
(10 ppb) (Kirchner, 1999, 2000) to 0.94 ng/honeybee,  
1.25–3.5 ng/honeybee, 1.5 ng/honeybee,  
8.2 ng/honeybee, and 9 ng/honeybee (Schmitzer, 
1999; Schmuck and Schöning, 1999; Thomson, 2000; 
Wilhelmy, 2000; Barth, 2000). 
Among the lowest	concentrations	at	which	
imidacloprid produces sublethal effects (LOEC), 
public	researchers reported: 0.075–0.21 ng/honeybee 
(3 ppb); 0.15–0.42 ng/honeybee (6 ppb);  
0.25–0.7 ng/honeybee (10 ppb), and 0.31–0.87 ng/
honeybee (12.5 ppb) (ACTA, 1998; Pham‑Delègue, 
1998; Pham‑Delègue and Cluzeau, 1998; Colin, 2000; 
Colin and Bonmatin, 2000; Colin et al., 2002). 
To enable comparison between the data obtained by 
Bayer and those obtained by public scientists, we note 
that, by definition, NOEC is the test concentration 
immediately below the LOEC. The NOEC values 
corresponding to data produced by public scientists 
were, by definition, below the LOEC values that they 
generated and which are presented here. 
Having said this, one might find strange that among 
the values above, the NOECs from Bayer are larger 
than most of the LOEC obtained by public scientists. 
However, this strange result can be partially 
explained by the fact that the values of NOEC 
of Bayer come from sublethal acute intoxication, 
whereas the two values cited from public scientists 
are sublethal chronic values. 
Indeed, the differences between the values above 
might arise from different sources. For example, 
as no standard tests existed, the laboratories used 
differing testing protocols. In addition, various 
sublethal effects were studied (knockdown effect, 
locomotion coordination, quantity of syrup ingested, 
pollen consumption, wax production, parent 
recognition, memory, visits to the food source, odour 
recognition, etc.). Of course, the results depend on 
what, and how, one measures.
Studies of lethal and sublethal effects: 2001–2004
In 2001, public	scientists identified chronic lethal 
effects at LD50 = 12 pg/honeybee after 10 days of 
feeding with imidacloprid‑containing syrup (0.1 ppb) 
(Suchail, 2001). 
In 2002, Bayer declared that 'Bayer's studies 
established that below 20 ppb, no negative effect 
can be observed on honeybee colonies' (14) (AFSSA, 
2002).
Properties of imidacloprid: persistence in soils and 
presence in untreated crops
In its dossier submitted to the Ministry of 
Agriculture (Bayer, 1999), Bayer quoted half‑lives 
for Gaucho® (DT50) (15) of 188 ± 25 days and 
249 ± 40 days for two soil types. It should be noted 
that this exceeds the threshold of three months 
established in EU Directive 91/414/EEC (Annex VI, 
Part C, point 2.5.1.1) for conducting detailed 
ecotoxicological studies: 
'No authorization shall be granted if the active 
substance and, where they are of significance 
from the toxicological, ecotoxicological or 
environmental point of view, metabolites 
and breakdown or reaction products, after 
use of the plant protection product under 
the proposed conditions of use during tests 
in the field, persist in soil for more than one 
year (i.e. DT90 > 1 year and DT50 > 3 months) 
[…] unless it is scientifically demonstrated 
that under field conditions there is no 
accumulation in soil at such levels that 
unacceptable residues in succeeding crops 
occur and/or that unacceptable phytotoxic 
effects on succeeding crops occur and/or 
that there is an unacceptable impact on the 
environment...'
Gaucho® was authorised in France on the basis of 
this EU Directive and a French regulation (16). 
The average levels of imidacloprid found in the soil 
by public	scientists were 10.25 ppb during the year 
that the crop was treated with Gaucho® and 4.4 ppb 
the following year (Bonmatin et al., 2000).
(14)  In the original French: 'Les études Bayer ont établi que jusqu'à 20 ppb, aucun effet négatif ne pouvait être observé sur des colonies 
d'abeilles'.
(15)  DT50 is the degradation half-life, or period required for 50 % dissipation/degradation of the initial concentration of substance. DT90 
is the time needed for the dissipation/degradation of 90 % of the initial concentration of substance.
(16)  Arrêté du Ministre de l'Agriculture de 6 septembre 1994 portant application du décret no 94-359 du 5 mai 1994 relatif au contrôle 
des produits phytopharmaceutiques, modifié par l'arrêté du 27 mai 1998.
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16.2.2 Methodological quality of the evidence
Method of risk assessment 
The risk of sprayed ('classic') pesticides to honeybees 
were assessed using mortality studies in laboratory 
conditions, followed by semi‑field studies and finally 
field studies (Halm et al., 2006). The first step in such 
studies is to calculate a hazard quotient (HQ = the 
field application rate/oral or contact LD50) (OEPP/
EPPO, 2003). Further studies are demanded if the HQ 
exceeds a certain threshold (Halm et al., 2006). 
Bayer used the LD50 methodology in its dossier 
applying for marketing authorisation for Gaucho® 
(Bayer, 1999). However, the methodology based 
on LD50 is designed to assess the risk of sprayed 
pesticides and has been shown to be inappropriate for 
seed‑dressing systemic insecticides for several reasons:
•	 Seed-dressing	systemic	insecticides	are	applied	
on seeds and disperse in the plant during growth. 
The field application rate of active substance 
as an exposure parameter is therefore a highly 
inadequate measure for the true exposure of 
honeybees (Halm et al., 2006). What is important 
for the effects of seed‑dressing insecticides on 
honeybees is not the amount applied per hectare, 
but the amount of imidacloprid (and metabolites) 
in the pollen and nectar.
•	 Both	acute	and	chronic	effects	are	important	for	
the colony (given the clinical signs observed), 
whereas LD50 only considers the acute effects on 
adult honeybees.
•	 Seed-dressing	systemic	insecticides	can	have	
sublethal effects affecting the performance of 
the whole colony, not just individuals, because 
foragers can bring the pesticide inside the hive via 
pollen and nectar.
•	 The	risks	of	seed-dressing	systemic	insecticides	
vary, depending on the age and role of the 
honeybees in the colony (Rortais et al., 2005). 
Consequently, the risk assessment procedure that the 
CST chose for imidacloprid was based on evaluating 
the ratio PEC:PNEC. This approach, which is used to 
assess the environmental risk of industrial chemicals, 
allows comparisons between the levels of exposure 
(Predicted Exposure Concentration — PEC) and 
toxicity (Predicted No Effect Concentration — PNEC), 
and considers both lethal and various sublethal effects 
in the short and longer term, for different age groups 
and casts of honeybees and for different matrices 
(e.g. honey and pollen) (Halm et al., 2006). Thus, the 
PEC:PNEC approach results in a probability (risk) that 
effects found in controlled studies of specific items of 
toxicity are found in real conditions. 
Field and laboratory studies
The Bayer-funded	scientists and public	scientists 
disagreed about the relative relevance of laboratory 
and field studies (17). Bayer held that the results of 
field experiments would either prove or disprove the 
risk of the active substance, regardless of whether 
they conformed to the results of laboratory studies. 
The public scientists argued that field studies cannot 
be decisive for deciding on the risk of a pesticide to 
honeybees. 
The principle of an experiment is to vary one factor, 
keeping all the others constant. This cannot be done 
in current field experiments with bees, because the 
combination of abiotic and — especially — biotic 
factors is never identical in control fields (where the 
insecticide has not been used) and test fields. Bee 
(17) A distinction is made between 'field experiments' and 'monitoring', which measures clinical signs in real conditions.
Photo:  © istockphoto/Youra Pechkin
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colonies themselves are not identical, and the food 
sources available in the environment for honeybees 
are always diverse. 
Furthermore, in field tests, it is impossible to prevent 
honeybees visiting fields not in the experiment. For 
example, the distance separating control and test 
areas is often too small to prevent bees foraging in 
other fields (18). Many differences have been reported 
in honeybees' mortality, both by beekeepers and 
during open field experiments (CST, 2003). Therefore, 
it is probable that observations made in a particular 
field experiment are not representative of the range of 
effects that could occur in real conditions. Due to the 
large variability of factors that cannot be controlled 
(e.g. soil structure, climate, combination of plants 
attractive for bees etc.), current field experiments only 
give information about the particular situation in 
which they were done.
In the end, it was not a scientific institution but the 
highest judicial administrative institution in France, 
the State	Council, that decided (29 December 
1999) that the results of both field experiments and 
laboratory studies may be legitimately used in risk 
assessment (Fau, 2000). This is common practice in 
risk assessment of chemicals, which is based on the 
PEC:PNEC ratio.
16�3 Processes of generating knowledge 
and assessing risk 
16.3.1 Knowledge producers: public scientists
Public scientists were in a very difficult position 
in this case. The results of their work were central 
to a social debate with high economic and political 
stakes. In certain cases their work was not judged 
based on scientific merits but whether or not it 
supported the positions of certain stakeholders. 
This situation challenged the ability and 
courage of researchers to continue their work on 
imidacloprid.
One stated: 'From the beginning of the programme, 
in January 1998, I personally received a letter 
from Bayer threatening me with a lawsuit for 
defamation' (19) (AFP, 2003). The letter written by 
Bayer's lawyers warned of both judicial action and 
financial reparations (personal letter). 
Bayer also wrote a letter to the researcher's 
hierarchical superior, asking him to use his position 
to influence the researcher's interventions in the 
press (personal letter). The superior refused the 
demand of Bayer but advised his researcher to take 
extreme care with the press. 
Another researcher said: 'I worked for three years 
on the topic and the management… my managers 
[…], asked me to change topic' (20) (Elie and 
Garaud, 2003).
In 2000, one public scientist acquired European 
funds to analyse the risk of imidacloprid to 
honeybees. However, the researcher's hierarchical 
superior suddenly stopped the programme, even 
though the researcher had already produced some 
first results in previous studies on imidacloprid, 
the funding was confirmed and the work had 
both social and scientific relevance (personal 
communication). 
We lack information about the experiences of 
Bayer‑funded scientists. During the process of 
reviewing this chapter a Bayer researcher was 
directly asked for such information but none was 
provided. 
16.3.2 Official evaluators of evidence of the risk of 
Gaucho® to honeybees
Commission for Toxic Products (CTP)
In 1993, in the light of Bayer's claims that honeybees 
were not exposed to imidacloprid applied in 
seed‑dressing, the Commission for Toxic Products 
(CTP) (21) issued an assessment in favour of 
(18)  Semi-field (tunnel) studies are also unable to provide a decisive indication of a pesticide's risk to honeybees for several reasons. First, 
the quantity of food and the time of exposure to the contaminated source are much less important in semi-field experiments than 
in real conditions. Second, one cannot know if the honeybees really consume the collected pollen and nectar (contaminated for the 
purpose of the test) or if they continue to consume the reserves already present in the hive at the beginning of the experiment. Third, 
the foraging distance is very small, and therefore some distance-dependent behavioural effects (for instance, orientation troubles) 
may not be seen under semi-field experiments but could appear in real conditions, when honeybees have to forage far from the hive.
(19)  In the original French: 'Dès le début du programme, en janvier 1998 j'ai reçu personnellement une lettre de Bayer me menaçant 
d'un procès en diffamation.'
(20)  In the original French: 'J'ai travaillé trois ans sur le sujet et la direction… ma direction […], m'a demandé de changer de sujet.' 
(21)  La Commission d'étude de la toxicité des produits anti-parasitaires à usage agricole et des produits assimilés, des matières 
fertilisantes et des supports de culture, known as Commission for Toxic Products, was under the aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
It was composed of experts in toxicology and eco-toxicology. Its remit was to analyse authorisation dossiers from toxicological and 
eco-toxicological points of view. In 2006, the Commission was replaced by expert groups headed by the French Food Safety Agency 
AFSSA (called DIVE).
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authorising Gaucho®, without consulting its 
specialist Honeybee Working Group (22). 
After the emergence of clinical signs in the field 
and the first evaluation report (Belzunces and Tasei, 
1997), the assessment of the CTP (11 December 
1997) was ambiguous. It found that in the light 
of the information available, it was impossible 
to confirm or deny a causal link between the 
use of Gaucho® and honey yield losses. The CTP 
continued to issue ambivalent assessments until 
December 2002. 
From 1997 to 2001, the CTP considered that there 
was not enough knowledge to pronounce clear 
conclusions and repeatedly recommended further 
studies. For example, in 1997: 'The demonstration, 
made by Bayer that Gaucho® is not involved, is 
not made in a rigorous and complete manner. 
On the other hand, the declarations coming from 
beekeepers are not rigorous and stable enough 
for saying that Gaucho® is the only	(23) cause of 
honeybee colonies problems' (24) (CTP, 1997). 
In 1998 the CTP stated that, 'the data examined 
do not allow us to conclude to an unquestionable	
effect	of imidacloprid and/or of its metabolites on 
honeybees and honey production. Conversely, it is 
also not possible to	completely	exclude	the effect 
of imidacloprid and/or its metabolites, given the 
toxic effect at low doses, which have to do with the 
concentrations potentially present in the plants at 
the foraging time' (25) (CTP, 1998). 
In 2002, the conclusion of the CTP was expressed 
in unclear language and referred vaguely to all 
honeybee losses in France instead of focusing on 
the clinical signs observed in areas of intensive 
agriculture: 'The risk assessment does not allow 
us to demonstrate that maize seed‑dressing with 
Gaucho® can be solely	responsible, at national 
level, for all colony losses, behavioural troubles, 
honeybee mortalities or general decline in the 
honey production' (26) (CTP, 2002, p. 22). 
In all these cases, the CTP conclusions were 
answering a question that had never been asked, 
that is, is Gaucho® responsible for all honeybee 
losses, everywhere	in	France? They thus avoided 
a clear answer to the question really asked: is 
Gaucho® responsible for honeybee losses in	
intensive	sunflower	and	maize	seed-dressed	
cultures? 
The CPT lacked clear operating procedures and 
the assessment of the dossiers submitted by 
companies during the authorisation processes was 
based on unstructured expert judgement. It did 
not involve a systematic reflection on the quality 
of the results presented in these dossiers, based on 
clear assessment criteria. During their meetings, the 
workload was such that members of the CTP were 
often dealing with several dossiers simultaneously 
and therefore could not have in depth discussions 
on each of them. 
While the CTP issued advice to the Ministry several 
times during 1997–2002, only one member of the 
CTP was a bee specialist. The CTP had a Honeybee 
Working Group but this was not consulted until 
late in the debate (in 2000). A former member of the 
CTP argued that they were not consulted earlier 
because two members were beekeepers and were 
considered to have an interest in banning Gaucho® 
(personal communication). Even in the Honeybee 
Working Group, honeybee scientists were 
under‑represented. Overall, the divergent data 
coming from different sources, the lack of sufficient 
expertise on honeybee biology and the absence of 
enough time and rigorous criteria for evaluating 
the dossiers, all contributed to producing 
ambiguous advice. 
State Council
In the case of Gaucho®, different stakeholders, 
persons, and evaluation and decision bodies used 
varying criteria to judge the quality of the scientific 
evidence available. Thus, in contrast to the CTP, 
which was formally charged with assessing the 
(22)  The Honeybee Group was a CTP working group set up to report the risks to honeybees of plant protection products (PPP) submitted 
for authorisation for marketing. It advised on awarding a product the 'honeybee label' indicating that it poses no risk to honeybees 
when used on flowering plants.
(23)  The underlining in this quote and all subsequent quotes has been added by the authors of the present paper.
(24)  In the original French: 'La démonstration par Bayer que le Gaucho est hors de cause n'est pas établie de façon suffisamment 
rigoureuse et complète. D'autre part, il n'y a pas assez de rigueur et de stabilité dans les rapports de terrain provenant des 
apiculteurs pour affirmer que le Gaucho est la seule cause de troubles dont les colonies d'abeilles sont victimes.'
(25)  In the original French: 'Les données examinées ne permettent pas de conclure à un effet indiscutable de l'imidacloprid ou de ses 
métabolites sur les abeilles et la production de miel. Inversement, il n'est pas possible d'exclure totalement l'effet de l'imidacloprid 
et de ses métabolites, compte tenu de l'effet toxique à faible doses, doses en rapport avec des concentrations potentiellement 
présentes dans les plantes à l'époque du butinage.'
(26)  In the original French: 'L'évaluation du risqué réalisée ne permet donc pas de démontrer que le traitement de semences de maïs 
par la préparation Gaucho puisse être le seul responsable au niveau national de l'ensemble des dépopulations de ruches, des 
troubles comportementaux, des mortalités d'abeilles et plus globalement de la baisse de production apicole.'
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conformity of the existing evidence with the 
regulatory demands for pesticides risk assessment, 
the State Council employed legal criteria, assessing 
conformity with the law. 
The first intervention of the State Council was in 
1999, immediately after the ban on using Gaucho® 
on sunflower seeds, when Bayer mounted a 
legal challenge to the ministerial decision. About 
that time, several international consortia of seed 
producers (Monsanto, Novartis, Rhône‑Poulenc, 
Pionneer, Maisadour and Limagrain) rallied behind 
Bayer and formulated a similar case against the 
Minister's decision. The beekeepers syndicate 
UNAF (27) co‑defended the Minister's decision 
in court. The State Council decided in favour of 
the beekeepers and the Minister, judging that the 
Minister's precautionary decision was based on 
an appropriate evaluation of the results from the 
1998 scientific programme and the conclusions 
of the CTP, which expressed doubts about the 
harmlessness of Gaucho® for honeybees. 
The State Council was involved again in 2002 
and 2004, calling on the Minister to reconsider 
his decisions refusing to ban Gaucho® in maize 
seed‑dressing (see Section 16.4.2), on the grounds 
that the Ministry had not rightly evaluated its 
harmlessness in the way demanded by French 
legislation (28). In its conclusion in 2002, the State 
Council pointed out that, given the reasons for 
concern about Gaucho®, the Ministry should 
have examined all the necessary data to evaluate 
its effects on honeybees in maize seed‑dressing. 
That is, the Ministry should have asked for 
quantification of the use of maize pollen by 
honeybees, as well as of the nature and intensity 
of the effects on honeybees of maize pollen 
containing imidacloprid. In 2004, the State Council 
again stated that the CTP's risk assessment of 
Gaucho®‑treated maize for the Ministry failed to 
comply with the law as the effects on larvae had 
not been assessed. 
Other cases in court 
In 2001, Bayer took three representatives of 
beekeepers' syndicates to court in their home towns 
(Châteauroux, Mende and Troyes), accusing them 
of discrediting Gaucho® (GVA, 2001). In all cases, 
the courts decided in favour of beekeepers, based 
on the freedom of the syndicates to play their role 
in society and to express their opinions publicly. 
One of the courts explicitly criticised the attempt of 
Bayer CropScience to intimidate a syndicate leader 
who was defending the interests of his profession 
(UNAF, 2004).
An investigation into Gaucho® was launched in 
a court in Paris, following a charge brought by 
UNAF in 2001. The investigation continues to 
stagnate. Since its beginning, two judges have been 
replaced for different reasons. The judge currently 
dealing with the case has proceeded with new 
interrogation of experts and parties involved. In 
March 2011, the judge was still investigating the 
available evidence, in order to decide if there will 
be a trial or not.
16.3.3 Scientific and Technical Committee
Based on the analysis of 338 bibliographical 
references, the CST concluded that seed‑dressing 
sunflower and maize posed serious risks to 
honeybee colonies via larvae feeding, pollen 
consumption by nurses, nectar ingestion by 
foragers, and honey consumption by honeybees 
living inside the hive: 
'Based on our current state of knowledge and 
on the scenarios we developed to evaluate 
exposure, and based on the uncertainty 
factors chosen to evaluate the dangers, 
the PEC:PNEC ratios determined are of 
concern. They are in agreement with the 
field observations reported by numerous 
beekeepers' areas of intensive corn and 
sunflower growing, relating to the mortality 
of foragers (scenario 4), their disappearance, 
behavioural disturbances and certain winter 
mortalities (scenario 5). Consequently, the 
dressing of sunflower seeds with Gaucho® 
poses significant risks for bees of different 
ages, with the exception of the pollen 
ingestion by foragers during the making of 
pollen balls (scenario 3). 
'Regarding corn seed dressed with Gaucho®, 
the PEC:PNEC ratio turns out to be, as for 
the sunflower, of concern in the case of 
pollen consumption by nurse bees, which 
would lead to an accrued mortality of these 
and be one of the explanatory elements for 
the weakening of bee populations observed 
(27)  UNAF (Union Nationale de l'Apiculture Française) is one of the three French beekeeping syndicates, representing about 
22 000 beekeepers.
(28)  Arrêté du 6 septembre 1994.
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despite the ban on Gaucho® on sunflowers. 
Finally, given that other factors can contribute 
to the weakening of bee colonies, research 
should be continued on the frequency, 
mechanism and causes of these clinical 
signs' (29) (CST, 2003, p. 11).
Although the interim CST report on the risks of 
Gaucho® to honeybees was completed in 2002, 
DGAL (the General Directorate for Food, within the 
Ministry of Agriculture) did not submit it then to the 
Management Committee (30) of the CST. Just before 
publication in 2003, the Ministry of Agriculture 
withdrew its logo. One interpretation of this was 
that it emphasised the independence of the CST, 
alternatively it could be seen as demonstrating that 
the Ministry of Agriculture did not want to show 
any support for the results. This last interpretation is 
reinforced by a post‑publication letter from the DGAL, 
in which the Directorate considered that the findings 
of CST were too precise and asked for more studies. 
16�4 Societal debate and the policy 
responses
16.4.1 Stakeholder strategies 
Beekeepers systematically presented and compared 
the results of studies conducted by Bayer, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, public research and their 
own field observations. Their objective was to make 
the results public in order to show the congruity of 
their own observations with the scientific results and 
to mobilise civil society for support. The beekeeping 
sector was supported by civil society, as the issues 
were of major concern to the French public. The 
sector's arguments received good coverage in the 
national press. 
DGAL's	public statements were ambiguous. 
Its lack of transparency undermined trust: 
for example, when beekeepers' requested the 
authorisation dossier for Gaucho®, DGAL only 
released limited information (Clément, 2000). 
DGAL communicated all the documents requested 
by beekeepers only after intervention from 
both the Minister of Agriculture himself and 
the Commission for Access to Administrative 
Documents. 
There was variance in the public positions of 
different ministries of the French government 
and different services within the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The decisions of the Ministers of 
Agriculture to suspend the use of Gaucho® in 
seed‑dressings for sunflower (1999, 2001, 2003) 
and maize (2004) contrasted with DGAL's 
procrastination. 
Bayer had an inappropriate communication 
strategy on scientific figures, which contributed 
to increasing mistrust from the other 
stakeholders. For example, in 2002, Bayer publicly 
acknowledged exposure 'between 0 and 5 ppb, 
which is the quantification limit' (31) (AFSSA, 2002, 
p. 32). This statement represented a major step 
forward in Bayer's communication of scientific 
figures but was still vague about the information 
available on imidacloprid. However, Bayer‑funded 
scientists had already obtained precise figures 
for sunflower, i.e. 3.3 ppb in pollen and 1.9 ppb 
in nectar (Stork, 1999) (32). In addition, between 
2000 and 2001 public scientists had also reported 
quantification limits well below 5 ppb, i.e. 1 ppb 
for quantifying imidacloprid in pollen and 
nectar (Lagarde, 2000, Bonmatin et al., 2001) and 
detection limits of 0.3 ppb for pollen (Bonmatin 
et al., 2001) and 0.8 for nectar (Lagarde, 2000). 
These quantification and identification limits, as 
well as the precise measures of imidacloprid in 
pollen and nectar, available from public scientists, 
were ignored by Bayer in its statements on 
Gaucho® despite being publicly available (33). 
(29)  In the original French: 'Dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances, selon les scénarios développés pour évaluer l'exposition et selon les 
facteurs d'incertitude choisis pour évaluer les dangers, les rapports PEC/PNEC obtenus sont préoccupants. Ils sont en accord avec 
les observations de terrain rapportées par de nombreux apiculteurs en zones de grande culture (maïs, tournesol), concernant la 
mortalité des butineuses (scénario 4), leur disparition, leurs troubles comportementaux et certaines mortalités d'hiver (scénario 5). 
En conséquence, l'enrobage de semences de tournesol Gaucho® conduit à un risque significatif pour les abeilles de différents âges, 
à l'exception de l'ingestion de pollen par les butineuses lors de la confection de pelotes (scénario 3).
 'En ce qui concerne l'enrobage Gaucho® de semences de maïs, le rapport PEC/PNEC s'avère, comme pour le tournesol, préoccupant 
dans le cadre de la consommation de pollen par les nourrices, ce qui pourrait entraîner une mortalité accrue de celles–ci et être un 
des éléments de l'explication de l'affaiblissement des populations d'abeilles encore observé malgré l'interdiction du Gaucho® sur 
tournesol. Enfin, étant donné que d'autres facteurs peuvent contribuer à l'affaiblissement des colonies d'abeilles, il convient que les 
recherches soient poursuivies sur la fréquence, les mécanismes et les causes de ces symptômes.'
(30)  The Management Committee's remit was to supervise the scientific, economic and regulatory aspects of the CST's work and to 
ensure communication with the Minister of Agriculture, stakeholders and the public.
(31)  In the original French: 'comprise entre 0 et 5 ppb, qui est la limite de quantification'.
(32)  The data obtained by Bayer using radiolabelled imidacloprid have been published in 2001 (Schmuck et al., 2001).
(33)  For instance, Apiservices (2001) presents a synthesis of the available data and was published online on 16 February 2001. 
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Bayer steadfastly maintained that using Gaucho® 
in sunflower seed‑dressing had no effect on 
honeybees (Bayer CropScience, 2006). In 2006, the 
case dossier on the company's website did not 
mention the CST's conclusion that 'in the actual 
state of our knowledge […] the PEC:PNEC ratios 
obtained are worrisome' (34), or the findings from 
French public scientists regarding the risks of 
Gaucho® for honeybees (35).
16.4.2 Policy response to scientific evidence on risk 
A dossier prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(2001c) frames the 1999 decision of the Minister to 
ban Gaucho® on sunflower in the following terms: 
'The Ministry of Agriculture has conducted 
a first series of laboratory studies, as well 
as field studies in three test departments: 
Vendée, Indre and Deux‑Sèvres. The results 
yielded suspicions about the effects of the 
product, without, however, formally proving 
its responsibility. Applying	the	precautionary	
principle, the Minister of Agriculture has 
decided, in January 1999, to temporarily ban 
the product in sunflower seed‑dressing' (36). 
The Minister of Agriculture's ban on Gaucho® 
as maize seed‑dressing was introduced later. 
The stakes were higher for Bayer (only 10 % of 
Gaucho® revenue came from use on sunflower, the 
area under maize in France being 2.5 times that 
under sunflower (37)), for farmers, for beekeepers, 
for the general public (as articulated by the 
media) and probably for the Minister himself as a 
politician. In addition to the economic importance 
of maize, it is frequently cultivated without 
rotation. Therefore the pressure from pests (and 
maize growers) can be higher than for sunflower. 
Justifying his decision not to ban Gaucho® in maize 
seed‑dressing, the Minister of Agriculture stated 
to the State Council that maize does not produce 
nectar and therefore honeybees do not visit this 
plant for producing honey, apparently unaware 
that honeybees do, however, visit maize to collect 
its pollen, which they consume (Conseil d'Etat, 
2002). 
Although a procedure for the reversal of this 
authorisation was under way at the State Council, 
on 21 January 2002 the Ministry of Agriculture 
renewed the authorisation of Gaucho® on maize 
for ten more years. Subsequently, the judicial 
inquiry on Gaucho® was extended to challenge this 
renewed authorisation (Saunier, 2005). In October 
2002 the State Council concluded its re‑examination 
of the scientific evidence and advised the Minister 
to reconsider his decision. In 2003, the Minister 
of Agriculture refused again to ban the use of 
Gaucho® in maize seed‑dressing. In September 
2003 the CST concluded that imidacloprid in maize 
seed‑dressing posed a serious risk to honeybees 
(specifically the nurses consuming pollen). Again, 
in March 2004, the State Council advised the 
Minister to reconsider their decision but it was not 
until July 2004 that this use of Gaucho® on maize 
was banned. The press release communicating 
the Ministry's decision refers to the CST report, 
and states that 'the risk for honeybees seems less 
important than in case of sunflower seed‑dressing 
because exposure occurs only via pollen but is, 
however, of concern' (38) (Ministère de l'Agriculture, 
2004). 
Prior to this, in a letter published on 21 November 
2003, the head of the Bureau for the Regulation 
of Pesticide Products of the DGAL had revealed 
various shortcomings of the official risk assessment 
and management procedure: there were only three 
public servants to deal with 20 000 applications 
for authorisation per year; risk assessments were 
performed jointly with the industry; there was lack 
of transparency in the procedures; and insufficient 
attention was paid to the issue of pesticide residues 
in food during the risk assessment. In consequence, 
(34)  In the original French: 'Dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances […] les rapports PEC/PNEC obtenus sont préoccupants.'
(35)		On	the	Bayer	CropScience	France	website	(www.bayercropscience.fr)	in	2006,	there	was	a	file	entitled	'Honeybees'.	In	November	
2009,	on	this	website,	if	one	searches	for	'honeybee'	('abeille'),	no	document	can	be	found.	On	the	website	of	Bayer	Cropscience	
World, searching 'honeybees' gives no specific reference to Gaucho®, but searching 'Gaucho' results in some documents on the 
French case. Among them, the document referring to the ban of Gaucho® on maize still does not mention the conclusions of the 
CST or of French scientists. In January 2011, seaching for honey + bee + gaucho gives 1 result, referring to the judgement of the 
court of Chateauroux, whereas searching bee + gaucho gives 14 results, among which 4 refer to honeybees.
(36)  In the original French: 'Le ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche a conduit une première série d'études en laboratoire, comme 
sur le terrain dans trois départements tests: la Vendée, l'Indre et les Deux-Sèvres. Les résultats ont généré des suspicions sur 
l'effet du produit, sans pour autant prouver formellement sa responsabilité. En application du principe de précaution, le ministre 
de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche a décidé en janvier 1999 le retrait provisoire de l'autorisation de mise sur le marché du produit sur 
traitement de semences de tournesol.'
(37)		Official	figures	from	the	website	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	(Agreste,	2011)	for	the	year	2000	put	the	area	used	for	maize	at	
1 764 767 ha and for sunflower 728 555 ha.
(38)  In the original French: 'le risque pour les abeilles, s'il apparaît moins important que dans le cas de l'usage pour l'enrobage des 
graines de tournesol du fait de la seule exposition au pollen, reste préoccupant.'
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the Bureau chief concluded, 'it is impossible for the 
Bureau to accomplish its mission' (39). 
16.4.3 Costs and benefits of the policy responses 
In the last 20 years, the chemical	industry has 
been increasingly regulated. Directive 91/414/EEC 
required the reassessment of active substances 
contained in plant‑protection products already on 
the EU market. Many active substances have since 
been withdrawn. Furthermore, some pests have 
developed resistance to formerly used pesticides. 
European manufacturers of agricultural chemicals 
face higher research and development costs. On 
average, it costs some USD 50 million to develop a 
new product. Nevertheless, systemic insecticides 
represent a highly profitable investment. For 
example, imidacloprid‑based insecticides (40) 
brought Bayer DM 800 million of global sales in 
1998 (approximately EUR 409 million) (Bayer, 1998) 
and EUR 556 million in 2007 (Bayer CropScience, 
2008). Furthermore, focusing on these products also 
represents a networking investment for the industry 
because partnerships are made with seed producers 
and distribution chains. We do not have information 
about the economic consequences for the chemical 
industry of banning Gaucho® or RégentTS® in France.
The economic situation of the French	beekeeping	
sector worsened significantly between 1994 
and 2004. In 1994, there were 1 370 220 beehives 
and 84 800 beekeepers. By 2004, there were 
1 360 973 beehives and 68 800 beekeepers 
(GEM‑ONIFLHOR, 2005). Many small producers 
abandoned beekeeping in the interim. The apparent 
stability of the number of hives between 1994 and 2004 
belies the higher turn‑over of colonies to replace those 
lost. The decrease in the sunflower average honey yield 
(Belzunces and Tasei, 1997; CNEVA Sophia‑Antipolis, 
1997; Pham‑Delègue et Cluzeau, 1998; Coordination 
des Apiculteurs, 2001; Alétru, 2003), and the increase 
in colony mortality forced professional beekeepers to 
increase the number of hives to compensate for their 
losses. 
The relative contribution of insecticides and other 
factors (e.g. the international market for honey and 
honeybee diseases) to the decline of French beekeeping 
is unclear. France's honey imports per annum rose 
from 6 000 tonnes in 1993 to 17 000 tonnes in 2004, 
whereas domestic honey consumption stayed constant 
at about 40 000 tonnes per annum (GEM‑ONIFLHOR, 
2005). A study of the cooperative France Miel (41) 
for western France showed that severe losses in the 
sunflower honey yield started in 1995 and continued 
over the following years (Figure 16.1). 
Data similar to those obtained for western 
France exist for the cooperative Poitou‑Charentes 
(Figure 16.2) and for the department of Deux‑Sèvres, 
produced by the Agricultural Chamber (Chambre 
d'Agriculture). In 2005, the important decrease in 
the production of sunflower honey is also referred to 
in a national audit report of the beekeeping branch 
(GEM‑ONIFLHOR, 2005). 
These data are not exhaustive but they show that 
the losses of sunflower honey yield were significant, 
started around 1994 and continued in the following 
years. 
Among the beekeeping sector's expenses, there was 
also additional outlay on research (funding research 
to assess the risk of Gaucho® and RégentTS® through 
European funds for beekeeping) and legal fees (for 
the different judicial interventions). The financial 
burden was double because the funds had been 
intended to support the development of beekeeping. 
Having been spent on defending beekeepers' stakes 
in the debate, some could not be used to achieve the 
development goals.
The beekeepers have not been compensated for their 
economic losses but after 2003, France was granted 
financial support from the European Commission 
to restore honeybee colonies, as general support for 
beekeeping in a time of economic hardship.
In the agricultural	sector, the economic 
repercussions are unclear. A large proportion of 
French crops (such as sunflower, maize and cereals) 
were rapidly given seed‑dressing protection, 
even when pest control was rarely needed (for 
example for sunflowers). The Technical Center for 
Oilseed Crops (CETIOM) website specifies (42) that 
'sunflower has a low attractiveness for [click beetle] 
(39)  'Trois fonctionnaires pour traiter 20 000 demandes d'autorisation par an, 'une cogestion de l'évaluation des risques avec 
les industriels', 'une absence de transparence dans les procédures'. 'En matière d'évaluation des risques, le domaine des 
résidus de pesticides dans les aliments est insuffisamment couvert.' Enfin, 'Le bureau est dans l'impossibilité de remplir ses 
missions.' (Le Point, 21 November 2003).
(40)  Gaucho®, Confidor®, Admire® and Provado® in 1998 and Confidor®, Admire®, Gaucho® and Merit® in 2007.
(41)  Additional figures for the evolution of sunflower honey are available in France Miel (2000).
(42)  This information has been already present on this website in 2003.
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Figure 16�1 Sunflower honey harvest in western France (*) 
Note: *	The	method	for	obtaining	these	data	was	communicated	to	Laura	Maxim	by	France	Miel.	The	quantities	of	sunflower	
honey comprise all the quantities brought to France Miel between 1988 and 1998 by a representative sample of professional 
beekeepers providing honey to France Miel, from the departments 72 (Sarthe), 49 (Maine-et-Loire), 85 (Vendée), 
17 (Charente-Maritime), 33 (Gironde) and 32 (Gers). The vertical axis represents an index 100 — which is the average of 
the	quantities	of	sunflower	honey	provided	to	France	Miel	between	1988	and	1994.	Beekeepers	are	committed	to	supply	
all	of	their	annual	harvests	to	the	cooperative.	A	laboratory	further	checks	the	floral	origin	of	the	supplied	honey.	It	was	
not	possible	to	calculate	the	evolution	of	the	quantity	of	sunflower	honey	beyond	2001	because	some	beekeepers	from	the	
sample abandoned beekeeping, left the cooperative, developed other activities in addition to beekeeping or retired. Note that 
sunflower	seeds	were	also	dressed	with	another	insecticide	after	1995,	RégentTS®.
Source: Laura Maxim.
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larvae and the time lag during which the plant 
is sensitive to these larvae is relatively short' (43). 
Furthermore, for 'most of the areas where sunflower 
is cultivated in France', the risk is 'low or zero' (44) 
(CETIOM, 2011).
Contrary to the use of curative treatments usually 
recommended to farmers when pest density was 
above an economic threshold, the new control 
method was preventive regardless of the presence 
and abundance of pests. 
Seed‑dressing reduces the work needed for crop 
protection, so it could be economically attractive 
to farmers. But some farmers said that their 
productivity was unchanged or diminished, and 
reported more empty seeds in the flowerheads, 
suggesting a possible link with the poor pollination 
associated with Gaucho® (Elie and Garaud, 2003). 
(43)  In the original French: 'le tournesol est faiblement attractif pour les larves et la période de sensibilité aux attaques est relativement 
brève.'
(44)  In the original French: 'Population de taupins nulle à faible, dégâts très peu probables sur tournesol: Majorité des situations où le 
tournesol est cultivé aujourd'hui en France.'
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Mainstream (intensive) farmers' organisations such 
as the General Association of Maize Producers 
(AGPM) (45) argued that banning seed‑dressing 
insecticides increased pressure from pests, 
particularly on maize (Beulin et al., 2005; AGPM, 
2008). 
In 2002 the rapporteur on 'insecticides' in the 
Committee for Pesticides Authorisation (46) stated 
that, at that time, the two 'really effective' plant 
protection products that served as alternatives to 
Gaucho® and were available for certain maize pests 
were terbufos (which was due to be withdrawn 
from the EU market in 2003) and RégentTS® (Comité 
d'homologation, 2002).
In 2005, farmers reported losses of 500 000 tonnes 
of maize‑grain in France (worth EUR 50 million) 
and some of them linked this figure to the ban on 
seed‑dressing insecticides (Dossier de la protection 
des sémences, 2005). However, others blamed the 
productivity drop on the exceptionally hot and 
dry summer that year. AGPM itself has pointed 
towards the decrease in maize yield from 2003 due 
to increasingly drier summers. 
Figure 16.3 shows that the seed‑dressing ban is not 
directly correlated with productivity: 2007 was the 
best year in over a decade. For maize, production 
was worst not after 2004, when Gaucho® was 
banned on this crop and RégentTS® on all uses, but 
in 2003, when a major heatwave hit Europe. 
Beekeepers contended that, because not all maize 
crops in France were seed dressed, maize could 
be cultivated without seed‑dressing insecticides. 
Contrastingly, the website of the General 
Association of Maize Producers (Dossier de la 
protection des secmences, 2005) reports that there 
is no authorised alternative treatment to control 
wireworms. 
The losses for agriculture associated to the 
potential decline in pollination during this period 
(1994–2004) have not been assessed. 
Finally, resistance to insecticides is more likely with 
the long persistent molecules of seed‑dressings 
(such as imidacloprid, fipronil and thiametoxam) 
which exert a constant pressure on natural 
selection, compared to sprays. 
Figure 16�3 Trends in maize and sunflower yields in France from 1995 to 2007 
Source:  Data from AGRESTE, Statistiques agricoles annuelles.
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(45)		L'Association	Générale	des	Producteurs	de	Maïs	—	also	a	defender	of	industrial	agriculture,	for	example	through	cultivating	GMOs	
and intensive biofuel crops.
(46)  Comité d'homologation — one of the two authorities previously involved in evaluating applications for authorisation of pesticides in 
France. The other instance was the CTP.
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16.4.4 Debate in France: 2004–2011
The figures for bee mortality in France are very 
diverse and heterogeneous among sources. 
According to UNAF, since 2003 honeybee colonies 
have partially recovered in France. UNAF reported 
that high summer	mortality has stopped in intensive 
agriculture areas and the general state of the French 
hives improved (Clément, 2005; UNAF, 2007 and 
2008). 
An AFSSA study between 2002 and 2005 on 120 hives 
reported normal activity of honeybees, and usual 
winter mortalities (5–10 %) (Aubert et al., 2008). 
AFSSA (Faucon and Chauzat, 2008) and some 
beekeepers (Schiro, 2007) reported high mortality 
for the winter 2005–2006. However, according to 
EFSA (2008), only 1.2 % of French beekeepers made 
declarations regarding mortality in 2006 and 0.6 % 
did so in 2007. 
Following the 2006–2007 winter, apiaries were 
reported to be in good condition in early spring 2007 
(Clément, 2007). 
For the 2007–2008 winter, an inquiry by the National 
Center for Apicultural Development (CNDA), 
based on 168 professional beekeepers' answers 
(representing about 5 % of French hives and 10 % of 
French professional beekeepers), found an average 
winter	loss of colonies for France of around 30 %. 
That was some 12 % higher than CNDA figures for 
the two previous winters (De Boyer des Roches et al., 
2009). 
The	reality	is	that	no	system	exists	in	France	
for	the	accurate	and	extensive	monitoring	of	
honeybees. The national statistics of the French 
Ministry of Agriculture are recognised to support 
neither accurate quantification of bee mortality, nor 
identification of causes. Furthermore, official statistics 
focus on the survey of bee contagious diseases. The 
Ministry of Agriculture's data on the influence of 
diseases on French hives differ markedly from those 
collected by the AFSSA (2009). 
AFSSA has produced several reports after 2004, 
presenting results from its eco‑epidemiological 
studies, suggesting that honeybee problems had 
multiple causes, with diseases being important 
in winter mortalities. They showed that varroa is 
currently a pressure in French hives, as few drugs 
against this mite are available (AFSSA, 2009).
The reports AFSSA (2009) and CST (2003) differ 
in terms of their objectives and, therefore, in their 
methods. These differences are apparent in their 
respective bibliographies. Of the 338 bibliographic 
references considered in the CST report, only five 
were included in AFSSA (2009). Similarly, 173 of 
the references available before 2003 and included in 
AFSSA (2009) report were not included in the CST 
report. 
The majority of the references considered by the CST 
concern imidacloprid. Contrastingly, 43 % of the 
documents considered in the AFSSA report concern 
diseases and viruses and only about 15 % concern 
ecotoxicological issues, with only 3 % focusing on 
imidacloprid. 
Nevertheless, the AFSSA report describes its 
analysis as 'An	almost	exhaustive	study of French 
and European investigations carried out on the 
issue of bee morbidity and mortality' (p. 12). It 
also asserts that 'This information has allowed an 
almost exhaustive inventory of the causes of bee 
diseases and particularly bee colony mortality 
to be drawn up' (p. 101). However, the statistics 
regarding references demonstrate that almost 
none of the documents reviewed during the CST 
were considered by AFSSA. The AFSSA analysis 
only refers to some of the references available on 
honeybee losses in France — mainly those referring 
to diseases. Therefore the AFSSA inventory of 
sources cannot be considered as being 'almost 
exhaustive'.
AFSSA (2009) does not assess the influence of 
Gaucho® and Régent® on honeybees in sunflower 
and maize areas (e.g. the word Gaucho® is present 
four times in the main text of the document, twice in 
naming the precautionary decision of the Ministry 
and twice in naming the corresponding CST report). 
Regarding, generally, the influence of pesticides on 
honeybees, AFSSA (2009) states that 'The group's 
deliberations do not confirm the hypothesis of 
a predominant role attributed to pesticides by 
beekeeping professionals in French bee colony 
mortality'. This statement takes an important place, 
because it is found in the conclusions section. 
However, this general conclusion lacks precision 
in several respects that are relevant to the present 
chapter:
•	 It	is	not	clear	to	which	'pesticides'	the	text	refers.	
Do the authors refer to all pesticides?
•	 It	is	not	clear	to	which	'beekeeping	professionals'	
the text refers. Is it beekeepers in maize and 
sunflower areas or beekeepers in other areas 
(for example mountain regions)? 
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•	 It	is	not	clear	which	'French	bee	mortality'	this	
statement refers to because the time period is 
not specified. Is it before 2004 (before the ban 
on imidacloprid in maize seed‑dressing and on 
fipronil in all agricultural uses?) or is it after 
2004?
•	 The	method	used	to	draw	this	conclusion	is	not	
clear either. How were the 'group deliberations' 
organised in order to produce this conclusion? 
On which bibliographic basis were these 
conclusions drawn, given that less than 15 % 
of the documents considered refer directly to 
pesticides? How were these documents chosen, 
among all the references available on the effects 
of pesticides on honeybees, and used to reach 
this conclusion? 
Suchail et al. (2001) investigated the oral acute 
and chronic toxicity of imidacloprid and its 
main metabolites (5‑hydroxyimidacloprid, 
4,5‑dihydroxyimidacloprid, desnitroimidacloprid, 
6‑chloronicotinic acid, olefin, and urea derivative) 
in Apis mellifera. Regarding two metabolites (urea 
and 6‑chloronicotinic acid), their results were 
contested in a study published by a Bayer‑funded 
scientist (Schmuck, 2004). This study could not 
find any increased treatment‑related mortality 
or behavioural abnormalities following chronic 
exposure of honeybees to these two metabolites, at 
0.0001, 0.001, and 0.010 mg/L 50 % sucrose solution. 
Schmuck (2004) did not address the parent 
molecule, imidacloprid, in an experimental way 
but through a literature analysis. The author 
argued that comparison with other studies should 
be considered sufficient to reject the results 
found by Suchail (2001), based on the argument 
that Suchail's results are lower than others. This 
comparative literature survey neither analysed the 
sources of the differences between the results, nor 
examined comparatively the protocols used by the 
various researchers to understand the sources of 
these differences. 
Post‑2003 studies also found that exposure to 
imidacloprid is also possible through aerial 
pollution, through foraging on wild flowers coated 
with imidacloprid‑containing dust as a result 
of sowing‑related activities (Greatti et al., 2006) 
and through consumption by honeybees of leaf 
guttation drops of corn plants germinated from 
imidacloprid‑coated seeds (Girolami et al., 2009). 
Public scientists in France found that the 
persistence of imidacloprid resulted in its 
presence in untreated crops cultivated after 
seed‑treated crops. Bonmatin et al. (2005) found 
1–2 ppb imidacloprid in flowerheads of untreated 
sunflowers grown a year after seed‑dressed 
sunflowers. Imidacloprid was still detectable two 
years after treatment (detection limit = 0.1 ppb). 
In pollen, imidacloprid was detected one year after 
treatment (detection limit = 0.3 ppb). 
Immunodepression caused by sublethal exposure 
to insecticides may favour lethal diseases (Glinski 
and Kauko, 2000; ISIS, 2011). Indeed, beekeepers 
formulated this hypothesis and launched a call 
for research (Alétru, 2003). Results of a survey 
initiated in France showed that the most frequently 
found pesticide residue in pollen samples was 
imidacloprid (in 49.4 % of the samples), followed 
by one of its metabolites, 6‑chloronicotinic acid 
(in 44.4 % of the samples). At least one of these 
two molecules was present in 69 % of the samples 
(Chauzat et al., 2006). 
Alaux et al. (2009) found that honeybees that 
were both infected with the pathogen Nosema 
and exposed to imidacloprid at concentrations 
encountered in the environment showed the 
highest mortality rate comparing to honeybees 
infected with Nosema alone or treated with 
imidacloprid alone. Although imidacloprid 
contamination in the hive is usually found at 
sublethal doses, infection with Nosema increases 
the energy demands of bees and therefore their 
food intake. By this means bees could be exposed 
to lethal doses. Alaux et al. (2009) found that in 
the long term the synergy between Nosema and 
imidacloprid induced the immunosupression of an 
enzyme essential in sterilising larval food, leading 
to higher susceptibility of the colony to pathogens.
Authorisation has been requested since 2004 for 
two other seed‑dressing insecticides in France. 
Poncho® (with the active substance clothianidin), 
produced by Bayer, has not been authorised 
for maize. Cruiser® (with the active substance 
thiametoxam), produced by Syngenta, has been 
authorised and honeybees were monitored in three 
regions in 2008 and six in 2009. In June 2009, the 
Minister of Agriculture decided not to renew the 
marketing authorisation of Cruiser® until autumn 
2009. In December 2009, Cruiser® was reauthorised 
for use on maize for 2010. 
Relationships between beekeepers and the 
Ministry of Agriculture seem to have improved. 
The decisions of the Ministers of Agriculture to 
ban Gaucho® on sunflower and maize significantly 
calmed the controversy and a Technical Beekeeping 
Institute has been created.
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16.4.5 Assessment of Gaucho® at the European level
In the framework of Directive 91/414/EEC, 
imidacloprid has been assessed at European level for 
inclusion on the list of active substances allowed for 
marketing in the European Union. The rapporteur 
Member State for imidacloprid was Germany, which 
submitted a Draft Assessment Report (DAR) to the 
EFSA in 2005 (Rapporteur Member State, Germany, 
2006). In 2008, imidacloprid was included on the list 
of active substances allowed for marketing in the 
EU (47).
Several studies produced in France, relating to the 
risk of Gaucho® to honeybees were not considered 
in the DAR. Notably missing were relevant studies 
on the exposure of honeybees to contaminated 
pollen and nectar (e.g. none of Jean‑Marc Bonmatin's 
studies was included). In addition, the DAR report 
accorded only limited importance to sublethal effects, 
although there were at the core of the investigations 
in France because of their potential to create lethal 
effects in field conditions. Finally, the risk assessment 
methodology was not adapted to seed‑dressing 
formulations. 
Several NGOs (Stichting Natuur en Milieu, 
PAN‑Europe, Inter Environment Wallonie, Nature et 
Progres and Mouvement pour le Droit et le Respect 
des Générations Futures (MDRGF)), analysed the 
DAR in a letter sent to the European Commissioner 
for Health. They articulated several criticisms of 
the DAR: the absence of necessary tests for each 
bee category (e.g. larval tests); underestimation of 
the nectar consumption per bee, meaning that the 
non‑effect concentration was set too high; validation 
of studies without any validation criteria; discrediting 
of reports non‑favourable to imidacloprid but 
thorough validation of reports favourable to the 
thesis that there were no risks to honeybees; flawed 
consumption tests and colony sizes too small to test 
egg‑laying; insufficient measurement of sowing 
dust effects; and no consideration of synergic effects 
between the active substance and bee pathogens 
(Kindemba, 2009).
16�5 Lessons on the governance of 
controversies 
The lessons developed in the present chapter are 
based on the case study of Gaucho® but may be 
relevant for governance of the controversy about 
systemic insecticide risks in general, in France and in 
Europe.
The most important factor fuelling the debate in 
France was increasing mutual mistrust between 
the parties involved, arising, in part, from a failure 
to generate and ensure access to information. This 
reinforces one of the lessons from the first volume 
of Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001), 
namely the need to 'Provide adequate long‑term 
environmental and health monitoring and research 
into early warnings'. 
Initially, various local/regional government services 
confirmed the clinical signs described by beekeepers 
(CNEVA, 1997; AFSSA, 2001; Chambre d'Agriculture 
de la Vendée, FDSEA de la Vendée and FDSEA des 
Deux‑Sèvres in Alétru, 2003). However, beekeepers 
have stated that on several occasions they could not 
access raw field data held centrally by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Thereafter, beekeepers viewed further 
initiatives of the DGAL with suspicion, criticised the 
'paralysis by analysis', the diversion of the 'official' 
research towards too 'complex' subjects and their 
exclusion from creating the research protocols. The 
Ministry of Agriculture did, however, finance two 
post‑doctoral projects for two years, which made an 
important contribution to the work of the CST. 
Another important lesson from the first volume of 
Late lessons from early warnings is the need to 'Ensure 
the use of "lay" and local knowledge, as well as 
relevant specialist expertise in the appraisal' (EEA, 
2001) to ensure a correct understanding of the 
problem and to deal with conflicting social processes. 
The first volume highlighted the importance of 
rigorous monitoring to identify early warnings and 
the need to provide sufficient funding to achieve 
that goal. We could add that the experience of 
honeybee colony decline in France shows that bodies	
performing	monitoring	studies	should	have	the	
trust	and	acceptance	of	the	field	actors	directly	
concerned (in our case, beekeepers and farmers). 
From the first alert, particular attention should have 
been given to the professional beekeepers, who 
have daily experience and good knowledge of the 
land and of the insects they breed. Where key actors 
are not properly engaged, the monitoring process 
becomes discredited and ineffective. For example, the 
actors directly concerned may cease to participate or 
the monitoring protocols may be poorly designed, 
leading to a focus on non‑essential features of the 
(47)  France maintains its ban on sunflower and maize seed-dressing.
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problem. Furthermore, extensive local observations 
from such actors can help understand variability 
in clinical signs and the reasons that different 
circumstances produce varying exposures and effects.
Ensuring that relevant specialist expertise is involved 
is also of key importance to increase trust and the 
quality of information. As the current case exemplifies 
(see Section 16.3.2 above), there is a need to ensure 
that specialists involved in risk assessments are 
selected based on competence and transparent 
procedures. Furthermore, the risk assessment 
process should involve the relevant disciplines 
and the experts should have the relevant research 
experience (i.e. articles on the topic, published in 
peer‑reviewed journals). For example, members of 
the official commissions assessing the evidence in risk 
assessment of honeybees must include more honeybee 
specialists than, for example, plant specialists. Where 
a causal pattern is being researched, balance should 
be ensured among the different fields of specialisation 
(such as honeybee diseases, toxicology and climate) 
because specialists in, for example, diseases are more 
prone to produce conclusions on diseases than on 
ecotoxicological aspects. 
Governance of controversies about chemical risks 
must therefore be guided by a continuous focus on 
promoting mutual trust between the stakeholders, 
including scientists and policymakers. 
With that goal in mind, eight	new	lessons	can	be	
drawn	from	the	present	case	study. 
First, governance must focus on identifying potential 
properties of new chemicals and anticipating 
surprises that may arise from them. It is unwise 
to assume that methods used to assess the risks 
of existing technologies are also appropriate for 
assessing risks from new technologies (48). In the 
present case, even though the nature of the risk 
posed by systemic pesticides was different from 
the one associated with sprayed insecticides, the 
same assessment tools (LD50 and HQ) were used 
for authorisation, without any assessment of their 
adequacy for new patterns of exposure and effects. 
The lesson learned is: when	dealing	with	new	
technologies,	verify	whether	the	methods	already	
in	use	for	risk	assessment	are	relevant,	given	the	
specific	new	properties	and	characteristics	of	new	
risks. 
A	second	lesson deals with the adequacy of the 
present standardised tests regarding the assessment 
of pesticide risks to honeybees. The lesson is: develop	
new	tests	to	assess	sublethal	effects	of	pesticides,	
their	chronic	effects	and	their	effects	on	the	colony. 
The laboratory studies measuring imidacloprid's 
sublethal effects or chronic lethal effects showed a 
range of different results. One important reason for 
this diversity is the lack of standardised protocols 
for such studies, resulting in each laboratory using 
different approaches. From one study to another, 
several factors can be a source of variability (the 
subspecies of honeybees used, their age, the 
temperature, the fasting time, etc.). Each of these 
parameters can induce differences in the results. For 
example, it has been shown that there is considerable 
genetic variation between colonies regarding the 
immune responsiveness of colony members (Evans 
and Pettis, 2005). Alaux et al. (2009) also found 
differences between the responses of colonies to 
their experiment, despite the fact that these colonies 
came from the same location and were exposed to 
the same environment. They suggested that genetic 
background and colony history (pathogens, food 
sources) can produce these differences.
The differences between existing protocols are 
producing results that are difficult to compare. 
To address sublethal and chronic lethal effects of 
pesticides on honeybees, new official directives 
using standardised protocols are therefore needed. 
Today, field experiments play a decisive role in 
determining the risks of a substance. However, 
the complexity of environmental factors and of 
bee colonies themselves means that the same 
conditions can never be reproduced. A particular 
combination of such factors arising in a field 
experiment cannot be considered representative of 
some kind of 'average' environmental conditions 
to which honeybees or other organisms could be 
exposed. 
After 2004 a group of honeybee experts appointed 
(but not funded) by the French Ministry of 
Agriculture was tasked to develop new tests for 
honeybees for inclusion in risk assessment practice. 
This group had proposed several draft tests to the 
Commission for Biological Essays, charged with 
validating methods for risk assessment in France. 
In Europe, until 2010, honeybee tests followed the 
European and Mediterranean Plant Protection 
Organisation (EPPO) 2001 norms (OEPP/EPPO, 
2001). The International Commission on Plant‑Bee 
(48)  This is a very old lesson, developed in detail in the analysis of DDT by Dunlap (1978).
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Relations (ICPBR) proposed a modified honeybee 
risk assessment scheme for systemic pesticides and 
changed the test guidelines for semi‑field and field 
studies. Both have been submitted to EPPO for 
consideration (Thompson, 2010). The modified risk 
assessment scheme has been adopted as EPPO norm 
in 2010 (OEPP/EPPO, 2010a, b). 
However, the process of revising this norm failed 
to significantly change the risk assessment pattern. 
The 2010 norm still does not consider sublethal and 
chronic effects properly. Furthermore, standardised 
laboratory tests are still missing for chronic 
and sublethal effects. Therefore, the European 
Commission has mandated the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) to create a working group 
to assess the current risk assessment scheme. 
The	third	lesson is not to underestimate the 
resources needed to implement policies. The case 
of Gaucho® revealed the French administration's 
difficulties managing the authorisation of new 
pesticides. Policymakers need to ensure	adequate	
personnel	(in	number	and	competence)	and	
financial	resources	to	design	efficient	regulatory	
procedures	for	risk	governance	and	thus	reinforce	
their	ability	to	manage	risks	effectively. 
The	fourth	lesson is that	the	independence	and	
competence	of	the	experts	on	the	issue	at	hand	
must	be	assured,	as	well	as	complete	transparency	
of	the	research	process. This lesson refers to 
researchers working both in private and in publicly 
funded structures. 
Publically funded researchers can be also at risk 
of conflicts of interest. First, the low funding of 
public research can mean that some laboratories 
are obliged to find external sources of funding 
(including pesticide‑producing companies). Second, 
some public researchers may also be consultants for 
the chemicals industry (e.g. addressing the effects 
of certain substances on honeybees or other subjects 
such as the development of anti‑mite products 
against Varroa jacobsoni for companies which are 
also producing insecticides used in crops visited by 
honeybees). 
Conflicts of interest can be financial, with the 
funding potentially influencing a researcher's work 
in favour of the funder. They can also be intellectual, 
where the prior commitment of a scientist to a 
particular world view prevents him or her seeing 
other perspectives. However, even if no scientist is 
'completely free' of subjectivity, some strive to be 
as impartial as possible. All the conditions for them 
to be able to do so must be institutionally insured. 
Furthermore, building a clear framework for their 
expertise, which reduces the possibility of selective 
use of information, of avoiding responsibility 
or of ambiguous statements, could reinforce the 
legitimacy of expertise and diminish its potential for 
generating controversies. 
Research policies and funding should be balanced 
between two core goals: science explicitly targeting 
the development of knowledge with commercial 
purposes (resources for the 'knowledge economy'); 
and science targeting the development of socially 
valuable knowledge (resources for the 'knowledge 
society'), such as knowledge on health and 
environmental risks. The first kind of science 
can draw largely on private funding. The second 
type of knowledge requires publicly managed 
funding and a particular status for the researchers 
involved, ensuring the 'highest possible level' of 
independence from vested interests and institutional 
pressure. Research developed in public structures 
can complement the evidence on chemical risks 
produced by the industry pursuant to existing 
regulatory frameworks. 
In addition, the contractual relationship between 
industry sponsors and public or private researchers 
of risk could provide for a legal guarantee that, for 
example, findings will be published regardless of 
their content. 
Industry dossiers that support the authorisation 
of chemicals must be transparent. External parties 
should be allowed to scrutinise the dossiers and 
the original studies, contributing to content and to 
the overall quality of the dossier. The capacity of 
different stakeholders to provide comments should 
be balanced, thereby preventing the most powerful 
stakeholder from capturing the process with 
repeated comments. Complete information on the 
assessment of health and environmental risks should 
be easily available to both scientists and NGOs, 
and opportunities to comment should be created 
and stimulated. One option could be Substance 
Information Review Forums, similar to the 
Substance Information Exchange Forums organised 
in the framework of the REACH Regulation. To 
create real opportunities for review, the original 
studies on which risk assessments are based should 
be available through a cost‑free database. Such a 
library could be also useful for cases where doubts 
arise about the risks of a substance after is has been 
authorised. 
All researchers, private or public, publishing or 
involved in regulatory risk assessments should 
communicate their conflicts of interest. This is 
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already the case in many situations but these 
declarations should also be readily available to the 
public (e.g. on the internet). Researchers should 
not be involved in evaluating the risk of pesticides 
produced by the company financing them or their 
laboratories.
The	fifth	lesson is: be	aware	that	the	social	
quality	of	the	scientific	information	you	
communicate	in	the	debate	determines	your	
public	trustworthiness. The present case study 
showed major deficiencies in the communication 
of scientific information by Bayer and by certain 
administrative services of the French State, 
contributing to the distrust of other stakeholders 
and intensification of the debate. We have 
six recommendations for the social quality of 
information communicated in a contested policy 
process: 
•	 be	reliable	—	base	your	arguments	on	all	
available scientific knowledge; 
•	 be	robust	—	answer	criticism	instead	of	
ignoring it; 
•	 be	complete	—	do	not	ignore	the	information	
produced by other stakeholders, especially 
those contradicting your own views; 
•	 have	a	discourse	relevant	for	the	issue	under	
debate (e.g. regarding the particular clinical 
signs or the geographical area evoked), instead 
of referring to general issues only distantly 
related to the problem addressed;
•	 be	logical,	do	not	contradict	yourself	except	
if you change your views and you explicitly 
recognise this; 
•	 ensure	the	legitimacy	of	your	sources	(make	
appeal to competent researchers, who do not 
have conflicts of interests) (for further details, 
see Maxim and van der Sluijs, 2007). 
The	sixth	lesson is that structures	responsible	for	
assessing	the	scientific	adequacy	of	applications	
for	marketing	authorisation	should	develop	
clear	and	standardised	scientific	quality	criteria	
to	enable	existing	studies	to	be	evaluated	and	
compared. 
All the existing literature, including scientific 
papers, should be taken into account in risk 
assessments and the scientific quality of the data 
submitted by the industry should somehow be 
assessed. An important issue is the balance between 
the burden of proof (i.e. who has the responsibility 
to produce evidence for decision‑making on risks) 
and its credibility. The selection of valid studies 
(e.g. for obtaining marketing authorisation) 
should be based on uniform and clear criteria of 
scientific quality, not on some unjustified 'expert 
appreciation' of their relevance. Lack of precise 
criteria for evaluating the quality of a study can 
lead to arbitrary or subjectively justified exclusion 
of certain studies from the risk assessment process. 
This exclusion can potentially have a decisive 
influence on the final result. 
In addition to existing practices for the quality of 
the laboratory work, criteria for evaluating the 
scientific quality of studies should be established. 
Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) standards ensure 
a framework in which laboratory studies are 
controllably planned, performed, monitored, 
recorded, reported and archived. However, 
the GLP certification only provides guarantees 
about the transparency and the traceability of 
the laboratory work. It does not guarantee the 
scientific quality of the study. For non‑standardised 
tests, GLP does not warrant, for example, that 
the protocol chosen for a study adequately takes 
into account the biology and the behaviour of the 
studied organism or that the results are correctly 
interpreted. However, whereas new patterns of 
risk need to be assessed, novel tests that are not yet 
standardised are increasingly needed. 
The	seventh	lesson deals with multicausality: 
prioritise	the	potential	causal	factors	and	address	
them	separately	before	assessing	potential	
correlation	or	synergies	among	them. Honeybee 
losses can be influenced by many factors but this 
should not become an excuse for not dealing with 
particular clinical signs and particular causes. 
Action should not be hampered because several 
potential causes are involved. On the contrary, 
potential causes have to be prioritised before being 
addressed. The different causes could play different 
roles, e.g. some might be 'primary' (i.e. influencing 
the expression of other causes), whereas others 
may be 'secondary' (e.g. immunodepression due to 
pesticides could favour diseases, as was shown for 
imidacloprid and Nosema) (see also Maxim and 
Van der Sluijs, 2010).
The discourse on multicausality is only apparently 
contradictory with the discourse on the risk of 
Gaucho® to honeybees. Thus, the fact that many 
factors influence honeybees all	over	the	country 
does not contradict the fact that Gaucho® posed a 
risk to honeybees in	Gaucho®-treated	extensive	
sunflower	and	maize	areas. It is obvious that some 
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causes can mainly act in some geographical areas 
and other factors can be present everywhere in 
a country. Certain factors could act at particular 
moments of the year (e.g. during the summer), 
whereas others could act throughout the year.
In choosing which factor to focus research on 
first, considerations such as feasibility, potential 
to reduce the final effects, and co‑benefits 
(e.g. reduction of social conflict) need to be taken 
into account. Investment in research, to improve 
understanding of synergistic effects between low 
doses of systemic insecticides and other factors like 
diseases, seems important for addressing losses of 
bee colonies. 
The	eight	lesson is: build	the	regulatory	
background	needed	to	protect	early-warning	
scientists. The case of Gaucho® raises questions 
about science's role in democracy and about the 
resources scientists receive from society. There are 
many critics of science but how many also address 
society's obligations towards scientists? How much 
freedom of thought and responsible action are 
science professionals institutionally given in such 
conflicting cases? How does society recognise and 
provide legal protection to early warning scientists? 
Although the impacts of pesticides are important 
and have high social relevance, generalised social 
conflict associated with this issue is likely to 
discourage scientists from working on the subject.
In the European 'knowledge society', democratic 
production of knowledge should benefit from 
institutional structures favouring scientific 
accountability (based on sound peer review 
and validation) and the freedom of scientists 
to pursue their work independently on socially 
sensitive issues. If science is to continue to inform 
decision‑making, open discussion and criticism, 
respectfully expressed, is to be encouraged. Misuse 
of scientific results to support predetermined 
conclusions, and actions that provoke anxiety and 
psychological pressure are unacceptable (see also 
Gleick, 2007). 
16�6 Conclusions and prospects
Imidacloprid seems to be a substance particularly 
'fit for the precautionary principle'. The effects 
on living beings are highly variable, both for 
honeybees (the lowest oral LD50 is 21 times lower 
than the largest LD50, a factor of 40 separates the 
lowest and largest contact LD50s and a factor of 
1 000 separates the LOECs for chronic toxicity) and 
for other organisms, for example wild bees (Tasei 
et al., 2000; Morandin and Winston, 2003; Desneux 
et al., 2007; Colla and Packer, 2008; Mommaerts 
et al., 2009). Calculated half‑lives of imidacloprid 
range from 83 days to 1–2 years. 
Imidacloprid's persistence in soil is affected 
by various factors, including temperature, soil 
composition and whether the field is cropped 
or not (Canadian Council of Ministers of the 
Environment, 2007). It is thus plausible to say 
that the risks of imidacloprid are dependent on a 
specific assembly of environmental factors, such 
as temperature, humidity and soil composition. 
Furthermore, more than one study failed to find 
a dose‑effect relationship between imidacloprid 
and chronic effects (Suchail, 2001; Schmuck, 2004). 
Given this variability, it seems likely that some of 
the effects of Gaucho® are uncontrollable. 
The present chapter focused on the social 
consequences of this diversity of ecotoxicological 
effects. It is interesting to find that a diverse 
ecotoxicological portfolio allows each stakeholder 
to identify their own 'scientific arguments' and 
use them for defending opposite positions in the 
debate. 
Declining honeybee colonies have been reported 
in several European countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Italy, Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom) and have sometimes been 
related to seed‑dressing insecticides (CARI, 
2003; Panella, 2001; Ministério da Agricultura, 
do Desenvolvimento Rural e das Pescas, 2000; 
COLOSS, 2009). The European Parliament 
has officially acknowledged the issue since 
December 2001, when a resolution dealing with 
the production and marketing of honey was 
adopted (European Parliament, 2001). It states that: 
'extremely serious damage has been caused to bee 
populations in several Member States by systemic 
insecticides with extremely long residual activity 
periods used in arable seed coatings, which have 
led to the mass poisoning of colonies.'
The precautionary principle has been applied 
in other European countries for seed‑dressing 
insecticides. Imidacloprid, clothianidin, 
thiametoxam and fipronil have been temporarily 
banned in Italy, on oilseed rape, sunflower and 
maize seed‑dressing. A research programme 
(APENET) has been started to improve 
understanding of relationships between these 
active substances and the honeybee losses found in 
this country. APENET found that after the ban, the 
number of reports of high mortality during spring 
Some emerging issues | Seed-dressing systemic insecticides and honeybees
425Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
decreased from 185 cases in 2008 to two cases 
in 2009 (Il punto coldiretti, 2009). The ministry 
decided on 14 September 2009 to extend the ban 
until 20 September 2010 (Ministero della Salute, 
2009) and then until the 30 June 2011 (Ministero 
della Salute, 2010). Italian researchers found a clear 
indication that honeybees were killed by the dust 
emitted during sowing neonicotinoid‑coated maize 
in conditions of high humidity (Marzaro et al., 
2011).
In Slovenia, clothianidin, thiametoxam and 
imidacloprid in oilseed rape and corn seed 
treatment have been successively banned, 
reapproved and then banned again between 2008 
and 2011. 
In Germany, eight insecticidal seed treatment 
products with the active substances clotianidin, 
thiametoxam and imidacloprid were temporarily 
banned on maize in May 2008 and the bans 
were renewed for February 2009 (BVL, 2009). In 
January 2011, certain formulations of the three 
active substances were suspended, whereas 
others were authorised in agricultural uses (BVL, 
2011). Germany lifted the suspensions except for 
the use of the neonicotinoid clothianidin in corn 
seed‑treatment (EPA, 2011).
Since 2006, American apiaries have reported 
'Colony Collapse Disorder', where colonies are 
suddenly lost (MAAREC, 2011). Because the 
clinical signs of disappearing adult honeybees 
recalled the clinical signs found by French 
beekeepers, the popular and scientific media — 
rightly or wrongly — drew parallels with honeybee 
colony decline in France. Clearly, before any 
conclusions are drawn, the specific characteristics 
('fingerprints') of the clinical signs and their spatial 
and temporal patterns must be properly compared. 
There is growing evidence in some European 
countries of parallel declines in pollinators and 
pollinated plants (Biesmeijer et al., 2006; Vaissière, 
2005). In some cases, such as China's Sichuan 
province (Newsweek, 2008), honeybee declines 
have forced farmers to pollinate fruit trees by hand. 
Can Europe afford this? 
Domestic honeybees are managed by humans and 
represent a source of revenues. Much less is known 
about other species. The role of the honeybee as a 
bioindicator for the state of the environment was 
highlighted during the debate in France. A study 
published in the journal Nature (The Honeybee 
Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2006) found 
that honeybees tend to respond faster than other 
insects to environmental pollution. It seems that 
the size of the major detoxifying gene families is 
smaller in the honeybee, which makes it unusually 
sensitive to certain pesticides; honeybee losses can 
be interpreted as an 'alarm bell' of harm to other 
entomofauna and indirectly to plants, birds and 
other species.
Our case study highlights the importance of 
ensuring scientists' independence (which is never 
absolute but varies significantly). Knowledge of 
risks can be limited by a number of factors: funding 
constraints, which necessitate the need for private 
sector resources; a dearth of research positions in 
toxicology and eco‑toxicology; or assessing the 
quality of the research by institutional rather than 
scientific criteria. 
Social concerns are essential to establishing a 
relevant research agenda. As pollinators, honeybees 
have an ecologic impact on the survival of plants 
in the wild. But they have important impacts on 
people, most notably the economic value of free 
pollination of many fruits and vegetables. 
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1995–1997 Bayer conducts several studies on the risk of Gaucho® for honeybees. All report absence of harm. 
Greater declines in honeybee colonies are reported. At the same time, the areas growing Gaucho® seed-dressed 
sunflower	are	also	rapidly	increasing
1997 During an important meeting with representatives of Bayer and the Ministry of Agriculture, beekeepers publicly point 
to Gaucho® as cause for observed massive honeybees' losses. 
The	first	report	of	the	Commission	for	Toxic	Products	is	published.	It	recommends	further	research
1998 The	first	research	programme	involving	publicly	funded	researchers	detects	imidacloprid	in	sunflower	nectar	and	
pollen.
RégentTS® is suspected of contributing to the clinical signs in honeybees.
On	17	December,	more	than	1	000	beekeepers	demonstrate	in	Paris,	in	front	of	the	Eiffel	Tower,	demanding	a	ban	on	
Gaucho®.	In	the	apiaries	affected,	sunflower	honey	yields	30–70	%	below	normal	potential	are	reported
1999 In January, the Ministry of Agriculture decides to ban Gaucho®	in	sunflower	seed-dressing	for	two	years,	applying	the	
precautionary principle. 
The	conflict	shifts	to	court,	as	Bayer	challenged	the	ministerial	decision	in	the	administrative	court	of	Paris	(March	
1999). The UNAF defends the Minister's decision in court
2000 In	response	to	new	scientific	findings	detecting	imidacloprid	in	maize	pollen	and	confirming	high	persistency	in	soils,	
beekeepers demand to ban imidacloprid for all uses
2002–2003 Intoxication	episodes	severely	affect	several	thousand	hives;	residues	of	fipronil	are	found	in	dead	honeybees
2004 The Minister of Agriculture temporarily bans Gaucho® in maize seed-dressing and RégentTS® for all agricultural uses
2005–2007 French beekeepers report cessation of high summer mortality. Colony recovery is gradual but winter losses vary 
annually
2009 Scientific	publication	proving	synergic	effects	between	imidacloprid	and	Nosema
2010 UNEP publishes report on global honeybee colony disorders and other threats to insect pollinators (UNEP, 2010)
2011 French/German beekeepers ask EEA to consider bees as sentinel species for their ecosystems (EEA, 2011)
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Panel 16�1 The Bayer CropScience view on Maxim and van der Sluijs 'Seed-dressing systemic  
  insecticides and honeybees  
 
Dr Richard Schmuck, Head of the Department of Environmental Safety of Bayer CropScience 
The authors' efforts to analyse the challenge for democratic governance of controversies on chemical risks 
are commendable in their aims. There are, however, shortcomings in the focus they chose. Democratic 
governance is a complex matter. It requires looking at the root causes of societal and political reactions and 
to separate them from emotional and intellectual forces involved. Moreover, policymakers are often under 
pressure to take rapid decisions: thus as long as causal patterns are far from clear, all potential ones should 
at least be addressed. 
The publication focuses on chemical governance in response to bee colony losses in France. The insecticidal 
seed treatment Gaucho® is taken a priori by the authors as THE key cause of these losses. This approach 
can not arrive at a balanced conclusion since it fades out numerous scientific papers that cover the 
multiple factors contributing to bee losses (such as bee diseases, habitat loss and with that loss of bee 
feeding-grounds, changing agro–ecosystems, including due to economic and trade reasons, or unfavourable 
climatic conditions that add stress on honey bee health). The authors also omit to consider literature 
(Rivière-Wekstein, 2006) that covers the sum of the socio-political, economic and other drivers that led to 
the suspension of Gaucho® in France. This would, however, have been an essential source when undertaking 
this research, especially in the context of governance. 
Bee losses were first attributed to imidacloprid in France during the 1990s. They were not related to specific 
product incidents. Rather the product market introduction coincided with a time when bee health issues 
had increased. Later, an accident with another neonicotionoid insecticide occurred in Germany which was 
attributed to an inappropriate quality of the seed treatment process. This was very regrettable, although 
lessons were learned and resulted in enhanced mitigation measures to prevent reoccurrence. Due to both 
these situations much research — partly pioneering new testing designs was undertaken. As a consequence 
more is known today about bee safety of the neonicotinoids. 
For some years now, the majority of researchers have highlighted the multi-factorial nature of bee colony 
losses. A series of long-term, large-scale monitoring programmes confirm these findings. They have been 
conducted in Belgium, France, Germany, the US and other countries. In these programmes, exposure to 
pesticides was measured as well as colony health and safety. None of them have found a correlation between 
colony losses and exposure to neonicotinoid seed-dressing products (Chauzat et al., 2009, 2010; Nguyen 
et al., 2009; Genersch et al., 2010).
Bayer CropScience is committed to finding solutions to enhance honeybee health, e.g. by providing Varroa 
mite management products including potential new treatments, and bee safety, e.g. by ensuring the 
sustainable use of its pesticides through research and promotion of 'bee-responsible' farming practices. 
When evaluating new pesticides (this costs about EUR 250 million per compound) prior to market release we 
follow legal requirements and the spirit of precaution in a way that is as practical and responsible as possible; 
we also acknowledge that perceptions will vary among stakeholders of what constitutes an acceptable level 
of precaution, depending on their knowledge, perspectives and interests. The positive tension between 
innovation and precaution we see, continues to drive both technological progress and the move towards 
enhanced pesticide regulation — to the benefit of agriculture, the consumer and the environment. This is 
what was generated through the Gaucho® case, especially in the context of bee safety. Suspending products 
may be helpful in some instances. It does however bear the risk of stopping innovation if it is not handled 
carefully, thus being made reversible — should new data confirm the lack of plausibility of earlier decisions.
From field observation of aphids, we were already able to deduce, before the first registration of Gaucho®, 
that bees would not be affected by systemic residues in treated sunflowers. Laboratory tests had shown 
that aphids are ten times more sensitive to Gaucho® than bees. Despite treatment of seeds with Gaucho®, 
aphids were observed in the field re-invading sunflower plants before blooming, so it was logical to conclude 
that there would no longer be effects on bees either at the time of blooming. Since its registration in the 
early 90s, Gaucho®	has	met	all	post-registration	re-evaluation	requirements	and	NO	evidence	of	a	causative	
link between Gaucho® use and bee colony losses could be found. (e.g. Faucon and Chauzat, 2008; Nguyen 
et al., 2009). In addition, large-scale monitoring programmes run under field conditions during the
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post-authorisation period confirmed the original findings of 1998 (no causative link to Gaucho®) of the ACTA 
monitoring programme (Association de Coordination Technique Agricole).
Gaucho® continues to be registered for use in sunflower crops in various countries, including Argentina, 
Australia, Bulgaria and Croatia. In none of these countries have bee colony losses been reported in 
connection with sunflower growing (Neumann and Carreck, 2010; Ivanova and Petrov, 2010; Tlak Gajger 
et al., 2010). During the years following the suspension of Gaucho® in France, bee colonies have continued 
to suffer losses (e.g. Faucon and Chauzat, 2008; AFSSA, 2009; Chauzat et al., 2010b). According to a 
statement made in November 2007 by the then French Minister of Agriculture, Michel Barnier to the National 
Assembly bee losses were also observed in regions where Gaucho® had not been applied.
We are thankful for the opportunity to share our view here with various stakeholders. Further information on 
the subject can be found in Bayer's 2011 publication on 'Honey bee care: Challenges and solutions' http://
www.bayercropscience.com/bcsweb/cropprotection.nsf/id/EN_Bee_Health_Crop_Protection_2010/$file/
Honey_bee_care.pdf. 
See the full comprehensive review, including additional references:  
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/late-lessons-2/bees-insecticides-debate.   
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Panel 16�2 Response to the Bayer Cropscience (Richard Schmuck) comments on the chapter 
Laura Maxim, Jeroen van der Sluijs
Mr Schmuck insists on how complex and uncertain things are and on how policymakers are taking 
decisions under pressure. However, the decision to ban Gaucho® was taken in France about five years 
after the first clinical signs in bees and two years after the public boom of the controversy — for sunflower. 
The corresponding delay for maize was ten, respectively seven, years. The word 'rapid' does not seem 
adequate to us for these time frames. 
Further in the text, these same policymakers (Mr Barnier) are subsequently quoted in Mr Schmuck's 
text as legitimate and reliable sources. Should one understand that policymakers 'act under pressure' 
when they apply the precautionary principle as they did in banning Gaucho®, and that they are 'good 
policymakers' when they see reality as being too complex to take a decision but actually decide to maintain 
the status quo?
The speech of Mr Barnier is, by the way, perfectly reasonable, stating that honeybees' losses are not all 
due to only one factor (indeed, nobody ever claimed that one factor causes all honeybee losses!). He also 
says that several factors influence honeybees, and that all these factors do not act at the same time and 
at the same place, which are truisms. The fact that honeybee losses can be due to Gaucho® is not at all 
contrary to the fact that honeybee losses can also be due to diseases or lack of food, just as human beings 
can die of many causes, such as car accidents, diseases or cancer. This is not an argument for not trying 
to limit car accidents or treat cancer, just as the fact that many factors can influence honeybees is not an 
argument for not dealing with Gaucho®. 
Multicausality cannot become an argument for avoiding dealing with specific causes, or for avoiding 
establishing priorities among causes and addressing them. There is clear value in prioritising those causes 
that are easier to control. For example, it is much more difficult to address climate change than to limit the 
use of a specific pesticide. 
The phrase 'The insecticidal seed treatment Gaucho® is taken a priori by the authors as THE key 
cause of these losses' is a blunt misrepresentation of our text, Mr Schmuck then arguing against this 
misrepresentation. If read carefully, our text is precise: 'In this chapter, we present the historical evolution 
of the evidence regarding the risks of Gaucho® for honeybees in sunflower and maize seed-dressing, and 
analyse	the	actions	in	response	to	the	accumulating	evidence	regarding	these	risks.'	Our	subject	is	not	
all honeybee losses, in France or in the world, in all times. We address honeybee losses 'in sunflower 
and maize areas', from the start of the controversy in 1994, to the political decisions to ban Gaucho® 
in sunflower and maize seed-dressing, in 1999 and 2004, and analyse the developments in science and 
society that ultimately lead to these decisions. As we have also specified in our chapter, 'many factors can 
play a role in the state of honeybees and pollinators more generally'. 
We disagree with Mr Schmuck that the book of Gil Rivière-Wekstein can be considered an 'essential 
source'. Its author is the director of a firm providing consultancy for companies, who has produced papers 
on diverse subjects not related to honeybees such as USA Elections 2004: eleven democrat candidates 
facing George W. Bush and Enron, the crush of an empire. 
More generally and beyond this particular reference, the length of our paper did not allow us to include 
extensive reference to several insightful and relevant books written in France on the subject of Gaucho® by 
journalists,	policymakers	or	NGOs,	including:	
•	 Cicolella,	André	and	Benoît-Browaeys,	Dorothée,	2005.	Alerts	on	health:	experts	and	citizens	face	to	
private interests (49). 
•	 Nicolino,	Fabrice	and	Veillerette,	François,	2007.	Pesticides:	revelations	about	a	French	scandal	(50).
(49) Alertes santé : experts et citoyens face aux intérêts privés.
(50) Pesticides : revelations sur un scandale français.
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  (cont�) 
Massive bee-poisoning events from dust emissions during sowing of maize coated with neonicotinoids such 
as the one in 2008 in Germany are not incidents or accidents but have continued to happen since in many 
countries. The Italian moratorium on seed dressing with neonicotinoids lead to a reduction of the number 
of such reported poisoning incidents from 185 beekeepers (6 328 hives) per year to 3 beekeepers per year, 
these 3 remaining cases could all be linked to illegal use of neonicotinoid seed dressing (APENET) (51).
The loss of 2 500 bee colonies during maize sowing in the Pomurje region in Slovenia in April 2011 
demonstrates that the prescribed mitigation measures are still insufficient (Drofenik, 2011).
A series of recent field trials by Girolami's group (Marzaro et al., 2011; Girolami et al., 2012; in press) has 
demonstrated that even when all mitigation measures are implemented such as deflectors and improved 
coatings, the pneumatic maize sowing machines still produce a ellipsoidal toxic cloud of dust particles 
of 3 meter high and 20 meter wide that is acute lethal to honeybees that cross this cloud on their flight. 
A single flight though that dust cloud showed to provide an average dose of 300 ng imidacloprid per 
honeybee.
The use of 'Gaucho®' in sunflower crops in countries such as Argentina and Australia cannot be compared 
to its previous use in France. The concentration of imidacloprid presently used in the 'Gaucho®' product 
is much lower than it was in France in the 1990s. The two situations are therefore not comparable, since 
that lower doses of imidacloprid lead to lower exposure of bees, and might have more long-term than 
short-term effects. As well, it can be hypothesised that national characteristics such as soil, climate, 
relative attractiveness of the plants for honeybees etc. could significantly influence the imidacloprid uptake 
from soils and its availability to honeybees.
It seems that Mr Schmuck used extrapolation from aphids to honeybees for being 'able to deduce, 
before the first registration of Gaucho®, that bees would not be affected by systemic residues in treated 
sunflowers'. He does not specify if this extrapolation was based on scientific publications or on some sort 
of 'expert judgment'. So we have searched in the Web of Science — Current Contents database (including 
8 500 major journals and 9 000 web sources) with the key words (in topic): aphid AND honeybee 
(variant:	honey	bee)	(+	AND	extrapolation).	Only	two	relevant	records	were	found	(Matsuda,	2009	and	
Guez, 2003), which did not exist at the time when the extrapolation had apparently been done before the 
registration of Gaucho®. These publications rather support evidence against this extrapolation.
Moreover, several important differences between honeybees and aphids raise doubts about the relevancy 
of such an extrapolation: 
•	 looking	at	aphids	behaviour	on	sunflower	plants	only	considers	short-term	effects	but	ignores	the	
long-term effects. Indeed, honeybees store pollen and nectar in the colony and can consume them 
on the long run. The honeybees could repeatedly ingest the contaminant on the long term, leading to 
chronic effects. 
•	 different	ages	of	individuals	in	a	honeybee	colony	vary	in	their	sensitivity	to	insecticides.	Even	if	
foragers (collecting pollen and nectar in the fields) are not affected, other honeybees in the colony 
could be intoxicated (nurses, larvae) 
•	 all	the	aspects	related	to	the	complex	social	organisation	of	honeybees	are	missing	in	aphids
•	 observing	aphids	cannot	account	for	synergic	effects	of	neonicotinoids	on	the	honeybees	colonies,	as	
those highlighted by Cummins (2007), Alaux et al. (2009), Videau et al. (2011) and Pettis et al. (2012) 
for imidacloprid and the pathogen Nosema. 
We are astonished that the effects in aphids were assumed to be similar to the effects in honeybees. Such 
extrapolative assumption would indicate lack of selectivity of imidacloprid on target and non-target species 
and should have, on the contrary, raised worries about the potential effects on honeybees.
(51) http://www.bijensterfte.nl/sites/default/files/Piotr_Medrzycki_-_Apimondia_2009.pdf and http://pub.jki.bund.de/index.php/JKA/
article/view/146/131. 
Some emerging issues | Seed-dressing systemic insecticides and honeybees
437Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Panel 16�2 Response to the Bayer Cropscience (Richard Schmuck) comments on the chapter  
  (cont�)
Several other sources cited by Mr Schmuck merit consideration. First, it is normal that different signs 
and potential causes will be identified depending on the protocol used and the specific situation studied. 
Ivanova and Petrov (2010) and Tlak Gajger et al. (2010) employed surveys that did not address summer 
mortalities but winter colony losses. In both papers, the causal investigation used only beekeepers' 
opinions but did not undertake chemical analysis. The Bulgarian survey looked at 1.3 % of beekeepers, 
the	Croatian	one	at	3.6	%.	One	of	the	two	papers,	Ivanova	and	Petrov	(2010),	refers	to	sunflower,	
mentioning: 'untypical behaviour of honeybees in some regions of north Bulgaria manifested by avoiding 
flowering sunflower was also reported'. No indication is given about how this behaviour had been 
measured or observed, for example whether it was apparent in diminishing sunflower honey production 
or behavioural signs. The paper mentions that 'the problem appeared to be more serious for areas 
with cultivated fields and grasslands due to crop protection activities, such as the north-central and 
north-eastern parts of Bulgaria….'
Neumann and Carreck (2010) is another undue reference for addressing honeybees' intoxication on 
sunflower crops, as sunflower is not referred to at all. The paper notes, however, that 'These interactions 
are particularly worrying, as sub-lethal effects of one driver could make another one more lethal; for 
example a combination of pesticides and pathogens' (p. 3). 
Another paper by Bacandritsos et al. (2010), which was not cited in Mr Schmuck's response, refers to 
summer losses in Greece. This paper reports results of chemical analysis of honeybee tissues showing 
that 60 % of the samples analysed contained imidacloprid, in an average concentration of 27 ng/g 
tissue. A high level of virus and N. ceranae infection accompanied this contamination. Also, the study by 
Krupke et al. (2012) shows a link between clothianidin coated maize and bee mortality in spring in the 
same area.
Some of the authors quoted by Mr Schmuck have recently published papers on pesticide loads in 
France (Chauzat et al., 2010). Imidacloprid was found to be widely available to honeybees. The average 
levels of imidacloprid found in pollen is 0.9 ppb (with a maximum of 5.7 ppb). These results are in line 
with results published four years earlier by Chauzat et al. (2006), who found that the most frequently 
found pesticide residue was imidacloprid (identified in 49.4 % of the samples), followed by one of its 
metabolites, 6-chloronicotinic acid (in 44.4 % of the samples). At least one of these two molecules was 
present in 69 % of the samples. Statistical tests also showed no variance in concentrations between 
sampling locations, meaning that imidacloprid is present everywhere in the 5 sites considered, and that 
it is present in pollen loads throughout the year, with a maximum presence during July–August but 
comparable concentrations during spring and autumn. 
The presence of imidacloprid in pollens all through the year, even long after the treatment moment, 
shows that honeybees are exposed all through the year, and not only during the agricultural season. 
This could also be an indication that imidacloprid is so persistent that it might be uptaken in non-treated 
crops or wild plants. Indeed, imidacloprid is currently banned in France for seed-dressing of sunflower 
and maize but it is still used in seed-dressing for sugar beet, wheat and barley. It is also authorised to 
treat fruit trees such as apricot, peach, pear, quince, apple and plum trees, in products for disinfecting 
storage facilities, shelters for domestic animals etc. 
In conclusion, our chapter responds to one of the main objectives of the present report, which is to 
describe and analyse cases of application of the precautionary principle and reflect on what can be 
learned from these cases. The partial French ban of Gaucho® in sunflower and maize seed-dressing is 
one such explicit application of the precautionary principle.
See the full answer at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/late-lessons-2/bees-insecticides-debate.
Some emerging issues | Seed-dressing systemic insecticides and honeybees
438 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Panel 16�2 Response to the Bayer Cropscience (Richard Schmuck) comments on the chapter  
  (cont�)
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Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Jacqueline McGlade and Sybille van den Hove
17 Ecosystems and managing the 
dynamics of change
  
A decade after Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was published, describing the toxic legacy 
of the twentieth century, Annie Dillard in her Pulitzer prize winning book Pilgrim at Tinker 
Creek, opened up a different way of looking at the world. It presaged a twenty first century 
in which the global economy would be based on a more thorough understanding of nature, 
its functioning and material wealth. Wholly descriptive, yet increasingly relevant, her book 
captured the very essence of what this chapter is about: that amongst the observations which 
routinely help to predict the evolution of the natural world are the seeds of surprise — surprise 
of	the	unusual	and	surprise	as	a	portent	of	future	change.	Our	systemic	failure	to	anticipate	
such surprises forms the core of this chapter. A series of case studies from fisheries, forests, 
savannah and aquatic systems are used to underline how early warnings about changes in 
these natural systems emerged but were not used. 
The chapter highlights how the division of knowledge into political, disciplinary and geographic 
silos has led to the 'recurring nightmares' of short-term interests outcompeting long-term 
vision; situations where competition replaces co-operation; fragmentation of values and 
interest; fragmentation of authority and responsibility; and fragmentation of information and 
knowledge leading to inadequate solutions or even additional problems. In addition, the lack 
of institutional fit has often confounded the effectiveness of the stewardship of ecosystem 
services, and led to unexpected surprises, excessive rent seeking and high transaction costs. 
Using counterfactual thinking (i.e. the dependence of whether, when and how one event occurs 
on whether, when and how another event occurs and the possible alteration of events), built 
around the four interconnected concepts of planetary boundaries, tipping points, panarchy 
and resilience, the chapter provides an analytical lens through which to explore why many 
of the warning signals were not seen. The chapter concludes by suggesting why ecosystems 
are likely to be even more at risk in the future and why we will need to observe and interpret 
the dynamics of both nature and institutions ever more closely if we are to avoid sudden 
irreversible ecological changes.
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17�1 Introduction
'The road we have been traveling is 
deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway on 
which we progress with great speed, but at 
its end lies disaster. The other fork of the road 
— the one 'less travelled by' — offers our last, 
our only chance to reach a destination that 
assures the preservation of our earth' (Carson, 
1962).
A decade after Rachel Carson called the world's 
attention to the dangers of industrial chemicals 
in her book Silent Spring (Carson, 1962), another 
writer, Annie Dillard (1974) took her readers on 
a yearlong investigation into nature's beauty and 
complexity in her Pulitzer prize winning story 
Pilgrim at Tinker Creek. Quintessentially descriptive, 
the book shows how close observation of nature 
and its inherent surprises — both of the unusual 
and as a portent of things to come — is vital for 
achieving an understanding of the resilience of 
ecosystems and the resources within them. Charles 
Keeling, dubbed the father of climate change 
science, followed this same approach throughout 
his lifetime's work on measuring the levels of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Detailed observation of past forms of nature 
is also vital for anticipating surprises. As 
R. G. Collingwood (1939) argued in his 
autobiography, history provides something 
'altogether different from [scientific] rules, 
namely insight'. The historian is like a woodsman 
compared to an ignorant traveller who might say 
'Nothing here but trees and grass' whereas the 
woodsman says 'Look, there is a tiger in that grass'. 
Memory is also an important element in 
determining current ecosystem structure and 
function (Hendry and McGlade, 1995). For 
example, the history and age of an individual tree 
determine its susceptibility to physiological shock, 
native disease and parasites; this generally rises 
with age, leading to an increased probability of 
accelerated death in elderly stands. However, the 
history of each position within a forest also has 
an influences on the current stand, as the state 
of the soil, the height of the water table, the level 
of nutrients are affected by the species that have 
grown there over previous centuries.
By combining insights such as these with 
detailed observations from comparative analyses 
of ecosystems and heuristics from the natural 
and social sciences, scientists have begun to 
build a more general theory of the dynamics of 
socio‑ecological change across a broad range of 
ecosystems (Walker et al., 2006); they include 
lakes and wetlands (Carpenter and Brock, 2004), 
rangelands (Janssen et al., 2004), forests (Bodin 
et al., 2006) and coral reefs (Hughes et al., 2003). 
These developments have also highlighted 
just how limited many more classical scientific 
approaches really are for dealing with real‑world 
situations (i.e. developing hypotheses and testing 
them with simple causal models validated with 
controlled experiments or statistical sampling). As 
the case studies in this chapter show, the continued 
dependence of many resource managers on these 
more traditional approaches has contributed to the 
catastrophic decline of some resources.
The chapter looks at how scientific evidence 
and advice are generated and used in policies 
for managing natural resources and ecosystems. 
Through case studies of key events, resources, 
important actors and institutions and the 
lens of planetary dynamics and resilience of 
socio‑ecological systems, the chapter explores the 
reasons why the evidence was sometimes flawed, 
how and why scientific advice influenced or was 
ignored during the process of decision‑making, 
and looks at some prospects for the future. 
17�2 Data, knowledge and 
counterfactual thinking
Field ecologists have traditionally adopted a 
diversity‑oriented approach to gathering data 
and creating knowledge. Their assessments 
are often based on detailed case studies using 
measurements of many system‑specific attributes 
with configurational complexity (McGlade, 2003). 
Conversely, resource managers, have historically 
adopted a variable‑oriented approach based on 
the measurement of a small number of attributes 
relating to global patterns emerging from surveys 
of a large number of cases. The two approaches 
represent the ends of an inverse relationship 
between the number of cases and variables. 
They represent a fundamentally different way 
of developing counterfactual thinking (i.e. the 
dependence of whether, when and how one event 
occurs on whether, when and how another event 
occurs and the possible alteration of events) 
and their misapplication has contributed to the 
catastrophic demise of some the world's key 
ecosystems and resources.
This section contains two case studies(Box 17.1 
and Panel 17.1): the first demonstrates how a 
well‑structured diversity‑oriented approach, using 
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close observation at carefully selected sites and 
correct counterfactual thinking, produced a data 
series which influenced the global community's 
thinking about climate change. In contrast, the 
second shows how a variable‑oriented approach 
based on flawed counterfactual thinking and a 
poorly described polythetic scheme, led to the 
catastrophic demise of an international fishery. 
This second case study shows how false inferences 
were used to suppress early warnings leading to 
an unanticipated, sudden collapse and irreversible 
demise and highlights how ill‑suited the models and 
observations were in relation to the complexity of 
the socio‑ecological system; and the consequences 
of separating knowledge about the resource into 
disciplinary, community and geographic silos. 
17.2.1 Complex causality and configurations — 
context matters
The diversity‑oriented approach uses information 
about cross‑scale interconnections amongst 
many parts of the system to produce a detailed 
representation of a particular ecosystem. Causation 
is viewed as conjunctural, or combinatorial and 
heterogeneous and there is no assumption that 
the same causal factors operate in the same way in 
all contexts or in all instances. Diversity‑oriented 
analyses tend not to provide insights into causal 
generalisations, but rather into the validity 
of specific processes. This approach builds 
links between the detail of specific ecosystem 
analyses and the broad view of ecology via an 
understanding of complex causality and the 
identification of specific necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a particular set of interactions to 
influence the overall system (Hogg et al., 1989). It 
works best when causation is complex, where no 
single condition is either necessary or sufficient 
or when causes are sufficient only in combination. 
Identification of the necessary conditions for 
change and their detection are extremely important 
steps in ecosystem assessment and can have very 
powerful policy implications.
Few variable‑oriented studies are framed in such 
terms. Instead, the variable‑oriented approach 
takes a small number of dependent variables across 
many instances in order to identify a parsimonious 
set of causal variables. Causation is dealt with 
through simplifying assumptions about chains 
of association between independent variables, 
reflecting the inferential framework of many 
resource managers. The theoretical basis is an 
additive linear model, which relies on the fact that 
it is possible to assess the independent effect of 
each causal variable, net of the effects of all others. 
The assumption is that for a particular outcome, 
the necessary conditions need only be presence or 
absence. 
Typically, variable‑oriented analyses focus 
on statistical similarities and differences and 
inductively derive a small number of groupings 
where within‑group differences are minimised 
and between‑group differences maximised. These 
schemes are polythetic, i.e. the cases that are 
grouped together can differ substantially from each 
other for one or more attribute as long as they are 
similar for the majority of attributes selected by 
the researcher. By contrast in diversity‑oriented 
analyses, context matters and cases are examined 
as configurations in which as many as possible 
relevant aspects as possible are looked at in the 
form of combinations. Such analyses concentrate 
on the specific features of individual cases, 
identifying those that are most relevant, whilst 
considering how those features cohere with each 
other as distinct types. 
Polythetic schemes, typical of the variable‑oriented 
approach widely used in resource management, 
violate the core principles of the configurational 
or diversity‑oriented approach used for studying 
resilience and the dynamics of socio‑ecological 
systems. The question is whether the approach 
adopted can make a difference in terms of being 
able to better understand or anticipate surprises 
and change. 
A good example of a configurational, diversity‑
oriented approach with strong counterfactual 
thinking is the work of the climate scientist, Charles 
Keeling (Box 17.1). Whilst there are some sceptics 
who maintain that the cause of global warming 
is evidenced in measurements of solar radiative 
output, the vast majority of policymakers and 
scientists now agree that the root cause, i.e. human 
activity, can be seen in the measurements of carbon 
dioxide. To a large extent, this view is the result 
of the Keeling's work. Having built up a picture 
of the causal linkages between greenhouse gas 
emissions and human activities, he carefully chose 
sites where he then took precise measurements of 
carbon dioxide at rapid intervals over more than 
four decades. What he was able to show was the 
inexorable increase in CO2 over that time. The 
Keeling Curve (see Figure 14.1) is now one of least 
disputed pieces of evidence of climate change. 
Keeling adhered to the idea that close observation 
of a natural phenomenon — the 'breathing of the 
planet' — was an essential part of understanding 
the dynamics of global changing. 
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Box 17�1 The Keeling Curve — how close observation revealed the secret of climate change
Fifty-five years ago, the young American scientist Charles Keeling began one of the most important projects 
in the study of climate change, recording in immense detail the changing levels of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. Staring out in January 1958, Keeling set up his equipment on the northern slope of world's largest 
volcano, Mauna Loa and started a lifelong experiment that would change our view of humans on the planet. 
The real story had begun much earlier, when Keeling was only 27, and had told colleagues that all the existing 
measurements of carbon dioxide were wrong or misleading. Recognising that no one else was really interested 
in taking consistent, continuous measurements of the levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, he decided 
to take on the task himself. He had studied chemistry, but his great love was being close to nature. So he 
jumped at the chance to combine these two passions in a post at the California Institute of Technology.
Keeling	had	by	then	developed	his	own	protocols	and	started	taking	measurements	of	CO2 every three hours 
in different areas, including the roof of Caltech. He did not mind that it was not the most exciting science; 
collecting samples gave him the chance to do what he loved — packing up his car and family and heading off 
into the wilderness, camping in forests and national parks, far away from any urban areas.
He kept meticulous records of all his measurements in a series of notebooks, and it was from these that he 
got his first clue as to how carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was changing — work that would later see him 
dubbed 'the father of climate change science'. 
Scientists	already	knew	that	CO2 levels fluctuated according to the seasons and location, but they did not know 
why or whether there was a global base level. Keeling wanted to use his new measuring techniques to find out 
if there was. He and colleagues began getting measurements from carefully selected sites all around the world, 
including Antarctica, with the intention of making comparisons between them. 
What	Keeling	understood	from	his	own	counterfactual	thinking	was	that	the	measurement	of	CO2 in the 
atmosphere was vital to the development of an understanding of humanity's effects on the planet. He also 
realised that persistence and attention to detail were essential to the success of the experiment, so whilst 
other scientists might have moved on to discover new phenomena, Keeling decided that he could not give up 
— he had to stay with it. In this sense, the science itself forced him to behave unusually as a scientist
By	1956	he	had	accepted	a	post	at	the	Scripps	Institute	of	Oceanography;	realising	that	he	needed	to	measure	
CO2 over the course of years not months he knew had to find the ideal spot to run the experiment. The site he 
chose was a former US military site on the slopes of the world's largest volcano Mauna Loa in Hawaii. In the 
middle	of	a	huge	ocean,	it	was	away	from	contamination	and	any	sources	of	CO2 which would have interfered 
with the measurements. Given that Keeling had to pick an initial site to represent the whole of the world, 
Mauna Loa observatory was probably the best choice he could have made.
In	this	ideal	environment	Keeling	started	his	project,	taking	samples	of	air	and	making	CO2 measurements for 
the next 40 years. Each day he would venture outside and, after holding his breath, fill a specially designed 
flask with the incoming ocean breeze. The air would be taken back to the lab to measure its carbon dioxide 
content.
The result was one of the most famous graphs in science, and would become known as the Keeling Curve. It 
showed a jagged edge with an amazing regularity and a steep relentless rise of carbon dioxide in the Earth's 
atmosphere, showing the world's inability to absorb the excess carbon dioxide that human activities were 
producing. 
Placing a temperature curve on top of this curve gave Keeling the foreboding in the 1970s of what was to 
come. The clean curve of the increase in carbon dioxide spoke to the magnitude of the forces at work, and a 
picture of all of humanity's exhausts superimposed on the 'breathing' of the planet. 
What Keeling discovered is one of the few undisputed pieces of evidence in climate science. Several times he 
faced cuts to his funding, but always found ways to carry on. His analyser, which was installed in March 1958, 
collected carbon dioxide data in its original configuration until it was decommissioned in January 2006; even 
the original strip chart recorder operated from 1958 until 2006. Charles Keeling died in 2004 and today his son 
Ralph continues the work. 
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17.2.2 A tale of two cods
The widespread use of variable‑oriented approaches 
in resource management has thrown up a number 
of problems, especially a general lack of anticipation 
about sudden collapses. In fisheries, a simple 
equilibrium model became paradigmatic during the 
1960s; it was based on determining the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) under different extraction 
rates and constant rates of birth, growth and death. 
The model was related to the larger literature of 
optimal control techniques and the calculus of 
variations, which had been successfully applied 
in theoretical physics, aeronautics, chemistry and 
management (Hotelling, 1931; Pontryagin et al., 
1962), and then spread to economics and resource 
policy (Dasgupta, 1982; Clark and Kirkwood, 1986). 
Concerns were raised by some about the utility of 
MSY models (Larkin, 1977), but these early warning 
signals were ignored. 
It was only when the northern cod (Gadus morhua) 
off Newfoundland collapsed in 1986 (Panel 17.1) that 
questions began to be raised about its effectiveness. 
The story of what happened in Newfoundland 
exposed fundamental flaws in the inferences being 
made about why the cod population was decreasing, 
about the roles of the scientists and fishermen in 
the collection of data, the development of advice 
and the delays in actions taken by the government. 
However, the comparison with what happened 
in Norway is just as interesting. The immediate 
reaction by the Norwegian government to the 
collapse of the Barents Sea cod was to impose a 
moratorium and to invest in more research. The 
outcomes of the two government actions could not 
have been made clearer when three years later the 
Barents Sea cod spawning biomass was bigger than 
it had been in twenty‑five years, whilst the potential 
collapse of Canadian fish stock was still being 
covered up.
What is also interesting from the perspective 
of Late Lessons was the reaction by Norway's 
Fisheries Minister, Oddrum Pettersen, who said 
that although the warning signs were there, the 
knowledge to understand them was missing. As a 
consequence the government took precautionary 
actions through the moratorium and invested 
in research to increase knowledge about the 
linkages between species of fish, especially cod 
and capelin, and mammals in the Barents Sea. 
This led Norwegian scientists to develop new 
counterfactual thinking about the collapse of the 
cod stock. They believed that the large year‑classes 
of two and three‑year old cod had eaten over 
a million tonnes of capelin at the same time as 
there was overfishing of the same capelin stock. 
The result was a sudden collapse of the capelin, 
which led to the cod eating each other; the seal 
population, which fed on capelin, also turned to 
feeding on cod. At the same time a change in ocean 
temperatures triggered collapses in stocks in the 
coastal waters of Russia, Iceland, Sweden, Finland 
and the Faeroes and Lofoten islands.
Meanwhile in Canada, the government scientists 
insisted that there was no proven connection 
between fishing on spawning stocks and the 
survival of the 0‑year class. Senior officials 
maintained that there was no evidence that fishing 
on spawning grounds in any way harmed the 
stock. In Norway such fishing was banned on 
the basis that although it was difficult to find the 
relation between recruitment and spawning stock, 
the scientists were convinced that there was such a 
relation. The Norwegians had understood that no 
evidence of harm is not the same as evidence of no 
harm.
17.2.3 Post moratorium
What lessons can be learnt from the demise of 
the northern cod, especially as the majority of the 
world's commercial fisheries are over‑exploited and 
many resources are managed using similar models 
and approaches? 
Fisheries management is like a black‑box; it is 
very difficult to see how things are calculated 
or how things work. In the case of the Canadian 
moratorium, the Minister of Fisheries, John Crosbie, 
blamed the collapse on three main factors: 
•	 overestimation	of	the	stock	leading	to	the	setting	
of total allowable catches that were too high; 
•	 foreign	overfishing;	
•	 devastating	ecological	factors.	
The effects of ecological factors became myth‑like, 
but in fact as Finlayson and McCay (1998) point out, 
there were some very obvious problems with these 
assertions which showed that the counterfactual 
thinking behind the assessment was deeply flawed. 
First of all the stock was treated as one unit 
whereas it was known to be comprised of distinct 
populations with different migratory behaviour 
and patterns; not including this variability may 
have contributed to the overestimation of biomass 
(deYoung and Rose, 1993; Finlayson, 1994).
Some emerging issues |  Ecosystems and managing the dynamics of change
444 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Panel 17�1 The last hunters
Jacqueline McGlade
A view from inside
In	1980,	as	a	newly	recruited	scientist	in	the	Department	of	Fisheries	and	Oceans	(DFO),	in	the	Canadian	
federal government, I was given the responsibility for assessing the size of the stocks of pollock (Pollachius 
virens) off the eastern coast of Canada and determining the size of the quotas. Pollock was one of the 
less	valuable	stocks,	but	nevertheless	thousands	of	tonnes	were	landed	each	year.	At	the	time,	DFO	was	
the largest employer of biologists in the public service and the second largest of research scientists and 
technicians; it was heavily decentralised with more than 2 200 personnel and nearly one third of the 
departmental budget. When the 200 nautical mile limit was declared, the offshore area accounted for one 
third of Canada's territory.
My task involved estimating the size of the spawning biomass, determining the distribution of potential 
yield in terms of catch per unit of effort by all the fleets across all age-classes. I was given a small team, 
a computer, historical data sets and a model, derived from the equilibrium model of Beverton and Holt, 
known as a Virtual Population Model, plus a few weeks of ship-time on a research vessel in the middle of 
the winter to complete the annual recruitment survey, an inshore programme for tagging juveniles and 
a genetics laboratory to determine stock structures. Estimates of catches and effort from the dockside 
and	fleets	would	arrive	at	the	Bedford	Institute	of	Oceanography	in	Nova	Scotia	and	we	would	quality	
check the data, enter the various numbers, and eventually age-biomass tables would be calculated and 
graphs produced for different levels of fishing mortality: the target of choice was F0.1. — the level of fishing 
mortality at which the increase in yield to be obtained by adding one unit of fishing effort is 10 % of the 
increase in yield to be obtained by adding one unit to a lightly exploited stock. 
When we went out tagging, we would talk to the fishermen about what they were observing but this was 
not	a	common	practice,	nor	was	it	a	regular	part	of	the	assessment	for	most	of	the	stocks.	Once	a	year,	
the scientists from the department responsible for groundfish would meet under the auspices of CAFSAC 
(Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee) and go over the analyses for each stock to 
set annual predictions of stock abundance on which to establish the total annual allowable catches and 
harvesting rules. I used to say that you had to leave your ego at the door, because you would often be 
sent out again and again to redo the analysis using new combinations of recruitment, fishing effort and 
mortality rates: this was the reason why it was called 'tuning'. 
My colleagues had similar experiences to me, but there was always the worry especially with some of the 
more valuable stocks that the models were too simple to capture the complexity of the real-life situation 
and the mechanics of running them on the available computers were not straightforward. There was also 
the issue of the quality of the data: they were often out of date and even though we had an observer 
programme to check what was going on at sea, there was no guarantee that the fishermen were accurately 
recording the locations or the size of their catches. Successive ministers would say that science was the 
foundation of everything, and that fisheries management required a sound knowledge of the fish stocks.
Canada's northern cod
Many official reports, articles and books have been written about the collapse of the northern cod (Gadus 
morhua) in the 1980s (see especially Finlayson, 1994; Harris, 1998, Steele et al., 1992). The question is: 
why,	with	such	open	support	and	well	funded	research,	did	DFO	scientists	not	anticipate	the	problem?
From the fisherman's perspective, there were signs in the 1980s that the condition of the inshore cod was 
deteriorating. The industry asked Memorial University biologists to review the1986 cod assessment for 
Newfoundland	waters.	Their	conclusion	was	that	the	DFO	assessment	had	seriously	overestimated	the	size	
of the stock. The authors also postulated a connection between the large offshore landings and the poor 
inshore catches. The surprise was that they had used the same data and come out with startlingly different 
conclusions. 
In the 1986 CAFSAC Advisory Document there were inconsistencies between the projected increases in 
biomass and the fact that the total allowable catches had been at least twice as high as they should have 
been over the previous eight years. The document suggested that something was very wrong. When 
the research survey results came in, pointing to an enormous abundance of cod, scientists should have 
realised that there was no biological means for the stock to have increased as much when there were still 
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Panel 17�1 The last hunters (cont�)
so few fish inshore. There was, however, one potential explanation for the increase: in the 1960s, another 
biologist Wilfrid Templeman had warned that if the dense schools of cod which gathered to spawn in the 
deep warmer waters were overfished, they would continue to concentrate but in a smaller areas. Thus 
catch	rates	might	continue	to	increase	even	as	the	stock	was	collapsing.	Unfortunately,	DFO	accepted	the	
data as they stood.
The next year, in 1987, another external panel of experts was commissioned to write a report on the cod; 
this	time	they	were	given	access	to	the	DFO	data	and	also	looked	at	the	anecdotal	evidence	of	fishermen.	
The	report	concluded	that	DFO	had	got	its	figures	tragically	wrong	(Alverson,	1987).	The	Chairman,	
Lee Alverson said that the problem had been caused by errors in interpretation of some of the survey 
information, compounded by a reliance on a faulty mathematical model. He said that the error had been 
magnified because it had taken several years to find and admit to the problem and by then the stock 
was already on a downturn. When asked who was to blame he pointed to the government who owned 
and managed the resource on behalf of all Canadians and were reticent in making effective and timely 
decisions.	He	also	pointed	out	how	little	the	DFO	scientists	knew	about	the	biology	of	the	species	and	the	
ecosystem in which it lived.
It	was	at	this	point	that	the	DFO	scientists	came	up	with	the	idea	that	the	absent	cod	inshore	were	trapped	
in warmer water, avoiding the cold intermediate layer, rather than being fished out. 
Alverson's report was the first time that the government's concerns about the health of the stock were 
made	public,	yet	the	politicians	and	senior	staff	in	Ottawa	remained	convinced	that	the	ocean	would	
continue to provide fish and raised the allowable catch level for 1988. This was a clear indication that any 
concerns about the health of the stock were put far behind socio-economic considerations.
In	December	1988,	DFO	scientists	in	a	dramatic	reversal	of	advice	proposed	a	fifty	per	cent	cut	in	the	
quota for 1989.The Federal and Newfoundland Ministers knew that this would lead to thousands being 
out of work and bankruptcies everywhere. They decided that the consequences would be too devastating, 
supporting their decision by saying that the scientists had been wrong before. Moreover, there was 
resistance	amongst	some	senior	DFO	scientists	to	admit	that	any	mistakes	had	been	made.	The	assistant	
deputy minister later published the official line: 'It appeared that the sudden, unexpected decline in 
northern cod during 1991 was the result not of high fishing mortality, but rather abnormal environmental 
conditions … which, through mechanisms not yet understood, may have led to an abrupt increase in 
natural mortality in the early 1980s' (Parsons, 1993).
Despite the increasing evidence that the unthinkable was happening to the cod stock, the politicians asked 
for more evidence. In 1989 the Northern Cod Review Panel, led by Leslie Harris, began its work. Meanwhile 
the inshore fishermen took the federal government to court to stop destructive fishing practices on the 
spawning	grounds.	They	lost	and	DFO	officials	maintained	the	line	that	there	was	no	evidence	that	fishing	
on	spawning	grounds	in	any	way	harmed	the	stock.	By	now	Ottawa	was	already	subsidising	Newfoundland	
to the level of 2.56 billion Canadian dollars (CAD). The release of the Harris report in 1990 showed how 
dire the situation had become: it concluded that the reduction in quotas in 1990 would not enough to 
reverse the trend of a declining spawning stock but would rather contribute to a further decline (Harris, 
1990). 
On	the	point	of	how	had	the	collapse	come	about,	Harris	pointed	to	the	disastrous	advice	given	to	
managers	and	politicians	by	the	DFO	scientific	branch.	He	stated	that	the	scientists	'lulled	by	false	data	
signals and, to some extent, overconfident of the validity of their predictions, failed to recognise the 
statistical inadequacies in their bulk biomass model and failed to properly acknowledge and recognise the 
high risk involved with state-of-stock advice based on relatively short and unreliable data series … it is 
possible that if there had not been such a strong emotional and intellectual commitment to the notion that 
the F0.1 strategy was working, the open and increasing scepticism of inshore fishermen might have been 
recognised as a warning flag demanding more careful attention to areas of recognised weakness in the 
assessment process' (Harris, 1990). 
Harris	recommended	that	the	assessments	be	peer	reviewed	by	those	not	involved	in	DFO.	He	warned	that	
the models had become more important than the study of the species themselves; he said that what was 
needed	was	nothing	short	of	a	massive	research	effort	to	understand	the	life	in	the	oceans.	Ottawa	
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Panel 17�1  Case study: The last hunters (cont�)
accepted nearly all the recommendations made by Harris, but reducing the total allowable catch on cod 
was not approved. In 1992 the minister closed the northern cod fishery, saying it had collapsed due to 
unusual ecological and environmental conditions.
The collapse of the northern cod stock was one of the most catastrophic failures in fisheries and an 
ecological disaster. The social and economic consequences have been enormous and many communities 
remain	devastated.	DFO	now	admits	that	it	had	evidence	as	early	as	1986	and	that	'the	model	used	to	
determine the status of most of the key groundfish stocks has consistently overstated their abundance and 
understated the level of mortality' (Auditor General of Canada 1997).
Barents Sea cod
Meanwhile	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic	Ocean,	in	Norway,	the1989	autumn	survey	results	showed	that	
cod stocks in the Barents Sea were at their lowest for over a hundred years. Scientists and fishermen had 
already been worried that the fish were too small and earlier estimates of abundance too high. Cod quotas 
were slashed and the capelin fishery also closed. Fishermen warned that the fish they were catching 
appeared to be starving. 'When scientists told the Norwegian politicians that there had to be severe quota 
cuts, the politicians acted immediately and backed the cuts despite a firestorm of criticism from their 
constituents.	Oslo	also	immediately	implemented	policies	to	reduce	the	number	of	cod	fishermen	and	
vessels' (Harris, 1998).
In January 1990 the government imposed a moratorium. Fishermen's incomes dropped by up to 40 per 
cent and in the end the Norwegian government spent more than EUR 50 million to remove capacity from 
the fleet. However, the prompt action by the government meant that by 1991 signs of a recovery were 
seen and in 1992 the spawning biomass of the stock was larger than it had been for 25 years. 
Second, key variables, such as recruitment and 
natural mortality, were treated as constants in the 
models used. This in combination with problems 
in the periods used to derive averages used to 
generate the constants also resulted in overestimates 
(Finlayson, 1994). 
Thirdly, data from the fishing industry used in stock 
assessments, in combination with research vessel 
survey data, were seriously distorted by the practice 
of discarding undersized fish. There was also a 
bias towards the use of offshore versus inshore 
landings as an index of abundance to 'tune' the stock 
assessment model. Inshore fisheries landings were 
not systematically used in the assessments because 
of difficulties obtaining consistent measures of 
'catch per unit effort' and otherwise dealing with 
messy and often anecdotal data. Therefore evidence 
of decline in the abundance and size of inshore 
migrating fish was apparently missed (Steele et al., 
1992; Neis, 1992), contributing to DFO's inclination 
to dismiss the concerns of inshore fishers. 
Why was the research on basic cod biology not being 
carried out? One obvious reason was the career 
structure of fisheries scientists who were assessed 
on their publications in peer reviewed journals. The 
number of papers published on northern cod, one 
of the most important resources in eastern Canada 
fell from more than 10 per year to 2 annually over 
a twenty year period, in contrast to the increase 
in papers seen in the Norwegian setting, where 
research was being actively encouraged.
Another problem however was the hubris amongst 
senior government officials in denying that there 
was anything wrong. This was a projection of the 
government's own crisis around its institutional 
authority and epistemological legitimacy. For 
example, in the February 1988 issues of Fo'c'sle, 
aimed at fishermen and the general public, the DFO 
Newfoundland office published an article entitled 
'The Science of Cod'. In the introductory statement the 
Director General says: 
'It is reassuring that the conclusions of the 
Task Group [the Alverson Report, 1987] and 
CAFSAC about northern cod are quite similar 
with respect to the present stock size and the 
causes for the decline in the inshore fishery 
since 1982. The credibility of DFO scientific 
advice was not questioned. The northern cod 
stock continues to increase, but perhaps not as 
fast as projected several years ago'.
Finlayson and McCay (1998) also asked why it was 
that scientists who knew or suspected that there 
were problems with the stock assessment did not 
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Table 17�1 Pedigree of knowledge
Pedigree Theoretical paradigm Data Peer acceptance Colleague consensus
4 Established Experimental Total All but cranks
3 Theoretical model Historical/field High All but rebels
2 Computer model Calculated Low Competing schools
1 Statistical procedures Educated guess Low Embryonic	field
0 Definitions Random guess None No opinion
∞ Unknown unknowns Unknown Unknown Unknown
Source:  McGlade, 2002.
speak up. It is clear from the inside that some DFO 
scientists had misgivings about the quality of the 
scientific advice given about cod, but as in any civil 
service they were not allowed to speak publicly 
about the issues once it had become policy. It was 
also the case, however, that many assessment 
scientists had little contact with the fishing industry 
or actual fish, dealing rather with 'paper fish'. 
There was also a tendency when scientists were 
presenting their assessments to the relevant advisory 
body that they would minimise the problems 
associated with data reliability, uncertainty, the 
models and data‑sets, issues of stock structures 
or even admitting to the possibility of unknown 
unknowns! (1). 
17.2.4 Knowledge systems
The fisheries case studies serve to underline the 
fact that simple variable‑oriented analyses are no 
match for the complexity of real socio‑ecological 
systems. So why have these approaches not been 
replaced, especially given that it has long been 
recognised that the majority of the world's fisheries 
are over‑exploited (Pauly et al., 2002; FAO, 2010)? 
One reason is perhaps the lack of consensus about 
which approaches could replace them in order 
to understand complex systems and manage 
resources more effectively. This partly stems from 
the low pedigree of knowledge about the causality 
linking many of the processes and elements in 
socio‑ecological systems (Table 17.1).
The division of knowledge into political, 
disciplinary and geographic silos can lead to 
Yaffee's (1997) 'recurring nightmares' of short‑term 
interests outcompeting long‑term vision; situations 
where competition replaces co‑operation because 
(1)  This phrase, cited by many military experts, was made infamous by Donald Rumsfeld (2002) in his press briefing on weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq, where he said '[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known 
unknowns; that is to say there are things that, we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns — there are 
things we do not know we don't know.' 12 February 2002.
of conflicts in management; fragmentation of 
values and interest; fragmentation of authority and 
responsibility; and fragmentation of information 
and knowledge leading to inadequate solutions or 
even additional problems. In situations where strong 
counterfactual thinking is needed, for example in 
developing early warnings, the presence of silos of 
knowledge can become a real hindrance.
The fact that ecosystem and resource management 
is highly interdisciplinary, involving fields of 
varying states of maturity and with very different 
heuristic and social practices is also a challenge. 
Those involved in planning and policy development 
often find themselves having to use inputs from 
areas of expertise with which they are potentially 
unfamiliar, making it difficult to apply the same 
level of judgement as in their own core field. The 
result can be a dilution of quality control in the 
information gathering process and a weaker quality 
assurance of results. It is unsurprising that planning 
and management institutions have been unable to 
respond to crises or change, as in many instances, 
the organisations are suffering from a chaotic 
mixture of information, analysis and interpretation 
with no paradigmatic structure in which to 
incorporate all the various forms of scientific, 
interdisciplinary, and indigenous knowledge 
(McGlade, 2001).
In the pre‑modern environment, knowledge was 
rich and adapted to the requirements of living 
locally. Individuals today are just as knowledgeable 
but they receive information from an enormous 
number of sources, some technical, some cultural. In 
this way we can see a form of second‑order science 
emerging in which individuals must rely on other 
peer groups and experts to be able to evaluate the 
information within their own domains of expertise. 
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This type of interaction is especially important 
in ecosystem and resource management, because 
direct scientific evidence is likely to be missing but 
there is often a wealth of local and lay knowledge 
to be gained through the close observation of and 
proximity to nature, as Annie Dillard experienced 
during her year spent next to Tinker Creek. In this 
sense the concept of an expert as part of the system 
of governance has to be broadened to include those 
who have particular knowledge about a system but 
who do not necessarily walk the corridors of power 
and/or of science. It is interesting in this regard to 
note that the newly established Intergovernmental 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) explicitly recognises the contribution of 
indigenous and local knowledge to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems, 
yet it is still struggling to find operational ways to 
include such knowledge into its work.
17�3 Planetary dynamics and ecosystem 
change
This section looks at ecosystem change through the 
lens of four interconnected concepts arising from 
the scientific field of non‑linear dynamical systems 
behaviour: planetary	boundaries	(Rockström 
et al., 2009); tipping	points (Lenton et al., 2008; 
Schellnhuber, 2009), panarchy (Gundersen 
and Holling, 2001) and resilience (Walker and 
Salt, 2006). Based on information drawn from 
socio‑ecological systems around the world, we 
explore whether or not these concepts could help 
communities and managers anticipate sudden 
change or the collapse of a resource and provide a 
practical basis for sustainable management of our 
relationship to ecosystems.
17.3.1 Navigating the Anthropocene
The dynamical behaviour of the planet's natural 
systems is now changing more rapidly than at any 
time previously during the previous 10 000 years of 
the Holocene. Evidence of the scale, magnitude and 
significance of these changes has been sufficient for 
geologists to conclude that an epoch‑scale boundary 
has been crossed and that we are now in a new 
epoch — the 'Anthropocene' (Steffen et al., 2011; 
Zalasiewicz et al., 2011). Living in the Anthropocene 
will require us to deal with ongoing and rapid or 
sudden onset threats such as oil spills, chemical 
and nuclear accidents, earthquakes, landslides, 
tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, severe weather, storms 
and cyclones, floods, wildfires and epidemics, and 
slow‑onset threats such as air quality, droughts and 
desertification, food security and epidemics and 
climate variability (UNEP, 2012).
The 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of the 
theories of chaos, non‑linear dynamics and many 
other highly sophisticated mathematics as a source 
to explain the complexity of ecosystems (May 1982; 
McGlade 1999). At the same time, knowledge about 
the planet's own dynamics was growing: from 
debates about the impact of the Milankovitch cycles 
on climate to the idea that the 'flap of a butterfly's 
wing' could cause changes thousands of kilometres 
away. 
The analytical basis of ecosystems science was 
also growing but the sophistication of the tools 
and computational methods meant that few field 
biologists could really make use of the ideas beyond 
concepts and definitions. Instead, the advances 
were largely taken forward by climate scientists, 
meteorologists, oceanographers and biogeochemists 
under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. The models of global change which 
were developed, however, generated scenarios of the 
likely magnitude of global temperature increases, 
sea‑level rise, melting of the ice caps, glaciers and sea 
ice, droughts and tropical storms which would have 
direct consequences for ecosystems. 
It was with this information, that a network of 
theoreticians and mathematical ecologists began to 
expand their ideas on four major concepts: planetary 
boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009); tipping points or 
elements, (Lenton et al, 2008; Schellnhuber, 2009), 
panarchy	and resilience (Holling, 1996; McGlade, 1999). 
Rockström and colleagues have proposed nine hard 
global biophysical limits, or planetary boundaries, for 
human development — land‑use change, biodiversity 
loss, nitrogen and phosphorous levels, freshwater 
use, ocean acidification, climate change, ozone 
depletion, aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. 
Each has its own metric, for example greenhouse 
gas emissions, concentrations of various pollutants 
in air and water, and aragonite concentrations in the 
ocean. At present, none of these limits can be entirely 
dismissed either by firmly ruling out a possible 
anthropogenic triggering of irregular dynamics 
or confirmed by providing relevant estimates for 
activation or reaction times. Nor can the response 
times of the various sub‑elements be estimated 
beyond a certain resolution e.g. yearly in the case 
of aerosol loading and loss of summer sea ice or 
millennia in the case of ocean acidification. However, 
the widespread lack of in situ observations to validate 
the models underpinning these limits and the inbuilt 
latency of the planetary system itself, mean that there 
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will be many decades of tantalising ignorance about 
whether or not any of these boundaries per se have 
been crossed. 
Instead it is more likely that the effects of the 
tipping elements described by Schellnhuber, 
Lenton and co‑workers, will come to define 
future surprises. We are experiencing some of 
them already — Arctic sea‑ice loss; boreal forest 
dieback; melting of Greenland ice sheet; instability 
of the west Antarctic ice sheet; Atlantic deep 
water formation and permafrost and tundra loss. 
Others are potentially yet to come — climatic 
change‑induced ozone hole; greening of the 
Sahara; chaotic multi‑stability of the Indian 
monsoon; changes in the amplitude or frequency 
of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO); 
dieback of the Amazon rain forest; west African 
monsoon shift; and changes in Antarctic bottom 
water formation. The causality and inter‑linkages 
between these potential tipping elements raises 
both long‑ and short‑term questions. For example, 
will increasing levels of greenhouse gases lead to 
a permanent change in the ocean current system 
including the north Atlantic Gulf Stream and the 
El Niño regime that could ultimately suppress 
the Quaternary glacial 'cycles', while drastically 
altering the number of extreme weather events 
such as droughts, storms, cyclones and tornadoes? 
Tipping elements pose one of the toughest 
challenges for contemporary science, because 
key emergent properties (and consequently early 
warning signals) are likely to arise on a range of 
spatial and temporal scales and be observed by 
scientists across many disciplinary silos, which are 
themselves populated by elites and people with their 
own paradigms and language. Global changes in 
climate, ocean acidification and even possibly ozone 
depletion may cause thresholds on a planetary 
scale to be crossed that alter or reconfigure the 
functioning of some ecosystems, leading to abrupt 
transitions and potential irreversible changes on a 
local scale. Identifying thresholds based on a generic 
model of tipping points is an exercise in futility; 
instead we will need to adopt an approach based 
on cascading thresholds, where early warnings and 
signals of change are linked to observations of key 
processes on a local and regional scale.
17.3.2 Anticipating surprises — adaptive cycles and 
panarchy
Over the past fifteen years, Buzz Holling, Brian 
Walker, Carl Folke, Terry Hughes, Steve Carpenter 
and colleagues have been exploring socio‑ecological 
systems around the world (www.resalliance.
org). The idea has been to create an empirical and 
theoretical base on which to understand abrupt 
change in managed resources and to develop 
a general theory with heuristics and principles 
to better understand resilience (Holling, 1973; 
Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Walker et al., 2006).
The concept of resilience in ecosystems was 
introduced by Holling in his classic paper on non‑
linear dynamic models that captured the relationship 
between stability and resilience in ecosystems 
(Holling, 1973). Whilst some ecologists considered 
resilience to be a measure of how quickly a system 
returns to an equilibrium state after a disturbance 
(what is now known as engineering resilience), 
Holling kept to the notion that ecological resilience 
was the measure of how far an ecosystem could be 
perturbed without experiencing a regime shift (Hogg 
et al., 1989; Holling, 1996; McGlade, 1999). 
There are many examples where ecological resilience 
has been described and its loss recorded (Table 17.2). 
In most instances, the dynamics of the adaptive 
cycles are the product of the interlinkages between 
the ecosystem and people, and it is generally these, 
sometimes hidden, cycles that managers are actually 
coping with. As the diversity of the case studies 
shows, the scale of the management challenge is 
enormous. However, one aspect that is of particular 
importance is the anticipation of surprise or abrupt 
changes, and the rapid shift to a new regime. In some 
literature, the term 'alternative state' is used: this is a 
misnomer. Complex ecological and socio‑ecological 
systems are better expressed as configurations of 
states with the same controls at work, i.e. the same 
feedbacks, but where the configuration describes 
the kinds and strengths of feedbacks and where the 
different internal controls on functions represent 
alternate regimes with thresholds between them. 
Striking examples of this are the desertified regions of 
the Sahel and the emergence of permanent summer 
algal blooms in the Baltic Sea.
As part of the development of a more general 
theoretical basis for managing socio‑ecological 
systems, Walker and colleagues (Walker at al., 
2006) proposed five heuristics: two describing the 
dynamics across scales — adaptive cycles and 
panarchy, and three describing the properties 
of the system — resilience, adaptability and 
transformability. Adaptive cycles in ecosystems 
generally follow a path known as 'ecological 
succession', involving growth (r) where resources 
are plentiful, and conservation (k). Most 
socio‑ecological structures are not scale invariant 
but are built on combinations of slow and fast 
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Table 17�2  Case studies of socio-ecological systems
Location of case study 
(researcher; cited in 
Walker et al�, 2006)
Socio-ecological 
characteristic
System change Vulnerabilities Resilience
Causse Méjan, France 
(Etienne & Bousquet) 
Ecosystem diversity is 
totally dependent on 
grazing.
Pine trees from 
neighbouring forest 
stands are invading 
the steppic grasslands. 
Agriculture has 
destroyed many 
flatlands.
New social groups, 
including forest owners, 
secondary residents.
Keeping alive the Causse 
culture and traditions of 
environmentally friendly 
farming through sharing 
labour and knowledge 
and the co-evolution of 
habitat and farming.
Caribbean coral reefs
(Hughes, 2003)
Coral reefs have been on 
a trajectory of serious 
decline. In the 1950s 
a single species of 
sea-urchin was keeping 
macro-algal blooms in 
check. In the 9170s a 
disease outbreak led to 
the catastrophic loss of 
urchins, precipitating 
blooms that persist 
today.
Collapse of many reefs 
due to overharvesting, 
pollution, disease and 
climate change. Loss 
of key habitat forming 
Acropora species.
Long-term trajectory 
of	a	shift	from	fish-	to	
echinoid-dominated 
destructive herbivory.
Reefs exhibit numerous 
alternate states, but the 
resilience of these is 
unknown. Experiments 
with No Take Areas and 
protection of hotspots 
may help locally, but 
are unlikely to stem 
region-wide loss of 
resilience.
Dry spiny forests, 
southern Madagasar
(Elmqvist)
High degree of 
endemism; inhabited 
by the People of the 
Thorn Bush who protect 
dense forest patches 
through strong informal 
institutions. 
Fragmentation and loss 
of forest due to insecure 
land rights.
Tensions between 
Christianity ad 
customary institutions, 
government policies 
and local informal 
arrangements.
Strong social capital 
and the large capacity 
of spiny forests to 
regenerate.
Everglades, Florida
(Gunderson, 2001)
Internationally 
recognised wetland, 
which was historically 
partitioned  into 
agricultural, recreational 
and conservation areas. 
Area is now maintained 
through canals, pumps 
and levees.
Ecological crises brought 
on by changes in water 
quality and quantity 
caused by the volume 
and	timing	of	flooding.
Institutional reformation 
and realignment, 
plus the need for 
large-scale, expensive, 
technologically based 
solutions.	Conflicts	over	
water use amongst 
institutions and actors. 
Example of a perversely 
resilient social system 
based	on	conflict	and	a	
formal closed network 
of government agencies 
and policies.
Gorongosa National 
Park, Mozambique
(Lynan)
Park was home to large 
herbivore and carnivore 
populations but these 
were decimated in the 
war of Independence in 
the 1980s. Now home to 
some 500 bird species 
and 10 000 people.
The loss of major 
species.
There are no schools, 
clinics or facilities for 
the people living in 
the park who provide 
local protection to the 
ecosystem. No local 
enforcement of existing 
conservation policies in 
the buffer zone.
Remains one of the 
prime protected areas in 
southern Africa.
Goulburn-Broken 
Catchment, Australia
(Ryan)
Sub-catchment of the 
Murray River. Climate 
temperate with sparse 
vegetated plains. 
Originally	occupied	by	
Aboriginal people but 
subsequently populated 
by Europeans after the 
discovery of gold. Today 
heavily agricultural.
Irrigation infrastructure 
and clearing of more 
than 70 % of the native 
vegetation cover have 
substantially altered the 
hydrological balance. 
Climatic variation 
causing changes 
in vegetation and 
groundwater recharge. 
Substantial land-use 
change, with dry-land 
areas delivering 
significant	salt	and	
nutrient loads to 
the waterways. 
Increasing demand for 
non-consumptive water 
and	conflicts	amongst	
property rights.
Property rights 
and downstream 
accountability in place. 
Costs of maintaining 
the regime mounting, 
resource base 
degrading, regional 
economy more 
brittle. System more 
vulnerable to shocks and 
disturbance (Anderies 
et al. 2006).
Northern Highland Lakes 
District, Wisconsin
(Petersen & Carpenter)
Pristine wilderness 
with management 
focused on protection 
and promotion as a 
wilderness tourist 
destination.
Lakeshore development 
for tourism and second 
homes. Invasive species 
including rainbow smelt, 
rusty	crayfish	and	
Eurasian milfoil have 
reduced the quality of 
fishing	and	boating.	
Proliferation of suburban 
life. 
Stakeholders with many 
divergent views. Natural 
resource management 
has been slow to adjust 
to ecological and social 
change. Invasive species 
and eutrophication.
Multiple states 
and thresholds are 
known relating to 
eutrophication, collapse 
of	fisheries,	trophic	
cascades, woody 
habitat and inertia of 
long-lived predator and 
tree populations. Non-
reversible threshold may 
be caused by species 
invasions and a shift 
from old-growth timber 
harvesting to pulpwood 
rotation.
Source: Adapted from Walker et al., 2006. Detailed descriptions of each case study can be found at www.resalliance.org. 
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processes; panarchy is the term that describes how 
these different types of processes operate across time 
and space scales. Disturbances can lead to another 
connected regime in which resources that have 
been	historically	bound-up	are	released	(Ω)	and	the	
fundamental structure collapses; this is followed 
by	a	phase	of	re-organisation	(α)	in	which	novel	
structures can take hold leading to another growth 
phase in a new cycle. There are many examples of 
disturbances causing shifts in this way, including 
forest fires (Dublin et al., 1990), forest pest outbreaks 
(Ludwig et al., 1978), algal blooms in eutrophied 
aquatic systems (Carpenter and Brock, 2004) and 
droughts.
17�4 Socio-ecological systems — 
institutional fit and resilience
In this section we look at socio‑ecological systems	
from the perspective of institutional fit and resilience 
as sources of anticipation and adaptive capacity. 
As Elinor Ostrom (2005), Carl Folke and colleagues 
(Folke et al., 2007) have pointed out, the lack of 
institutional fit can confound the effectiveness of 
stewardship of ecosystem services and resource 
management, and can lead to unexpected surprises, 
excessive rent seeking and high transaction costs 
(Kofinas, 2009). 
Despite innovations in institutional arrangements 
and a greater awareness of the importance of the 
need for more effective forms of governance, the 
loss of trust in bureaucracies has been growing. 
Deeply embedded differences in attitude towards 
conserving ecosystems versus exploiting resources 
have led to highly politicised public debates around 
false dichotomies, such as choosing between 
protecting the environment and employment or 
energy, or diversionary arguments such as the 
tragedy of the commons. In the case of the collapse 
of the northern cod, the commons were neither 
open‑access or unregulated, but the use of this 
discourse meant that the only solution sought 
was downsizing of the fleets, rather than a closer 
examination of the complexity of the causes of the 
problem, such as flawed scientific advice, vested 
interests and government priorities.
The key question is what happens when there is 
a real crisis, brought about by sudden change in a 
resource or ecosystem? Do those institutions with 
most to lose become destabilised or do they attempt 
to renegotiate their power relations? Do those with 
most to gain seize the opportunity for restructuring?
In Newfoundland it has been the social structure 
of the fishery that has collapsed even though 
the inshore fishermen potentially had the most 
to gain in the aftermath. The resource scientists 
and managers on the other hand have only made 
modest changes despite being at the core of the 
problem. This might suggest that modern science 
is much stronger and more deeply embedded 
as a social and political authority than generally 
assumed. It means that it will take more than the 
collapse of a resource or a shift in an ecosystem 
to displace the existing form of authority that 
has been built on a certain control of science. 
It also raises questions about how to build up 
institutional fit and resilience and develop effective 
science‑policy interfaces. 
17.4.1 Institutional fit and governance
Institutional infrastructure, along with governance 
and leadership, heavily influence our capacity to 
manage complex systems and cope with abrupt 
change. It has been the lack of institutional fit that has 
often confounded the effectiveness of the stewardship 
of ecosystems and the systems they provide, and 
led to unexpected surprises, excessive rent seeking 
and high transaction costs. The causes of a lack of 
institutional fit are many and can stem from mere 
folly (Tuchman, 1984), complexity, uncertainty 
about roles, a lack of ownership and property rights, 
institutional frailty and vested interests. 
An example of the consequences of the 
confounding effects of a poor institutional fit can 
be seen in the 1997 legal case of Nunavut Inuit 
concerning the Canadian Fisheries Minister's 
decision to increase the turbot quota against 
the advice of the NAFO scientific council and 
then to assign the additional tonnage to his own 
constituents rather than to the Inuit of the Nunavut 
region or Denmark (2). It was said in an internal 
memo to the Fisheries Minister that the Canadian 
government could be seen as hypocritical by 
the international community because it exhorts 
others to share the burden of conservation but was 
unwilling to do likewise.
Judge Douglas Campbell set aside the Minister's 
decision and referred the matter back for 
(2)		Nunavut	Tunngavik	Inc.	v.	Canada	(Minister	of	Fisheries	and	Oceans)	(C.A.),	[1998]	4	F.C.	405.	13	July	1998	(http://reports.fja.
gc.ca/eng/1998/1998fc22910.html).
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reconsideration of the quota. The Minister 
appealed, stating that he possessed: 
 'absolute discretion… to issue leases and 
licenses for fisheries or fishing. The rationale 
for such discretion is that Canada's fisheries 
are a common property resource belonging 
to all the people of Canada and licensing 
is a tool to manage fisheries which is given 
to the Minister whose duty it is to manage, 
conserve and develop that resource in the 
public interest. … The actual exercise of 
such discretionary power is influenced 
by numerous fluctuating policy concerns 
which go beyond the necessary issue of 
conservation and protection of fish to include 
cultural, political, scientific, technical and 
socio‑economic considerations or policies.' 
The Court of Judicial Review rejected the appeal for 
reasons that the Minister had not acted lawfully, but 
it made clear that the Court was 'not to become an 
academy of science to arbitrate conflicting scientific 
predictions, or to act as a kind of legislative upper 
chamber to weigh expressions of public concern 
and determine which ones should be respected…
[it] is concerned with the legality of the ministerial 
decision resulting from an exercise of discretion, not 
its opportunity, wisdom or soundness'. There was 
clearly a lack of institutional fit between the legality 
of the defined role of the Minister and a legal 
framework in which the Minister's actions could 
be judged on the basis of evidence of fairness and 
long‑term sustainability of the resource.
Over the past two decades, a number of important 
institutions and initiatives have been created to 
bridge the science‑political divide and support 
international agreements on managing and 
protecting our global resources. These range from 
the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Species to initiatives such as 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, IPBES 
(International Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem), TEEB (The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity) and ABS (Access and Benefit 
Sharing). These are primarily aimed at reducing 
the likely impacts of a growing human population 
and climate change on ecosystems and ensuring 
the sustainable use and equitable distribution of 
natural resources. However, as we show in the 
case study on European Union fisheries, even with 
highly cohesive, well‑resourced institutions the 
consequences of a poor institutional fit remain 
one of the largest obstacle to the resilience of our 
fisheries (Panel 17.2).
There are a number of structures of governance; 
including the minimal state, corporate governance; 
new public management; good governance; 
sociocybernetic systems and self‑organising 
networks (McGlade, 2001). This last type involves 
complex sets of organisations drawn from the public 
and private sector and is particularly interesting 
in relation to the governance of resources. The key 
to understanding their importance comes from 
the observation that integrated networks can resist 
government steering; they develop their own 
policies and mould their environment. This leads 
to interdependencies between organisations in 
order to exchange information and negotiate shared 
resources and a significant degree of autonomy. 
In the end, this form of governance can hollow out 
the state through privatisation and by limiting the 
scope of public intervention. A manifestation of 
this type of governance is swarms of amorphous 
groups that link together to tackle single issues such 
as dolphin‑friendly tuna fishing and anti‑sealing 
and whaling. In managing resources it is necessary 
to understand that governance is becoming 
increasingly operative, where lines of authority 
are less formal, legitimacy is more ambiguous and 
where people are choosing when and where they 
want to engage in collective action.
The majority of fisheries are operated through 
instrumental actions, i.e. where technical rules 
are developed and implemented. However, in 
many of the case studies listed in Table 17.2, 
the communities manage the resources through 
consensual actions and norms, such as religion, 
deity or faith, rather than legal ones. The 
effectiveness of this type of action and user 
participation is that in times of crisis, participants 
learn more quickly and show a greater capacity to 
adapt and even transform. For example, after the 
initial water‑table crisis in the Goulburn Broken 
Catchment in the 1970s, conflicts gave way to 
networks that connected people and interests to 
deal with issues of flooding, waterlogging and 
drainage (Anderies et al., 2006). Leaders emerged 
to form committees to represent the concerns of 
the various networks throughout the catchment. 
They pooled existing knowledge, identified gaps 
and invested in research and effectively lobbied 
government agencies for support. Despite all this, 
government leaders opted for adaptation rather 
than transformation. 
By contrast, the ecological crises in the Florida 
Everglades (Gunderson, 2001) which had originally 
given rise to a network dominated by government 
agencies and formal policies, gradually led to a 
network of government and non‑governmental 
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Panel 17�2  Knowledge-based management of EU fisheries — how much is scientific evidence 
being used? 
Constança Belchior and Johnny Reker 
Despite being managed under one of the most complex and expensive science-based management systems 
in	the	world,	since	1983,	the	condition	of	Europe's	fish	stocks	has	continued	to	worsen	(O'Leary	et	al.,	
2011; EU, 2011). The 2002 and 2012 reforms of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aimed to deal with 
the failure to achieve the core objective of ecological, economic and social sustainability, where 72 % of all 
assessed EU fish stocks were estimated to be overexploited, and over 20% fished beyond safe biological 
limits, i.e. with a greater risk of collapse. (In the north-east Atlantic the number of stocks known to be 
overfished fell from 94 % to 63 % from 2004 to 2010, compared to 82% in the Mediterranean) (EC, 2010, 
2011a). 
One	problem	is	that	data	of	sufficient	quality	to	support	scientific	advice	on	MSY	and	overfishing	is	missing	for	
approximately two-thirds of the stocks for which quotas (Total Allowable Catches) are set in the north-east 
Atlantic (EC, 2011a) (Figure 17.1). This figure was intended to show fishing opportunities, but inconsistencies 
in the data on different stock parameters (e.g. number of stocks with no or insufficient data, or for which an 
excess TAC was set) point to the underlying difficulty of producing coherent assessments. For example, data 
quality and availability is so poor in the Mediterranean, that in 2010, only 16 out of 102 candidate species 
could be assessed (EC, 2010).Part of the problem is that Member States have not provided the relevant 
scientific data despite there being a legal responsibility to do so (EC, 2011a), introducing greater uncertainty 
into the scientific advice, and thus further undermining its credibility (Piet et al., 2010).
There have been many analyses of why EU 
fisheries management has not been successful 
(e.g. Sissenwine and Symes, 2007; Khalilian 
et al., 2010; EC, 2009; EU, 2011). The main 
conclusion, alongside the lack of scientific 
knowledge and ineffective management options 
to restore fish stocks and fisheries to profitable 
and equitable conditions, is the very nature of the 
decision-making process (Villasante et al., 2010; 
Piet	et	al.,	2010;	O'Leary	et	al.,	2011).	Overall,	
scientific advice has been largely overruled when 
setting fishing opportunities for EU fish stocks; 
between 1987 and 2006, the TACs only matched 
scientific advice in 8% of the assessed stocks (Piet 
et al. 2010), and were consistently set well above 
the scientifically advised level by an average of 
47 % since 2003 (EC, 2011a). 
The actual impacts of such mismatches remains 
uncertain	(O'Leary	et	al.,	2011),	but	it	is	likely	
to be significant given the cumulative impacts of 
overfishing and increased capacity on the integrity 
of the wider marine ecosystem (Anticamara et al., 
2011). For example, it has been estimated that 
the recovery time for benthic habitats in areas in 
the Greater North Sea where there was low natural 
disturbance, was between 7.5–15 years following 
only	one	pass	of	a	beam	trawl	(OSPAR,	2010).
In German waters some areas have experienced 
up to 4 000 hours of beam trawling (Pedersen, 
2009). Fisheries are thus a significant contributor 
to pressures on European marine biodiversity 
where only 2 % of the species and 10 % of the 
habitats reported under the Habitats Directive are 
considered to be in favourable conservation status 
(HELCOM,	2010;	EEA,	2010).	
Figure 17�1 Trends in status and advice 
setting for north-east Atlantic 
fish stocks between 2005 and 
2011
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Panel 17�2  Knowledge-based management of EU fisheries — how much is scientific evidence 
being used? (cont�)
As a response to the current situation, an ecosystem-based approach to management has become one of 
the CFP's objectives under the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive. The intention is to implement more 
holistic, integrated management strategies to achieve EU ambitions on securing healthy and productive 
marine ecosystems, including halting the loss of biodiversity, ensuring sustainable economic growth and 
improving resource efficiency. 
The ecosystem approach sets out a framework for understanding the socio-ecological system, where the 
hidden long-term costs or externalities and subsidies are accounted for, in order that options that generate 
more societal value can be prioritised (e.g. ISU, 2012; Crilly and Esteban, 2011). In a recent study on the 
potential benefits of restoring 43 European fish stocks to their maximum sustainable yield from current levels 
(Crilly, 2012), the authors found that it could generate 3.53 million tonnes of additional landings, and an 
additional value of EUR 3 188 billion annually. This is more than five times the annual fisheries subsidies paid 
to EU Member States), and could in turn support the creation of more than 80 000 jobs in the sector in the EU. 
Thus it seems that there is sufficient available knowledge to underpin informed decision-making to support 
an ecosystem approach to fisheries, but also one that prioritises solutions that will benefit society the 
most. At a time where the EU already depends on substantial imports to meet more than 65 % of total 
EU consumption of seafood (EC, 2011a) and where food security is becoming a global growing concern, 
managing fish stocks sustainably provides a competitive advantage to the EU which should not be overlooked 
by individual or national interests. However, as previously discussed, this is unlikely to happen as long 
as decision-making in the CFP allows for short-term economic interests to compete with and outcompete 
long-term sustainable and precautionary scientific advice at the very beginning. 
The question remains: has Europe learned from past experiences? The short answer is yes, but we are 
still not reacting to our knowledge fast enough. Fisheries are still not being managed sustainably and 
the majority of European fish stocks are still overfished. Furthermore, there are considerable gaps in 
our knowledge regarding the status of fish stocks, yet on average TACs are still set well above scientific 
recommendations showing a disregard for scientific advice and also for the precautionary approach. From a 
societal perspective, further evidence also shows that overfishing also means the EU is getting much less out 
of its fish stocks than if they were restored and sustainably managed. This situation is mirrored at a global 
level, where the 'sunken billions' in world fisheries due to excess fishing capacity have been estimated at 50 
billion US dollars annually (World Bank, 2009). 
The new CFP proposal (EC, 2011b) features ambitious measures from the European Commission, namely 
the commitment to establish management measures 'in accordance with the best available scientific advice' 
and no longer just 'based on scientific advice'. Also, it proposes to give more power and responsibilities to 
the actual stakeholders, making them more accountable for the resource they are being allowed to exploit, 
alongside other measures which aim to better integrate the precautionary and ecosystem approaches into 
the	CFP.	Overall,	it	sets	out	a	more	flexible	mechanism	that	should	allow	it	to	cope	better	with	the	inherent	
diversity in both EU fisheries and the changing marine environment. 
It is questionable, however, whether a management system in which scientific evidence is consistently 
being undermined, either by lack of compliance by Member States in delivering sound fisheries data, or by 
disregarding it due to narrow political interests and negotiations, will ever be able to deliver its objective of 
long-term sustainability. This is a point recognised by the European Parliament in its review of the proposal 
for the new CFP regulation (EP, 2012). Therefore one of the greatest challenges in managing EU fisheries 
and specifically the EU 2012 CFP reform remains the level of respect for scientific advice as a fixed boundary 
condition for natural capital when negotiating political agreements.
A socio-ecological management system solidly grounded in science is undoubtedly a more objective way to 
manage natural resources following established criteria, whilst also coping and adjusting to uncertainties. 
Together with the precautionary approach, it could help to set out a long-term transparent management 
system for fisheries, unlike the vested political decision-making system that prevails in the CFP today. 
Governance arrangements in and around EU fisheries will need to respect scientific advice and ensure the 
compliance of national data obligations to support it, as well as allowing for more transparent and inclusive 
decision-making that favours a wider sectorial and public engagement. This could be through broader 
representative constituencies and greater societal benefits as opposed to the current practice that favours 
the exhaustion of natural capital whilst leading the fisheries sector towards a deteriorating future.
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groups which opted for transformation. New 
institutions, technological solutions were created 
on the back of significant levels of investment. As 
many of the cases indicate, two of the most critical 
factors for adapting to change and transformation 
are institutional fit and leadership.
17�5 Future prospects 
This final section looks at some of the key lessons 
that emerge from the various case studies and 
reflects on how they might be used to improve 
resource management and ecosystem stewardship 
in the future. The six major lessons that resource 
managers and those living in a particular 
socio‑ecological system need to consider to 
ensure that sudden, abrupt changes do not lead to 
catastrophic collapse are as follows:
•	 Close	observation	of	ecosystems	and	natural	
phenomena.
•	 Development	of	a	diversity-oriented	approach	
to resource management that reflects the 
complex causality of the real‑world context.
•	 Widening	the	sources	of	information	
and knowledge about the dynamics of 
socio‑ecological systems. 
•	 Reducing	delays	between	early	warnings	and	
actions.
•	 Developing	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	full	
adaptive cycle of the ecosystem and resource 
base being managed.
•	 Building	up	the	learning,	leadership	and	
innovative capacities in the institutional and 
societal context to enable transformation rather 
than only adaptation. As seen in so many of 
the case studies there is a need for greater 
participation and transparency regarding 
vested interests. 
The evidence used to develop management advice 
will also need to be far more explicit about the 
dynamics of processes across different time and space 
scales and uncertainty. Resource managers and the 
community at large will need to develop the skills 
and capacities to create consensus — and where not 
possible compromises (van den Hove, 2006) — about 
how to handle uncertainty and which diagnostic 
criteria and metrics will be used to elicit action in 
the case of early warning signals (Table 17.3). For 
example, thresholds in water use, size of patches 
of forest clearance, wildfire management and the 
extent of agistement have all been shown to be 
critical activities in determining the resilience of the 
socio‑ecological systems examined.
Table 17�3  Examples of early warning and possible outcomes and responses
Type of early warning Possible outcome Examples Possible solutions
Spatial Potential rapid spread via 
multiple unknown pathways 
Bird	flu;	various	fungal	
diseases, invasive species
Establish broad jurisdictional authority 
to monitor spread and develop 
potential policy actions; develop in 
situ monitoring, and multi-scale and 
multi-interaction models
Temporal Potential spread of problem 
on different time scales linked 
to ecological and physiological 
processes leading to collapse 
and a different regime 
Drought, over-exploitation 
of key resources over time, 
invasive species 
Develop an understanding of the 
adaptive cycle, multiple pathway and 
time-dependent models and ensure 
appropriate in situ monitoring of 
human and ecological systems
Demographic Potential long-term 
impacts on the health of 
the ecosystem and human 
population
Age-related diseases Develop more intense monitoring of 
entire adaptive cycle and long-term 
monitoring of age-related processes
Threshold behaviour Potential for issue/events 
to create socio-ecological 
regime	shifts	with	significant	
long-term economic and/or 
ecological impacts including 
irreversibility
Sustained over-harvesting of 
fish	stocks	leading	to	collapse	
of keystone species; runoff 
from nitrogen fertilizer leading 
to eutrophication
Develop integrated assessments 
with scenario analyses that include 
the potential to identify long-term 
physiological and ecological shifts
Cascading effects Potential that problem effects 
cannot be buffered or can be 
amplified	between	domains	
leading	to	significant	socio-
ecological impacts
Reduction in the polar ice cap 
opens up northern sea routes 
to shipping; creating new 
forms of land use change and 
local harvesting of resources 
Develop multi-jurisdictional approach 
to manage changes; develop integrated 
assessments and scenario analyses 
to understand the multi-dimensional 
dynamics and resilience of the 
socio-ecological systems; establish new 
monitoring systems
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Box 17�2 Definitions
Adaptive management  
Adaptive approaches to management are defined as those that recognise uncertainty and encourage 
innovation while fostering resilience (after Chapin et al., 2009). It is often considered as an approach based 
on learning by doing and implemented through careful and regular observation of socio-ecological conditions, 
drawing on these observations to improve the understanding of the system's behaviour, evaluation of the 
implications of emergent conditions and various options for intervention and action and responding in ways 
that support the resilience of the socio-ecological system. 
Configurational complexity 
Characteristic of diversity-oriented analyses, where context matters. Cases are examined as configurations 
in which all relevant aspects are looked at in the form of combinations. Such analyses concentrate on the 
specific features of individual cases, identifying those that are most relevant, whilst considering how those 
features cohere with each other as distinct types (McGlade, 2003)
Counterfactual thinking 
The dependence of whether, when and how one event occurs on whether, when and how another event 
occurs and the possible alteration of events.
Diversity-oriented	approach 
Analyses of socio-ecological systems based on detailed case studies using measurements of many 
system-specific attributes with configurational complexity (McGlade, 2003). 
Earth System  
The Earth System is defined by Schellnhuber (1999) as the conglomerate formed by human civilization and its 
planetary matrix, i.e. all parts of the Earth that interact with the members and manifestations of our species.
Institutional fit  
This refers to the linkages between ecosystems and socioeconomic and cultural systems in their local, 
regional, national, continental, and global contexts. The use of the word 'fit' in English refers to a match of 
sizes, e.g. if the shoe fits, then it is a good match for the foot. Social and ecological systems and processes 
have sizes too: they have spatial and temporal dimensions which interact and depend on each other within a 
specific geographical space. The degree to which these match is meant by 'institutional fit.'
The fundamental assumption that the existing 
institutional landscape is fit for purpose should 
also be examined carefully. As Hobbes (in Leviathan, 
1651) and Machiavelli (in The Prince ca. 1514) well 
understood, user participation and the frameworks 
of power are the most important elements to 
understand when mapping out the rights of the 
community. In ecosystem and resource management 
there are a number of regimes including: 
laissez‑faire; market regulation; communal 
governance; state governance and international 
governance (generalising from McCay, 1993). As 
shown in each case study, property rights and the 
authority to constrain exploitation are at the heart 
of the matter and inevitably come under intense 
pressure during a crisis. Ensuring the resilience 
of socio‑ecological systems requires an explicit 
understanding of the rights and responsibilities 
during periods of transformation.
A final observation is that many interventions in 
resource management are made on the basis of a 
belief that these would have predictable outcomes. 
The assumption has been that all interactions can 
be adequately understood and that all future states 
are contained within the present structure of the 
socio‑ecological system. The hubris of this type 
of thinking parallels that of the financial world in 
which a constrained set of tools and those using 
them (known as 'quants') created short‑term 
indebtedness, mispricing of securities and a false 
protection against unknowable uncertainties. 
Ultimately, the two worlds of finance and resources 
became intertwined via market volatility and 
the mispricing of commodities, and led to the 
catastrophic consequences of the economic crisis all 
over the world (McGlade, 2009). 
We must avoid repeating the mistakes of the 
past, as these will ultimately result in the collapse 
of ecosystems and social crisis. Instead, we 
should acknowledge that resilience in nature 
contains the seeds not only of surprise but also of 
transformation.
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Box 17�2 Definitions (cont�)
Panarchy  
Describes the way in which nested evolving hierarchical systems with multiple interrelated elements interact 
on different time and space scales (Gundersen and Holling, 2001). Panarchy is the structure where natural 
systems (e.g. fish stocks) and of humans (e.g. capitalism), as well as combined human-natural systems 
(e.g. institutions that govern fisheries resource use), are interlinked in continual adaptive cycles of growth, 
accumulation, restructuring, and renewal. These transformational cycles can occur on scales ranging from a 
drop of water to the biosphere, over periods from days to geologic periods. Understanding these cycles and 
their scales can help identify leverage points to foster resilience and sustainability within the overall system.
Polythetic scheme 
Characteristic of a variable-oriented approach in which the cases that are grouped together can differ 
substantially from each other for one or more attribute as long as they are similar for the majority of 
attributes selected by the researcher (McGlade, 2003). 
Regime shift  
An abrupt large-scale transition to a new state or stability domain characterised by a very different 
structure and feedbacks (Chapin et al., 2009).
Resilience 
The capacity of a social-ecological system to absorb a spectrum of shocks or perturbations and to sustain 
and develop its fundamental function, structure, identity, and feedbacks as a result of recovery or 
reorganisation (Walker and Salt, 2006; Chapin et al., 2009).
Tipping point and tipping elements 
Tipping points are popularly understood as a situation where at a particular moment in time, a small change 
can have large, long-term consequences for a system, i.e. popularly understood as 'little things can make 
a big difference' (after Gladwell, 2000). Lenton et al. (2009) offer a more formal definition for the earth 
system, introducing the term 'tipping element' to describe subsystems of the Earth system that are at least 
sub-continental in scale and can be switched — under certain circumstances — into a qualitatively different 
state by small perturbations. The tipping point is the corresponding critical point — in forcing and a feature 
of the system — at which the future state of the system is qualitatively altered. The term tipping point has 
been used to describe a variety of phenomena, including the appearance of a positive feedback, reversible 
phase transitions, phase transitions with hysteresis effects, and bifurcations where the transition is smooth 
but the future path of the system depends on the noise at a critical point.
Variable-oriented	approach 
Analyses of systems based on the measurement of a small number of attributes relating to global patterns 
emerging from surveys of a large number of cases (McGlade, 2003).
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18 Late lessons from Chernobyl, early 
warnings from Fukushima
  
The nuclear accident at Fukushima in Japan occurred almost exactly 25 years after the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. Analysis of each provides valuable late and early lessons 
that could prove helpful to decision-makers and the public as plans are made to meet the 
energy demands of the coming decades while responding to the growing environmental costs of 
climate change and the need to ensure energy security in a politically unstable world.
This chapter explores some key aspects of the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, the 
radiation releases, their effects and their implications for any construction of new nuclear 
plants in Europe. There are also lessons to be learned about nuclear construction costs, 
liabilities, future investments and risk assessment of foreseeable and unexpected events that 
affect people and the environment.
Since health consequences may start to arise from the Fukushima accident and be documented 
over the next 5–40 years, a key lesson to be learned concerns the multifactorial nature of 
the event. In planning future radiation protection, preventive measures and bio-monitoring 
of exposed populations, it will be of great importance to integrate the available data on both 
cancer and non-cancer diseases following overexposure to ionising radiation; adopt a complex 
approach to interpreting data, considering the impacts of age, gender and geographical 
dispersion of affected individuals; and integrate the evaluation of latency periods between 
exposure and disease diagnosis development for each cancer type. 
Given the degree of uncertainty and complexity attached to even the most tightly framed 
and rigorous nuclear risk assessment, attempts to weight the magnitude of accident by the 
expected probability of occurrence have proven problematic, since these essentially theoretical 
calculations can only be based on sets of pre-conditioning assumptions. This is not an arcane 
philosophical point but rather a very practical issue with significant implications for the proper 
management of nuclear risk. With its failure to plan for the cascade of unexpected beyond 
design-base accidents, the regulatory emphasis on risk-based probabilistic assessment has 
proven very limited. An urgent reappraisal of this approach and its real-life application seems 
overdue.
Whatever one's view of the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, it is clear that the possibility of 
catastrophic accidents and consequent economic liabilities must be factored into the policy and 
regulatory decision-making process. In the context of current collective knowledge on nuclear 
risks, planned pan-European liability regimes will need significant re-evaluation.
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18�1 Introduction 
The chapter on climate change has demonstrated the 
need to plan for a low-carbon energy future, and an 
ambitious long-term target of 80–95 % reductions 
in greenhouse gases by 2050 has been set by the 
European Union (EU) (EU, 2011). Although some 
scenarios suggest that future energy demands could 
be met without nuclear electricity production (1) 
(IPPC, 2011; SRU, 2011b), others suggest greater 
reliance on new nuclear capacity in Europe (2), as 
well as Asia (Yi-chong, 2011). 
At present, nuclear energy is used in 30 countries 
and Taiwan, producing roughly 13 % of the world's 
commercial electricity, and currently 14 countries 
and Taiwan are in the process of planning the 
building of new nuclear capacity. There are 
435 nuclear power reactors in operation around the 
world — at the peak of nuclear generation in 2002 
there were 444 — of which 189 are in pan-Europe 
and the Russian Federation, comprising about one 
third of the world's 146 civil reactors, with France 
alone generating close to half of the EU's nuclear 
production from 58 plants (Schneider et al., 2011).
With mounting public concern and policy 
recognition over the speed and pace of low carbon 
energy transition needed to mitigate climate change, 
nuclear power has been reframed as a response to 
the threat of global warming. Proponents conclude 
that nuclear provides a secure supply of low carbon 
base-load energy, safe in operation and powered by 
a reliable source of uranium supplies (IAEA, 2000; 
EDF, 2012; NIA, 2012; WNA, 2012). However, at the 
heart of the question of nuclear power are differing 
views on how to apply foresight, precaution and 
responsibility in the context of the possibility of 
accidents. 
18�2 Chernobyl
On the 26th April 1986 an explosion at the Chernobyl 
Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 in Northern Ukraine 
resulted in widespread cross-boundary atmospheric 
pollution by fission-product radioisotopes. Following 
what is understood to have been a misconceived 
reactor experiment, a positive void coefficient 
caused reactivity excursion, resulting in a steam 
explosion that destroyed the plant. Over the six 
days of open containment 30–60 % of the Chernobyl 
reactor core's fission products were released to the 
atmosphere, 6.7 tonnes of material from the core. This 
material was projected high into the atmosphere, 
spreading radioactive isotopes over more than 
200 000 square kilometres (km2) of Europe (UNDP, 
2002). In response, the authorities evacuated and 
subsequently relocated around 115 000 people from 
areas surrounding the reactor; after 1986, a further 
220 000 people from Belarus, the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine were re-settled (UNSCEAR, 2008). 
Each day some 3 500 workers enter the 30 kilometre 
exclusion zone, established by the Ukraine, 
to monitor, clean and guard the site, where 
remediation work is likely to continue until 2065 
— although less than half the resources needed to 
fund the remediation have been raised, and the 
completion date has slipped by a decade. The work 
includes managing the long-term storage of waste 
from Reactor 4, and more than 20 000 spent fuel 
canisters from the site's other reactors. Significant 
quantities of radioactive waste continue to be 
generated — partly due to ongoing flooding in some 
areas of the waste-storage buildings and Reactor 4's 
turbine hall, forcing the pumped discharge 
and on-site storage of around 300 000 litres of 
radioactively contaminated water per month 
(Peplow, 2011). 
18.2.1 Post-Chernobyl meta-analyses 
Whilst it is outside the remit of this discussion 
to rehearse in detail the very broad literature on 
radiation risk epidemiology, it is sufficient to note 
that the precise estimation of acute and long-term 
health effects as a result of the Chernobyl accident 
remains problematic and subject to ongoing 
critique. This is because epidemiological evidence 
on health impacts is contradictory and conflicting. 
The link between radiation and the aetiology of 
cancer and leukaemia is well established — but the 
debate continues about the risks of those diseases, 
in particular childhood cancer and leukaemia, 
from Chernobyl releases and in the vicinity of 
other operational nuclear installations elsewhere 
(Box 18.1).
It is therefore unsurprising to see significant 
differences in the understanding and interpretation 
(1) The German governments Energiekonzept involves a reduction in primary energy consumption by 50 % between 2008 and 2050, 
a reduction in electricity consumption of 25 %, and a reduction in carbon emissions by 80 % (SRU, 2011a).
(2) Planning for the same carbon target as the German government, the UK government's National Policy Statement on Energy 
envisages a doubling of electricity demand by 2050 and a potential trebling of total installed capacity (DECC, 2011). As a result, 
the policy foresees the construction of a series of new nuclear plants in the United Kingdom.
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Box 18�1 Low level radiation epidemiology 
There are significant uncertainties associated with the choice of differing models used to interpolate 
radiation risk between populations with different background disease rates; for the projection of risk over 
time; for the extrapolation of risks following primarily a single external high dose and a high dose-rate in 
contrast to cumulative low dose and low dose-rate exposures (ARCH, 2010). Despite this, the analysis of 
incidence and distribution of disease (epidemiology) remains fundamental to radiation-risk determination 
and standard setting. Epidemiological investigations ranging from the Japanese atomic bomb life span 
survivor studies to more numerically and temporally limited studies have provided a weight of evidence 
about the effects of ionizing radiation on humans. Whilst a range of studies suggests no causal or 
associative link between routine discharges from operating nuclear plants (Jablon et al., 1991; Yoshimoto 
et al, 2004; Evrard et al., 2006; COMARE, 2011), this important debate is ongoing. 
One of the most significant data sets in this debate comprises a national case-control study, funded and 
published by the Federal Ofﬁce for Radiation Protection on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for the 
Environment and conducted by the German Childhood Cancer Registry on childhood cancer near nuclear 
installations. This study investigated childhood leukaemia and cancer incidence near nuclear plants from 
1980 to 2003, providing evidence of a significant increase in childhood leukaemia and cancer risk near to 
nuclear plants in Germany (Kaatsch et al., 2007; Kaatsch et al., 2008a; Kaatsch et al., 2008b; Spix et al., 
2008). The German Federal Ofﬁce for Radiation Protection formally confirmed these findings, stating that 
'in the vicinity of nuclear power plants, an increased risk of 60 % was observed for all types of childhood 
cancer, and for childhood leukaemia the risk doubled equaling a risk increase of approximately 100 %' 
(BfS, 2008). In response, the UK scientific advisory body Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in 
the Environment (COMARE) 14th Report (2011) critiqued the German study, and discounted the findings, 
noting that COMARE's primary analysis of the latest British data had revealed no significant evidence of an 
association between risk of childhood leukaemia and living in proximity to a UK nuclear facility (COMARE, 
2011). The Committee also pointed to the role of unidentified viral infections rather than radiation exposure 
in the aetiology of childhood leukaemia near nuclear power plant (Kinlen, 2011). 
Subsequently, in early 2012, a further nation-wide case-controlled investigation by Institut Nationale de la 
Santé et de la Recherche Medicale (INSERM) on behalf of France's nuclear safety research body, Institut 
de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), demonstrated a statistically significant doubling of the 
incidence of leukaemia near to nuclear plants in France between 2002 and 2007 (Sermage-Faure et al., 
2012). However, neither a causal link nor an association between gaseous discharges and ill health were 
established.
of Chernobyl health effects. The problem may be 
exacerbated by the nature of previous studies, 
which have been described as forming a patchwork 
rather than a comprehensive, structured attempt 
to delineate the overall health consequences of 
the accident (ARCH, 2010). Nevertheless, despite 
differences in the types of exposure, doses, dose 
rates and applied methodologies, data on the health 
consequences of the Chernobyl accident add to 
knowledge collected from atomic bomb victims 
and from populations over-exposed during nuclear 
accidents and nuclear weapons testing. Integration 
of the available data on related health risks gives 
added value in preparing radiation protection 
protocols and in the management of subsequent 
nuclear accidents, such as Fukushima. 
Focusing only on Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation, and no other exposed countries and 
populations, the International Atomic Energy 
Authority (IAEA) convened the Chernobyl Forum 
(2005) that predicted a potential total mortality of 
about 4 000. Discounting the significantly raised 
childhood thyroid cancer incidence (3), the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR, 2008) found no 
evidence of increases in overall cancer incidence 
or mortality rates or in rates of non-malignant 
(3) In Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine nearly 5 000 cases of thyroid cancer have now been diagnosed to date among 
children who were aged up to 18 years at the time of the accident (WHO, 2006).
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disorders that could be related to radiation 
exposure. Both of these estimates were subject 
to critical analysis by Yablokov et al. (2006), who 
suggested a higher death toll as a consequence of 
the Chernobyl fall-out. Based on Belarus' national 
cancer statistics, the study predicted approximately 
270 000 cancer incidences — of which 93 000 would 
prove fatal. A follow-up meta-analysis, which 
included Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, suggested 
further increased predicted premature deaths as a 
result of the radioactivity released (Yablokov et al., 
2007). 
It is worth noting that UNSCEAR (2008) decided 
not to use models to project absolute numbers of 
effects in populations exposed to low radiation 
doses from the Chernobyl accident, because of 
unacceptable uncertainties in the predictions. 
Given that UNSCEAR (1993) and IAEA (1996) 
estimate a total world-wide collective dose 
of 600 000 person-Sieverts over 50 years from 
Chernobyl fallout, and the standard risk 
estimate from the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP, 2005) is 0.057 fatal 
cancers per Sievert, this suggests an estimate of 
about 34 000 fatal cancers over that time period 
(Ramana, 2009). Given the widely accepted linear 
no-threshold radiation risk model may overstate 
or understate risks by a factor of two (BIER VII, 
2006) — then estimates for post-Chernobyl cancer 
mortality extrapolation may range from 17 000 to 
68 000 over 50 years. 
These differences in meta-analysis estimates 
also obtain around post-Chernobyl leukemia 
 
Box 18�2 Acute medical care of Chernobyl radiation casualties
'By May 5, 10 days after the accident, 172 individuals, 47 of them fire fighters, had been admitted 
Hospital #6 with the most severe form of radiation sickness. All had visible burns, were in severe pain 
and had little chance of survival. It should be remembered that all medical staff entering the rooms of 
irradiated patients were also exposed to intensive radiation from victims whom they were supposed to 
treat. We should express deep gratitude to all personnel, from the reception area, sterile rooms, specialized 
offices and laboratorie, to dosimeter controllers for their tireless service and sacrifice. As experienced 
radio-biologists, we understood that some of our patients would not survive — they had received radiation 
doses of more than 1 000 rad, which resulted in large and deep radiation burns and the penetration of their 
bodies by significant amounts of radioactive material. Therefore, we planned for their funerals, including 
the selection of appropriate location(s) and estimates of the necessary depth of tombs to avoid increases in 
the radiation level above the tomb. We needed to equip vehicles that would transport the dead bodies with 
strong protection layers quickly so as not to harm the drivers and to avoid radiation pollution between the 
hospital and the cemetery' (Grigoriev, 2012).
Despite these challenging circumstances it is important to note that, thanks to round-the-clock care over 
many months by a dedicated team of doctors, and through a wide range of holistic treatments, the lives of 
many patients with acute radiation sickness were saved (Grigoriev, personal communication, 2012).
aetiology: Whilst UNSCEAR (2008) suggests 
that the incidence of leukaemia in the general 
population, one of the main concerns owing to 
the shorter time expected between exposure and 
occurrence compared with solid cancers, does not 
appear to be elevated, the UK government scientific 
advisory Committee Examining Radiation Risks 
of Internal Emitters (CERRIE, 2004) concluded 
that, in the judgment of a large majority of 
committee members, it is likely that radioactive 
fallout from the Chernobyl accident resulted in an 
increased risk of infant leukaemia in the exposed 
populations. 
In addition, there were immediate deaths of 
emergency workers and firefighters resulting from 
acute radiation exposure. Treatment of these people 
also placed hospital staff and funeral workers at risk 
of radiation over-exposure (Box 18.2).
18.2.2 Post-Chernobyl cancer risk
The most susceptible populations for thyroid 
disease development after nuclear overexposure 
are pre- and post-natally exposed children, young 
people and women (Shimizu, 1991; Nagataki and 
Nystrom, 2002; McCarthy, 1997, Prysyazhnyuk, 
2007). As both external and internal exposure to 
ionizing radiation can cause thyroid cancer, similar 
incidences were detected amongst those exposed in 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and following the Chernobyl 
accident, with a much higher prevalence in children 
than adults (Larsen et al., 1982; Pacini et al., 1999). 
Increased levels of anti-thyroid antibodies, hyper- or 
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hypothyroidism and thyroid cancer have different 
latency periods after exposure, even at relatively 
low doses of less than 1 Sv (Nagataki, 1994), and 
the data from the Chernobyl and atomic bomb 
victims should be of significance in bio-monitoring 
exposed subjects following the Fukushima 
accident.
In recent years, an increased incidence of leukaemia 
has been described among clean-up workers 
and the population aged 0–5 years at the time of 
the Chernobyl accident (Noschenko et al., 2010; 
Romanenko et al., 2008). Such a trend may continue 
as the latency period for leukaemia can exceed 
more than 40 years, as shown for myelodisplastic 
syndrome (pre-leukaemia) and the related 
increased risk for acute myeloid leukaemia after 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bomb detonations 
(Iwanaga et al., 2011).
Lactating women may be more susceptible to 
ionizing radiation, as breast tissue bio-accumulates 
iodine as part of the physiological process of 
its accumulation in breast milk. These levels of 
accumulated radioiodine in breast milk may also 
increase the risk of thyroid cancer in newborns 
(Bland et al., 1969; Tazebay et al., 2000; Hatch 
et al., 2005). This information may prove necessary 
and significant for breastfeeding sub-populations 
in cases of increased radioiodine levels. Similar 
results were shown for breast cancer incidence 
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the highest 
dose-specific excess relative risk was among 
women exposed prior to the age of 20 years (Land 
et al., 2003), with the latency period for breast 
cancer development at approximately 10 years 
for both those affected by the atomic bombs and 
Chernobyl (Tokunaga, 1979; Pukkala et al., 2006), 
with raised incidence of breast cancer found among 
young and pre-menopausal women exposed 
during the Chernobyl accident. 
In order to improve preventive measures 
following over-exposure to ionizing radiation, 
it is imperative that the latency period between 
exposure and disease development be re-evaluated 
for each cancer type; as the currently approved 
10-year latency period of international radiation 
protection agencies does not seem in accord with 
data reported for certain solid cancers, with a 
4-year latency period reported post-Chernobyl 
(UNSCEAR, 2008; Ivanov et al., 2009). The 
question of latency in cancer induction is further 
complicated through radiation biology discoveries 
about the underlying complex cellular response 
mechanisms by which radiation interacts with 
living organisms (Box 18.3).
18.2.3 Post-Chernobyl non-cancer health 
consequences
Evaluation of health risks relating to accidental 
overexposure to ionizing radiation is usually 
limited to estimations of increased cancer 
incidence; however, current knowledge of complex 
interactions of ionizing radiation and living systems 
demonstrates that in addition to increasing cancer 
risk, exposure to radiation may disturb a number 
of other biological pathways. For example, analyses 
of the Japanese A-bomb survivor Life Span Studies 
mortality data (1950–1997) show a statistically 
significant dose-response pattern for death from 
diseases other than cancer, and these excesses do 
not seem limited to any particular disease (Preston 
et al., 2003; Yamada et al., 2004). Disturbance of 
pathways by ionizing radiation may be modified by 
age, gender, psychological status of a person (stress) 
or diet, all of which impact on the final increase of 
health risk and its duration. 
Correspondingly, the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
also caused non-cancerous diseases, such as 
cardiovascular and immunological disorders, 
and cataracts (Hatch et al., 2005; Cardis, 2011). In 
children exposed to long-term low doses after the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident, a significant increase 
of cardiovascular diseases was reported, followed 
by decreased physical status (Kostenko, 2005). 
A significant increase in cardiovascular disorders 
was also recorded among adults (Bebeshko et al., 
2007; Eglite et al., 2009), which was compatible 
with atomic bomb survivor data (Zubovksi and 
Tararukhina, 1999; Shimizu et al., 2010). 
Immunological disturbances have been reported 
for both clean-up workers and the environmentally 
exposed population affected by the Chernobyl 
accident. In children, marked immune disturbances 
were detected after Chernobyl, with significant 
differences between directly exposed children 
and children born to irradiated parents (Baleva 
et al., 2011). In children residing in the zone 
30–90 km from the Chernobyl site, immunological 
disturbances arising more than 20 years after the 
nuclear accident are still clinically presenting 
(Sajjadieh et al., 2009). Additionally, immunological 
disorders are combined with inflammations and an 
increased risk of cardiovascular disease in both those 
exposed to radiation following atomic bomb and the 
Chernobyl accident (Kusunogi et al., 1999; Hayashi 
et al., 2003; Kusunoki et al., 2010; Timoshevskiĭ et al., 
2011). It has also been suggested that data regarding 
cataracts in subjects participating in the clean-up 
and building of sarcophagi in Chernobyl may fail to 
support the ICRP 60 risk guideline assumption of a 
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Box 18�3 Genomic instability and the bystander effect 
The theoretical underpinning of the biological effects of ionizing radiation is based on sophisticated variants 
of target theory, such as track structure theory. Target theory stipulates that the biological targets damaged 
in the cell are relevant to the endpoint: for example, damage to a tumour suppressor gene might lead to 
cancer. Target theory holds for single locus hereditary disease but there were problems in applying it to 
somatic cell endpoints such as cancer. However, in 1992 evidence inconsistent with target theory emerged 
in the form of two effects, genomic instability (Khadim et al., 1992) and the bystander effect (Nagasawa 
and Little, 1992). Such effects are collectively known as non-targeted effects because the target is large 
enough to encompass the whole nucleus of the cell, and radiation does not directly affect the damaged cell. 
Genomic instability is characterised by the acquisition, de novo, of various kinds of damage, mostly to DNA, 
up to several cell generations after the exposure. Damage associated with genomic instability may not be 
directly caused by the radiation but is a secondary response of the cell to radiation insult. The bystander 
effect occurs in cells that experienced no radiation events, but are neighbours of cells that have. 
These phenomena pose a set of significant research questions for the understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms involved, and could imply the need for a re-appraisal of the target theory approach, and the 
emergence of a new theoretical framework for the biological bases of the effects of radiation. Perhaps the 
most worrying aspect from the public health perspective is the potential for trans-generationally inherited 
genomic instability. A number of mechanistic hypotheses have been proposed to explain genomic instability 
(ARCH, 2011), and Baverstock and Karotki (2011) have suggested a further explanatory conceptual 
framework. 
Whilst two European Commission projects, RISC-RAD (http://riscrad.org/) and NOTE (http://www.note-ip.
org), specifically directed at obtaining a better understanding of genomic instability, have reported — so far no 
replacement for the underpinning framework based on target theory has emerged. This may be because, as 
usual with radiation biology, the picture is complex, especially in distinguishing between the interpretation of 
results from in vitro and in vivo studies. Yet more recent work indicates that additional mechanisms may also 
be important for the understanding of the impact of genomic instability and bystander effects on radiation 
protection regulation: Mukherjee et al. (2012) suggest that radiation-induced chromosomal instability may 
also result from inflammatory processes having the potential to contribute secondary damage expressed 
as non-targeted and delayed radiation effects. Lorimore et al. (2011) conclude that complex multi-cellular 
interactions resulting from bystander effects may influence carcinogenic susceptibility, with inflammatory 
processes responsible for mediating and sustaining the durable effects of ionizing radiation. Given that the 
genotype of each individual is a key determinant of carcogenic susceptibility, then genotype-directed tissue 
responses may be important determinants of understanding the specific consequence of radiation exposure in 
different individuals (ibid). One potentially significant implication of these finding is that differing people may 
have differing responses and susceptibilities to radiation insult.
5-Gy threshold for detectable opacities, but rather 
point to a dose-effect threshold of under 1 Gy 
(Worgul et al., 2007; Chumak et al., 2007).
One of the most at risk groups is infants and 
children (Box 18.4). 
Although increased levels of stress and depression 
have been found in children and teenagers born 
to exposed parents (Panchenko et al., 2005); in 
general, post-Chernobyl psychological disturbances, 
stress, depression and suicides in children and 
adults have been poorly described. The significance 
of psychological impacts on survival rates after 
exposure may prove important, as there has been 
increased suicide rates among clean-up workers 
(Rahu et al., 1997). 
18�3 Fukushima Dai-ichi
On 11 March 2011, the Japanese Great Easter 
Earthquake, involving 5 to 10 metres of slip motion 
on fault zones more than 100 kilometres in length 
along the Japanese Trench Subduction Zone, struck 
the east coast of Japan triggering the shut down 
of 10 operating nuclear power plants. At the time 
of the earthquake, Fukushima Dai-ichi units 1, 2, 
and 3 were operating at full power (Marshall and 
Reardon, 2011). The plants, designed to withstand 
a maximum 8.2 earthquake on the logarithmic 
Richter scale, received a seismic shock 9–15 times 
higher than the design limit (Park, 2011). At the 
time of the accident, the radiological inventory 
at risk within the 6 reactor cores comprised 487 
tonnes of uranium, of which 95 tonnes include 6 % 
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plutonium from the MOX assemblies (4). There 
were a further 1 838 tonnes of stored spent fuel on 
the site, including 1 097 tonnes in the central pool 
store (Large, 2011a). 
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi No. 1 plant, site 
emergency diesel generators provided on-site 
power to the reactor cooling pumps and other 
essential services of the three operating nuclear 
plants, as well as cooling for the six-reactor unit 
spent fuel ponds, and also for the central spent 
fuel store (Brumﬁel and Cyranoski, 2011a). On‑site 
power supplies continued in operation for just 
over one hour until the entire site was swamped 
by a 15 metre tsunami with the total wave height 
amplified by the backwash as the tsunami wave 
was contained and reflected by the heavily terraced 
western section of the site. This part of the site 
(4) MOX (mixed oxide) is a form of nuclear fuel designed for use in breeder reactors, consisting of a blend of uranium and plutonium 
oxides.
(5) According to the Japanese Commission tasked with reviewing the disaster, the tsunami that struck the plant was twice as high as 
the highest wave predicted by previous risk assessments, and the assumption made by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) that 
the plant's cooling system would continue to function after the tsunami struck worsened the disaster (The Investigation Committee, 
2011).
 
Box 18�5 Japanese earthquakes and tsunamis  
Minoura et al. (2001) conclude that traces of large-scale invasion tsunami recorded in the coastal 
sequences of the Sendai plain show an approximate 1 000-year re-occurrence interval, noting that more 
than 1 100 years have passed since the historic Jgan tsunami and, given the reoccurrence interval, the 
possibility of a large tsunami striking the Sendai plain was high. Their findings indicated that a tsunami 
similar to Jgan would inundate the present coastal plain for about 2.5 to 3 km inland. More recently, 
post-Fukushima, the University of Tokyo's Earthquake Research Institute concluded that risk of a 
large-scale earthquake in the region has risen considerably since the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. 
This implies that, since neither practical nor theoretical models can properly determine the dynamics of 
imminent large earthquakes, much greater emphasis may need to be placed on natural hazards for nuclear 
risk assessment (Park, 2011).
contained four reactors, three of which had been 
fully operational at the time of the earthquake, 
resulting in the failure in two or three of the 
nuclear power plants robust sealed containment 
structures as water poured into the plants (Large, 
2011b) (5) (Box 18.5).
The collapse of the Japanese electricity distribution 
grid resulted in the shut-down of individual 
nuclear power plant's electricity systems, resulting 
in loss of essential reactor fuel cooling and crucial 
instrumentation and control systems. This loss 
of offsite power and onsite AC power combined 
with the rapid discharge of DC batteries led to 
a complete station blackout which disabled the 
emergency core cooling systems which, in turn, 
disabled the monitoring of critical parameters 
such as reactor water levels and open critical 
 
Box 18�4 Infants and children: susceptible sub-populations 
Children are generally more susceptible to ionizing radiation and other environmental pollutants, and may 
suffer from life-long health consequences, some of which may be pre-natally determined (EEA, 1999; BCPT, 
2008; Fucic et al., 2008). Pathological changes in reproductive function, peri-natal illnesses and mortality 
were reported several years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The birth rate was additionally influenced 
by migration of the population, use of contraceptives, stress and induced abortions (Kulakov et al., 1993), 
and a peak in Down Syndrome cases was observed in newborns born in 1987, one year after the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident (Zatsepin, 2007). New DNA mutations in children born after the accident to irradiated 
parents and living in non-contaminated territories confirm the long-term health risks in the exposed 
population (Aghajanyan and Suskov, 2009; Weinberg et al., 1997). Additionally, trans-placental exposure to 
radioisotopes may significantly increase the rate of spontaneous miscarriages without clinical symptoms in 
mothers or difference in level of genome damage between women exposed to external and internal radiation 
by radioisotopes (Fucic et al., 2008).
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safety valves, cascading to significant fuel and 
containment overheating and damage (Buongiorno, 
2011). As Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 
was unable to restore either on or off-site power; 
the entire Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear complex 
went into, and remained, in station blackout.
The blackout meant that no safety systems 
remained intact, just passive design features and 
defense in depth layers — representing a beyond 
design base accident. In Unit 1, steam was bubbled 
through the suppression pools, further increasing 
water temperature, and water leaving the core was 
not replaced. As the water dropped below the top 
of the fuel, the temperature in the fuel and cladding 
began to rise rapidly, causing fuel degradation. 
The zirconium in the cladding oxidized, releasing 
hydrogen into the containment dry-well, and after 
a short time, pressure levels in the containment 
were at or above the design pressure, raising risk 
of containment rupture. In response, operators 
manually opened valves to release steam from 
containment into the reactor building, and the 
vented steam containing hydrogen violently 
and exothermally ignited, destroying the reactor 
building, allowing gaseous fission products to 
escape, and exposing elements of the spent fuel to 
open containment. 
Units 3 and 4 soon experienced similar beyond 
design-based cascading conditions. At this point, 
elevated radiation levels of several fission products 
including Caesium 137 and I-131 were detected 
at the reactor buildings, and the plant boundary; 
providing the first indication that some fuel in 
the reactor had already melted (Butler, 2011). The 
presence of hydrogen and these volatile fission 
products in the released steam suggested that 
the temperature had severely damaged the fuel 
cladding inside the reactor pressure vessel (Bonin 
and Slugen, 2011). 
Backup generators and batteries arrived some 
hours later, restoring partial power to plant, but 
these were insufficient to power any of the cooling 
pumps; instead smaller ad hoc fire pumps were 
used to pump boranated seawater into the reactor 
core and containment. 
Within a few hours the reactor cores of the three 
operating units were subject to varying degrees 
of meltdown. The molten fuel had slumped to the 
bottom of the reactor pressure vessels, the reactor 
pressure vessels themselves had failed and, in 
various degrees, the primary containment of the 
pressure suppression system had failed. What 
remained of the reactor instrumentation clearly 
indicated an ongoing and deteriorating situation — 
with thermal activity within the reactor buildings 
resulting in sharp perturbations in containment 
pressure and radiation levels, particularly within 
what remained of the primary containment. Doubts 
about the effectiveness of water injection, and 
increasing concerns about the volumes of highly 
contaminated water have been linked to TEPCO's 
necessary emergency seawater cooling strategy, 
which also involved unconventional cooling efforts 
with helicopter and water cannons over the period 
of a week.
18.3.1 Fukushima Dai-ichi radiation releases: 
cross boundary pollution
The multiple meltdown of reactors at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant released more 
radiation than any accident since Chernobyl. 
Japanese regulatory officials initially assessed the 
accident as Level 4 on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), with the risk level successively 
rising to 5 and eventually to the maximum of 7 — 
a rating equal to the Chernobyl disaster. Of primary 
concern were fission products, readily absorbed 
by the human body, and the actinides, which act 
as heavy metal poisons. Caesium 137 (Cs-137) 
represents the most significant long-term hazard 
since it is readily taken up in human metabolic, 
environmental, and agricultural systems. 
Early measurements reported from the United 
States, more than 7 000 km from Fukushima, 
confirmed maximum concentrations of radioxenon 
(Xe-133) in excess of 40 becquerel per cubic metre 
(Bq/m3) — more than 40 000 in excess of normal 
expected average concentration (Bowyer et al., 
2011). High activity concentrations of several 
man-made radionuclides (I-131, I-132, Te-132, 
Cs-134 and Cs-137) were detected along the Iberian 
Peninsula from 28 March to 7 April 2011, deduced 
through back-trajectories analysis, and verified by 
activity concentrations (Lozano et al., 2011). Other 
elevated levels were recorded in air sampling, 
rainfall and sheep's milk at Thessaloniki, Greece 
(Manolopoulou et al., 2011). In April and May 2011, 
fallout radionuclides (Cs-134, Cs-137, I-131) were 
detected in environmental samples in Krasnoyarsk, 
Russian central Asia. Similar maximum levels of 
I-131 and Cs-137/Cs-134 and I-131/Cs-137 ratios 
in water samples collected in Russia and Greece 
suggested the high-velocity global movement of 
radioactive contamination from the Fukushima 
nuclear accident (Bolsunovsky and Dementyev, 
2011); as did results from the Russian rapid 
response Typhoon monitoring system (Box 18.6).
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18.3.2 Post-Fukushima Dai-ichi radiation releases: 
Japan
The very high population density near the damaged 
reactors and spent fuel dispersions implies 
increased risk for local communities. The regulators 
conducted an initial evacuation of 100 000 people 
from around Fukushima, and after some hesitation, 
Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission established 
a new 20 km evacuation zone, with a further 
90 000 people evacuated. Because damaged plant 
monitoring proved unreliable — on at least four 
occasions TEPCO retracted findings on the amount 
and composition of radionuclides in areas in and 
around the plant, or on reactor parameters — it 
has been suggested that more complete analyses of 
reactor-event scenarios and release fractions can be 
derived from outside Japan (Nature, Editorial, 2011a).
The radiation releases dispersed according to the 
wind direction and weight of the particles. The 
radionuclides of interest were I-131, primarily linked 
to thyroid cancer; Cs-134 and Cs-137, primarily 
linked to bladder and liver cancer; and strontium, 
primarily linked to bone disorder and leukaemia. 
Significantly, there is confirmed isotopic evidence 
for the release of plutonium into the atmosphere and 
deposition on the ground in northwest and south of 
the Fukushima nuclear site (Zheng, 2012). 
In September 2011, Japan's Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA) estimated that the Fukushima 
Daiichi plant had released 15 000 terabecquerels 
Cs-137 to air. Other estimates vary. However, it may 
well be too early to accurately estimate or determine 
the scale of the damage and radiological releases 
(Cyranoski and Brumﬁel, 2011). A meta‑analysis 
comprising radionuclide measurement data and 
atmospheric dispersion modeling (Stohl et al., 2011), 
reported in Nature (Brumfiel, 2011), suggested 
that the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi may have 
released far more radiation than Japanese regulatory 
estimates; concluding that the emissions started 
earlier, lasted longer, and were therefore higher than 
earlier official estimates assume. The study noted 
that: 
'While at ﬁrst sight it seemed fortunate 
that westerly winds prevailed most of the 
time during the accident, a diﬀerent picture 
emerges from our detailed analysis. Exactly 
during and following the period of the 
strongest Cs-137 emissions on 14 and 15 March 
as well as after another period with strong 
emissions on 19 March, the radioactive plume 
was advected over Eastern Honshu Island, 
where precipitation deposited a large fraction 
of Cs-137 on land surfaces. The plume was also 
dispersed quickly over the entire Northern 
Hemisphere, ﬁrst reaching North America on 
15 March and Europe on 22 March. In general, 
simulated and observed concentrations of 
Xe-133 and Cs-137 both at Japanese as well 
as at remote sites were in good quantitative 
agreement with each other. Altogether, we 
estimate that 6.4 TBq of Cs-137, or 19 % of the 
total fallout until 20 April, were deposited over 
Japanese land areas, while most of the rest fell 
over the North Paciﬁc Ocean. Only 0.7 TBq, 
or 2 % of the total fallout were deposited on 
land areas other than Japan' (Stohl et al., 2011, 
p. 28 322).
In other words, Fukushima releases may have 
contained an estimated 3.5 × 1 016 Bq Cs‑137 — 
roughly twice the official government figure, with 
almost one fifth falling on the Japanese mainland. 
This means that the Fukushima release can be 
 
Box 18�6 Typhoon monitoring system 
For hazardous facilities located close to larger cities, early stage accident detection, monitoring and 
warning systems are critical — as they allow for better impact prediction and mitigation of human and 
environmental consequences. During the Fukushima accident, Typhoon, the early monitoring network 
associated with the Russian Early Warning and Emergency Response System (REWERS), carried out 
operational analysis and forecasting for this large-scale radioactive emergency. The monitoring was 
achieved through a network of observational stations, with radiometric laboratories providing the 
measurement data for environmental samples. The first Fukushima air mass transfer dispersion calculations 
made by Typhoon's experts were carried out on the evening of 11 March and on 12 March 2011 — the 
radiation monitoring network of Roshydromet in the Russian far east was set to rapid measurement mode 
to obtain radionuclide dose rate measurements every hour. Throughout the accident period at Fukushima, 
Typhoon cooperated with the IAEA and the World Meteorological Institute in performing calculations and 
assessments of trans-boundary emissions (Shershakov, 2011).
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estimated to equal to 40 % of the Cs-137 release from 
Chernobyl.
By November 2011, the air radiation level in Ibaraki 
Prefecture was about 0.14 microsievert per hour, 
equivalent to an annual dose of about 1 millisievert, 
the safety limit for exposure under normal standards 
(Ishizuka, 2011). On 14 December 2011, the Japanese 
Science Ministry assessed caesium fallout in 
Fukushima Prefecture in the four months after the 
March 11 disaster at 6.83 MBq/m2 — 94 % of which 
was concentrated in March, an indication of the 
severity of radiation discharge shortly after the onset 
of the accident (Asahi Shimbun, 2011).
Fallout attaches strongly, through ion exchange, to 
soil — in particular to clay soils common throughout 
Fukushima. From there the radiocaesium will move 
slowly into plants, at a rate, and level of risk, that 
remains unclear. Cs-137 strongly contaminated the 
soil in large areas of eastern and northeastern Japan, 
whereas western Japan was relatively sheltered by 
mountain ranges. The soils around the Fukushima 
nuclear site and neighboring prefectures have been 
extensively contaminated with depositions of more 
than 100 000 and 10 000 megabecquerel per square 
kilometre (MBq/km2), respectively (Yasunaria et al., 
2011).
Correspondingly, it was reported that Fukushima 
Prefecture survey conducted in June and July 2011 
found 33 Cs-137 hot-spots in excess of 1.48 MBq/m2, 
the level set by the Soviet Union for forced 
resettlement after the Chernobyl accident. A further 
132 locations had combined Cs-137/134 of more 
than 0.555 MBq/m2, the level at which the Soviet 
authorities called for voluntary evacuation and 
imposed a ban on farming (Obe, 2011). Further 
reports suggest that radiation pollution is widely 
dispersed in Japan, with the Japanese Science 
Ministry confirming that Cs-134 and Cs-137 fallout 
was present in all prefectures, with the highest 
combined cumulative density of Cs-134 and 
Cs-137 found in Hitachinaka, Ibaraki Prefecture, 
at 0.0408 MBq/m2, followed by 0.0226 MBq/m2 in 
Yamagata, the capital of Yamagata Prefecture, and 
0.0174 MBq/m2 in Tokyo's Shinjuku Ward (Ishizuka, 
2011). Further reports indicated that the Japanese 
Environment Ministry estimated the contaminated 
zones at circa 2 400 km2 over Fukushima and four 
nearby prefectures, with Cs-134 and Cs-137 the 
dominant contaminants, mainly contained in the 
topsoil layer. By definition, shorter-lived isotopes 
decayed promptly (Reuters, 2011).
The Fukushima accident contaminated large areas 
of farmland and forests, albeit not as severely or 
extensively as at Chernobyl. But lacking land for 
resettlement and facing public outrage over the 
accident, the Japanese government has embarked 
on an unprecedented decontamination effort. The 
Japanese Ministry of the Environment estimates 
disposals of 15–31 million m3 of contaminated 
soil and debris by the time the decontamination 
projects finish (Bird, 2012). The total remediation 
programme may cover about 500 km2 where 
radiation dose levels are above 20 millisieverts 
per year (mSv/year), and about 1 300 km2 where 
radiation dose levels are between 5 mSv/year and 
20 mSv/year (IAEA, 2011a). In order to cope with 
this level of contamination, and in contradiction 
to international radiation protection standards, 
Japanese regulators have raised dose constraints to 
20 mSv/year — thereby subjecting schoolchildren 
to exposures normally only tolerated by adult 
nuclear workers.
Over the time of the accident, the amount of 
highly contaminated water on the site rose from 
10 000 to 100 000 tonnes, presenting storage capacity 
difficulties (Reardon, 2011). The French Institute 
for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety 
estimated that between March and mid July, the 
amount of radioactive Cs-137 discharged into the 
Pacific from the Fukushima Daiichi plant amounted 
to 27.1 million megabecquerels — the greatest 
amount known to have been released to water from 
a single accident (Brumﬁel and Cyranoski, 2011b).
18.3.3 Fukushima Dai-ichi aftermath
The Japanese government established an 
independent Investigation Committee on the 
Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations 
of Tokyo Electric Power Company on June 7, 2011. 
The Committee's December 2011 Interim Report 
strongly criticised both central government and 
TEPCO, noting that both seemed unequal to the task 
of making decisions in order to stem radiation leaks 
as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the 
days and weeks following the disaster. The Interim 
Report also noted that Japan's response to the crisis 
was flawed by poor communication and delays in 
releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at the 
facility, and was critical of the regulatory authorities' 
'inappropriate preparation' of nuclear disaster 
emergency planning (Investigation Committee, 
2011).
In a commentary published in Nature, committee 
members Tomoyuki Taira and Yukio Hatoyama, 
both also members of the House of Representatives 
in the Japanese Diet, with Hatoyama having served 
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as Prime Minister of Japan from 2009 until 2010, 
noted that their investigation had 
'shown that key pieces of evidence remain 
incomplete… Particularly important is 
finding out whether the worst-case scenario 
occurred: that is, whether self-sustaining 
nuclear reactions were re-ignited in the core 
(re-criticality), creating more fission products 
and heat damage; whether the explosions that 
rocked the plant days after the earthquake 
were nuclear in origin, releasing radioactive 
metals from damaged fuel rods; and whether 
molten fuel has broken through the reactor's 
base, threatening environmental contamination' 
(Tomoyuki and Hatoyama, 2011). 
These internal critiques were compounded by 
others, questioning the relative independence of 
Japanese regulators: 
'The Japanese government's main sources for 
scientific information for Fukushima were the 
industry ministry's Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety 
Commission. Although these bodies might 
have expertise in nuclear reactor physics, they 
also have ties to the nuclear industry that 
create a conflict of interest. And they were 
not an effective and prompt source for quick 
decisions on decontamination or health risks' 
(Nature, Editorial, 2011b).
Despite these ongoing difficulties, on 16 December 
2012, the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshihiko 
Noda, declared that the Fukushima nuclear plant 
had entered the state of cold shutdown; with 
cold shutdown confirmed by IAEA in their Status 
Report (IAEA, 2011b) (6). However, whilst the 
reactor temperatures had fallen, there still remained 
uncertainty about a series of ongoing problems, 
including the state and level of the nuclear fuel, 
particularly after confirmation that molten fuel may 
have eaten through three-quarters of the concrete 
under unit 1 and damaged the bases of two of the 
other reactors (TEPCO, 2012). A revised TEPCO 
timetable suggests that decommissioning, including 
melted reactor fuel, fuel rod removal, and repair of 
containment vessels, will take up to 40 years (ibid).
Extrapolating from monthly trade ministry data, the 
average Japanese nuclear power plant utilisation 
rate fell to 15.2 % in December 2011 from 67.9 % a 
year earlier (Reuters, 2012) and, following a further 
reactor shut-down in January 2012, to 10.3 % 
(Japan Times, 2012). With almost all of Japan's 
54 reactors either offline in early 2012, or scheduled 
for shutdown, the issue of structural safety looms 
over any discussion about restarting them. Japan, 
traditionally a pro-nuclear country, derived 
about 30 % of its electricity from nuclear plants in 
2010 — however opposition has been emerging 
as an important political issue, and the country's 
nuclear industry has been repositioning itself for a 
significantly less attractive market, halting plans to 
build 14 further reactors by 2030 (Crooks, 2011).
Although post-Fukushima plans for bio-monitoring 
and epidemiological assessment are still not 
finalised, it is clear that there will need to be 
a significant assessment of a wide range of 
environmental risk factors. Because some of the 
evacuees have started to settle across the country, 
long-term follow-up of the victims will need to 
account for geographic dispersion (Sugihara and 
Suda, 2011). 
The final Report of the National Diet of Japan 
noted the severity of the future decontamination 
challenges that Japan faces, and strongly criticised 
the underlying organisational, institutional and legal 
framework that resulted in the 'regulatory capture' 
of safety systems. The Independent Investigation 
Commission also concluded that the Fukushima 
accident was a man-made disaster, pointing to 
the key role of human agency in radiation risk 
controversies, see Box 18.7.
18.3.4 Post-Fukushima nuclear policy impact 
Before the Fukushima accident, most planned 
nuclear power plant projects were in Asia and 
Eastern Europe, extending a trend from earlier years, 
including a dispersion of proposed new reactors 
around the Pacific seismic region. Between 2009 and 
April 2011 construction started on nine units; and 
where projects are going ahead, they do so with 
strong government support, including implicit or 
explicit public subsidy (Box 18.8). 
Since the Fukushima accident, the number of 
operating reactors fell from 441 at the beginning of 
2011 to 435 in early 2012, with a total net installed 
(6) 'Cold shutdown' normally refers to a state in which a reactor has become subcritical, with the temperature having been brought to 
a stable level below 95 °C through the operation of normal systems.
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Box 18�8 Nuclear costs
A key challenge for nuclear power has been the high cost of construction (Davis, 2011). Nuclear new 
builds are high value and high risk construction projects with a marked tendency for significant delay and 
delay claims, cost growth and investor risk (KPMG, 2011). Based on the experiences of 52 United States 
investor-owned utilities that built nuclear power plants in 1960–2011, the Texas Institute (2011) concluded 
that building nuclear power plants provide significant economic risks involving a 70 % certainty that a 
power utility would see borrowing costs rise due to the downgrading of credit rating once construction 
began, with plant construction marred by significant cost overruns and electricity tariff increases. Nuclear 
plants, which are among the largest and most complex engineering projects in the world, also carry high 
technical and regulatory risks, with World Nuclear Association figures showing very significant cost overruns 
for most projects, implying that utilities may only be able to pay for new plants if governments guarantee 
their income (Thomas, 2010a). Thus, costs and risks associated with nuclear construction may mean 
that plants may only be built with implicit and explicit public subsidy, including long-term power purchase 
agreements (Professional Engineering, 2011).
capacity of just more than 368 gigawatts (GW), 
representing a decrease in installed nuclear capacity 
of around 10 GW or 3 %. Similarly, construction starts 
fell from 15 in 2010 to just 2 in 2011. New nuclear 
plant construction is progressing in Brazil, China, 
India, and Russia. Iran has recently completed its 
first reactor. New-build orders have been placed in 
the United Arab Emirates and the United States, with 
a planned call for tender in South Africa. Ordering 
continues in China, India, Korea and Russia. 
In Europe, Finland and France are completing their 
new Generation III European Pressurized Reactor 
(EPR) at Olkiluoto and Flammanville (Box 18.9), with 
the Finnish parliament and regulators having granted 
permits for construction of the country's sixth and 
seventh commercial reactors to Teollisuuden Voima 
(TVO) and Fennovoima (a subsidiary of E.ON), with 
a further reactor to be built at Olkiluoto by TVO. In 
October 2011, Fennovoima announced that it had 
chosen Pyhäjoki, in northern Finland, as a site for 
further nuclear expansion, with construction expected 
to start in 2015. Elsewhere, the United Kingdom's 
government, excluding Scotland, has in principle 
approved the concept of a new generation of up to 
eight nuclear power plants, subject to reactor generic 
design approvals; Bulgaria has begun detailed 
planning for a reactor at Belene; Romania has issued a 
planned call for tender; Poland's state utility, PGE, has 
shortlisted three sites as possible locations for their 
first nuclear power plant; and the Czech Republic 
is progressing with planning new-build — despite 
downsizing the proposed Temelin site tender from 
five to two reactors and Austria's strong objection to 
the expansion of the Temelin plant, which is situated 
near the border of the two countries.
Although Sweden formerly had a nuclear phase-out 
policy aiming to end nuclear power generation by 
2010, on 5 February 2009, the Swedish Government 
announced an agreement allowing for the 
replacement of existing reactors. However, the 
 
Box 18�7 The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission  
 (NAIIC, 2012)
'The earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 were natural disasters of a magnitude that shocked the 
entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade 
disaster.'
'The Commission recognizes that the residents in the affected area are still struggling from the effects 
of the accident. They continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, 
displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination 
of vast areas of the environment. There is no foreseeable end to the decontamination and restoration 
activities that are essential for rebuilding communities. The Commission concludes that the government and 
the regulators are not fully committed to protecting public health and safety; that they have not acted to 
protect the health of the residents and to restore their welfare.'
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Fukushima disaster may have reversed prior public 
support of nuclear power, with a BBC World Service 
— Globescan (2011) poll showing that 64 % of Swedes 
opposed new reactors while 27 % supported them. 
Similarly, whilst Spain has no plans for expansion 
or closure, public opposition to new nuclear build 
remains very high at 55 %. The United Kingdom is 
more favourable towards the use of nuclear energy 
than any other European country, with 37 % in favour 
of building new nuclear infrastructure (ibid).
Given that Germany uses around 20 % of all EU 
electricity, the government's March 2011 decision 
to close 7 of its 18 reactors, followed in June by 
the German Parliament vote to phase out nuclear 
power by 2022 and to invest in renewables, energy 
efficiency, grid network infrastructure, and plan for 
trans-boundary pumped-storage hydroelectricity 
(PSH), may prove significant for European energy 
policy as a whole. In June 2011, Italian voters also 
passed a referendum to cancel plans for new reactors, 
with over 94 % of the electorate voting in favour of 
the construction ban. Because 55 % of the eligible 
voters participated, the vote is binding. Elsewhere, six 
months after the Fukushima plant catastrophe, strong 
Swiss public opposition to nuclear led to a decision 
not to replace the country's five reactors when they 
come to the end of their operation in 2034. Belgium 
also confirmed a nuclear phase-out, with no firm date 
set for end of operation, whilst the only Dutch reactor 
at Borssele will remain open until 2033 if it can 
comply with the highest safety standards. It is also 
worth noting that, at a ministerial meeting in Vienna; 
ministers and heads of delegations of Austria, Greece, 
Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Portugal, observed by ministers from Cyprus, 
Denmark and Estonia, concluded that nuclear power 
was not compatible with the concept of sustainable 
development, suggesting that nuclear power does not 
provide a viable option in combating climate change 
(Vienna Declaration, 2011).
Before Fukushima, the IAEA had predicted that 
around the world nuclear plants would add 360 GW 
of generating capacity by 2035, the equivalent of 
over 200 new reactors. Post-Fukushima, it has 
halved this forecast, partly due to diminishing 
public acceptance of nuclear energy, but also to the 
increased costs of nuclear security improvements 
and of insurance premiums for accident-related 
damages (Leveque, 2011). France has set radical 
safety standards for the industry. However the 
required plant upgrades are both technically 
difficult and expensive, with the French nuclear 
authority, ASN, estimating the cost of necessary 
improvements at the country's 58 nuclear reactors at 
around EUR 10 billion (Nature, Editorial, 2012).
Western European Nuclear Regulators 
Association (WENRA) 'Stress Tests' comprised 
a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of 
nuclear power plants in the light of Fukushima, 
including extreme natural events which challenge 
plant-safety functions, leading to severe accident 
(WENRA Task Force, 2011). However, since the 
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
(ENSREG, 2011) decided that security issues were 
outside WENRA's remit, post-Fukushima stress 
tests of EU's 143 nuclear power reactors did not 
include accident and incident from an aeroplane 
strike or terrorist attack. The exclusion of these 
security issues seems unfortunate given that, 
for example, all UK civil nuclear infrastructures 
are uniquely implicated in all four high priority 
tier-one threats identified in the UK National 
Security Strategy (HM Govt., 2010). 
Despite further new-build plans in e.g. Finland, 
France and the United Kingdom; the general 
post-Fukushima situation in the EU implies that 
the limited construction of nuclear new-build 
since 2000, and potentially in the coming decade, 
combined with the ageing of nuclear power 
 
Box 18�9 European Union Nuclear New-build Experience
The Olkiluoto 3 EPR in Finland was originally planned to go online early in 2009, but is now predicted to 
start generating in late 2014 (Thomas, 2010c). The new 1.6 GW AREVA designed EPR is conceived as 
first of type, with Siemens responsible for steam turbines and electricity generators. Originally priced at 
EUR 3 billion, the project is now estimated at EUR 5.7 billion and rising. The fixed price turn-key contract is 
subject to an ongoing dispute between the French manufacturer AREVA and TVO with the former claiming 
compensation of EUR 1 billion for alleged failures, and the latter demanding EUR 2.4 billion in compensation 
for delays (Thomas, 2010b). Similarly, in France, EDF confirmed the EPR Flamanville project was running 
late and increased its estimate of the cost. Originally scheduled to start operating in 2012, it is hoped that 
the reactor may be operational by 2016. Originally priced at EUR 3.3 billion, the reactor completion is 
currently estimated at EUR 6 billion (Thomas, 2011). 
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Box 18�10 Cultural and policy diversity in energy governance
Finland: The Finnish discussion culture can be summarised as one in which decisions are preceded by an 
open public and policy debate, but once the decision has been made, according to the rules and regulations 
in force, there should no longer be room for complaints and further debate. Provided that proper 
procedures have been followed, changing course would mean loss of face and identity. Correspondingly, 
nuclear power has acquired the reputation of being the cheapest, safest, and most reliable source of 
electricity generation. This is primarily because there have been no serious nuclear accidents in Finland, and 
their reactors maintain a high reliability and load factor. These advantages are coupled with arrangements 
under the Mankala Principle, whereby large industrial corporations such as forest and heavy industry — as 
shareholders in nuclear power companies — can buy electricity at cost price (Lehtonen, 2010a; Lehtonen, 
2010b).
Germany: Decisions on nuclear power cannot be separated from prior energy policy choices, and Germany 
has demonstrated a very strong, historic commitment to renewables, with renewable electricity production 
doubling between 1998 and 2003 and again between 2003 and 2008. By 2010 renewables contributed 
17 % of total electricity production, and there are plans to increase this to at least 35 % by 2020 (BMU, 
2011). Innovative German practice includes the first implementation of a fixed price feed-in-tariff, and 
huge purchases of solar photo voltaics (PV), which have driven down the world price of modules. Energy 
futures have also devolved to the local level, with communities securing political agreements under which 
the Bundesländer (federal states) are enabled to set goals and locations for renewable generation. This 
ensures that local energy resources and financial subsidies — paid for by customers (through feed-in 
tariffs) or taxpayers (through cheap loans provided by the government development bank (KfW)) — benefit 
not only the energy companies but also the local people, with profits and employment kept in the region. 
Germany's non-nuclear energy policy is framed in the context of national pride and scientific-technological 
achievement, twinned with economic expansion: 'As the largest industrialized (European) nation, we can 
achieve a transformation toward efficient and renewable energy, with all the opportunities that brings for 
exports, and the development of new technologies and jobs' (Chancellor Angela Merkel, in German, 2011).
plants and the finalisation of nuclear phase-out 
in Germany and other European countries, will 
lead to a relative decreasing share of electricity 
production sourced from EU nuclear energy 
after 2020. The emphasis is likely to shift towards 
maximizing output of existing reactors through 
extension, up-grade and retrofit (Leveque, 2011; 
Coenen and López, 2010). 
The energy futures landscape within Europe is one 
of major national differences between state and 
market, choices and trade-offs over supply-side, 
demand-side, transmission and load-balancing 
infrastructure (Schiellerup and Atanasiu, 2011). 
Although EU Member States diverge in terms 
of cultural and industrial landscapes, public 
opinion, technological structures, institutions, 
regulatory practice and energy mixes (Box 18.10), 
the European energy policy offers a fairly open and 
flexible framework in which some Member States 
could develop collective action on energy issues. 
The development of sustainable and affordable low 
carbon energy remains a growing economic sector 
with huge potential for job creation (Andoura, 
2010). 
18�4 Nuclear liability
The risk to people, the environment and to the 
future of nuclear energy as a consequence of a major 
incident is significant. The cost of the Chernobyl 
accident can only be roughly estimated, but a variety 
of government estimates from the 1990s put the cost 
of the accident, over two decades, at hundreds of 
billions of dollars. 
More recent events at Fukushima tend to support 
the conclusion that reactor accidents may prove 
the single largest financial risk facing the nuclear 
industry, far outweighing the combined effect 
of market, credit, and operational risks. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, liability estimates vary with ongoing 
events. Japanese replacement power costs in 2011 
alone have been estimated at EUR 6.5 billion 
(JPY 700 billion), with decommissioning costs 
for the six reactors are estimated at EUR 9 billion 
(JPY 1 trillion). On 20 May, 2011, TEPCO reported 
a net loss for the fiscal year ending in March 2011 
of EUR 11.5 billion (JPY 1.25 trillion), the largest 
corporate loss in Japanese history outside the 
financial sector. By mid 2011, Bank of America Merrill 
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Box 18�11 High burn-up fuel 
Following the liberalisation of the EU energy market, it was realized that a decrease in nuclear costs could 
be achieved if reactor power could be optimized by using more uranium as reactor fuel and keeping the 
fuel rods in longer. This means that generation III reactor high burn-up spent fuel will be significantly 
more radioactive than conventional spent fuel. Five years after discharge, each square metre of spent fuel 
in the proposed EPR cooling ponds may generate up to 17 kW of heat compared with 11 kW from more 
conventional spent fuel pool. And the high density of spent fuel racks from the proposed Westinghouse 
AP1000 reactor implies that 24–36 kW of heat may need to be removed from each square metre. Safety 
could depend on the effective and continuous removal of the significant thermal power of high burn-up 
spent fuel, potentially requiring additional pumps, back-up electricity supplies and back-up water supplies: 
all systems potentially vulnerable to mechanical failure or deliberate disruption. It is also likely that densely 
packed high burn-up spent fuel may require additional neutron absorbers, and greater radiation shielding 
during encapsulation and storage (Richards, 2009).
Lynch reported that compensation claims could total 
EUR 93–102 billion (JPY 10–11 trillion) over the next 
two years, with liabilities far exceeding the current 
market cap (Maloney, 2011). By September 2011, 
Fukushima liabilities stood at anywhere between 
EUR 76–152 billion, with the Japanese Centre for 
Economic Research estimating clean-up remediation 
at EUR 190 billion over the next 10 years (Kobayashi, 
2011).
Currently, individual European nuclear accident 
liabilities are capped at EUR 169 million for 
operators. However, the Paris Convention on 
Nuclear Third Party Liability and Brussels 
Convention (2011) (7) aims to raise this to ensure 
that victims of a nuclear incident are compensated 
for resulting damage. Under the proposals, 
nuclear operators would be liable for the first 
EUR 700 million for any accident, with the national 
government having the option of adding a 
maximum of a further EUR 500 million towards the 
company's liabilities. Collectively, other signatory 
states could contribute a further EUR 300 million, 
potentially bringing the total available to 
EUR 1 500 million for any one accident. 
Yet actuarial analysis suggests that even this level of 
cover may fail to account for liability in case of major 
accident. Versicherungsforen Leipzig GmbH (2011), 
a company that specialises in actuarial calculations, 
concluded that these costs were not adequately 
internalised, suggesting that full insurance against 
nuclear disasters would increase the price of nuclear 
electricity by up to EUR 2.36 per kilowatt hour (kWh) 
— a sum that may weaken the economic case for 
nuclear power compared to other low-carbon sources. 
Both the required liability (EUR 6.09 trillion), based 
on an estimate of the average maximum damage and 
corresponding variance, and the resulting insurance 
premium, are significantly higher than the financial 
resources currently legally required of nuclear power 
plant operators. Versicherungsforen Leipzig's study 
estimated that future damage and liability insurance 
costs would exceed the financial resources that 
nuclear power plant licensees are currently required 
to maintain by several orders of magnitude. In this 
context, nuclear disasters seem uninsurable, due 
to a combination of methodological difficulties in 
estimating the probability of occurrence of damage, 
insufficient size of the risk pool, and the extent of 
potential maximum damage (ibid).
To the extent that liability rules provide incentives 
for prevention, the financial limit on the liability 
of an operator may lead to under-deterrence — 
since, as a result of the financial cap on liability, the 
potential complementary function of liability rules 
in providing additional deterrence may be lost. The 
financial limit, and the resulting nuclear subsidy, 
may also distort competition by unduly favoring 
nuclear energy compared to other energy sources 
(Faure and Fiore, 2009). 
The issue of nuclear waste liability has also been 
subject to intense and prolonged debate, especially 
in the context of high burn-up fuel proposed for 
Generation III reactors (Box 18.11).
(7) Note, not all EU Member States are signatories. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Turkey are signatories to the Paris Convention on Nuclear 
Third Party Liability and Brussels Convention. 
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18�5 Nuclear risk: probabilistic 
risk assessment and beyond 
design-based accidents 
Key to the analysis of nuclear safety is the analytical 
concept of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) or 
probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). Whilst PRA 
calculations are not taken as absolute, but rather as 
significant indicators of plant weaknesses, they do 
underpin the concept of acceptable risks and tolerable 
consequences under fault conditions. In this context, 
the risk of an accident must be acceptable, and the 
radiological consequences tolerable, with more 
frequently occurring incidents countered by greater 
resilience through enhanced safety systems grounded 
in robust engineered structures. However, PRA has 
proven structurally limited in its ability to conceive 
and capture the outcomes and consequences of a 
nuclear accident resulting from a cascading series of 
events, as described in the Fukushima disaster and all 
previous major nuclear accidents. This implies that 
relatively simplified chain-of-event fault-tree models 
may not be sufficient to account for the indirect, 
non-linear, and feedback relationships common 
for accidents in complex systems. Here, modeled 
common-cause, common-mode, and dependent 
failures have proved problematic; partly due to data 
limitation (since major failures occur infrequently), 
and because failure mechanisms are often plant 
speciﬁc (Ramana, 2009). 
Most PRAs assume failure likelihood can be 
captured through identical, independent log-normal 
failure distributions. Since strong independence 
assumptions employed in PRAs assume that 
reactor safety systems are duplicated and reliable, 
core damage frequency estimates are typically 
very low. Because of this, there may be good 
reason to question the conceptual and theoretical 
completeness, and empirical and practical reliability 
of PRA models. This is partly because PRA is prone 
to under-counting accident scenarios — since risk 
is estimated for enumerated reactor states, failure 
to account for unknown and serially cascading 
beyond design-base accident scenarios leaves an 
un-measurable model error in the core damage 
frequency estimate (Maloney, 2011). 
Before the Fukushima accident, for example, the 
Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guidance 
(NSC, 2006), updated in early 2011, concluded that 
'robust sealed containment structures would prevent 
damage from a tsunami… and no radiological hazard 
would be likely'. Whereas after the accident, the 
Chairman and President of the European Nuclear 
Society High Scientific Council stressed that 'the 
magnitude of the tsunami that struck Japan was 
beyond the design value to which the reactors were 
supposed to withstand' (Bonin and Slugen, 2011). 
These pre- and post-facto statements suggest that, 
although reactor design can prove relatively robust 
against speciﬁc accidents and speciﬁc modes, 
safety cannot be guaranteed for cascading beyond 
design-base accidents. In the case of Fukushima, 
because the cascade from earthquake, through 
tsunami, to reactor and spent fuel fault condition 
was discounted, no account was taken for the need 
to respond to the failure of three nuclear reactors 
and spent fuel ponds. 
Pre-Fukushima probability estimates of a major 
nuclear accident were around 1:100 000 for the 
440 reactors in operation over the next 20–25 years. 
Since Fukushima, estimated probabilities of major 
nuclear accidents have increased significantly. 
However, estimation of core melt and containment 
failure may still prove problematic. Chernobyl 
and Fukushima together comprise catastrophic 
meltdown in four nuclear reactors over the past 
few decades, implying that that the probability 
of a major accident in the current worldwide fleet 
over the next 20–25 years is around 1:5 000. Thus, 
whereas earlier estimates assumed a probability of 
one major nuclear accident over a 100-year period, 
reoccurrence of these events can be expected 
once every 20 years (Goldemberg, 2011). This 
reassessment of nuclear risk has been particularly 
apparent in Germany, where Chancellor Angela 
Merkel concluded that Fukushima 'has forever 
changed the way we define risk' (Schwägerl, 2011); 
an analysis echoed by Norbert Röttgen, Germany's 
Environment Minister, who noted that Fukushima 
'has swapped a mathematical definition of nuclear 
energy's residual risk with a terrible real-life 
experience… we can no longer put forward the 
argument of a tiny risk of 10–7, as we have seen that 
it can get real in a high-tech society like Japan' (ibid). 
Importantly, the governmental German Advisory 
Council on the Environment also concurred with this 
critique, suggesting that: 'The widespread view that 
the extent of the damage due even to major incidents 
can be adequately determined and limited in order 
to be weighed up… is becoming considerably 
less persuasive… The fact that the accident was 
triggered by a process which the nuclear reactor 
was not designed to withstand… casts a light on the 
limitations of technological risk assessment… based 
on assumptions, and that reality can prove these 
assumptions wrong' (SRU, 2011b, p.11).
Levels of reliability required for a complex 
interactive and tightly coupled nuclear power plant 
are very great (Perrow, 1984), with the range of 
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operating reactors having differing sets of designs 
and configurations. Because of their complexity and 
the physical conditions during reactor operation, the 
understanding of the reactor design and operation is 
always partial. Additionally, as system components 
and external events can interact in unanticipated 
ways, it is not possible to predict all possible 
failure modes. It follows that numerical estimates 
of probabilities of significant accidents remain 
deeply uncertain. As the Fukushima Investigation 
Committee concluded (2011, p. 22): 'The accidents 
present us (with) crucial lessons on how we should 
be prepared for… incidents beyond assumptions'. 
18�6 Conclusion
Because it is likely that post-Fukushima health 
consequences may start to arise and be documented 
over the next 5–40 years, a key lesson to be learned 
concerns the multi-factorial nature of this event. It 
can be expected that a number of chemical agents 
were released and, hence, the final biological 
effect may depend on the consequential complex 
radiochemical environment. Thus, in planning 
future radiation protection, preventive measures 
and bio-monitoring of exposed populations, it is of 
great importance to: 
•  integrate the available data on both cancer and 
non-cancer diseases following overexposure to 
ionizing radiation; 
•  take a complex approach in the interpretation 
of data — considering the impacts of age, 
gender, and geographical dispersion of affected 
individuals, and the psychological, educational 
and social status of victims; and 
•  integrate the evaluation of latency periods 
between exposure and disease diagnosis 
development for each cancer type. 
Bunn, the former adviser to the US Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, and Heinonen, the former 
Deputy Director General of the IAEA, also conclude 
that there is a need for more stringent nuclear safety 
standards, and propose six areas for improvement 
involving substantial cost and time investment: 
•  operators must plan for events beyond design 
bases; 
•  more stringent standards for protecting nuclear 
facilities against terrorist sabotage; 
•  a stronger international emergency response; 
•  international reviews of security and safety; 
•  binding international standards on safety and 
security; and 
•  international co‑operation to ensure regulatory 
effectiveness (Bunn and Heinonen, 2011). 
In addition, there is also the need to defend 
and adapt the coastal sites of nuclear plants to 
the hazards of rising sea levels, storm surges, 
flooding and the possibility of eventual nuclear site 
islanding (IME, 2009; Kopytko and Perkins, 2011). 
It should also be understood that it is very unlikely 
that current major accident liability regimes will 
prove adequate, and a significant re-adjustment 
may be essential.
This wide-ranging set of recommendations 
constitutes a significant step forward in radiation 
protection philosophy. However, there seem 
to be no resounding new revelations over the 
vulnerability of nuclear power to unforeseen 
natural disasters like earthquakes and tsunamis, 
or through human or engineering based fault 
conditions, including accidental or deliberate harm. 
Accidents are by nature, accidental, and the cost 
of ignoring this common-sense axiom can prove 
radiologically catastrophic (Stirling, 2011). 
Whilst the imaginative use of foresight and 
precaution are key to the management of nuclear 
risks, a further paradox lies at the heart of the 
debate: Whereas fundamental radiation protection 
science is characterised by very real uncertainty, 
indeterminacy and contingency, the regulation 
and operation of nuclear facilities is based on 
the language of certainty. The nearer one gets 
to the fundamental science and engineering of 
complex technological systems, the greater the 
uncertainty and complexity; yet the nearer one 
gets to regulation and operation, the greater the 
certainty and simplicity. Since somewhere along 
this continuum, uncertainty has been translated 
into certainty, and risk has been translated into 
'safety', the question remains: when, how, and why 
does this transformation happen? 
Given the degree of uncertainty and complexity 
attached to even the most tightly framed and 
rigorous nuclear risk assessment, attempts to 
weight the magnitude of accident by the expected 
probability of occurrence has proven problematic, 
since these essentially theoretical calculations 
can only be based on sets of pre-conditioning 
assumptions. This is not an arcane philosophical 
point, but rather a very practical issue with 
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significant implications for the proper management 
of nuclear risk. With its failure to plan for the 
cascade of unexpected beyond design-base 
accidents, the regulatory emphasis on risk-based 
probabilistic assessment has proven very limited. 
An urgent re-appraisal of this approach, and its 
real-life application seems overdue.
Whatever one's view of the risks and benefits 
of nuclear energy, it is clear that the possibility 
of catastrophic accidents must be factored into 
the policy and regulatory decision-making 
process. In the context of current collective 
knowledge on nuclear risks, both the regulation 
of operating nuclear reactors and the design-base 
for any proposed reactor will need significant 
re-evaluation.
Given the size of the long-term investments that 
are now needed across the options of nuclear, 
carbon based fuels, renewables, energy efficiency 
and conservation, grid network infrastructure 
development and load balancing; it is clear that 
European public needs to play a key role in taking 
these critical, social, environmental and economic 
decisions (8). Here, public values and interests are 
central, and the role of public dialogue and the 
participatory practices that enable it are core to 
the building of mutual understanding between 
European states, governments, industry and 
people. If carried out in a truly involving way, the 
integration of public, policy, and expert scientific 
knowledge allows for greater accountability, 
transparency, and much better take-up of necessary 
change and improved long-term likelihood of 
problem resolution. This conclusion mirrors those 
from many chapters in this publication — from 
leaded petrol to nanotechnology: that wider public 
engagement in choosing strategic innovation 
pathways is essential. 
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Innovation's potential to deliver food security and solve other agriculture-related problems is 
high on the agenda of virtually all nations. This chapter looks at two different examples of food 
and agricultural innovation: genetically modified (GM) crops and agroecological methods, which 
illustrate how different innovation strategies affect future agricultural and social options. 
GM crops are well suited to high-input monoculture agricultural systems that are highly 
productive but largely unsustainable in their reliance on external, non-renewable inputs. 
Intellectual property rights granted for GM crops often close down, rather than open up further 
innovation potential, and stifle investment into a broader diversity of innovations allowing a 
greater distribution of their benefits.
Science-based agroecological methods are participatory in nature and designed to fit within 
the dynamics underpinning the multifunctional role of agriculture in producing food, enhancing 
biodiversity and ecoystem services, and providing security to communities. They are better 
suited to agricultural systems that aim to deliver sustainable food security than high external 
input approaches. They do, however, require a broader range of incentives and supportive 
frameworks to succeed. Both approaches raise the issue of the governance of innovation within 
agriculture and more generally within societies.
The chapter explores the consequences of a 'top-down transfer of technology' approach in 
addressing the needs of poor farmers. Here innovation is often framed in terms of economic 
growth in a competitive global economy, a focus that may conflict with efforts to reduce 
or reverse environmental damage caused by existing models of agriculture, or even deter 
investment into socially responsible innovation. 
Another option explored is a 'bottom-up' approach, using and building upon resources already 
available: local people, their knowledge, needs, aspirations and indigenous natural resources. 
The bottom-up approach may also involve the public as a key actor in decisions about the 
design of food systems, particularly as it relates to food quality, health, and social and 
environmental sustainability.
Options are presented for how best to answer consumer calls for food quality, sustainability 
and social equity in a wide sense, while responding to health and environmental concerns 
and securing livelihoods in local small-scale agriculture. If we fail to address the governance 
of innovation in food, fibre and fuel production now, then current indications are that we will 
design agriculture to fail.
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19�1 Introduction
Would it not be a loss to humanity if society's science 
and policy institutions delivered wonderfully 
sophisticated technological tools for agricultural 
innovation, but yet were out of touch with the needs 
for food security, poverty alleviation and ecological 
sustainability? In agriculture, as in other industries, 
research and development is guided by innovation 
policies. Within these policies, the incentive systems 
set at the highest levels of policymaking largely 
determine who is innovative and what innovative 
products will look like. They also favor those who 
will most benefit. Under the current innovation 
policies for industrial agriculture, continuous 
increases in wealth, sufficient food production 
to more than feed the current population, and 
ongoing investment in particular kinds of research 
and technology fail nearly a billion people who are 
undernourished or hungry, well above Millennium 
Development Goals (FAO, 2010, 2011a). Has 
modern agriculture, despite good intentions, been 
unwittingly designed to fail?
A confluence of issues surround agriculture 
and its existing problems: Ongoing societal and 
trade issues, food price volatility (FAO, 2008), 
inefficient energy utilisation, harvesting/storage 
and production systems (Nellemann, 2009) as 
well as retail/consumer level waste (Gustavsson, 
2011) to name a few. These challenges are building 
on decades of environmental degradation from 
high-external input farming, and centuries 
of environmental damage from inefficiencies 
within traditional farming that have exacerbated 
social inequities (IAASTD, 2009a). The extent of 
these environmental and social consequences of 
current agricultural practices in food-wealthy 
and food-poor countries alike means that food 
production must be rethought in order to achieve 
greater resilience and sustainability within these 
systems. The new goal for agricultural innovations 
is a transition towards social, economic, and 
environmental sustainability that can support 
needed production levels (De Schutter, 2010; 
EU-SCAR, 2011; UNEP, 2011).
Scientific and technological advances within 
agriculture have the potential to alleviate hunger 
and increase food security, particularly where food 
productivity and sustainability are solely limited 
by simple technical issues or their availability, 
rather than by institutional or societal constraints 
(Heinemann, in press). Science and technology 
have the capacity to produce valuable outcomes 
from investments in research and development. 
However, the efficacy of innovation is more than 
merely invention; it must also meet real needs and 
be effectively accessed, supported and adopted 
by farmers who, like retailers, consumers and 
community members must share in the benefits.
Agriculture is multifunctional (IAASTD, 2009a). 
It provides food, fibres and fuel for local and 
international needs, income for producers who 
purchase education, health and consumer goods, 
calories and nutrients for families, and cultural 
and social identity. Through its practice skills 
are transferred and developed, biodiversity and 
greenhouse gas emissions are changed — depending 
on how agriculture is practiced (Hoffman, 2011; 
IAASTD, 2009c). However, food production 
remains local. Local needs must be met through 
both technological and non-technological advances 
which can be adapted to fit local conditions through 
ongoing innovation (Altieri, 2011b; Vanloqueren, 
2009).
In the global context, the policy focus on agricultural 
development and food production is shifting from 
'how much' through to 'how long' to just 'how'. 
Some see the problem as not enough production to 
feed the world. Others note that we have a global 
food surplus, but the lack of good infrastructure, 
conflicts and appropriate tools for local farmers 
cause food shortages and insecurity in many places 
(MEA, 2005).
Even other commentators see farmers no longer 
as producers of food, but more accurately of 
biomass, as part of an economic system that can 
vary the usage of this biomass as human food, 
animal feed, biomaterial or biofuels (Pengue, 
2005a). Competition among different markets 
(for energy, industrial products, food production 
or animal fodder) is creating further constraints 
on food availability in some parts of the world. 
Moreover, with the predominant food production 
practices, there are also concerns that current 
demands on yields require an unsustainable level 
of environmentally damaging external inputs of 
agrochemicals and supply of exogenous energy. 
For example, industrial agricultural practices 
on average require 10 calories of exogenous 
energy (used for everything from petrochemical 
production, extraction, transport etc.) for every 
1 calorie of food produced (Giampietro, 1993; 
UNEP, 2011). Growing populations, competing 
demands for crop biofuels and demand for meat 
will continue to intensify these pressures on 
agricultural food production. This insight draws us 
full circle: food security will follow not only from 
producing more food, but how we produce and 
consume it (IAASTD, 2009c).
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(1) While hypothetically not all GM crops would necessarily require high-input or monoculture farming methods, their development 
to date has focused on 'technology traits' amenable to agricultural practices focused on high-input and monoculture production 
methods.
The role of innovation to end food insecurity and 
solve other problems caused by, and for, agricultural 
is high on the agenda of virtually all nation states. 
More and more frequently, governments are framing 
innovation as a means for economic competitiveness 
by using the promise of returns on intellectual 
property (IP) as incentive for both public and private 
innovators (Heinemann, 2009). As a result, those 
that innovate by inventing technologies — mainly 
products — that can be commodified in a form that 
meets the criteria for IP instruments, e.g. patents or 
patent-like plant variety protections, are incentivised 
by the prospect of financial rewards. Moreover, the 
problems identified for solution will tend to be those 
that can be packaged and sold — usually to the 
largest/wealthiest/most lucrative market and largely 
bypass the poor (Spielman, 2007). This was perhaps 
the most evident early warning of the so called 
'Green Revolution', where supplying technological 
product packages of seed and agrochemical inputs 
for monocultures on large tracts of land in some 
developing countries would increase yields and 
production for cash crops (e.g. in Asia but not Africa), 
but would prove to be incompatible with the cultural 
and social structures surrounding farming practices 
in many places that it was implemented (e.g. Africa). 
Indeed, its successes for decreasing hunger and 
malnutrition was a useful stop-gap solution, yet 
has not shown to be a sustainable approach for 
contributing to local food security or diet diversity 
for resource-poor small tract farmers or generate 
sufficient surplus income for many to be a path out 
of poverty (IAASTD, 2009b). Meeting these needs 
for a healthy and diverse diet would require the 
development of locally adapted varieties that are 
tailored to local environments, agricultural practices 
and needs for a range of nutrient dense foods from 
local food crops (Reynolds, 2006). 'Although the 
world food system provides an adequate supply 
of protein and energy for over 85 % of people, 
only two-thirds have access to sufficient dietary 
micronutrients. The supply of many nutrients in the 
diets of the poor has decreased due to a reduction in 
diet diversity resulting from increased monoculture 
of staple food crops (rice, wheat and maize) and the 
loss of a range of nutrient dense food crops from local 
food systems.' (IAASTD, 2009d).
Those who might invest in research or invent 
solutions that are not derived from a technology 
or technological process leading to a product that 
can be licensed under existing IP instruments are 
often left out of the innovation development and 
support system. Instead of a view of agricultural 
innovation focused on seed products from genetic 
improvement or developing external inputs, the 
neglected innovations are often locally adaptable 
practices and services related to complex and 
dynamic ecological processes that do not lend 
themselves to commodification—at least not in 
the way current IP instruments require—but are 
transferable knowledge that can undergo further 
innovation at the local level by the end user. 
A good example of this is the 'push-pull' systems 
developed at the ICIPE in Kenya (Cook, 2006; 
Hassanali, 2008).
For this case study on innovation, we have 
chosen to contrast genetically modified (GM) 
crops and agroecological methods as two 
examples of innovation outputs and strategies 
that have very different outcomes in the way 
we produced food. We illustrate how these 
contrasting innovation strategies shape, and in 
some cases limit, future social options. The former 
is driven by production goals and short-term 
profit maximisation incentives, where the 
predominant types of GM crops developed thus 
far are economically profitable within a system 
of high-input industrialised monoculture that is 
largely unsustainable in its reliance on external, 
non-renewable inputs. In such systems, economies 
of scale allow the farmer to outweigh the higher 
costs of production of such farming practices (1). 
The latter innovation strategy, based on an 
understanding of co-evolution and dynamics at 
ecological and social levels of agriculture, is better 
suited to agricultural systems that are in transition 
to sufficient production and socio-ecological 
sustainability, and requires a broader range of 
incentives and shelters to succeed (Tilman, 2002). 
That is, agroecological systems may be better suited 
than the current practice with GM crops to answer 
the call from affluent consumers for food quality, 
sustainability and social equity in a wide sense, 
responding to health and environmental concerns 
as well as securing livelihood in local small-scale 
agriculture. These issues may be crucial for the 
future of diverse agricultural practices needed 
to address improvements to the resilience and 
sustainability of agricultural systems. If we fail to 
address the governance of innovation in food and 
fibre production now, then current indications are 
that we will surely design agriculture to fail.
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19�2 Innovation: what kinds and for 
whom?
Agriculture has not escaped the wave of new 
policies behind the banner of 'innovation'. The 
European Commission (EC) is running the 
'Innovation Union' campaign (EC, 2011). The explicit 
claim is that innovation 'speeds up and improves 
the way we conceive, develop, produce and access 
new products, industrial processes and services. 
It is the key not only to creating more jobs, building 
a greener society and improving our quality of 
life, but also to maintaining our competitiveness 
on the global market.' The EC further endorses 
innovation as a means for stimulating economic 
growth investment in knowledge generation 
where 'innovative ideas that can be turned into 
new marketable products and services help create 
growth and quality jobs' (EU-Council, 2011). Similar 
initiatives and campaigns will be found in most 
developed and developing countries (Kiers, 2008) (2).
How innovation is conceived shapes how it is 
promoted, and who benefits from the promotion. 
The EC sees 'expensive patenting, market 
fragmentation, slow standard-setting and skills 
shortages' as barriers to innovation because they 
'prevent ideas getting quickly to market' (van den 
Hove, 2011). This preoccupation with how efficiently 
technology products flow from knowledge holders 
to technology users is what Altieri (2002) called 
the 'top-down transfer-of-technology approach' 
in the context of addressing the needs of poor 
farmers. Here innovation is often framed in terms of 
economic growth in a competitive global economy, 
a focus that may conflict with efforts to reduce or 
reverse environmental damage caused by existing 
models of agriculture, or even disincentivise 
investment into socially responsible innovation 
(Tilman, 2002). This is an aspect deserving of 
representation in European innovation discourses, 
policies, and actions (van den Hove, 2012).
Kiers et al. (Kiers, 2008) argue for a more 
comprehensive approach to innovation: '[i]nnovation 
is more than invention. Success is not based on 
technological performance in isolation, but rather 
how technology builds knowledge, networks 
and capacity…innovation demands sophisticated 
integration with local partners'. This emphasis on 
the appropriateness of the technology for the target 
user is what Altieri (2002) called 'a 'bottom-up' 
approach, using and building upon the resources 
(2) For example, New Zealand defines it this way: 'Innovation is defined as the introduction of any new or significantly improved goods, 
services, processes, or marketing methods' (see Statistics-NZ, 2012).
already available: local people, their knowledge 
and their autochthonous natural resources. It must 
also seriously take into consideration, through 
participatory approaches, the needs, aspirations 
and circumstances of smallholders'. The bottom-
up approach also may involve the public as a key 
actor in decisions in the design of food systems, 
particularly as it relates to food quality, health and 
environmental sustainability.
Either pathway could lead to policy decisions to 
drive efficiencies in food production, lower food 
costs through increased supply, and become a 
means out of poverty. Where these pathways differ 
is in who is considered the critical innovator and thus 
who should primarily benefit from innovation policies. 
The key innovator in the top-down approach is 
usually a specialist technology producer, such as 
an agroindustrial company that builds technologies 
optimised for a specific type of farming system that 
shape the agroecosystems in which they are to be 
applied. For example, the use of herbicide tolerant 
GM plants coupled with the application of a specific 
herbicide creates a type of farming suited towards 
low agrobiodiversity and high capital inputs 
(e.g. multi-row spraying equipment) to maximise 
efficiency, and demands a scale investment and 
specialised farmer. However, this approach is 
incompatible with the available resources and needs 
of the subsistence and small farmer (see Box 19.1), 
the key innovator in the bottom-up approach and 
the target of strategies to feed the world through 
local production (IAASTD, 2009a). Bottom-up 
approaches place emphasis on the ability of the 
small-scale farmer to innovate to address critical 
local needs.
Will the predominant top-down approaches to 
agricultural innovation— and the science policies 
and legal instruments which support them — be 
better pathways to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals, namely, to sustainably feed the 
world nutritious and desirable food, and through 
the production of this food, provide pathways out of 
poverty for the poor? Or might there be alternative 
strategies better suited to meeting these needs? 
Our focus here will be whether top-down 
innovation produces the necessary benefits 
to small-scale farmers as well as income- and 
food-insecure countries as has been claimed. 
And in this attempt to create a consistent set 
of common regulatory and market incentives 
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Box 19�1 Herbicide tolerant GM crops: a technology for developing country agriculture?
Starting in the 1990s, the agroecosystems adopting herbicide tolerant GM crops simplified weed 
management through a near exclusive reliance on a single agrochemical product ('Roundup'), with its active 
ingredient glyphosate. The Roundup and Roundup-tolerant GM crop package promises lower labour costs 
through a simplified weed management strategy. It is also compatible with no-till practices that can reduce 
soil erosion (Duke, 2008).
These advantages are, however, disappearing (Service, 2007; Pengue, 2005b;Benbrook, 2012). Extensive 
and continuous use of glyphosate with the introduction of GM crops (Powles, 2008) has led a rapid evolution 
of glyphosate-resistant weeds (Binimelis, 2009; Duke, 2008; Heap, 2012; Heinemann, 2008; NRC, 2010). 
This has a negative overall effect on sustainability, where minimising the use of external inputs such as 
agrochemicals is key. Since glyphosate tolerance can be overcome by using more glyphosate, farmers have 
entered into a treadmill where overuse of a single product leads to tolerance and tolerance is overcome with 
more product, leading to ever higher levels of tolerance in weeds and an increase in the number of species 
that display tolerance (Binimelis, 2009; Duke, 2008; NRC, 2010). In some cases, farmers are returning 
to tilling and using other (and possibly more toxic) herbicides (Binimelis, 2009; Duke, 2005; Heinemann, 
2008b; Mortensen, 2012). Further, indications of harm stemming from the widespread and intensive use 
of glyphosate for the environment and human health has been documented in the scientific literature and 
remains a concern (Greenpeace, 2009; Séralini 2012).
The herbicide-GM crop package is not compatible with how most people farm, and especially with small 
and subsistence farming practices. The package is most economical when herbicide can be sprayed in great 
quantities using mechanised delivery (e.g. airplanes) or expensive, multi-row sprayers and this would not 
be possible in a mixed cropping landscape (Binimelis, 2009).
Moreover, this top-down solution to the problem of weeds threatens long-term retention of alternative 
weed control skills. 'Although seed and chemical companies can generate enormous revenues through the 
packaged sales of herbicides and trans- genic seeds, the [integrative weed management] approaches… 
are based on knowledge-intensive practices, not on saleable products, and lack a powerful market 
mechanism to push them along' (Mortensen, 2012). The farming system is 'deskilling' and losing the 
know-how to implement other pest management approaches (Binimelis, 2009). A second problem with 
this package is that it is encouraging the expansion of damaging agricultural practices. For example 
mixed agriculture/animal husbandry instead would require animal production further out into marginal 
lands or necessitate clearing new lands and accelerating rates of deforestation (Morello, 2007).
A bottom-up innovation for addressing weed problems is integrative weed management (IWM). The 
advantages of this system are that it uses, maintains and improves local knowledge of weed dynamics 
and ecology to develop multiple weed management approaches (Liebman, 2001) and is affordable to poor 
farmers. 'IWM integrates tactics, such as crop rotation, cover crops, competitive crop cultivars, the judicious 
use of tillage, and targeted herbicide application, to reduce weed populations and selection pressures that 
drive the evolution of resistant weeds' (Mortensen, 2012). IWM improves agrobiodiversity conservation, 
soil-quality, on farm energy efficiency — all of which enhance a more multifunctional system of agriculture 
that produce important environmental services (Boody, 2005). Farmers benefit from the same high yields 
and profits (Anderson, 2010; Liebman et al., 2008; Pimentel, 2005). Further, the soil-building under IWM 
helps to achieve conservation goals and improves soil quality even above no-till approaches based on 
herbicides (Venterea, 2006). This does not cause resistance problems of the magnitude seen with simplified 
chemical controls (Davis, 2007).
'Stacking additional herbicide tolerance genes into existing plants is not an alternative to IWM or other 
pest management strategies. They are likely to undermine sustainable agriculture further because 'the new 
traits will encourage continued neglect of public research and extension in integrated weed management' 
(Mortensen, 2012).
The transfer of herbicide tolerant GM crops to poor farmers, which has demonstrated not to be a 
sustainable approach for addressing the needs of developed country agriculture, appears to be another 
example of a top-down approach that has not, and will not produce the beneficial outcomes for the poor 
farmer (Heinemann, 2008b). However, there are already viable bottom-up approaches; all that is lacking is 
the political will and institutional capacity to make them available.
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(3) However GM papaya, sugar beet and possibly alfalfa are grown commercially in the US, with tomato and peppers reported in China 
yet at very low levels.
(itself a top-down approach) if it in tandem will 
be suited to promoting the kind of innovation 
needed in countries with conditions favouring 
small-scale farms as well as those that are poor 
and food insecure. Building on the late lessons 
from prior top-down innovations in agriculture, 
we find that the promise of this approach to 
deliver the expected benefits will continue to be 
elusive when the pace and scale of innovations are 
prioritised over considerations for the intertwined 
institutional, governance and societal issues. 
Critically, innovation pathways that do not include 
such considerations may condition innovation 
directions, diversity and distribution away from 
the very kinds of innovation that are best adapted 
to meet local needs (STEPS, 2010). With this in 
mind, the lure of short-term wealth production 
from predominantly productivist frameworks for 
innovation must be re-balanced with those that 
prioritise long-term goals for sustainability — 
including financial sustainability and nutritional 
goals of small and subsistence farmers. This means 
supporting not just innovations which create 
new technology, but also those that create social 
good by addressing the non-technological, social, 
institutional, organisational and behavioural 
aspects along with new technology (van den Hove, 
2012).
There is increasing evidence that the top-down 
approach to innovation will not achieve the expected 
stimulus to innovation (Baldwin, 2011), where an 
approach reliant on private incentives (primarily 
through IP protections) may actually have a negative 
effect on the progress in certain fields, including 
biotechnology (Murray, 2007).
19�3 GM crops as a top-down path out 
of poverty and hunger
The use of genetic engineering to produce 
commercially viable GM agricultural products 
is so far and for the foreseeable future restricted 
to crop plants (Heinemann, 2009). The crops are 
predominantly cotton, maize, rapeseed (canola) 
and soybeans (3) (James, 2011). Despite more 
than 30 years of research and development and 
nearly 20 years of commercialisation of GM crops, 
surprisingly only two traits have been significant 
in the marketplace — herbicide tolerance and 
insecticide production. And they are grown 
at scale only in a small number of countries. 
Industry-derived figures (James, 2011) report a large 
number of global hectares under GM cultivation, 
but when examined by country indicate an uneven 
global commitment to GM crops. The five countries 
USA, Brazil, Argentina, India and Canada account 
for 91 % of the global GM crop production, with 
the next five largest GM-cultivating countries 
accounting for another 8 %, leaving a total of 1 % 
of all GM acreage produced annually among 
just seven other countries. The proportion of 
agricultural land with GM varied from < 1 % to 
17 % per country (Figure 19.1). These 17 so-called 
GM 'mega-countries' combined had 159 million 
hectares under GM cultivation in 2011 — seemingly 
a large figure, but in reality is just 3 % of the world's 
agricultural land (Figure 19.2). Some crop types 
have been converted entirely (or effectively entirely) 
to GM production in some countries. For example, 
nearly 100 % of the soybean crop in Argentina and 
the US is GM, sugarbeet in the US, and cotton in 
India at the present time is almost exclusively GM.
 
Box 19�1 Herbicide tolerant GM crops: a technology for developing country agriculture? (cont�)
Finally, the adoption of these crops is not leading to uniform or sustainable increases in income for farmers 
(Botta, 2011). The highest yielding varieties of GM crops are so because of ongoing and intensive genotype 
improvement through traditional breeding, rather than through the development of genetically engineered 
traits (Gurian-Sherman, 2009). Even in the most mature GM agroecosystems, such as cotton plantations in 
the US south, GM-farmers have not enjoyed a net economic benefit for adopting these plants compared to 
other high yield varieties (Jost, 2008). The high rent of patent-protected seeds is an upfront cost to farmers 
who may not realise a benefit from the trait each year, or would have to purchase other inputs, such as 
expensive agrochemicals, to gain any benefit. Here again, especially for poor farmers, those initial costs can 
be too high (Delmer, 2005).
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Why this patchy and limited global adoption of 
GM? There are several reasons. First, significant 
markets of high-income consumers have rejected 
GM (Gaskell, 2010). Given that the types of crops 
being commercialised, and the types of traits on 
offer, provide no direct benefit to consumers and 
may be introducing unintended adverse effects 
(see Box 19.2), in some places there exists skepticism 
on claims of net benefit. The main argument for 
adoption is the indirect benefits, financial and 
management-related, that GM crops offer to certain 
kinds of farmers (Heinemann, 2009).
Among the GM-adopting farmers are usually 
large-scale commodity growers that cultivate 
monocultures (e.g. soybeans in Argentina) or are 
in two-crop rotations (e.g. maize/soy in the US 
Midwest). The US and other OECD countries produce 
plenty of food or have the income to purchase it. 
While their agricultural systems deliver what they 
need, the OECD agroecosystems rely on heavy 
taxpayer subsidies to remain viable (Kiers, 2008).
It is perhaps no surprise that GM crops, the 
paradigmatic examples of top-down products, are 
most commonly crops that benefit from subsidies, 
such as maize, soy and cotton in the US (Pechlaner, 
2010). These subsidies lead to the second reason 
for patchy adoption, where their use in developed 
countries undermines the market for these crops 
in developing countries. 'The average support to 
agricultural producers in the major developed 
countries as percentage of gross value of farm 
receipts was at 30 % for the period 2003–2005, 
representing an amount of almost USD 1 billion 
per day (OECD, 2006). These developed-country 
agricultural policies cost developing countries 
about USD 17 billion per year — a cost equivalent 
to five times the recent levels of ODA [official 
development assistance] to agriculture' (Hoffman, 
2011).
The incentive brought by subsidies give a third 
reason for patchy adoption. The high rent of GM 
seeds and associated management inputs, such as 
proprietary agrochemicals, and other high costs 
of high external farming, confines these tools for 
agriculture to countries that redistribute wealth to 
farming for export, whether rich or poor (Delmer, 
2005). Such capital and management intensive 
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Figure 19�1 Ranked commitments to GM by the 17 largest producing countries
Note: Left: Countries range from a high of 69 million (USA) to < 50 000 hectares. Lowest level shown in graph is Spain at an 
industry estimated 100 000 hectares. 
 Right: Countries range from a high of 17 % (USA, Argentina) to under 1 % conversion from conventional to GM plants 
in commercial production. The rankings by proportion differ from the rankings by absolute number of hectares showing 
signiﬁcantly different commitments to GM for primary production. 
Source: GM hectares data taken from the industry source ISAAA (James, 2011). Agricultural land values taken from FAOSTAT 
(FAOSTAT, 2012).
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Figure 19�2 Proportion of land in GM production
Note: Left: Charts indicate the proportion of total agricultural land per country in GM cultivation. The 5 countries shown have the 
highest absolute number of hectares in GM.
 Right: Global value of GM production as a function of global agricultural land. 
Source: GM hectares taken from the industry source ISAAA (James, 2011). Agricultural land values taken from FAOSTAT 
(FAOSTAT, 2012).
agricultural practices simply are not well adapted to 
use by small and subsistence farmers (see Box 19.1).
Poor countries that adopt this export lead are in 
danger of being caught on a loss leading treadmill 
where they produce agricultural goods at a net 
social loss and must continue to bear this debt as 
agriculture becomes a leading source of export 
income (Heinemann, in press; Pengue, 2005b). GM 
crops have not migrated to countries that have yet 
to commit to this strategy or are avoiding it, because 
the upfront costs are too high (Delmer, 2005).
19.3.1 Top-down incentives homogenise tool 
building
Too often the 'how to feed the world debate' 
(possibly a shorthand for the Millennium 
Development Goals) is presented as if it were an 
either/or choice between genetic engineering and 
agroecological science (Marris, 2008; Vanloqueren, 
2009). Advocates for or against these technologies 
often are distinguished by their beliefs on whether 
it is genes or the environment that is the right 
substrate to manipulate to improve agriculture.
This dichotomy is in essence artificial, because few 
when pressed would argue against the relevance 
of both genotype and environment for meeting 
agricultural production and sustainability goals. 
However, there is an underlying truth to this 
division. The emphasis on genetics, or seed-based 
tools (Lal, 2009), is an unavoidable outcome of how 
innovation in the top-down model works. Modifying 
genotypes and capturing them as IP through plant 
variety protection and patent instruments is a far 
easier means of capturing financial benefits than 
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(4) While both classical breeding and genetic engineering are different ways to create plant varieties, the latter creates novelty through 
the use of modern biotechnology (involving the in vitro manipulation of nucleic acids or fusions across the taxonomic boundary).
attempting to commodify management-based 
innovations, such as cover crops, rotation schedules 
and composting, farmer-initiated training and 
education and small scale marketing and credit 
programs. When a singular, centralised and highly 
specialised approach to agricultural development is 
followed, such as through genetic engineering, it can 
stifle other approaches that might produce even more 
desirable outcomes.
The size of the market available to genotype- 
manipulated tools may also be larger than for 
management-based approaches (4). Provided that the 
agroecosystem can be homogenised through the use 
of external inputs (e.g. fertilisers, agrochemicals), then 
a small number of varieties based on a proprietary 
genotype can be sold to a large number of farmers. 
In contrast, management-based techniques are 
knowledge- rather than product-intensive and 
must be customised to the location and often the 
circumstances of the farmer (e.g. whether irrigated or 
non-irrigated land, mixed or monocropping, combined 
crop and livestock production) and thus require more 
investment relative to the size of the market. Yet the 
benefits of these investments to promote and sustain 
management-based agricultural improvements are 
better distributed because they are not concentrated 
back to a seed producer. However, these asymmetries 
in investment incentives mean that management-based 
approaches do not receive the same levels of support 
and investment as do approaches that are easily 
recaptured in the marketplace.
To some degree, however, the environment does 
offer commercial opportunities through top-down 
innovation yet even then it comes from selling 
farmers tools that homogenise the environment 
to support proprietary genotypes. These tools 
are usually in the form of external inputs such as 
fertilisers and agrichemicals. The success of the 
green revolution was its ability to convert very 
different lands into similar agroecosystems using 
external fertilisers and other inputs to achieve 
high yields, but at great long term environmental 
costs, fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions (Giampietro, 1993; Pretty, 2011; UNEP, 
2011). Indeed, the unsustainability of the green 
revolution shows it will not be the model for future 
agriculture.
The editor of Nature magazine summed up the 
duality of genotypic and environmental sources 
of technology for addressing future needs in 
agriculture when he said: 'A second green… 
revolution will require a wholesale realignment 
of priorities in agricultural research. There is an 
urgent need for new crop varieties that offer higher 
yields but use less water, fertilisers or other inputs 
— created, for example, through long-neglected 
research on modifying roots — and for crops that 
are more resistant to drought, heat, submersion 
and pests. Equally crucial is lower-tech research 
into basics such as crop rotation, mixed farming 
of animals and plants on smallholder farms, 
soil management and curbing waste. (Between 
one-quarter and one-third of the food produced 
worldwide is lost or spoiled.)' (Editor, 2010). 
That is, the tools and knowledge needed to 
transform agriculture towards a more sustainable 
path are not sufficiently prioritised in research 
and development. The failure of current top-down 
approaches to deliver on promises of a wide range 
of trait innovations needed by farmers, for example 
those that are tolerant to various environmental 
stresses (i.e. salt tolerance, water stress tolerance) 
requires a fundamental shift in agricultural 
innovation priorities towards improvements 
in genotype and environmental management 
approaches. 
19.3.2 Effects on the knowledge pipeline
At the start of the 21st century public sector 
spending on agricultural research and development 
was just under twice the amount spent by the 
private sector (IAASTD, 2009b). Developing 
countries invested the majority of public 
funding at around USD 12 billion per year while 
high-income countries invested only around 
USD 10 billion. To see the investment imbalance 
another way, consider that the Consultative 
Group on International Agriculture Research, the 
world's largest international public sector research 
body, has an annual budget of only 12 % of the 
combined research and development budgets 
of the world's 6 largest breeding and genetic 
engineering companies (Spielman, 2007). Private 
funding in agricultural research is largely focused 
on innovations that will allow a high return on that 
investment to shareholders.
These statistics require deeper analysis to be 
fully understood. First, the shift in responsibility 
for agricultural research and development from 
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public research institutions to the private sector is 
unequivocal in high-income countries. This shift has 
profound effects on what comes from innovation. 
Second, high income countries have cited the need 
for increasing their economic competitiveness 
through instituted 'industry-driven' priorities 
into the research and development spending 
that they still do, thereby further leveraging the 
public contribution toward (often privately held) 
top-down innovation. This compromises the unique 
function and capacities that public funding supports 
pro-poor agriculture (Spielman, 2007), which 
may lack sufficient financial incentives to attract 
investment from the private sector (Tilman, 2002). 
Third, much of the existing public funding has direct 
or indirect ties to industry. Direct ties can take the 
form of private-public partnerships at universities 
and indirect ties include preferential relationships 
with institutions that maintain long-term 
industry-friendly cooperation (Knight, 2003; Lotter, 
2009b; Seabrook, 2011).
Top-down innovation is guided by patent 
and patent-like plant variety protection (PVP) 
instruments, many newly applied to agriculture only 
in the last decades of the 20th century (Heinemann, 
2009). Patents 'provide more control since (PVP) 
certificates have a research exemption allowing 
others to use the new variety for research purposes' 
(Fernandez-Cornejo, 2006; Mascarenhas, 2006).
The general argument for this approach is that 
patent and patent-like IP rights instruments 
on biotechnology create net social benefits, by 
encouraging and then capturing wealth for 
developers whether they be private or public 
(Pray, 2007). The main limitation here is that 
such an approach ignores significant effects on 
the innovation pipeline (Heinemann, 2006b; 
Kleinman, 2003; Krimsky, 2004; Shorett, 2003b; 
Wright, 2000) which shift innovation priorities 
towards economic policies and financial incentives. 
Leading international institutions have dismissed 
prevailing IP instruments as agents of constructive 
economic or food security change in developing 
countries at least at their stage of development 
(WHO, 2005; WorldBank, 2007). Furthermore, they 
impede practices that uphold and improve both 
food security and sovereignty. For example, seed 
savings and exchanges have become incompatible 
with these more severe IP instruments as shown in 
the conversion of behaviour in the US, and would, if 
adopted by developing countries, undermine what 
is now seen as an important source of bottom-up 
innovation: farmer by farmer breeding and 
adaptation of germplasm (Bellon, 2011; Borowiak, 
2004; Mascarenhas, 2006; WHO, 2005).
The patenting of germplasm is concentrating IP 
rights-based control of the seed supply under a very 
small number of multinational corporations (Adi, 
2006; Barlett, 2008; Sagar, 2000; Howard, 2009). The 
consolidation of the seed industry also has resulted 
in lower competitiveness (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1999) 
as the 'concentration of the top four' (CR4) seed 
companies breached a critical threshold (WorldBank, 
2007). For example, the UK Parliament now says 
that:
'The use of patents on genes is controversial. There 
are concerns that in countries where GM technology 
is widespread in agriculture, seed companies may 
have reduced incentives to develop conventional 
varieties, as the market for these varieties is 
reduced, and they tend to have weaker IP rights 
than the patents usually used with GM crops. In 
the US, this is the case for soy, with conventional 
breeding now mainly left to universities and to 
small seed producers who focus on niche markets. 
The presence of patents may also limit public-sector 
research in some areas' (POST, 2011).
Is the answer to empower public institutions 
to secure IP instead? If the goal is to stimulate 
innovation across the board, history to date indicates 
that it does not seem to be so. Intriguingly, the 
flow of IP to the private sector has been fuelled by 
an unprecedented accumulation of IP claims in 
biotechnology made by public sector institutions 
whose behaviour is consistent with top-down 
innovation models despite their historic public-good 
role (Graff, 2003). This creates a feedback loop 
in which the best-funded researchers are those 
with top-down innovation interests, and they in 
turn out-compete other researchers — and their 
possible innovations — from future funding. This 
loop can decrease bottom-up innovation, even 
products that would provide much greater benefit. 
The downstream effects are stifling of public-good 
knowledge commons, upon which the modern 
agroecosystems of North America and Europe were 
initially built, and neglect of the needs of poor and 
subsistence farmers who are key to feeding the 
world. 
'[F]or scientific knowledge subject to both Open 
Science and private property institutional regimes, 
the granting of IP [rights] is associated with a 
statistically significant but modest decline in 
knowledge accumulation as measured by forward 
citations (in academic publications)…Overall, we are 
able to reject the null hypothesis that IP [rights] have 
no impact on the diffusion of scientific knowledge… 
These patterns provide a novel perspective on the 
economic consequences of the privatisation of the 
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Box 19�2 GM crops: a late lesson case in the making?
The benefits and harms of GM crops are still being verified, despite there being science-based calls for 
greater scrutiny concerning the release of genetically engineered organisms from early on in the US 
FDA (5) (Drucker, 2012) and elsewhere (Traavik, 1999). The literature is accumulating indicators both of 
inflated benefit claims and of evidence of adverse effects (Bøhn, 2008; Botta, 2011; Hilbeck, 2012; Jost, 
2008; Mesnage, 2012; Rosi-Marshall, 2007; Service, 2007). The benefits that may have been overstated 
are the reduction in pesticide use (Service, 2007), the reduced use of more toxic pesticides (Mesnage, 
2012; Séralini, 2009), higher yields (Gurian-Sherman, 2009) and farmer income (Jost, 2008).
While GM crops are not found at scale in many places (see Figure 19.1), because they dominate as 
commodity crops they can be present at low levels in many types of food and feed, fibres and industrial 
products. Thus, exposure is global even if production is mainly in a few countries.
At what point is there sufficient evidence to be concerned and take action about the effects of GM crops 
on human health and the environment? How strong is the evidence of safety vs. risks? 
The outcomes of many risk assessment studies equate the conclusions of 'no evidence of harm' to be 
synonymous with safety. The troubling outcome is that the safety of GM crops is presumed when there 
is a lack of evidence of harm, as if this were equivalent to evidence of lack of harm, when it clearly is 
not. Hence many of the safety conclusions arising in risk assessments stating 'no evidence of harm' are 
assumptions-based, rather than evidence-based, reasoning (Spök, 2004). Critically, when this lower 
standard of safety assurance is followed, as is the case with the mainstream risk assessment approaches 
today, important effects may be missed.
Of course, it is plausible that there simply are no effects to be found. Yet, what is the likelihood that the 
existing risk assessment approaches would capture an adverse effect caused by a particular GM plant? 
Are there particular challenges to detecting biologically important but difficult to detect effects? If so, 
what regulatory approaches can help avoid or overcome these challenges?
Emerging from the experience with biosafety research and risk assessment is a number of obstacles and 
limitations in policy or methodology that can limit or underestimate the detection of potential harms that 
may be present. 
Obstacles to conducting biosafety research
Biosafety research and the safety investigations required for regulatory approval are the two main 
means for identifying potential adverse effects. However, a number of obstacles may limit or prevent the 
observation adverse effects in research, if they were indeed occurring:
• Industry contracts with researchers and farmers restrict access to material for safety testing. For 
example, 26 scientists released a public statement criticising that confidentiality and material transfer 
agreements made conducting any independent research on GM foods virtually impossible (Pollack, 
2009).
• GM innovation research and development is outpacing biosafety research necessary to evaluate 
for safety. When it comes to research funding for biotechnology (including genetic engineering 
research), biosafety‑related research has been lagging behind. From 1992 to 2002 the USDA 
disbursed USD 1.8 billion for biotechnology research, yet only approximately 1 % (USD 18 million) of 
this went to risk-related research (Mellon, 2003).
• Safety interested scientists face tough career choices. Researchers who have published scientific 
evidence unfavourable to the interests of GM crop developers have experienced personal and 
professional attacks on their work (Delborne, 2008; Editor, 1999; Waltz, 2009a, 2009b), and in some 
cases leading to threats or loss of research funding and dismissal (Lotter, 2009a, 2009b).
(5) FDA Memos. FDA Memos 1991, 1992a and 1992b above are 3 of 24 internal FDA documents obtained through a FOIA (Freedom of 
Information Act request by the Alliance for Bio-Integrity, see http://www.bio-integrity.org/list.html).
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Box 19�2 GM crops: a late lesson case in the making? (cont�)
Risk assessment: barriers to detecting adverse effects
The release of a GM crop into the environment, or for use in feed or food, is preceded in many countries by 
a pre-market risk assessment. The principles, concepts and methodologies of assessment vary, but most 
countries use international guidance (e.g. OECD/Codex Alimentarius, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety) as a 
basis of their systems. Scientific and other information may also inform the risk assessment or secondary 
evaluation by expert committees.
Policies can undermine the effectiveness of risk assessment (Pavone, 2011) by allowing risk standards which 
increase the likelihood that adverse effects, if occurring, would not be identified during the appraisal.
Key examples:
• Many jurisdictions require scientific testing to be done by the developer and supplied to the regulator, 
who often lacks any capacity to perform independent testing. This lack of independence in the testing 
sets up the situation of bias in the studies outcomes as a result of 'the funding effect' — where 
results tend to correlate with the wishes of the funder (Krimsky, 2004). Various research efforts have 
found that the funding effect reaches well into the public research community and especially into 
biotechnology (Diels, 2011; Heinemann, 2006a; Shorett, 2003a). 
• Often there is a provision to keep secret information that the developer claims is of proprietary value. 
When regulators agree to keep some information in the risk assessment confidential, review or reproduce 
the study by independent scientists is prevented (Fontanarosa, 2005). Transparency is a fundamental 
principle of good science reporting and practice but lacking in many risk assessments (AHTEG, 2012).
• Risk research conducted for the purposes of a risk assessment by the developer often lacks sufficient 
methodologies to allow statistical rigor that would yield meaningful results. Risk studies with low 
sample numbers lack statistical power, and bias the outcome towards no observation of differences/
effects between treatment groups (for examples, see Marvier, 2002). Further, they might not have been 
designed to test for potential hazards that the regulator has not asked the developer to test, or to the 
sensitivity that the regulator might find valuable (Séralini, 2009) or which have long lag time frames 
(Marvier, 2007).
• The regulator's policies on what to test will also affect what might be found. This approach may miss 
unintended changes to other gene products or metabolites or the effects of cooking and processing. 
For instance, applicants are often allowed to use a transgenic protein 'surrogate' (derived from a source 
other than the transgenic organism for which environmental release or consumption is being sought) 
in the place of the actual transgenic protein in safety testing from which regulatory approval is sought. 
Often the protein used in safety testing is that produced in bacteria, which is not going to be released 
into the environment or used as food — leaving the actual protein produced by the GM plant untested 
for safety. Since there can be significant biological differences in how the transgenic protein is produced 
in different hosts (e.g. in plants vs. bacteria), any differences would not be possible to detect (Freese, 
2004).
• Currently, no regulatory framework requires mandatory toxicity or allergenicity testing from the 
consumption (or inhalation, see Kroghsbo 2008) of GM crops or their products. Commonly, only 
90-day (usually rat) feeding trials are conducted and conclusions of long-term risk are based on these 
short-term tests, despite their critical deficiencies in revealing sub-chronic and chronic effects (Séralini, 
2009; Spiroux de Vendomois, 2010). Research has indicated the importance of life-time studies for 
health affects where indications of adverse health impacts only manifested after 120 days (Séralini, 
2012).
• A common practice in risk assessment is a comparative approach: the new GM plant is compared to 
a similar plant to see if there is any evidence of additional potential to cause harm. In actual practice, 
however, developers will often further include 'reference lines' (usually genetically less similar and 
grown under different environmental conditions) in the comparison which will expand background 
variation where any potential signals to be drowned in statistical noise and thusly concluded as 'within 
the range of biological variation' (Antoniou 2012; Dolezel and Gaugitsch 2009). 
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Box 19�2 GM crops: a late lesson case in the making? (cont�)
• Ongoing risk assessment may not be benefitting as much as it could from new information, because of 
a general lack of comprehensive post-release monitoring efforts. As pre-market risk assessments are 
based on information acquired over short term and/or small scale investigations, they are not designed 
to capture effects that may occur when exposure is on a larger scale, or for longer time periods, or 
result from unanticipated interactions with other GM plants post release. While monitoring is mandated 
in some jurisdictions there is very little information on its effectiveness and no uniformity in design or 
methodology (Züghart, 2008, 2011; AHTEG, 2012; Heinemann, 2012).
Can the precautionary principle make scientific risk assessments more scientific?
The precautionary principle has been legitimised as an important objective in GMO legislation 
(e.g. European Union, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety). Nonetheless, it thus far has mainly been 
considered as a risk management tool and not part of the scientific risk assessment. While critics of the 
precautionary principle consider it easily misused as a barrier to trade and the cause of more regulation, 
this misrepresents how precaution may be appropriately applied. Importantly, precaution has a role to 
play in the scientific risk assessment itself in two fundamental ways. First, applying precaution within 
risk assessment practice also means applying more robust scientific standards — that is, the need for 
precaution and the need for scientific rigor are not incompatible but complementary (Groth, 2000). Second, 
particularly when testing hypotheses, value judgements within science practice (Funtowicz, 2003; Rudner, 
1953) may be informed by precaution, including levels of evidence, directions of error (Brosi, 2009; 
Lemons, 1997), and by acknowledging and communicating what we know, do not know, and cannot know 
with existing methodologies (Aslaksen, 2006; Myhr, 2002). The formal acknowledgment of uncertainties 
and the choice of error type from the risk assessment and their communication to decision-makers are key 
components of rigorous science-based risk assessment.
Conclusion: avoiding old lessons from earlier late lessons
The critical late lesson that may be emerging from GM crops is not the evidence of harm — the early 
indications of harm are just emerging — but the persistence of the same institutional patterns that led 
to the old late lessons already learned from asbestos, benzene and BSE (Harremoes, 2001). In these 
cases, weak risk assessment standards were implemented that prevented identifying the harm and taking 
precautionary action. To avoid this old lesson, the appropriate application of the precautionary approach to 
risk standards would help ensure we are not repeating the same error with GM crops, and thus avoid a late 
lessons case in the making.
scientific commons. Rather than simply serving to 
facilitate a 'market for ideas,' IP may indeed restrict 
the diffusion of scientific research and the ability 
of future researchers to 'stand on the shoulders of 
giants,' at least for research of the type published in 
Nature Biotechnology' (Murray, 2007).
This has been a brief review of the predominant 
top-down innovation models that characterise the 
main policy developments of wealthier and food 
rich nations (Heinemann, 2009). We have found 
that if this framework of innovation for agricultural 
development is followed, the outcome is likely 
contrary to the stated objectives to create a global 
food production capacity that delivers on calories 
and nutrients to all. It will fail in the long run to 
produce food security because it does not have the 
necessary incentives to create resilient and sustainable 
production systems. If the demands on agriculture 
are reasonably expanded to include delivery of 
culturally diverse foods, produced locally by those 
most in need, and which serves as a path out of 
poverty, then the top-down innovation models of 
today are the wrong pathways to achieve it.
In coming to these stark realisations, we do not 
argue that top-down innovation is irrelevant at all 
times and in all countries. Indeed, the right mix of 
innovation is essential. Likewise, seed-based versus 
environmental approaches both have value in all 
agroecosystems at all times. The question is more 
complex. When industries or private providers 
become out of balance in scale, power or access to 
information, then one can smother the other. At the 
heart of it, most farmers are private sector, even if 
they are feeding themselves with the products of 
their labour and capital. But there is a difference 
between the economic scale of the large US farming 
unit and the farmer, especially the one most prone 
to hunger, and the one searching for long-term 
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agroecosystem sustainability. Similarly, there is a 
difference in scale between the university and the 
multinational corporation, and between both and 
the farmer. When public institutions must act in a 
way that is consistent with how companies must act, 
then the imbalance between farmer and knowledge 
access grows.
19�4 The bottom-up path towards 
sustainable farming
A core quality of bottom-up approaches is that they 
can generate, harness and exchange information and 
innovation in a multitude of ways that bring users of 
innovations into the process so that local adaptation 
and shaping of technologies fit the ecological, 
socio-cultural and technical dimensions of the 
system (STEPS, 2010; Wagner, 2007).
Bottom-up innovation is demonstrating its potential 
to build not just sustainable farming systems, but 
also sustainable communities through the support 
of local food production and local markets (Altieri, 
2011a; UNEP-UNCTAD, 2008). Discussions on 
increasing agricultural sustainability tend to 
put the emphasis on biodiversity, soil and water 
management and ecological principles to improve 
productivity and energy efficiency (including 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions). This is 
a specialty of the science of agroecology. Instead 
of engineering nature to fit into our desired 
technological system, agroecological innovations 
fashion our technological solutions to fit nature 
(Schumacher, 1973) by applying ecological concepts 
and principles to the design and management of 
agroecosystems (Altieri, 1995). Agroecology strives 
to increase the sustainability of agriculture by 
minimising the use of agrochemical and energy 
inputs and instead leverage ecological synergisms 
and interactions between biological components 
of the agroecosystem to produce their own 
productivity, crop protection and soil fertility. This 
type of production system has also been captured 
as a means for transitioning to more sustainable 
agricultural practices under the banner of 'green 
agriculture' (UNEP, 2011).
While this science also values the importance of 
conventional breeding and genotype optimisation, it 
tends to address yield problems using management 
solutions, often through a modification of 
agricultural practices that remove, rather than 
adapt to, the problem (Lal, 2009). Biodiversity is 
important to create greater system resiliency within 
the agricultural environment (Enjalbert, 2011; Ensor, 
2009; Li et al., 2009). Enhancing on-farm biodiversity 
and soil organic matter can make agriculture more 
resilient to climate change (drought, flooding, severe 
weather, and temperature change) and enhance 
ecosystem services (Hajjar, 2008). In a recent survey, 
of agricultural productivity after hurricane Mitch in 
Central America revealed that farms that engaged 
in agroecological practices such as intercropping, 
cover crops and agroforestry incurred less damage 
than neighbouring conventional monoculture farms 
(Altieri, 2011a). Hence, increasing the adaptive 
potential of agricultural systems will be vital in the 
face of global climate change (Bellon, 2011).
We have chosen to use agroecological science 
(including compatible organic certification schemes) 
as an example of an outcome of bottom-up 
innovation because this science is delivering 
excellent results in the farming systems most in 
need of innovation (Altieri, 2011b; De Schutter, 
2010; FAO, 2011b; Pretty, 2011; UNEP-UNCTAD, 
2008 (Khan et al., 2008)). The main feature of the 
bottom-up approach is that it decentralises solution 
providers and their solutions, thereby facilitating 
the transfer of products, services or information that 
allows continued innovation at the hands, skills and 
knowledge of the local user. In contrast to top-down 
approaches, the real innovation potential does 
not stop with the farmer, but often starts there. In 
addition, consumer concerns and desires for food 
quality, health and environmental concerns are 
facilitated by initiating discussions over agricultural 
innovations as a bottom-up approach (SCAR, 2012).
It is important to distinguish between traditional 
farming approaches and agroecological science. The 
former can, yet in different ways be as destructive 
to the environment, and unsustainable, as any 
high external input industrial 'modern' farm 
(IAASTD, 2009a). While in general agroecological 
science utilises a 'low tech' toolbox, it is far more 
sophisticated, knowledge intensive, and integrative 
both on environmental and institutional levels than 
simple kitsets of seeds, fertilisers and agrochemicals 
that characterise industrial farming operations. 
That is, this approach creates a strong need for 
farmer support through extension services and 
farmer-lead educational initiatives, calling for broad 
participation across a range of scientific disciplines 
and policy actors.
19.4.1  Bottom-up incentives homogenise 
productivity and resilience rather than tools
Rather than sell farmers packages of tools that 
bring in improved seed and convert their soils to 
near replicas of those for which elite varieties of 
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plants have been optimised, agroecological science 
facilitates local development of soil conservation 
practices and supports farmer seed exchanges for 
breeding of local varieties or local elite varieties 
(Badstue, 2007; Jarvis et al., 2008). These practices 
support agrobiodiversity, which contributes to 
sustained productivity by creating resilience to 
unpredictable changes at the local level, such as to 
resource availability, or changes to climate, all the 
while making the farm less likely to attract pests 
(Bellon, 2011; Jarvis, 2000). Here the emphasis is on 
the farmer rather than the breeder, where they are 
different (Reynolds, 2006). 
The focus on farmers is a viable alternative to the 
focus on genotypes. As the UN FAO have argued, 
'75 % of the additional food we need over the next 
decades could be met by bringing the production 
levels of the world's low-yield farmers up to 80 % 
of what high-yield farmers get from comparable 
land' (Molden, 2007). This suggests that the future 
of sustainable, low impact agriculture is one in 
which products and methods are developed at 
landscape rather than global or even national 
levels. In this way we agree that 'there is a need to 
invest in science and practice which gives farmers 
a combination of the best possible seeds and breeds 
and their management in local ecological contexts' 
(Pretty, 2011).
19.4.2 Bottom-up innovations are participatory
Bottom-up approaches often include participatory 
activities built on open collaborative models, with 
the aim to address problems that are relevant to the 
local ecological and sociocultural context through 
experimentation and education (Baldwin, 2011; 
Ceccarelli, 2006; Toomey, 1999; Witcombe, 1996). 
Even where the incentive systems are tuned towards 
generating IP, such as in plant breeding, the choice 
of relevant instrument can encourage ongoing 
innovation through participatory innovation 
development.
For example, legal instruments such as patent-like 
PVP and patents restrict farmer use of this legally 
protected germplasm from breeder innovation 
unless they negotiate permission for use from the 
license holder. Poor and subsistence farmers who 
may most benefit from their own local innovation 
are unlikely to have access to either public or 
private patent holders who reside in urban centres 
far away, often out of country (Howard, 2009). In 
contrast, PVPs which recognise breeder's rights 
allow farmers and others to continue development 
including making locally adapted varieties for sale 
or for exchange (Figure 19.3). PVP allows a wave 
of innovation to extend from an initial variety and 
contributes to the speed of technology transfer 
within an institutional context that supports 
agricultural sustainability (Gyawali, 2007; Steinberg, 
2001). Thus breeding innovation that is centrally 
controlled by contracts between the license holder 
and selected breeders can bottleneck technology 
transfer. This phenomenon has been associated with 
the 'yield gap' experienced by GM varieties because 
of the use of patents to control these products 
(Fernandez-Cornejo, 2006).
The knowledge required to select and save seed, 
and the infrastructure for exchanges, are also social 
resources that if (or when) lost may be difficult to 
re-establish (Howard, 2009). In a future of climate 
change, decentralisation of public breeding and 
in situ conservation are likely to be fundamental 
to the survival of billions of people (Bellon, 2011; 
Ceccarelli, 2006; McIntyre, 2011).
'Farmers (including pastoralists and 
agro-pastoralists) should not simply be seen as 
maximisers of food and agricultural commodity 
production, but also as managers of the food and 
agricultural commodity-producing eco-systems' 
(Hoffman, 2011). That role requires farmers to have 
freedom to innovate as well as the confidence of 
governments in the value of that innovation.
Participatory research that leads to new innovations 
in agriculture often starts from a point of co-inquiry, 
whereby farmers and scientist work as partners 
and bring their own, complementary knowledge, 
experience and insights to developing innovations 
that are relevant to the needs of farmers. That is, 
participatory research treats farmers as experts 
with their own scientific knowledge and experience 
that is complementary to more formalised training 
expertise. In participatory breeding initiatives, traits 
of value to local farmers might be identified and 
often are different than those valued by national 
and international breeders: 'Professional breeders, 
often working in relative isolation from farmers, 
have sometimes been unaware of the multitude 
of preferences — beyond yield, and resistance to 
diseases and pests — of their target farmers. Ease 
of harvest and storage, taste and cooking qualities, 
how fast a crop matures, and the suitability of 
crop residues as livestock feed are just a few of 
the dozens of plant traits of interest to small-scale 
farmers…' (Toomey, 1999).
Another example of participatory innovation 
models, the farmer field schools, have been 
instrumental in designing new ways to decrease 
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Figure 19�3 Participatory IP instruments
Note: When farmers and breeders can continue to innovate on seed or propagule stock, the beneﬁts of elite varieties are more 
quickly adapted to local conditions and other desirable traits and may inspire new breeder income. Consider seed with a 
novel genotype (purple star) being sold to farmers who ﬁnd a variety of phenotypes after planting (pink, yellow, orange 
circles) due to local gene x environment interactions. Some of these new phenotypes may be desirable and could inspire the 
farmer or professional breeder to capture the new variety for ongoing sale. Other farmers may wish to return to the original 
seed stock (purple stars to the left). The new varieties may be purchased by other farmers or the same farmer and additional 
breeding may bring new and some desirable traits (blue, brown, blue, green and black circles).
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insecticide use in studies from Indonesia, 
Bangladesh and Vietnam, and increases in crop 
yield in China, India and Pakistan (Van den Berg, 
2007). These programmes teach farmers how to 
problem solve and experiment independently 
through interactive learning, which will help adapt 
technologies to their specific environmental and 
management needs (Vasquez-Caicedo, 2000).
19.4.3 Bottom-up approaches deliver the right kind 
of innovation to the right kind of users
Agroecological bottom-up innovations are relevant 
and work. By focusing on locally adapted and 
developed integrative innovation over remotely 
developed standardised innovation they can help 
create sustainable farming systems that deliver more 
food, nutrition and wealth to the farmers and their 
communities that are needed to feed the world. 
There is mounting evidence that the scale-up of 
these approaches may offer, beyond improvements 
to crop productivity, enhanced environmental 
benefits, e.g. reductions in chemical inputs and 
soil erosion, improved water conservation and 
soil organic matter content, and higher levels of 
biodiversity (Pimentel, 2005). Further, bottom-up 
approaches offer a means to tackle issues related to 
land degradation to restore soil fertility (de Jager, 
2005).
The world's largest meta analysis comparing 
science-lead industrial and agroecological (organic) 
farming systems found that the latter could match 
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the former in the common metric of yield (Badgley, 
2007). Critically, this intensification of farming 
systems through agroecological science achieved 
the same or superior yields with a concomitant 
reduction of external inputs, including a much lower 
dependence on agrichemicals and fossil fuel-derived 
fertilisers. Finally, this study also provided evidence 
to suggest that mature agroecological conversions 
(those in excess of five years old) consistently 
out produced industrial operations. This study 
exposed the reason for other studies reporting that 
agroecological farms are less productive: it takes 
about five years of intensive work to rehabilitate 
soils converted from traditional or industrial 
farming management to agroecological and past 
studies lumped young and mature conversions 
together.
International projects to initiate organic and 
sustainable agriculture have shown excellent 
overall results. UNEP-UNCTAD reported an 
average crop yield increase of 116% for organic 
and near-organic projects involving more than 
1.9 million African farmers on roughly 2 million 
hectares of cultivated land within the 114 cases 
analysed. The benefits were not just in yield — 
improvements in natural, social and economic 
capital associated within these farming systems 
led to an array of benefits that have increased food 
security. The report authors concluded: 'Organic 
agriculture can increase agricultural productivity 
and can raise incomes with low-cost, locally 
available and appropriate technologies, without 
causing environmental damage. Furthermore, 
evidence shows that organic agriculture can build 
up natural resources, strengthen communities and 
improve human capacity, thus improving food 
security by addressing many different causal factors 
simultaneously' (UNEP-UNCTAD, 2008), and can 
be more economically profitable than conventional 
farming (Edwards, 2008; Nemes, 2009).
Another synthesis study investigated the increases 
in productivity since the implementation of 
286 sustainable agriculture initiatives from the FAO, 
which covered 37 million hectares in 57 countries 
(Pretty, 2008). They found increased productivity on 
12.6 million farms with an average crop increase of 
79 %, and a rise in key environmental services.
A commissioned report from the Foresight 
Global Food and Farming Futures Project of 
the UK government (Foresight, 2011) appraised 
40 sustainable intensification projects developed in 
the 2000s, from 20 countries in Africa. The projects 
were developed based on a range of bottom-up 
approaches to agriculture, including participatory 
plant breeding, integrated pest management, 
agro-forestry and agroecological soil conservation 
measures. The results speak for themselves: by 
2010 the projects had led to a range of documented 
benefits and improvements to 12.75 million hectares 
for the 10.39 million farmers and their families, 
including a doubling of crop yields, on average 
(2.13-fold increase) spanning a 3–10 year period 
(Pretty, 2011).
Results from bottom-up approaches are also 
evidenced in the global North. In Wisconsin, 
USA, a 12-year study on productivity of organic 
vs. conventional cropping systems found that 
diverse, low-input systems can be as productive 
per unit of land as that of conventional ones 
(Posner, 2009). A 30-year study by the Rodale 
Institute in the US compared organic and 
conventional agricultural methods and found 
yields, economic viability, energy efficiency and 
human health indexes improved with organic 
farming (Rodale, 2011).
Scaling up these successes will require policies that 
stimulate investment into key sectors that support 
bottom-up approaches. In one modeling study 
(UNEP, 2011), the outcomes of targeted 'green' 
investments over a 40 year period are compared 
to the same amount of financial investment into 
conventional and traditional 'business as usual' 
agriculture of today. Overall, the green investments 
lead to numerous comparative benefits, including 
increased yield, soil quality, greater water 
efficiency and land use, increased GDP growth 
and employment, and reduced CO2 emissions 
and energy consumption. Therefore the potential 
scale-up for agroecological based bottom-up 
approaches appear to be immense.
19�5 Case example: Contrasting 
top-down and bottom-up 
innovation solutions to water stress
Consider the anticipated application of top-down 
innovation to address the challenges of agricultural 
water stress. Agriculture is already the largest 
user of water among human activities and lack of 
access to water is an increasing problem (Hoffman, 
2011; Marris, 2008). Climate change is expected 
to further exacerbate the problem (Schiermeier, 
2008). The most likely top-down product for 
addressing this problem will be genotypic changes 
to germplasm to enhance traits that confer drought 
tolerance. Already progress is being made in some 
crops through classical breeding (CIMMYT, 2012; 
Heinemann, 2009), especially augmented through 
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(6) Marker-assisted selection is a breeding technique that uses biotechnological tools to concentrate particular traits within the existing 
plant by traditional breeding. This allows for a more efficient breeding process for achieving varieties with specific traits of interest. 
It does not involve the use of in vitro modified nucleic acids as with genetic engineering.
marker-assisted selection (6). Yet similar genotypic 
approaches using genetic engineering have not 
been as successful. As drought tolerance depends 
on the action of multiple genes, drought tolerant 
varieties require changes in multiple genes all 
at once, rather than adding genes singularly (as 
with genetic engineering). Developing adapted 
varieties will require more responsive breeding 
and development than can be offered through 
the extensive process for creating a commercially 
viable genetically engineered drought tolerant 
product (Gurian-Sherman, 2009; Heinemann, 
2008a, in press). Further, plants with ever more 
extreme adaptation of genotypes will likely 
continue to exacerbate the depletion of the water 
table. Nevertheless, any seed (or propagule)-based 
product that is better adapted to drought stress 
would be amenable to prevailing IP instruments 
such as plant variety protection (PVP), patent-like 
plant variety protection, or patents and therefore it 
is no surprise that genotype innovation receives so 
much emphasis, especially from industry. 
In contrast, bottom-up environmentally based 
management solutions, some of which have been in 
practice for decades, tend to raise latent water levels 
and retention capacities in soil as well as improve the 
genetics of crop plants (Heinemann, 2008a; Lotter, 
2003; Pimentel, 2005; Scialabba, 2007). Environmental 
management using locally-adapted drought tolerant 
varieties, cover crops, polycropping, rotating in 
fallow years, compost and soil conservation to raise 
organic matter levels, agroforestry and building 
small dams all raise water levels (Altieri, 2002; Lal, 
2006). The resiliency of this kind of system is equally 
affected: In fact, it may not be possible to feed the 
world in 2050 unless soil quality and water retention 
capacity are raised regardless of how efficient plants 
can become at extracting water (Hoffman, 2011). 'If 
soils are not restored, crops will fail even if rains 
do not; hunger will perpetuate even with emphasis 
on biotechnology and genetically modified crops' 
(Lal, 2008). Many of these improvements would be 
considered innovations by our bottom-up definition 
(Kiers, 2008), but by their nature could not be easily 
described or protected by patents or similar IP 
instruments in order to facilitate the knowledge 
transfer to the commercial sector, and thus are not 
innovations in the currently practiced top-down 
model. By following the top-down approach, the 
private sector will offer solutions to a problem that 
either possibly cannot be solved using technologies 
that are described under prevailing IP instruments 
or which will only shift the problem in time or space, 
addicting us to finding and producing even more 
extreme genotypes through genetic modification.
19�6 Conclusions
We have attempted to contrast two pathways to 
innovation and their relative opportunities and costs 
for agricultural development. We find limitations to 
top-down innovation because of largely productivist 
objectives. These tend to shut down rather than 
open up innovation and options, particularly those 
for addressing social welfare issues. Further, science 
and its role as a public good become conditioned 
within certain notions of progress (Callo, 1994). This 
framework will only continue to create technological 
lock-ins and path dependence to specific research 
choices at the expense of others (Stirling, 2007). 
We find that both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches will have their roles to play, but getting 
them in the right mix, order and framing is critical 
to ensure their benefits and risks are more evenly 
distributed if we are to produce the kinds of 
innovations capable of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. This will require rebalancing 
innovation towards the public good, further requiring 
that innovation frameworks focus not only on 
scientific and technological developments, but also on 
the interlinked institutional, organisational and social 
changes. In terms of agriculture, taking these issues 
seriously means operationalising the outcomes from 
the IAASTD (2009a) and SCAR (2012) reports. The 
recent recommendations on research, innovation and 
agricultural knowledge coming from the European 
Commission's Standing Committee on Agricultural 
Research (SCAR) call for 'increased support be 
provided for research on the economic and social 
dimensions of these new technologies and farming 
practices. Approaches that promise building blocks 
towards low-input high-output systems, integrate 
historical knowledge and agro ecological principles 
that use nature's capacity should receive the highest 
priority for funding' (SCAR, 2012). To achieve 
this, a public sector free from political incentives 
for top-down innovation is an essential capacity. 
However, the small business and the farmer, while 
still private sector and benefiting from proprietary 
knowledge, will be an essential source of creativity, 
problem solving and income for their communities.
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Further, scientists are not passive members of the 
scientific enterprise, but a powerful force from 
within that influences the techno-sciences and the 
options available to society to benefit from scientific 
research. The modern techno-science culture took 
shape just after WWII in an unusual convergence 
of thinking across the East-West geopolitical divide. 
Nuclear power in the United States and space travel 
in the Soviet Union become exemplars of a new form 
of conceiving and doing science, and witness a deep 
transformation in its ethos and political economy. 
The convergence of internal culture, economic and 
political power was and is an irresistible force. 
Scientists today cannot shirk from their role and their 
responsibility on how science is done and governed, 
as practitioners and frequently as participants, 
entrepreneurs and citizens. 
Lastly, top-down innovations will be most effective 
when scientific knowledge from specialised 
fields within biology, chemistry, ecology, genetics, 
soil microbiology, etc. converge with bottom-up 
approaches to innovate locally optimised solutions. 
In this way, the benefits of advanced scientific 
knowledge will naturally become be much more 
diverse and widely distributed.
We have made the case that the future of 
agriculture and global food security is one that 
requires a truly long-term vision, attendant to the 
environmental and social costs of production, and 
with an emphasis on the small and subsistence 
farmer. Long term, there will be enough food if 
agriculture both intensifies and remains local. 
We have found that if the bottom-up approach is 
followed, the transfer of knowledge and further 
innovation potential is augmented, and success far 
more likely, than the outcomes witnessed to date 
from the prevailing top-down approach, where 
the innovation potential downstream is severely 
limited. Conversely, the proceeds of bottom-up 
innovation disproportionately flow to adopters 
rather than the providers. By their very distributive 
and participatory nature, bottom-up innovation 
strategies do not tend to concentrate power, financial 
or political, into providers which otherwise are 
easily displaced by wealthier and more powerful 
champions of top-down policies.
If the policy demands on agriculture are reasonably 
expanded to include delivery of culturally and 
nutritionally diverse foods, produced locally by 
those most in need, and which serve as a path out 
of poverty and malnutrition, then the bottom-up 
innovation models are the responsible innovation 
models, and require investment and support (De 
Schutter, 2011).
On the one hand, we have explored a path directed 
by top-down innovation models. As a type of 
black-box technology that is protected by particularly 
restrictive IP instruments (patents and patent-like 
PVPs), so-called 'biotech' crops (GM and similar) and 
their co-technologies are expensive to buy, destroy 
local seed savings and exchange practices, and 
prevent further farmer tinkering and improvement 
of innovations. When working as advertised, we 
find that top-down innovation as promoted by the 
large market economies, directed at advancements 
in agriculture (which ironically is maintained by 
extra-market subsidies), undermines the stated 
national and international goals of poverty reduction, 
sustainability, and increases food insecurity. They 
contribute to a feedback loop that continues to 
concentrate wealth and power into a smaller number 
of companies and large farms (Botta, 2011; Spielman, 
2007; USDA, 2009; World Bank, 2007). Top-down 
providers are invariably attracted to the largest 
markets (real or subsidised), the most uniform 
agroecosystems, and the highest volume farmer. 
They therefore will always serve last those who are 
foremost needed to feed the world in the future: the 
presently small and subsistence farmer on < 2 hectare 
plots of land where highly diverse and intermixed 
crops and livestock production work best to meet 
local needs.
On the other hand, bottom-up approaches emphasise 
the contextual role of innovation, even when 
the product is technology (van den Hove, 2012). 
Bottom-up innovation is the kind that provides 
useful tools, methods and knowledge that can be 
adapted to and by the farmer and farming system. 
Products that depend on ecosystem, cultural and 
financial homogenisation damage biodiversity 
and ecosystems, but also cultural identities as they 
eliminate the need for local knowledge (in the short 
term) and shift communities away from traditional 
foods and ethnobiological knowledge. Obstacles to 
taking bottom-up approaches need to be addressed 
and overcome by policy makers seeking to create a 
sustainable agricultural system (De Schutter, 2009, 
2011).
If there is a solution to the global mal-distribution 
of access to sufficient quantities of nutritious foods, 
how do we find it? In the process, how do we build 
agriculture into a pathway out of poverty without 
also raising greenhouse gasses and increasing soil 
erosion? How can we support agricultural systems 
that are resilient and sustainable? A commitment 
and investment of public resources as incentives to 
promote strategies for agricultural and ecological 
sustainability will require a radical shift on how we 
think about and perform innovations in the future, 
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where 'business as usual' in agriculture is no longer 
an option. As Einstein said, 'The solution will not 
come the same kind of thinking that created the 
problem'…
Innovations in agricultural food production have 
been deeply part of the human experience for over 
10 000 years. They will continue to be central to how 
we feed the world. The agricultural innovations 
of the future will have to be more 'hands on' and 
local if we are to meet our goals of food security, 
poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability 
(Benessia, 2012). For as long as the problems 
needing products are framed as technological rather 
than social, behavioural or political, then innovation 
will be directed toward technological products (van 
den Hove, 2012). The technological 'solutions' are 
often just responding to symptoms of the underlying 
cause of existing socio-ecological solutions. As the 
late Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg said: 'Our 
imperfect solutions aggravate every problem.' 
(Lederberg, 1970). 
We find the '3D Agenda' of the STEPS Centre 
(2010), cognisant of the ways which the directions, 
distribution and diversity of innovations affect their 
use, to be a compelling model for the future thinking 
of innovation in agricultural development.
As we have discussed, where the directions of 
innovation that follow top-down approaches — 
highly specialised, centralised and capital intensive 
— tend to shape innovation towards technological 
lock-ins. Economic and political forces that promote 
these innovation trajectories then become hard to 
reverse, or crowd out alternative approaches, such 
as agroecology. In contrast, bottom-up approaches 
facilitate participation of the user to shape the 
directions that innovation will take. The innovation 
direction further moulds the potential distribution 
of benefits, costs and hazards brought by the 
adoption of the innovation pathway. Often top down 
approaches leverage legal instruments of knowledge 
control that close down access to knowledge or 
further innovation, defines who indeed innovation 
is for, who can access it, based on who can afford 
to pay for it. An important consequence here is that 
top-down approaches marginalise those for whom 
innovations are more critically needed to increase 
the productivity and sustainability of agriculture. 
Lastly, these two aspects of innovation — direction 
and distribution — further determine the diversity 
of innovation possible, not only the scientific and 
technical aspects of innovation, but the social, 
organisational and innovations that support it. 
Diversity in innovation buffers against lock-ins and 
creates the potential for local adaptation within the 
ecological and economic contexts for which they are 
designed. This means a more integrative focus of the 
agroecosystem, beyond the genotype approaches 
towards augmenting biodiversity within agro-
environments to develop sustainable and resilient 
agroenvironments as protection against future 
uncertainties.
19�7 Lessons learned
In 1961, outgoing President of the US Dwight D. 
Eisenhower warned society to be vigilant of the 
large, concentrated interests in technology when 
he said: 'The prospect of domination of the nation's 
scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, 
and the power of money is ever present — and is 
gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific 
research and discovery in respect, as we should, we 
must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger 
that public policy could itself become the captive of 
a scientific technological elite' (Wikisource, 2012). 
The early warning, or perhaps late lesson, to be 
heeded here is that if one follows the top-down, 
usually technologically oriented, approaches to 
innovation,the desired outcomes for addressing 
food insecurity will not be achieved. Top-down 
approaches will most likely fail to deliver on the 
large promises of food security and alleviation of 
poverty, mainly because these approaches contribute 
to a feedback cycle that concentrates resources, 
knowledge, and influence as witnessed in the seed 
and agrichemicals sector (Adi, 2006; De Schutter, 
2009; Fernandez-Cornejo, 2006; Howard, 2009). 
Through this power, top-down providers can 
artificially homogenise both the conception of the 
problem to be solved and the solutions — such 
as GM crop plants — they propose. All too often 
questioning the rationality of the approach gets lost 
in the background of the unquestioning discussion 
over the use of the approach (Pavone, 2011 and see 
discussion in Boxes 19.1 an 19.2). Perhaps greater 
reflection and social deliberation into why and for 
whom agricultural innovations should be produced 
is needed if we are truly going to follow more 
sustainable pathways in the production of food and 
fibre.
In the path ahead, societies will have to make 
more conscientious choices of how to define and 
shape innovation to produce solutions that are 
appropriate for meeting global challenges related 
to agriculture. Bottom-up approaches are proving 
capable of getting sustainable, participatory 
and locally adapted solutions into the hands 
of those that need them most (Altieri, 2011a; 
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De Schutter, 2011), but are incapable of flourishing 
where invention is limited to what can be easily 
described by prevailing IP instruments. Change the 
directions, distribution and diversity of innovation, 
and you change the world.
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20 Invasive alien species: a growing but 
neglected threat?
  
Biological invasions are one of the five major causes of biodiversity loss as global human 
travel and trade have moved, and continue to move, thousands of species between and across 
continents. Some species of alien origin have a high probability of unrestrained growth which 
can ultimately lead to environmental damage.
An alien species — animal, plant or microorganism — is one that has been introduced, as a 
result of human activity, either accidentally or deliberately, to an area it could not have reached 
on its own. A common definition of the term 'invasive' focuses on its (negative) impact, while 
other definitions consider only rate of spread and exclude considerations of impact.
Despite the growing amount of legislation being adopted at the global scale, biological 
invasions continue to grow at a rapid rate, with no indication yet of any saturation effect. 
Decision-making in this area is very challenging. The overall complexity of the problem, its 
interdisciplinarity, the scientific uncertainties and the large number of stakeholders that need 
to be informed and involved, together demand governance actions that are difficult to see 
emerging at the regional scale (as in the EU), let alone globally.
It is widely agreed that preventing biological invasions or tackling them at a very early stage is 
the most efficient and cost-effective approach. Harmless species can be confused with harmful 
invasive species, however, leading to a waste of resources. Even more seriously, harmful 
invaders can be mistaken for innocuous species — so-called 'invaders in disguise' — and no 
appropriate action may be taken to counter the threats they pose.
Even with a very good risk assessment system, new outbreaks of invasive alien species could 
still occur, necessitating a system of rapid early warning and effective eradication response. 
The decision on where to draw the line on the acceptable environmental risks versus the 
introduction of new species or new communities that may carry invasive alien species then 
becomes a value judgement.
There is lively debate within the scientific community regarding the most appropriate 
strategies for managing invasive alien species. Governments and institutions charged with 
making decisions have access to considerable knowledge on the topic, but the lack of rules of 
interactions between multiple parties regularly thwarts effective decision-making.
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20�1 Introduction
Biological invasions are one of the five major causes 
of biodiversity loss, alongside habitat destruction, 
over-exploitation, climate change and pollution 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Global 
human travel and trade have moved, and continue 
to move, thousands of species between and across 
continents (McNeely, 2001). Only a small proportion 
of alien species become established, some of 
these spread, and a small subset produce major 
ecological, economic or social effects (generally 
termed 'impacts'). Ecological impacts include local 
extinction or a reduction in the diversity of native 
species, and various types of ecosystem-level 
changes such as modifications of nutrient cycling 
or water quality. As an example, in an analysis of 
680 recent animal extinctions worldwide, causes 
were compiled for about 25 % of these. Ninety-one 
(54 %) included invasive species among the causes 
of extinction, and in 34 cases they were the only 
known cause (Clavero and Garcia-Barthou, 2005). 
For example, feral cats on islands are responsible 
for at least 14 % of global bird, mammal, and reptile 
extinctions in recent times (Medina et al., 2011). All 
types of organism, from micro-organisms, including 
microbes and diseases, to mega-herbivores, can 
become invasive, and all can cause impacts on 
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. All types 
of ecosystem are affected: terrestrial, freshwater and 
marine.
Biological invasions are receiving increased attention 
in many countries, some of which have already 
set in place comprehensive legislation or national 
strategies to deal with various aspects of invasions, 
in particular concerning their management 
(e.g. Australia, Great Britain, Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Africa and USA) (Pyšek and Richardson, 
2010). As regards the management of invasive alien 
species (IAS), it is widely agreed that preventing 
biological invasions or tackling them at a very 
early stage is the most efficient and cost-effective 
approach. For example, the cost of eradicating 
weeds can increase at least 40 times if action is not 
taken promptly (Harris and Timmins, 2009), and in 
most cases eradication quickly becomes unfeasible 
(Genovesi, 2007). Preventive management calls for a 
precautionary approach, because prompt response 
often does not permit full assessment of the risks 
connected to a newly detected invasion (Genovesi 
et al., 2010). Despite widespread agreement on these 
principles, the full range of problems associated 
with IAS still lacks political recognition and too few 
government-coordinated actions are in place, or are 
effective, in most parts of the world, including in the 
European Union.
There is nevertheless a lively debate within the 
scientific community regarding the most appropriate 
strategies to adopt for managing invasive alien 
species. Aspects of this debate offer important 
pointers to dimensions that need to be better studied 
and the measures needed to make the phenomenon 
of biological invasion better understood by all 
stakeholders. Invasive alien species represent a 
growing threat, in particular in a globalised world, 
as they are introduced and spread by people 
(McNeely, 2001). This is more a human-driven 
environmental problem than a strictly biological 
one. Inherent uncertainties remain about what 
species will be introduced and which will become 
invasive. Consequently, making decisions is very 
challenging. The overall complexity of the problem, 
its interdisciplinarity, the scientific uncertainties, 
and the large number of stakeholders that need 
to be informed and involved, together demand 
governance actions that are difficult to see emerging 
at the regional scale (as in the EU), let alone at the 
global scale. Lessons already learnt in different parts 
of the world need to be considered when seeking to 
improve management regimes for IAS in different 
environments and at different scales.
20�2 The difficulty of defining invasive 
alien species
The terminology applied to organisms involved in 
biological invasions is complex, often confusing, 
and there is no universally accepted definition 
of IAS (Riley, 2005; Falk-Petersen et al., 2006; 
Richardson et al., 2011a); all this has serious 
practical consequences. The term 'alien' (exotic, 
foreign, non-indigenous, non-native) requires a 
geographical, biogeographical or ecological context 
to have a useful meaning — an alien species is one 
which has been introduced as a result of human 
assistance, either accidentally or deliberately, to 
an area it could not have reached on its own. The 
area in question has to be specified since a species 
'may be alien to any definable area, e.g. continents, 
islands, bio- or eco-regions, or any political entity 
(e.g. countries, states, provinces)' (Lambdon et al., 
2008). The terms alien and invasive both have 
political overtones. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) requires its Parties, through 
Article 8(h) to 'prevent the introduction of, control 
or eradicate those alien species which threaten 
ecosystems, habitats and species' and uses the term 
'invasive alien species' to refer to such species and 
defines these as 'alien species whose introduction 
and/or spread threaten biological diversity'. The 
term 'invasive' is therefore defined by the CBD in 
terms of (negative) impact, while other definitions 
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employ ecological and biogeographical criteria, 
i.e. invasive species are defined as alien species that 
sustain self-replacing populations, often in very 
large numbers at considerable distances from the 
site of introduction such as in natural areas, and 
explicitly exclude considerations of impact (see 
Richardson et al., 2011a; Blackburn et al., 2011 and 
references therein). Other definitions also include 
economic impacts, for example on agriculture or 
the use of amenities, and social impacts such as on 
human health. 
In general, the biogeographical concept is more 
widely used in the academic world, whereas the 
impact concept is widely used by decision makers 
(Ricciardi and Cohen, 2006). Such terminological 
and conceptual problems have contributed to 
difficulties in developing a coherent and effective 
political response to biological invasions.
The amount of information on IAS has grown 
steadily (Gurevitch et al., 2011) in the last 20 years. 
Since 2000, when the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Invasive Species 
Specialist Group (ISSG) established the Global 
Invasive Species Database (http://www.issg.org/
database/welcome/, the first web-based, freely 
accessible database on invasive species), many 
tools have been created (1). However, partly 
for the reasons discussed above, accurate and 
comprehensive information on global or regional 
numbers of invasive alien species is still difficult 
to obtain and statistics that are available are often 
ambiguous and difficult to interpret (e.g. see 
discussion in Richardson and Rejmánek, 2011). Even 
taxonomic reference works such as Floras and Faunas 
are notoriously bad at distinguishing between 
native and alien species (Lambdon et al., 2008). 
The need for accurate identification is an essential 
prerequisite for detection of IAS, and many cases of 
misidentification are coming to light. For example, 
harmless species can be confused with harmful 
invasive species, leading to a waste of resources 
and, even more serious, harmful invaders can be 
mistaken for innocuous species, so-called 'invaders 
in disguise' (Verloove, 2010), and no appropriate 
action taken to counter the threats they pose.
Europe is fortunate in having generally good 
information about invasive alien species, with many 
countries having prepared lists, although much 
more critical evaluation is needed in many cases and 
under-recording remains a problem. An overview 
(1) See http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-15/information/sbstta-15-inf-14-en.pdf for a very partial overview of main 
global data providers.
is provided by the DAISIE database (http://www.
europe-aliens.org/) and its List of Species Alien in 
Europe although there are still significant gaps in 
coverage and distribution and many problems of 
accurate identification remain to be resolved. For 
example, even well-known plant invaders such as 
Heracleum mantegazzianum and Fallopia japonica are 
frequently confused with related species, and the 
invasive hybrids often referred to as Rhododendron 
ponticum have now been named R.× superponticum 
(Cullen, 2011). In other taxa such as the genus 
Opuntia it is often unclear which species are 
involved in particular invasions, with experts 
disagreeing, for example, about whether O. maxima 
and O. ficus-indica are separate species. 
However outside Europe, very few countries have 
comprehensive, regularly updated lists of alien or 
invasive alien species. For example, the McGeoch 
et al. (2010) review of available data on invasive 
alien species for a set of 57 countries found that 
the number of invasive alien species varied from 
9 to 222, reflecting as much a lack of information as 
real differences of incidence. Furthermore, because 
of the dynamic nature of biological invasions, 
the lists that do exist need regular revision. An 
example of the difficulties of interpretation is the 
much-cited paper by Pimentel et al. (2005) which 
estimates that 50 000 alien species have entered 
the US. This figure is, however, misleading unless 
broken down. In the case of plants, the figure of 
25 000 alien species (compared with a native flora 
of about 17 500 species) includes agricultural and 
horticultural crops, timber and ornamental trees, 
garden plants, and weeds! In addition, although 
several countries had compiled lists of alien or 
invasive alien species by the late 1990s, there is 
general lack of coordination and harmonisation 
between these lists. Aggregation of lists developed 
using different criteria and definitions is a complex 
task which makes the interpretation of data and the 
planning of common action difficult and laborious.
20�3 Emergence of awareness of an old 
problem
The effects of IAS have been known for a very long 
time. As early as 77AD, Pliny the Elder wrote in 
his Naturalis Historia (The Natural History) that the 
invasion of rabbits in the Balearic Islands, Spain, was 
a very severe problem requiring effective control 
(see Scalera and Zaghi, 2004). In the 19th century, 
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Charles Darwin noted the invasive behaviour of 
some alien species during his explorations on the 
Beagle. Indeed, Darwin's musing on invasive alien 
species contributed to the development of his theory 
of the 'survival of the fittest' (Darwin, 1859). In 
most cases, however, alien species at that time were 
regarded as curiosities, rather than a significant 
threat to global or even regional biodiversity. 
Concerns regarding the impacts of alien species on 
native vegetation, particularly on islands (Kiehn, 
2011; Kueffer et al., 2010), started to be voiced in the 
19th century (Inderjit et al., 2005; Cadotte, 2006). 
For example, J D Hooker wrote in 1864: 'Among 
the most interesting phenomena connected with 
the distribution of plants, are those that concern the 
rapidity with which some species of one country 
will, when introduced into another, rapidly displace 
the aborigines and replace them' (Hooker, 1864). It 
was not, however, until the 20th century, especially 
in the second half, that they began to be recognised 
as a rapidly growing threat to global biodiversity. 
A key figure in the history of invasion biology 
was the British zoologist and ecologist Charles 
S. Elton (1900–1991) who not only made seminal 
contributions to modern population biology and 
community ecology but also set the scene for 
the emergence of invasion ecology as a separate 
discipline. His influential monograph The Ecology of 
Invasions by Animals and Plants, published in 1958, 
set out his concerns about the escalating impacts of 
IAS on natural ecosystems and the need to conserve 
species diversity from their adverse impacts. 
Elton's landmark publication is seen by many as 
a starting point for the understanding of invasion 
biology as a distinct field of study, and has been 
very widely cited (Richardson and Pyšek, 2008), 
although Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn (2008) note 
that the European tradition of research on biological 
invasions is actually older and is rooted in floristic 
studies of adventive species in the 19th and early 
20th centuries which already considered the role of 
humans as agents in biotic invasions.
The circumstances in the mid-20th century when 
Elton formulated his ideas were very different 
from those of today. The book Fifty years of Invasion 
Ecology. The legacy of Charles Elton documents the 
radical changes in the extent and nature of invasions 
since the 1950s and in the ways in which humans 
perceive and consider managing alien species 
(Richardson, 2011a). In Europe, in particular, these 
concepts were slow to manifest themselves widely; 
for many biologists and conservationists, biological 
invasions were still perceived as happening 
'somewhere else' (rabbits in Australia, water 
hyacinth in African lakes and waterways, etc). It was 
not until the last two decades of the 20th century 
that the significance of biological invasions and 
the threats they pose to native biological diversity 
became widely acknowledged at both global and 
national levels.
An international research programme on the Ecology 
of Biological Invasions ran in the 1980s under the 
auspices of the Scientific Committee on Problems of 
the Environment (SCOPE) (see Drake et al., 1989). 
This initiative ('SCOPE I') had a strong conservation 
focus (2), and was important in shaping the research 
agenda on IAS in its framing of the problem and in 
the core questions that the programme set out to 
examine. SCOPE I was a global research programme, 
and collated case studies and syntheses from around 
the world, thereby providing clear evidence of the 
global scale of the problem.
Another landmark was the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) which entered into force at the end 
of 1993. IAS was established as a cross-cutting issue 
and the CBD adopted a set of Guiding Principles 
for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of 
Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, 
Habitats or Species (COP decision VI/23).
A second SCOPE research programme ('SCOPE II') 
on IAS was launched in 1997. This was more inter/
transdisciplinary than SCOPE I, and considered 
economic valuation, stakeholder participation, 
pathway analysis and management (Mooney et al., 
2005). SCOPE II was run under the auspices of a 
consortium of scientific organisations including 
SCOPE, IUCN, and CABI which developed the 
Global Invasive Species Programme (GISP), with 
the explicit objective of providing new tools for 
understanding and coping with IAS. The report 
Invasive Alien Species: a Toolkit of Best Prevention and 
Management Practices (Wittenberg and Cock, 2001) 
gives a good synthesis of the concepts current in 
the 2000s on biological invasions. In 2011 GISP was 
closed down, for financial reasons.
In Europe, research on IAS was limited and 
uncoordinated until the late 1980s. Ambitious 
research programmes, focussing on risk analysis, 
inventories and the management of IAS, were 
launched in the early 2000s, including the EU 
(2) The outcomes of SCOPE 1 were published in a special issue of the journal Biological Conservation, volume 44, parts 1 and 2, 
published in 1988.
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programme 'Delivering Invasive Alien Species 
Inventories for Europe' (DAISIE; http://www.
europe-aliens.org) and 'Assessing Large Scale Risks 
for Biodiversity with Tested Methods' (ALARM; 
http://www.alarmproject.net/alarm) to cite only two 
important European initiatives.
The amount of information on IAS that was 
accumulating and the need to make it widely 
available to an audience of managers and scientists 
led to the development of national, regional and 
international databases and information systems, 
web portals and clearing house mechanisms such 
as the Global Invasive Species Information Network 
(GISIN) (3), the Global Invasive Species Database (4), 
the Invasive Species Compendium (ISC), the 
Inter-American IABIN Invasives Information 
Network (I3N) (5) for the Americas and NOBANIS (6) 
for North Europe and the Baltic.
20�4 A new discipline with its own 
approaches and research agenda
The global approach of the SCOPE I project in the 
1980s consolidated the recognition of the study of 
biological invasions as a new scientific discipline. 
Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn (2008) reviewed 
and analysed the state of research on biological 
invasions, and distinguished different approaches. 
The research topics have been further divided to 
make the distinctions clearer, but all these elements 
have coexisted over time. 
The classical model of biological invasions that 
emerged from the SCOPE 1 programme in the 
1980s examined case studies of invasions to attempt 
to answer three main questions: the traits that 
determine whether or not a species is an invader, 
why some habitats are more vulnerable to invasion 
than others, and how management systems using 
this knowledge can be developed (Drake et al., 
1989; Williamson, 1996). During this phase, research 
on invasions was restricted mainly to population 
and community ecology, and was based mostly 
on biogeographic comparisons of invasions, the 
underlying assumption being that the alien origin 
of species was important for explaining their 
behaviour. Despite many studies, and advances 
on many fronts, no single/common list of traits 
emerged that distinguish invasive from non-invasive 
species. The most informative criterion that emerged 
is that a species becoming invasive elsewhere 
(assuming that it has had the opportunity to do so), 
is a powerful predictor of whether that species will 
become invasive, although this criterion must be 
used with great caution in a world of rapid global 
change (Kueffer, 2010).
Invasions were then considered according to the 
different phases characterising their successive 
ecological and evolutionary processes. 'Phase 
transition models' break biological invasions down 
into at least the following steps: entry of a species 
into a new area, establishment after a possible lag 
phase during which the population size of the 
species remains small, and spread. Although the 
idea is older (Usher, 1986), considering invasions as 
a sequence of distinct phases has become a central 
piece of biological invasion theory since around 
2000 (Richardson et al., 2000; Kolar and Lodge, 2001) 
and has since guided much synthetic thinking in 
the field (e.g. Dietz and Edwards, 2006; Blackburn 
et al., 2011). The development of risk-assessment 
systems also emerged (e.g. Pheloung et al., 1999). 
Risk-assessment schemes seek to identify alien 
species (including those not yet introduced into 
a territory) that are likely to become invasive, 
as a basis for preventive measures or prioritised 
management action. The phase transition model 
also represents a conceptual basis for a multi-stage 
management approach involving prevention of 
entry at borders as a priority, plus early detection 
and eradication as key responses when prevention 
fails, or sustained containment and mitigation of 
impacts as the last option if the former steps fail 
(Wittenberg and Cock, 2001). Such a model also 
facilitates taking into account climate and global 
change.
As a result of SCOPE II and GISP, the study of 
pathways of introduction became an active research 
area, integrating natural and human sciences, since 
human activities are the central cause of movement 
of species (e.g. global trade and travel by rail, road, 
sea and air, wars, shipping movements and ballast 
waters, trade in animals and plants, intentional 
introductions for economic reasons or by tourists, 
accidental introductions) (McNeely, 2001; Ruiz 
and Carlton, 2003). A landscape-scale perspective 
on biological invasions was largely neglected, 
focusing initially on spatial models of spread, and 
(3) GISIN website: http://www.gisin.org.
(4) GISD website: http://www.issg.org/database/welcome.
(5) IABIN website: http://i3n.iabin.net.
(6) NOBANIS website: www.nobanis.org.
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did not became prominent until around 2000 (With, 
2002). Such types of study also included the role of 
land-use change in invasions (Vilà and Ibañez, 2011).
There is now increasing acceptance that biological 
and social factors interact in complex ways to initiate 
and sustain different facets of biological invasions 
(Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn, 2008), and several 
studies have in particular highlighted the role of 
economic factors in the introduction and spread 
of invasive species (e.g. Kueffer et al., 2010; Pyšek 
et al., 2010; Essl et al., 2011; Jeschke and Genovesi, 
2011). Lately, research on the impact of invasive 
alien species on ecosystem resilience and ecosystem 
services has been gaining importance (EFSA, 2011). 
Indeed the advances in understanding the 
mechanisms and the correlates of invasions have 
had a significant influence on awareness of the 
issues, and on the development of innovative and 
more effective response strategies. For example, 
the recent engagement of European institutions (7) 
to adopt more stringent measures to deal with 
IAS may also have been helped by an assessment 
showing that, in addition to the ecological impact, 
the economic costs of invasive alien species in the 
region exceed EUR 12.5 billion/year (Kettunen 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, several assessments 
have shown the efficacy of eradication of invasives 
for the recovery of native species affected by 
IAS at a global scale, with eleven birds, five 
mammals and one amphibian species having 
improved their conservation status as a result of 
the successful removal of IAS (McGeoch et al., 
2010). These results contributed to the increased 
implementation of this management option, with 
more than 1 100 campaigns being carried out in 
the world (Genovesi, 2011). However, although 
some eradications are being undertaken in Europe 
(e.g. Carpobrotus spp. in Menorca or Ruddy Duck 
Oxyura jamaicensis in the United Kingdom, France 
and Spain), they are uncommon.
20�5 A wealth of initiatives worldwide
Many initiatives focussing on IAS, dealing with 
legislation, management and communication, 
have emerged from international organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, governments 
and universities across the world. The case of the 
EU is detailed in Box 20.1. Some are listed below 
to illustrate their diversity (the listing is in no way 
exhaustive):
International treaties and agreements
As Riley (2005) notes, at least 42 treaties dealing 
with environmental issues, the marine environment 
and international quarantine refer to the regulation 
of IAS in the world. As regards terrestrial IAS, 
one of the major treaties is the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC), setting international 
standards for phytosanitary measures (although it 
only covers non-marine invertebrates and plants). 
The IPPC initially focused mainly on the protection 
of cultivated plants, but extended its scope in 1999 
to include issues relating to wild plants and the 
environment. The CBD also recognises the need 
to address invasive alien species in Article 8(h). In 
2004, the two Conventions signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to avoid duplication of efforts on IAS 
(Tanaka and Larson, 2006). This required a revision of 
the glossaries and procedures of the two Conventions 
for dealing with the analysis of environmental 
impacts associated with IAS. These organisations 
have counterparts at the regional scale, and countries 
are obliged to implement legislation on IAS.
Governments
Governments and parliaments play a major 
role in preventing the entry and controlling the 
spread of IAS, in particular through the adoption 
and enforcement of legislation (both national 
and international), conducting or financing the 
eradication of some IAS through appropriate 
agencies, and promoting research and public 
awareness of the issue. Within countries, 
responsibility for the topic is usually divided 
between ministries of the environment and of 
agriculture (including farming, forestry, hunting 
and fisheries, although some aspects may fall within 
the ministries of health, energy, infrastructure and 
transport, etc.), with the ministries of agriculture 
also being responsible for plant and animal health 
and the associated legislation. Although the 
environmental and agricultural sectors cooperate at 
the international level, the mandates are not always 
clear at the national level. This reflects the fact that 
pest management (under the plant and animal 
health regimes) has a longer history than control of 
invasions, as well as the multiple impacts that IAS 
may have and the difficulty of categorising these. 
Many countries have implemented dedicated legal 
instruments that relate to the entry and control 
of IAS (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, USA, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom), and as a result 
the number of legal tools has increased steadily 
in recent decades (McGeoch et al., 2010). For 
(7) See European Commission Environment website: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/invasivealien/index_en.htm).
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Box 20�1 Varying European approaches for dealing with IAS
The current situation in Europe is that despite many studies to assess the impacts of IAS, and possible 
solutions (e.g. Miller et al., 2006), no comprehensive regulation or legislative framework for the EU is yet 
in place. Partly as a result of the lack of coordinated action, Europe houses a very large number of alien 
species (around 11 000 according to DAISIE http://www.europe-aliens.org), of which about 10 % (1 094) 
have ecological impacts and 12 % (1 347) have economic impacts (Vilà et al., 2010). Moreover, many of 
the invasive alien species of plants and animals that countries spend millions of Euros in managing and 
controlling can still be freely purchased in some outlets. For instance, the water hyacinth (Eichhornia 
crassipes), which caused spectacular invasions in Portugal, Italy and along 75 km of a Spanish river — 
which took a few months and 18 million Euros to control (Cifuentes et al., 2007) — can still be bought 
and traded freely in the EU. Another example is the American grey squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis) which is 
known to have replaced the native European red squirrel (Sciurus vulgaris) in most of Britain and yet was 
released in the wild in Italy at three sites, in 1948, 1966 and 1994. Even though the Bern Convention (see 
below) requested the government of Italy to eradicate the introduced population 'without further delay' 
and prohibit the trade in the species in 1999, and appropriate plans were made, twelve years later it is still 
legally offered for sale in pet shops, while the invasive population continues to grow in the absence of any 
efforts to control or eradicate it (Standing Committee to the Bern Convention, 2011). 
Europe has a complex, fragmented and continually developing network of legislative instruments and 
regulations aimed at prohibiting the introduction and spread of alien species that pose a threat to native 
biodiversity (Miller et al., 2006). The European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO) 
establishes regional standards on phytosanitary measures, and the Convention on the Conservation 
of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, generally known as the Bern Convention (1979), commits 
its contracting parties to a strict control of the introduction of alien species (article 11) and since 1993 
has established a working group aimed at supporting states in the implementation of their obligations 
concerning IAS (see Brunel et al., 2009 for further details). These plant health and environment 
organisations work closely together, and have, for example, jointly published the European Code of Conduct 
on Horticulture and Invasive Alien Plants (Heywood and Brunel, 2009). 
European states have developed national legislation on IAS but often in an un-coordinated manner. For 
example, Norway has adopted comprehensive and coordinated legislation on invasive species, Germany 
and Austria are developing a list of regulated species (Essl et al., 2011), the United Kingdom is working on 
a similar list, Spain adopted legislation in November 2011 which includes a list of regulated species, and 
Switzerland adopted similar legislation in September 2008. However, given that the regulation of trade in 
the EU lies within the European Commission, all these efforts will only have limited effectiveness until there 
is a legal tool that can be applied across the EU. No coordinated legal instrument is yet in place despite the 
many studies undertaken on the topic, but the European Commission is preparing a dedicated legislative 
instrument to be ready by the end of 2012 (see European Commission, COM, 2011). However, there will 
always remain matters that are more appropriately regulated on a national basis because of climatic or 
other country-specific contexts. 
One of the reasons for the lack of a coordinated European approach is that neither of the European legal 
instruments on nature conservation that deal with IAS — the Bern Convention, covering 45 European 
States, and the Habitats Directive, applied in all the EU-27 Member States — are very specific on the 
topic of IAS. They were formulated in 1979 and 1992 respectively, before IAS became a major concern of 
governments. The Bern Convention simply asks governments to 'strictly control the introduction of 
non-native species' and the Habitats Directive requires Member States to 'ensure that the deliberate 
introduction into the wild of any species which is not native to their territory is regulated … and, 
if they consider it necessary, prohibit such introduction', without giving much information on how to 
deal with the IAS issue as a whole i.e. dealing with the prevention of new entries, pathways, unintentional 
introductions, containment or eradication of introduced species, early detection and rapid response 
systems, etc. Although the Bern Convention's 'European Strategy on Invasive Alien Species' (2003) and 
the European Commission's technical documents produced during the preparation of the EU Strategy on 
Invasive Alien Species (2011) do contain sufficient guidance for precise government action, they are not 
legally-binding documents and their application has been patchy. Within the framework of a revision of 
the Plant Health regime, European national plant protection organisations have identified the inclusion of 
invasive alien plants having detrimental effects on biodiversity as one of their first concerns (Agra CEAS 
Consulting et al., 2010).
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Europe, no coordinated legal instruments are yet 
in place, despite the many studies undertaken on 
the topic, but the EU has committed to presenting 
a draft dedicated legal tool by the end of 2012, and 
an assessment of the different legal options was 
published in December 2011 (8).
Countries with national strategies on IAS include 
Canada (Gouvernement du Canada, Environnement 
Canada, 2004), South Africa, for the Cape Floristic 
region (CAPE Partnership Program, 2009), Mexico 
(Comité Asesor Nacional sobre Especies Invasoras, 
2010), the Bahamas, (see Pyšek and Richardson, 
2010), and a number of European countries (see 
Box 20.1).
A few governments have also established large 
interdisciplinary programmes for dealing with 
invasive species 2011).
Non-governmental organisations
Non-governmental organisations cooperate in the 
management of IAS through the preparation of 
strategic documents and gathering of information, 
or directly by managing sites to conserve native 
species and restore ecosystems. The Invasive 
Species Specialist Group (ISSG) of the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
is one of the oldest organisations active in this 
field (9). ISSG has long worked with all the main 
global initiatives, including SCOPE and the 
Convention of Biological Diversity, providing 
technical support for improving the ability to 
prevent and mitigate the impacts of invasive 
species on biological diversity. 
Other major institutions active in the field include 
CABI, Birdlife, The Nature Conservancy, Wildlife 
Conservation Society, and Island Conservation 
(whose mission is specifically to prevent extinctions 
by removing invasive species from islands). Across 
the world, at the national and local scale, thousands 
of associations or foundations are also involved in 
controlling IAS, for example in nature reserves.
Universities
Many universities and research institutes across 
the world are engaged in research on IAS, within 
the disciplines of biological science, weed science, 
agronomy, and more recently social science. 
Dedicated research centres and networks have been 
created in several parts of the world. Networks 
(8) Document available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/invasivealien/index_en.htm.
(9) Founded in 1993, it was the first thematic (as opposed to taxonomic) specialist group of the IUCN SSC to be created. ISSG is a 
voluntary global network of about 1 000 scientists and practitioners working to mitigate the impacts of biological invasions.
of scientists are also very active and organise 
conferences (e.g. NEOBIOTA, see http://cis.
danbif.dk/neobiota2010 or EMAPI, Ecology and 
Management of Alien Plant Invasions). 
Thus, despite the growing amount of legislation 
being adopted at the global scale, invasions 
continue to grow at a rapid rate, with no indication 
yet of any saturation effect (Butchart et al., 2010). In 
addition to the more than 42 international treaties 
dealing with environmental issues referring to 
the regulation of IAS (Riley, 2005), there is much 
reliance on voluntary codes of conduct which by 
definition lack sanctions for non-compliance, the 
latest in Europe being the European Code on Pets 
and Invasive Alien Species (Davenport and Collins, 
2011). None of this is helped by the inherent 
difficulties of defining and tackling IAS and the 
consequent continuing confusion and debate 
over terminology and the lack of an agreed core 
definition of IAS. It is therefore not surprising that 
the scientific community recurrently undergoes 
soul-searching over these issues. 
20�6 Obstacles to a common 
understanding
The issue of the extent to which IAS 
adversely affect the natural environment has 
long been a subject of controversy, not just 
between stakeholders with different interests 
(e.g. conservationists versus horticulturists/
foresters) but also within the scientific community. 
Dissenting voices periodically challenge the 
extent to which IAS represent a major threat to 
biodiversity, and the measures that should be taken 
(see for example the exchange between Sagoff, 2005 
and Simberloff, 2005).
The obstacles to reaching a common agreement 
about the threats posed and measures needed 
are reflected in the scientific debates on the topic. 
Although debates and discussion are inherent to 
the development of any discipline, too much focus 
on these controversies can have a deleterious effect. 
A more extensive discussion of the valuation of 
invasive alien plants can be found in Larson (2007), 
Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn (2008), Hattingh (2011) 
and Rotherham et al. (2011). Some of the key issues 
that are a cause of conflicting expert views are 
reviewed in the next section.
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Dissenting voices about the 'pros' and 'cons' of 
managing IAS
As already noted, IAS are broadly defined 
according to the negative impacts they cause 
(cf. the CBD definition and definitions extending 
to economic impacts). The very definition of 
IAS along these lines is therefore somewhat of a 
hybrid, mixing biological elements (a species), 
the effects on the environment that we are able to 
detect, and human perceptions of its economic, 
environmental or social impacts. Assessment of 
these impacts, specially when considering those 
on the environment (which in some cases are not 
easy to quantify or qualify, not to mention the 
dynamic nature of the environment), are subject 
to multiple interpretations. The assessments 
are particularly difficult in the context of a 
precautionary management approach that builds 
on an ability to predict potential future impacts. 
It is widely acknowledged that some IAS can have 
major impacts and that in these cases it would, in 
principle, be ideal to prevent these invasions before 
they happen. However, there are divergences 
in our perception of how common problematic 
alien invaders are and whether the alien origin 
of a species is a reliable heuristic for predicting 
problematic spread. Davis et al. (2011) question 
whether conservation money is efficiently spent 
on preventing the introduction of any new alien 
species until such species are proved innocuous, 
as a strict interpretation of the precautionary 
principle would require. In effect, they highlight 
the opportunity costs of a strict prevention of 
introduction of alien species, including the 
opportunity costs of losing the benefits that some 
alien species might provide.
The IUCN Invasive Species Specialist Group (ISSG) 
(2011) responded to these points by explaining 
that the escalating loss of biological diversity is 
the motivation for invasive management action on 
alien species. They also recalled that alien species 
may not manifest invasiveness till decades after 
their introduction, and draw attention to species 
that may only have a subtle immediate impact 
but which eventually affect entire ecosystems, for 
example through their effect on soil properties. 
In addition, invasions and impacts appear to 
be context-dependent. This is particularly true 
for plants: for example, while an alien species 
of cinnamon (Cinnamomum verum) has been 
considered as potentially beneficial for restoring 
novel mid-elevation forests in the Seychelles, it is 
a major invader in nearby montane cloud forests 
(Kueffer et al., 2010). The ISSG (2011) argues that, 
irrespective of how common problematic invasions 
of alien species are, prevention is needed because 
of the huge impacts of the invasions that do 
happen. 
Based on such a perspective, the cost of inaction 
has been estimated at up to USD 1.4 trillion 
per year, representing about 5 % of global GDP 
(Pimentel et al., 2005). Examples are also available 
for countries: USD 138 billion per year for the 
US, USD 14.45 billion for China (figure for 2000, 
representing 1.36 % of Chinese GDP) and over 
EUR 12 billion per year in Europe. While the cost 
of inaction in Europe is EUR 12 billion per year, the 
cost of action is estimated at EUR 40–190 million 
per year, depending on the possible policy options 
(Kettunen et al., 2009). The management of IAS is 
therefore, according to this perspective, considered 
a very cost-effective investment.
It is not, however, obvious how to decide on 
priorities and what actions should be taken to 
address the benefits or harm to native biodiversity, 
human health, ecological services and economies 
that species might pose when such benefits and 
harm cannot be predicted. The solution may 
come from a pragmatic approach that involves 
prevention or mitigation of the worst impacts of 
invasives through a combination of preventive 
measures, early detection and rapid response to 
new incursions, with permanent management as 
only the last option.
The lack of acceptance by society of some 
management actions
Measures to manage IAS may also be subject to 
criticism, in particular when they involve the 
killing of animals, or the use of biological control 
agents or phytosanitary products (i.e. herbicides or 
pesticides) (see Boxes 20.2 and 20.3). Opponents of 
the management of invasive alien plants may also 
oppose the use of herbicides or pesticides, which 
they perceive as a bigger threat than the actual 
impacts of the invasives.
Native vs. alien: a polemical topic to explain to the 
public
A misunderstanding that is pervasive when 
talking about IAS lies in not differentiating 
between invasive species and alien species, as 
already mentioned above, and using this to justify 
interventions against alien species in general. 
While conservation biologists and ecologists 
refer to the threats from alien species because of 
evidence that indicates that some of them entail 
particular ecological and economic risks, some 
social scientists such as Larson (2007) and Warren 
(2007) have pointed out the problematic social and 
cultural connotations of such 'prejudice' against 
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Box 20�2 The grey squirrel and the ruddy duck: too cute to be killed
A good example of protest by animal welfare groups is the case of the grey squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis) in 
Italy. The two officers in charge of the eradication of grey squirrel were brought to court and charged with 
cruelty toward animals and illegal methods of capture, despite consultations with animal welfare groups 
and exercising caution in killing the animals. The legal case delayed the enforcement of any action, ruining 
the whole eradication campaign, and the grey squirrel is now expected to spread across Europe, with 
huge impacts on biodiversity as well as the economy of the entire region (Bertolino and Genovesi, 2003; 
Bertolino et al., 2008).
Another relevant case is the control of the American ruddy duck (Oxyura jamaicensis) which escaped from 
captivity in the United Kingdom and, after reaching a population of several thousand, spread throughout 
Europe and started to hybridise with the endangered native white-headed duck (Oxyura leucocephala). In 
Spain it threatened the very intense efforts of the conservation authorities to prevent the extinction of the 
native species. Selective shooting of ruddy ducks and hybrids soon started in Spain, but this was only a 
temporary measure. Realising that the long-term solution for the Spanish populations of white-headed duck 
could only come from the eradication of the ruddy duck in the United Kingdom, a European eradication plan 
was proposed by the Bern Convention and its eradication financed by the UK government and the European 
Union from 1997. The problem was that shooting attractive ruddy-ducks caused a public and vociferous 
outcry in that bird-loving country, until the support of the Royal Society of the Protection of Birds for the 
controls was decisive in getting the project started. That courageous decision cost the society the loss of 
probably a few thousand members, but by December 2011 the number of birds in the United Kingdom 
had been reduced to a few hundred and there are good chances of eradicating the species from the wild in 
Europe by 2015 (Standing Committee to the Bern Convention, 2011; Consulting et al., 2010).
species of non-native origin. Some consider that 
environmentalists, conservationists and gardeners 
are 'xenophobic' when dealing with IAS. 
Invasive species may indeed be flagged in the 
press with pejorative names such as 'the yellow 
peril' for water primroses (Ludwigia grandiflora 
and L. peploides) in the south of France. But from 
a scientific point of view, the focus on alien 
species is not xenophobic but has a scientific basis 
(Simberloff and 141 scientists, 2001). The focus lies 
on alien species not because they are considered 
unwanted per se, but because they show that some 
species of alien origin have a higher probability of 
unrestrained growth which can ultimately lead to 
environmental damage. One reason why some alien 
species differ ecologically from native species is that 
they are not subject to the control of natural enemies 
(diseases, pests, herbivores) that are not present in 
the newly colonised area.
An even greater difficulty in defining what is 
'natural'
The debate on native versus alien goes beyond 
the species level and touches on the definition of 
ecosystems and on what conservationists or society 
decide to protect. The definition of an 'alien' species 
in an era of accelerated global change is also a 
challenge. Davis et al. (2011) call for management 
approaches that recognise that the 'natural' 
ecosystems of the past have changed forever 
due to drivers such as climate change, nitrogen 
eutrophication, increased urbanisation and other 
land-use changes. They argue that most human and 
natural communities now contain both long-term 
residents and new arrivals, and that ecosystems with 
combinations of species that never existed before 
are emerging as a consequence of climatic and other 
global change ('novel ecosystems' sensu Hobbs et al., 
2006; 'no-analogue ecosystems' sensu Williams and 
Jackson 2007).
These arguments only represent a part of the 
emerging challenges in the struggle against 
invasions (Kueffer, 2010). For example, the 
increasing use of novel alien crops such as those 
used for biofuel and biomass present a risk of 
favouring new invasions (Genovesi, 2010; Sheppard 
et al., 2011); and synthetic biology may in the 
near future produce still more fundamentally 
novel species. To overcome the effects of climate 
change, some authors have proposed translocating 
native species to areas outside their natural ranges 
(so called assisted migration (McLachlan et al., 
2007) or assisted colonisation (Hunter, 2007; 
Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2008): see Seddon et al., 2009; 
Stanley-Price, 2010), with the possible risk of causing 
further impact on native species, as in the case of the 
proposed translocation of the Iberian lynx into the 
British Isles (Thomas, 2011; Vilà and Hulme, 2011). 
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Box 20�3 Fear of biological control agents
Biological control is a management method that triggers reluctance in decision makers and the public, 
though generally supported by scientists if proper and conclusive research has first been carried out. 
Such caution prevents this efficient technique from being used when IAS are widespread. The mistrust of 
biological control agents springs from the fear that the agent may not prove specific enough and end up 
attacking non-target native species, thus aggravating the problem instead of solving it. The public also 
finds it odd and risky to introduce a new non-native species into a complex ecosystem, particularly in a 
psychological context of negative feelings towards alien species. Often scientists are not fully trusted either. 
The use of the lepidopteran Cactoblastis cactorum (Pyralidae) to manage the invasive Opuntia species 
that threatens endemic plants in rocky habitats is a typical example that is used to oppose biological 
control. While the introduction of the Lepidopteran had proved successful in managing millions of hectares 
of invasive Opuntia species in Australia, South Africa and then in Hawaii and the Caribbean Islands, 
Cactoblastis cactorum was then accidentally introduced in Florida where it threatened a native Opuntia 
species (Sforza, 2006). In this case, the potential for accidental spread of the species in areas where it 
could be detrimental had not been assessed accurately.
Another well-known example of the introduction of a biological control agent that itself became invasive is 
that of the cane toad (Rhinella marina) which was introduced in Queensland (Australia) to control insects 
that feed on sugarcane and other crops. Cane toads became naturalised and spread, and have detrimental 
impacts as they feed on many terrestrial animals and compete with native amphibians for food and shelter 
(Global Invasive Species Database http://www.issg.org/database/species/ecology.asp?fr=1&si=113). In 
this case, the potential adverse impacts of the species on native fauna had not been assessed accurately.
Even if successful, the method may be susceptible to criticism. The recent release of Cibdela janthina 
in Reunion Island in 2009 to combat the highly invasive plant Rubus alceifolius (Le Bourgeois and Della 
Mussia, 2009) triggered intense debate in the media. Apiculturists and fruit producers feared that the 
biological control agent would outcompete bees, jeopardising fruit production on the island. The issue even 
reached the French Senate (JO Sénat, 21/05/2009). After undertaking additional studies and dialogue 
with stakeholders, it finally appeared that Cibdela janthina had no impact on bees, and was efficient at 
controlling the targeted plant. Many other biological control programmes have proved successful, and the 
selection of an agent is nowadays carefully studied through formal risk assessment protocols (the same as 
those used for IAS) that greatly reduce the chance of unexpected behaviour of released species.
At a European level, legislation on the introduction of biological agents is quite stringent, while legislation 
against the introduction of any other species, including acknowledged invasive ones is non-existent.
In the case of the control of the water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes) in Spain, mentioned above, the 
authorities ruled out the introduction of a biological control agent, used successfully in Africa, because of 
the complex European legislative framework impeding the release of agents. 
It should be noted, however, that after extensive research and discussion, the biological control agent 
Aphalara itadori was released in the United Kingdom to control the highly invasive Japanese knotweed 
(Fallopia japonica) whose management and control costs more than GBP 150 million a year. This represents 
the first classical biological control release against an invasive alien plant in Europe. CABI had carried 
extensive testing on this insect over the past five years to verify that it can be safely released into the 
environment. A public consultation was launched: 20 respondents were against the release, 42 in favour 
(CABI, 2010).
20�7 The limits of governance on the 
complex issue of IAS
The interdisciplinary nature of the skills required 
for dealing with IAS is a challenge and can slow 
action and cooperation. An IAS may, for example, 
have both environmental and agricultural impacts 
as well as providing other agricultural benefits. 
This raises the question of which legislative 
framework should be in charge. At a macro scale 
such as the EU, various principles, terminologies 
and legislative frameworks need to be aligned 
before any decision can be taken, complicating 
and slowing the effective application of legislation 
and management measures. This has been of 
particular concern in the case of ragweed (Ambrosia 
artemisiifolia). The pollen of this plant is very 
allergenic, and the species is also a weed in crops, 
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particularly of sunflower. Discussions on which 
department — health or agriculture — should deal 
with the problem has much delayed measures to 
control the species.
Managing an invasive alien species is difficult 
not only because of its intrinsic biological 
characteristics and technical difficulties, but also 
because of the very many stakeholders that need 
to be involved for coordinated action. Classical 
environmental management tools (i.e. habitat 
protection, liability for environmental damage or 
mediation in environmental conflicts) prove of 
little use for IAS. Indeed, before becoming invasive, 
a species may remain unnoticed in an area for 
several decades, the so-called 'lag phase'. This can 
makes the application of a liability approach very 
difficult, as the traceability of who introduced 
a species may be lost with time. Environmental 
mediation that would permit a consensus between 
conflicting interests about the introduction of a 
particular species is handicapped by uncertainty in 
the potential invasive behaviour of an introduced 
species, as the decision on whether or not to 
introduce a species needs to be taken far in advance 
of the species becoming effectively invasive. For 
example, the potential impacts had not been 
assessed accurately before introducing the signal 
crayfish (Pacifastacus leniusculus) into Europe. 
When the Scandinavian fisheries of European 
crayfish (Astacus astacus) were damaged by a 
crayfish plague, signal crayfish, originating from 
North America, were introduced to Norway and 
Finland for recreational and commercial crayfish 
capture. It turned out that signal crayfish was not 
only the carrier of the crayfish disease, but it also 
became invasive, threatening the European crayfish 
as well as macro-invertebrates, benthic fish and 
aquatic plants. The species has spread widely and 
is now out of control (Global Invasive Species 
Database, Pacifastacus leniusculus, http://www.issg.
org/database/species/ecology.asp?fr=1&si=725). 
The species nevertheless has beneficial effects for 
crayfish production, resulting in a conflict of interest 
between those who want to control the species 
and those who want to breed it. Clearly a decision 
should have been taken long before allowing the 
introduction of this species in Europe.
These complex and difficult decisions are 
taken on the basis of risk assessment, which is 
a time-consuming exercise. Furthermore, even 
with a very good risk assessment system, new 
outbreaks of IAS could still occur, making the need 
for a system of rapid early warning and effective 
eradication response necessary. The decision 
on where to draw the line on the acceptable 
environmental risks versus the introduction of 
new species or new communities that may carry 
invasive alien species then becomes a value 
judgement to be taken by governments. The 
question of the proportionality of the measures to 
be taken (allowing the entry of any species versus 
prohibiting the entry of all non-native species) is 
very delicate and should involve, in addition to 
the strategic position of governments, a societal 
debate. This would imply, in the first place, a 
good knowledge by the public of the phenomenon 
and of the impacts of invasive alien species. The 
stakeholders involved in introducing IAS, and 
the public who are often responsible for the entry 
or further spread of these species, both need to 
be engaged in the debate. Another element of 
'proportionality' that makes legislative measures 
complex lies in the geographical range over which 
measures should be taken. A species might be 
a problem only in a given bioclimatic area, but 
free movement and trade might occur between 
this area and others, particularly in the free-trade 
space of the EU. Should this species therefore 
be prohibited in the whole free movement and 
trade area, even if it only has detrimental effects 
in part of it? Such concern is being raised for the 
development of a European legislative framework 
on IAS. In other words, should the attractive water 
hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), which in Europe 
may only become naturalised and be invasive in 
Mediterranean countries, be prohibited from trade 
in the United Kingdom where it is harmless? The 
UK nursery industry might like to make use of a 
plant that does not threaten UK biodiversity, but its 
introduction, given the free movement of persons 
and goods within the EU, might compromise 
management efforts in areas at risk. The question 
of balance between legislative and voluntary 
approaches in dealing with IAS is crucial. As many 
stakeholders are involved, both approaches are 
needed, the one reinforcing the other.
20�8 Applying the precautionary 
principle to invasive alien species
Because of the lack of robust criteria for predicting 
invasiveness, and because most research on 
biological invasions assumes that alien species are 
'guilty until proven innocent', rigid application of 
the precautionary principle in managing biological 
invasions is problematic in the context of free-trade 
agreements. New Zealand, for example, requires 
that every species imported to the country is 
assessed for risks, and only if found to pose a low 
risk can an authorisation be issued. Some countries, 
however, regulate the introduction only of species 
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on a list of 'unwanted' invasive or potentially 
invasive species (10). This approach is also proposed 
by the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC).
Another way of applying the precautionary 
principle, while not preventing the entry of IAS, 
is to eradicate new invaders in a timely manner. 
The case of Caulerpa taxifolia is a good illustration 
of a missed opportunity to undertake early action 
in Europe. The alien alga was detected in France 
in 1984 at a very early stage of invasion, and 
could have been quickly removed. However, the 
management of C. taxifolia only started when it 
had already expanded to a large portion of the 
Mediterranean, when eradication was no longer 
possible. When the same species was recorded in 
California in 2000, eradication started only 17 days 
after its discovery, leading to its successful removal 
(Genovesi, 2007). 
The precautionary principle is the first of the 
CBD's Guiding Principles for the Prevention, 
Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien 
Species ('The Guiding Principles' Annex Decision 
VI/23 (11)) (see Cooney, 2004). It is applied to some 
extent by the IPPC, when considering all sources 
of uncertainty in performing a pest risk analysis. 
Biosecurity is a very dynamic field of research that 
seeks to integrate the latest techniques and concepts 
in its methods to assess risks: the modelling of a 
species' potential area of establishment, pathway 
analysis, etc. Such techniques face the challenge 
of identifying species that may be invasive, and 
also those that may be invasive under novel 
conditions created by climate change and/or other 
facets of global change. Approaches for addressing 
such situations are being developed, such as 
consideration of the impacts of IAS on ecosystem 
services through the elaboration of different 
scenarios (EFSA, 2011; Chytrý et al., 2012).
20�9 Addressing invasion pathways: 
a late engagement with the 
stakeholders
A pathway for engagement: Codes of conduct
Managing IAS now consists of placing more 
emphasis on pathways of introduction of IAS, 
as well as identifying the stakeholders involved, 
although such aspects have been adopted quite 
recently considering the history of the discipline. 
(10) Such lists used to be called 'Black lists', but such a term is now not considered politically correct.
(11) See http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7197.
This has shifted the focus away from preventing 
particular species to managing risks associated 
with introduction pathways, including the human 
activities that create, shape and sustain such 
pathways (Wilson et al., 2009; Richardson, 2011b), 
involving local knowledge. Researchers in the 
social sciences have become interested in exploring 
perceptions of alien and invasive species and 
their impacts (Menozzi, 2007; Andreu et al., 2009; 
Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn, 2008; Javelle et al., 
2010). Cooperation with stakeholders involved in 
introducing and disseminating IAS is becoming 
increasingly common.
For invasive alien plants, the horticultural trade 
is the primary invasion pathway (Reichard and 
White, 2001; Dehnen-Schmutz et al., 2007; Drew 
et al., 2010; Richardson and Rejmánek, 2011). 
As a response, some countries have prepared 
voluntary codes of conduct or good practice for 
the horticultural industry, for example the United 
States (Fay et al., 2001) and Europe (Heywood 
and Brunel, 2009). Such approaches have so far 
had limited effectiveness and buy-in (Drew et al., 
2010), although 12 European countries report 
initiatives related to the implementation of a code 
of conduct on horticulture and invasive alien 
plants. The effectiveness of such voluntary codes 
depends largely on how well they are promoted 
(Dehnen-Schmutz and Touza, 2008; Brundu et al., 
2011); this requires continuing communication 
and dialogue with the stakeholders (Gibbs, 2011). 
When developing this code of conduct in Europe, 
the International Association of Horticulture 
Producers (AIPH) was involved in the drafting of 
the document. For the specific case of invasive alien 
plants, the industry cannot be seen as preventing 
legislation from happening, and although playing 
its role in challenging the issue, it has been 
collaborative in considering that if some species 
present a problem, then some alternative can be 
found.
Pathway approaches are also emerging in the field 
of plant health. It is increasingly considered that a 
species-by-species regulatory approach relying on 
inspections is more and more difficult in today's 
markets context. As a consequence, the forest 
entomology and pathology science communities 
recommend a pathway approach for regulating 
nursery stock, similar to that adopted for wood 
packaging material. This is based on the principle 
that best management practices that effectively 
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prevent known IAS will significantly reduce the 
risk of also introducing unknown pests. In this 
regard, the IPPC is developing an international 
standard for plants for planting (see the 
UK Forestry Commission website: http://www.
forestry.gov.uk/fr/INFD-6YUJRD).
Other initiatives to prepare codes of conduct 
involve botanical gardens (see Heywood, 2011 
for Europe; Fay et al., 2001 for the US), the pet 
industry, hunting, recreational fishing, zoos and 
aquaria, aquaculture, marine ballast waters, 
commercial forestry and other sectors.
Stakeholders: what forces lie behind action and 
inaction?
Scientists and experts have been active in 
communicating the dangers of IAS for biodiversity 
— although not necessarily in the most coherent 
way, as most scientists are not trained in public 
relations or communication. Dissenting views 
have probably had little influence on government 
decisions on IAS, where the consensus is now that 
this is a serious problem requiring some degree of 
attention. Other interest groups have been silently 
watching the growing interest in IAS with much 
attention and a degree of reluctance. This includes 
not only animal welfare activists, alarmed at the 
possible eradication of animals, but also industries 
and lobbying groups, for whom restrictions on the 
trade of some species would hinder or complicate 
business. Horticulture would have to change its 
current practices substantially if serious measures 
to avoid new introductions were put in place. 
But as they feel that their industry is part of the 
environment business, they do not want to be seen 
as environmentally unfriendly. A number of other 
stakeholders who deal with animals and plants 
may not welcome restrictions, i.e. foresters, the pet 
trade, aquaculture, recreational fishing and, to a 
lesser extent, hunters, zoological gardens, aquaria 
and botanical gardens. Many of these groups are 
generally aware of the problem and display in 
general a cooperative attitude with governments 
and scientists, but prefer a voluntary approach with 
agreed codes of conduct to hard laws. The industry 
may also be divided in some cases. While few 
businesses are in favour of more bureaucracy, some 
think they might be at a disadvantage compared 
with those who decide not to apply codes and 
therefore that legislation would be fairer. The pet 
industry is more favourable to a voluntary approach 
and has been actively engaged in the drafting of a 
European Code of Conduct on Pets and Invasive 
Alien Species. It would certainly not welcome some 
mandatory regulations, for instance any relating 
to the shipping of all pets, as these would increase 
costs and imply new complex procedures and 
operations. Yet it is clear that responsibility for the 
introduction of many invasive species lies partly 
with the industry and its activities, although it is 
also a consequence of the slowness of governments 
to take action or introduce legislation.
20�10 Lessons learnt on invasive 
alien species: towards more 
transdisciplinarity in a rapidly 
changing world?
During the past few decades, we have acquired 
greatly increased awareness of the extent of 
biological invasions, the impacts they have on 
biodiversity and the economy, and a much better 
understanding of how to prevent and manage them. 
Faced with the uncertainties posed by a rapidly 
changing world, we need to learn lessons from 
this large body of experience so as to avoid further 
losses.
Biological invasions currently interest a large and 
growing body of people, including researchers and 
students in academic institutions, conservation 
agencies and NGOs, civil servants, park managers, 
activists, volunteers and a growing number of 
concerned citizens in many parts of the world. 
This network of people, interests and perspectives 
has assembled over the past 30 years worldwide. 
The 'game rules' for interactions between different 
parties are still being defined, tested, and debated. 
Governments and institutions charged with making 
decisions have access to considerable knowledge 
on the topic, but the lack of rules of interactions 
between multiple parties regularly thwarts effective 
decision-making. Governance of IAS needs to be 
achieved before the introduction of species, which 
means dealing with uncertainties and setting a level 
of protection. Lessons can, nonetheless, be learnt 
that could pave the way to more effective interaction 
and communication between parties, which should 
result in more effective and transparent decisions. 
Some of these lessons are late ones (EEA, 2001). 
Align concepts for a better understanding by society 
and public engagement
Public understanding of the threats posed by IAS is 
fundamental for effective governance. Occasional 
divergence of opinion among experts in the field of 
biological invasions may weaken public confidence 
in the advice of 'experts'. Rather than talking with 
one voice to the public and insisting on convergent 
opinions, it is more important to ensure that 
different opinions are made clearly understandable 
and transparent to the public and decision makers.
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In the historical framing of the phenomenon of 
biological invasions (see above), it was assumed 
that the problem could be solved by identifying the 
biological traits of potentially invasive species and 
preventing their introduction to new areas. Fifty 
years of research have shown that the identity (alien 
or native) and traits of the species are indeed highly 
relevant, but it has become increasingly obvious that 
other factors are also involved (e.g. propagule (12) 
pressure, habitat factors, land use). In particular, 
several studies have shown that biological invasions 
are strongly correlated with economic factors (Essl 
et al., 2011; Jeschke and Genovesi, 2011; Pyšek 
et al., 2010). A comparison of plant invasions on 
oceanic islands highlighted the fact that economic 
development (measured as gross domestic product) 
is the most important predictor of invasive species 
richness on islands (Kueffer et al., 2010). Human 
activities are an essential factor in the understanding 
and solution of the IAS issue, so that public 
engagement is vital if we are to adopt effective 
measures and ensure good governance.
Harmonise concepts for improved coordination of 
on-the-ground actions
The lack of clear and common concepts and 
definitions of IAS has led to serious problems in 
obtaining reliable information on species involved in 
biological invasions and has undoubtedly hampered 
the development of detailed databases. This is a key 
element to be addressed when considering ways 
of strengthening strategies for the management of 
IAS. This is indeed one of the reasons why some 
countries do not have a comprehensive list of alien 
or invasive alien species and is exacerbated by the 
fact that some countries do not appear to be aware 
of the extent or seriousness of biological invasions. 
Another cogent reason is the dynamic nature of 
biological invasions, so that existing lists need to be 
regularly updated, requiring budgets and trained 
staff. A better connection between science and 
management would help increase and improve 
policy and legislative action. Initially, most research 
questions were disconnected from management 
concerns, and arose from the issues of population 
and community ecology (Kueffer and Hirsch 
Hadorn, 2008). Also, impacts were considered 
without explicitly clarifying the broader human and 
economic context, and it was often assumed that any 
detectable effect of an alien species on an ecosystem 
would be undesirable (Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn, 
2008). Researching global concepts may have 
hindered the provision of concrete and simple 
actions. With time, the study of biological invasions 
(12) A propagule is defined as any plant organ or part, as a spore, seed or cutting, used to propagate a new plant.
has become much more interdisciplinary, and links 
to management agencies have strengthened. The 
valuation of costs and benefits associated with alien 
species (including IAS) and their management has 
become an important research focus (Kueffer and 
Hirsch Hadorn, 2008). Consequently, the problem 
of IAS, initially recognised and brought forward by 
scientists, is now being more firmly rooted in civil 
society (e.g. NGO groups).
A late lesson not yet learnt: take account of wider 
social interests and values
As mentioned in Late lessons from early warnings 
Vol. 1 (EEA, 2001), 'taking account of wider social 
interests and values' has been overlooked when 
dealing with IAS. Further social studies are needed 
to understand human perceptions of biological 
invasions, so as to eventually adapt the concepts and 
reconcile diverging opinions between experts and 
stakeholders. It has for example been shown that 
the alien origin of a species is of minor importance 
for stakeholders, while the role that humans play 
in the spread of a species, its aesthetic and cultural 
value, or personal experiences with the impacts 
and management of a particular invasive species 
in a specific site, are of high importance in their 
valuation (Bardsley and Edwards-Jones 2007; 
Bremner and Park, 2007; Gobster, 2011; Selge et al., 
2012). Additional care and thought must also be 
given to the language used in communicating on the 
topic (Larson, 2010; Hattingh, 2011). For problems 
associated with IAS, it is crucial to involve all 
stakeholders, including those who introduce species 
and members of the public who have divergent 
ideas about the species. Identifying the pathways 
of introduction of the invaders and implementing 
any regulations that affect these demands ongoing 
dialogue with stakeholders (e.g. in formulating 
codes of conduct), which, to be effective, should 
be undertaken at an early stage. It is important 
to recognise that sociological aspects are very 
important in addressing this problem, and some 
of the research questions still need to be explored 
and the results acted on, such as personal attitudes 
to IAS and those of interest groups such as animal 
rights groups. 
Another late lesson: avoid paralysis by analysis
Much progress has been made in enhancing the 
consistency and transparency of protocols for 
(pest) risk analysis and cost-benefit studies, such as 
research undertaken for the PRATIQUE project at 
the European scale (see EPPO, 2011). Such progress 
in evaluating the risks that species pose has become 
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increasingly sophisticated and multidisciplinary, 
bringing together zoologists, botanists, managers, 
policy makers and economists (Hulme, 2011a). 
However, despite the significant advances in 
predicting the risks related to species introductions, 
the complexity of the relationships between the 
many potential explanatory variables still limits 
the precision of current risk assessment tools 
(Hulme, 2011b). In addition, the discipline known as 
'biosecurity' (13) which encompasses all aspects and 
measures that deal with the prevention of pests will 
also need to address the emerging challenges of a 
changing world.
A specific lesson for Europe which concerns 
the need to act without waiting for coordinated 
European action is presented in Box 20.4.
Anticipate further challenges and 'blind spots' in a 
changing world
Kueffer and Hirsch Hadorn (2008) suggest that 
biological invasions represent a complex societal 
issue because knowledge is highly uncertain, 
and because conflicts of interest and values are 
 
Box 20�4 A lesson for Europe: do not take the need for European coordination as an excuse  
 for inaction
A particular problem for Europe has been the long time taken by European institutions to propose 
coordinated stringent measures to control the introduction, trade and spread of IAS and to promote 
eradication or containment measures. It is likely that a dedicated legislative instrument will be prepared 
before 2013, to be implemented in the following years, but 2013 is twenty years after scientists alerted 
governments to the dimension of the problem and the growing risks to European native biological diversity 
from IAS. During that time the problem has grown worse. Many governments were reluctant to pass 
legislation on the grounds that the free movement of goods in the EU did not permit them to restrict the 
import of alien species that might threaten their native biodiversity through national laws. This remains a 
doubtful claim, as a few European governments did not hesitate to take that step. However many European 
governments have been slow to act.
As environment is a competence of the EU and resources are scarce, some EU states, when fixing their 
priorities for conservation action, pay a greater attention to the legal requirement for implementation of 
EU legal instruments and tend to pay less attention to other issues not specifically covered by European 
legislation, including much-needed action on IAS. Although the 1992 EU Habitats Directive contains 
obligations on the introduction of IAS and the European Commission has since the late 1990s invested 
substantial funds on research, data gathering and eradication operations, government awareness of the need 
for a more stringent legislative instrument has only come since the growing economic and environmental 
costs of invasive species have become difficult to ignore. The problem is complex, awareness only relatively 
recent, government interest limited, and public resources scarce. Hard times for native species!
(13) The FAO notes that 'Biosecurity is a strategic and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and regulatory frameworks 
(including instruments and activities) that analyse and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life and health, and plant 
life and health, including associated environmental risk. Biosecurity covers the introduction of plant pests, animal pests and diseases, 
and zoonoses, the introduction and release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and their products, and the introduction and 
management of invasive alien species and genotypes. Biosecurity is a holistic concept of direct relevance to the sustainability of 
agriculture, food safety, and the protection of the environment, including biodiversity.' http://www.fao.org/biosecurity.
central to the problem. A wider and more intense 
debate is expected on options for preventing and 
managing invasions, and on how to deal with the 
risks related to novel approaches to conservation 
and the economy such as biofuel crop planting 
and managed relocation. Contextual factors are 
amplified through the global changes that we 
are currently witnessing: climate change, habitat 
change, land-use change, etc. Consequently, 
criteria currently used to consider the invasive 
behaviour of a species in particular areas are likely 
to be increasingly challenged (Kueffer, 2010). For 
example, in montane areas, future invaders may be 
mountain specialists directly introduced through 
human activity between high-elevation habitats, 
rather than the current situation where most 
invaders of montane regions are climatically plastic 
species that spread from lowlands (McDougall et al., 
2011). As already described, increasing interest in 
'novel ecosystems' (Hobbs et al., 2006) as well as 
novel crops, and in radical conservation measures 
such as managed relocation, pose new challenges 
for nature conservation which will demand in-depth 
discussion.
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Do not allow philosophical debates to create 
blockages in tackling the problem
Biological invasions occupy a position between 
'nature' and 'culture', as they have both biological 
and social aspects. While many problems that affect 
biodiversity directly relate to human activities 
(destruction of habitats, pollution), issues related to 
IAS are 'nature threatening nature' through human 
activities, making the role of humans difficult to 
unravel. This is particularly true in Europe, where 
ecosystems have been modified since prehistoric 
times. Such uneasiness sends us back to the classical 
argument 'it is natural therefore it is safe'. The 
emerging questioning of IAS reflects the difficulties 
Table 20�1 Early warnings and actions
77 AD Pliny the Elder wrote in his Naturalis Historia that the invasion of rabbits in the Balearic Islands, Spain, 
was a very severe problem requiring effective control
1830s Charles Darwin noted the invasive behaviour of some alien species during his explorations on the 
HMS Beagle, which contributed to the development of his theory of natural selection
1958 Publication by the British zoologist and ecologist Charles S. Elton of his landmark monograph 
The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and Plants which is seen by many as a starting point for the 
understanding of invasion biology as a distinct field of study
1980s International research programme on the Ecology of Biological Invasions by the Scientific Committee 
on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE I) which was important in shaping the research agenda on 
IAS and led to an explosive growth in invasion biology
1993 Entry into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and of its Article 8(h) on invasive alien 
species, requiring parties to: Prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which 
threaten ecosystems, habitats or species. 
Establishment of the IUCN SSC Invasive Species Specialist Group, first interdisciplinary specialist 
group of IUCN 
1997 Launch of a second SCOPE research programme ('SCOPE II') on IAS, which was more  
inter/transdisciplinary than SCOPE I, and considered economic valuation, stakeholder participation, 
pathway analysis and management. SCOPE II was run under auspices of a consortium of scientific 
organizations including SCOPE, IUCN, and CABI which developed the Global Invasive Species 
Programme (GISP), with the explicit objective of providing new tools for understanding and coping 
with IAS
2002 Adoption, by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of Guiding Principles for the Prevention, 
Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species 
(COP decision VI/23)
2000s Development of national, regional and international databases and information systems, web 
portals and clearing house mechanisms such as the Global Invasive Species Information Network 
(GISIN) (a), the Global Invasive Species Database (b), the Invasive Species Compendium (ISC), the 
Inter-American IABIN Invasives Information Network (I3N) (c) for the Americas, DAISIE (d) for Europe 
and NOBANIS (e) for North Europe and the Baltic
Note: (a) GISIN: http://www.gisin.org.  
(b) GISD: http://www.issg.org/database/welcome. 
(c) IABIN: http://i3n.iabin.net.  
(d) DAISIE: www.europe-aliens.org.  
(e) NOBANIS: www.nobanis.org.
inherent in defining what nature is and how to 
protect it, in particular in a context of climate and 
global change. Global change will increasingly 
challenge current assumptions and concepts relating 
to biological invasions. The risk of invasion should 
be perceived not only as coming from alien species, 
but rather as a socio-ecological phenomenon in 
which our perceptions about how humans move 
species and manage land are considered as a whole 
(Kueffer, 2010). The response to invasions therefore 
needs to take into account the human dimension, 
combining the need to consider the rapidly changing 
patterns of our society with the urgent need to 
respond to the threats posed by invasive species.
Emerging issues | Invasive alien species: a growing but neglected threat?
535Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
References 
Agra CEAS Consulting, Food Chain Evaluation 
Consortium (FCEC), Civic Consulting — Agra CEAS 
Consulting, Van Dijk Management Consultants 
— Arcadia International, 2010. Evaluation of 
the Community Plant Health Regime, European 
Commission Directorate General for Health and 
Consumers.
Alyokhin, A., 2011, 'Non-natives: put biodiversity at 
risk', Nature, (475) 36.
Andreu, J., Vila, M., Hulme. P.E., 2009, 'An assessment 
of stakeholder perceptions and management 
of noxious alien plants in Spain', Environmental 
Management, (43) 1 244–1 255.
Bardsley, D.K., and Edwards-Jones, G., 2007, 'Invasive 
species policy and climate change: social perceptions 
of environmental change in the Mediterranean', 
Environmental Science & Policy, (10) 230–242.
Bremner, A. and Park, K., 2007, 'Public attitudes to 
the management of invasive non-native species in 
Scotland', Biological Conservation, (139) 306–314.
Bertolino, S., Genovesi, P., 2003, 'Spread and 
attempted eradication of the grey squirrel (Sciurus 
carolinensis) in Italy, and consequences for the red 
squirrel (Sciurus vulgaris) in Eurasia', Biological 
Conservation, (109) 351–358.
Bertolino, S., Lurz, P., Sanderson, R. and Rushton, 
S., 2008, 'Predicting the spread of the American 
grey squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis) in Europe: A call 
for a co-ordinated European approach', Biological 
Conservation, (141) 2 564–2 575.
Blackburn, T.M., Pyšek, P., Bacher, S., Carlton, 
J.T., Duncan, R.P., Jarošík, V., Wilson, J.R.U. and 
Richardson, D.M., 2011, 'A proposed unified 
framework for biological invasions', Trends in Ecology 
and Evolution, (26) 333–339.
Brundu, G., Brunel, S. and Heywood, V., 2011, 'The 
European Code of Conduct on Horticulture and 
Invasive Alien Plants'. In: Rindos, E. (ed.), Plant 
Invasions: Policies, Politics, and Practices. Proceedings 
of the 2010 Weeds Across Borders Conference, 1–4 June 
2010, pp. 32–26. National Conservation Training 
Center, Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Bozeman, 
Montana: Montana State University, Center for 
Invasive Plant Management.
Brunel, S., Petter, F., Fernandez-Galiano, E., 
Smith, I. M., 2009, 'Approach of the European and 
Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization to the 
evaluation and management of risks presented by 
invasive alien plants', Chapter 16, In Inderjit (ed.) 
Management of Invasive Weeds, Springer. 363 p.
Brunel, S., 2009. 'Pathway analysis: aquatic plants 
imported in 10 EPPO countries', Bulletin OEPP/EPPO 
Bulletin,(39) 201–213.
Butchart, S.H.M., Walpole, M., Collen, B., van Strien, 
A., Scharlemann, J.P.W., Almond, R.E.A., Baillie, 
J.E.M., Bomhard, B., Brown, C., Bruno, J., Carpenter, 
K.E., Carr, G.M., Chanson, J., Chenery, A.M., Csirke, 
J., Davidson, N.C., Dentener, F., Foster, M., Galli, A., 
Galloway, J.N., Genovesi, P., Gregory, R.D., Hockings, 
M., Kapos, V., Lamarque, J.-F., Leverington, F., Loh, J., 
McGeoch, M.A., McRae, L., Minasyan, A., Morcillo, 
M.H., Oldfield, T.E.E., Pauly, D., Quader, S., Revenga, 
C., Sauer, J.R., Skolnik, B., Spear, D., Stanwell-Smith, 
D., Stuart, S.N., Symes, A., Tierney, M., Tyrrell, T.D., 
Vié, J.-C. and Watson, R., 2010, 'Global Biodiversity: 
Indicators of Recent Declines', Science (New York, 
N.Y.) 1 164.
CAB International, 2010, Japanese Knotweed Alliance 
(http://www.cabi.org/japaneseknotweedalliance/?site=
139&page=356) accessed 7 March 2012.
Cadotte, M.W., 2006, 'Darwin to Elton: Early ecology 
and the problem of invasive species'. In: M.W. 
Cadotte, S. M. McMahon and T Fukami (eds) 
Conceptual ecology and invasion biology: reciprocal 
approaches to nature, Springer, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, pp. 15–34.
CAPE Partnership Program, 2009, Invasive Alien 
Species Strategy Greater Cape Floristic Region. Western 
cape Nature conservation Board t/a CapeNature, 30 p.
Chytrý, M., Wild, J., Pyšek, P., Jarošík, V., Dendoncker, 
N., Reginster, I., Pino, J., Maskell, L.C., Vilà, M., Pergl, 
J., Kühn, I., Spangenberg, J.H. and Settele, J., 2012, 
'Projecting trends in plant invasions in Europe under 
different scenarios of future land-use change', Global 
Ecology and Biogeography, (21) 75–87. 
Cifuentes, N., Hurtado, A. and Ruiz T., 2007, 
Integrated control of the Water Hyacinth (Eichhornia 
crassipes) in the Guadania river [In Spanish]. 
Invasiones Biológicas, un facto de cambio global. EEI 
2006 actualización de conocimientos. 1, 266–269 GEIB 
Grupo Especialista en Invasiones Biológicas. Dep Leg. 
LE2069-2007, León, Spain.
Clavero, M. and Garcia-Berthou, E., 2005, 'Invasive 
species are a leading cause of animal extinctions', 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution, (20) 110.
Emerging issues | Invasive alien species: a growing but neglected threat?
536 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Comité Asesor Nacional sobre Especies Invasoras, 
2010, Estrategia nacional sobre especies invasoras 
en México, prevención, control y erradicación. 
Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso 
de la Biodiversidad, Comisión Nacional de Áreas 
Protegidas, Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos 
Naturales. México. 91 p.
Cooney, R., 2004., Precaution and Invasive Alien 
Species: challenges at the interface of the trade and 
environment regimes. Proceedings of a Global 
Synthesis Workshop on Biodiversity Loss and Species 
Extinctions: managing risk in a changing world (sub 
theme Invasive Alien Species: coping with aliens). 
18–20 November 2004, Bangkok, Thailand. 
Cullen, J., 2011, Naturalised rhododendrons 
widespread in Great Britain and Ireland, Hanburyana, 
(5) 11–29.
Darwin, C., 1859, On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in 
the Struggle for Life , John Murray, London, pp. 502.
Davenport, K. and Collins, J. 2011, European Code of 
Conduct on Pets and Invasive Alien Species, Council of 
Europe. T-PVS/Inf (2011) 01 rev. 41p. 
Davis, M. A., Chew, M. K., Hobbs, R. J., Lugo, A. E., 
Ewel, J.J., Vermeij, G. J., Brown, J. H., Rosenzweig, 
M. L., Gardener, M. R., Carroll, S. P., Thompson, K., 
Pickett. S. T. A., Stromberg, J. C., Del Tredici, P., Suding, 
K. N., Ehrenfeld, J. G., Grime, J. P., Mascaro, J., and 
Briggs, J.C., 2011, 'Don't judge species on their origins', 
Nature, (474) 153–154.
Dehnen-Schmutz, K, and Touza, J. 2008, 'Plant 
invasions and ornamental horticulture: pathway, 
propagule pressure and the legal framework'. 
In: Teixeira da Silva, J.A. (ed) Floriculture, ornamental 
and plant biotechnology: advances and topical issues. 
Global Science Books, Isleworth, the United Kingdom, 
pp. 15–21.
Dehnen-Schmutz, K., Touza, J., Perrings, C., and 
Williamson, M. 2007, 'A century of the ornamental 
plant trade and its impact on invasion success', 
Diversity and Distributions, (13) 527–534.
Dietz, H. and Edwards, P. J., 2006, 'Recognition that 
causal processes change during plant invasion helps 
explain conflicts in evidence', Ecology, (87) 1 359–1 367.
Drake, J.A., Mooney, H.A., di Castri, F., Groves, R.H., 
Kruger, FJ., Rejmánek, M. and Williamson, M., (eds) 
1989, Biological Invasions: A Global Perspective, vol. 37 
of SCOPE, Chichester; New York (Wiley).
Drew, J., Anderson, N. and Andow, D., 2010, 
'Conundrums of a complex vector for invasive species 
control: a detailed examination of the horticultural 
industry', Biological Invasions, (12) 2 837–2 851.
EFSA, 2011, Scientific Opinion. Guidance on the 
environmental risk assessment of plant pests. EFSA Panel 
on Plant Health (PLH), 118 p.
Elton, C.S., 1958, The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and 
Plants, 1958, Methuen, London. Reprinted 2000 by The 
University of Chicago Press.
European Commission, COM, 2011, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and 
Committee of the Regions. Our life insurance, our 
natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020 
{SEC(2011) 540 final}, {SEC(2011) 541 final}. 17 p.
EPPO, 2011, Decision support scheme for quarantine 
pests. Guidelines on Pest Risk Analysis. PM 5/3 (5). 
44 p. 
Essl, F., Nehring, S., Klingenstein, F., Milasowszky, 
N., Nowack, C., Rabitsch, W., 2011, 'Review of risk 
assessment systems of IAS in Europe and introducing 
the German–Austrian Black List Information System 
(GABLIS)', Journal for Nature Conservation,  
doi:10.1016/j.jnc.2011.08.00.
EEA, 2001, Late lessons from early warnings: the 
precautionary principle 1896–2000, Environmental issue 
report No 22, European Environment Agency.
Essl, F., Dullinger, S., Rabitsch, W., Hulme, P.E., Hulber, 
K., Jarošík, V., Kleinbauer, I., Krausmann, F., Kuhn, 
I., Nentwig, W., Vila, M., Genovesi, P., Gherardi, F., 
Desprez-Loustau, M.-L., Roques, A. and Pyšek, P., 
2010, Socioeconomic legacy yields an invasion debt. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (108) 2–6.
Falk-Petersen, J., Bøhn, T. and Sandlund, O.T., 2006, On 
the numerous concepts in invasion biology, Biological 
Invasions, (8) 1 409–1 424, doi:10.1007/s10530-005-0710-6.
Fay K., Fay K.C. et al., 2001, Proceedings of the 
Workshop at the Missouri Botanical Garden, St. Louis, 
Missouri, 1–4 December 2001. 
Genovesi P., Shine C, 2003, European Strategy on 
Invasive Alien Species, final version. Convention on 
the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats. Council of Europe, Strasbourg.
Genovesi, P., 2007, Limits and potentialities of 
eradication as a tool for addressing biological 
Emerging issues | Invasive alien species: a growing but neglected threat?
537Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
invasions. In Biological Invasions, ed. Wolfgang 
Nentwig, (193) 385–401, Ecological. Springer — Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg.
Genovesi, P., 2010, European biofuel policies may 
increase biological invasions: the risk of inertia. Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, (103) 1–5.
Genovesi, P., Scalera, R., Brunel, S., Roy, D.B. and 
Solarz, W. 2010, Towards an early warning and information 
system for invasive alien species (IAS) threatening 
biodiversity in Europe, EEA Technical report No 5/2010, 
European Environmental Agency.
Genovesi, P., 2011, 'Are we turning the tide? 
Eradications in times of crisis: how the global 
community is responding to biological invasions'. 
In: Veitch, C. R.; Clout, M. N. and Towns, D. R. (eds), 
2011. Island invasives: eradication and management, IUCN, 
Gland, Switzerland.
Gobster, P.H., 2011, 'Factors affecting people's 
responses to invasive species management'. 
In: Rotherham, I.D., Lambert, R.A. (eds), Invasive and 
Introduced Plants and Animals — Human Perceptions, 
Attitudes and Approaches to Management. Earthscan, 
London, pp. 249–263.
Gouvernement du Canada, Environnement Canada, 
2004, An Invasive Alien Species Strategy for Canada. 40 p.
Gibbs, A. 2011, 'Working with the United States 
Horticulture Industry'. In: Rindos, E. (ed.), Plant 
Invasions: Policies, Politics, and Practices. Proceedings of 
the 2010 Weeds Across Borders Conference, 1–4 June 
2010, pp. 29–31. National Conservation Training 
Center, Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Bozeman, 
Montana: Montana State University, Center for 
Invasive Plant Management.
Gurevitch, J., Fox, G.A., Wardle, G.M., Inderjit, Taub, 
D., 2011, 'Emergent insights from the synthesis of 
conceptual frameworks for biological invasions', 
Ecology Letters, (14/4) 407–418.
Harris, S., Timmins, S.M., 2009, 'Estimating the benefit 
of early control of all newly naturalised plants', Science 
for Conservation, (292) 1–25.
Hattingh, J., 2011, Conceptual clarity, scientific rigour, 
and 'The stories we are': Engaging with the two challenges 
to the objectivity of invasion biology, pp. 359–393 in D.M. 
Richardson, editor. Fifty Years of Invasion Ecology: The 
Legacy of Charles Elton. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, the 
United Kingdom.
Heywood, V., and Brunel, S., 2009, 'Code of conduct 
on Horticulture and Invasive Alien Plants. Convention 
on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats (Bern Convention)', Nature and environment, 
No. 155. Council of Europe Publishing, 74 p. 
Heywood, V. H., 2011, 'A code of conduct on invasive 
alien species for Europe's botanic gardens, BG journal, 
(8/2) 26–28.
Hobbs R.J., Arico S., Aronson J., Baron J.S., Bridgewater 
P., Cramer V.A., Epstein P.R., Ewel J.J., Klink C.A., Lugo 
A.E., Norton D., Ojima D., Richardson D.M., Sanderson 
E.W., Valladares F., Vila M., Zamora R. and Zobel M., 
2006, 'Novel ecosystems: theoretical and management 
aspects of the new ecological world order', Global 
Ecology and Biogeography, (15) 1–7.
Hulme, P., 2011a, Biosecurity: the changing face of invasion 
biology. In Richardson D (ed.) (2011) Fifty Years of 
Invasion Ecology: The Legacy of Charles Elton, 
pp. 301–314.
Hulme, P., 2011b, 'Weed risk assessment: a way 
forward or a waste of time?', Journal of Applied Ecology, 
(49) 1 365–2 664.
Inderjit, Cadotte, M.W, and Colanti, R., 2005, 'The 
ecology of biological invasions: past, present and 
future'. In: Inderjit (ed.), Invasive plants: ecological and 
agricultural aspects, pp. 19–43.
ISSG, 2011. We need to strengthen, not weaken, the 
struggle against harmful invasive species, 15 June 2011, 
ISSG Website.
Javelle, A., Kalaora, B., Decocq, G., 2010, 'De la validité 
d'une invasion biologique. Prunus serotina en forêt de 
Compiègne', Etudes rurales, (185) 39–50.
Jeschke, J.M. and Genovesi, P., 2011, 'Do biodiversity 
and human impact influence the introduction or 
establishment of alien mammals?', Oikos, (120) 57–64.
Kettunen, M., Genovesi, P., Gollasch, S., Pagad, S. and 
Starfinger, U., 2009, Technical support to eu strategy on 
invasive alien species (IAS) Assessment of the impacts 
of IAS in Europe and the EU. Brussels, Belgium.
Kueffer, C, and Hirsch Hadorn, G., 2008, 'How to 
achieve effectiveness in problem-oriented landscape 
research: the example of research on biotic invasions', 
Living Reviews in Landscape Research, (2/2).
Kiehn, M., 2011, 'Invasive alien species and islands'. 
In: Bramwell, D. and Caujapé-Castells, J. (eds), The 
Emerging issues | Invasive alien species: a growing but neglected threat?
538 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Biology of Island Floras, pp. 365–384, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
Kolar, C.S., Lodge, T.S., 2001, Progress in invasion 
biology: predicting invaders, Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution, (16/4) 199–204.
Kueffer, C., Daehler, C. C., 2008, A Habitat-Classification 
Framework and Typology for Understanding, Valuing and 
Managing Invasive Species Impacts. Chapter 5 in Inderjit 
(ed.) Management of Invasive Weeds, pp. 77–101.
Kueffer, C. and Hirsch Hadorn, G., 2008, How to 
achieve effectiveness in problem-oriented landscape 
research: the example of research on biotic invasions. 
Living Reviews in Landscape Research 2:2.
Kueffer, C., 2010, 'Transdisciplinary research is needed 
to predict plant invasions in an era of global change', 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution, (25) 619–620.
Kueffer, C., Daehler, C.C., Torres-Santana, C.W., 
Lavergne, C., Meyer. J.Y., Otto, R. and Silva, L., 2010, 
'A global comparison of plant invasions on oceanic 
islands', Perspectives in Plant Ecology, Evolution and 
Systematics, (12) 145–161.
Larson, B.M.H., 2007, 'An alien approach to invasive 
species: objectivity and society in invasion biology, 
Biological Invasions, (9) 947–956.
Larson, B.M.H., 2010, 'Reweaving narratives about 
humans and invasive alien species', Etudes rurales, 
(185) 25–38.
Le Bourgeois, T., Della Mussia, S., 2009, 'Un insecte 
efficace contre la vigne marronne à la Réunion', 
Insectes, (153) 17–19.
Lerdau, M. and Wickham, J.D., 2011, 'Non-natives: four 
risk factors', Nature, (475) 36–37.
McDougall, K., Alexander, J., Haider, S., Pauchard, A., 
Walsh, N., Kueffer, C., 2011, 'Alien flora of mountains: 
global comparisons for the development of local 
preventive measures against plant invasions', Diversity 
and Distributions, (17) 103–111.
McGeoch, M.A., Butchart, S.H.M., Spear, D., Marais, 
E., Kleynhans, E.J., Symes, A., Chanson, J. and 
Hoffmann, M., 2010, 'Global indicators of biological 
invasion: species numbers, biodiversity impact and 
policy responses', Diversity and Distributions, (16) 
95–108.
McNeely, J.A. (ed.) 2001, The Great Reshuffling: Human 
Dimensions of Invasive Alien Species. IUCN, Gland, 
Switzerland and Cambridge, the United Kingdom.
Medina, F.M., Bonneaud, E., Vidal, E., Tershy, B.R., 
Zavaleta, E.S., Donlan, C.J., Keitt, B.S., Le Corre, M., 
Horwath, S.V. and Nogales, M., 2011, 'A global review 
of the impacts of invasive cats on island endangered 
vertebrates', Global Change Biology, doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2486.2011.02464.x.
Menozzi, M.J., 2007, ''Mauvaises herbes', qualité de 
l'eau et entretien des espaces', Natures Sciences Sociétés, 
(15) 144–153.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005, 'Ecosystems 
and Human Well-being: Biodiversity Synthesis', 
Washington, DC (World Resources Institute). 
Miller, C., Kettunen, M. and Shine, C., 2006, Scope 
options for EU action on invasive alien species (IAS), 
Final report for the European Commission, Institute 
for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), Brussels, 
Belgium. 109 pp + Annexes.
Mooney, H.A., Mack, R.N., McNeely, J.A., Neville, L.E., 
Schei, P.J. and Waage, J.K. (eds), 2005, Invasive Alien 
Species: A New Synthesis, vol. 63 of SCOPE, Washington, 
London (Island Press), 368 p.
Morse, L.E., Kartesz, J.T., Kutner, L.S., 1995, 'Native 
vascular plants'. In: LaRoe, E.T., Farris, G.S., Puckett, 
C.E., Doran, P.D., Mac, M.J. (eds), Our Living Resources: 
A Report to the Nation on the Distribution, Abundance, 
and Health of U.S. Plants, Animals and Ecosystems. 
U.S. Department of the Interior, National Biological 
Service, Washington, DC, pp. 205–209.
O Sénat, 2009, Conséquences pour les apiculteurs 
de l'introduction de la tenthrède cibdela janthina 
à La Réunion, 13 ème législature. Question orale 
sans débat n° 0559S de Mme Anne-Marie Payet (La 
Réunion — UC). publiée dans le JO Sénat du 
21/05/2009, page 1 250.
Pheloung, P.C., P.A. Williams, and Halloy. S.R., 
1999, 'A weed risk assessment model for use as a 
biosecurity tool evaluating plant introductions, 
Journal of Environmental Management, (57) 239–251.
Pimentel, D., Zuniga, R., Morrison, D., 2005, 'Update 
on the environmental and economic costs associated 
with alien-invasive species in the United States', 
Ecological Economics, (52/3) 273–288, doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2004.10.002 
Emerging issues | Invasive alien species: a growing but neglected threat?
539Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
PRATIQUE Website, 2011, PRATIQUE: Enhancements 
of Pest Risk Analysis Techniques.
Pyšek, P., Jarošík, V., Hulme, P.E., Kühn, I., Wild, J., 
Arianoutsou, M., Bacher, S., Chiron, F., Didziulis, V., 
Essl, F., Genovesi, P., Gherardi, F., Hejda, M., Kark, 
S., Lambdon, P.W., Desprez-Loustau, M.-L., Nentwig, 
W., Pergl, J., Poboljsaj, K., Rabitsch, W., Roques, A., 
Roy, D.B., Shirley, S., Solarz, W., Vilà, M., and Winter, 
M., 2010, 'Disentangling the role of environmental 
and human pressures on biological invasions across 
Europe', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America, (107) 12 157–12 162.
Pyšek, P., Richardson, D.M., 2010, 'Invasive species, 
environmental change and management, and 
ecosystem health', Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources, vol. 35, pp. 25–55.
Reichard, S.H., White P. 2001, 'Horticulture as a 
pathway of invasive plant introductions in the United 
States', BioScience, (51) 103–113.
Ricciardi, A., Cohen, J., 2006, 'The invasiveness of 
an introduced species does not predict its impact', 
Biological Invasions, (9) 309–315.
Richardson, D.M., Pyšek, P., Rejmánek, M., Barbour, 
M.G., Panetta, F.D., West, C.J., 2000, 'Naturalization 
and invasion of alien plants: concepts and definitions', 
Diversity and Distributions, (6) 93–107.
Richardson, D.M., Pyšek, P., 2007, 'Classics in physical 
geography revisited: Elton, C.S. 1958: The ecology of 
invasions by animals and plants, Methuen: London'. 
Progress in Physical Geography, (31) 659–666.
Richardson, D.M., Pyšek, P., 2008, 'Fifty years of 
invasion ecology — the legacy of Charles Elton', 
Diversity and Distributions, (14) 161–168.
Richardson, D.M. (ed.), 2011a, Fifty years of invasion 
ecology. The legacy of Charles Elton, Wiley-Blackwell, 
Oxford.
Richardson, D.M., 2011b, 'Invasion science: the roads 
travelled and the roads ahead'. In: Richardson, D.M. 
(ed.) Fifty years of invasion ecology. The legacy of Charles 
Elton, pp. 397–407, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Richardson, D.M., Pyšek, P., Carlton, J.T, 2011, 'A 
compendium of essential concepts and terminology 
in invasion ecology'. In: Richardson, D.M. (ed.) Fifty 
years of invasion ecology. The legacy of Charles Elton, 
pp. 409–420, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Richardson, D.M., Rejmánek, M. 2011, 'Trees and 
shrubs as invasive alien species — a global review', 
Diversity and Distributions, (17) 788–809.
Riley, S., 2005, 'Invasive Alien Species and the 
Protection of Biodiversity: The Role of Quarantine 
Laws in Resolving Inadequacies in the International 
Legal Regime', Journal of Environmental Law, (17/3) 
323–359.
Rotherham, I.D., Lambert, R.A., 2011, Invasive and 
Introduced Plants and Animals. Human Perceptions, 
Attitudes and Approaches to Management. Earthscan 
London.
Ruiz, G.M., and J.T. Carlton, (eds), 2003, Invasive 
Species. Vectors and Management Strategies, Island Press, 
Washington, London.
Sagoff, M., 2005, 'Do Non-Native Species Threaten 
The Natural Environment?' Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, (18) 215–236.
Scalera, R., Zaghi, D., 2004, Alien species and nature 
conservation in the EU, The role of the LIFE program. 
European Commission — Environment Directorate-
General, Ofﬁce for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg.
Seddon, P.J., Armstrong, D.P., Soorae, P., Launay, F., 
Walker, S., Ruiz-Miranda, C.R., Molur, S., Koldewey, 
H., Kleiman, D.G., 2009, 'The risks of assisted 
colonization', Conservation biology : the journal of the 
Society for Conservation Biology, (23) 788–789.
Selge, S., Fischer, A., and van der Wal, R., 2012, 
'Public and professional views on invasive non-native 
species — A qualitative social scientific investigation', 
Biological Conservation, in press, doi:10.1016/j.
biocon.2011.1009.1014.
Sforza, R., 2006, La lutte biologique contre les plantes 
envahissantes méditerranéennes : comment gagner du 
temps? In Brundel S (ed.) Proceedings of the 1st 
Workshop on Invasive Plants in Mediterranean Type 
Regions of the World, Mèze (France), 25–27 May 2005 
(2006) 214–220.
Sheppard, A.W., Raghu, S., Begley, C., Genovesi, P., 
De Barro, P., Tasker, A., Roberts, B., 2011, 'Biosecurity 
as an integral part of the new bioeconomy: a path 
to a more sustainable future', Current Opinion in 
Environmental Sustainability, (3) 1–7.
Simberloff, D., 2005, 'Non-native Species DO Threaten 
the Natural Environment! Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics', (18) 595–607.
Emerging issues | Invasive alien species: a growing but neglected threat?
540 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Simberloff, D. and 141 scientists, 2011, 'Non-natives: 
141 scientists object', Nature, (475) 36.
Simberloff, D., Genovesi, P., Pyšek, P. and Campbell, 
K., 2011, 'Recognizing conservation success', Science, 
(332) 419–421.
Standing Committee to the Bern Convention, 2011, 
Report of meeting. Council of Europe. T-PVS(2011)26. 
110 p.
Stanley-Price, M., 2010, 'IUCN Species Survival 
Commission: the Reintroduction and Invasive Species 
Specialist groups' task force for moving species for 
conservation purposes', Oryx, (44) 323.
Tanaka, H. and Larson, B., 2006, 'The role of the 
International Plant Protection Convention in the 
prevention and management of invasive alien 
species'. In: Koike, F., Clout, M.N., Kawamichi, M., 
De Poorter, M. and Iwatsuki, K. (eds), Assessment and 
Control of Biological Invasion Risks. Shoukadoh Book 
Sellers, Kyoto, Japan and IUCN, Gland, Switzerland,  
pp. 56–62.
Thomas, C.D., 2011, 'Translocation of species, 
climate change, and the end of trying to recreate past 
ecological communities', Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 
(1 354) 1–6.
Usher, M.B., 1986, Invasibility and wildlife conservation: 
invasive species on nature reserves. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B314, 
695–710.
Verloove, F., 2010, 'Invaders in disguise. Conservation 
risks derived from misidentification of invasive 
plants', Management of Biological Invasions, (1) 1–5.
Vilà, M., Basnou, C., Pyšek, P., Josefsson, M., 
Genovesi, P., Gollasch, S., Nentwig, W., Olenin, S., 
Roques, A., Roy, D., Hulme, P.E., DAISIE partners, 
2010, 'How well do we understand the impacts of 
alien species on ecosystem services? A pan-European, 
cross-taxa assessment', Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment, (8) 135–144.
Vilà, M., Hulme P.E., 2011. 'Jurassic Park? No thanks', 
Trends in Ecology & Evolution, (26) 496–497.
Vilà M., I. Ibáñez. 2011, 'Plant invasions in the 
landscape', Landscape Ecology, (26) 461–472. 
Warren, C.R., 2007, 'Perspectives on the 'alien' 
versus 'native' species debate: a critique of concepts, 
language and practice', Progress in Human Geography, 
(31) 427–46.
Weidema, I.R., (ed.) 2000, Introduced Species 
in the Nordic Countries. Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Copenhagen, Nord 2000, 13, 242 pp.
Williams, J.W. and Jackson, S.T., 2007, 'Novel climates, 
no-analog communities, and ecological surprises', 
Front. Ecol. Environ., (5) 475–482.
Williamson, M., 1996, Biological Invasions, vol. 15 of 
Population and Community Biology Series, London; 
New York (Chapman & Hall). 
Wilson, J.R.U., Dormontt, E.E., Prentis, P.J., Lowe, 
A.J. and Richardson, D.M., 2009, 'Something in the 
way you move: dispersal pathways affect invasion 
success', Trends in Ecology & Evolution, (24) 136–144.
With, K.A. 2002. 'The landscape ecology of invasive 
spread', Conservation Biology, (16) 1 192–1 203.
Wittenberg, R. and Cock, M.J.W., 2001, Invasive alien 
species: a toolkit of best prevention and management 
practices. Pages xvii-228. CAB International, 
Wallington, Oxon.
541
Emerging issues | Mobile phone use and brain tumour risk: early warnings, early actions?
Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Lennart Hardell, Michael Carlberg and David Gee (1)
21 Mobile phone use and brain tumour 
risk: early warnings, early actions?
  
In 2011 the World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
categorised the radiation fields from mobile phones and other devices that emit similar non-ionizing 
electromagnetic fields (EMFs), as a Group 2B i.e. 'possible' human carcinogen. Nine years earlier 
IARC gave the same classification to the magnetic fields from overhead electric power lines.
The IARC decision on mobile phones was principally based on two sets of case-control human 
studies of possible links between mobile phone use and brain tumours: the IARC Interphone 
study and the Hardell group studies from Sweden. Both provided complementary and generally 
mutually supportive results. This chapter gives an account of the studies by these two groups — 
and others coming to different conclusions — as well as reviews and discussions leading up to 
the IARC decision in 2011. The chapter also describes how different groups have interpreted the 
authoritative IARC evaluation very differently. 
There are by now several meta-analyses and reviews on mobile phones and brain tumours, which 
describe the challenges of doing epidemiology on this issue, the methodological limitations of the 
major studies published so far and the difficulties of interpreting their results.
It has been suggested that national incidence data on brain tumours could be used to qualify or 
disqualify the association between mobile phones and brain tumours observed in the case-control 
studies. However, in addition to methodological shortcomings, there might be other factors 
that influence the overall incidence rate such as changes in exposure to other risk factors for 
brain tumours that are unknown in descriptive studies. Cancer incidence depends on initiation, 
promotion and progression of the disease. As the mechanism for radiofrequency electromagnetic 
fields carcinogenesis is unclear, it supports the view that descriptive data on brain tumour incidence 
is of limited value.
The chapter points to mobile phone industry inertia in considering the various studies and taking 
the IARC carcinogenic classification into account and a failings from the media in providing the 
public with robust and consistent information on potential health risks. The IARC carcinogenic 
classification also appears not to have had any significant impact on governments' perceptions of 
their responsibilities to protect public health from this widespread source of radiation.
The benefits of mobile telecommunications are many but such benefits need to be accompanied 
by consideration of the possibility of widespread harms. Precautionary actions now to reduce head 
exposures would limit the size and seriousness of any brain tumour risk that may exist. Reducing 
exposures may also help to reduce the other possible harms that are not considered in this case 
study.
Evidence is increasing that workers with heavy long-term use of wireless phones who develop 
glioma or acoustic neuroma should be compensated. The first case in the world was established on 
12 October 2012. The Italian Supreme Court affirmed a previous ruling that the Insurance Body for 
Work (INAIL) must grant worker's compensation to a businessman who had used wireless phones 
for 12 years and developed a neuroma in the brain.
(1) This chapter was supported by grants from Cancer- och Allergifonden and Cancerhjälpen. Contributions by co-workers in the 
various Hardell group publications are acknowledged.
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21�1 Introduction
On May 31, 2011 the WHO International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC) categorised the radiation 
fields from mobile phones, and from other devices 
that emit similar non-ionizing electromagnetic 
fields (EMFs), as a Group 2B i.e. a 'possible' human 
carcinogen. Nine years earlier IARC had also 
classified the magnetic fields from overhead electric 
power lines as a Group 2B carcinogen. 
The IARC decision on mobile phones was principally 
based on two sets of case-control human studies: 
the IARC Interphone study and the Hardell group 
studies from Sweden. Both provided complementary 
but generally mutually supportive results. 
But why were these case-control studies into 
possible brain tumours from mobile phones 
initiated? 
21�2 The Hardell group studies — 
1999–2011 
Sweden, along with Israel, was one of the first 
countries in the world to widely adopt wireless 
telecommunications technology. Analogue phones 
(NMT; Nordic Mobile Telephone System) were 
introduced in the early 1980's using both 450 and 
900 Megahertz (MHz) fields. NMT 450 was used in 
Sweden since 1981 but closed down in 31 December, 
2007, whereas NMT 900 operated during 1986–2000. 
The digital system (GSM; Global System for 
Mobile Communication) using dual band, 900 and 
1 800 MHz, started to operate in 1991 and now 
dominates the market. The third generation of 
mobile phones, 3G or UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication System), using 1900/2100 
MHz RF fields has been introduced worldwide 
since a few years, in Sweden in 2003. Currently the 
fourth generation, 4G, operating at 800/2 600 MHz, 
and Trunked Radio Communication (TETRA, 
380–400 MHz) are being established in Sweden and 
elsewhere in Europe. 
Desktop cordless phones (e.g. Digital Enhanced 
Cordless Telecommunications; DECT) have been 
used in Sweden since 1988, first using analogue 
800–900 MHz RF fields, but since early 1990's the 
digital 1900 MHz system has been used.
Nowadays mobile phones are used more than 
landline phones in Sweden. (http://www.pts.se/
upload/Rapporter/Tele/2011/sv-telemarknad-halvar-
2011-pts-er-2011-21.pdf).
The real increase in use and exposures to their 
radiation fields has been since the end of the 1990's. 
Wireless phones emit radiofrequency (RF) EMFs 
and the brain is the main target organ during use of 
the handheld phone (Cardis et al., 2008).
One of the author's (LH) interest in this research 
area was initiated by his involvement in a Swedish 
committee that evaluated cancer risks from 
exposure to extremely low frequency (ELF) EMFs 
from power lines. The conclusion was that there 
was an increased risk for childhood leukemia based 
on distance to power lines (Hardell et al., 1995). 
In 2002 IARC concluded that ELF electric and 
magnetic fields from power lines etc. is a human 
Group 2B carcinogen (IARC, 2002). 
From a review of the literature there seemed 
to be an increased risk for brain tumours in the 
electronics industry (Hardell et al., 1995). It was 
decided to study it further in a case-control study. 
However, at that time there was also some media 
attention to a US lawsuit against cell phone 
industry companies. 
It was alleged that repeated use of mobile phone 
had caused a fatal brain tumour in a woman. The 
head line in Los Angeles Times was 'Suit Over 
Cellular Radiation Raises Hazard Questions' (Carlo 
and Schram, 2001). It was therefore decided to 
add questions on mobile phone use in the first 
of 4 linked case-control studies that are briefly 
described below.
This is followed by the results of the other major 
publications with some data on long-term use, the 
Interphone study, and the IARC evaluation of the 
RF and cancer evidence, and related responses and 
discussions. 
The aim is not to give a thorough review of this 
research area, nor to deal with possible other 
effects of RF exposures which can be found in other 
publications including meta-analyses of the risk 
of brain tumours related to use of wireless phones 
(Hardell et al., 2006d; 2009; Myung et al., 2009; 
Kundi, 2009; Cardis and Sadetzki, 2011; Levis et al., 
2011; IARC Monograph, in press).
21�3 First Hardell group study on 
mobile phone use and brain 
tumours — 1999
In 1999 the Hardell group in Sweden published 
results from their first case-control study on brain 
tumours and use of mobile phones (Hardell et al., 
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1999a). In total 209 (90 %) of the cases and 425 
(91 %) of the controls that fullfilled the inclusion 
criteria answered the mailed questionnaire. Overall 
no association between use of mobile phones and 
brain tumours was found. 
A slightly increased (but not statistically significant) 
risk was found for analogue phone (NMT) use and 
for a latency period greater than 10 years, Odds Ratio 
(OR) = 1.20 (95 % Confidence Interval; CI = 0.56–2.59). 
For tumours located in the temporal (2), occipital or 
temporoparietal lobe areas of the brain an increased 
risk was found for ipsilateral (3) exposure, OR = 2.42 
(95 % CI = 0.97–6.05) (Hardell et al., 1999a, 2001). 
However, all results were based on low numbers of 
exposed subjects and different histopathological types 
of brain tumours so no firm conclusions could be 
drawn. Furthermore, in this first study use of cordless 
phones was not included.
Authors of an Editorial in 2001, in commenting 
on a 'negative' US study (Inskip et al., 2001) that 
was published after the first Hardell et al. (1999a) 
study, stated that …the use of cellular telephones does 
not detectably increase the risk of brain tumors' and 
that 'This study allays fears raised by alarmist reports 
that the use of cellular telephones causes brain tumors 
(Trichopoulos and Adami, 2001). This statement 
goes far beyond what was scientifically defensible. 
For example, among the 782 patients with brain 
tumours only 22 had 5 years or more of mobile 
phone use and no data with longer latencies were 
presented. The Editorial illustrates a common 
misconception which is that a 'non–positive' study 
is often assumed to be a 'negative' study when in 
fact the data do not support this assumption. 
21�4 Second and third Hardell group 
studies — 2002–2006
This initial study by the Hardell group gave some 
support for an association between use of mobile 
phones and brain tumours. However, the results 
were based on low numbers especially regarding 
tumour type and long-term use. The first study 
was thus followed by two larger studies with cases 
diagnosed during the time period 1997–2003. The 
second study encompassed cases diagnosed during 
1 January 1997 to 30 June 2000 and the third study 
1 July 2000 to 31 December 2003. The methods were 
the same including an identical questionnaire in 
both studies. Results for these two study periods 
were published separately (Hardell et al., 2002, 
2005, 2006a), but here pooled results for the whole 
study period 1997–2003 are presented (Hardell et al., 
2006b, 2006c; Hardell and Carlberg 2009). More 
details can be found in the different publications. 
In short, all cases were reported to a cancer 
registry and had histopathological verfication of 
tumour diagnosis. Both men and women aged 
20–80 years at the time of diagnosis were included. 
Matched controls were identified from the Swedish 
Population Registry. The study included use of 
both mobile and cordless (DECT) phones (wireless 
phones), the latter an exposure which most 
other studies ignore (4). Also questions e.g. about 
occupational exposures were asked. Use of wireless 
phones was assessed by a self-administered 
questionnaire. The information was supplemented 
over the phone, if necessary. 
The ear that had mostly been used during calls with 
mobile phone and/or cordless phone was assessed 
by separate questions; more than 50 % of the time 
for one side, or equally both sides. This information 
was checked during the supplementary phone call. 
Moreover every person that had used a wireless 
phone received after that a letter asking them again 
to specify the ear that had been used during phone 
calls and to what extent that side of the head was 
mostly used. There was a very good agreement for 
the result using these three methods to assess these 
data. 
Separately, tumour localisation was defined by using 
medical records, such as computer tomography 
(CT) and/or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). 
Use of mobile and cordless phones was defined 
as ipsilateral (more than 50 % of the time), equally 
ipsi/contralateral or contralateral (less than 
50 %) in relation to tumour side. Calculation of 
cumulative hours of use over the years was based 
on information on first and last year of use (time 
period) and average number of minutes per day 
during that period. Use in a car with external 
antenna was disregarded as well as use of a 
handsfree device. A minimum latency period of 
one year was adopted. Hence, latency period and 
cumulative use for the different phone types could 
be defined. 
(2) A review of 110 phone models showed that exposure to radiations is generally higher in the temporal lobe, which is a part of the 
brain that is near to the ear, (Cardis et al., 2008).
(3)  i.e. the tumour appears on the side of head at which the phone is normally used.
(4) The Interphone study (see Section 20.9) had some questions on cordless phone use at least in some countries but that information 
has never been properly analysed or published.
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Box 21�1 Some concepts and tools for identifying cancer risks in human studies 
OR: Odds ratio� The odds ratio is an estimate of the relative risk, showing how much more likely it is 
that someone who is exposed to a factor (e.g. cell phones) will develop an outcome (e.g. brain tumour) 
compared to someone who is not exposed. An OR of 1 indicates no risk, OR < 1 decreased risk and  
OR > 1 increased risk. For example, an OR of 1.5 indicates that those who are exposed have a 1.5 times 
higher risk of developing a disease compared to those who are not exposed.
SIR: Standardized incidence ratio� The SIR compares the observed number of cases in a specific 
population (e.g. cell phone subscribers) to the number of cases expected would the same rates apply 
as observed in a reference population (e.g. general population). A SIR of 1 indicates no risk,  
SIR < 1 decreased risk and SIR > 1 increased risk.
CI: Confidence interval� A confidence interval shows the uncertainty of the statistical estimate. In the 
case of OR and SIR, if the corresponding CI range does not cover 1.0, the result is considered statistically 
significant. Usually 95 % confidence intervals are reported indicating the range of the true OR/SIR with 
95 % statistical confidence. The absence of 'statistical significance' can often be a weak guide to the 
strength of evidence for a risk compared to the power of a study to detect a risk (5).
Latency period� Time between first exposure and identification of the disease. For cancer, particularly the 
solid tumours like brain cancers in contrast to cancers of the blood, such as leukemia, the latency period 
can be from 15–45 years on average, depending on age at exposure, type and intensity of exposure (6) etc. 
This means that any study of cancer has to be at least as long as the average latent period for the tumour 
being studied before there will be any clear evidence of a cancer risk. 
(5) See Sir Bradford Hill's classic epidemiology paper, 'The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?' (Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Medicine, 1965) where he warned not to overrate the value of statistical significance since it often led people to 
'grasp the shadow and loose the substance' of what was in the data. See Chapter 26 on science for precautionary decision-making.
(6) Stein, Y., Levy-Nativ, O., Richter, E.D., 'A sentinel case series of cancer patients with occupational exposures to electromagnetic 
non-ionising radiation and other agents', Eur. J. Oncol., 2011, (16/1) 21–54. It has taken almost 50 years to be sure that the 
atomic bomb dropped on Japan in 1945 also caused brain cancers: the data before then were not clear or robust enough. (Shibata, 
Y. et al., 'Intercranial meningiomas among Nagasaki atomic bomb survivors', Lancet, 1994, (344) 1 770). 
21�5 Fourth Hardell group study — 2010
In a review commissioned by the former Swedish 
Radiation Protection Agency (now called the Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority) it was suggested that the 
exclusion of deceased cases was a source of bias in 
the Hardell group studies (Boice and McLaughlin, 
2002). The scientific reason for this suggestion was not 
given.
As a response to that critique a fourth study was 
performed. This included the cases with a malignant 
brain tumour who had died before inclusion in 
the case-control studies 1997–2003. These cases 
represented patients with a poor prognosis, mostly 
with a astrocytoma grade IV tumour. Controls were 
selected from the Death Registry in Sweden. 
Two groups of controls were included, one group 
consisted of controls that had died from other types 
of malignant diseases than brain tumour and one 
group of controls that had died from other diseases 
than cancer. Relatives to both cases and controls were 
identified through the Swedish Population Registry 
at the Swedish Tax Agency. The study encompassed 
464 cases and 464 controls that had died from a 
malignant disease and 463 controls with other causes 
of death. A similar questionnaire as in previous 
studies was used and exposure was assessed by a 
questionnaire sent to the next of kin to each deceased 
case and control. 
Replies were obtained for 346 (75 %) cases, 343 (74 %) 
cancer controls and 276 (60 %) controls with other 
diseases. Use of mobile phones gave an increased 
risk, highest in the >10 years latency group yielding 
an OR of 2.4 (95 % CI = 1.4–4.1). The risk increased 
with cumulative number of life-time hours of use, 
being highest in the more than 2000 hours group who 
had an OR of 3.4 (95 % CI = 1.6–7.1). 
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No clear association was found for use of cordless 
phones, although an OR of 1.7 (95 % CI = 0.8–3.4) 
was found in the group with more than 2000 hours 
cumulative use. This investigation confirmed the 
previous results of an association between mobile 
phones and malignant brain tumours (Hardell 
et al., 2010). It was concluded that the critique made 
by Boice and McLaughlin (2002) was scientifically 
unfounded.
21�6 Some Swedish responses to the 
Hardell group studies
The first publication on mobile phone use and brain 
tumour risk (Hardell et al., 1999a) was quickly 
followed by a letter to the journal (Ahlbom and 
Feychting, 1999). They suggested that selection bias of 
cases might have created the high response rate in the 
Hardell study. However, the critique was unfounded 
and easy to rebut (Hardell et al., 1999b). In all of 
the Hardell et al. studies there has usually been a 
high response rate to the oncologists who have been 
trained in cancer epidemiology. This applies as well 
to studies not related to mobile phone use.
Interestingly in the Swedish part of the Interphone 
studies, one of the authors (Anders Ahlbom) 
had stated, even before the study started, that an 
association between cellular telephones and brain 
tumours was biologically bizarre in an 'opinion' letter 
(Adami et al., 2001). Ahlbom's own work provided 
evidence for an association between exposure to 
magnetic fields from overhead power lines and 
childhood leukemia: an association that would also 
have to be regarded as biologically bizarre (Feychting 
and Ahlbom, 1993).
Maria Feychting, who participated in the Swedish 
part of the Interphone studies, queried whether 'the 
questions really were placed in the same way to cases and 
controls' (Björkstén, 2006). Indeed they were in the 
Hardell studies, however, different methods do seem 
to have been used for the interviews with cases and 
controls in the Interphone study, for example, when 
bed-side interviews were done of cases only. 
Meanwhile, the Hardell studies and other evidence 
of possible health risks from EMF inspired a group 
of scientists to summarise this evidence in their 
BioInitiative Report (BioInitiative Working Group, 
2007). This had considerable impact in alerting 
many people to the emerging evidence of risks and 
to the presence of a small but growing minority 
of experts who did not agree with the WHO EMF 
Project statements and other reports that there was no 
evidence of risk (e.g. of SCENIHR 2007). 
The European Environment Agency (EEA), having 
produced a report Late lessons from early warnings 
(EEA, 2001) was invited by the Biointiative group to 
submit a chapter about the relevance of the 14 well 
known 'Late lessons' case studies to the emerging 
issue of EMF. Having considered the published 
evidence, the EEA decided it was timely to issue a 
guarded early warning about the possible risk of 
brain tumours from mobile phones in September 2007 
(see Box 21.2).
21�7 A pooled analysis of the Hardell 
group studies 
Pooled analysis of the two case-control studies 
on brain tumour cases (glioma, meningioma and 
acoustic neuroma (7), Table 21.1) diagnosed for the 
whole time period 1997–2003 was made and results 
were reported for both malignant (Hardell et al., 
2006b) and benign (Hardell, 2006c) tumours. This 
was possible since the same methods were used in 
both studies with an identical questionnaire. In this 
presentation results for glioma in the fourth study 
were added (Hardell et al., 2010; Hardell et al., 2011a). 
Latency was divided in three categories, > 1–5 year, 
> 5–10 year, and > 10 year from first use of a wireless 
phone until diagnosis. Both use of mobile and cordless 
phones gave an increased risk overall for glioma, 
highest in the latency group > 10 years, increasing 
further for ipsilateral use; mobile phone OR of 2.9 
(95 % CI = 1.8–4.7) and cordless phone OR of 3.8 (95 % 
CI = 1.8–8.1). Highest OR was found in the > 10 year 
latency group for total wireless phone use as well. 
Table 21.1 gives the same calculations for 
meningioma (n = 916). There was no consistent 
pattern of an increased risk, although highest risk was 
found for ipsilateral exposure in the > 10 year latency 
period, mobile phone OR = 1.6 (95 % CI = 0.9–2.9). 
Also ipsilateral use of cordless phone in the same 
latency category yielded an increased risk, OR = 3.0 
(95 % CI = 1.3–7.2). 
Regarding acoustic neuroma (n = 243) wireless phone 
use gave OR = 2.2 (95 % CI = 1.3–3.7) in the > 10 y 
latency period. Ipsilateral use gave higher risks than 
contralateral use for both mobile phone and cordless 
phone use. 
(7) Studying especially long-term use and laterality. 
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21�8 Risks to children 
Use of wireless phones is widespread among 
children and adolescents (Söderqvist et al., 2007, 
2008). Children's brain absorbs higher radiation from 
RF-EMF emissions than adults (Cardis et al., 2008; 
Christ et al., 2010; Gandhi et al., 2012). This is due 
to the smaller head, thinner skull bone and higher 
conductivity of the brain tissue. The developing brain 
is more sensitive to toxins (Kheifets et al., 2005) and 
the brain is still developing until about 20 years of age 
(Dosenbach et al., 2010). The greater absorption of 
RF energy per unit of time, the greater sensitivity of 
their brain, and the longer lifetimes within which to 
develop a brain tumour leaves children at a higher 
risk than adults from mobile phone radiations. 
Analyses of the Hardell group results revealed 
that first use before age of 20 is associated with the 
highest risk for glioma and acoustic neuroma, see 
Table 21.2 (Hardell, Carlberg, 2009).
Three age groups for first use of a wireless phone 
were used; < 20 years, 20–49 years and 50–80 years. 
For glioma, first use of a mobile phone < 20 y of age 
gave OR = 3.1 (95 % CI = 1.4–6.7). A similar pattern 
was found also for cordless phone use (data not 
shown). Also for acoustic neuroma the risk was 
highest in the youngest age group; OR = 5.0 (95 % 
CI = 1.5–16), but no conclusions could be drawn 
regarding cordless phones since only 1 case had 
first use before the age of 20 years. These ORs 
increased further for ipsilateral mobile phone use 
in the youngest age group; glioma OR = 4.4 (95 % 
CI = 1.3–15), acoustic neuroma OR = 6.8 (95 % 
CI = 1.4–3.4). No clear age dependent pattern of 
increased risk was found for meningioma.
There have been very few other studies of children 
and mobile phone use except the CEFALO study 
(Aydin et al., 2011) and that of the EU, Mobikids (8), 
which is ongoing. 
The multi-centre case–control study CEFALO, 
conducted in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and 
Switzerland has been commented in detail by 
Söderqvist et al. (2011) since serious methodological 
problems exist as exemplified below. 
In the summary of the study the authors wrote that 
they did not observe that regular use of a mobile phone 
increased the risk for brain tumors. This conclusion was 
accompanied by an editorial stating that the study 
showed no increased risk of brain tumors (Boice and 
Tarone, 2011) as well as by a news release from the 
Karolinska Institute in Stockholm that the results 
of no increased risk were 'reassuring' (Karolinska 
Institute, 2011). However, the statements go far 
beyond what the study really showed.
For example the data collection and analyses of use 
of cordless phones was not valid. Use of cordless 
phones was assessed only in the first 3 years of use, a 
most peculiar definition for which the authors gave 
no explanation for or reference to. Furthermore, 
the study never considered wireless phone use, 
including both mobile and cordless phones, as 
an exposure category. IARC categorised wireless 
phone use as a relevant exposure group (Baan et al., 
2011). Instead, Aydin et al. (2011) included use of 
cordless phones in the 'unexposed' category, so risk 
estimates for mobile phone use might therefore be 
underestimated. Similarly mobile phone use was 
included among the 'unexposed' when considering 
use of cordless phones and thereby potentially 
concealing an increased risk. 
The study yielded a statistically non-significant 
increased risk for brain tumours among regular users 
of mobile phones, OR = 1.36 (95 % CI = 0.92–2.02). 
This OR increased somewhat with cumulative 
duration of subscriptions and duration of calls 
(Aydin et al., 2011). Only latency time of 5 years or 
more was presented with very few cases within this 
category. Further support of a true association was 
found in the results based on operator-recorded use 
for 62 cases and 101 controls, which for time since 
first subscription > 2.8 years yielded a statistically 
significant OR of 2.15 (95 % CI = 1.07–4.29) with a 
statistically significant trend (p = 0.001). 
Although the authors do not emphasize that the 
results yielded an increased risk, the data indicate a 
moderately increased risk, in spite of low exposure, 
short latency period and limitations in study 
design and analyses. Certainly it cannot be used 
as reassuring evidence against an association, as 
discussed in the commentary (Söderqvist et al., 
2011).
Unfortunately, the CEFALO study (Aydin et al., 
2011) was published after the IARC meeting in May 
2011. Had it been available at the IARC meeting 
it would have provided additional evidence to 
support the IARC conclusion that human exposure 
to RF-EMF is a group 2B carcinogen. 
(8) Contact: ecardis@creal.cat for details.
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Box 21�2 The EEA early warnings on brain tumour from mobile phones, 2007–2011 
'There are many examples of the failure to use the precautionary principle in the past, which 
have resulted in serious and often irreversible damage to health and environments. Appropriate, 
precautionary and proportionate actions taken now to avoid plausible and potentially serious threats to 
health from EMF are likely to be seen as prudent and wise from future perspectives' (EEA, 2007).
This early warning was updated in 2009 to include:
'The evidence for a head tumour risk from mobile phones, although still very limited, and much 
contested, is, unfortunately, stronger than two years ago when we first issued our early warning'.
The evidence is now strong enough, using the precautionary principle, to justify the following steps 
(EEA, 2009):
1. For governments, the mobile phone industry, and the public to take all reasonable measures 
to reduce exposures to EMF, especially to radio frequencies from mobile phones, and 
particularly the exposures to children and young adults who seem to be most at risk from 
head tumours. Such measures would include stopping the use of a mobile phone by placing it next 
to the brain. This can be achieved by the use of texting; hands free sets; and by the use of phones 
of an improved design which could generate less radiation and make it convenient to use hands free 
sets (9).
2. To reconsider the scientific basis for the present EMF exposure standards which have 
serious limitations such as reliance on the contested thermal effects paradigm; and simplistic 
assumptions about the complexities of radio frequency exposures.
3. To provide effective labelling and warnings about potential risks for users of mobile phones. 
Across the European Union, the vast majority (80 %) of citizens do not feel that they are informed 
on the existing protection framework relating to potential health risks of electromagnetic fields. 
65 % of citizens say that they are not satisfied with the information they receive concerning the 
potential health risks linked to EMF. (Special Euro barometer report on EMF, Fieldwork Oct/Nov 2006, 
published 2007).
4. To generate the funds needed to finance and organise the urgently needed research 
into the health effects of phones and associated masts (base stations). Such funds could 
include grants from industry and possibly a small levy on the purchase and or use of 
mobile phones. This idea of a research levy is a practice that we think the US pioneered in the 
rubber industry with a research levy on rubber industry activities in the 1970s when lung and 
stomach cancer was an emerging problem for that industry. The research funds would be used by 
independent bodies (10) (http://latelessons.ew.eea.europa.eu/fol572324/statements/Benefits_of_
mobile_phones_and_potential_hazards_of_EMF.doc).
This was updated in 2011 when evidence was presented to the Council of Europe hearing on mobile 
phones, February 2011 (EEA, 2011a).
(9) The EEA has since noted, with some relief, what appears to be an increased use of hands free devices, particularly in the younger 
generation, due to enhanced applications.
(10) The EEA has noted the increasing evidence of 'funding bias' in scientific research whereby results outcomes are strongly linked to 
source of funding. This observation is based on evidence from pharmaceuticals, tobacco, lead, asbestos, BPA and EMF, as well as on 
evidence from other fields such as cost-benefit analysis and transport construction project cost estimations.
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Table 21�1 Odds ratio (OR) and 95 % confidence interval (CI) for glioma, meningioma and 
acoustic neuroma and use of wireless phones (mobile phones and/or cordless 
phones)
Ipsilateral, 
> 10 year latency
> 10 year latency Total,  
> 1 year latency
OR, CI OR, CI OR, CI
Glioma (n = 1148)
Wireless phone - 2�1 
1�6–2�8
1�3 
1�1–1�5
Mobile phone 2�9 
1�8–4�7
2�5 
1�8–3�3
1�3 
1�1–1�6
Cordless phone 3�8 
1�8–8�1
1�7 
1�1–2�6
1�3 
1�1–1�6
Meningioma (n = 916)
Wireless phone - 1.4 
0.97–2.0
1.0 
0.9–1.2
Mobile phone 1.6 
0.9–2.9
1.4
0.9–2.1
1.1 
0.9–1.3
Cordless phone 3�0 
1�3–7�2
1.6 
0.9–2.8
1.1 
0.9–1.4
Acoustic neuroma (n = 243)
Wireless phone - 2�2 
1�3–3�7
1�5 
1�1–2�0
Mobile phone 3�0 
1�4–6�2
2�6 
1�5–4�6
1�7 
1�2–2�3
Cordless phone 2.3 
0.6–8.8
1.0 
0.3–2.9
1�5 
1�04–2�0
Note: Bold = statistically signiﬁcant. Number of controls = 2438 in analyses of glioma (living and deceased controls), 2162 for 
meningioma and acoustic neuroma (only living controls). Only living cases and controls included in analyses of ipsilateral use 
of mobile and cordless phones. 
 Adjustment was made for age, gender, socioeconomic-code and year of diagnosis. For glioma adjustment was also made for 
vital status.
Source: Hardell et al., 2006b, 2006c, 2010, 2011a.
Table 21�2 Odds ratio (OR) and 95 % confidence interval (CI) for glioma, meningioma and 
acoustic neuroma in different age groups for age at first use of a mobile phone 
Note: Bold = statistically signiﬁcant. Number of controls=2438 in analyses of glioma (living and deceased controls), 2162 for 
meningioma and acoustic neuroma (only living controls).
 Adjustment was made for age, gender, socioeconomic-code, year of diagnosis. For glioma adjustment was also made for vital 
status. 
Source: Hardell et al., 2006b, 2006c, 2010, 2011a. 
Glioma  
(n = 1148)
Meningioma  
(n = 916)
Acoustic neuroma  
(n = 243)
OR, (CI) OR, (CI) OR, (CI)
Mobile phone 1�3
(1�1–1�6)
1.1
(0.9–1.3)
1�7
(1�2–2�3)
 < 20 years old 3�1
1�4–6�7
1.9
0.6–5.6
5�0
1�5–16
 20–49 years old 1�4
1�1–1�7
1.3
0.99–1.6
2�0
1�3–2�9
 ≥ 50 years old 1�3
1�01–1�6
1.0
0.8–1.3
1.4
0.9–2.2
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21�9 The Interphone study 2000–2010: 
disagreements and delays 
The Interphone study was an international 
collaboration on brain tumour risk and mobile phone 
use conducted under the guidance of IARC, which is 
an independent agency of WHO. The investigation 
was inititated by recommendations from several 
expert groups to study possible health effects of 
exposure to RF-fields (McKinlay, 1997; Cardis et al., 
2007). It was conducted at 16 research centres in 
13 countries during varying time periods between 
2000 and 2004. It cost nearly EUR 20 million of which 
industry contibuted 5.5 million (IARC, 2010) (11). 
Some of the separate country analyses of the 
Interphone study produced different results, 
with some being positive i.e. finding increased 
brain tumour risks, and some negative i.e. finding 
decreased risks, i.e. seemingly a 'protective' effect of 
the radiation. 
The authors therefore found it hard to come to an 
agreed conclusion and there was a 4 year delay 
between publication of the country results and of 
the overall study results. One group reportedly 
thought that the Interphone study overall had found 
indications of a positive link between mobile phone 
use and brain tumours, especially when the results 
of the 10+ year exposure group were analysed 
separately. Another group thought that they had 
found no indication of a risk and that the apparent 
excess of brain tumour was an artifact of the study 
design and methodology. A third group could agree 
to neither position. 
The publication of the overall Interphone results was 
finally initiated by the Director of IARC, Christopher 
Wild, who brokered sufficient agreement between 
the scientists to finally get the results published in 
May 2010. 
No association between mobile phone use and 
meningioma was found in the overall Interphone 
results whereas subgroup analyses showed 
statistically significant increased risk for glioma 
in the highest exposure group, i.e. those who 
had used their mobile phones for 1 640 hours or 
more, which corresponds to about half an hour 
of use per day for ten years (Interphone Study 
Group, 2010), OR = 1.40 (95 % CI = 1.03–1.89). 
The risk increased further for ipsilateral exposure 
(OR = 1.96, 95 % CI = 1.22–3.16) and for tumours in 
the most exposed part of the brain, the temporal 
lobe, (OR = 1.87, 95 % CI = 1.09–3.22) in the highest 
exposure group for glioma. 
However, the compromise reached between the 
opposing scientists involved the juxtaposition of two 
contrasting sentences that were pointing in different 
directions: There were suggestions of an increased risk 
of glioma, and much less so meningioma, at the highest 
exposure levels, for ipsilateral exposures and, for glioma, 
for tumours in the temporal lobe followed by …biases and 
errors limit the strength of the conclusions we can draw 
from these analyses and prevent a causal [our emphasis] 
interpretation (Interphone Study Group, 2010). 
There was no explanation about how the strength of 
a link between a cause and an effect can vary from a 
'scientific suspicion of risk' to a 'strong association' 
through 'reasonable certainty' and on to 'causality' 
which requires the strongest of evidence. This 
continuum in strengths of evidence, which was 
illustrated in Bradford Hill's paper written at the 
height of the tobacco and lung cancer controversy 
(Hill, 1965), was not explained in the Interphone 
paper. This meant that the media and the public 
could assume that 'not causal' meant 'no link' 
between mobile phones and brain tumours. Other 
epidemiologists did pick up this rather significant 
nuance. 
In an Editorial accompanying the Interphone 
results (Saracci and Samet, 2010), published in the 
International Journal of Epidemiology, the main 
conclusion of the Interphone results, was described 
as both elegant and oracular…(which) tolerates 
diametrically opposite readings. They also pointed out 
several methodological reasons why the Interphone 
results were likely to have underestimated the 
risks, such as the short latency period since first 
exposures became widespread: less than 10 % 
of the Interphone cases had more than 10 years 
exposure. 
None of the today's established carcinogens, including 
tobacco, could have been firmly identified as increasing 
risk in the first 10 years or so since first exposure. 
The 'oracular' concluding sentences from the 
Interphone study therefore allowed the media 
to report opposite conclusions. For example, on 
17 May, 2010 the UK Daily Telegraph reported 
that the Interphone study provided evidence of 
a brain tumour risk from mobile phones (http://
(11) The Hardell studies cost approximately EUR 410 000 and were financed by the Swedish Work Environment Fund, Cancer- och 
Allergifonden, Cancerhjälpen, Telia, Fondkistan, and the Örebro University Hospital Cancer Fund.
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www.telegraph.co.uk/health/7729676/Half-an-
hour-of-mobile-use-a-day-increases-brain-cancer-
risk.html) whilst the BBC News reported on the 
same day that there was no risk (http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/health/8685839.stm). This conflicting 
media reporting pattern was widely repeated 
elsewhere (12). 
Further confusion for the public and policymakers 
followed as a result of the differences in the 
statements of the Interphone scientists reported 
in the media. For example, Microwave News 
reported on 17 May that Elisabeth Cardis, the 
coordinator of the Interphone study, thought 
that Overall...the results show a real effect; Bruce 
Armstrong, the Australian Interphone participant, 
thought that It shows some indication of an increased 
risk of gliomas, but I cannot say this with certainty; 
and Siegal Sadetzki from Israel thought the 
results had consistency in indicating a risk 
but, whilst not strong enough for a causal [our 
emphasis] interpretation, they are sufficient to support 
precautionary policies (http://www.microwavenews.
com/Interphone.Main.html). 
In contrast, another co-author, Feychting, thought, 
the use of mobile phones for over ten years shows no 
increased risk of brain tumours (http://www.i-sis.org.
uk/EEA_Highlight_Mobile_Phone_Cancer_Risks.
php) and Ahlbom, also from the Swedish Interphone 
part, told Chinese Television that there is nothing in 
these data or in previous data, really, to indicate that there 
is any risk involved in this (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=TllmreWZdoA).
In later publications of Interphone data the 
estimated RF dose from mobile phone use in the 
tumour area was also associated with an increased 
risk for glioma in parts of the Interphone group. The 
OR increased with increasing total cumulative dose 
of specific energy (J/kg) absorbed at the estimated 
tumour centre for more than 7 years before 
diagnosis with an OR of 1.91 (95 % CI = 1.05–3.47) in 
the highest quintile of exposure (Cardis et al., 2011).
This important result, which for the first time linked 
amount of radiation absorbed (rather than just its 
proxy which is years of exposure/cumulative hours 
of use) to tumour induction, received very little 
media attention. 
A similar study based on less sound methods was 
later published by another part of the Interphone 
study group, see below (Larjavaara et al., 2011).
Results have also now been published for acoustic 
neuroma (Interphone study group, 2011). An 
increased risk was found for start of ipsilateral 
mobile phone use > 10 year before reference 
date and cumulative use > 1 640 h; OR = 3.74 
(95 % CI = 1.58–8.83). 
The total Interphone results for tumours of the 
parotid gland (13) have never been published. Since 
the IARC has now terminated the Interphone 
study (14) only the results from Sweden (Lönn et al., 
2006) and Israel (Sadetzki et al., 2008) are available. 
Subgroup analyses that considered laterality (side 
of use and risk of tumour) and/or amount of use 
(cumulative hours) indicated increased risks. 
However, results from other studies do not indicate 
a consistent pattern of increased risk (Auvinen et al., 
2002; Hardell et al., 2004; Duan et al., 2011; Söderqvist 
et al., 2012a). Results on long-term use are, however, 
scarce. 
21�10 Some reviews and discussions of 
the Hardell group and Interphone 
studies 
There are by now several meta-analyses and reviews 
on mobile phones and cancer and they describe 
the challenges of doing epidemiology on this issue, 
the methodological limitations of the major studies 
published so far and the difficulties of interpreting 
their results.
For example, several of the Interphone findings 
display differential misclassification of exposure 
due to observational and recall bias which would 
tend to underestimate the risk. There were low 
participation rates for both cases and controls in the 
Interphone studies, for example in some countries 
only about 50 % of the cases and about 40 % of the 
controls participated. This is to be compared with 
90 % response rate for cases with malignant brain 
tumours, 88 % for benign and 89 % for controls in 
the Hardell-group studies on living subjects (Hardell 
et al., 2006b, 2006c). Deceased cases were included in 
the calculations of participation in Interphone, but in 
(12) The EEA had anticipated this confusion and had earlier proposed to IARC that the conflicting opinions of the different Interphone 
groups should be published alongside each other, with their different arguments and data interpretations clearly illustrated in the 
same scientific article. This would have helped the media and the public to better understand the reasons for the divergent views 
amongst the Interphone scientists. However, this suggestion was not adopted. 
(13) A tumour in a gland on the cheek in front of the ear.
(14) According to the official website (http://interphone.iarc.fr/) the Interphone Study was completed in February 2012.
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the Hardell studies deceased cases were included in a 
separate sub-study on malignant brain tumours.
About 40 % of the cases were interviewed at hospitals 
in the Interphone studies. Further, it was always 
known to the interviewer if it was a case or a control 
that was interviewed. Use of cordless phones was 
not properly assessed in the Interphone study, or 
at least not reported. Further discussion on these 
methodological points may be found elsewhere 
(Hardell et al., 2008; Kundi, 2009).
Myung et al. (2009) subsequently compared methods 
and results in all the published studies on the use of 
mobile phones and the risk for brain tumours. They 
concluded that the Hardell studies were of higher 
quality compared with the Interphone study based on 
the Interphone results from different countries that 
were then available. 
However, one important issue was not covered in the 
Myung et al. (2009) review, namely that the Hardell 
group also assessed use of cordless phones in contrast 
to the Interphone study group. RF-EMF emissions 
from a cordless phone are of the same magnitude 
as that from a digital mobile phone, something that 
has been pointed out several times (Hardell et al., 
2006d; Kundi, 2009; Redmayne et al., 2010). Moreover 
cordless phones are typically used for longer calls 
than mobile phones (Hardell et al., 2006b, 2006c). 
Including cordless phone use in the 'unexposed' 
group, as was done in the Interphone study, would 
bias estimates against a risk. 
The use of bedside interviews of cases, as in the 
Interphone study, can be a major disadvantage and 
is ethically questionable. At that time the patient has 
not fully recovered from e.g. surgery, may not have 
been fully informed about the diagnosis, treatment 
and prognosis and may even be under sedation by 
drugs. In fact patients scored significantly lower than 
controls due to problems in recalling words (aphasia), 
problems with writing and drawing due to paralysis 
in the Danish part of Interphone (Christensen et al., 
2005). Obviously observational bias could have been 
introduced thereby during these bedside interviews. 
In contrast, the Hardell group cases received a postal 
questionnaire approximately 2 months after diagnosis 
and could give the answers in a relaxed manner, a 
situation similar to the controls. All cases and controls 
were later interviewed over the phone to verify and 
clarify different exposures. This was done blinded as 
to case or control status. 
The possibility of recall and observational bias was 
investigated in the second case-control study by 
Hardell et al. (2002). Use of a wireless phone was 
similar among cases and controls regardless if they 
reported a previous cancer or if a relative helped to 
fill in the questionnaire. Potential observational bias 
during phone interviews was analysed by comparing 
change of exposure in cases and controls after these 
interviews. No significant differences were found, 
showing that the results could not be explained by 
observational bias: for further details see discussion in 
that publication (Hardell et al., 2002). All interviews 
were performed by trained persons using structured 
instructions and protocols. 
The article by Myung et al. was commented on 
by e.g. Rowley and Milligan (2010) representing 
the mobile phone industry. They claimed that the 
Interphone studies were independent of industry 
influence. However, the mobile phone industry 
provided 5.5 million euro for the Interphone study 
and additional funding was provided by the industry 
in some countries. Furthermore, according to the 
study protocol Other parties may also be involved in 
the Study Group as observers or consultants. These may 
include representatives of industry, other concerned 
organisations... In addition, representatives of industry 
and other concerned organisations… shall be informed 
shortly (maximum of seven days) before publication, and 
before the scientific community and laymen have 
access to the study results (IARC, 2001).
Rowley and Milligan claim that there is evidence of 
selection, information, and recall bias, and unusually 
high reported participation rates in the Hardell studies 
(Rowley and Milligan, 2010). These ad hoc statements 
are not substantiated by the authors or in their 
references. A high participation rate is a pre-requiste 
for high quality in case-control studies. 
Other scientists have analysed the Hardell results 
more favourably (Kundi, 2009; Myung et al., 2009; 
Mead, 2009; Cardis and Sadetzki, 2011; Levis et al., 
2011) and IARC relied mainly on the Hardell group 
and Interphone study group results for its evaluation 
of the RF evidence. 
The Cardis review was particulary interesting as 
she was the coordinator of the Interphone study. In 
the review with Sadetzki, another Interphone study 
participant, they concluded, after a full discussion of 
the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the 
Hardell and Interphone studies, that:
It is not possible to evaluate the magnitude and 
direction of the different possible biases on the 
study results and to estimate the net effect of 
mobile phones on the risk of brain tumours. The 
overall balance of the above mentioned arguments, 
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however, suggest the existence of a possible 
association (i.e. between mobile phones and 
brain tumour). 
They ended by concluding that: 
Simple and low cost measures, such as the use of 
text messages, handsfree kits and/or the loudspeaker 
mode of the phone could substantially reduce 
exposure to the brain from mobile phones. Therefore, 
until definitive scientific answers are available, the 
adoption of such precautions, particularly among 
young people, is advisable (Cardis and Sadetzki, 
2011, p. 170).
21�11 IARC evaluation of the 
carcinogenicity of RF-EMFs 2011
In 2011 IARC evaluated the carcinogenic effect to 
humans for RF-EMF emissions during a 8 days 
(24–31 May) meeting at Lyon in France. This 
included all sources of radiofrequency radiation, 
not only mobile and cordless phones. Regarding use 
of wireless phones all of the published studies by 
the Hardell group were included as well as overall 
results for Interphone (Interphone Study Group, 
2010, 2011; Cardis et al., 2011). The results on glioma 
are similar in the Hardell group and Interphone 
studies if the same inclusion and exclusion criteria 
are used (Hardell et al., 2011b). This is in contrast to 
widespread claims that the results of the two sets of 
studies differed significantly. 
The IARC Working Group consisted of 
30 scientists (15) representing four areas: 'animal 
cancer studies', 'epidemiology', 'exposure' and 
'mechanistic and other relevant data'. The different 
expert groups had initially a draft written before the 
meeting by some of the experts. Further work was 
done in the expert groups and a final agreement, 
sentence by sentence, was obtained during plenary 
sessions with all experts participating. 
The Working Group concluded that there is 'limited 
evidence in humans' for the carcinogenicity of RF-
EMF, based on positive associations between glioma 
and acoustic neuroma and exposure to RF-EMF 
from wireless phones. This conclusion was based 
on the Interphone study and the Hardell group 
studies. No conclusions could be drawn from the 
Danish cohort study on mobile phone subscribers 
due to considerable misclassification in exposure 
assessment (Baan et al., 2011).
The final conclusion was obtained by voting by all 
30 scientists and there was a very large majority for 
the conclusion that RF-EMF radiation is 'possibly 
carcinogenic' to humans, Group 2B, based also on 
occupational studies. 
21�12 Some responses to the IARC 
conclusion
It is interesting to see that even the authoritative 
IARC evaluation has been interpreted very 
differently by different groups. 
To date, no adverse health effects have been established as 
being caused by mobile phone use. This was stated in 
a fact sheet in June 2011 from WHO EMF Program 
after the IARC decision (http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs193/en/), and furthermore 
that Tissue heating is the principal mechanism of 
interaction between radiofrequency energy and the human 
body without acknowledging any of the non-thermal 
effects that could explain the evidence on brain 
tumours (Guiliani and Soffriti, 2010). 
Michael Milligan from the Mobile Manufacturers 
Forum (MMF) said:
…After reviewing the available scientific evidence, 
it is significant that IARC has concluded that 
RF electromagnetic fields are not a definite nor 
a probable human carcinogen… (http://www.
mmfai.org/public/docs/eng/MMF_PR_310511_
IARC.pdf).
Jack Rowley from GSM Association (GSMA) said:
…The IARC classification suggests that a hazard 
is possible but not likely… (http://www.gsma.
com/articles/gsma-statement-on-the-iarc-
classification/17567/).
(15) David Gee of the EEA had been invited by IARC to join the group as 'a representative of your organization, rather than as an 
observer' (for a definition of representatives and observers, please see the Preamble: http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/
currenta5participants0706.php). However, a few days before the IARC meeting began the EEA wrote to IARC to say they were 
withdrawing because of further delays in publishing the full Interphone results and because of the intellectual bias of Ahlbom who 
was then the Chair of the epidemiology group for the meeting. The day before the meeting began Ahlbom was removed from the 
Chair by IARC as a result of a reported conflict of interest: and the meeting was also given part of the unpublished Interphone data. 
However, this was too late for the EEA to then participate.
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Patrick Frostell from the Federation of Finnish 
Technology Industries (FFTI) said:
…IARC's classification is in line with the 
dominant interpretation of current research 
data, according to which radiofrequency 
electromagnetic fields are neither carcinogenic to 
humans nor probably carcinogenic to humans…
(http://www.teknologiateollisuus.fi/en/
news/announcements/2011-6/no-change-in-
international-assessment-of-the-health-effects-
of-mobile-phones).
Professor Dariuz Leszczynski from the Finnish 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and 
member of the IARC expert panel wrote:
Recent IARC evaluation of mobile phone radiation 
potential to cause cancer and classification of it as 
a 2B carcinogen has caused a stir of pro and contra 
opinions among the scientists, industry and news 
media. Unfortunately, the only outcome of this 
broad attention leads to only one — confusion. 
Regular mobile phone user, whether highly or 
not so highly educated, can only be confused by 
this flurry of contradictory opinions and spin-
statements (http://betweenrockandhardplace.
wordpress.com/2011/06/29/%e2%80%a2viva-
confusion/).
The Economist wrote:
..your correspondent thinks the whole brouhaha 
over mobile phones causing brain cancer is 
monumentally irrelevant compared with all the 
other things there are to worry about (http://www.
economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/mobile-
phones-and-health).
Microwave News has followed this area for a 
long time. Much of the whole IARC story and the 
aftermath can be found at its website, for example 
regarding ICNIRP's standpoint: 
ICNIRP is a self-perpetuating group that declines 
to disclose its finances. Its Standing Committee on 
Epidemiology, which wrote the new commentary, 
has only welcomed the like-minded. Its previous 
chairman, Anders Ahlbom, has also registered his 
opinion that cell phone tumor risks are nonexistent. 
(He was the lead author of the last ICNIRP 
review of cell phones and cancer.) Another former 
member, Maria Blettner, was the lone dissenting 
voice in the final vote of the IARC working group. 
Both Blettner and Ahlbom worked on Interphone 
(http://www.microwavenews.com/ICNIRP.
Interphone.html).
Perhaps even IARC has contributed to this confusion 
by seeming to agree with the largely non-positive 
but much criticized Danish cohort study, see below 
(http://www.microwavenews.com).
No doubt the IARC decision started a world-wide 
spinning machine perhaps similar to the one 
launched by the tobacco industry when IARC was 
studying and evaluating passive smoking as a 
carcinogen in the 1990s (Ong and Glanz, 2000) (16). 
Sowing confusion and 'manufacturing doubt' is a 
well known strategy used by the tobacco and other 
industries (Michaels, 2008; McGarity and Wagner, 
2008; Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
21�13 Some further studies published 
since the IARC conclusion 
The Nordic part of Interphone published a study 
relating brain tumour location to mobile phone 
radiation (Larjavaara et al., 2011). The results 
seemed to contradict the findings by Cardis et al. 
(2011) as discussed above, but used a different, less 
clear method. Only 42 cases had used the mobile 
phone for more than 10 years and no analysis was 
made of the highest exposed group with longest 
duration of use. Thus, this study is much less 
informative and less sophisticated that the one by 
Cardis et al. (2011).
In Denmark a cohort of mobile phone subscribers 
was designed and started in cooperation between The 
International Epidemiology Institute (IEI), Rockville, 
MD, USA, and the Danish Cancer Society. The 
cohort was established by grants from two Danish 
telecom operation companies (TeleDenmark Mobil 
and Sonafon), by IEI, and by the Danish Cancer 
Society. The source of money for the IEI has not been 
disclosed. 
(16) In the early 1990s the Philip Morris tobacco company feared that an IARC study and a possible IARC monograph on second-hand 
smoke would lead to increased restrictions in Europe so they spearheaded an inter-industry, three-prong strategy to subvert 
IARC's work. The scientific strategy attempted to undercut IARC's research and to develop industry-directed research to counter 
the anticipated findings. The communications strategy planned to shape opinion by manipulating the media and the public. The 
government strategy sought to prevent increased smoking restrictions. The IARC study cost USD 2 million over ten years; Philip 
Morris planned to spend USD 2 million in one year alone and up to USD 4 million on research (Ong and Glanz, 2000).
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Box 21�3 IARC and its classifications of carcinogens
IARC evaluates the hazard from potential carcinogens, i.e. 'an agent that is capable of causing cancer 
under some circumstances', while a cancer risk is an estimate of the carcinogenic effects expected from an 
exposure to a cancer hazard. The IARC monographs are an exercise in evaluating cancer hazards, despite 
the historical presence of the word 'risks' in the title. 
IARC has categorised nearly 1000 potentially carcinogenic hazardous agents, that it has studied over 
the last 40 years, into 5 classifications. These are differentiated by different strengths of evidence. In 
descending order of strengths of evidence they are: Group 1, which are 'established' human carcinogens, 
such as asbestos, diesel engine exhaust, tobacco, and X-rays (108 agents); Group 2A, which are probable  
carcinogens, such as perchloroethylene (64 agents); Group 2B, which are possible carcinogens, such 
as other traffic fumes, lead, DDT and now radiofrequency electromagnetic fields, including mobile phones 
(272 agents); Group 3, where the agent is not classifiable because the evidence is inadequate and 
does not permit another classification (508 agents); and Group 4, where the agent is probably not 
carcinogenic to humans, based on fairly strong evidence against a cancer effect in both humans and 
animals (1 agent) (IARC, 2012).
It may be helpful to clarify the meaning of the particularly contentious groups. i.e. 2A and 2B.
IARC chooses 3 main different strengths of evidence when it is evaluating the different types of cancer 
evidence that may be available. The evidence evaluated comes mainly from humans; from animals; and 
from consideration of the biological mechanisms for cancer causation: this last can provide understanding 
about how carcinogens cause cancer, in contrast to whether they cause cancer.
The main strengths of evidence groups used by IARC are: 'sufficient', 'limited', and 'inadequate'. For 
example, while Group 1 consists of those agents where there is 'sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity' 
in humans; Group 2A includes those agents where there is 'limited evidence of cancer in humans' but 
'sufficient evidence of cancer in animals'; and Group 2B, which is the radiofrequency EMF category, is 
those agents where there is 'limited evidence of cancer in humans and less than sufficient evidence in 
animals' and where 'chance, bias or confounding cannot be ruled out with reasonable confidence'. 'Evidence 
suggesting lack of carcinogenicity' is used for Group 4 (IARC, 2006, p. 19–20).
Different agents in the same classification group are evaluated on the basis of very different kinds of 
evidence and exposure conditions that are specific for each substance. Some 2B agents will be at the 
lower end of the probability range, others will be close to the nearly one in two probability and the rest 
are somewhere in between, depending on their very specific characteristics. By loosely lumping together 
several randomly chosen carcinogens from the 271 in Group 2B such as dry cleaning fumes and coffee, 
which invites comparison to mobile phones, journalists and others help to complicate the already difficult 
discussion about the likelihood of cancer risks. Each agent needs to be considered on its own evidence.
The first results from the Danish study on brain 
tumour risk among mobile phone subscribers were 
published in 2001 and updated in 2006 and 2011 
(Johansen et al., 2001; Schüz et al., 2006, 2011; Frei 
et al., 2011). It included subjects from 1 January, 
1982 until 31 December, 1995 identified from the 
computerized files of the two Danish operating 
companies, TeleDenmark Mobil and Sonafon. A total 
of 723 421 subscribers were identified but the initial 
cohort consisted of only 58 % of these subscribers. 
The IARC working group's main reason for not using 
the Danish study as evidence for its evaluation was 
that it could have resulted in considerable misclassification 
in exposure assessment (Baan et al., 2011).
The authors of the Danish study have themselves 
pointed out the main causes of such considerable 
exposure misclassification (Frei et al., 2011): mobile 
phone subscription holders not using the phone 
were classified as 'exposed'; non-subscribers 
using the mobile phone were classified as 
'unexposed'; corporate subscribers of mobile 
phones (200 507 people), which are likely to have 
been heavy users, were classified as 'unexposed'; 
persons with a mobile phone subscription later than 
1995 (which is over 80 % of the Danish population) 
were classified as 'unexposed'; and many users of 
cordless phones, which Hardell et al. have linked to 
excess risks of brain cancers, were also classified as 
'unexposed'. 
Emerging issues | Mobile phone use and brain tumour risk: early warnings, early actions?
555Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Other limitations are the absence of analysis by 
laterality (the side of head were the phone is used 
in relation to the side of the tumour) and the 
complete absence of actual exposure data. These and 
other shortcomings in this cohort study have been 
discussed elsewhere in more detail (Ahlbom et al., 
2007; Söderqvist et al., 2012b). 
It is clear from these limitations that the authors 
conclusion that 'In this update of a large nationwide 
cohort study of mobile phone use, there were no 
increased risks of tumours of the central nervous 
system, providing little evidence for a causal 
association' is not soundly based (Frei et al., 2011). 
21�14 Need for monitoring long term 
trends in country wide nervous 
system tumours
It has been suggested that overall incidence data 
on brain tumours for countries may be used to 
qualify or disqualify the association between 
mobile phones and brain tumours observed in the 
case-control studies (Aydin et al., 2011; Ahlbom 
and Feychting, 2011; Deltour et al., 2012; Little 
et al., 2012). In support of the findings that Frei 
et al. (2011) presented for Denmark, Ahlbom 
and Feychting (2011) refer to data on overall 
brain tumour incidence from the Swedish Cancer 
Registry (which does not show an overall increase 
in brain tumour incidence since the 1990s) rather 
than from the Danish Cancer Registry which would 
have been more relevant. 
The quality of the Swedish Cancer Registry in 
reporting of central nervous system tumours, 
particularly high grade glioma, has been seriously 
questioned (Bergenheim et al., 2007; Barlow et al., 
2009). In the Deltour et al. paper (2012) Sweden 
accounted for about 40 % of the population and 
cases. Thus, underreporting of brain tumour cases 
to the Swedish Cancer Register would make the 
conclusions in the Deltour et al. study less valid.
In Denmark a statistically significant increase in 
incidence rate per year for brain and central nervous 
system tumours (combined) was seen during 
2000–2009, in men +2.7 % (95 % CI = 1.1 to 4.3) and in 
women + 2.9 % (95 % CI = 0.7 to 5.2) (NORDCAN). 
Recently updated results for brain and central 
nervous system tumours were released in Denmark. 
The age-standardized incidence of brain and central 
nervous system tumours increased by 40 % among 
men and by 29 % among women between 2001–2010 
(Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2010).
A more recent news release based on the Danish 
Cancer Register states that during the last 10 years 
there has been an almost 4-fold increase in the 
incidence of the most malignant glioma type, 
glioblastoma (http://www.cancer.dk/Nyheder/
nyhedsartikler/2012kv4/Kraftig+stigning+i+hjern
esvulster.htm). So far these incidence data are not 
generally available.
Little et al. (2012) studied the incidence rates of 
glioma during 1992–2008 in the United States 
and compared the results with odds ratios for 
glioma associated with mobile phone use in the 
2010 Interphone publication (Interphone Study 
Group, 2010) and the Hardell group pooled results 
published in 2011 (Hardell et al., 2011a). However, 
an important methodological issue that was not 
stated in the abstract or in Figures, but can be 
found in the web appendix, is that observed rates 
were based on men aged 60–64 years from the Los 
Angeles SEER registry as the baseline category. 
These data were used to estimate rates in the entire 
dataset, men and women aged > 18 years and all 
12 SEER registries. Thereby numerous assumptions 
were made. The conclusion by Little et al. that 'Raised 
risk of glioma with mobile phone use, as reported 
by one (Swedish) study … are not consistent with 
observed incidence trends in the US population 
data...' goes far beyond scientific evidence and what 
would be possible to show with the faulty methods 
used in the study. On the contrary, it is of interest that 
they in fact showed statistically significant yearly 
increasing incidence of high-grade glioma in the 
SEER data for 1992–2008, + 0.64 %, 95 % CI 0.33 to 
0.95, a result not commented further by the research 
group. 
Much care is needed when using descriptive data, 
as in Aydin et al. (2011), Deltour et al. (2012) and 
Little et al. (2012), to dismiss results from analytical 
epidemiology. In addition to methodological 
shortcomings, there might be other factors that 
influence the overall incidence rate such as changes 
in exposure to other risk factors for brain tumours 
that are unknown in descriptive studies. Cancer 
incidence depends on initiation, promotion and 
progression of the disease (Hazleton et al., 2005). 
As the mechanism for RF-EMF carcinogenesis is 
unclear it supports the view that descriptive data 
on brain tumour incidence is of limited value. 
21�15 Concluding remarks
It is sometimes claimed by the telecommunications 
industry and others that:
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•  the scientific basis for the current ICNIRP limits 
for exposure to EMF is adequate to protect the 
public from cancer risks; 
•  that children are no more sensitive than adults to 
the RF from mobile phones; 
•  that there are no biologically significant effects 
from non-thermal levels of EMF, and 
•  that, if there are such effects, there are no 
acceptable mechanisms of action that could 
explain these effects. 
However the recent 400-page review by the 
Ramazzini Institute and The International 
Commission for Electromagnetic Safety (ICEMS) 
provides a wealth of evidence on the non–thermal 
biological and ecological effects of EMF (Giuliani 
and Soffritti, 2010). The EEA summarised the main 
findings of this report in its evidence to the Council 
of Europe' hearing on RF and mobile phones in 2011 
(EEA, 2011a, 2011b).
Results from the Hardell-group as well as from 
the Interphone group show an increased risk for 
glioma and acoustic neuroma associated with long 
term mobile phone use. Also use of cordless phones 
increases the risk when properly assessed and 
analysed. The risk is highest for ipsilateral exposure 
to the brain of RF-EMF emissions. Adolescents seem 
to be at higher risk than adults. For meningioma 
there is no consistent pattern of increased risk. 
Furthermore, of interest is that in the same studies 
different results were obtained for different tumour 
types. This strongly argues against systematic 
bias as an explanation of the findings. In that case 
the results would have been similar regardless of 
tumour type.
The IARC conclusion that RF-EMF emissions 
overall, e.g. occupational and from wireless 
phones, are possibly carcinogenic to humans, 
Group 2B (Baan et al., 2011) has been questioned 
by e.g. members of ICNIRP (Swerdlow et al., 2011). 
That article appeared online 1 July, 2011, one month 
after the IARC decision, and concluded that the trend 
in the accumulating evidence is increasingly against the 
hypotheses that mobile phone use can cause brain tumors 
in adults. There has also been unfounded attacks 
on individual researchers as exemplified in this 
article, a pattern that repeats similar experiences in 
the asbestos, lead and tobacco histories. Published 
results on health effects are questioned by using 
obscure methods and citing single results out of 
context without considering the overall pattern. 
There is a lack of investigating journalists who 
can produce nuanced reports in the media. Most 
journalists seem to make only reference to news 
reports or press releases without making their own 
evaluations or without seeming to have read the 
original articles. Many limitations of epidemiological 
studies are to be found in the text, but rarely in 
the abstract which is most often all that is read. 
Without accurate and reliable reporting in the 
media the public do not get a robust and consistent 
information on potential health risks to make their 
own judgements about how precautionary they 
should be. 
It is remarkable that the IARC carcinogenic 
classification does not seem to have had any 
significant impact on governments' perceptions of 
their responsibilities to protect public health from 
this widespread source of radiation, especially 
given the ease with which exposures can be reduced 
(i.e. texting, handsfree devices and better phone 
design). 
Independent research into the many unknowns 
about the biological and ecological effects of RF 
radiations are urgently needed, given the global 
exposure of over 5 billion people and many other 
species, especially those, like bees and some birds 
whose navigation systems are possibly being affected 
by such radiations (Balmori, 2005, 2009; Sharma and 
Kumar, 2010), and effects on breeding of wild birds 
(Everaert and Bauwens, 2007). Research could be in 
part funded by relevant industries from levies on 
phones and masts but used independent from their 
influence. 
The benefits of mobile telecommunications are many, 
but, as with other case studies in the Late lessons from 
early warnings Volume 1 (EEA, 2001) and the present 
report, such benefits need not to be accompanied by 
the possibility of widespread harms. Precautionary 
actions now to reduce head exposures, as pointed out 
by the EEA in 2007, and many others since, would 
limit the size and seriousness of any brain tumour 
risk that may exist. Reducing exposures may also 
help to reduce the other possible harms that are not 
considered in this case study.
21�16 Epilogue
The Italian Supreme Court affirmed a previous 
ruling that the Insurance Body for Work (INAIL) 
must grant worker's compensation to a businessman 
who had used wireless phones for 12 years and 
developed a neurinoma in the brain (http://www.
applelettrosmog.it/public/news.php?id_news=44; 
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http://microwavenews.com/news-center/italian-
supreme-court-affirms-tumor-risk). He had used 
both mobile and cordless phones for five to six 
hours per day preferably on the same side as the 
tumour developed. The neurinoma was located in 
the trigeminal Gasser's ganglion in the brain. This 
5th cranial nerve controls facial sensations and 
muscles. It is the same type of tumour as the acoustic 
neuroma in the 8th cranial nerve located in the similar 
area of the brain. Although neurinoma is a benign 
tumour it causes persistent disabling symptoms after 
treatment with neurological impairment that severely 
affects the daily life. The Italian case fulfils the criteria 
for a causal association; more than 10 years use of 
wireless phones, high cumulative exposure on the 
same side as the tumour appeared, and a tumour 
type that would be predicted based on previous 
research on use of wireless phones and brain tumour 
risk. No further appeal of the Supreme Court decision 
is possible.
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(1) This chapter is based on and in parts identical to Hansen, S.F., Maynard, A., Baun, A., Tickner, J.A. 2008. 'Late lessons from early 
warnings for nanotechnology', Nature Nanotechnology, (3/8) 444–447.
  
Nanotechnology is the latest in a long series of technologies heralded as ushering in a new era 
of technology-driven prosperity. Current and future applications of nanotechnology are expected 
to lead to substantial societal and environmental benefits, increasing economic development and 
employment, generating better materials at lower environmental costs, and offering new ways 
to diagnose and treat medical conditions. Nevertheless, as new materials based on nanoscale 
engineering move from the lab to the marketplace, have we learnt the lessons of past 'wonder 
technologies' or are we destined to repeat past mistakes?
This chapter first introduces nanotechnology, clarifies the terminology of nanomaterials and 
describes current uses of these unique materials. Some of the early warning signs of possible 
adverse impacts of some nanomaterials are summarised, along with regulatory responses of 
some governments. Inspired by the EEA's first volume of Late lessons from early warnings, the 
chapter looks critically at what lessons can already be learned, notwithstanding nanotechnology's 
immaturity (1).
Nanotechnology development has occurred in the absence of clear design rules for chemists and 
materials developers on how to integrate health, safety and environmental concerns into design. 
The emerging area of 'green nanotechnology' offers promise for the future with its focus on 
preventive design. To gain traction, however, it is important that research on the sustainability 
of materials is funded at levels significant enough to identify early warnings, and that regulatory 
systems provide incentives for safer and sustainable materials.
Political decision-makers have yet to address many of the shortcomings in legislation, research 
and development, and limitations in risk assessment, management and governance of 
nanotechnologies and other emerging technologies. As a result, there remains a developmental 
environment that hinders the adoption of precautionary yet socially and economically responsive 
strategies in the field of nanotechnology. If left unresolved, this could hamper society's ability to 
ensure responsible development of nanotechnologies.
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22�1 What is nanotechnology and what 
are nanomaterials? 
Nanotechnology is often described as having roots 
in a wide range of scientific and technical fields, 
including physics, chemistry, biology, material 
science and electronics. The field of nanotechnology 
is thus broad and covers a multitude of materials, 
techniques, scientific and commercial applications 
and products (RS and RAE, 2004). Originally the 
term nanotechnology, first used by Taniguchi in 1974, 
referred to the ability to engineer materials precisely 
at the nanometre (nm) level (Taniguchi, 1974). The 
term has since been framed and reframed by various 
actors over the decades and, despite the desire for a 
unifying all embracing definition of nanotechnology, 
many versions of the definition exist today. Here, we 
use the widely-accepted definition suggested by the 
United States National Nanotechnology Initiative 
(NNI): 
Nanotechnology is the understanding and 
control of matter at dimensions between 
approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, 
where unique phenomena enable novel 
applications. Encompassing nanoscale science, 
engineering, and technology, nanotechnology 
involves imaging, measuring, modelling, 
and manipulating matter at this length scale 
(NNI, 2009).
Chemistry typically deals with large numbers of 
atoms and molecules acting together. The behaviour 
of individual atoms and molecules can best be 
understood within a quantum physics-based 
framework, while the motion of massive collections 
of atoms and molecules such as physical objects 
under the influence of force are best described 
through classical mechanics or Newtonian physics. 
Nanotechnology falls between these two domains 
and holds the possibility of revealing and exploiting 
unique novel phenomena as a result. 
Although the wordings differ, a number of definitions 
require that two criteria must be fulfilled for materials 
to be considered as engineered nanomaterials (2):
•  they must have some purposely engineered 
structure with at least one dimension in the 
approximate range 1–100 nm; 
•  this nanostructure must give the system 
properties that differ from those of the bulk forms 
of the same material. 
(2) Nanomaterials in this context specifically refer to materials that have been purposely engineered to have nanoscale structure.
Although the definition is broad, in most materials 
or systems it can be determined whether they 
involve nanomaterials or not (Hansen et al., 2007).
The range of nanomaterials that can be 
manufactured is extremely broad. However the 
techniques used to produce them can, roughly 
speaking, be divided into top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. Top-down techniques involve starting 
from a larger unit of material, and etching or 
milling it down to smaller units of desired shape, 
whereas bottom-up involves progressing from 
smaller sub-units (e.g. atoms or molecules) to make 
larger and functionally richer structures (RS and 
RAE, 2004; BSI, 2007b). Top-down techniques 
include processes such as high-energy ball milling, 
etching, sonication and laser ablation, whereas 
bottom-up techniques include sol-gel, chemical 
vapour deposition, plasma or flame spraying, 
supercritical fluid, spinning and self-assembly 
(Biswas and Wu, 2005). Both approaches pose 
specific challenges. Creating smaller and smaller 
structures with sufficient accuracy is a critical 
challenge for top-down manufacturing, whereas 
the challenge for bottom-up techniques is to make 
structures large enough and of sufficient quality 
(RS and RAE, 2004).
Starting with a palette of conventional materials, 
new nanomaterials may be formed by subtly 
altering the shape, size and form of these materials 
at the nanoscale. A further range of nanomaterials 
with new properties may be developed by 
combining two or more nanoscale materials. 
Familiar chemicals may also be used to construct 
new nanometre-scale molecules and structures, 
such as carbon-60 and carbon-70 molecules 
(C60 and C70), carbon nanotubes, nanoscale 
liposomes, self-assemble monolayers, dendrimers 
and aerogels. Various international standardisation 
institutes have expanded their focus of attention 
from trying to define nanotechnology to defining 
the nature of the many different kinds of 
nanomaterials such as carbon nanostructures, 
nanorods and nano-objects (BSI, 2007; ISO, 2008).
In order to facilitate hazard identification and 
focus risk assessment, a procedure for dividing 
nanomaterials into relevant subcategories has been 
developed by Hansen et al. (2007), as illustrated by 
Figure 22.1.
Hansen et al. (2007) suggest categorisation of 
nanomaterials depending on the location of the 
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nanoscale structure in the system. This leads to a 
division of nanomaterials into three main categories:
•  materials that are nanostructured in the bulk;
•  materials that have nanostructure on the surface; 
•  materials that contain nanostructured particles.
Nanoparticles have been defined by the ISO (2008) 
as particles having three external dimensions 
between 1 and 100 nanometre (3). Category III above 
contains nanostructured nanoparticles that can 
have various forms and shapes and this category 
includes, for example, quantum dots, fullerenes, 
nanotubes and nanowires (Maynard and Aitken, 
2007). There are four subcategories of systems 
with nanoparticles, depending on the environment 
around the nanoparticles:
•  subcategory IIIa has nanoparticles bound to the 
surface of another solid structure;
Figure 22�1 The categorisation framework for nanomaterials� The nanomaterials are 
categorised according to the location of the nanostructure in the material 
Source: Hansen et al., 2007, reprinted with permission.
(3) It is important to note that this is not a universally accepted definition and that, as with the term nanotechnology, a number 
of different definitions as to what constitutes a nanomaterial exists. The articulation by the European Commission of their 
recommendation for a definition is discussed in detail in Section 22.5 of this chapter. 
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•  subcategory IIIb consists of systems where 
nanoparticles are suspended in a liquid;
•  subcategory IIIc is nanoparticles suspended in 
solids; 
•  subcategory IIId consists of airborne 
nanoparticles.
Most health and environmental impact concerns 
have been raised over nanoparticles that fall into 
subcategories IIIc and IIId (see, for example, 
SCENIHR, 2009; RCEP, 2008; Madl and Pinkerton, 
2009). A major benefit of the proposed categorisation 
framework is that it provides a tool for dividing 
nanosystems into identifiable parts, thereby 
facilitating evaluations of, for example, relevant 
exposure routes or analysis of effect studies 
according to relevance to the material tested.
22�2 Development of nanotechnology 
and nanomaterials 
The development of nanotechnology has been rapid 
when assessed by a number of metrics, including 
government funding and number of research 
publications and industrial patents (see, for example, 
Chen and Roco, 2009; Youtie et al., 2008; Sylvester and 
Bowman, 2011). Early nanotechnology development 
was driven by advances in materials science and 
scientific breakthroughs such as the discovery of 
fullerenes, quantum dots and carbon nanotubes 
(Iijima, 1991) along with innovations that allowed 
nanostructures to be visualised, such as the invention 
of the scanning tunnelling microscope and the atomic 
force microscope (Kroto et al., 1986; Iijima, 1991; 
Binning et al., 1982 and 1986). 
One of the key turning points in science and 
technology policy in relation to nanotechnology was 
the establishment of the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI) by the United States of America 
(USA) Government in 2000, along with significant 
increases in research and development (R&D) 
funding for nanotechnology-related research (Igami 
and Okazaki, 2007). Since then, most developed and 
many emerging economies have launched national 
initiatives or prioritise research in nanotechnology 
(Roco, 2011). Although somewhat speculative in 
nature, Lux Research (2008) estimated that in 2008 
alone global nanotechnology R&D investment was 
around USD 18.2 billion, representing USD 8.4 billion 
from governments, USD 8.6 billion from corporate 
sources and USD 1.2 billion from venture capital 
investors. Government funding of academic research 
has lead to a significant increase in the number of 
scientific research publications in nanotechnology 
(Linkov et al., 2009). Scientific activities sparked 
by government funding have had a crucial role in 
nanotechnology-related knowledge creation and 
technology transfer, although there is often some time 
lag before scientific knowledge is diffused into useful 
inventions and applications (Igami and Okazaki, 
2007). 
22�3 Current production and 
application of nanotechnology and 
nanomaterials
According to the Nanotechnology Company 
Database, there are now about 2 000 nanotechnology-
focused companies around the world; the majority 
of these are based in the US (estimates suggest 
1 100), and 670 have their headquarters within the 
European Union (Nanowerk, 2010). These companies 
range from multinationals to small and medium-size 
companies and university spin-offs. They span a wide 
range of sectors and applications including energy, 
analysis, textiles, anti-microbial wound dressings, 
paints and coatings, fuel catalysts and additives, 
lubricants, cosmetics and food packaging (Chaundry 
et al., 2006; Hodge et al., 2010). 
Till now, the emerging nature of the technology has 
ensured that much of the public and private sector 
attention has been on R&D activities. However, one 
could argue that nanotechnology is entering in a new 
era in which both the number of products containing 
nanomaterials and the sophistication of these 
nanomaterials have increased spectacularly. Mundane 
products will soon, it would appear, be superseded 
by a range of innovative nanotechnology-based 
products. 
In 2006, the Project for Emerging Nanotechnologies 
(PEN) at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars launched an online inventory 
of consumer products that are reported to include 
nanomaterials (the Consumer Products Inventory). 
At the time of its launch in March 2006, the 
global inventory contained 212 different products 
available for purchase. This number increased 
to 580 products in 2007, and in March 2011 the 
inventory contained 1 317 products from about 
30 countries (PEN, 2011). These products fall into 
a number of different categories including health 
and fitness, home and garden, and electronics and 
computers. More than half (738) were considered to 
be health and fitness-related and included products 
as diverse as hair straighteners, sporting equipment 
and cosmetics. The primary material in many of 
the products was nanoscale silver (PEN, 2011). The 
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Woodrow Wilson Consumer Products Inventory 
contains information such as product name, 
company, manufacturer or supplier, country of 
origin, and a short product description. However, 
it does not contain information about how many 
units of a given product are produced and sold or 
the mass/volume of nanomaterial in each product. 
Such information is only available if the producers 
themselves make it available, which occurs rarely. It 
is therefore not surprising that the public, and even 
the relevant regulators themselves, have limited 
knowledge about the current production volumes 
of nanomaterials. Moreover, the veracity of the 
available information must be considered, given its 
scattered and incomplete nature. 
Publicly available information on commercially 
produced engineered nanomaterials is at best 
patchy. For example, in 2001, the global production 
of carbon-based nanomaterials was estimated to be 
around several hundred tonnes per year; by 2003 
global production of nanotubes alone was estimated 
to be about 900 tonnes (Kleiner and Hogan, 2003). 
Frontier Carbon Corp, a Japanese-based company, 
produces more than 40 tonnes of C60 per annum, 
mainly for use in a range of goods including 
sporting goods, batteries, lubricants and polymer 
additives (Fujitani et al., 2008). The consulting firm 
Cientifica (2006) has estimated that in 2006 the 
global annual production of nanotubes and fibres 
was 65 tonnes, giving it a commercial value of about 
EUR 144 million. Cientifica (2006) has suggested 
that the value of nanotubes and fibres will exceed 
EUR 3 billion by 2010, representing an annual 
growth rate of well over 60 %. The veracity of these 
claims is still to be tested. Even though information 
about the production of carbon-based nanomaterials 
is scarce, more is known, or at least guessed at, 
about such materials than about many other 
nanomaterials such as quantum dots, nano-metals 
and materials with nanostructured surfaces. 
22�4 Signs of early warnings
Concerns have been raised about the potential risks 
of nanotechnology and nanomaterials almost since 
the emergence of nanotechnology (Drexler, 1986), 
and historical analogies have been made with both 
ambient ultrafine particles and asbestos (RS and 
RAE, 2004; Seaton et al., 2009; Mullins, 2010). 
Ambient ultrafine particles, which can come from 
multiple sources, are defined as airborne nanoscale 
particles, including particles incidentally produced 
such as those in diesel exhaust and incinerator 
stacks. Ultrafine particles are typically considered to 
be smaller than 0.1 micron (i.e. < 100 nm). Research 
on ultrafine particles has found an increased 
morbidity and mortality from cardiovascular and 
pulmonary diseases inversely correlated with size 
i.e. the smaller the particles, the more dangerous 
(Oberdorster et al., 2005a; Pope and Dockery, 2006). 
Since nanomaterials are in the same size range 
as ultrafine particles, concerns have been raised 
on whether nanomaterials could have the same 
hazardous properties as ultrafine particles. 
Much of the research performed on ultrafine 
particles in the 1990s now feeds into what we know 
about the potential risk of nanomaterials and lays 
the foundation for many of the current scientific 
research hypotheses in the field of nano(eco)
toxicology (Oberdorster et al., 2007). One of the 
most important hypotheses is that the hazard 
properties of nanoparticles might be related to 
inherent physico-chemical properties different from 
those traditionally used for industrial chemicals, 
e.g. particle size, shape, crystal structure, surface 
area, surface chemistry and surface charge. As 
early as 1990 Oberdorster et al. (1990) and Ferin 
et al (1990) reported that ultrafine titanium dioxide 
(TiO2) and aluminium oxide (Al2O3) of 30 and 
20 nm, respectively, induced a very striking 
inflammatory reaction in the lung of rats compared 
to larger particles of 250 and 500 nm. Two years 
later Oberdorster et al. (1992) reported that the 
crystallinity of TiO2 nanoparticles influenced their 
toxicity and that surface area was a better descriptor 
than mass for the adverse effects observed in rats. 
Donaldson et al. (2002) have since observed a 
similar correlation for carbon black, when studying 
the ability of nano and micron particles to cause 
inflammatory effects in rats. Warheit et al. (2006) 
and Sayes et al. (2007), however, did not observe 
any correlation with surface area when evaluating 
biological response in rats after exposure to 
nano-sized TiO2, SiO2 and other particles. 
One study has found a statistically significant 
increase in malignant lung tumours in rats 
following chronic inhalation of nano-sized TiO2 
(Heinrich et al., 1995) and, on the basis of this study, 
NIOSH (2011) has determined that ultrafine TiO2 
should be considered a potential occupational 
carcinogen. NIOSH further concluded that TiO2 
is not a direct-acting carcinogen, but acts through 
a secondary genotoxicity mechanism that is not 
specific to TiO2 but primarily related to particle 
size and surface area and surface area was found 
to be the critical metric for occupational inhalation 
exposure to TiO2.
Visual similarities between carbon nanotubes 
(CNTs) and asbestos fibres have led to others raising 
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concerns about them having the same hazardous 
properties (Huczko et al., 2001; Warheit, 2009). In 
2004 Lam et al. (2004) published a study in which 
they exposed mice to a number of single-walled 
CNTs of different purity and found that all 
nanotubes induced dose-dependent granulomas 
and interstitial inflammation in the lungs. The 
results presented by Lam and co-workers were 
supported by observations by Warheit et al. (2004) 
who also observed pulmonary granulomas in rats 
after exposure to single-walled CNT soot. However, 
in contrast to Lam et al., the effects observed by 
Warheit et al. (2004) were not dose-dependent. 
Absence of pulmonary biomarkers suggests a 
potentially new mechanism of pulmonary toxicity 
and induced injury (Warheit et al., 2004). More 
recently, Poland et al. (2008) compared the toxicity 
of four kinds of multi-walled carbon nanotubes 
(MWCNTs) of various diameters, lengths, shape and 
chemical composition by exposing the mesothelial 
lining of the body cavity of three mice to 50 mg 
MWCNT for 24 hours or 7 days. This method was 
used as a surrogate for the mesothelial lining of 
the chest cavity. They found that long MWCNTs 
produced length dependent inflammation, 
foreign body giant cells and granulomas that were 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the 
foreign body inflammatory response caused by long 
asbestos. Only the long MWCNTs caused significant 
increase in polymorphonuclear leukocytes or 
protein exudation. The short MWCNTs failed to 
cause any significant inflammation at 1 day or 
giant cell formation at 7 days. The finding that the 
length of CNTs affects their biological activity is 
supported by findings by Takagi et al. (2008) and 
Muller et al. (2009). Poland et al. (2008) also found 
that water-soluble components of MWCNTs did not 
produce significant inflammatory effects 24 hours 
after injection, which rules out the concern that 
residue metals were the cause of the observed 
effects, an association that other researchers had 
previously hypothesised on the basis of in vitro 
studies (Shvedova et al., 2005; Kagan et al., 2006).
Most studies of CNTs have used intra-tracheal 
or intra-peritoneal administration. Intra-tracheal 
and intra-peritoneal instillation bypasses upper 
respiratory tract defences and does not deposit 
particles evenly in the lung in a manner similar 
to inhalation. This has historically led to the 
biological relevance of such studies being 
questioned (Oiser et al., 1997). Recently, however, 
a number of nose-only inhalation studies on 
CNTs have been published in peer-reviewed 
journals by industry (BASF, Nanocyl and Bayer) 
that support previous findings such as Ellinger-
Ziegelbauer and Pauluhn (2009), Ma-Hock et al. 
(2009) and Pauluhn (2010). For example, in a 90-day 
nose-only inhalation toxicity study of MWCNTs, 
Ma-Hock et al. (2009) found that the incidence 
and severity of granulomatous inflammation of 
the lung and the lung-draining lymph nodes were 
concentration-dependent, something which has 
previously been demonstrated for intra-tracheally 
instilled single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWCNTs) 
(Lam et al., 2004) and MWCNTs (Muller et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, exposure via inhalation revealed 
inflammation in the nasal cavity, larynx and trachea, 
where the particles are deposited during inhalation, 
as well as alveolar lipoproteinosis. This had not been 
observed using intra-tracheal or intra-peritoneal 
administration (Ma-Hock et al., 2009).
In addition to CNTs, substantial concerns have 
been raised over the use of nanometre-scale silver 
particles, or nanosilver, especially in regard to its 
widespread prevalence in everyday consumer 
products. Nanosilver is reportedly one of the most 
widely used nanomaterials in consumer products 
today (PEN, 2011), and the antibacterial properties 
of nanosilver have been exploited in a very diverse 
set of products and applications. These include 
dietary supplements, personal-care products, 
powdered colours, varnish, textile, paper, interior 
and exterior paints, printing colours, water and air 
purification, polymer-based products and foils for 
antibacterial protection such as washing machines, 
kitchenware and food storage (PEN, 2011). The 
scale of use is currently unknown as there are no 
labelling requirements for nanoproducts, and the 
concentrations used are also unknown for most of 
the products on the market (Boxall et al., 2008).
Many applications involving nanosilver involve direct 
exposure of the substance to humans. This has raised 
concern about the potential human health effect of 
the material. The potential health and environmental 
impacts of nanosilver have been subject to many 
reviews (Luoma, 2008; Aitken et al., 2009; Wijnhoven 
et al., 2009; Pronk et al., 2009; Stone et al., 2010, 
Christensen et al., 2010; Mikkelsen et al., 2011). The 
toxicity of silver metal is generally considered to be 
relatively low (Wijnhoven et al., 2009). At very high 
concentrations, repeated ingestion or inhalation of 
colloidal silver has been found to lead to deposition 
of silver metal/silver sulphide particles in the skin, 
eye and other organs, leading to blue or bluish-grey 
discolouration of the skin. Although cosmetically 
undesirable and irreversible, the condition — known 
as argyria — is not life threatening. It has been 
shown that silver from nanoparticles can enter the 
body via oral and inhalation routes and that silver 
is absorbed and distributed to target organs such as 
the liver, olfactory bulb, lungs, skin, brain, kidneys 
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and testes (Sung et al., 2008 and 2009; Kim et al., 
2008). The form in which the silver is transmitted 
through and accumulated within the body is however 
unclear, i.e. whether it is present as particles, ions or 
complexes (Mikkelsen et al., 2011). Nanosilver has 
been associated with inflammation as well as slight 
liver damage in mice after oral exposure (Cha et al., 
2008; Kim et al., 2008). Prolonged exposure to 
nanosilver particles via inhalation has been found to 
produce an inflammatory response in the lungs of 
rats, as well as inducing alterations in lung function 
(Sung et al., 2008). 
A number of in vitro studies have found that the 
toxicity of nanosilver is mediated by an increase 
in the production of reactive oxygen species, 
stimulating inflammation and subsequent cell 
death. The relevance of this is unclear and subject 
to scientific investigation (Stone et al., 2010; 
Christensen et al., 2010; Mikkelsen et al., 2011). In an 
extensive review of risk assessments of nanosilver, 
Wijnhoven et al. (2009) concluded that the number 
of well-controlled studies on the potential toxicities 
of nanosilver as well as current knowledge of the 
kinetics of nanosilver is too limited to provide a 
proper foundation for human risk assessment.
With regard to environmental organisms, concerns 
have been raised by the expected increased 
emissions and toxicity of nanoscale materials 
compared to bulk forms of the same material. In 
this respect, silver nanoparticles may serve as an 
example since the substance is being used in an 
increasing number of consumer products because 
of its antibacterial properties. Silver is known to be 
ecotoxic. However the toxicity is highly dependent 
on the form and speciation of the metal. In the 
registration of silver under REACH (Registration, 
Evaluation and Authorisation of CHemicals) 
(Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006), predicted 
no-effect concentrations (PNECs) are reported 
as 0.04 µg/L (micrograms per litre) (freshwater), 
0.86 mg/L (marine water) and 0.025 mg/L (sewage 
treatment plants) (ECHA, 2011). Toxicity tests using 
silver nanoparticles also reveal very-low-effect 
concentrations. For freshwater algae EC50-values 
as low as 4 µg/L have been found, and values far 
below 1 mg/L have been reported for crustaceans 
(Navarro et al., 2008; Griffitt et al., 2008). EC50 
is the maximum concentration that induces a 
response halfway. Inhibition of nitrifying bacteria 
can occur at concentrations below 1 mg/L (Hu, 2010) 
and the function of wastewater treatment plants 
may therefore be affected by the presence of 
silver nanoparticles. For ionic silver it is known 
that the speciation in aqueous media determines 
bioavailability and toxicity. This is likely also to 
be the case for elemental silver nanoparticles, but 
the influence of speciation on uptake, depuration 
and toxicity has yet to be studied in depth. The 
environmental concentrations resulting from the use 
of nanosilver in consumer products are at present 
uncertain, although a number of different estimates 
have been made (e.g. Mueller and Nowack, 2008; 
Gottschalk et al., 2010). Where silver nanoparticles 
are incorporated in textiles, they can be released 
during washing (Benn et al., 2010). Resulting 
environmental concentrations in the low ng/L range 
have been proposed by Gottschalk et al. (2010). It 
remains uncertain whether silver nanoparticles 
are more toxic than their bulk counterpart or ionic 
silver, since the effects can in many cases be ascribed 
to the ionic form of silver (Ag+). Some studies have 
documented a more pronounced effect associated 
with nanosilver (e.g. Navarro et al., 2008), but the 
data so far are not conclusive.
After reviewing the current level of scientific 
knowledge of nanosilver, Aitken et al. (2009) stated 
that there is: 
…indicative evidence of the harm of silver 
nanoparticles at low concentrations on 
aquatic invertebrates, which suggests that the 
environmental release of silver nanoparticles 
will be detrimental for the environment 
and that any industry/institute using silver 
nanoparticles should consider taking the 
necessary steps to reduce or eliminate the 
potential exposure of the environment to these 
nanoparticles.
The authors further stated that there is insufficient 
evidence to make a risk assessment feasible for 
nanosilver. They did however go on to state …
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that silver 
nanoparticles may be harmful to the environment 
and therefore the use of the precautionary principle 
should be considered in this case (Aitken et al., 
2009).
Although preliminary, these studies on the 
nanoforms of TiO2 and silver as well as carbon 
nanotubes are indicative of wider concerns that 
materials intentionally designed and engineered 
at the nanoscale to exhibit novel properties may 
also pose emergent risks. They therefore arguably 
trigger indicators of early warnings regarding the 
potential impacts of engineered nanomaterials, and 
as a consequence have led to increased attention and 
funding on various aspects of nanotechnological 
health and environmental risks (Hankin et al., 2011; 
Aitken et al., 2011; National Academy of Sciences, 
2012). 
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22�5 Current (lack of nano-specific) 
regulation for nanomaterials
Whereas there has been some government funding 
of environmental, health and safety research into 
the potential adverse effect of nanotechnology and 
nanomaterials, there has been limited action from 
regulatory decision-makers towards changing 
existing technology-neutral regulation to take the 
unique properties of these materials into account. 
This is not surprising given the current state of 
scientific understanding of nanomaterial hazards 
and risks. Nor is this lag in regulatory response 
unique to nanotechnologies. As observed by Ludlow 
et al. (2009), the emergence of a new technology is, 
for example, likely to be perceived as a period of 
under-regulation in which the development of a 
specific regulatory response will occur subsequent to 
an initial period of research and development (R&D) 
and commercialisation. It must also be remembered 
that the regulatory frameworks under which 
nanomaterials currently fall are in any case not 
perfect, with many current regimes outdated and 
needing to be overhauled. Such recasts were needed 
prior to the commercialisation of nanotechnology 
and in many respects nanomaterials highlight many 
of the deficiencies that have existed for some time. 
In an effort to elicit information regarding the types 
of nanomaterials being produced and imported into 
their jurisdictions, some governments, for example 
in the United Kingdom, USA and Australia, have 
implemented voluntary reporting schemes for 
nanomaterials (see, for example, DEFRA, 2006a 
and 2006b; US EPA, 2007; Weiss, 2005; NICNAS, 
2008). Voluntary in nature, and somewhat onerous 
in operation, the schemes can be described as at 
best underwhelming. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) received a total 
of 13 submissions over the life of the programme 
(2 years). The US scheme, which ended in 2009, 
fared a little better with the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) receiving submissions from 
a total of 31 organisations (DEFRA, 2008; Hansen, 
2009; Maynard and Rejeski, 2009). Given the lack 
of buy-in from stakeholders, it is not surprising 
that other jurisdictions, including France and 
California, have focused their efforts on mandatory 
nanomaterial reporting schemes. 
Nanomaterials which are defined as chemical 
substances are regulated by the EPA under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) (US EPA, 2009a; 
Breggin et al., 2009). Pursuant to the TSCA, chemical 
substances are typically regulated on the basis of 
their Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number; 
this system differentiates chemicals on the basis of 
their novel molecular structure and not their size. 
Silver, for example, is an existing chemical under the 
TSCA with its own unique CAS number. The TSCA 
Inventory is not able to differentiate nanosilver 
from bulk silver under the current framework, as 
the nanoscale and bulk versions of the substances 
both have the same CAS number. This approach 
ignores evidence that size and shape often lead to 
nanomaterials behaving in substantially different 
ways from their bulk counterparts. In the case 
of nano-silver, this failure to trigger regulatory 
oversight for the nanoscale substance has already 
raised considerable debate among various 
stakeholders, including those within the scientific 
community, due to its increasingly widespread use 
in consumer products (see, for example, Chen and 
Schluesener, 2008; Wijnhoven et al., 2009). 
It is important, however, to note that the approach 
adopted under the TSCA is not unique, with chemical 
substances traditionally regulated on the basis of 
being existing or new based on their CAS number 
in most jurisdictions. At this stage, the majority of 
nanoscale substances are considered to be existing 
chemical substances under these frameworks.
One approach that the EPA has implemented in 
order to gather additional data on existing chemicals 
manufactured at the nansocale is through the use of 
its significant new use rule (SNUR). As explained by 
Widmer and Maili (2010), Section 5(a)(2) of the TSCA 
provides the EPA with the regulatory authority to 
request addition information on existing chemicals 
for the purpose of regulatory review where the 
proposed use of the chemical has significantly 
changed since it was initially reviewed. This 
regulatory tool has so far been employed for several 
types of nanomaterials, including single-walled and 
multi-walled CNTs. The EPA has proposed a more 
encompassing SNUR that would require companies 
that intend to manufacture, import or process new 
nanoscale materials based on chemical substances 
listed on the TSCA Inventory to submit a significant 
new use notice (SNUN) to the EPA at least 90 days in 
advance (Matus et al., 2011).
Even if a nanomaterial has a novel molecular 
structure, the US EPA must show that it may 
pose an unreasonable risk of significant exposure 
before manufacturers are required to undertake 
environmental, health and safety testing. These 
are just the data the agency needs to determine 
whether the substance poses an unreasonable risk 
— a classic regulatory paradox. Nonetheless, the 
EPA has proposed a data collection rule that would 
require the submission of certain existing data 
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on nanomaterials, including production volume, 
methods of manufacture and processing, exposure 
and release information, and available health and 
safety data. Despite these limitations and some 
recent moves towards reform of the TSCA, actual 
amendments have yet to be implemented (Davies, 
2006 and 2009; US EPA, 2009b; Breggin et al., 2009). 
A December 2011, EPA Office of the Inspector 
General report (EPA OIG, 2011) found several 
limitations in the EPAs evaluation and management 
of engineered nanomaterials, including:
•  Program offices do not have a formal process to 
coordinate the dissemination and utilisation of 
the potentially mandated information; 
•  EPA is not communicating an overall message to 
external stakeholders regarding policy changes 
and the risks of nanomaterials; 
•  EPA proposes to regulate nanomaterials 
as chemicals and its success in managing 
nanomaterials will be linked to the existing 
limitations of those applicable statutes;
•  EPAs management of nanomaterials is limited 
by lack of risk information and reliance on 
industry-submitted data. 
The Office of the Inspector General concluded that: 
'these issues present significant barriers to 
effective nanomaterial management when 
combined with existing resource challenges. 
If EPA does not improve its internal processes 
and develop a clear and consistent stakeholder 
communication process, the Agency will not 
be able to assure that it is effectively managing 
nanomaterial risks.'
The EUs approach towards ensuring adequate 
protection of human health and the environment 
also relies heavily on chemical legislation, in 
particular the REACH Regulation, which was 
adopted by the Council and Parliament in 2006 and 
has been implemented progressively within the 
EU since 2007 (EP and CEU, 2006). As articulated in 
Article 1 of REACH, the purpose of the scheme is 
to ensure a high level of protection of human health 
and the environment. To fulfil this overarching 
objective, the regulation has expressly incorporated 
the precautionary principle into its text and sets out 
a no data, no market requirement under Article 5. 
Pursuant to this Article, REACH prohibits the 
manufacture or sale of any substance in the EU that 
has not been registered with the European Chemical 
Agency in accordance with the regulation. In this 
respect, REACH applies uniformly to existing 
and new chemicals, thus overcoming some of the 
difficulties associated with systems analogous to the 
TSCA.
As with the US system, however, REACH relies on 
the CAS identification system for the registration 
of chemical substances. One of the limitations of 
REACH yet to be addressed is related to whether 
a nano-equivalent of a substance with different 
physico-chemical and (eco)toxicological properties 
from the bulk substance would be considered as the 
same or different from the bulk substance under 
REACH. The regulation requires that a registration 
dossier be submitted to the European Chemical 
Agency containing information about manufacture 
and uses, classification and labelling, and guidance 
for safe use. If a nanomaterial is considered to 
be different from its bulk equivalent, hazard 
information has to be generated for this registration 
dossier if more than 1 tonne/year is produced. On 
the other hand, if the nanomaterial is considered 
to be the same as a registered bulk material, the 
appropriateness of the hazard information data 
submitted in the registration dossier is open to 
discussion (Chaundry et al., 2006; Breggin et al., 
2009; Milieu and RPA, 2009). To date, the only 
amendment has been to annul the exemption status 
of carbon and graphite under REACH (CEC, 2008a; 
Breggin et al., 2009; Milieu and RPA, 2009).
It has recently been reported that companies 
have set up two different data-gathering groups 
on carbon nanotubes — one group of companies 
considers them as new substances while the other, 
including global chemical producing companies 
such as Arkema and Bayer, consider them as bulk 
graphite (Milmo, 2009). This example shows that 
whether nanomaterials are to be considered new or 
not is not just a theoretical question, but a source 
of confusion among regulated parties. Clearer 
guidance is expected on the issue from the European 
Commission as a result of the review of REACH in 
2012. 
If nanomaterials are considered to be different from 
their bulk counterpart, and if they are produced 
or imported in quantities of more than 10 tonnes, 
companies have to complete a chemical safety 
assessment. Companies are urged to use existing 
guidelines, however both the Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC, 2008a) and SCENIHR 
(2007) and others have pointed out that current 
test guidelines that support REACH are based on 
conventional methodologies for assessing chemical 
risks and may not be appropriate for assessing risks 
associated with nanomaterials. This means that, 
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although manufacturers and importers might be 
required to provide a chemical safety assessment, 
they cannot rely on the toxicological profile of the 
equivalent bulk material and cannot use existing test 
and risk assessment guidelines since these might 
not provide any meaningful results or be practically 
applicable, because of the limitations of conventional 
methods (Hansen, 2009; Milmo, 2009).
Pursuant to the text of the regulation, REACH is 
to be reviewed in 2012. It is generally expected 
that the revisions will include provisions related 
to nanomaterials. This is not surprising given 
the last-minute attempts to specifically include 
nanomaterials in the text of REACH during the 
second reading speech in 2006 (Bowman and 
van Calster, 2007). However, how REACH can be 
modified to expressly regulate nanomaterials — and 
the extent thereof — is still up for debate among 
politicians, regulators and stakeholders in the EU. 
Expressly differentiating nanomaterials from their 
bulk equivalents in legislation is not new to the 
European Parliament and Council, as highlighted 
by the recent recast of the regulatory regime for 
cosmetics. While this recast was not initiated in 
response to the increasing use of nanomaterials 
in cosmetic products — but rather to increase 
transparency and streamline human safety 
requirements — considerable debate centred on the 
issue of nanomaterials (Bowman et al., 2010). 
The Cosmetic Regulation, adopted in 2009, requires 
that all cosmetics that contain nanomaterials — 
which are defined as an insoluble or bio-persistent 
and intentionally manufactured material with one or 
more external dimensions, or an internal structure, 
on the scale from 1 to 100 nm (Article 2(k)) — be 
labelled. This will be done by placing the word 
nano in brackets after the nanoscale ingredient 
(Article 19(1)(g)) and will come into effect in 2012. 
As observed by Bowman et al. (2010), the regulation 
does not set a minimum threshold for this labelling 
requirement, which suggests that the mere presence 
of any nanoparticles in the cosmetic will be enough 
to trigger this requirement.
In addition to the labelling requirements, producers 
will have to provide a safety assessment of the 
nanomaterial used (European Parliament, 2009). The 
regulation also requires the European Commission 
to create a publicly available catalogue of all 
nanomaterials used in cosmetic products placed 
on the market … and the reasonably foreseeable 
exposure conditions (Article 16(10)(a)). Titanium 
dioxide, zinc oxide and lipid-based nanocapsules 
are examples of materials used in cosmetics such 
as sunscreens and moisturisers, while it has been 
reported that fullerenes have been used in a small 
number of facial creams (PEN, 2011).
Although the recast of the Cosmetic Regulation 
could be interpreted as a successful political effort to 
address the potential risk and transparency concerns 
relating to the use of nanomaterials in such consumer 
products, recent controversies surrounding the 
recast of the EU Novel Foods Regulation is evidence 
of the challenges that lie ahead for implementing 
future nano-specific revisions to existing legislation 
such as REACH. In regard to the EU Novel Foods 
Regulation, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union recently failed to 
reach an agreement about changes to the instrument 
that would have ensured that the regulation 
includes foods modified by new production 
processes such as nanotechnology. 
In its current form, the EU Novel Foods Regulation 
requires pre-market approval of all new food 
ingredients and products as well as safety 
assessments by European Food Safety Authorities 
on the composition, nutritional value, metabolism, 
intended use and level of microbiological and 
chemical contaminants. Studies on the toxicology, 
allergenicity and details of the manufacturing 
process may also be considered. Had the proposed 
revisions been adopted, such information relating 
to nanomaterials might have assisted in addressing 
current concerns surrounding their use in such 
applications in relation to nanoparticles (CEC, 
2008b; Chaudhry et al., 2012). 
The failure of the political parties to reach 
a compromise in regard to the Novel Foods 
Regulation should act as a warning sign of what to 
expect in regard to the likely negotiations around 
revisions to REACH, in which the stakes appear to 
be significantly higher for many parties. There is, we 
would argue, the potential for nanomaterials to be 
overlooked in the 2012 REACH revision discussion, 
with attention focusing instead on the myriad of 
other issues in play, including increasing dossier 
quality, limiting registration bureaucracy and 
lessening the impact of the regulation on small to 
medium enterprises.
Many of these issues are so controversial that the 
EU Commission is trying to downplay expectations 
for the 2012 REACH revision, arguing that no 
fundamental overhaul should be expected (EurActiv, 
2011). In regard to nanomaterials, such efforts to 
maintain the status quo are worrying given the 
rapidly increasing evidence of risks as well as the 
swift growth of production and commercialisation 
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of nanomaterials and products. Such political 
statements are further worrying given the fact that 
the next formal REACH revision with relevance 
for nanomaterials is not scheduled before 2019 
(EP and CEU, 2006). Substantial time is being wasted 
and effective regulation of nanomaterials is being 
pushed even further into the future although it is 
clear that immediate revisions are needed to address 
the most obvious and short-term limitations of the 
current legislative framework. 
Against this background of legislative reform and 
associated debates, a number of other policy-related 
activities have occurred within the EU that have the 
potential to impact on the longer-term regulatory 
approach in relation to nanomaterials. For example, 
in 2009 the European Parliaments Environment 
Committee adopted a report on regulation of 
nanomaterials in general which calls for application 
of the no data, no market principle (as already 
incorporated in REACH) until safety assessments 
can be made (Schylter, 2009). While the fate of the 
proposal to implement this principle is unclear, it 
would appear to put additional pressure on the 
European Commission and the Council to address 
the potential risks of nanomaterials in the short to 
medium term.
Of arguably greater significance is the October 
2011 recommendation of a definition of the term 
nanomaterial by the European Commission 
specifically for legislative, policy and research 
purposes. As set out in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (2011), a nanomaterial means: 
'… a natural, incidental or manufactured 
material containing particles, in an unbound 
state or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate 
and where, for 50 % or more of the particles 
in the number size distribution, one or more 
external dimensions is in the size range 
1 nm-100 nm. 
In specific cases and where warranted by 
concerns for the environment, health, safety or 
competitiveness the number size distribution 
threshold of 50 % may be replaced by a 
threshold between 1 and 50 %.'
This definition differs considerably from the 
one in the Cosmetic Regulation (as articulated 
above) and was mooted in relation to the recast 
of the Novel Foods Regulation. It is therefore 
not surprising that this recommendation for a 
definition has not been without considerable 
controversy and global debate. According to 
Maynard (2011), the Commissions push for a one 
size fits all policy-based definition has the potential 
to sideline the science and may fail to capture what 
is important for addressing risk. Others within 
the scientific community have similarly expressed 
concern about the fact that the definition fails 
to take into account the key physico-chemical 
characteristics associated with potential risks 
(see, for example, ChemSec, 2011). In response to 
such criticisms, Hermann Stamm of the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for 
Health and Consumer Protection has contended 
…such a definition is urgently needed, especially 
for particulate nanomaterials. The aim should be 
to identify a general class of materials for attention 
— whether they are benign or hazardous (Stamm, 
2011). It would seem that both camps have valid 
points; it is important that the crafting of such a 
definition does not act as a barrier to the effective 
regulation of nanomaterials.
The fact that existing legislation may have 
serious shortcomings when it comes to effectively 
regulating nanomaterials is not a new revelation. 
Government and independent reviews of 
the current regulatory frameworks and their 
applicability to nanotechnologies have now been 
published (see, for example, Chaudhry et al., 
2006; Ludlow et al., 2007; European Commission, 
2008). While the reports have varied in scope, 
method and the instruments that they have 
sought to evaluate, each has concluded that 
nanomaterials are currently captured under the 
existing regimes. However, the failure of such 
instruments to differentiate between nano-based 
products and their conventional counterparts 
has raised a number of concerns regarding the 
ongoing effectiveness of these regimes. A number 
of cross-cutting issues that appear to be common 
to most jurisdictions have now been examined 
through these reviews. The main areas of concern 
include that, as discussed above, the regimes do not 
differentiate between novel and known substances 
for the purposes of triggering regulatory oversight; 
that requirements for regulators to undertake 
safety evaluations on novel substances are 
triggered by mass or volume thresholds that are 
not tailored to the current production volumes 
of nanoscale materials; the lack of trust in the 
appropriateness of conventional risk assessment 
protocols and technical guidelines; and that risk 
thresholds and exposure limits established with 
existing methodologies are questionable (Ludlow 
et al., 2007; Baun et al., 2009). 
In most countries, nanomaterials are still being 
treated within existing regulatory frameworks, 
under which the nanomaterials have inherited 
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the scope and features of the previous analogous 
regime (Stokes and Bowman, 2012). At this stage 
of development and commercialisation, countries 
such as the US, Australia, China and India, as well 
as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the EU, are proposing 
to treat nanomaterials primarily in the same 
manner as their conventional chemical counterparts 
(CEC, 2008; US EPA, 2007 and 2009b; OECD, 2009a 
and 2009b). In doing so, they have opted to retain 
the regulatory status quo despite the growing body 
of literature that suggests that some nanomaterials 
may cause harm to human and/or environmental 
health. This approach is not surprising given the 
current knowledge deficits in the evolving state 
of the scientific art and a general lack of express 
reliance on the precautionary principle in most 
jurisdictions. 
Australia is one country that has explicitly moved 
to differentiate the requirements for some new 
industrial nanoscale chemicals. Recent administrative 
changes to its National Industrial Chemicals 
Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS) 
(which may be considered analogous to the TSCA), 
which came into effect in January 2011, have sought 
to remove several of the low-volume/low-concentrate 
exemptions that usually apply to new industrial 
chemicals (NICNAS, 2010). While minor and 
incremental in nature, such a shift is indicative of how 
some countries may attempt to tweak their regulatory 
frameworks in the first instance rather than move 
towards more wholesale changes.
A number of features related to engineered 
nanomaterials indicate that the identification of 
hazards may deviate from what is known about 
regular chemicals. While our current approach 
to toxicity-driven risk is based on the paradigm 
attributed to Parcelsus, that it is the dose that makes 
the poison, and most extrapolations from toxicity 
tests assume that there is a correlation between mass 
and toxicity, this may not hold true for engineered 
nanoparticles (Baun and Hansen, 2008). As pointed 
out in a number of studies, other properties such as 
surface area and surface chemistry may be better 
indicators of the toxicity of some nanoparticles. This 
raises the question of how to determine the relevant 
exposure concentrations in laboratory studies and 
in occupational and environmental settings. In 
response to this concern, SCENIHR has stated that 
amendments have to be made to the existing technical 
guideline for risk assessment of chemicals since: due 
to the physico-chemical properties of nanoparticles, 
their behaviour and their potential adverse effects 
are not solely dependent on exposure in terms of the 
mass concentration … (SCENIHR, 2007). 
Another issue that makes engineered nanomaterials, 
especially nanoparticles, different from conventional 
industrial chemicals is their ability to agglomerate 
(form clusters of weakly bound particles) or 
aggregate (form clusters of strongly bound particles) 
into stable particles. Aggregated particles are 
generally considered to be less prone to biological 
uptake, however it is not correct to assume that 
they are inherently safe. While the aggregation 
and agglomeration behaviour of engineered 
nanoparticles is only partly understood, it is known 
that their formation is concentration-dependent 
and that smaller aggregates/agglomerates may 
be formed at lower initial concentrations. If 
toxicity is inversely associated with aggregation/
agglomeration size, our traditional understanding of 
concentration-response relationships may have to be 
altered for nanoparticles since higher concentrations 
may not necessarily result in higher toxicity. 
Furthermore, it is not known whether larger benign 
agglomerates may be broken down after inhalation 
or ingestion, resulting in smaller, and perhaps 
less benign, agglomerates or single particles. For 
these reasons the statement that lower exposure 
equals lower effects should be seriously scrutinised 
before it can be considered valid for engineered 
nanoparticles (Baun and Hansen, 2008; Baun et al., 
2009).
In environmental hazard identification it is not 
only the toxicity, but also the degradability and 
potential for bioaccumulation that are used as 
parameters to identify chemical compounds that 
are environmentally hazardous. Very few studies 
have addressed these two parameters for engineered 
nanomaterials (Stone et al., 2010; Mikkelsen et al., 
2011) and, as described above, serious concerns 
have been raised about whether the knowledge 
built up for regular chemicals can be transferred 
to nanoparticles. This led the SCENIHR (2007) to 
conclude that: The criteria used for persistence, 
bioaccumulation and toxicity (PBT) assessment 
applied for substances in soluble form should be 
assessed for applicability to nanoparticles. 
Finally, in order to take the unique properties of any 
type of nanoparticles into consideration, it has often 
been argued that risk assessments of nanoparticles 
need to be completed on a case-by-case basis 
(see for example, SCENIHR, 2007 and 2009; Stone 
et al., 2010). Past experiences with case-by-case 
risk assessment of regular chemicals indicates 
that such an approach can be very time- and 
resource-intensive even with well-defined data 
demands and hence one has to wonder whether 
this is the most appropriate approach when it 
comes to risk assessment of nanoparticles. The 
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situation for these is further complicated by the fact 
that the hazard characteristics will be linked not 
only to the chemical identity but also to a number 
of other characteristics and their combinations. For 
example, it has been claimed that there are up to 
50 000 potential combinations of single-walled carbon 
nanotubes (SWCNTs), depending on their structural 
type, length, surface coating, manufacturing 
processes and purification method (Schmidt, 2007). 
Each of these 50 000 SWCNTs may have different 
chemical, physical and biological properties that 
determine their overall hazard. Although not all of 
them are expected to be of commercial relevance, 
there are many kinds of nanoparticles, such as 
fullerenes, quantum dots, and metal and metal 
oxide nanoparticles, which imply a great complexity 
in performing case-by-case risk assessments for 
nanoparticles.
22�6 Late lessons from early warnings 
for nanotechnology
A comparison between the EEA recommendations 
made in 2001 and the current situation for 
nanotechnology shows that stakeholders are doing 
some things right, but we are still in danger of 
repeating old, and potentially costly, mistakes. In this 
section we briefly discuss the current development 
of regulation and environmental, health and safety 
research in view of the late lessons from early 
warnings learned by the EEA in 2001. 
22.6.1 Lessons 1–3: heed the 'warnings'
According to Late lessons from early warning Volume 1. 
'No matter how sophisticated knowledge is, it will 
always be subject to some degree of ignorance 
(i.e. inevitable surprises, or unpredicted effects). To 
be alert to — and humble about — the potential gaps 
in those bodies of knowledge that are included in our 
decision-making is fundamental' (EEA, 2001). 
Perhaps more than any preceding technology, the 
early development of nanotechnology has been 
characterised by discussions of potential risks and 
the need for regulatory reform (Grieger et al., 2009; 
Fiedler and Reynolds, 1994). Such discussions have 
always been an integral part of the government-led 
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the US, 
for example, while in the EU the landmark report 
published by the Royal Society & Royal Academy of 
Engineering (RS and RAE) in 2004 emphasised the 
need to address uncertainties regarding the risks of 
nanomaterials (RS and RAE, 2004). Levi-Faur and 
Comhanester (2007) have observed that unlike other 
cases where the discussion of the associated risks 
has followed the development of new technologies, 
the discussion on the proper regulatory framework 
for the governance of nanotechnology risks is 
accompanying the development of the technology 
and the associated products themselves. While 
hard government action may still be limited, we 
have however seen the emergence of a number 
of nano-specific self-regulatory activities within 
industry, including codes of conduct, guidance 
documents and risk assessment/management 
frameworks (Bowman and Hodge, 2009; Meili and 
Widmer, 2010). Voluntary in nature, they sit within 
the shadow of formal regulatory obligations and do 
not seek to usurp legislative requirements. 
Currently, most economies investing in 
nanotechnology season discussions about future 
directions in research with questions concerning 
potential risks and how to manage them. Yet despite 
some moves (for example, the funding of early 
investigations into environmental, health and safety 
risks) to respond to ignorance and uncertainty rather 
than simply discuss them, coordinated action seems 
slow to emerge. The EEA report recommends looking 
out for warning signs such as materials that are novel, 
bio-persistent, readily dispersed or bioaccumulative, 
and/or materials that lead to irreversible action 
(such as mesothelioma caused by the inhalation of 
asbestiform fibres).
These warning signs are clearly relevant to many 
nanomaterials, some of which have novel properties, 
may be capable of being incorporated in highly 
diverse products, may be transported to places in the 
human body in new ways, such as across the blood, 
brain or placental barriers, and may be designed to 
be persistent. Too little is known at this early stage 
of the technologys development trajectory to predict 
the environmental fate of many nanomaterials, 
and appropriate documentation of environmental 
dispersion through monitoring is not expected in the 
short term (SCENIHR, 2007). The extent to which 
specific nanomaterials are bioaccumulative or lead 
to irreversible impact is largely unknown, but the 
current state of knowledge suggest that the potential 
exists for such behaviour under some circumstances 
(Moore, 2006; Stone et al., 2011; Mikkelsen et al., 2011) 
(see Box 22.1 on how EEAs warning signs apply to 
C60 and CNTs).
The global response to these warning signs may 
be described, at least in our view, as patchy at best, 
with governments being slow, and sometimes 
complacent, regarding the need to gather essential 
data, for example on production, use patterns and the 
effectiveness of current types of personal protection 
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equipment (see Section 22.5 on the current regulation 
of nanomaterials). Saying this, it is important to 
acknowledge that efforts to date have been better 
than those seen in response to the emergence of 
earlier technologies, but they are still far from ideal.
A number of reports have made specific 
recommendations on developing responsive research 
strategies (see for instance Oberdorster et al., 2005b; 
Maynard et al., 2006; Tsuji et al., 2006; SCENIHR, 
2006; National Academy of Sciences, 2012). For 
example Maynard et al. (2006) called for: 
•  the development of strategic programmes that 
enable relevant risk-focused research, within the 
next 12 months;
•  the development of instruments to assess 
exposure to engineered nanomaterials, within the 
next 3–10 years;
•  the development of robust systems for evaluating 
the health and environmental impact of 
engineered nanomaterials over their entire life, 
within the next 5 years;
•  the development and validation of methods to 
evaluate the toxicity of engineered nanomaterials, 
within the next 5–15 years; 
•  the development of models for predicting the 
potential impact of engineered nanomaterials on 
the environment and human health, within the 
next 10 years. 
Calls for research proposals in the European seventh 
framework programme reflect some of these 
recommendations, and a number of countries are 
beginning to develop integrated environment, health 
and safety (EHS) research programmes, such as the 
cross-agency risk-research strategy published by the 
NNI (2008). However, there are still critical gaps in 
our knowledge that need to be addressed in EHS 
research programmes. These include, but are not 
limited to, epidemiological investigation of exposed 
populations; the behaviour and impact of ingested 
nanomaterials; investigation of the fate, behaviour 
and (eco)toxicity of nanomaterials throughout the 
life cycle; and interactions between nanomaterials 
and environmental matrices such as natural organic 
matter and sediments and other pollutants already 
present in the environment (Maynard 2006; Baun 
et al., 2008; Grieger et al., 2009; National Academy of 
Sciences, 2012). 
Research strategies that target recognised areas of 
uncertainty (including the applicability of current 
testing procedures and equipment, how to assess 
human and environmental effects, and how to 
do exposure assessments and characterisation of 
nanomaterials) should be relatively easy to develop, 
as the critical questions to be addressed are generally 
agreed (Maynard et al., 2006; Grieger et al., 2009). 
But the EEA report highlights the dangers of entirely 
missing important areas because the right questions 
have not been identified, leading to blind spots in 
our understanding. The report cites the widespread 
use of anti-microbials as growth promoters in 
food animals, methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) and 
tributyltin as three examples where conventional 
thinking led to inappropriate assumptions and a 
lack of recognition of broader issues. At present it is 
not clear whether the recognition of ignorance in the 
field of nanomaterial-related EHS risks is sufficient 
to avoid blind spots, or whether the novel properties 
of nanomaterials inherently will generate blind spots 
because of their novelty (see Box 22.1). 
22.6.2 Lessons 4 and 11: reduce obstacles to action
Even when research throws up useful information, 
it may be ignored and overlooked through what the 
EEA authors call institutional ignorance. They cite 
cases where regulators have made inappropriate 
appraisals because of the blinkers imposed by their 
specific disciplines — such as the preoccupation of 
medical clinicians with acute effects when dealing 
with radiation and asbestos. There is a real danger 
of similar errors being made with nanotechnology, 
which crosses many fields of expertise. One needs 
to draw on physics, chemistry, computer sciences, 
health, environmental sciences and law to understand 
nanomaterial properties and risks (Karn et al., 
2003). A number of multidisciplinary centres for 
nanoscience and nanomanufacturing have been 
established around the world, but only a few of 
these address health, environmental and social 
aspects. It is critical to set aside resources to create 
an infrastructure that gets people working together 
across disciplines (Lynch, 2006).
Interdisciplinary obstacles also affect regulatory 
oversight in decision-making (EEA, 2001). In a 
discussion on how nanomaterials were covered under 
the TSCA, the US EPA appeared to be constrained 
by a world-view rooted in chemistry, stating that the 
sole factor that determines whether a nanomaterial is 
legally classified as new depends on whether it has a 
unique molecular identity (US EPA, 2007). However, 
it is now clear that characteristics other than 
molecular identity — such as particle size and shape 
— can affect exposure and response to engineered 
nanomaterials (SCENIHR, 2007). 
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Box 22�1 EEA's warning signs applied to fullerenes and carbon nanotubes
To acknowledge and respond to ignorance, i.e. potential risks that you do not know (EEA, 2001), seems 
almost impossible when it comes to a rapidly emerging technology such as nanotechnology. In cases of 
ignorance, the EEA recommends being proactive, alert and humble about the state of the scientific evidence 
indicating harm as well as looking for warning signs such as novelty, persistence, ready dispersion, 
bioaccumulation, leading to potentially irreversible action. These lessons bear an uncanny resemblance 
to many of the concerns now being raised about various forms of nanomaterials such as the two types of 
nanoparticles: C60-fullerenes and carbon nanotubes (CNTs). 
No single exhaustive taxonomy exists for novel materials and, as noted by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2008), it is unlikely that one is possible or even necessarily desirable. That 
said, one could argue that nanomaterials are novel by definition in the sense that many of the definitions 
of nanotechnology require either novel applications, whatever they might be, and/or that nanomaterials 
exhibit novel properties compared to bulk materials (see for example the definitions cited earlier in the 
chapter). In the following, C60 and CNT will be used as illustrative examples of nanomaterials that are 
novel in their use pattern and properties.
At present, very few studies have addressed the degradability of engineered C60 and CNT, but, because of 
their structure, they are expected to be persistent in the environment. Both C60 and CNT are often seen 
as anthropogenic, however they may also be formed in forest fires or volcanic eruptions. Although the 
sources of naturally occurring carbon-containing nanoparticles are different from the engineered ones, the 
particles are, from a chemical point of view, identical, and geological studies have shown that both C60 and 
CNT may be very resistant to degradation. Thus, Becker et al. (1994) observed C60 in 1.85 billion year-old 
shock-produced breccias of the Sudbury impact structure in Ontario, Canada and C60 has also been found 
in a 70 million-year-old fossil dinosaur eggshell from Xixia, China (Zhenxia et al., 1998). CNT and fullerenes 
have been extracted from 10 000-year-old ice-core melt samples (Murr et al., 2004). 
Whether C60 and CNT are readily dispersed depends on a number of factors such as the environmental 
compartment considered (e.g. air, water, soil). Little is known about the fate and transport of C60 and CNT 
in air and soil, but under laboratory conditions hydrophobic nanoparticles such as C60 and CNT have been 
found to aggregate rapidly (Fortner et al., 2005; Baun et al., 2008). As a result of sedimentation, they may 
therefore not be readily dispersed after emission to the aquatic environment. However, the dispersivity 
of nanomaterials can be altered, for example by changing the surface chemistry, and hydroxylated C60, 
for example, is much more soluble in water (Sayes et al., 2004). What happens in the environment, and 
how interaction with natural substances (e.g. humic substances) and water-living organisms influence 
dispersion, are however unclear (Roberts et al., 2007; Hansen et al., 2009). 
The potential bioaccumulation of nanomaterials is believed to depend on a combination of the specific 
properties of the nanomaterial (such as biodegradability, lipophilicity, aqueous solubility) that influence 
overall bioavailability. For example carbon nanotubes are known to be non-biodegradable, insoluble in water 
and lipophilic, which indicates that carbon nanotubes have a potential to bioaccumulate. However, there is a 
profound lack of studies addressing the issue of bioaccumulation of engineered nanomaterials (RCEP, 2008).
Because of the lack of scientific research, it is currently almost impossible to say whether or not the 
production and use of nanomaterials could lead to potentially irreversible action. Some studies have 
indicated that some CNTs might be able to cause effects that would be classified as irreversible (e.g. Poland 
et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007). Widespread production and use of C60 and CNT will inevitably lead to 
the release of these materials into the environment, and hence an irreversible action, as they would be 
practically impossible to locate and recover after release (Hansen et al., 2009). 
22.6.3 Lessons 5 and 8: stay in the real world
The EEA panel assertion from 2001 (EEA, 2001) that 
it is often assumed that technologies will perform to 
the specified standards. Yet real life practices can be 
far from ideal echoes claims made of nanotechnology. 
In 2006, Rick Weiss of the Washington Post visited a 
nanomaterial company expecting to see a high-tech 
work environment. Instead, he found the future 
looked a lot like the past with men in grease-stained 
blue coats […] story-tall spray-drying machines […] 
noisy milling operations and workers with face masks 
covered by a pale dust stemming from emptying 
buckets of freshly made powders (Weiss, 2006).
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It is often assumed that nanotechnology will be 
conducted with small quantities of material, within 
sealed processes. Reality can be very different 
and the past tells us that persistent substances 
used in closed settings or incorporated in solid 
matrices (like PCBs) will eventually end up in 
the environment. Moreover, there is evidence 
that the R&D community is entrenched in the 
philosophy that basic research will ultimately 
solve real-world problems through a one-way 
process of knowledge diffusion, and that they do 
not need to worry about EHS issues. A study by 
Powell (2007) found that many scientists who are 
developing new nanotechnologies do not think 
that nanotechnologies pose new or substantial risks 
and that concerns about risks are based on invalid 
science (Powell 2007). This is a mistake in our view, 
and there is plenty of historical evidence to support 
this view in the first EEA report Late lessons from 
early warnings (EEA, 2001), including the sorry tale 
of asbestos. Clearly, applied researchers and the 
EHS community need to be involved in informing 
policy decisions. According to the EEA, this includes 
making use of the information that workers and 
users can bring to the regulatory appraisal process, 
although such knowledge of course needs as much 
critical appraisal as specialist knowledge.
Nanotechnology is complex, and it can be argued 
that non-experts have little to contribute to its safe 
development and use currently. But non-specialists 
intimately involved with a technology can bring 
unique insight to the table since they may have some 
of the clearest ideas about what is important, what 
has the potential to work and what may not (Gavelin 
et al., 2007).
22.6.4 Lessons 6 and 9: consider wider issues
Concerns have often been raised that speculation 
on risks overshadows real benefits, or that an 
unbalanced promotion of possible benefits will 
prevent potential risks from being critically 
scrutinised. 
Nanotechnology is in such a position (Maynard 
et al., 2011). Pros include economic benefits, 
improved materials, reduced use of resources and 
new medical treatments (RS and RAE, 2004; Roco 
and Bainbridge, 2005), while cons mainly revolve 
around worker health, consumer exposure and 
environmental impacts. Comparisons have also been 
made between ultrafine particles in the atmosphere 
— which are known to cause health problems — and 
specific types of nanoparticles (RS and RAE, 2004, 
Oberdorster et al., 2005b; Maynard et al., 2006).
It is generally difficult to evaluate whether 
proclaimed pros and cons are valid both in 
the short and the long term. However, the 
process of determining more likely scenarios is 
vital to the future development of sustainable 
nanotechnologies. As we emerge from the first 
flush of nano-enthusiasm and begin the hard work 
of translating good ideas into viable products, this 
is a lesson that is more relevant than ever if an 
appropriate balance between benefits and risks is to 
be struck (Maynard et al., 2011).
If proclaimed pros do not materialise in the 
foreseeable future despite heavy public investments, 
or if projected cons are not investigated, but later 
prove to be significant, decision-making processes 
will be undermined, and public trust may be 
compromised.
A key feature of the public reaction to the emerging 
evidence for bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) in the late 1980s was the surprised revulsion 
that cows and other ruminants were being fed on 
offal and bodily wastes. The EEA panel in 2001 
speculates that accounting for wider social values 
at an earlier stage might have limited the scale of 
BSE problems. The extent to which societal interests 
and values can prevent real risks with emerging 
technologies is debatable. Yet these interests and 
values influence what is considered acceptable, 
and consequently what is accepted or rejected. 
Nanotechnology is proclaimed to have a tremendous 
potential to address major global challenges like 
cancer, renewable energy and provision of clean 
water. Yet precisely because of the widespread 
applications of nanotechnology, citizens around the 
world are as much stakeholders in the technology 
as the governments, industries and scientists 
promoting it. But so far the deliberate engagement 
of citizens and the public in risk-related decisions on 
nanotechnology has been very limited.
22.6.5 Lesson 7: evaluate alternative solutions
This lesson may simply be summarised by saying, 
dont become so enamoured by a new technology, 
that you are blinded to alternative solutions. 
Past lessons have shown there is a tendency 
for proponents to justify heavy investment in a 
new technology by promoting its application to 
every conceivable problem, with the result that 
alternatives are insufficiently scrutinised, and the 
most appropriate solution not always selected.
While nanotechnology is diverse and widely 
applicable, this would seem a potential pitfall as 
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the number of nanoscale solutions looking for a 
problem continues to grow. And with international 
nano-fever running high, everyone wants to be at 
the forefront of the nanotechnology revolution. 
In many cases, nanotechnology will provide the 
means to overcome challenges — but the lesson to 
be learnt is the need to find the best solution to a 
given problem, rather than to squeeze a solution out 
of the latest technology. This means that, in some 
cases, while nanotechnology could be used, it may 
be questionable whether it should. In the context of 
such discussions, assessment of alternatives can be 
used to provide helpful guidance in case of doubt 
as it provides a structured approach to examining 
a wide range of alternatives (e.g. technologies, 
processes, social changes) to potentially hazardous 
activities (Rossi et al., 2006).
Alternatives assessment is normally a six-step 
process that includes: 
1) identification of target(s) for action; 
2) characterisation and prioritisation of end uses; 
3) identification of alternatives; 
4) evaluation and comparison of alternatives; 
5) selection of preferred alternative(s); and 
6) review of selected alternative. 
The scope of any alternatives assessment should be 
broad enough to examine the service and function 
that it requires as opposed to just examining, 
for example, the opportunities of substituting a 
hazardous chemical with a less hazardous one. 
In the case of nanomaterials this means that 
alternatives need not simply be nanomaterials, 
but may include the process or administrative 
changes that reduce the need for the materials 
in the first place (Rossi et al., 2006; Linkov et al., 
2009). While alternatives assessment is generally 
applied to existing technologies and problems, the 
thinking about alternatives can be applied at the 
design phase, which did not occur in the case of 
nanotechnology. 
22.6.6 Lesson 10: maintain regulatory independence
The EEA panel found evidence in the case studies 
that interested parties are often able to unduly 
influence regulators. As a result, decisions that 
might reasonably have been made on the basis of 
available evidence were not taken. For example 
according to the EEA panel one factor in the slow 
UK response to BSE was that the governmental 
regulatory body was responsible first to the industry 
and only second to consumers. In many countries, 
the organisations responsible for overseeing the 
development of nanotechnologies through R&D are 
the very ones that address health and environmental 
issues. 
In testimony to the US Congress House Committee 
on Science and Technology, Richard Dennison of 
the Environmental Defense Fund, a non-profit 
environmental campaign group, wrote that: 
'we have become convinced that a conflict of 
interest has arisen from the decision to house 
within NNI the dual functions of both seeking 
to develop and promote nanotechnology 
and its applications, while at the same time 
aggressively pursuing the actions needed to 
identify and mitigate any potential risks that 
arise from such applications. That conflict of 
interest is both slowing and compromising 
efforts by NNI and its member agencies 
and departments to effectively address 
nanotechnologys implications' (Denison, 2007a). 
Concerns that such a conflict of interest could 
jeopardise effective environmental, health and safety 
research were most recently articulated by the US 
National Academies of Science in a research strategy 
for environmental, health and safety aspects of 
engineered nanomaterials: 
'There is a concern that the dual and potentially 
conflicting roles of the NNI — developing 
and promoting nanotechnology and its 
applications while identifying and mitigating 
risks that arise from such applications —
impede implementation and evaluation of 
the EHS risk research…To implement the 
research strategy effectively, a clear separation 
of management and budgetary authority and 
accountability is needed between the functions 
of developing and promoting applications of 
nanotechnology and of understanding and 
assessing potential health and environmental 
implications. Such a separation is needed 
to ensure that progress in implementing an 
effective nanotechnology-related EHS research 
strategy is not hampered' (National Academy of 
Sciences, 2012).
While an integrated approach to understanding 
the risks and benefits of nanotechnology is 
critical, when the promoters of nanotechnology, 
whether government or industry, have a strong 
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influence over oversight, independent regulatory 
decision-making becomes compromised. Perhaps 
more insidiously, research and development 
decisions end up being influenced by what 
will ultimately promote the technology, rather 
than what will protect producers, users and the 
environment.
22.6.7 Lesson 12: avoid paralysis by analysis
In the face of uncertainty, a frequent response is to 
call for more research before action is taken. Yet, as 
the EEA panel note, Experts have often argued at an 
early stage that we know enough to take protective 
action (EEA, 2001). Good policy depends on 
identifying the right balance between information 
and action while keeping the end-point (preventing 
harm) in mind, and building in review procedures 
for course corrections.
Twenty years have elapsed since first indications 
of nanomaterial harm were published (Ferin et al., 
1990; Oberdorster et al., 1990), and in the intervening 
time an increasing body of literature has been 
developed on how nanomaterials interact with cells, 
mammals and aquatic organisms (Hansen et al., 
2007; Stone et al., 2010). Yet many governments 
still call for more information as a substitute for 
action; there are indications that understanding and 
managing the risks of engineered nanomaterials 
are being paralysed by analysis. While it is clear 
that more scientific information is needed, we need 
to act on what we know now, to enable industry 
to produce and market nanotechnology-enabled 
products that are as safe as possible. Engineered 
nanomaterials are already on the market, and in 
some cases the risks are poorly understood and 
may therefore be ineffectively regulated. Applying 
current knowledge to nanotechnology oversight will 
not solve every problem, but it will help prevent 
basic mistakes being made while the knowledge 
needed for more effective oversight is developed.
One way to facilitate decision-making on 
nanomaterials may be to develop design criteria to 
identify which nanomaterials are of higher or lower 
concern because of their intrinsic properties or use 
or exposure characteristics. For example, Maynard 
et al. (2011) have proposed principles of emergent 
risk, plausibility and impact to identify materials 
of high concern. Further, a thorough consideration 
of health and safety implications at the design 
phase of a nanomaterial, including consideration of 
possible safer production methods and alternatives 
to the material, will facilitate decisions as economic 
interests are not fully entrenched at that point. 
22�7 So have we learnt the lessons?
Although the EEA panel was writing about 
existing technologies, and some of the 12 lessons 
learned are not directly applicable to all emerging 
technologies, many of the lessons are directly 
relevant to nanotechnology today. Yet the picture 
is not as bleak as it might be. Table 22.1 provides 
a qualitative analysis of 10 main EU Member State 
national and multilateral scientific reports that have 
provided input to the EU regulatory and political 
decision-makers on nanomaterials over the course 
of the last decade. For each of the late lessons from 
the first volume of this publication (EEA, 2001) we 
have provided an assessment of whether the lessons 
there have been mentioned in passing (+), have 
been substantially discussed and/or analysed (++), 
or whether a strategy to address a given lesson has 
been suggested (+++). Blanks means that no noticed 
was taken of these lessons.
While progress in developing sustainable 
nanotechnologies has been slow, the qualitative 
analysis above indicates that policy makers and 
relevant stakeholders seem to have learnt at least 
some of the lessons: they are asking more critical 
questions early on about health and environmental 
fate and effects; developing collaborations that 
cross disciplines, departments and international 
boundaries; beginning the process of targeting 
research to develop relevant knowledge; engaging 
stakeholders; and asking whether existing oversight 
mechanisms are fit for purpose.
But are we doing enough? The second half of 
Table 22.1 provides a qualitative analysis of the main 
EU regulatory actions taken over the course of the 
last decade in response to the twelve lessons.
The Cosmetic and the Biocides regulations 
acknowledge that there is a high level of 
scientific uncertainty regarding the risks of 
nanomaterials. They require industry to submit 
data and information about physical/chemical 
characteristics and the exposure and toxicological 
profile of a given nanomaterial, thereby providing 
some elements of a strategy toward long-term 
environmental and health monitoring to help 
identify and reduce scientific blind spots. The 
burden of providing health and safety data being 
placed on industry also helps to overcome the 
problem of paralysis by analysis since companies 
are in theory not able to market their products 
without proper data and information about 
risks. To some extent, regulatory independence 
is also ensured in the Cosmetic and the Biocides 
regulations in the sense that the scientific 
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Table 22�1 Late lessons learned, as indicated in 10 EU Member State nanomaterials reports
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ignorance, uncertainty and risk in 
technology appraisal
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Provide long-term environmental and 
health monitoring and research into 
early warnings
++ ++ ++ + ++ + ++ + ++ ++ ++ + +
Identify and work to reduce scientiﬁc 
blind spots and knowledge gaps
++ + + ++ ++ + + ++ ++ ++ + +
Identify and reduce interdisciplinary 
obstacles to learning
++ + + +
Account for real-world conditions in 
regulatory appraisal
+ + + +
Systematically scrutinise claimed 
beneﬁts and risks
+ + + + ++
Ensure use of lay knowledge, as well 
as specialist expertise
++ + ++
Evaluate alternative options for 
meeting needs, and promote robust, 
diverse and adaptable technologies
Account fully for the assumptions and 
values of different social groups
++ + ++ +
Maintain regulatory independence of 
interested parties while retaining an 
inclusive approach to information and 
opinion gathering
+ ++
Identify and reduce institutional 
obstacles to learning and action
++ + +
Avoid paralysis by analysis by acting 
to reduce potential harm when there 
are reasonable grounds for concern
+ + + ++ + + + + +
Note: A empty cell indicates no notice taken 
+ mentioned in passing; ++ substantially discussed and/or analysed; +++ strategy suggested/implemented 
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committees such as the European Commissions 
Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety and the 
European Food Safety Agency that are responsible 
for evaluating the health and safety data and the 
information provided by industry are independent 
from the regulatory agencies that promote the use 
of nanomaterials in those same products. However, 
these agencies have recently come under attack 
for not being independent from industry interests 
(Muilerman and Tweedale, 2011).
In the light of the 14 case studies in the first volume 
(EEA, 2001), the question here seems not to be 
whether we have learnt the lessons, but whether 
we are applying them effectively enough to prevent 
nanotechnology becoming yet another future case 
study on how not to introduce a new technology. 
Despite a good start, it seems that we have become 
distracted by the way that nanotechnology is being 
overseen by the very government organisations 
that promote it; research strategies are not leading 
to clear answers to critical questions; collaboration 
continues to be hampered by disciplinary and 
institutional barriers; and stakeholders are not being 
fully engaged, or not being engaged early enough. 
In part this is attributable to bureaucratic inertia, 
although comments from some quarters, such as risk 
research jeopardises innovation or regulation is bad 
for business, only cloud the waters when clarity of 
thought and action are needed. 
If we are to realise the commercial and social 
benefits of nanotechnology without leaving a 
legacy of harm, and to prevent nanotechnology 
from becoming a lesson in what not to do for future 
generations, perhaps it is time to go back to the 
classroom and re-learn these late lessons from early 
warnings.
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22�8 Precautionary strategies for 
nanomaterials
Linkov et al. (2009) have pointed out that there 
seems to be a substantial time lag between the 
emergence of products containing nanomaterials, 
the generation of EHS data and their subsequent use 
by regulatory agencies (see Figure 22.2). 
They argue that this results from these agencies 
having limited resources and that it will take time 
for regulatory agencies to adjust risk assessment 
procedures so that they are applicable to 
nanomaterials. The precise extent of the time lag is 
unclear, but there is historical evidence indicating 
that it will not be less than two decades. In 1977, 
Lawless and his team analysed 45 episodes of public 
alarm or strong concern over various technologies 
including reproduction and genetics, food and 
medicine, and environmental problems. A common 
theme identified by Lawless was that social 
institutions grapple with the problem for varying 
amounts of time while papers on effects increase 
in the technical literature. On average, this delay 
is one or two decades (Lawless, 1977). Volume 1 
of this publication (EEA, 2001) found that the time 
gap between the first report of harm and effective 
regulatory action was decades, and in some cases, 
even over a century. Although the cases analysed by 
the EEA and Lawless may not reflect all emerging 
Figure 22�2 Schematic representation of the 
emergence of nanotechnology 
products in comparison with 
generated EHS data
Source: Reprinted with permission from Linkov, I. et al., 2009.
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technologies, they do represent plausible worst-case 
scenarios. Given that the shelf life of specific new 
nanotechnology products is likely to be short 
because of continuous technology improvements, 
Linkov et al. (2009) argue that the approaches to 
regulating these materials should be adjusted to the 
evolving nature of the field. The question however is 
how this should be done. 
RCEP (2008) has pointed out that existing 
regulatory approaches cannot be relied on to 
detect and manage problems before a novel 
technology such as nanomaterials has become 
ubiquitous. Although, this observation is rather 
bleak and discouraging, several precautionary 
strategies have nevertheless been suggested over 
the past decade. Some have focused on providing 
recommendations on how to adapt existing 
legislation, for example Chaundry et al., 2006; Fuhr 
et al., 2007; Franco et al., 2007; Ludlow et al., 2007 
and Breggin et al., 2009. Specific recommendations 
include clarification of key terms and definitions 
of nanotechnology and material properties; 
ensuring the relevance of the scope and objectives 
of existing legislation; clear definition of thresholds 
relevant to nanomaterials; and risk assessment 
of nanomaterials prior to or after release into the 
environment.
Others have focused on providing recommendations 
on how to adapt existing risk assessment methods 
and risk management procedures such as the 
nano-risk framework jointly developed by the 
American non-governmental organisation 
Environmental Defense and the DuPont Corporation 
(ED and DuPont, 2007). This framework describes 
a process for ensuring the responsible development 
of nanoscale materials, and is designed to be used 
iteratively at different stages of development 
including basic R&D, prototyping, pilot testing, 
test marketing, and finally when new information 
becomes available. The suggested framework 
consists of six distinct steps: 
•  develop the nanomaterial and its intended uses; 
•  develop nanomaterial hazard and exposure 
profiles along the full life cycle; 
•  evaluate information generated to assess the 
probability of nanomaterial risks; 
•  evaluate risk management options and 
recommend a course of action; 
•  decide alongside key stakeholders whether to 
continue R&D and production; 
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•  update and re‑execute the risk evaluation 
regularly and share appropriate information with 
relevant stakeholders (ED and DuPont, 2007).
A third series of recommendations from various 
stakeholders and experts, for example the 
International Council on Risk Governance (2007) 
and RCEP (2009), have a much broader focus 
and have provided recommendations on issues 
more relevant to the governance of emerging 
technologies and innovation. In addition to a wide 
range of recommendations focused on restructuring 
risk research and regulation of chemicals and 
emerging technologies, RCEP (2009) has called for 
the development of flexible and resilient forms of 
adaptive management to allow us to handle such 
difficult situations and emergent technologies 
while recognising the high degree of ignorance and 
uncertainty and the time it will take to address these. 
According to RCEP (2009), key elements of such a 
framework should be structured around modification 
and extension of the existing regulatory framework 
as a matter of urgency, and development of an early 
warning system including robust arrangements for 
monitoring complemented (and informed) by the full 
range of perspectives on innovation.
Similarly, ICRG (2006, 2007) has suggested an 
integrated analytic framework for risk governance, 
consisting of pre-assessment, risk appraisal, and 
judgment of tolerability and acceptability, with risk 
management and communication as integrated 
elements that provide connectivity between the 
other elements. Application of the framework 
to nanotechnologies has led to a number of 
recommendations that fall into five categories: 
improve the knowledge base; strengthen risk 
management structures and processes; promote 
stakeholder communication and participation; ensure 
social benefits and acceptance; and collaboration 
between stakeholders and nations.
Recently, the German Advisory Council on the 
Environment for the German Government has 
called for a multifaceted strategy that includes 
intensification of risk research, promotion of 
social dialogue, development of a single piece of 
nano-specific legislation based on the precautionary 
principle, establishment of a labelling and product 
register, and a reform of the current chemical, 
product and environmental legislation (SRU German 
Advisory Council for the Environment, 2011). 
In many ways, these recommendations echo those 
made by the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering in 2004 in areas such as health, safety 
and environmental impacts; regulatory, social and 
ethical issues; stakeholder and public dialogue; 
and ensuring the responsible development of 
nanotechnologies. Key recommendations include:
•  Research into possible adverse health, safety 
and environmental impacts of nanomaterials, 
which the RS and RAE (2004) argue should be 
an integral part of the innovation and design 
process of products including nanomaterials.
•  Avoidance of the release of manufactured 
nanoparticles and nanotubes into the 
environment as far as possible.
•  Regulatory authorities to consider whether 
existing regulations are appropriate to protect 
humans and the environment and inclusion of 
future applications of nanotechnologies in their 
horizon-scanning programmes to ensure timely 
identification of any regulatory gaps. 
•  Consideration of whether ethical and social 
implications of advanced technologies (such 
as nanotechnologies) should form part of the 
formal training of all research students and staff 
working in these areas.
•  Comprehensive qualitative work involving 
members of the general public as well as 
members of interested sections of society, and 
government funding of public dialogue around 
the development of nanotechnologies.
•  Establishment of a group that brings together 
representatives of a wide range of stakeholders 
to look at new and emerging technologies and 
identify, at the earliest possible stage, areas 
where potential health, safety, environmental, 
social, ethical and regulatory issues may arise 
and advise on how these might be addressed.
While a regulatory, stakeholder engagement and 
R&D strategy are critical elements of a precautionary 
approach to nanomaterials, one must not forget the 
critical role of design in ensuring that technology 
development occurs in parallel with technology 
assessment. Nanotechnology development has 
occurred in the absence of clear design rules for 
chemists and materials developers on how to 
integrate health, safety and environmental concerns 
into the design of nanomaterials. This is not 
surprising given that most chemists and materials 
designers are not trained to recognise these issues. 
The emerging area of green nanotechnology offers 
promise for the future. For this type of focus on 
preventive design to occur, we will need a cultural 
transition: that chemists and materials developers 
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Table 22�2 Early warnings and actions
1974 Taniguchi first uses the term nanotechnology referring to the ability to engineer materials precisely at 
the nanometre (nm) level
1981 Scanning tunnelling microscope developed
1985 Atomic force microscope developed
1985 Fullerenes discovered at Rice University
1986 Drexler raises concern about potential risks of nanotechnology
1991 Iijima discovers carbon nanotubes
1992 Surface area found to be a better descriptor than mass for the adverse effects observed in rats 
exposed to TiO2
2000 National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) established by the US Government 
2003 Making analogies with ultrafine particles and asbestos, the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering in the UK calls for more research and for avoidance of the release of manufactured 
nanoparticles and nanotubes into the environment 
2004 Single-walled carbon nanotubes of different purity found to induced dose-dependent granulomas and 
interstitial inflammation in the lungs of mice
2006 Project for Emerging Nanotechnologies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars launches 
online consumer nanoproduct inventory totalling 212 products
2006 2 year voluntary reporting program set up in the United Kingdom by DEFRA
2007 Publication of Nano-risk framework jointly developed by the American non-governmental organisation 
Environmental Defense and the DuPont Corporation 
2007 Voluntary reporting program set up in the US by the US EPA
2008 Long multi-walled carbon nanotubes are found to produce adverse effects qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar those caused by long asbestos
2009 Voluntary reporting program end in the US receiving only 31 submissions
2009 Cosmetic Regulation in Europe adopted that requires labelling and safety assessment of nanomaterials
2009 European Parliaments Environment Committee call for application of the no data, no market principle 
in regard to regulation of nanomaterials
2011 Australia explicitly moves to differentiate the requirements for some new industrial nanoscale 
chemicals in its National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme
2011 NIOSH (2011) has determined that ultrafine TiO2 should be considered a potential occupational 
carcinogen
2011 European Commission publishes proposal of a definition of nanomaterials
are educated on health, safety and environment; 
that environment, health and safety become quality 
concerns in the development of new materials, 
equal to economic and performance considerations; 
that research on the sustainability of materials is 
funded at levels significant enough to identify early 
warnings; and that regulatory systems provide 
incentives for safer and sustainable materials.
When it comes to addressing R&D gaps, specific 
legislative gaps, limitations in current risk 
assessment and risk management approaches 
as well as risk governance of nanotechnologies 
and other emerging technologies, a common 
denominator of all of these recommendations is that 
many of them are not or have yet to be successfully 
implemented by political decision-makers. As a 
result, there remains a developmental environment 
that hinders the adoption of precautionary yet 
socially and economically responsive strategies 
in the field of nanotechnology. If left unresolved, 
this has the potential to hamper our ability as a 
society to ensure the responsible development of 
nanotechnologies. 
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23 Understanding and accounting for the 
costs of inaction
Mikael Skou Andersen and David Owain Clubb
  
In political decision-making processes, the burden of proof is often distributed such that 
policymakers only respond to early warning signals from environmental hazards once the costs of 
inaction have been estimated. 
This chapter revisits some key environmental issues for which estimates of costs of inaction have 
been carefully developed over many years of research. The aim is to consider the methodological 
challenges involved in producing estimates that are credible and appropriate rather than present 
specific estimates for these costs. 
The case studies also provide insights into how early warning signals might provide a basis 
for estimating the costs of inaction, when the science base is less consolidated. For example, 
the case of nitrates in drinking water illustrates that a precautionary approach to the costs of 
inaction is quite conceivable. The phase-out of ozone-depleting substances, where early-warning 
scientists successfully alerted the world to the damaging effects of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
provides another important case because additional impacts for global warming actually cause 
the costs of inaction to be considerably higher than initially believed. This is a reminder that 
figures for the costs of inaction have often been grossly underestimated.
Finally, in the case of air pollution, making use of different estimates for mortality risk avoidance 
will help decision-makers to see that there are higher- and lower-bound estimates for the costs 
of inaction. Even if the lower-bound estimates are perhaps too conservative, with a bias towards 
health effects, they will in many situations encourage more rather than less abatement effort. 
Reducing emission loads will also tend to bring relief for the intangible assets of biodiversity and 
nature. 
Making the best use of environmental science and modelling helps to make environmental 
protection and precaution a priority. Producing cost estimates should not be left to economists 
alone, but should rather be seen as a starting point for a broader discussion, featuring also 
the relevant expertise in health, ecology, demography, modelling and science. Well researched 
estimates, based on interdisciplinary collaboration, can strengthen some of those scattered and 
diffuse interests, which during the ordinary processes of policy-making have difficulty making 
their voices heard.
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23�1 Introduction
The first volume of Late lessons from early warnings 
reminded us that: 
'The costs of preventive actions are usually tangible, 
clearly allocated and often short term, whereas the 
costs of failing to act are less tangible, less clearly 
distributed and usually longer term, posing particular 
problems of governance. Weighing up the overall 
pros and cons of action, or inaction, is therefore 
very difficult, involving ethical as well as economic 
considerations, as the case studies illustrate' (EEA, 
2001:3-4).
In the decade since its publication, there has 
been considerable interest in addressing and 
understanding the possible costs of inaction. The 
Stern review on 'The Economics of Climate Change' 
for the UK government is a prominent example of 
how an economist specialising in risk assessment 
was able to provide credible estimates of the global 
costs of failure to prevent climate change (Stern, 
2007). Stern warned that the likely consequences 
of continued, unabated global warming would be 
in the magnitude of 5 % of global GDP annually. 
He estimated that the costs could rise as high as 
20 % when including non-market costs for health 
and environment and if we factor in the effects on 
developing countries in an equitable way. In contrast, 
according to Stern's review, the average expected 
costs of mitigation for stabilising greenhouse gas 
concentrations are likely to be about 1 % of GDP 
annually, while unlikely to exceed 3.5 % of GDP 
annually. 
The Stern review has been subject to much attention 
and scrutiny, mainly over the so-called 'discount 
rate' (a measure of how to value costs and benefits 
in the future — see section below) it used. However, 
its basic finding that the costs of preventive action 
were less than the harm caused by inaction was 
broadly accepted. The Review influenced the political 
debate, and the UK government subsequently passed 
the Climate Change Act, which called for an 80 % 
reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050. The Stern 
review also influenced the European Council in its 
decision in March 2007 to embark on a more active 
climate policy.
The subject of the 'costs of inaction' has subsequently 
become a recurrent topic in deliberations over 
climate policy, and more recently, with respect to 
biodiversity. The OECD (2008) has provided an 
overview of studies addressing the costs of inaction 
for a range of other environmental issues, including 
air pollution, water pollution, natural resource 
depletion and industrial accidents. To understand 
the costs of inaction, one must express in monetary 
terms the damage that will be caused if no or limited 
intervention is agreed. Stern did this by taking 
a risk-analysis approach, which unlike the more 
static cost-benefit approach, emphasised a range 
of outcomes and the uncertainties involved in the 
calculations. 
It is essential to understand that under an 
economics perspective the 'costs of inaction' are 
simply analogous to the benefits that can be 
obtained with proper controls (OECD, 2008:49). 
Addressing the 'costs of inaction' involves the 
same methods used to account for benefits in 
conventional cost-benefit analysis. They have in 
recent years been underpinned by the availability 
of computing and modelling capacities, that better 
allow environmental scientists and environmental 
economists to account for the complexities and 
uncertainties at stake, and hence to integrate a 
precautionary perspective.
This chapter reviews some of the methodologies used 
to produce estimates for the costs of inaction. Not 
all the case studies here will match chapters in Late 
lessons from early warnings Volumes 1 and 2. Instead, 
the case studies provide a generic perspective, which 
will be of some relevance to historical, current and 
future case studies. 
The first case study we look at is the phasing out of 
lead in petrol. We use this example as a starting point 
for a discussion of the subtle differences between 
scientific proof and scientific evidence. In our second 
case study, we turn to the issue of nitrates in drinking 
water in order to show that costs of inaction can be 
estimated even when there are uncertainties over the 
long term effects of inaction. In the third case study, 
we explain some of the methodological controversies 
that have raged over how to account for the costs of 
inaction related to mortality risks, which is relevant 
for air pollution for example. By way of illustration 
we present in separate boxes monetary estimates 
of the environmental burdens related to lead and 
mercury, SO2 with other air pollutants as well as to 
ozone-depleting substances (ODS). 
23�2 Should we require proof or 
evidence to account for the costs 
of inaction: insights from lead 
phase-out
Heinzerling, Ackerman and Massey (2005) provide 
a concise overview of the role of scientific and 
economic analysis in eventually ending the use of 
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lead in gasoline in the United States. It was research 
by Herbert Needleman (see Chapter 3 on lead in 
petrol) on the relationship between lead levels in 
children's blood and cognitive impairment that 
made it possible to state in quantitative terms the 
loss of IQ involved. Heinzerling et al. describe how 
economic analysis eventually came to the rescue of 
the lead phase-out by translating this IQ loss into 
monetary figures. Lower IQ could be shown to 
result in lower life-time income, which could in turn 
be translated into an implied cost of inaction (see 
also Nichols, 1997). 
This approach differed from the simple 'willingness-
to-pay' studies that previously had been referred 
to by economists. In these willingness-to-pay 
studies, parents were asked how much they would 
spend to prevent exposure of their children. These 
studies were problematic in that they expected firm 
monetary preferences to emerge for a problem the 
dimensions of which few parents would understand. 
The shift in focus away from willingness-to-pay 
studies meant that the findings of the lead scientists 
were used directly in economic assessments of the 
costs of inaction. The human bones absorb lead, 
and Needleman's breakthrough was to measure the 
stocks of accumulated lead in the first 'baby' teeth 
of children, rather than the level of more recent 
lead exposure in their blood. One challenge was to 
establish to what extent blood lead levels reflected 
ambient concentrations of lead in air. The lead case 
is described in more detail in Box 23.1.
Today there are numerous hazards and challenges 
for which we have only limited scientific evidence, 
and for which it will take many years to accumulate 
the same understanding as was reached in the case 
of lead. Economists trying to estimate the costs of 
inaction will often ask whether there is 'scientific 
proof', but it must be acknowledged that there 
is usually not a simple answer to this question. 
Economic analysis should therefore consider the less 
certain levels of knowledge that make up scientific 
evidence in order to explore the magnitude and 
risks of potential impacts suggested through early 
warning signals.
We sometimes tend to think of knowledge and 
lack of knowledge in a simplistic way, believing 
that research is a process that can transform lack 
of knowledge into indisputable proof. More 
realistically, our knowledge base is less clear-cut. 
It often has a focused nucleus of complete 
understanding, with a surrounding area where 
many linkages and relationships are not understood 
with the same rigour and underpinning. Early 
warning signals are often located in this blurred area 
where linkages are not fully understood. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), which establishes the precautionary 
principle as one of the guiding principles of 
environmental policy, does not generally mandate 
a requirement for scientific proof. For instance, 
TFEU art. 114 no. 5 — the so-called environmental 
guarantee — allows a Member State to introduce 
unilaterally more stringent measures in areas where 
there is 'scientific evidence'. The precautionary 
perspective (TFEU art. 191) is really about acting in 
the absence of scientific proof (see Chapter 2 on the 
precautionary principle).
Although Needleman's research was able to 
document a relationship between low doses of lead 
and IQ impacts on children, not all aspects of lead 
exposure were fully understood. Today we can take 
advantage of computerised environmental models 
to account for blood lead concentrations as a result 
of the lead accumulation over time in the various 
compartments of the human body. In this way, we 
can clarify the link between low-dose exposure and 
the resulting, age-dependent blood lead in children 
(Pizzol et al., 2010). But the use of such tools remains 
the exception. For example, the chemical PCB is a 
substance for which the abatement costs are now 
counted in billions of euros (von Bahr and Janson, 
2004) while welfare economic damage costs are 
largely unknown. Therefore, when it comes to 
substances for which the knowledge base is less 
developed, it will be necessary to explore the 
potential costs of inaction by relying on evidence 
from early warning signals. These harm costs could 
for instance be calculated by looking first at the 
already-proven impacts of high doses in the work 
environment, and then scaling linearly to low doses. 
23�3 Using warning signals to estimate 
the costs of inaction: risks from 
nitrate in drinking water 
The European Union's 1980 directive on drinking 
water quality (80/778/EEC) introduced a maximum 
admissible concentration value (MAC) for nitrate 
contents in drinking water, based directly on WHO 
guidelines. Drinking water with MAC levels of 
nitrates is suspected to increase the occurrence of 
methaemoglobinaemia in vulnerable individuals, 
particularly babies (leading to the potentially fatal 
phenomenon of 'blue' babies, cf. NSW, 2006). At 
MAC-concentration levels, drinking water nitrate will 
double the amount of nitrates that the average person 
would ordinarily consume from other sources. 
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Box 23�1 Costs of inaction on lead and mercury
Why does lead matter?
Lead is a potent and pervasive neurotoxicant that travels widely throughout the body once ingested 
or inhaled, and affects virtually every organ or system in the body (Meyer et al., 2008). Children and 
pregnant women have a higher absorption rate of lead due to constant bone remodelling, which arises 
from skeletal development (Barbosa et al., 2005). The impacts upon children are profound, because not 
only is lead more easily absorbed, it is also more damaging to the developing nervous system. Even 
extremely low Bloodstream Lead Levels (BLL) can have significant impacts on future academic achievement 
(Miranda et al., 2011), a fact that was a material consideration in the 2005 US Centre for Disease Control's 
recommendation that there is no safe BLL for children (ACCLPP, 2012). These changes in development are 
irreversible. Exposure to even low levels of lead during pregnancy will cause permanent and irreversible 
developmental harm, which manifests itself in lower educational achievement in later stages (Lourdes et al., 
2006).
The damages arising from lead have been described as nothing less than a 'catastrophe' for public health 
(Landrigan, 2002). Lead damages almost every biochemical process in the human body (Gidlow, 2004; 
Needleman, 2004). It damages fertility and neuropsychology, as well as distorting enzymes, structural 
proteins and mitochondrial cristae. It also pushes out calcium from natural neuron signalling processes 
(see Box 3.1 on children and lead in Chapter 3).
Recognition of the problem
Lead has been recognised as a health problem since Roman times (Reddy and Braun, 2010). But it was not 
until 100 years ago that an Australian doctor identified the critical vulnerability of children to lead (Taylor 
et al., 2010). But despite multiple early warnings, lead continued to be used as an additive in paint for many 
years in Europe, America and Australia.
The most harm was caused by the use of lead as an additive to motor vehicle fuel, which resulted in 
widespread environmental exposure and serious health impacts for hundreds of millions of people. Lead was 
first added to motor fuel in the 1920s, and it took many decades before developed nations began to phase 
out the practice. 
The history of the use of lead as an additive in petrol is a sad testament to the desire of companies to make 
profits regardless of the consequence to human health. Other, much less harmful alternatives to lead were 
available to the petrochemical industry, but they were not adopted because they were not patent-protected, 
and would therefore have greatly reduced profits for the sector (Ackerman et al, 2005). The global harm 
caused by leaded gasoline is undoubtedly high, not least because extremely high BLL have been measured in 
different cities. For example, the average BLL of the sampled population in Bangkok in the 1980s and 1990s 
was 40ug/dl, levels at which effects such as headaches, slowing of motor nerve conduction and anaemia may 
occur. Death may occur at BLL of about 100ug/dl (Olson, 2004).
In 1981, the EU introduced a limit of 0.4 gram of lead per litre of leaded gasoline. Use of lead became less 
attractive following the requirements for installation of catalytic converters in cars. Germany introduced 
different tax levels for leaded and unleaded petrol in 1985, an approach copied in several other Member 
States (Hammar and Löfgren, 2004). This meant that by the time the European Union prohibited use of 
leaded gasoline in 2000, there was little protest from any quarter. As of January 2011, only six countries 
continue to allow leaded gasoline: Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, North Korea, Burma and Afghanistan.
Economic impacts
In the US, economic analysis was instrumental in convincing the Reagan administration of the desirability to 
phase out lead in petrol (US EPA, 1985). These analyses explored the loss of IQ in children exposed to lead, 
a phenomenon that had been demonstrated by scientists. Cognitive impairment of children could be shown to 
result in reduced expectations for life-time income (Salkever, 1995). Statistically, a loss of one IQ-point can 
be shown to cause a loss in life-time income of 2-3 % (highest for females). There is no lower threshold for 
the lead-induced cognitive impairment of young children, so all emissions impair cognitive function (Schwartz, 
1994).
Because the harm from lead relates to a future stream of income over a lifetime, the discount rate used to 
convert future earnings into a net present value decisively influences the final monetary estimate for the
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Box 23�1 Costs of inaction on lead and mercury (cont�)
harm caused. In studying the harm cause by lead, US economists used a discount rate of 10 %, while 
an EU study abstained from any discounting (1). Early childhood IQ-losses, such as those that arise 
from undernourishment or poisoning, can be significant. IQ levels have been demonstrated to influence 
dramatically the relative affluence of nations, and are therefore a social good (see Figure 23.1). 
When using a social discount rate of 1.4 % (cf. Stern, 2007; European Commission, 2008) the result is 
a damage estimate of EUR 1.50 per gram of lead emitted in urban areas (Andersen, 2010). The discount 
rate is not the only factor that influences the cost estimate. Estimates of the cost of damage can also 
be greatly influenced by assumptions about how lead enters the food chain (2) and by assumptions 
about so-called 'resuspension'. Resuspension is 
the process by which lead emitted years ago is 
deposited on the soil, but then blown up into the 
air again by the wind.
Considering that until the 1970's, gasoline 
contained about 1 gram of lead per litre, valuing 
lead-associated IQ damages at EUR 1.50 per gram 
(EUR 1.50 per litre) implies significant annual 
costs of about 4–6 % of GDP in EU Member 
States.
Today, lead emissions in the European Union 
have decreased greatly, and the magnitude of 
damages from new emissions, mainly from waste 
incineration and industry, amounts to less than 
0.1 % of GDP. Still, further reduction of lead in 
products (e.g. paints, toys) remains desirable to 
prevent continued harm to children. 
All the lead emitted during the 20th century is 
dispersed across the environment, contributing 
each year to renewed harm as some of the lead 
finds its way back into our atmosphere. Many 
urban areas have chronically high levels of lead in 
top-soils. This is sufficient reason to recommend 
the resurfacing of playgrounds and areas of high 
activity for young children, as the intake of even a 
few micrograms may suffice to induce IQ-damage.
Economic damage estimates are based on scientific 
research on the impact of human exposure to a 
particular substance. But not all risks are factored 
into cost-benefit analysis. For example, the ability 
of lead to trigger cardiovascular diseases in 
adults (hypertension, nonfatal heart attacks and 
premature deaths, cf. Menke et al. 2006) has not 
been included in the above-mentioned damage 
estimate. Thus, some damage estimates are 
lower-bound conservative values (Gould, 2009). 
This tendency for cost-benefit analysis to lean 
toward conservative values further strengthens the 
case for adopting a precautionary perspective.
(1) The US EPA study due to its use of a private discount rate implied a damage cost of 8 US cents1983 per gram lead, while the 
European study with no discounting implied a damage cost of 5.9 EUR2004 per gram lead.
(2) Spadaro and Rabl (2004) indicate a ratio of 1:25 between inhalation and ingestion (intake) from food.
Note: This graph shows the social impact of a drop in 
average population IQ. For example a 5-point drop 
could raise by 57 % the number of individuals 
considered neurologically impaired, with implications 
for social and economic development. It also 
significantly lowers the number of intellectually 
gifted children. 
Source: www.ourstolenfuture.org.
Figure 23�1 Diminished IQ stunts economic 
development
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Box 23�1 Costs of inaction on lead and mercury (cont�)
Why does Mercury matter?
Mercury has a long atmospheric lifetime (6–18 months), which means that once it is released from a source 
anywhere in the world, it can be transported globally, hence its characterisation as a 'global pollutant'. After 
deposition in ground or water, mercury can be transformed. The process by which this happens is primarily 
microbial action, which turns mercury into methylmercury. Methylmercury can 'accumulate' as it progresses up 
the food chain. For example, an animal could eat a smaller animal that has eaten mercury, exposing the larger 
animal to all the mercury consumed by the smaller animal in its lifetime. This results in ever higher levels of 
mercury being found in larger predator animals. Human health can be adversely affected by this process of 
accumulation if organisms with high concentrations of mercury are ingested. This is a particular problem in 
consumption of predatory fish, notably tuna and shark (Shimshack and Ward, 2010). Pregnant women are at 
particular risk, as mercury readily passes through the placenta, concentrates in umbilical tissues and leaches 
into breast milk. Methylmercury is a developmental neurotoxicant , and high environmental exposure to this 
compound is associated with a statistically significant reduction in IQ in developing children.
Recognition of the problem
Despite the official acknowledgement of Minamata Disease (a sickness affecting people exposed to 
methylmercury in the Japanese city of Minamata, see Chapter 5) in the spring of 1956, success in tracing the 
cause to the mercury discharges from an industrial facility took several years. It was not until 1968 that the 
Japanese Government 'announced its opinion', that factory effluent was directly responsible. An official apology 
was finally made at the 50th anniversary of the discovery of the disease (Japan Times, 2006) (3). Although 
large-scale acute cases of mercury poisoning are relatively rare, the more general result of lower IQ due to the 
developmental neurotoxicant effects of methylmercury continues. 
Economic impacts
Mercury damages the developing brain and reduces IQ, just like lead (see above). And like lead, it is a 
substance that has only harmful effects. This is in contrast to other metals that are also toxic at high doses, 
but of which the human body needs a certain minimum to survive. Several studies have attempted to calculate 
the costs for diffuse poisoning (i.e. poisoning from many different sources) by mercury. Despite the wide 
uncertainty in these figures, they demonstrate that the impact is far from trivial. 
Axelrad et al. (2007) created a 'dose-response' model to assess the effect on IQ of each additional 'dose' of 
mercury exposure by performing an integrative analysis of studies from New Zealand, the Seychelles and the 
Faroe islands. Their central estimate is that for every 'part per million' increase in mercury in the hair of an 
expectant mother, the child suffered a 0.18 point decline in their IQ (4). Concentrations of mercury in hair can 
be converted into blood concentrations, or concentrations in the umbilical cord, using established factors. As is 
the case with other mercury studies, the authors assume that there is a minimum threshold (0.1 ug per day 
per kilogram bodyweight) below which no effects of mercury occur.
For low doses, the time window during which the brain is affected by mercury needs to be considered. The 
sensitivity of the brain to mercury is greatest during the early development of the body. The epidemiological 
studies all assume that once a person is exposed to mercury, the effects on their IQ are both measurable 
and irreversible, remaining with the person throughout their lives. Since the dose-response function refers to 
maternal hair concentration and effect on children's IQ, it implicitly includes the effect of mothers' diet during 
pregnancy and early infancy of her child while she is nursing. 
Spadaro and Rabl (2008) have calculated the marginal impact of low-dose mercury emissions. Applying an 
estimate for the monetary value of a 'global' IQ-point (i.e. the value that an extra IQ point brings a person 
in terms of lifetime income), Spadaro and Rabl report a marginal damage cost per kilogram of mercury 
emitted of about USD 1 500. If not assuming any threshold to the impact of low doses, the cost is reported 
to be USD 3 400 per kg. These estimates are conservative compared with the average damage cost of over 
USD 6 000 USD per kg implied by one US EPA study (where a 33 tonne change in mercury emissions would 
cost USD 210 million), which used a different methodology and did not have any threshold for pre-natal 
exposures (Griffiths et al., 2007).
A study in Greenland, where three quarters of newborns have elevated blood concentrations of mercury, even 
though there are hardly any local emissions, estimated a damage of 59 million dollars per year (Hylander and 
Goodwin, 2006). This translates to about USD 59 000 for each new born child. The traditional diet in the Arctic 
region of fish and sea mammals serves as a sink for global mercury emissions by means of the accumulation 
process described above. Global mercury emissions are projected to increase by 20 % by 2020 (relative to 
2005 cf. AMAP, 2011:143).
(3) 'Koizumi issues official Minamata apology', The Japan Times Online, 29 April, 2006, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
nn20060429a4.html.
(4) A part per million is roughly equivalent to the concentration of a single drop of a substance in 50 litres of water.
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In addition to a MAC-value of 50 mg NO3 per litre, 
the directive introduced a complementary 'guide 
value' of 25 mg NO3 per litre. When revising the 
directive in 1998, the precautionary guide value 
for nitrate in potable water was deleted and only 
the MAC-value retained. The main reason for 
abandoning a guide value was the absence of 
scientific proof to underpin it. 
Starting with the introduction of the drinking 
water directive (80/778/EEC), the European 
Union introduced several initiatives to reduce 
environmental pressures from nitrogen. One such 
initiative is the nitrogen application ceiling for 
agricultural land, and the associated regulations 
on animal manure that were introduced with the 
Nitrate Directive (91/676/EEC). The Urban Waste 
Water Directive (91/271/EEC) also introduced 
constraints for emissions of nitrogen from sewage 
and industrial effluents. The protection of drinking 
water was not the only goal in these efforts to reduce 
nitrate leaching and emissions. Policy makers were 
also motivated by concerns over eutrophication 
in shallow and open coastal waters. Over the 
years, many conflicts have appeared over the costs 
associated with both these directives. Farming 
interests in particular have requested derogations 
and exemptions from regulatory requirements 
aiming to reduce nitrate loads. 
No analysis has so far been carried out in Europe 
to explore how the possible benefits of these nitrate 
regulations compare to the costs of implementing 
them. The evidence that nitrates have adverse 
health effects is contested. In particular, there has 
been controversy over the extent to which gastric 
cancer is related to nitrate intake. The World Health 
Organization experts maintain that 'a link between 
cancer risk and endogenous nitrosation as a result of 
high intake of nitrate and/or nitrite and nitrosatable 
compounds is possible' (WHO, 2007:12). WHO 
normally requires at least three different studies 
establishing comparable evidence before accepting 
a link to exposure as conclusive, but in the case of 
nitrate there are few well-designed epidemiological 
studies in the international scientific literature. 
Chronic impacts resulting from exposure over 
longer periods of time due to elevated levels of 
nitrate in drinking water have caused particular 
concern. In order to detect such influences, 
epidemiological cohort studies, which monitor 
health effects in a large population sample over a 
series of years, are required. Such cohort studies 
are both laborious and costly, and they often face 
difficulties with establishing the specific historical 
exposures. At present, the international scientific 
literature reports results only from two cohort 
studies regarding nitrate, and their results are 
ambiguous.
One study by Weyer et al. (2001) reports an 
increased incidence of bladder cancers in a 
population cohort of 10 000 women aged 55 or more 
from Iowa, US — a state with intensive agricultural 
practices, and high levels of nitrate in public utility 
water supply. A more recent study could not detect 
an increased incidence of bladder cancers in a 
population cohort in the Netherlands, presumably 
because nitrate levels in Dutch public water supply 
are rather low.
The Iowa study was published after the EU Council 
of Ministers abandoned the 25 mg NO3 per litre 
guide value for nitrate in drinking water. Along 
with other types of studies, the Iowa study suggests 
that health effects can be detected well below the 
MAC-value and with lower thresholds of 15–25 mg 
NO3 per litre. Hence there appear to be costs of 
inaction at stake, but a relevant question is: how 
significant are they?
The studies provide evidence from which nitrate 
health effects can be quantified. A quantification 
of these health effects is useful for estimating the 
potential costs of inaction — the risks in other words. 
For instance, the World Bank (2007) has used those 
studies that show a connection between ill health 
and nitrate exposure as a basis for providing rough 
estimates of the health benefits associated with 
reducing nitrate exposures. More detailed studies 
have taken a similar point of departure. Van Grinsven 
et al. (2010) explore the health risk costs related to 
colon cancer from nitrates, and arrive at a level of 
EUR 0.7 per kg of fertiliser nitrogen. Andersen et al. 
(2011), in the EU FP7 EXIOPOL project, explored 
different river catchment areas and arrived at 
site-specific estimates based mainly on figures for 
bladder cancers derived from Weyer et al. (2001). 
Their mean estimate is EUR 0.3 per kgN-loss, but they 
report higher health risk costs for specific Member 
States, for example the United Kingdom and Belgium 
at a level of EUR 1.3 per kgN. In some urban areas, 
the health risk costs are much higher. Consequently, 
it can be estimated that the risk costs of inaction on 
nitrate in drinking water amount to EUR 2.6 billion 
annually for the United Kingdom alone. This figure 
is comparable to a previous estimate for all external 
costs of UK agriculture combined (Pretty et al., 2001).
Since there are also other costs related to nitrogen, 
arising from the pollution of surface waters, 
ammonia evaporation, and greenhouse gas 
emissions of N2O, these figures taken together 
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would suggest that a precautionary approach is 
warranted. The abandoned guide value for nitrate in 
drinking water also deserves reconsideration.
23�4 Air pollution: how to account for 
the mortality risks from inaction?
The willingness of individuals to make economic 
sacrifices in order to reduce potential statistical 
mortality risk is determined by their risk aversion. 
People make decisions to this effect with many 
everyday choices, such as adding airbags and other 
safety devices to their car. In the United States, 
the authorities have determined risk aversion 
by resorting to wage-risk analysis. This involves 
exploring what wage premiums individuals require 
for more risk-prone occupations, and on that basis 
have estimated the value of preventing a fatality at 
about 5.5 million USD1999 (1999 prices). 
In Europe, there has been more emphasis on 
applying specific values comparable to figures used 
in transport economics for avoiding fatalities. Still, 
air pollution has a risk profile different from road 
traffic: The average road victim is middle-aged, 
while victims of air pollution are believed to 
be mainly people over 65 (Pope, 2002). While a 
road victim on average loses 30–40 years of life 
expectancy, the average air-pollution victim may 
stand to lose only a few years. The European 
Commission, on the basis of expert advice, has 
opted to value a statistical life (VSL) at 1.4 million 
EUR2000, but has adjusted it downwards to about 
EUR 1 million for air pollution to account for the 
advanced age of the typical air pollution victim. 
Similar adjustments proposed in the United States 
were however met with public outcry and were 
branded as a 'senior death discount' (NYT, 2011).
In the economics literature, VSL remains the 
conventional metric for the valuation of statistical 
fatalities. In recent years, it has been challenged by 
the adoption of more conservative estimates, based 
on the specific number of life-years lost. There has 
therefore been a debate over whether it would be 
reasonable to exchange VSL-figures with VOLY: 
the value of a life-year (Hofstetter and Hammitt, 
2002). Questions that have been addressed include 
whether life-years towards the end of an individual's 
life should be valued more highly than an average 
life-year (as more precious) or rather should be 
valued lower, as reduced health and vigour is likely 
to reduce life-quality. VOLY-values can be derived 
schematically from VSL, by assuming that the 
average VSL represents a loss of life expectancy of 
3–40 years as in road traffic. 
OECD (2006) guidelines for environmental 
cost-benefit analysis recommend the use of VSL for 
acute mortality (as in road transport) and to introduce 
VOLY for cases of so-called 'chronic' mortality, (the 
result of elevated exposures to harmful substances 
over longer periods of time), such as air pollution or 
nitrate in drinking water (See Box 23.2 on SO2 and 
other air pollutants for results obtained with the 
OECD approach).
In contrast, the Science Advisory Board of the 
US EPA maintains that the only solid value 
available for quantifying risk aversion in monetary 
terms is the VSL (US EPA, 2010:12). The obvious 
implication of the US approach is that it accords 
a higher monetary value to environmental 
risk reduction than Europe. Unfortunately, 
US economists are facing decreased political 
acceptance of the recommended approach. This 
was reflected in the recent decision by the Obama 
administration — acting under political pressures 
— to withdraw proposed restrictions on ozone 
pollution, despite the high costs of inaction.
VOLY-based figures provide perhaps only a 
lower-bound estimate for the benefits of action, but 
in many cases these conservative values are already 
sufficient to justify abatement action. The European 
Commission's impact assessment of the thematic 
strategy on air pollution (CAFÉ; Clean Air For 
Europe cf. AEA, 2005) programme decided to tackle 
the ambiguity over VSL and VOLY values simply by 
reporting different sets of benefit estimates. It then 
left it to policymakers to make a decision based on 
these two different pieces of information. While the 
most conservative estimate suggests that air pollution 
costs account for roughly 3 % of GDP in EU-25, the 
highest estimate amounts to 5 % (see Box 23.2 on 
SO2 and other air pollutants). The acknowledgement 
that economics may not offer a mature consensus 
corroborates the role and significance of the 
precautionary principle. The Stern review of climate 
change reflected similar uncertainties, reporting 
different estimates, rather than presenting one 
specific economic figure.
23�5 Should we accept a discount on 
costs of inaction arising in the 
future?
The costs of inaction will often only be felt in the 
future. This is certainly the case for the impact of 
lead on IQ-loss or the health implications of living 
with high levels of air pollution and drinking water 
nitrate. In the case of the skin cancers induced by the 
ozone 'hole', impacts are expected to peak only after 
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Box 23�2 Costs of inaction on sulphur dioxide (SO2) and other air pollutants
Why does air pollution matter?
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) is a colourless, pungent gas that is a by-product of combustion at power plants, and 
also arises from natural sources such as volcanic eruptions. SO2 emissions are a particularly important 
issue because they are produced in the combustion of coal, which is a major component of the electricity 
generation systems of many major economies (see Figure 23.2).
Sulphur dioxide has many potential environmental impacts, including its conversion to various acidic 
compounds (sulphuric acid, sulphurous acid) that can damage tree, plant and animal life (see EEA, 2001, 
Ch. 10 on sulphur dioxide, lungs and lakes). The converted and hence secondary formation of particulates 
(for example SO4) after transport and chemical action cause severe health problems too.
Health impacts
Inhaled sulphur dioxide readily reacts with the moisture of mucous membranes to form sulphurous acid 
(H2SO3), which is a severe irritant. People with asthma can experience increased airway resistance with 
sulphur dioxide concentrations of less than 0.1 ppm when exercising. Healthy adults experience increased 
airway resistance at 5 ppm, sneeze and cough at 10 ppm, and experience 'bronchospasm' at 20 ppm 
(ATSDR, 2011). 
The further risk posed by SO2 is in its subsequent conversion to sulphate particles, and as a precursor to 
PM (particulate matter), contributing to ill-effects caused by PM10 (particulates of larger size) and PM2.5 
(particulates of smaller size). A meta-study of the mortality effects of ambient particulate sulphates 
demonstrates a strong correlation between mortality and the atmospheric density of the pollutant (i.e. the 
amount of pollutant present in the air, Smith et al., 2009).
Recognition of the problem
The first deadly impacts of an air pollution episode had been reported as early as 1929 in Wallonia, 
Belgium. Another significant and widely-recognised case of health impacts from sulphur dioxide was the 
Great Smog which affected London in 1952, causing an excess mortality of as many as 13 000 deaths 
(Bell et al., 2003). The smog was caused by a high level of air-borne pollutants, which remained in the 
city due to unusually still weather conditions. The response to this event was to propose remedies such as 
increasing the height of chimneys. Whilst this alleviated the problem, it also dispersed the pollution more 
regionally, and caused the acidification of rain, lakes and rivers in Scandinavia. 
Japan also suffered badly from sulphur dioxide pollution in the three decades of industrialisation that 
started in about 1950. In all, more than 100 000 people were registered by the Japanese ministry of the 
environment as having suffered health impacts as a result. Sulphur dioxide pollution, known at the time as 
Yokkaichi Asthma, is listed as one of the four 'big pollution diseases of Japan' (Committee, 1997). 
Economic impacts
In the 1970s, some claimed that the problem of sulphur dioxide pollution were not severe enough to 
warrant expensive action. Some even called it a 'million dollar problem with a billion dollar solution' 
(Opinion, 1977). The link between atmospheric concentrations of sulphur dioxide and sulphate to increased 
mortality rates was only gradually accepted. However, when one factors in not only the costs of morbidity 
(the sickness caused by sulphur dioxide) but also those of mortality (the deaths caused by sulphur dioxide) 
it is clear that the health costs of inaction on air pollution damages should indeed have been counted in 
billions too. 
Pope et al. (1995, 2002) showed how increased rates of mortality are consistently associated with high 
ambient levels of pollutants. Most of the deaths were seen to occur in response to chronic exposures over 
extended time periods, rather than in response to shorter periods of exposure. Their findings were based 
on a population cohort of more than 500 000 individuals, who had been interviewed about health status, 
smoking habits and other potentially confounding variables. The American Cancer Society had obtained 
individual death certificates from deceased participants in the cohort, which allowed control for death 
caused by air pollution exposure. The US EPA decided to require a complete reanalysis of the data by an 
independent research team before finally accepting the findings — it led to the same results.
In 2005, the European Commission commissioned a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis when preparing its 
Thematic Strategy for Air Pollution. It also invited the World Health Organization (WHO) to review the 
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Box 23�2 Costs of inaction on sulphur dioxide (SO2) and other air pollutants (cont�)
health effects evidence available. Because of the methodological debate over the appropriate valuation metric 
for the risks to human lives (see discussion in main text of this chapter), the assessment presented different 
estimates. The lowest estimate, based on a VOLY metric, came to a total cost of air pollution for the EU-25 of 
EUR 276 billion, equivalent to 3 % of GDP. The highest estimate, based on a VSL metric, came to a total cost 
of EUR 427 billion, close to 5 % of GDP (AEA, 2005). 
The costs were seen to differ considerably among Member States. In Poland and other new Member States, 
the air pollution costs (using 2000 as the reference year) varied between approximately 15 % and 22 % of 
GDP depending on the metric (AEA, 2005). These costs referred to the combined exposure to particles from 
SO2, NOX and primary PM.
Although these figures do not include all relevant costs of inaction — for instance in relation to biodiversity 
— the figures suffice to justify further action to reduce air pollutants. While the damage cost per kilo of 
SO2 ranges from EUR 5 to 9 per kg SO2, marginal abatement costs start from below EUR 1 per kg SO2 
(Rive, 2010). Theoretically, it would be desirable to pick the lowest-hanging fruit first and focus on the most 
cost-effective measures, but in reality there are large benefits for nearly all efforts regarding SO2 abatement.
A cost-benefit assessment becomes highly complex when multiple types of emissions are considered 
jointly (SO2, NOX, VOC, O3, NH3 and PM). There are non-linearities at play in the atmospheric transport and 
chemistry, for instance relating to ozone, which must be taken into account. Some integrated assessment 
models have been created to study these situations that feature complex mixtures of emissions. They 
typically produce scenarios for different levels of pollutants (e.g. SOX, NOX) and come up with a best-cost 
solution for meeting various environmental outcomes. The technically feasible reduction of air pollution has 
been estimated at EUR 56–181 billion equivalent to 0.6–2 % of GDP in EU, which are the costs that could be 
avoided by introducing appropriate controls (AEA, 2005).
Japanese industry was a pioneer in air pollution abatement. In 1975, investment in air pollution abatement 
accounted for 18 % of Japanese capital investment and 6.5 % of GDP. The OECD (1977) has reviewed the 
experience and concludes that 'the impact of relatively high pollution abatement costs on macro-economic 
magnitudes, such as GNP, employment, prices and foreign trade is practically negligible'. In fact, these 
investments accelerated technological innovation, raised product quality and lowered technical costs. Even 
today, Japanese companies control many of the patents and licenses for air pollution control equipment, and 
benefit from sales globally, demonstrating the economic significance of being a pioneer in environmental 
technology.
Figure 23�2 Global SO2 emissions 1850–2005 by end-use sector 
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Table 23�1 Effect of the discount rate on the 
estimated costs of inaction
Source: Stern, cited from OECD, 2008:96.
Discount rate 
(%)
Discounted costs of inaction 
(% of GDP-equivalents)
1.3
1.8
2.3
2.8
14.7
10.6
6.7
4.2
60 years. These delayed effects present a particular 
problem for estimating the costs of inaction.
To allow for the comparison of monetary estimates 
at different points of time, economists typically 
use 'discounting' techniques, whereby all estimates 
of future costs are discounted — or reduced in 
absolute terms — into net present values. There are 
two textbook reasons why economists assume the 
future is not worth the same as the present to an 
investor. Firstly the investor may not be alive when 
the return on the 'investment' is made, and secondly, 
the prospect of continued economic growth and 
technological progress means an investor expects 
to be richer when the return is made, meaning that 
the return will have less value in the future. For this 
reason economists apply a discount rate, reflecting 
mainly these two aspects, and adjusting them for time 
preferences and consumption value. 
To many non-economists, the implied shrinking of 
future values with the discounting technique is at 
odds with the core idea of intergenerational equity 
that is central to sustainability. A related problem is 
that many economists are applying discount rates 
that are typically used in the corporate sector — 
rising up to as much as 10 % — without reflecting on 
the specific context of environmental challenges. 
As pointed out in the Stern report, time preference 
discounting is less relevant for a society than to an 
individual. Firstly, society is not mortal. There is only 
a small risk that societies would be discontinued, 
whereas an individual investor faces a much greater 
risk. For this reason, Stern recommends representing 
this risk of social 'mortality' with a tiny discount rate 
of 0.1 %. As for the second aspect of discounting, the 
consumption discount rate that seeks to compensate 
for continued economic growth in the future, Stern 
maintains it should be based on expectations for 
future economic growth, net of inflation. Only a 
very small number of countries have expectations 
for annual economic growth rates of 10 %. In Stern's 
analysis of climate change policy with the PAGE 
model, he simulated many different trajectories of 
economic growth for the future decades and came to 
an average expectation of 1.3 % per annum. Stern's 
review argued that even when discounting the stream 
of future benefits, the aggregate sum of avoided 
damages — from 5 to 20 % of annual consumption 
— would well exceed the involved costs. Table 23.1 
illustrates how the social cost of carbon depends 
crucially on the discount rate chosen.
Many environmental projects have much shorter time 
horizons than climate change policy. For example, 
investments in sulphur scrubbers for air pollution 
abatement have only a 10 or 20 year lifetime. With 
shorter project lifetimes than in climate change policy, 
there will be less 'shrinking' of the future, even for 
the lifetime-loss of income of the lead-poisoned child 
(see estimates in Box 23.1 on lead). For mortality risks, 
discounting is not very important because the VSL 
must be adjusted upwards for expected economic 
growth, which will cancel out the consumption 
component of the discounting, leaving only the 0.1 %. 
23�6 Concluding remarks
We have discussed above some of the problems with 
the willingness to pay model of estimating the costs 
of inaction. In what has become a classic discussion 
of this model, Diamond and Hausman (1994) raise 
two other difficulties with willingness-to-pay and 
the so-called 'contingent valuation method' (CVM) 
it uses. Firstly, because stated willingness-to-pay 
is hypothetical, there is an inherent risk that 
any respondent will overstate their preferences, 
neglecting their level of income and therefore 
their real ability to actually pay. Secondly, there is 
the tendency of willingness-to-pay results to be 
inconsistent across different surveys. For example, the 
willingness-to-pay for cleaning up one lake might be 
similar to the willingness to pay for cleaning up five. 
People may simply express a desire to contribute EUR 
50 for a good purpose, but have no specific individual 
preference as to the amount of the public good in 
question. These are strong methodological critiques to 
the use of monetary estimates derived from CVM. 
Europe has acted cautiously in mandating formal 
requirements for cost-benefit analysis. At Member 
State level, there is a fairly limited tradition as part of 
formal legislative processes. Although the concept has 
found its way into common-day language across the 
European continent (Germans for instance speak of 
'Kosten-Nutzen analyse'), it is perceived by many as a 
somewhat American-style approach to policymaking 
processes. The Dutch felt compelled to rename it as 
Costs, justice and innovation | Understanding and accounting for the costs of inaction
607Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Box 23�3 Benefits of early action on ozone depleting substances
Why do ODS matter?
The ozone layer absorbs most of the high-frequency ultraviolet radiation that could cause damage to life on 
Earth. Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) are chemicals that can survive long enough in the atmosphere 
to migrate to ozone-rich areas, in the upper atmosphere, some 25 km high. At this altitude, ODS then 
undergo reactions that break down ozone molecules (see also Figure 23.3). If the emission of ODS is 
allowed to continue or increase, the ozone layer will reduce in thickness, increasing the quantity of harmful 
UV radiation that reaches the surface of the Earth (Molina and Rowland, 1974 — see also Chapter 7 on 
halocarbons and the ozone layer in Late lessons from early warning Volume 1 (EEA, 2001)).
Exposure to UV radiation has significant health implications for many forms of life, including humans. 
Excessive exposure is linked to increasing rates of skin cancer, cataract development and reduced capacity 
to resist bacterial and viral infection (WHO, 1994). Insufficient exposure can also create problems, notably 
by leading to vitamin D deficiency, and damaging crop productivity.
UVB radiation is a major causal factor in the development of melanoma and non-melanoma skin cancer 
(NMSC). A reduction in the thickness of the stratospheric concentration of ozone allows a greater proportion 
of UVB radiation to reach the Earth's surface, and will generate an increase in UVB-related cancers. 
Although NMSC is not as serious as melanoma, it accounts for the majority of skin cancers.
Recognition of the problem
Scientist Richard Scorer of Britain's Imperial College was a respected environmentalist, but sided with 
industry on the safety of CFC's, claiming in 1975 that 'The only thing that has been accumulated so far is a 
number of theories' (Roan, 1989:61). 
In spite of scepticism about the ozone depletion theory from some quarters, the case for limiting the 
production and emission of ODS is often viewed as a cause célèbre for international agreements. This 
is because it was one of the first cases of successful coordinated, international action on phasing out 
a chemical (CFCs were the first of the ODS to be banned) that was in widespread use, and that was 
shown to be causing an environmental impact on a global scale. The Montreal Protocol entered into force 
on 1 January 1989, and was recognised by Kofi Annan in 2003 as 'perhaps the single most successful 
international environmental agreement to date'. It 
went on to become the first international treaty to 
be universally ratified, on 16 September 2009, by 
196 countries, and has shown demonstrable success 
in achieving its stated objectives. This means that 
the ozone layer should return to its pre-1980 levels 
sometime between 2050 and 2075 (UNEP, 2009a).
A study undertaken in 2009 attempted to predict 
the future that was avoided by the Montreal Protocol 
and by subsequent international agreements on 
ozone-depleting chemicals (Newman et al., 2009). 
The benefits of early action are starkly illustrated 
in the predicted 'World Avoided' ultraviolet (UV) 
radiation index compiled by that study (see 
Figure 23.4). This figure shows the impact of the 
increasing amount of harmful UV radiation that 
would have been permitted to reach the Earth's 
surface. Without international agreements to 
eliminate ODS production and emissions, the ozone 
layer could have reduced in thickness by as much as 
67 % by 2065, with highly damaging consequences 
for humans and many other organisms.
Figure 23�3 Region of exceptionally depleted 
ozone in the stratosphere over 
the Antarctic
Source:  NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center Scientific 
Visualization Studio.
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Box 23�3 Benefits of early action on ozone depleting substances (ODS) (cont�)
Economic impacts
Health 
Incidence of skin cancers in response to increased UV radiation are expected to peak about 60 years 
from exposure. Assuming prevention of a 48 % decrease in the ozone layer by 2050, UNEP (2009b) has 
estimated that more than 20 million skin cancers and 130 million cataract cases have been prevented 
globally as a result of the Montreal protocol. 
The stabilisation of the ozone layer means that by 2050 annually about 47 000 skin cancer cases will be 
avoided in north-western Europe, although 14 000 additional cases of skin cancer are still to be expected 
as a result of the damage to the ozone layer that has already been done and the 60 year latency period 
(Slaper et al., 1998:83; Velders et al., 2001:8). 99.5 % of skin cancers are likely to be non-melanoma with 
a mortality rate of 1 %, while 0.5 % will be melanomas with a mortality rate of 24 %. The implication is 
about 500 fatalities avoided annually in north-western Europe towards the middle of the 21st century. 
Assuming the same ratio between fatality reduction 
and other avoided UV-radiation effects (mainly 
health-related) as in US studies (Sunstein, 2007), 
these figures imply that annual benefits of early 
action from the Montreal Protocol are not less 
than EUR 3 billion for Europe. Scaling results for 
north-western Europe to all of the European Union 
must take into account higher exposure risks in 
southern Europe, with likely annual benefits of 
EUR 10–11 billion for EU-27.
Climate change benefits of early action
ODSs have had a considerable impact upon so-called 
'radiative forcing', and therefore on global warming 
(Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence a 
factor has in altering the balance of incoming and 
outgoing energy in the earth-atmosphere system). 
It is estimated that 13 % of the present total global 
warming effect is due to the release from year 1750 
to 2000 of Halocarbons and ODSs (IPCC, 2007).
The avoided impacts of ODSs on climate change 
are substantial. The combined effect in 1990 was 
7.5 ± 0.4 GtCO2-equivalent/year, or about 33 % of 
the annual CO2 emissions due to global fossil fuel combustion (IEA, 2009). If we assume — in the absence 
of a Montreal protocol — a 3 % annual increase in ODS and halocarbon production, the 2010 emissions 
would have amounted to ~ 14 GtCO2-equivalent/year. In other words the Montreal protocol has over two 
decades saved the atmosphere for about 215 GtCO2-equivalent in emissions. Assuming that ODS had not 
been regulated separately, but also were to be counted under the Kyoto Protocol, these emissions, that 
stem mainly from developed countries, should have been offset and could have represented a cost of about 
EUR 2 150 billion (assuming a price of EUR 10 per tCO2-equivalent) — about 0.5 % of annual GDP of OECD 
countries over these two decades. 
The CO2-equivalent of ODS-reduction is bigger than cuts required by developed countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Important is also the time delay achieved in relation to climate change. It will take between 
7 and 12 years for CO2-emissions to increase by the amount of ODS abated with the Montreal Protocol. If 
considering the full reduction achieved since the 'early warning' scientists Molina and Rowland (1974) first 
called attention to the ozone layer break-down, as many as 30 to 45 years may have been gained (Velders 
et al., 2007). These estimates further underscore how early warning scientists must be attributed a role in 
curbing ODS-consumption being equally important to the Montreal protocol itself.
Figure 23�4 The 'world avoided' UV index 
as a result of international 
agreement
Source: Newman et al., 2009.
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SCBA — social cost benefit analysis — to sweeten the 
pill (RMNO, 2008). The uptake of cost-benefit analysis 
has been most significant in the United Kingdom. 
And because the United Kingdom has promoted the 
extension of the method to EU regulations — with 
occasional support from other Member States — 
there are examples of formal requirements for cost 
benefit analysis in EU programmes. Findings from 
cost-benefit analysis are also referred to in impact 
assessments of new legislative proposals prepared 
by the Commission. There has been a rule in place 
for the past 15 years requiring a cost-benefit analysis 
as part of the screening of projects set to receive 
EU support under the Structural Fund programmes 
and a manual is available to guide these assessments, 
published by the European Commission (2008). 
Obviously there are great methodological challenges 
in further expanding the use of cost-benefit analysis. 
However, there has also been some progress in 
these methodologies. For example, improvements in 
scientific knowledge and modelling techniques have 
helped to significantly influence the ratios of benefits 
to costs in favour of regulation.
Precautionary action can be justified by using credible 
estimates of the costs of inaction. The lead case 
illustrates that even if we have an understanding of 
only some of the benefits, making good use of the 
science base can be enough to prompt action. The 
nitrate case demonstrates that risk calculations can 
be useful and help prompt immediate action, even 
though the time-lag effects of exposure means that 
full proof will likely take decades to materialise. 
Finally, in the case of air pollution, making use of 
different estimates for mortality risk avoidance will 
help decision-makers to see that there are higher- 
and lower-bound estimates for the costs of inaction. 
Even if the lower-bound estimates are perhaps too 
conservative, with a bias towards health-effects, they 
will in many situations encourage more rather than 
less abatement effort. Reducing emission loads will 
also tend to bring relief for the intangible assets of 
biodiversity and nature. 
Making the best use of environmental science and 
modelling helps to make environmental protection 
and precaution a priority. Producing cost estimates 
should not be left to economists alone, but should 
rather be seen as a starting point for a broader 
discussion, featuring also the relevant expertise 
in health, ecology, demography, modelling and 
science. Well-researched estimates, based on 
inter-disciplinary collaboration, can strengthen 
some of those scattered and diffuse interests, which 
during the ordinary processes of policymaking have 
difficulty making their voices heard.
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24 Protecting early warners and late 
victims
Carl Cranor
  
Many Late lessons from early warnings chapters provide examples of early warning scientists 
who were harassed for bringing inconvenient truths about impending harm to the attention of the 
public and regulators. There is also some evidence that young scientists are being discouraged 
from entering controversial fields for fear of such harassment. In addition, where warnings 
have been ignored and damage has ensued, it has often proven difficult in the past to achieve 
prompt and fair compensation for the victims. Some ideas for reform, building on some current 
institutional models are explored here.
This chapter first explores the idea of extending whistleblowing laws to help encourage 
and protect early-warning scientists and others who identify evidence of impending harm. 
Complementary measures, such as greater involvement of professional societies and the use of 
recognition awards, as for example in Germany, could also be helpful. 
Next, the chapter explores improved mechanisms for compensating victims of pollution and 
contamination. The chapter on the Minamata Bay disaster provides an extreme example of 
long delays in getting adequate compensation for the victims of methylmercury poisoning. It 
was almost fifty years, between 1956 and 2004, before the victims attained equitable levels 
of compensation and legal recognition of responsibility. Other case studies illustrate similar 
examples of long delays in receiving adequate compensation. 
Options are examined for providing justice to any future victims of those emerging technologies 
such as nanotechnology, genetically modified crops and mobile phone use, which currently can 
provide broad public benefits but potentially at a cost to small groups of victims. The potential for 
widespread exposure and uncertain science could justify 'no-fault' administrative schemes that 
provide more efficient and equitable redress in situations where the benefit of scientific doubt 
would be given to victims. The use of anticipatory assurance bonds to help minimise and meet 
the costs of future environmental damage from large scale technologies is also explored.
A supplementary panel text describes cases of asbestos and mesothelioma, where the senior 
courts in the United Kingdom have developed innovative ways of dealing with both joint 
and several liability, and the foreseeability of subsequent asbestos cancers, after the initial 
recognition of the respiratory disease, asbestosis. Such legal developments in the field of 
personal injury could illustrate the future direction of long-tail liability in both environmental 
damage and personal injury. 
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Implementing a precautionary approach to 
managing new technologies requires, first and 
foremost, administrative laws aimed at detecting 
and addressing risks before they materialise into 
harms. But in addition to precautionary policies 
towards chemical, genetic and other technologies, 
additional legal tools can support the precautionary 
approach, better protecting public health and 
environment.
Since most statements of the precautionary principle 
emphasise acting on the basis of early warnings 
of threats to health and the environment and to 
minimise harm, at least two significant kinds of 
supporting laws should be considered. 
First, in order to encourage the identification of 
impending threats to health or environment as early 
as possible, current whistleblowing laws could 
be extended to protect early warning scientists 
and others from harassment. Such people should 
feel free, and be free, to research and report early 
warnings without the threat of adverse actions that 
would discourage them. 
Second, for those foreseeable and surprise events 
that cause future harm despite precautionary 
actions, measures could be taken to provide prompt 
and fair compensation without having to prove 
negligence by specific parties. 
These two issues are explored below.
24�1 Encouraging and protecting early 
warning scientists and others
It is not hard to imagine situations where 
rules or personal risks could prevent potential 
'whistleblowers' from sharing important 
information. Employees in academia, business or 
government might become aware of serious risks 
to health and the environment, but internal policies 
might pose threats of retaliation to those who report 
these early warnings. Private company employees in 
particular might be at risk of being fired, demoted, 
denied raises and so on for bringing environmental 
risks to the attention of appropriate authorities. 
Government employees could be at a similar risk 
for bringing threats to health or the environment 
to public attention, although perhaps this is less 
likely (1). 
Several democracies in the developed world have 
implemented whistleblower laws and policies to 
foster and protect those who call attention to legal 
wrongs, often but not only regarding corruption. 
Such laws provide models for how to think about 
whistleblower protections in a precautionary world.
'Whistleblower protection laws are intended 
to make it safe for employees to disclose 
misconduct that they discover during the 
course of their employment. Indeed, when 
accompanied by other initiatives, such laws 
can actually help foster an environment that 
rewards and encourages whistleblowing' 
(Kaplan, 2001).
Countries that have constitutional guarantees of 
free speech can also assist in protecting public 
employees, in particular those who call attention to 
issues of public concern. 
While some may praise whistleblowers for taking on 
their own companies or misconduct in government, 
others may regard them as disloyal, malcontents, 
grumpy employees, even bitter individuals who have 
been passed over for merits or promotions and are 
seeking to create problems. When they are regarded 
in this negative light, it becomes clear why there 
might be a need to foster and protect whistleblowing 
in order to encourage the revelation of misconduct, 
wrongdoing and harm, along with warnings that 
actions have occurred or are about to occur.
Some whistleblower protections in the United 
States
In the United States, the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection 
Act of 1989 (WPA), provides some of these 
protections. As Kaplan (2001) explains:
1. The WPA 'makes it illegal to take or threaten 
to take a 'personnel action' against a federal 
employee because the employee has made a 
protected disclosure' where 'personnel action' is 
broadly defined. 
2. This prohibition should be backed by sanctions 
for taking or threatening a 'personnel action' 
against a federal employee because the 
employee has a made a protected disclosure. 
This would be information that the employee 
'reasonably believes evidences a violation of the 
(1)  The US Union of Concerned Scientists has recently reported cases of government employees in food and other areas who have 
been restricted from speaking out in the past. There are now attempts to restore the integrity of science across the US government 
following an initiative from the administration (UCS, 2012).
Costs, justice and innovation | Protecting early warners and late victims 
615Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
law, rule or regulation, a gross waste of funds, 
gross mismanagement, an abuse of authority, 
or a significant and specific danger to public 
health or safety.' Moreover, such a disclosure 
'need not prove ultimately accurate in order to 
be protected — it is enough if the person making 
it is acting in good faith and with an objectively 
reasonable belief in its accuracy.' 
3. In the US, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) 
enforces the whistleblower protection provisions 
of the WPA and has a great deal of independence 
from other government and private sector bodies 
to carry out its work. 
4. The OSC has authority to correct an adverse 
personnel action or to prosecute any retaliation. 
5. It also operates a 'secure channel', which 
government employees can use to report 
misconduct. 
6. It is comparatively easy for a whistleblower 
to make a 'prima facie case of retaliation'. It is 
sufficient that an employee's public disclosure 
be a 'contributing factor' to an adverse personnel 
action. 
Following the recent financial crisis, the US 
Congress passed financial reform legislation that 
included protections for whistleblowers in order to 
improve early warnings of violations of securities 
laws (Harvard Law Review, 2011). The new law 
provides substantial bounties to people reporting 
information that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) finds useful in identifying 
securities law violations, enhances protections for 
those providing the information, and establishes a 
two-tiered system for whistleblowers reporting to 
the SEC. The bounties can be 10–30 % of sanctions 
exceeding USD 1 million. 
The law 'prohibits employers from discharging, 
demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, 
or in any other manner discriminating against a 
whistleblower "because of any lawful act done by 
the whistleblower"' (Harvard Law Review, 2011). 
Protections for whistleblowers are greater for those 
who report directly to the SEC, but somewhat 
lesser for those who report to the company. These 
two tiers strongly encourage a person to report 
to the SEC rather than going to the company 
that has committed the violation. This could be a 
strength — boosting the hand of SEC enforcers, but 
discouraging local corrections for abuses — or a 
weakness, undermining internal compliance systems 
within companies.
Some whistleblower protections in the United 
Kingdom and South Africa 
The United Kingdom's Public Interest Disclosure 
Act (PIDA) differs in some respects from the 
US approach (House of Commons, 1998). In the 
United Kingdom the PIDA governs both public 
and private employees, providing that 'a worker 
has the right not to be subjected to any detriment 
by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, done on 
the ground that the worker has made a protected 
disclosure.' 
Based on 'reasonable belief', whistleblowers 
are protected if reporting criminal offenses, 
miscarriages of justice or that 'the health or 
safety or an individual, is being or is likely to be 
endangered.' There are defined channels by which 
a whistleblower may disclose violations but in the 
United Kingdom there is a preference for disclosing 
to the private employer or some public agency 
identified by the Secretary of State to hear such 
reports. Whistleblowers are at some risk if they go 
outside the recognised reporting channels (Kaplan, 
2001).
In contrast to the US approach, the UK law 
encourages employers to specify internal 
procedures for disclosures and responses to them, 
but employees are not restricted to these. Moreover, 
there is no 'independent agency of the State to 
investigate or prosecute whistleblower complaints' 
as there is in the US (Kaplan, 2001).
In 2000, South Africa passed 'the Protected 
Disclosures Act', largely modelled on the UK's 
PIDA and covering both private and public 
employees. In addition to covering dismissals, 
demotions, involuntary transfers and suspensions, 
it goes beyond the US laws by 'explicitly including 
harassment and intimidation, as well as the 
refusal to provide an employment reference, or 
provision of an adverse reference as "occupational 
detriments"'. Reports of misconduct may be made 
to employers or a specified public agency, but there 
is no independent agency of the State to conduct 
investigations. The whistleblower has to invoke a 
court or tribunal for protection (Kaplan, 2001).
Whistleblower provisions have been enacted in 
some established democracies but many emerging 
democracies have been slow to institute them. In 
addition, countries with constitutional or other free 
speech protections appear to have a wider range 
of protections for those who identify and report 
wrongdoing (Kaplan, 2001). 
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In order for whistleblower provisions to function 
well employees must be aware of both statutory 
protections and the variety of channels through 
which disclosures or wrongdoing may be reported. 
The protections must be sufficiently effective 
to overcome employee reluctance to use them. 
In addition, government agencies and private 
entities must 'change their cultures, to make them 
receptive, rather than hostile, to employees who 
"rock the boat"' and this must be communicated 
from the top (Kaplan, 2001).
Desirable features of whistleblower laws
Whistleblower protections for those who report 
threats to the environment or public health 
from genetic, chemical or other technologies can 
supplement laws implementing the precautionary 
principle. Existing models suggest that such laws 
 
Panel 24�1 Better scientific support for early warning scientists? 
David Gee
An early warning scientist is not the same as a whistleblower who reports on wrongdoing. However, the 
Late lessons from early warnings case studies have provided several examples of early warning scientists 
who, like whistleblowers, were harassed after issuing or publishing their views. Examples include Snow 
(in relation to his work on cholera); Selikoff (regarding asbestos); Henderson, Byers, Patterson and 
Needleman (regarding leaded petrol); Osakawa (regarding mercury); Putzai and Chapella (regarding 
GMOs); Schneider (regarding climate change); and several scientists in the French bees story. In addition 
there are others who wish to remain anonymous. 
Other examples from beyond the Late lessons case studies include public servants who have been 
prevented from speaking out on environment or health issues (UCS, 2012; Martin 1999 and 2008).
Generally, recognition that scientists were harassed seems to increase over time, alongside acceptance 
that the early warning has been vindicated by unfolding science. The luxury of such hindsight is of little 
use to harassed early warning scientists, however, who, unlike Nobel prize winners, need fairly immediate 
recognition for their 'inconvenient truth' and resulting personal difficulties. 
The price of providing early peer group support to harassed early warning scientists could be that some 
warnings turn out to be false alarms. However, this may be seen as an acceptable price to pay for 
defending the rights of scientists to issue an early warning based on reasonably plausible evidence. 
As we have seen, there are some legal precedents from the field of whistleblowing that could be used to 
help characterise the situations in which responsible early warning scientists would be encouraged and 
protected by their scientific peers. Relevant considerations include the following:
• the scientists have acted in good faith in drawing attention to threats to health and/or the environment 
based on evidence that they reasonably believe;
• the belief need not necessarily prove 'ultimately accurate' in order for them to be protected, (Kaplan, 
2001);
• the early warning scientist suffers from some form of serious harassment, including personal 
attacks (distinct from scientific criticism) in the scientific literature and elsewhere; being preventing 
from speaking out, or publishing; removal from their scientific work; loss of contracts or funding; 
unreasonable difficulties in getting their science in the relevant literature; accusations of scientific 
misconduct; being by-passed for promotion; loss of their facilities or staff; and threats of legal action.
should protect public and private employees from 
adverse personnel actions, broadly construed. 
Employees should be protected as long as they 
have a reasonable belief that private or government 
actions are a violation of the law or pose threats 
to the environment or public health. There should 
be a secure channel by which misconduct can 
be reported and it should be fairly easy for an 
employee to make a prima facie case that he or she 
has suffered retaliation. There should be an office 
with considerable independence from private 
or government bodies to provide protection and 
prosecute any retaliation. Finally, if a country desires 
to encourage whistleblowing more strongly, it could 
offer bounties amounting to some percentage of the 
fines issued against wrongdoers.
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Panel 24�1 Better scientific support for early warning scientists? (cont�)
In contrast to whistleblowers, where the law is the main measure used in their protection, it would be 
more constructive if early warning scientists were encouraged from the outset by a culture within science 
that explicitly supported challenges to conventional scientific ideas and paradigms and the scientists who 
may suffer as a result of producing the challenges. There is a long history of scientific and other dissenters, 
which illustrates their frequent value to societies (Sunstein, 2005; Mercer, 2010). 
It may be asking too much of individual scientists, whose lifelong work is challenged by an early warning 
scientist, to respond positively to the challenge. It would be reasonable, however, to expect more 
independent professional associations of scientists, who have the integrity of science as a whole to uphold, 
to produce explicit policies that encourage early warning scientists and defend them if they are harassed.
Early warning scientists would be further encouraged if there were a European award to an early warning 
scientist who had produced a reasonably credible challenge to conventional science and who subsequently 
suffered harassment.
Such an award would follow the precedent of rewards to successful whistleblowers, which began with a law 
against lead in alcohol production in the USA in the 18th century (see Chapter 3) and which continue today 
under US financial regulations.
The award would need to be made by an authoritative and independent scientific body of scientists, free 
from direct bias (i.e. their own scientific work would not be challenged by affording credibility to the early 
warning science).
An interesting legal view of such 'intellectual bias' comes from a World Trade Organization case in which 
scientists acting as expert witnesses were asked to review science that was critical of their own work. The 
WTO Appellate Body considered that as 'coauthors' of the JECFA reports that were being criticised, they 
'cannot be considered to be independent and impartial in these circumstances, because this would amount 
to asking them to review and criticise reports that are their own doing' (WTO, 2008). 
An appropriate title for such an award could be 'The Henrik Ibsen award for early warning scientists' in 
recognition of Ibsen's play, 'An enemy of the people' which concerns the harassment of an early warning 
public health doctor. The harassed Chisso company doctor in the Minamata chapter of the present volume 
of Late lessons from early warnings, like many others in similar situations drew support from reading that 
Ibsen play. 
An existing award that could provide some relevant lessons is the German Whistleblower Award, which 
honours individuals who have exposed grave abuses, dangers or aberrations in their professional field for the 
public good. It is awarded by The Federation of German Scientists (VDW/FGS) and the German section of the 
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). info@vdw-ev.de / info@ialana.de.
In addition to possible legal remedies, early warning 
scientists could receive greater support from 
scientific communities (see Panel 24.1).
24�2 Providing compensation in a 
precautionary world
If we have precaution, do we need compensation?
How necessary are compensation policies in a legal 
system committed to precaution in protecting health 
and the environment? Compensation might seem 
unnecessary in a world guided by precautionary 
approaches. Effective precautionary approaches 
would result in fewer wrongs to right; wholly 
successful policies might not leave any. 
In reality, of course, flawless implementation 
of precautionary approaches is unattainable. 
Compensatory schemes are needed to address 
harms that occur despite precautionary efforts. 
Harms can also arise because society accepts certain 
risks, which benefit society as a whole but may 
result in harm to individuals. For example, we use 
lead or cadmium in batteries and other electronic 
devices despite the hazards to people and the 
environment. Alternatively, accepting one risk of 
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harm potentially mitigates other, more serious 
dangers to human or environmental health. The use 
of some pesticides is an example of such a risk-risk 
trade-offs. Even if such harms do not involve 
wrongful acts by individuals or companies, justice 
arguably demands that society compensate those 
adversely affected 
In addition, there may continue to be less visible 
threats to health and the environment. For instance, 
substances that contribute to disease during early 
human development can trigger subtle diseases 
or dysfunctions that can be difficult to detect via 
human studies. Some will have extremely long 
causal tails, delaying the manifestation of disease 
by decades. Some will be comparatively rare. For 
example, early or mid-life exposures to substances 
such as the pesticide paraquat or the industrial 
degreaser trichloroethylene (TCE) may hasten the 
early onset of Parkinson's disease, as shown by 
animal and human studies (Cranor, 2011). Other 
substances may pose long-delayed risks to wildlife 
or the broader environment, as has been seen in the 
Arctic (Cone, 2005).
Genetically modified plants may cause subtle genetic 
or other changes in vegetation or the environment 
that may not be immediately perceptible, or that 
will only be revealed over a longer period of time. 
For example, there have been proposals to use 
transgenic plants to extract organic mercury from 
the soil and volatilise it into elemental mercury 
(National Research Council, 2002). While this 
might be of some benefit at a local level, on a larger 
scale this proposal could easily have long-term 
adverse environmental and health consequences. 
Concentrations of atmospheric mercury would 
probably increase in local areas and then be deposited 
further away into aquatic or terrestrial ecosystems via 
precipitation and condensation. Once there, it would 
again be converted into more toxic organic mercury, 
although in a different location. This would add to 
organic mercury from other sources, exacerbating 
existing effects (National Research Council, 2002). 
Decision-makers must clearly be alert to such 
long-term, subtle environmental consequences of new 
technologies.
Finally, it is worth noting that imposing an 
obligation to compensate those harmed by 
technological hazards can also help deter firms from 
undertaking harmful activities. 
Compensation systems
There are different rationales for compensation. One 
comes from the tort law. As Priest (2003) explains: 
'Tort law is designed to deal with harms inflicted by 
some identifiable person who was in a position to 
have prevented the harm'. The tort system shifts the 
costs of injuries to parties judged to be responsible, 
sometimes 'at fault' for the harm, 'in order to create 
incentives to reduce the level of harm suffered in the 
society'. It awards full damages to injured parties 
in order to ensure that the full costs of the legal 
violation are paid by the tortfeasor and to provide 
some degree of deterrence. 
In contrast, insurance addresses 'losses that 
cannot realistically be prevented'. Typically private 
insurance is funded by parties seeking to protect 
themselves from future costs and placed into 
'self-supporting risk pools in ways that serve to 
reduce effective risks while amassing resources to 
compensate those who ultimately suffer losses'. 
Government insurance, another form of risk 
sharing, is ordinarily 'provided for more generalised 
societal risks for which no, or less of a, market exists, 
such as the risks of unemployment or disaster' 
(Priest, 2003). 
Contrasted with all of these, but somewhat similar to 
tort law, are systems of compensatory reparations. 
Reparations presuppose that one person has acted 
wrongly, causing harm to another person who 
deserves compensation as a consequence (Boxill, 
2011). The best reparations would also include 
an acknowledgement by the wrongdoer of the 
wrongdoing in order to help restore relationships 
severed by the wrongful act (2). Institutionalising 
acceptance of wrongdoing presents difficulties, 
however, and there is likely to be greater success in 
securing compensation for injured parties if it is not 
required.
The existing institutions discussed below do 
not always carefully distinguish these different 
dimensions of restitution. The central idea, however, 
is to provide some substantial degree of recompense 
to those who have suffered losses as a result of new 
technologies. 
One ideal would be to ensure that the full social 
costs of a technology are incorporated into the costs 
of the activity (removing negative externalities), or 
at least to ensure that the costs are not left to fall on 
innocent bystanders or the environment. However, 
(2) As noted in Chapter 5, victims of methylmercury poisoning in Minamata, Japan, have sought such acknowledgement but have not 
secured it.
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not all compensatory approaches accomplish the 
first goal. For example, the creator of a technology 
that causes harm may not be have acted wrongfully 
according to the requirements of tort law or 
compensatory reparation systems. 
Guidance for compensation in a precautionary 
world
The above discussion suggests the outline for 
compensatory approaches in a precautionary 
world: 
1. Successful precautionary policies should reduce 
the need for compensation. 
2. Compensatory approaches should seek 
to minimise any harm as quickly as is 
institutionally reasonable and to shorten its 
duration, if possible. 
3. Some past environmental, health and new 
technological issues suggest that compensation 
is needed to address difficult situations such 
as long-tailed, less visible, low probability, and 
subtle consequences of a technology. These 
could be long-tailed in two senses: both highly 
unlikely and possibly years into the future. 
4. Any reasonable compensation should also 
be combined with an adequate deterrence 
mechanism to discourage firms from negligence 
or recklessness toward public health or the 
environment. 
5. Finally, in some countries with single-payer 
health systems that provide medical care to 
all citizens, compensation for injured people 
would be less than under medical systems with 
private insurance. Nonetheless, there would 
still be a need to compensate for income loss, 
personal suffering, losses of loved ones, and 
other non-medical losses.
What compensatory 'institutions' or policies might 
be adopted for a precautionary world to set matters 
right, once people or the environment have been 
harmed? Of those compensatory approaches, which 
might be most compatible with a precautionary 
approach towards people and environmental 
resources?
With these questions in mind, the strengths and 
weaknesses of several compensatory approaches 
are assessed below: traditional personal injury 
law, workers' compensation, and individual 
compensatory schemes tailored to particular classes 
of potential harms such as the US Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program and the UK's radiation 
compensation programme. In addition, general 
no fault compensatory arrangements like those 
used in New Zealand are considered, and flexible 
assurance bonds instituted upfront to provide 
compensation if technological risks materialise.
24.2.1 Tort or personal injury law
Tort or personal injury law is a major institution in 
the US and the United Kingdom (with analogues in 
other countries). It aims to provide compensation 
for injuries that people suffer because of the 
conduct of others. In bringing a tort action, a party 
(the plaintiff), who believes another party (the 
defendant) has caused him or her harm, must 
show that defendant breached a legal duty, that the 
plaintiff suffered a legally compensable injury, and 
that defendant's breach was the cause in fact and the 
legally proximate cause of the injury. Each element 
of the cause of action must be established by the 
preponderance of the evidence — the balance of the 
quality and quantity of evidence must favour the 
plaintiff. 
The duty that the defendant breached in most cases 
is a duty in negligence — to take reasonable care 
that one's actions do not cause legally compensable 
injuries to others. In the US, tort duties in strict 
liability (liability without fault) exist for products, 
ultra-hazardous activities and trespass. Under 
strict liability a plaintiff need only show that the 
defendant's action caused and was the proximate 
cause of a plaintiff's injuries. A plaintiff need not 
show lack of reasonable care by the defendant. 
When torts came into prominence in the 
19th century, it was quite cramped and restricted 
in principle at the outset and quite limited in 
application in achieving compensation goals. 
Nineteenth century courts never considered 
holding defendants accountable in strict liability, 
instead basing liability on 'moral fault,' interpreted 
as negligence. Defendants were also provided a 
number of defences that greatly limited many tort 
actions for harm caused by railroads or factories 
during the industrial age, reducing the number 
of injuries entitled to compensation. Courts were 
concerned that more extensive tort liability would 
too greatly burden enterprises; and they had a 
suspicion of juries, who might be overly sympathetic 
to injured parties. Both continue in current debates 
(Friedman, 1985).
As the tort law developed, some of these 
liability-limiting features were moderated. Strict 
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liability became the basis for some legal actions: 
for harm caused by ultra-hazardous activities 
and for products liability. Proximate causation 
rules were liberalised. In the early 20th century 
workplace torts largely disappeared in favour of 
a government-managed workers' compensation 
programme designed to expedite compensation, 
remove long, costly disputes, and provide a 
more consistent legal framework for addressing 
workplace injuries (Friedman, 1985).
Doctrines more favourable to plaintiffs continued 
to develop until about 1980. Various cause-in-fact 
rules were adopted to ease the burden on plaintiffs 
in establishing causal claims, recognising the 
multifactorial nature of causation (Anderson 
v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. St. M.R.R. Co., 
1920; Summers v. Tice, 1948; Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 1980). Doctrines of joint and several 
liability better ensured that plaintiffs received 
compensation from some defendant to an action. 
About this time, firms required to defend tort suits, 
with support from some legal scholars, began efforts 
to roll back doctrines that had eased the burden on 
plaintiffs. At the same time, other scholars argued 
that the tort law had never served well to express 
moral outrage about wrongs (likely never its aim), 
poorly compensated plaintiffs and did not function 
especially well to deter harmful conduct (Abel, 
1988).
Defence arguments yielded some success in the 
United States during the late-1980s and early-1990s. 
Some jurisdictions limited compensation, especially 
for pain and suffering. Some sought to limit joint 
liability. And, there was considerable pressure to 
ensure high standards for scientific evidence in cases 
requiring it. 
As a consequence, the US Supreme Court 
intervened, ultimately invalidating a long-standing 
rule concerning the admissibility of scientific 
testimony. The Court had initially seemed to 
liberalise admissibility rules for experts in 
Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993). 
However, as that decision was implemented by 
lower courts and expanded by two later Supreme 
Court decisions (General Electric v. Joiner (1997) 
and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999)), in many 
jurisdictions it substantially burdened experts, 
especially those for plaintiffs (Cranor, 2006). Some 
state and federal circuits are especially onerous 
(Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 1997). 
Although in principle these rules impartially apply 
to both plaintiffs and defendants, in reality they 
asymmetrically hamper plaintiffs, who bear the 
burden of proof to establish the key elements of a 
tort. 
This series of decisions reduced plaintiffs' access 
to the law because lawyers must invest greater 
resources upfront to ensure experts have good 
scientific foundations for testimony, which in turn 
means they only take cases they are more certain to 
win. This development likely reduces somewhat any 
deterrent effect of tort law (Cranor, 2006).
Too often judicial interpretations of the admissibility 
of scientists erected unscientific barriers against 
expert testimony (Cranor, 2007 and 2008b). Recently, 
however, a decision from the US First Circuit Court 
of Appeals has marked a change. In that circuit, 
with jurisdiction over about one-twelfth of the US, 
scientists may now use in the courtroom the same 
kinds of arguments that they would use in the lab 
to draw scientific conclusions. In addition, there is 
no priority of evidence for cancer causation, such 
as human epidemiological evidence (Milward v. 
Acuity Specialty Products, Inc., 2011). This decision 
removes some judicially created unscientific barriers 
to expert testimony.
In large measure current US tort law does not 
compensate injured parties well or quickly. They 
bear the initial burden of proof to establish legal 
violations, injuries and causation. When scientific 
or technical evidence is needed, this increases the 
hurdles. In some US federal jurisdictions plaintiffs 
must have human epidemiological evidence 
showing that toxic exposures double the relative 
risk of disease from which a plaintiff suffers, 
a further barrier because of the insensitivity of 
epidemiological research. In some jurisdictions 
compensation is capped at a sufficiently low 
level that it is inadequate for some injuries. Even 
when plaintiffs are successful, resolution can take 
considerable time. 
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products was filed in 
2007 and stopped by the trial judge for inadequate 
scientific testimony in 2010. It was reinstated by the 
First Circuit Court of appeals in 2011 with many of 
the original twenty-two defendants settling. As of 
2012 one defendant continued to seek a jury trial 
to conclude the issues. This case involves a single 
plaintiff (but many defendants) and in this respect 
may be typical of many tort cases.
Class actions involving many plaintiffs and 
sometimes many defendants are more difficult 
and can take longer to resolve. However, once 
there is a sufficient record of injury types, as 
with asbestos, and a long history of litigation, 
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subsequent compensation disputes will generally 
be settled much more quickly, often without trial. 
In addition, class action cases can reach a point 
at which the issues are clear and there is no need 
to litigate compensation for each plaintiff. At that 
time, defence and plaintiff attorneys, perhaps 
with encouragement from the judge, agree to 
a 'settlement matrix' — a classification system 
for groups of plaintiffs with similar exposures, 
adverse health outcomes and possible confounding 
factors, e.g. health status or smoking. The matrix 
enables comparatively easy classification of each 
plaintiff to receive greater or lesser compensation 
depending on the circumstances for the injuries 
suffered. In this respect, some tort law settlements 
can resemble the classification of injured parties 
under the compensation schemes described below, 
such as worker compensation or vaccine injury 
compensation. 
In addition to the shortcomings of the tort system 
outlined above, it is essential to note that when 
there is clear harm to people, injured parties rarely 
bring legal cases to set matters right. For instance, 
Saks (2000) observes that in cases of clear medical 
malpractice just 4 % or fewer of injured parties even 
approach a lawyer to consider redress.
Based on the above, existing US tort law appears 
to be a poor legal model for providing rapid and 
adequate compensation for those who have been 
wrongly injured by the actions or products of others. 
Tort law persists but its achievements fall far short of 
its goals. 
Battery and trespass are two other causes of action 
in the US tort system that could provide some 
compensation for citizens, short of people being 
actually harmed. Battery is the 'foundational tort 
cause of action. It protects bodily integrity and 
individual autonomy, creating the essential status 
and space for social interactions' (Lyndon, 2012). 
The idea is that by giving citizens a cause of action 
for offense against them or for violation of bodily 
integrity without their consent, this lessens the 
chances of retaliatory harm needing criminal 
intervention; historically it was a means of helping 
to keep the King's peace in the United Kingdom.
To establish a battery a plaintiff must show that 
'the defendant committed a voluntary act with the 
intent to cause a wrongful [offensive or harmful] 
contact and the contact occurred.' Intent is widely 
construed for this purpose and it applies to the 
contact only; one need not intend offensiveness or 
harm (Lyndon, 2012; Cranor, 2011). For intentional 
invasions of one's body by potentially harmful 
chemical substances without consent that one 
would reasonably regard as offensive, one could 
bring a battery cause of action. A special advantage 
of battery compared with the main body of tort 
law is that one need not show harm as the result 
of the invasion, offensive contact is sufficient. 
Consequently, if one's bodily integrity has been 
invaded by potentially harmful substances in a 
manner one would reasonably regard as offensive, 
whether or not one has been harmed and before one 
could even show harm, one potentially has a cause 
of action in battery.
Trespass is also a vindication of a legal right against 
invasion. What remains of early trespass law largely 
concerns property but also applies to invasions 
of individuals. If someone enters property or 
causes molecules, particles, or toxic substances to 
enter property without 'authorization' or without 
permission, the person has trespassed on the 
property. Trespass also applies to violations of the 
integrity of persons, e.g. as when blasting trees 
injure a party on a public highway (Cranor, 2011). 
Both battery and trespass are founded on deep 
considerations concerning the integrity of one's 
person (or property) and 'rights over aspects of one's 
life'. Without doing harm one can be accountable for 
either battery or trespass and merit compensation. 
Compensation for battery would consist of 'Proof 
of the technical invasion of the integrity of the 
plaintiff's person by even an entirely harmless, but 
offensive, contact [which] entitles him to vindication 
of his legal right by an award of nominal damages, 
and the establishment of the tort cause of action 
entitles him also to compensation for the mental 
disturbance inflicted upon him' (Cranor, 2011).
A larger number of citizens could potentially bring 
battery or trespass causes of action than could 
bring actions in torts for harm caused by toxicants. 
This might better facilitate safety testing and better 
deter invasions by potentially harmful substances 
than would successful tort suits alleging (and even 
proving) harm. Battery and trespass would likely be 
much quicker and easier to resolve than would tort 
suits for harm. Compensation for each individual 
invaded in a battery/trespass action would likely 
be much less than for each individual harmed in a 
typical tort action, but total compensation paid out 
by a company that caused the invasion (or harm, 
respectively) could be substantial.
One aspect of the tort law, whether for actions for 
harm or battery/trespass, is quite important both 
in supporting health protections and providing 
compensation for plaintiffs. This is a pre-trial stage 
called 'discovery'. During discovery each litigant in 
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the dispute can interrogate the other party about 
information it may have about the background of 
the dispute, try to determine what legal issues are 
or could be easily agreed upon, request documents 
related to the issue, and conduct depositions 
(questioning of witnesses on the issues). This 
process can reveal a good deal of information about 
a case that might expedite settlement or narrow 
issues. It can also serve the wider public good, 
by revealing hidden data about adverse health 
effects, decisions made by responsible people 
that contributed to harm, policies that might have 
exacerbated problems and so on. If information 
unearthed during discovery is publicised, as it 
has been for asbestos, lead, and vinyl chloride in 
the US, it can alert public health officials to other 
problems, issues meriting further investigation, 
scientists who have acted without integrity, or even 
other serious legal wrongdoings (Brodeur, 1983; 
Markowitz and Rosner, 2002).
In a legal system that greatly emphasised 
precautionary policies toward risks and harms, tort 
law with its emphasis on showing harm would be a 
poor compensatory model simply because bringing 
a successful tort action is normally burdensome 
and slow. This would greatly slow efforts to reduce 
harm and clean up environmental contamination. 
Tort actions for battery/trespass would be less 
burdensome and slow, but lesser compensation for 
each individual would result; total compensation 
paid out could be substantial. 
Of course, tort law can be modified; it is not set in 
stone. For instance, there are some developments 
in the tort system of the United Kingdom that 
merit attention because they may expand the 
range of compensation available to plaintiffs for 
injuries suffered from some kinds of environmental 
exposures. For asbestos-caused mesothelioma 
possibly resulting from exposures due to the 
activities of two or more defendants, a plaintiff 
need not rule out other possible causes (because all 
or virtually all mesothelioma is caused by asbestos 
exposure). Also, once liability has been established 
for particular defendants, all defendants must pay 
full compensation for the mesothelioma-related 
injuries. Other court decisions have applied the 
same principle to dermatitis caused by coal dust 
(discussed below). 
Just because medical science cannot determine 
which of several liable defendants' asbestos fibres 
caused plaintiff's injuries does not bar recovery for 
mesothelioma. In short, 'where there are multiple 
potential tortfeasors ... in the case of an 'indivisible 
injury' such as mesothelioma, any tortfeasor could 
be liable for the whole of the injury once liability 
has been established' (McIntyre, 2004 (emphasis 
added)). UK courts treat asbestosis (which also 
results from asbestos exposures) differently: each 
liable defendant in a group need not pay for the 
full costs of the disease but only for the portion 
of time plaintiff had asbestos exposures at their 
facilities (McIntyre, 2004).
A second UK innovation concerns foreseeability for 
harm from an asbestos facility to those outside the 
plant boundaries. Where a defendant should have 
reasonably foreseen a risk of pulmonary injury, not 
necessarily mesothelioma, it has been found liable 
for mesothelioma in people who reside near to 
asbestos plants (see Panel 24.2.). Generalising from 
this, it suggests that companies might be liable 
not merely for known toxic injuries to employees 
but also for other types of harm to local residents 
of a type that emerged after the initial exposure 
(McIntyre, 2004).
24.2.2 Alternatives to the tort system
Workers' compensation
The tort system's shortcomings in addressing 
compensation for occupational injuries and 
illnesses led to the development of an alternative 
compensatory arrangement. Under tort law, 
employees seeking compensation historically bore 
the burden of proof to show that employment 
caused an injury and that the employer was 
negligent. Employers had an incentive to delay 
legal proceedings because injured employees 
probably had more limited means to support 
themselves, to secure medical care and to bring 
legal actions. Such suits were slow to resolve 
and unpredictable, and damages were often 
inadequate. Employees were often afraid to sue 
their employers, and witnesses among fellow 
workers were often difficult to find (Franklin, 
1979).
Workers' compensation programmes were 
implemented as an alternative to torts for 
employees. They hold employers liable without 
fault for injuries suffered by employees in the 
course of and arising out of their employment. 
Employees 'exchange their common law damage 
actions for smaller but more reliable recoveries 
whenever they [are] hurt on the job even if they 
[are] at fault and the employer [is] not' (Franklin, 
1979). The discussion that follows provides the 
general outlines of workers' compensation within 
various states in the United States, since this is a 
state, not a federal issue.
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Panel 24�2 Liability for asbestos-related illness: redefining the rules on 'toxic torts'
Owen McIntyre
In recent years litigation over diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos has led to the progressive 
development of UK common law principles as they apply to two issues that have traditionally proven very 
onerous for plaintiffs claiming for 'toxic torts' (Cranor, 2006). These are the burdens of establishing the 
necessary causal link between an activity and disease and of establishing that harm that only becomes 
apparent long after the period of exposure, when scientific understanding of the risks may have been less 
developed, ought to have been reasonably foreseeable. Considerations of justice and injustice played a 
major role in each of these innovative developments in tort cases on asbestos-induced mesothelioma. 
The UK House of Lords has recently ruled that the traditional 'but for' test for causation need not apply in 
mesothelioma (3) claims entered by employees who suffered periods of exposure to asbestos with more 
than one employer and where medical science cannot prove who among a number of employers caused 
the condition (4). This decision effectively creates joint and several liability whereby the claimant will be 
entitled to recover damages in full against each defendant. 
In addition, and with strong implications for the precautionary principle, the English Court of Appeal ruled 
in 1996 that liability arose in respect of exposure to asbestos resulting in mesothelioma despite 
the fact that the disease was not known to medical science at any time during the relevant period 
of exposure (5). The Court reached this decision by employing a broad concept of injury for the purposes 
of establishing reasonable foreseeability. This development is significant in light of the emphasis placed 
on the requirement of foreseeability in environmental claims by the House of Lords decision in Cambridge 
Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather (6).
Causation
Establishing causation in toxic tort actions has long proven a difficult and even insurmountable task. 
The Scottish case of Graham and Graham v. ReChem (7) provides an extreme example of the practical 
problems which can be involved in establishing causation in such cases, involving an action in negligence 
and nuisance against the operator of a hazardous waste incinerator by local farmers for alleged damage to 
their cattle. The case lasted for 896 hours in court, spread over 198 days, and involved 80 lay witnesses 
and 21 expert witnesses on such issues as veterinary toxicology, agricultural accountancy, incinerator 
design, dioxin formation, pollution dispersion, analysis of trace organics and meteorology. The defendant's 
costs were estimated at GBP 4.5 million and the cost to the Legal Aid Board at GBP 1.5 million (see Wooley 
et al., 2000). Ultimately, the case failed on the issue of causation as there were other possible explanations 
of the cattle's injuries.
The cancer mesothelioma is classified by the UK courts as an 'indivisible' disease, as distinct from the 
respiratory disease, asbestosis, which is 'divisible' or cumulative. In the case of asbestosis, once the 
threshold for exposure is exceeded, all inhaled fibres are considered to contribute proportionately and 
progressively to lung dysfunction. The 'indivisibility' of mesothelioma creates obvious difficulty for a 
plaintiff mesothelioma victim who has been negligently exposed to asbestos by a number of defendants, 
usually successive employers, in terms of establishing causation.
In Fairchild, Curtis J. refused recovery at first instance to the estate of a mesothelioma victim suing two 
former owners of buildings containing asbestos in which he had worked (8). The Court found that there 
was no evidence of significant differences between the respective levels of exposure and was 'unable to 
establish on the balance of probabilities that the breaches of duty by either defendant were a cause or a 
material contribution to the deceased's mesothelioma'. 
(3)  Mesothelioma is cancer of the lining of the lung or stomach. See the chapter on asbestos in Volume 1 of Late lessons from early 
warnings (EEA, 2001).
(4)  Joined cases Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, Fox v. Spousal (Midlands) Ltd, and Matthews v. Associated Portland 
Cement Manufacturers (1978) Ltd and others, (2002), UKHL 22, NLJ Law Reports, 28 June 2002. See also, Morgan (2002).
(5)  Unrep. 17 April 1996. See further, McIntyre (2004).
(6)  (1994) 1 All ER 53 (H.L.)
(7)  (1996) EnvLR.
(8)  QBD, 1 February 2001.
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Panel 24�2 Liability for asbestos-related illness: redefining the rules on 'toxic torts' (cont�)
However, a mere five months after Curtis J.'s decision in Fairchild, the English High Court reached a very 
different conclusion on very similar facts (9). Where a mesothelioma victim sued two of 15 employers who 
had exposed him to asbestos during the course of his working life, Mitting J., relying on the 1972 decision 
of the House of Lords in McGhee (10), justified his award of full damages against both defendants stating: 
'The claimant was exposed by each defendant and by both defendants, to asbestos fibres, in quantities 
sufficient greatly to increase his risk of contracting mesothelioma.'
This followed the earlier ruling of Philips J. in a 1987 case (11) where he stated:
'Whether the defendants' breaches of duty merely added to the number of possible initiators of 
mesothelioma within the lungs of Mr Bryce, or whether they also produced a cumulative effect on the 
reduction of his body's defence mechanism, they increase the risk of his developing mesothelioma. 
He developed mesothelioma. Each of the defendants must accordingly be taken to have caused the 
mesothelioma by its breach of duty.'
The House of Lords later judgment in Fairchild relaxed the traditional test for establishing causation 
where there are multiple potential tortfeasors, holding that, in the case of an 'indivisible injury' such as 
mesothelioma, any tortfeasor could be liable for the whole of the injury once liability has been established. 
The House of Lords relied on its earlier decision in McGhee where it held that an employer who causes an 
indivisible disease such as dermatitis through exposure, only some of which is negligent, shall be liable in 
full for that injury. 
The Lords stressed in McGhee that theirs was a 'common sense' understanding of causation having regard 
to the circumstances of such cases. According to Lord Reid:
' … it has often been said that the legal concept of causation is not based on logic or philosophy. It is based 
on the practical way in which the ordinary man's mind works in the everyday affairs of life. From a broad 
and practical viewpoint I can see no substantial difference between saying that what the respondents did 
materially increased the risk of injury to the appellant and saying that what the respondents did made a 
material contribution to his injury' (emphasis added).
Lord Hoffman stated that 'I think it would be both inconsistent with the policy of the law imposing the duty 
and morally wrong for your Lordships to impose causal requirements which exclude liability'. 
Lord Hoffman approved the test for causation proposed by the Supreme Court of California in Rutherford 
v. Owens-Illinois Inc., stating that 'the causal requirements of the tort were satisfied by proving that 
exposure to a particular product was a substantial factor contributing to the … risk of developing cancer'. 
Lord Bingham stated that '… such injustice as may be involved in imposing liability on a duty-breaking 
employer in these circumstances is heavily outweighed by the injustice of denying redress to a victim'. 
Foreseeability of the 'surprise' disease of mesothelioma
The unique characteristics associated with the disease of mesothelioma have also resulted in the English 
courts taking an innovative approach to the issue of foreseeability of damage for the purposes of liability. 
The disease can develop from a very short period of exposure, even from a single instance of exposure but 
only manifests itself many years after exposure. According to statistics published by the insurer Munich 
Re, the average latency period (i.e. from first exposure to diagnosis of the cancer) for asbestos-related 
mesothelioma is 34 years (12) and epidemiology suggests that it is so rare for the latency period to be less 
than ten years that exposures within ten years of diagnosis may be excluded as causal (see Miller, 2002). 
(9)  Matthews v. Associated Portland Cement and British Uralite PLC, QBD, 11 July 2001. Indeed, Dr Rudd, the principle expert witness 
in Fairchild, also acted in Matthews giving substantially similar evidence. See Miller (2002). 
(10)  McGhee v. National Coal Board (1972) 3 All ER 1008, where it held that an employer who causes an indivisible disease such as 
dermatitis through exposure, only some of which is negligent, shall be liable in full for that injury.
(11)  Bryce v. Swan Hunter Group plc and others (1988), 1 All ER 658.
(12)  Munich Re, Employers Liability Handbook. See further, Buckley, supra, n. 1, at 192.
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Panel 24�2 Liability for asbestos-related illness: redefining the rules on 'toxic torts' (cont)
In the joined cases Margereson v. JW Roberts Ltd and Hancock v. JW Roberts Ltd, (13) the plaintiffs 
sued an asbestos manufacturer after having contracted mesothelioma due to the defendant's extensive 
asbestos contamination of the district of Armley in Leeds where both plaintiffs had lived as children. 
Both sued in negligence and strict liability (14) and/or nuisance, though only liability in negligence 
was considered by the court. It was never disputed by the defendant that the steps taken by them to 
mitigate the problems of asbestos dust contamination were woefully inadequate. At trial, Holland J. 
found for the plaintiffs despite the fact that at no material time was mesothelioma a concept known to 
medical science. 
The defendant appealed on the ground that there was no culpable lack of foresight on their part as they 
did not know and had no reason to believe that the risk of mesothelioma existed. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal stating that liability would arise where the applicant should 
reasonably have foreseen a risk of some pulmonary injury, not necessarily mesothelioma, and, that the 
damage occurred at a time when the applicant was on actual or constructive notice as to the potential 
pulmonary damage that exposure to asbestos could cause. 
The Court also considered whether any distinction could sensibly be made between employees working 
within the factory and local residents. It asked 'did the factory wall pose such a barrier that risk of injury 
to persons on the other side … amount at worst to no more than a "mere possibility which would never 
occur to the mind of a reasonable man"?' and agreed with the trial judge that if the conditions outside 
the factory are not materially different to those giving rise to a duty of care within, there is 'no reason 
not to extend to that extramural neighbour a comparable duty of care'.
Lady Justice Hale has elsewhere (15) stated:
'The point which impressed the [trial] judge was the certain knowledge that asbestos dust was 
dangerous and the absence of any knowledge, and indeed any means of knowledge, about what 
constituted a safe level of exposure. … But just as courts must beware using such later developments to 
inflate the knowledge which should have been available earlier, they must beware using it to the contrary 
effect. The fact that other and graver risks emerged later does not detract from the power of what was 
already known …'
It remains to be seen whether this decision has implications beyond personal injury actions (16) and 
whether the courts are prepared to apply a less onerous test of foreseeability in cases of environmental 
damage generally. Where any particular class of environmental damage was foreseeable, liability might 
arise for any other type of damage in that class which arises much later. Several of the case studies in 
volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings and the present report demonstrate that much harm arises 
after the first wave of harm, e.g. with PCS, mercury, CFCs, benzene and radiations. If the courts were 
to examine foreseeability in the context of broad classes of damage, the test of foreseeability (seen 
by many commentators as one of the factors responsible for tort's failure to compensate for historic 
pollution), would effectively be relaxed. The test may now relate to the foreseeability of some relevant 
damage.
(13)  The Times, 17 April 1996.
(14)  Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
(15)  Shell Tankers UK Ltd. v. Betty Irene Jeromson (2001), EWCA Civ 101, 2 February 2001.
(16)  Following the House of Lords decision in Page v. Smith (1996) AC 155, it is sufficient if any personal injury to a 'primary' victim is 
foreseeable.
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Part of the rationale is that the since the 'employment 
of labor involves the risk of disability, by social 
policy the employer must defray its costs.' Expressed 
succinctly: 'The cost of the product should bear the 
blood of the workingman' (Franklin, 1979). When 
employees are harmed, there are costs; workers' 
compensation seeks to internalise those costs to the 
commercial activity that produces profits and harms 
employees.
Workers' compensation is financed by employers' 
contributions based on the hazards of particular kinds 
of employment ranging from quite hazardous jobs to 
office work. General tax revenues could fund such a 
system but this would likely disconnect compensation 
from current modest incentives for employers to 
provide a safer work environment. Moreover, since 
funding is largely employer based, it could and often 
does reflect a particular employer's safety record 
(Franklin, 1979). In addition, like tort law, workers' 
compensation laws in some jurisdictions permit 
discovery — but with a twist. Some jurisdictions only 
permit an impartial adjudicator to conduct discovery 
concerning injuries, while others allow the injured 
party to conduct discovery much like under tort 
law. While either option provides some of the same 
information benefits of tort, it slows the process, thus 
interfering to some extent with one of the strengths 
of workers' compensation: quick compensation and 
resolution of issues. 
Initially workers' compensation only covered injuries 
resulting from the workplace, not diseases. Coverage 
has subsequently been extended, however, to include 
at least some diseases resulting from workplace 
exposures. Sometimes particular diseases resulting 
from particular working conditions are dealt with by 
separate legislation, e.g. black lung from coal mining. 
Many but not quite all workers are covered in the US. 
Domestic service employees, agricultural workers, 
casual employees, and possibly employees of small 
businesses tend to be excluded by statute (Franklin, 
1979).
Injuries or diseases for which employees are 
authorised to receive compensation must fall within 
prescribed legislative categories. The injuries must 
be both explicitly authorised by the legislation or 
enabling regulations and attributable to a person's 
employment (Franklin, 1979). A back injury for which 
compensation is sought must be due to a workplace 
event, not weekend soccer. 
Compensation typically consists of cash payments 
to an employee or his/her survivors, reflecting lost 
income, costs of medical care, and rehabilitative 
services. Lost income payments tend to be some 
percentage of the worker's weekly earnings at the 
time injuries were suffered, usually with a maximum 
payout, for example up to two thirds of the total 
earnings. This can vary depending upon marital 
status and whether the person has dependent 
children. Moreover, compensation is based on the 
generic kind of injury suffered, whether it was a 
temporary but partial disability, a temporary total 
disability, a permanent total disability, or death 
resulting from the workplace. 
Payment amounts can be quite specific for a lost 
arm, leg, or particular finger, for example. When 
an employee dies as a result of a workplace injury, 
typically his or her survivors receive compensation 
based on the levels of earnings at the time and 
the number of his or her dependents. Medical 
and rehabilitative services provided by workers' 
compensation 'are generally considered to be the 
most effective single part of the system'. This is 
typically provided at once following an injury or 
disease (Franklin, 1979). Rehabilitative services can 
avoid other long-term costs that would otherwise 
result.
Finally, if the workers' compensation law in question 
does not cover a person or an injury or disease, 
remedies in tort law may be available. Ordinarily, 
workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for 
workplace-caused diseases but if employees for some 
reason are not covered or poorly compensated for 
injuries, in some instances they may have recourse to 
the tort law.
In the US there are additional variations on workers' 
compensation. A federal version covers federal 
non-military employees. The Black-Lung Benefits Act 
'provides compensation for [coal] miners suffering 
from 'black lung' (pneumoconiosis)'. Other laws 
provide compensation for employees injured by 
railroads, those working on ships, and those working 
for private maritime employers, but most of these 
provide compensation only if employers were 
negligent (Cornell University Law School, 2010). 
Some shortcomings of workers' compensation are 
considered at the end of the next section.
Analogues to workers compensation for a 
precautionary world
How well might generic strict liability analogues to 
workers' compensation laws function within a legal 
system oriented toward a precautionary approach to 
environmental health and environmental protection? 
Imagine a generic compensation scheme that 
could compensate workers or citizens for injuries, 
diseases, dysfunctions or death as a result of an 
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environmental hazard, such as a chemical or other 
exposure. Imagine also that it provided compensation 
for environmental damage caused by products whose 
causal consequences were missed by prior review. 
How well would such a system function? 
A well functioning system analogous to workers' 
compensation could have aspects consistent with 
a more precautionary approach to environmental 
and occupational health harms. It could provide 
compensation quickly to repair and rehabilitate 
people from injuries suffered. Once harms were 
identified, this would shorten their duration. But 
could analogues for environmental damages be 
devised? This more difficult issue would need to be 
addressed.
There is one major limitation. Workers' compensation 
laws function as well as they do is because many 
injuries tend to be immediately cognisable and 
causally traceable to a source, e.g. a worker cuts 
off a finger or is in a car accident. Obvious and 
immediate traumatic injuries are easy to identify 
under workers' compensation programmes. 
Provisions for other injuries, such as diseases 
associated with workplace exposures, would need 
to be created as understanding of disease processes 
develops and as diseases can be causally attributed 
to exposures, e.g. how coke oven emissions can 
contribute to lung cancer (very easy) or bisphenol A 
can contribute to metabolic syndrome, breast cancer 
or adverse reproductive effects (extremely difficult). 
In a precautionary world creating categories of 
identifiable injuries, diseases or dysfunctions from 
many chemical exposures becomes more difficult 
when harms are not obvious, are not obviously 
traceable to a particular exposure or are not causally 
proximate to the time of exposure. 
As a first step for comparatively new or 
poorly understood exposures to technologies, 
decision-makers could assess potential causes of 
harm from what is known about the technologies and 
any plausible adverse effects that might result. These 
could be used together with background information 
and analogies to the same adverse effect caused by 
other exposures or sources to create presumptive 
categories of adverse outcomes and appropriate 
compensation. For example, at present the evidence 
may or may not be sufficient to identify various 
forms of electromagnetic waves as contributors to 
brain cancer. However, there is surely considerable 
knowledge about the costs of treating different 
brain cancers and how much these forms of cancer 
disrupt people's lives so that if it turns out that cell 
phones do contribute to some forms of brain cancer, 
compensation tables could begin to be developed 
even before the causal evidence is fully sufficient to 
support a case for compensation. 
In addition, decision-makers could 'learn as they 
go', and assess and evaluate kinds of diseases and 
dysfunction based on the causal properties of the 
substance as they are revealed over time. It would 
take some time to build up categories of injuries that 
would be more or less automatically compensable. 
For known hazardous but socially important 
chemical products whose toxicity was better 
understood, compensation tables could be developed 
somewhat quicker. 
Another amendment might be a procedure for 
monitoring for any potential adverse health or 
environmental effects from risky but socially 
important products or activities, such as lead. This 
is highly toxic product with no known safe level of 
exposure but it is likely to have continued use in 
batteries (Wigle and Lanphear, 2005). Lead companies 
would need to continue monitoring the health status 
of their employees for known adverse effects of 
lead exposure. Neighbourhoods or communities 
downwind or downstream from lead battery factories 
or recycling plants would need to be monitored 
in order quickly to detect health or environmental 
effects from fugitive lead exposures for compensation 
and to expedite its delivery. 
For environmental harms there would need to 
be categories of plausible or even remote harms 
for which there would be compensation based on 
liability without fault. There would also need to 
be monitoring programmes in place to identify 
long-tailed risks as early as possible so that harm 
could be minimised and its duration shortened. 
Such efforts could probably be expedited by experts 
giving careful thought to potential adverse effects, 
where these estimates would be made on the basis 
of existing information and analogies to similar 
outcomes caused by other sources. For instance, for a 
genetically modified weed killer new to the market, 
there might well be recent historical examples of other 
weed killers, genetically modified or not, that when 
released into the environment posed problems of 
killing beneficial plants from which decision-makers 
could learn. For genetically modified plants with 
in-built pesticides that are close relatives to wild types 
that could pose problems, decision-makers could 
learn from analogies. 
Despite the appearance that workers' compensation 
is more efficient, faster and without many of the 
transaction costs of tort law, over time it appears 
that this system's apparent attractiveness has been 
reduced in practice. Compensation rarely appears to 
Costs, justice and innovation | Protecting early warners and late victims 
628 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
be adequate, some employees engage in fraud, and 
companies resist workers' compensation provisions. 
The public perceives that system as substantially 
flawed at present. An additional worry for 
long-tailed risks would be whether companies that 
caused harms continued to exist long enough for the 
results of their activities to appear. 
Analogues to the US Vaccine Injury Compensation 
System
The Vaccine Injury Compensation System, a 
hybrid of the regulatory and tort systems in the 
US, constitutes another model. Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers at one time argued that they could 
no longer manufacture vaccines because there 
was too little profit margin and even that could 
quickly disappear if the few people who suffered 
adverse reactions to vaccines were permitted to sue. 
Congress created the Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program to encourage the production of needed 
vaccines by providing a streamlined procedure 
to compensate those who, in rare instances, 
experienced a vaccine-related injury. This was an 
alternative to traditional tort actions concerning 
injuries caused by vaccines and companies were 
immunised from suits by the legislation. 
The Program has two main parts: compensation 
for so-called 'on table' injuries from vaccines, and 
compensation for 'off-table' injuries. On-table 
injuries are identifiable and have typical adverse 
effects from particular vaccinations. These receive 
fairly automatic compensation with minimal 
evidentiary showings. 
Off-table injuries are those that might be causally 
attributable to a vaccine but the injury is atypical. 
People using this remedy may file a petition 
'against the Department of Health and Human 
Services in the US Court of Federal Claims seeking 
compensation from the Vaccine Trust Fund'. They 
must specify who was injured, the vaccine that 
caused it, when and where it was given, the type of 
injury, when the first symptoms appeared and how 
long any adverse effects lasted (USHRSA, 2010).
For off-table injuries, tort law standards of proof 
apply, but the requirements on expert testimony 
set out in Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals 
(1993) do not because the magistrate hearing the 
case is both judge and juror. There is no need to 
screen a jury from experts; judges simply assess 
such testimony and give it appropriate weight. In 
addition, there are fewer formal procedures than in 
a typical tort case and the magistrates in this system 
appear to have a much more sophisticated grasp of 
scientific evidence than the general federal district 
judges that hear tort cases (Stevens v. the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services, 2001).
Successful petitioners may receive compensation 
for past and future non-reimbursable medical, 
custodial care, and rehabilitation costs, as well as up 
to USD 250 000 for pain and suffering, lost earnings 
and/or reasonable lawyer expenses. Death benefits 
of up to USD 250 000 plus reasonable legal fees are 
also permitted (USHRSA, 2010).
The Program is funded by an excise tax of 
USD 0.75 on each dose of vaccine (USHRSA, 
2010). Thus, the costs of VICP seem likely to be 
paid by patients, their insurance companies or the 
government (in the case of those with government 
aid). During the 12 years of its existence it has 
provided 'a less adversarial, less expensive and 
less time-consuming system of recovery than 
the traditional tort system that governs medical 
malpractice, personal injury and product liability 
cases. More than 1 500 people have been paid in 
excess of USD 1.18 billion' since its inception. This 
averages to about USD 78 000 per plaintiff (US 
Department of Justice, 2010).
In principle, an analogue to the VICP appears to be 
a superior compensation system to torts and might 
function well in a legal system that emphasised the 
importance of precautionary policies. How might it 
work?
If a potentially hazardous product has been tested 
and subject to pre-market review (for example under 
Europe's Registration, Authorisation and Restriction 
of Chemicals (REACH) system) or is subject to 
post-market health regulations, neither might be 
sufficient to protect all those contaminated by the 
substance. Some will be more susceptible, some 
less so, because of life-stage, genetic heterogeneity, 
variation in detoxifying enzymes, age, pre-existing 
illnesses and so on. Some provisions need to be 
provided for citizens who are harmed because 
health standards failed to protect them (Cranor, 
2008a).
For injuries that are typical of such exposures — 
analogous to 'on-table' injuries — there should be 
virtually automatic compensation. (The list of such 
injuries would obviously need to be developed and 
revised over time.) For injuries that were not typical 
but were suspected of being causally traceable to the 
toxic exposure subject to regulation, injured parties 
could make an argument that the compensation 
system should recognise such injuries with a 
standard of evidence similar to those employed in 
the VICP.
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How well might such a system function? First, there 
would need to be a table of expected or not atypical 
injuries to people or damage to the environment 
from exposures in order to create the equivalent of 
'on-table' injuries subject to compensation. This is a 
necessary element to expedite compensation. How 
difficult it might be to create such tables for more 
subtle diseases and dysfunctions is difficult to know 
but it should be addressed.
Second, there would need to be some showing that 
appropriate exposure had occurred that would 
support the connection between the technology and 
the adverse effects. Unlike vaccines where exposures 
are typically known with some degree of confidence, 
for environmental and even some workplace 
exposures, this critical element would likely be 
subject to numerous disputes. 
Third, explicit provisions would be needed for 
long-tailed, subtle, adverse consequences of the 
technology, making it possible, with reduced 
procedural requirements, to argue that people or the 
environment had been damaged as a consequence. 
One might think of these as something like the 
off-table injuries if they were more atypical adverse 
effects. 
A possible shortcoming of analogues to VICP is 
that tort law's preponderance of evidence standard 
is needed for off-table injuries. This attenuates the 
chances of compensation for those whose injuries 
that may have been caused by exposures — at least 
compared to the United Kingdom's Compensation 
Scheme for Radiation-Linked Diseases (discussed 
below). 
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund
This fund was created by a separate law passed 
following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on 
New York city. Its aim was 'to provide compensation 
to any individual (or relatives of a deceased 
individual) who was physically injured or killed 
as a result of [the 11 September attacks].' Congress 
sought 'in part, to establish a mechanism that would 
provide financial security and assistance to the 
victims of the attacks without the uncertainties, 
delays and costs of traditional litigation' (Feinberg, 
2004).
The legislation creates an administrative alternative 
to traditional tort litigation for the victims of the 
terrorist attacks. Injured parties were permitted to 
seek tort compensation instead but with substantial 
limitations. The law created a 'Special Master' with 
substantial powers to issue any 'procedural and 
substantive rules' and to determine eligibility under 
them. The Special Master had authority to determine 
the amount of compensation for harms suffered by 
those making the claims where this includes both 
economic and non-economic damages. Neither 
liability nor punitive damages could be considered. 
Congress authorised the funds necessary to pay 
compensation costs, but placed no aggregate 
limit on the total fund or on individual claimants 
(Feinberg, 2004).
The result was a hybrid system utilising some 
aspects of tort law but precluding liability and 
punitive damages. It authorised reduction of 
compensatory awards 'by payments that the 
claimant received from certain collateral sources'. 
Congress tried to create a comparatively quick 
and fair system for the victims. This was enforced 
by imposition of 'strict time limits' during which 
claims could be evaluated. Not everyone harmed by 
the attacks was eligible — only those 'individuals 
physically harmed or killed at the sites and in the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks.' Congress 
sought to ensure awards that were individualised 
between parties but not overly disparate between 
them. The details of these regulations and how they 
were implemented are described in the final report 
(Feinberg, 2004).
The Compensation Fund was created following a 
major tragedy and the enabling legislation passed 
in less than one week. There was no debate about 
the need or justification for compensation, which 
is likely to be quite different from analogous 
legislation that might cover environmental 
or environmental health harms. Moreover, 
there is a critical feature of this law that differs 
from traditional tort law. It was enacted and 
implemented in a manner similar to administrative 
or regulatory law: the Justice Department and 
Special Master had to implement regulations that 
would guide the award of compensation and 
considerations the Special Master had to take 
into account. The Master also had considerable 
discretion in deciding on individual amounts 
of compensation. There was provision for one 
to appeal these decisions, but appeals were 
considered within the same organisation that 
made the initial compensation decision instead 
of a separate appellate court. Once an appellate 
decision was issued, no further appeals were 
available. Thus, unlike the tort law or US 
administrative law, appeals were quite limited and 
were heard by lawyers within the structure created 
by the legislation (Feinberg, 2004).
This example does suggest that a compensation fund 
might be created under administrative procedures 
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rather than procedures more closely analogous to 
tort law. There could be rules issued for guiding an 
administrator or administrative agency in awarding 
damages and damage awards would be upheld on 
appeal as long as the administrative agency did 
not act to violate administrative procedures for 
adjudicating compensation under the rules. 
In the US, an agency awarding compensation 
would probably be reviewed to determine whether 
it had 'substantial evidence' for its conclusion, 
assuming it had otherwise followed proper 
procedures. Thus, a reviewing court would 
consider whether, on the record established by 
the agency, it 'could reasonably make the finding'. 
Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion . . . [or provides] a substantial 
basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be 
reasonably inferred' (Davis, 1972). While this is 
somewhat vague, it conveys the idea that such 
decisions are reviewable, and acknowledges 
deference to the decisionmaker, but is not so strict 
as to force frequent second-guessing.
UK Compensation Scheme for Radiation-Linked 
Diseases
In 1965 the United Kingdom passed the Nuclear 
Installations Act to provide for civil liability for 
injuries from nuclear installations. This imposed 
strict or absolute liability for such injuries, rather 
than requiring proof of negligence. Despite this, 
subsequent litigation concerning such damages was 
complex, contentious and slow. 
Consequently, this led to a voluntary Compensation 
Scheme for Radiation-Linked Diseases (CSRLD) in 
1982. This was a joint agreement between British 
Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) and trade unions that 
worked within it. The aim was to create a quicker, 
more generous alternative to the normal litigation 
process, and reduce stressful and expensive 
litigation for complainants and expensive litigation 
for BNFL. Ultimately this was expanded to include 
other employers using radiation, and their unions. 
The Compensation Scheme initially permitted only 
compensation for mortality but later expanded to 
include morbidity. This agreement was possible 
because the causes of radiation-induced cancers 
were well understood as a result of past experience 
(CSRLD, 2010).
In order to make a claim under this programme, 
an employee must have worked for one of the 
companies that is a party to the agreement and have 
received a radiation dose during employment with 
one of the signatory companies. He or she must 
also be a member of a union that was party to the 
agreement, with some exceptions. The person must 
have been diagnosed with a disease that is typical 
of radiation exposure. Most cancers are considered 
eligible.
Compensation is determined by a person's radiation 
dose record from signatory employers, which is 
then used to assess the likelihood that a disease was 
caused by the exposure in question. Signatories 
have guidelines for determining the dose to which a 
person was exposed. The methodology to determine 
probabilities of causation and interpretation of 
uncertainties are generous toward claimants.
If a claimant is found to have radiation-induced 
cancer as a result of workplace exposure, the 
full value of a settlement is agreed by the parties 
and then discounted by the probability that it 
was the result of workplace exposure. Minimal 
compensation is awarded if the causation 
probability is 20 %, whereas in tort litigation the 
requirement for compensation would be at least 
50 % (more likely than not). 
If the odds of radiation-caused cancer are between 
20 and 29.9 %, a quarter of the full value of a 
settlement is provided. If it is between 30 and 39.9 %, 
half is compensated, and from 40 to 49.9 %, 75 % of 
the full value is paid. If the probability of cancer is 
greater than 50 % then the full value of the disease 
is compensated. Most compensation that has been 
dispensed is for probabilities of causation below 
50 %. One hundred and six people have received 
compensation for radiation-induced injuries, 
with payments totalling GBP 5.3 million or about 
GBP 50 000 per person on average. 
Claimants have been much more likely to be 
successful than if their cases had been considered 
under tort law. They have received some 
compensation for their diseases based on the best 
information available, which was probably much 
quicker and more generous than civil litigation 
would have provided. The Scheme had therefore 
achieved its goals (CSRLD, 2010).
The United Kingdom also has a single-payer 
health system, the National Health Service (NHS), 
under which all citizens, including those suffering 
from illnesses caused by radiation, would receive 
essentially free health care for any diseases. 
Consequently, it would be difficult to compare 
compensation received under the CSRLD with 
compensation received in a country such as the 
US with myriad private health care providers and 
insurers. 
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In the United Kingdom, radiation-exposed 
employees would receive diagnosis and treatment 
for their diseases as quickly as the NHS provides 
it; this seems independent of the timeliness 
of compensation under the CSRLD. CSRLD 
compensation assists in setting right other 
matters beyond health care and rehabilitation 
for radiation-caused diseases. Clearly, countries 
with a single-payer system have quite important 
institutional resources that permit harm to be 
minimised and shortened as much as can be 
achieved through medical care and the rate at 
which patients are considered by the medical 
system. 
Compensation under the CSRLD is possible 
because there is a substantial medical and exposure 
history with radiation. Well-designed, scientifically 
based compensation tables can be provided based 
on past injuries to earlier employees. Such a scheme 
could not be instituted quickly because creating 
the compensation tables depends so critically on 
a history of previous diseases. For new and subtle 
diseases, more likely to be typical of contemporary 
technological risks, this would be a limitation. 
There appear to be modest incentives for 
companies to control exposures to radiation 
and reduce diseases and death as a result of this 
programme. If employees contract radiation-caused 
diseases, the company responsible must pay 
the required compensation, which is considered 
'generous', and some packages are awarded based 
on probabilities well short of the preponderance 
of evidence. How successful this is likely to be in 
deterring dangerous exposure is difficult to judge. 
Will compensation packages in at least some cases 
be much less than the costs of preventing the 
diseases in the first place, especially when they 
involve substantial capital commitments? If so, the 
compensatory payouts by themselves would lack 
deterrence value. Of course, there could be other 
protective mechanisms, such as regulatory rules, 
inspections and so on.
New Zealand's no-fault compensation law
In 1972 New Zealand abolished almost all of its 
existing tort system and moved toward expanding 
a no-fault injury compensation scheme for 
compensating workers for personal injuries under 
the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC). 
Initially covering workplace and automobile 
injuries, this was later expanded 'to cover virtually 
all accidental injuries and to confer very broad 
benefits on victims' (Schuck, 2008). Covered 
categories include motor vehicle accidents, 
work-related injuries both to employees and 
self-employed people, employees injured outside 
the workplace, medical treatment injuries, and 
coverage for those outside the workforce, such as 
children and the elderly. 
Compensation is provided for injuries suffered, 
medical and rehabilitation costs associated with 
treating injuries, replacement of wages up to 80 % 
of average weekly earnings, impairment of earning 
capacity, loss of bodily function, possibly lump sum 
payments for permanent injuries, and benefits for 
surviving spouses and children, as well as funeral 
expenses. Injured people 'receive free hospital 
care and subsidized pharmaceuticals' (Bismark 
and Paterson, 2006). Compensation comes from 
different accounts corresponding to accident types 
and the category of victim involved. Peter Schuck 
observes that 'New Zealanders today generally 
regard their system … as a mainstay of their social 
policy' (Schuck, 2008). Others note that the 'ACC 
system is one of the simplest in the world for 
patients to navigate' (Bismark and Paterson, 2006).
Compensating all medical treatment injuries led 
to substantial costs and, consequently, for medical 
injuries subsequent legislation reduced 'the scope 
of covered injuries, shortened the time within 
which claims could be brought, and eliminated 
lump sum payments for pain and suffering' 
(Schuck, 2008). The programme reintroduced the 
notion of fault, similar to the US requirement of 
negligence for medical malpractice. In this New 
Zealand reverted to the previous standard of care 
that had been used in tort medical malpractice suits 
before instituting the ACC. There do not appear 
to be such restrictions for other 'accidents' in the 
workplace — from automobiles, and so on. 
Illnesses not caused by accidents and wilful self-
inflicted injuries are excluded from compensation, 
creating tensions within the system (Henderson, 
1981). Injured parties who are not employed, such 
as children and the elderly, may not be similarly 
compensated, since they receive no earnings 
equivalent (Bismark and Paterson, 2006).
Aspects of the New Zealand system in large part 
seem consistent with a precautionary view of 
the world. It is relatively simple to navigate and 
claims are dealt with expeditiously, minimising 
the time before injuries are addressed. This in turn 
should shorten the duration of harm that must be 
endured. It appears that all accidents (with minor 
exceptions) are eligible for compensation. 
A serious shortcoming appears to be the 
ineligibility of illnesses, at least with respect to the 
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medical compensation system. Moreover, the focus 
on 'accidents' might suggest that it is traceable 
to earlier views in which illnesses were seen as 
resulting from 'natural' processes, not induced 
by human activities. The result is that the system 
might underemphasise illnesses, dysfunctions or 
death traceable to toxic and other environmental 
exposures. In addition, the system appears to 
lack deterrents discouraging activities that lead to 
accidents (or illnesses). 
Precautionary assurance bonds for environmental 
damage
Liability regimes for environmental damage 
are helpful but apply after the damage is done 
(EC, 2008, 2009 and 2010). A more precautionary 
approach to future environmental damage could 
involve the use of assurance bonds. 
An assurance bonding system is an arrangement in 
which commercial entities whose activities might 
have adverse impacts on the environment must 
'pay in advance for the costs they might inflict on 
society if they adopted the most harmful method 
of disposal, [it] reverses the usual presumption of 
'innocence' over 'guilt' as applied to environmental 
damages' (Costanza and Perrings, 1990). A simple 
example is a refundable deposit on glass bottles. 
This encourages users to dispose of the bottles by 
returning them to a location where they would 
be recycled instead of their becoming litter, thus 
providing incentives for better disposal. 
Because it is difficult or impossible to calculate 
the costs of future damage, it is unlikely that a 
private insurance market could encourage similar 
behaviour. There are therefore two alternatives: costs 
from future damage could be imposed on public 
agencies or privately injured parties when damage 
occurs, or they could be imposed on the party 
engaging in an activity that could have possible 
adverse future consequences. 
Assurance bonds impose responsibility and 
costs on the entity undertaking the activity that 
might adversely affect health or the environment. 
A government body would estimate potential future 
costs of adverse environmental consequences and 
impose a fee for those on any party whose activities 
threatened environmental resources.
Under the scheme, each resource user would be 
required to post bonds, refundable at specified 
dates if the intertemporal external costs of the 
activity turned out to be less than those assessed 
by the environmental authority. The value of the 
bond at the date of posting would be a function of 
the environmental authority's [best] estimate of the 
costs of environmental repair or rehabilitation if the 
worst happened between the date of posting and the 
refund date. The value of the bond would be higher, 
the greater the estimate of the worst case costs 
(Costanza and Perrings, 1990).
The bond would be refundable in whole or part 
if the resource users could demonstrate lower 
damages than those assumed by the agency setting 
the bond. The burden of proof that the estimate of 
the agency was incorrect would lie with the user of 
the resource. The system should therefore provide 
a strong economic incentive to firms to research the 
future environmental costs of their activities, and 
so to improve their environmental performance. If 
the environmental authority's estimate of the worst 
case costs were revised downwards during the life 
of the bond it would be reduced; if revised upwards 
it would be increased. This feature of the scheme 
provides the incentive to resource users to research 
the future environmental effects of their activities 
(Costanza and Perrings, 1990).
Such bonds provide a means for addressing 
ignorance and uncertainty associated with possible 
future environmental hazards, as well as deterring 
undesirable behaviour. When businesses are 
required to post bonds, if harm from their activities 
occurs, there are resources that can assist in whole 
(the preferred alternative) or in part (less preferred) 
in compensating those whose property or person 
have been harmed and assist in repairing damage to 
the environment. The greater the upfront bond, the 
more likely adequate resources would be available 
to address adverse consequences. Of course, a 
bonding scheme would need to be supported by an 
appropriately quick and adequate compensation 
system similar to the best ones we have considered 
above.
Assurance bonds have a number of virtues. 
They provide incentives for private parties and 
government agencies to conduct research and 
improve estimates of adverse environmental 
impacts before the activities are instituted. 
They also internalise these calculations into the 
procedures of a commercial enterprise with nudging 
from environmental agencies. They help correct 
underinvestment in research on such adverse 
effects. The funding of environmental protection 
through the bonds would be proportionate to 
the size of the problem insofar as this could be 
determined. And the inducement for research 
would also be approximately proportional to the 
assessed social costs of permitting the activity to 
proceed in ignorance (Costanza and Perrings, 1990). 
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If companies cannot afford the upfront bonds, they 
would not be permitted to engage in the activity; in 
short, no bond, no market.
Importantly, bonds help protect against 
economically marginal firms whose activities 
might turn out to be especially environmentally 
damaging. If they are marginal, they would likely 
lack resources to address the problems after they 
occurred and simply go out of business or declare 
bankruptcy rather than provide compensation for 
damage caused. Bonds required for activities prior 
to instituting a potentially hazardous activity would 
provide funds when firms are optimistic about 
their activities to ensure that there will be resources 
to address problems when they arise, even if the 
firms are no longer in business (provided funding 
is held in trust). This resembles a common rationale 
for administrative regulation of risks rather than 
post-market injury suits to repair damage when 
risks materialise into harm (Cranor, 1993).
Assurance bonds promote a precautionary 
approach, placing approximate upfront costs 
on commercial activities insofar as these can be 
determined. They do not require testing or estimates 
of adverse effects of products or activities as does 
REACH, but they provide incentives for it. If in 
fact harm occurs, there is then a fund, hopefully 
adequate, to begin to repair, minimise and shorten 
damage. 
Moreover, because bonds provide incentives to 
conduct research to discover future harms, they 
might assist in discovering long-tailed, less visible 
adverse consequences of technology earlier. They 
might provide some incentives for businesses to 
reveal risks earlier in order to increase funds that 
might be returned should harms be minimised. 
While there is no explicit deterrence in the form of 
punishments or penalties, the equivalent of some 
deterrence exists because firms have resources at 
stake, which they would lose if there were adverse 
consequences, but which would be refunded if there 
were not. 
A possible downside is that assurance bonds 
might overly burden new technologies, possibly 
discouraging investment in new but potentially 
risky activities. This concern might be addressed 
by requiring upfront bonds commensurate with 
the extent of risks. For low probability, relatively 
contained risks when enterprises are small, lesser 
bonds could be required, but as commercial 
activities grow and the range of risks increases, 
bonds should probably be increased appropriate 
to potential costs of risks. The size of commercial 
activities would need to be monitored in order for 
the bond fund to keep pace with potential risks. 
Governmental agencies may or may not be up to the 
task of on-going monitoring. An illustration of how 
an assurance bond scheme could have been applied 
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster is provided in 
Panel 24.3.
24.2.3 Desirable features of compensation systems
Comparatively quick measures to identify 
diseases and environmental damage due to poorly 
understood technologies and quickly minimise 
and shorten them would promote precautionary 
approaches better than slower systems. There are 
tensions between the rationales of the different 
compensatory systems reviewed above. Different 
ones might be more appropriate for the varying 
circumstances and institutions of individual 
countries, e.g. the presence of universal health 
care or existing compensation systems like New 
Zealand's.
The best compensation systems appear to have nearly 
automatic provisions for many classes of injuries 
(ideally all). It may be difficult to provide tables 
for automatically compensable health injuries and 
illnesses, and for environmental damage from less 
well understood technologies, but decision-makers 
must do the best they can. This might be more 
difficult for subtle, long-tailed risks. Some of these 
problems would be eased in countries with single-
payer, universal health care such as many countries 
in Europe have, and in New Zealand's no-fault 
compensation system for accidents, with extensions 
to diseases and the environment. 
A compensation arrangement with some similarities 
to administrative law and some features of the 
September 11 Fund in the US might be desirable. 
In this an administrator would have considerable 
discretion to award compensation and it would 
likely be more efficient in quickly providing 
resources to repair damages suffered. There 
would, however, need to be some constraints on 
decision-maker discretion to ensure justice between 
applicants and to utilise funds efficiently.
The generous compensation system of the UK's 
Compensation Scheme for Radiation-Linked 
Diseases, with allowances for compensating for 
cancers with probabilities less than 50 % is notable. 
It could be difficult to duplicate, however, because 
it rests on a long, well understood history of 
radiation-caused diseases with prior victims. It is 
nevertheless worth considering.
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Panel 24�3 Precautionary assurance bonds for potentially serious environmental risks
Robert Costanza has long advocated anticipatory assurance bonds on corporations as a means of 
internalising and helping to minimise future environmental costs from their large scale, potentially 
hazardous technologies (Costanza and Perrins, 1990). His argument is summarised below, based on 
lessons from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Costanza et al., 2010).
The spill from the Deepwater Horizon is causing enormous economic and ecological damage. The 
spill has directly and indirectly affected at least 20 categories of valuable ecosystem services in and 
around the Gulf of Mexico. The USD 2.5 billion per year Louisiana commercial fishery has been almost 
completely shut down. As the oil extends to popular Gulf Coast beaches, the loss of tourism revenue 
will also be enormous. In addition, the spill has damaged several important natural capital assets 
whose value in supporting human well-being is both huge and largely outside the market system. These 
non-marketed ecosystem services include climate regulation via the sequestration of carbon by coastal 
marshes and open water systems, hurricane protection by coastal wetlands, and cultural, recreational, 
and aesthetic values.
A recent study estimated the total value of these ecosystem services for the Mississippi River Delta to be 
in the range of USD 12–47 billion per year (Batker et al., 2010). Based on the flow of these services into 
the future, the value of the Delta as a natural asset was estimated to be in the range of USD 330 billion 
to USD 1.3 trillion, far more than the total market value of BP (USD 189 billion) before the spill. Unlike 
BP, ecosystem service values are outside the market. They continue to produce benefits unless an action 
like the spill damages them.
One major lesson is that our natural capital assets and other public goods are far too valuable to 
continue to put them at such high risk from private interests. We need better (not necessarily more) 
regulation and strong incentives to protect these assets against actions that put them at risk. Our 
current approach to dealing with the risk of private interests damaging public environmental assets is 
to assign liability to the private interests, but with the burden of proof on the public. The public must 
demonstrate damages after the fact, claim compensation, endure a lengthy judicial process, and finally 
hope to recover just reparations. In addition, the total liability is often limited, as with oil spill and 
nuclear accident cots. This gives private interests strong incentives to take large risks with public assets 
— far larger than they should from society's point of view.
The long-term solutions to these problems require fundamental changes to business-as-usual practices, 
including assessment and incorporation of the full value of public natural capital assets into both 
corporate and public accounting and decision-making, a reversal of the burden of proof from public 
to private interest, and a requirement of corporations and other private interests to internalise and 
monetise their risks to public goods. 
One way to internalise and monetise these risks would be to require private interests to post an 
'assurance bond' large enough to cover the worst-case damages. Portions of the bond (plus interest) 
would be returned if and when the private interests could demonstrate that the suspected worst-case 
damages had not occurred or would be less than was originally assessed. If damages did occur, portions 
of the bond would be used to rehabilitate or repair the environment and to compensate injured parties. 
The critical feature is that the risk to the public asset is apparent to the private interests in financial 
terms before the fact, not as a liability that may or may not be enforced after the damage occurs.
Imagine how this system might have worked had it been in place prior to the Deepwater 
Horizon incident. What actually occurred is pretty close to the 'worst-case' scenario that might have 
been envisioned before the fact. Our best guess of the potential damages would thus be in the range 
of USD 34–670 billion. Let's say that a scientific review panel, after assessing the risk in more detail, 
settled on an estimate of USD 50 billion. This immediately makes it very apparent to BP and others 
drilling in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico that they are engaged in a very risky business — several 
orders of magnitude riskier than the USD 50 million liability limit previously in force. What could they 
do? Either not drill at all or find ways to reduce the size of the risk and the bond. They might be able to 
do this very cost-effectively if they spent some money on risk-reduction procedures or technology, such 
as the acoustic blowout preventer costing a mere USD 500 000 which they failed to install on Deepwater 
Horizon. These 
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Panel 24�3 Precautionary assurance bonds for potentially serious environmental risks (cont�)
measures might convince the scientific review panel to change its assessment of the worst-case scenario 
and reduce the bond. There would be very strong economic incentives for BP to find creative ways to 
reduce the risks rather than ignoring the risks and cutting corners.
The Deepwater Horizon incident offers a strong lesson in risk management. Our entire society is taking far 
too many risks with public assets whose real value we are only now beginning to recognise. By shifting the 
financial burden of those risks onto the private interests who benefit from them, we can establish the right 
incentives, shift investment to less risky, more productive pursuits, and create a more sustainable and 
desirable future.
Source: Costanza et al., 2010. 
Funding for some of the systems suggests useful 
features of a model. Workers' compensation and the 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in the US 
all institute a fee on the covered activities to create 
a monetary source from which compensation can 
be paid. This is likely to be attractive to government 
agencies facing tightened budgets or long-term 
budgetary concerns. Moreover, if contributions to 
a compensation fund are based to some extent on a 
company's safety record with regard to the activity, 
this may provide some modest deterrence feedback 
to the company to modify its safety practices toward 
the new technology. Workers' compensation funds do 
this explicitly; there is no 'deterrence surcharge' in the 
VICP and it is not clear that there is such a surcharge in 
the UK's radiation compensation programme. 
Health care and rehabilitation services, likely to be 
part of some but not all health care systems do not 
exhaust compensatory needs. People's loss of earning 
capacity and long-term care, as well as compensation 
for families left poorly supported, must be addressed. 
Assurance bonds or insurance if it is available in 
the markets, paid for upfront by companies whose 
technologies appear to pose health or environmental 
risks, provides important resources to help fund 
anticipatory research into risks and to provide 
compensation so that society does not have to pay 
for any future damage. When companies put up 
their own money, this provides incentives for better 
research on risks associated with their technologies 
and deters carelessness or recklessness in creating 
such risks. 
24�3 Conclusion
Early warning scientists and others who identify 
potential impending harm have sometimes been 
discouraged in the past or actually lost positions 
or suffered various kinds of losses. However. they 
often bring forth useful and timely knowledge and 
therefore need to be encouraged and not harmed 
for their efforts. Good public policy suggests laws 
should discourage such actions in the first place and 
justice requires rectification if they are the subjects 
of retaliation. And if warnings are not heeded and 
damage results, or if damage results even when 
there were not warnings, it has often proved difficult 
in the past to achieve prompt and fair compensation 
for the victims. 
This chapter has explored some ideas for reform, 
building on some current institutional models in the 
hope that this will raise awareness of these issues 
among the wider public and suggest plausible 
improvements in current law and practices. 
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25 Why did business not react with 
precaution to early warnings?
Marc Le Menestrel and Julian Rode
  
In the past, companies have frequently neglected early warning signals about potential hazards 
for human health or the environment associated with their products or operations. This chapter 
reviews and analyses relevant interdisciplinary literature and prominent case studies — in 
particular those documented in both volumes of Late lessons from early warnings — and 
identifies main factors responsible for the disregard of early warning signals. 
The chapter shows how economic motives often drive non-precautionary business decisions. 
In virtually all reviewed cases it was perceived to be profitable for industries to continue 
using potentially harmful products or operations. However, decisions are also influenced by a 
complex mix of epistemological, regulatory, cultural and psychological aspects. For instance, 
characteristics of the research environment and the regulatory context can provide business 
actors with opportunities to enter into 'political actions' to deny or even suppress early warning 
signals. Also, business decision-makers face psychological barriers to awareness and acceptance 
of the conflicts of values and interests entailed by early warning signals. Cultural business 
context may further contribute to the denial of conflicts of values.
The chapter concludes with a set of reflections on how to support more precautionary business 
decision making. A prominent policy response to the conflicting interests of business and society 
is introducing regulations that attempt to steer business rationality towards internalising external 
effects. Innovative solutions such as assurance bonding should be considered. 
There is a need to better understand and expose why business actors do not respond voluntarily 
to early warning signals with precautionary actions. Blaming business, in particular with 
hindsight, tends to be common reaction that may not always be constructive. It often misses the 
complex or even contradictory set of motives and drivers that business actors face. 
Public institutions could support progressive business by analysing and publically disclosing the 
dilemmas and temptations entailed by early warning signals, for example for different industries 
and for the specific societal and regulatory context of decisions. Rigorous and explicit exposition 
of the dilemmas will create further incentives for responsible actors to share and communicate 
their precautionary responses. 
An additional reflection centres on the role of political actions of business actors, in particular 
those actions aimed at suppressing early warning signals. Regulatory efforts that make the 
political actions of business more transparent can help to sustain a sound balance of power, 
thereby maintaining our ability to benefit from early warning signals and reducing the likelihood 
of health and environmental hazards.
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25�1 Introduction
Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001) describes 
a number of prominent cases in which early 
warning signals about potential hazards from the 
use of commercial products or operations have been 
neglected over long periods of time, eventually 
with grave consequences for human health and the 
environment. While the volume derives lessons which 
focus primarily on improving decision-making by 
regulatory agencies, it becomes also very clear that 
decisions to act with precaution — or the failure to do 
so — often involved business actors. Private companies 
have been the main drivers of innovative activity and, 
notwithstanding the benefits they have generated for 
society, their business practices and products have 
in many instances also caused considerable harm. In 
essence, EEA (2001) shows that business decisions 
played a major role when things went wrong. 
So why did companies not act with precaution when 
early warning signals were available? In this paper, 
we review case studies from EEA (2001) as well as 
some additional 'early warnings' cases which appear 
in this volume. We look for patterns in these past 
experiences and study relevant interdisciplinary 
academic literature with the aim to analyse and 
better understand the situation of companies that are 
confronted with early warnings. We identify several 
potential impediments for business decision-makers to 
act in a precautionary manner, which we summarise in 
three 'lessons about business'. We conclude with some 
reflections on how to support more precautionary 
business decision-making in the face of early warning. 
There is no doubt that many business actors recognise 
their responsibility to strive for economic benefits, 
in line with a wider regard for human welfare 
and with respect for the natural environment 
(see WBCSD, 2010). This analysis should be useful for 
decision-makers to be aware and better understand the 
challenges and potential pitfalls of business behaviours 
when dealing with early warnings. For policy makers 
as well as the general public, the analysis should foster 
a more integrative and differentiated judgement of the 
role of (different) types of business actions towards 
society. 
25�2 Impediments for companies to 
respond to early warnings in a 
precautionary manner
25.2.1 Economic rationality
The standard economic paradigm that underlies 
typical present day business decisions takes root in 
the times of classical industrial society (Shrivastava, 
1995). Private corporations in a market economy are 
regarded as systems of production with the purpose 
of profit maximisation. In such a worldview, 
economic value created by business actors is 
understood primarily as financial returns to owners, 
typically the shareholders. Though a variety of novel 
approaches have been brought forward (e.g. Kelly, 
2001, 2012), this paradigm is the main driver behind 
management decisions. It is embedded in decision 
tools across corporate units, and remains the core 
element of management education. Since half a 
century, it has been to a large extent shared and 
supported by mainstream ideology and the public 
perception of the role of business within a free 
market society (Friedman, 1970; Karnani, 2010). 
The idea of profit maximising firms embraces 
a rationality according to which ethical values 
are reasons to act if and only if they contribute 
to the expected economic benefits for the 
business actor (Le Menestrel, 2002). In particular, 
nature and society at large are external to the 
business environment, and potential societal 
and environmental costs are not to be taken into 
account in business decisions unless they imply 
potential costs for the business actor. Accordingly, 
the internal risk evaluation that is part of the 
standard cost-benefit analysis toolbox is typically 
limited to minimising financial business risk, i.e. the 
comparison of expected revenue or profit figures 
(Sommerfeld, 2010). External risks to human health 
or the environment may enter the calculations, 
but only insofar as they indirectly pose a business 
risk via legal liabilities, regulatory restrictions or 
reputation risks for the company.
Economic rationality is thus remote from a 
proactive precautionary response to early warning 
signals. Virtually all reviewed cases have in 
common that early warnings about harmful effects 
were available, but that the prospect of short-term 
profit generated strong economic incentives 
for companies to continue with their practices. 
The most efficient fishing methods (EEA, 2001, 
Ch. 2), the sales and use of cheap and effective 
substances such as benzene (EEA, 2001, Ch. 4), 
lead in petrol (Chapter 3), asbestos (EEA, 2001, 
Ch. 5), insecticides (Maxim and van der Sluijs, 
2007 and Chapter 16), or growth hormones for 
meat production (EEA, 2001, Ch. 14) are only 
some of many examples. Moreover, competitive 
market forces can further increase the economic 
pressure for using potentially hazardous product 
or for gaining a monopoly position from early 
introduction of innovative products or methods 
(Gollier and Treich, 2003; Maxim and van der 
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Sluijs, 2007). Voluntary preventive measures and 
costly scientific research that may confirm the harm 
or the involved risks are usually expected to be 
detrimental to financial performance.
Reputation
Public concerns or 'conscious consumer' preferences 
for safe products and operations have the potential 
to induce economic incentives for socially or 
environmentally responsible business behaviour 
(Banerjee et al, 2003; Rode et al., 2008). A company 
that is economically rational will not sell a product 
that, for reasons of public concern or lack of 
consumer trust, may not be profitable or give rise 
to consumer boycotts. The eventual termination 
of the use of antimicrobials (EEA, 2001, Ch. 9) and 
of growth hormones (EEA, 2001, Ch. 14) for meat 
production in Europe was driven to some extent by 
growing public concern about potential health risks. 
Such public concern can be a powerful force, no 
matter whether it is driven by the available scientific 
evidence or, in some cases, unrelated to evidence, 
or even overrating the dangers (Sunstein, 2003). 
In many cases, however, the public lacks knowledge 
about early warnings, underrates the risks (see 
also Section 25.2.4 on psychological factors), or 
does not feel affected. Under these circumstances, 
public concern about specific uncertain hazards of 
a particular product or industry is generally absent 
or weak. Consequently, reputation does not provide 
a sufficient economic incentive for precautionary 
behaviour.
Moreover, economically rational companies can 
decide to influence public opinion in their favour 
when this appears cheaper than reducing or 
terminating the potentially harmful practice. If 
companies themselves hold information about 
potential harm of their products or operations, 
they can choose not to disclose it. Voluntarily 
disclosing early warning signals about a potential 
hazard creates the risk that consumers refrain from 
buying the product, and consumers seem to reward 
transparency and honest disclosure of negative 
information only under very limited conditions 
(Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010). When negative 
information is generated outside the company and 
becomes public, we describe below that companies 
have in the past employed a variety of measures to 
influence public opinion in order to prevent or at 
least weaken reputation risks.
Economic interest in preventing harm
In some instances, specific industries stand to lose 
from potential hazards and have an economic 
interest in precautionary termination of the 
potentially harmful activities. For example, when 
inshore cod fishers in Newfoundland suffered 
from falling catches due to unsustainable off-shore 
fishing practices (EEA, 2001, Ch. 2), they reacted 
with protests and the commissioning of a report, 
which gained media attention and eventually 
lead to an official reappraisal of the situation on 
depleted fish stocks. The Arcachon oyster industry 
feared the harmful effects of TBT as antifouling 
biocides for boats and strongly supported the 
implementation of restrictions on the use of TBT 
(EEA, 2001, Ch. 13). Beekeepers suspected early 
on a toxic effect of the insecticide Gaucho on bee 
populations and fought hard for the recognition of 
the evidence (Maxim and van der Sluijs, 2007 and 
Chapter 16). These cases, however, seem to be a 
minority compared to those where industries have 
direct and strong economic motives against taking 
precautionary measures.
25.2.2 Uncertainty in science and the research 
environment
Scientific uncertainty
The research community is expected to provide 
the necessary scientific evidence for determining 
whether early warnings of hazards are credible 
and substantial enough to justify precautionary 
measures. However, the prevalence of scientific 
uncertainty about hazards can weaken acceptance 
of such evidence and act as an impediment to 
precautionary responses to early warning signals. 
Here it is important to consider, however, that 
the uncertainties that companies face today are 
increasingly characterised by indeterminacy 
and even ignorance (Stirling, 2003). Typical 
examples are the effects of industrial operations 
and substances on (marine) ecosystems (EEA, 
2001, Ch. 2) and the uncertainties regarding 
environmental or health effects of mobile 
phones (Chapter 20), GMOs (Chapter 18) or 
nano-technologies (Chapter 21). It seems difficult 
for people to cognitively deal with and to act upon 
such strong uncertainty (Weber, 2006 — see also 
Section 25.2.4 on psychological aspects below) 
and to comprehend the complexity of natural 
systems (Sivakumar, 2008; Kysar, 2009). Moreover, 
it becomes problematic to apply the standard 
risk analysis tools that are based on cost-benefit 
analysis and require knowledge of the set of 
possible outcomes and estimated probabilities of 
their occurrence, which are not always available 
(Ashford, 2005). It remains a challenge for social 
science, and in particular for business research, 
to develop appropriate concepts and operational 
tools that help companies deal with this type of 
uncertainty (e.g. Kunsch et al., 2009). 
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Secondly, it is often not recognised — and not 
communicated sufficiently to the general public — 
that even when scientific evidence with probabilistic 
data exists, uncertainty is an intrinsic and essential 
characteristic of science. There is no scientific 
justification of a 'sufficient level of confidence' or 
for the appropriateness of a confidence interval of 
99 % or 95 % (Crawford-Brown et al., 2004; Ashford, 
2005), and it is an ethical or political issue rather 
than a scientific one to determine an 'acceptable level 
of risk' for a 'reasonable fraction of the population' 
(Crawford-Brown et al., 2004). Moreover, in light 
of different scientific methods (e.g. based on direct 
evidence, correlations, model predictions), levels 
of data quality (e.g. with respect to statistical 
properties, reliability, relevance or level of scrutiny), 
and different lines of evidential reasoning (e.g. with 
respect to conceptual clarity, logical deduction, 
methodological rigor) the 'weight of evidence' from 
scientific results is almost always open to subjective 
judgment and interpretation (Crawford-Brown et al., 
2004; Rauschmayer et al., 2009). 
Interpreting and 'manufacturing' uncertainty
The uncertain and sometimes ambiguous nature of 
scientific evidence seems to stand in a stark contrast 
to the perceptions and idealistic expectations of 
science by the general public (Ravetz, 2005; van 
den Hove, 2007) and to its preference for complete 
certainty for justifying actions, in particular 
when the actions involve concrete costs (Dana, 
2003). This allows industry lobbyists to oppose or 
prolong precautionary measures by 'manufacturing 
uncertainty' and generating doubt on the state 
of scientific evidence. Examples abound where 
corporate public relations efforts have exploited 
the subjectivity in judgment and interpretation 
of particular results, and used rhetorical tricks 
to emphasise the remaining uncertainty and the 
need for further research. Rampton and Stauber 
(2001) give an early account of such processes, 
while Oreskes and Conway (2010) provide a 
historical perspective of this controversial interface 
between science and business. One may also 
look at Sismondo (2008) for an example in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
According to Maxim and van der Sluijs, (2007 and 
Chapter 16), Bayer seems to have repeatedly used 
selective knowledge and 'semantic slips' to blur 
the evidence of a toxic effect of Gaucho on bee 
populations. In the case of benzene, manufacturers 
hired consultants to downplay the importance of 
scientific evidence and to introduce irresolvable 
arguments about dose-response analysis, which 
delayed governmental regulation (EEA, 2001, Ch. 4). 
Monsanto in the 1960s launched a public defense 
of PCBs, arguing that scientific evidence was not 
clear, and that it would take extensive research, on 
a worldwide basis, to confirm or deny the initial 
scientific conclusions (EEA, 2001, Ch. 6; Francis, 
1998). Shell in 1967 circumstantiated its denial of a 
causal relationship between leaking chemicals and 
effects on wildlife and human health in the Great 
Lakes area by publishing a report saying that fish 
killed due to chemical contamination had not been 
verified by recent studies (EEA, 2001, Ch. 12). 
Brush Wellmann in the 1980s hired PR specialists 
to create a more favourable public opinion and to 
reassure customers of the safety of beryllium, for 
instance by claiming that any reports of disease 
at less exposure than the current limit were 
scientifically unsound. In the late 1990s, when it 
was beyond doubt that the established beryllium 
exposure limit was not effective in protecting 
workers, Brush Wellmann initiated more research 
and convened a conference that propagated the 
need for further research before any new limit could 
be set (see the analysis at the end of Chapter 6). 
The millions of pages of previously secret internal 
tobacco industry documents, made public in the 
Minnesota trial, revealed the extent to which the 
effects of nicotine were known and intentionally 
blurred for consumers by creating doubt about the 
health risk (Hurt and Robertson, 1998). Similarly, in 
order to 'keep the debate alive', the tobacco industry 
financed the creation of new research institutions 
to carry out research on the effects of second hand 
smoking (Hong and Bero, 2002 and Chapter 7). 
In the early days of the debate about climate change, 
Exxon was publicly contesting the science, based on 
its complexity and associated uncertainties. While 
presenting itself as 'a science and technology-based 
company', its strategy of preventing political action 
on climate change was chiefly implemented through 
efforts in publicly denying the existence of the 
problem that they had privately identified (van den 
Hove et al., 2002). In essence, by emphasising the 
lack of scientific certainty companies can contribute 
effectively to a 'paralysis by analysis' that prevents 
precautionary measures in response to early 
warning signals (EEA, 2001).
Corporate influence on scientific research
When industry and research are interacting 
closely, for instance in medicine (Sismondo, 2008), 
companies can also directly influence scientific 
results. They do not even have to manipulate results 
or engage in other forms of misconduct, which 
may happen in some cases (Francis, 1998), but they 
can effectively bias research results in their own 
interest by inducing so-called (pro-industry) design 
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and publication biases. It is common that the main 
indicator of scientific confidence of a harmful effect 
is the number of published studies that provide 
evidence for the effect vs. the number of studies 
that do not find one. This overall impression of 
sheer number of scientific results, however, can 
easily be altered through the selection of which 
scientific studies to actually carry out (Lexchin and 
O'Donovan, 2010). In particular since companies 
typically have significant financial means, they 
can strive to misrepresent the weight of results in 
their favour by sponsoring those scientific studies 
and methods which can be expected to produce 
favourable results. 
As prominently done by the tobacco industry 
(Grüning et al., 2006), companies can further 
enhance this bias by organising symposia and 
publishing their proceedings. Symposia proceedings 
are typically not peer-reviewed, but still cited as 
published results. Another example where these 
strategies were applied is research on the health 
effects of lead in petrol. As reported in Chapter 3, 
the relevant studies were conducted and funded 
exclusively by the Ethyl Corporation and General 
Motors for over 40 years, and General Motors 
controlled the publication of results and imposed 
tight reporting constraints on the regulating 
US Bureau of Mines. In this case, it is even said that 
critical independent scientists had their funding 
withdrawn and their jobs and lives threatened. 
In the Gaucho debate in the 1990s, Bayer relied 
almost exclusively on their own research to argue 
against evidence of toxicity (Maxim and van 
der Sluijs, 2007 and Chapter 16). In the case of 
beryllium (Chapter 6), Brush Wellmann financed 
new publications within the beryllium health and 
safety literature under the names of well-known 
academics. 
Unfortunately, these cases weaken the credibility of 
privately sponsored research and create a difficulty 
for companies that have a genuine and honest 
interest in objective and unbiased research about the 
risks of their products or operations. 
25.2.3 Gaps and loopholes in the regulatory 
framework
A perfectly operating regulatory system would 
employ appropriate mechanisms to assure that 
companies only take the risks that are deemed 
acceptable by society at large. Commonly used 
regulatory mechanisms are legal constraints that 
limit or prohibit certain activities, laws that prescribe 
safety standards, or liability and tax systems that 
align the economic interests of the company with the 
interests of society (Pigou, 1912). The Precautionary 
Principle is widely recognised as guidance to 'err 
on the side of caution' and to opt for preventive 
regulatory measures when an activity is believed 
to threaten human health or the environment, even 
if there is no scientifically established evidence 
(Tickner and Raffensberger, 1998). Within a perfect 
regulatory system, it may be argued that the sole 
responsibility of a company is 'to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game' (Friedman, 1970). Many of the reviewed 
cases revealed, however, that the regulation which 
actually constrained corporate decision-making 
in the face of early warning signals, were far from 
such an ideal regulatory system. The following 
paragraphs highlight some key gaps and loopholes 
of the regulatory framework.
Incomplete information for regulation
First, regulators often do not have the complete 
information that would be necessary for imposing 
all appropriate constraints. On the one hand, this 
is of course due to the high degree of uncertainty 
or ignorance inherent in the activities, such as 
currently for nanotechnology or for GMOs. In 
addition, however, regulatory measures such as 
legal bans, safety standards or contingency plans 
often rely on information that is generated within 
the companies whose products or activities have to 
be assessed (EEA, 2001). For instance, companies 
may be the ones to first recognise early warning 
signals, as exemplified in the famous article of Bill 
Joy, the co-founder and Chief Scientist Officer of 
Sun Microsystem, alerting the public about the risks 
of genetically modified organisms, robotics and 
nanotechnology (Joy, 2000). Even in the presence of 
information disclosure rules, it is frequently up to 
the companies to reveal such 'private information' 
to the regulatory agencies. Not revealing important 
information can hence delay or distort regulatory 
action.
Regulation rarely induces full internalisation of 
externalities
Apart from their ex post role of ensuring justice, 
liability regimes are meant to provide ex ante the 
incentive for companies to internalise potential 
harm to society or the environment in their business 
decisions, to make sure that companies have the 
financial means for compensation, and to motivate 
complete risk assessment as well as precautionary 
measures (Boyd, 1997). In accordance with the 
'polluter pays' principle, financial responsibility 
rules would take the form of strict liability to pay for 
potential harm. Alternatively, 'assurance bonding' 
can require companies to deposit a premium that 
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would cover the costs of potential damage before 
undertaking the dangerous activity (Kysar, 2009). 
In many past cases, however, limited or even 
complete absence of liability have undermined the 
polluter pays principle and left companies without 
economic incentives to internalise external risks. 
Then, external costs from corporate action are 
typically borne by society at large. In the case of 
fisheries (EEA, 2001, Ch. 2) there was no corporate 
liability in place to account for externalities of 
overfishing and the costs to restore stock is to be 
paid by governments of the respective adjacent 
states. Similarly, the majority of external costs 
from MTBE in petrol (treatment of contaminated 
water, alternative water supply, health costs etc.) 
were borne by society (EEA, 2001, Ch. 11). For 
asbestos in the United Kingdom, it is argued that 
the market price of asbestos was so low since it did 
not internalise the external costs, which remained 
with families, health service, insurance carriers and 
building owners (EEA, 2001, Ch. 5). Even though 
laws on prevention, compensation, and sanctions 
existed as early as in the 1930s, they were simply not 
appropriately implemented. 
There are other important aspects that determine 
the effectiveness of liability regimes in steering 
corporate conduct. For instance, the evidentiary 
strength to determine when liability comes into 
effect may be more or less strict, ranging from the 
need of 'clear and convincing evidence' vs. 'more 
probable than not' vs. 'preponderance of evidence', 
or the requirement of a 'substantial cause or factor' 
vs. 'contributing factor'. In addition, it is crucial 
whether the legal burden of persuasion is with 
those who suffer the harm or whether it is the 
responsibility of the industry to prove that no harm 
was done (Ashford, 2005). Clearly, a company facing 
a legal situation in which the victim has to provide 
convincing evidence that the corporate activity was 
a substantial cause for the suffered harm can expect 
fewer costs than in other situations, e.g. in which the 
burden of proof of no harm lies on the company.
It has also been noted that insolvency risk can 
further undermine full cost internalisation by 
companies, especially when harm would only occur 
in the far future (Boyd, 1997). For instance, Manville 
Corporation filed for bankruptcy in 1982 as a means 
of dealing with asbestos pollution claims (EEA, 2001, 
Ch. 5), when it was far too late to act with precaution 
towards asbestos.
Conflicting mandates of regulatory agencies
The implementation of a regulatory framework that 
adequately constrains companies for protecting 
society from potential hazards requires that 
the responsible governmental agencies have a 
clear mandate to do so. Governmental agencies 
sometimes have conflicting mandates. Before 
establishment of the US EPA, for instance, the 
US Department of Agriculture was responsible for 
environmental regulation in the debate on chemical 
contamination of the Great Lakes. As a supporter of 
the economic interests of the agro-industry, it tended 
to align itself with the pesticide manufacturers and 
the farmers, demanding proof of causal relationship 
before 'massive' approbations and expenditures 
of public and private funds on remedial works' 
(EEA, 2001, Ch. 12). In a similar fashion, the 
US Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), 
which was responsible for reporting the scientific 
evidence on overfishing, is said to have followed the 
interests of the fishery sector (EEA, 2001, Ch. 2). The 
DFO is accused of having presented biased results, 
referring to remaining uncertainties, and of arguing 
against 'pseudo-science' and bad faith of early 
warnings. 
Conflicting mandates of regulatory agencies are 
reported in further instances. In the case of the 
'mad-cow disease', the responsible British Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was 
expected simultaneously to promote the economic 
interests of farmers and the food industry whilst also 
protecting public health from food-borne hazards 
(EEA, 2001, Ch. 15). In the debate on the toxic effects 
of Gaucho, the French Ministry of Agriculture 
was responsible for the contradictory demands of 
intensive agriculture and beekeepers and at the 
same time for the management of risks issuing 
from the agricultural sector's activities (Maxim 
and van der Sluijs, 2007, and Chapter 16). The US 
Department of Energy (DOE) was responsible both 
for the cheap production of nuclear weapons and 
the protection of workers through appropriate 
beryllium exposure limit (Chapter 6).
Corporate influence on regulation
Regulators have in the past not always judged and 
decided objectively and independently with respect 
to corporate interests. In several cases, regulatory 
agencies and committees included experts with 
a conflict of interest, who could shape policy 
recommendations by interpreting scientific evidence 
in the interests of the industry. Again, the tobacco 
documents have revealed the extent to which 
industry is able to subvert public institutions. In a 
report about the strategies to undermine tobacco 
control activities of the World Health Organization, 
authors write that 'evidence from tobacco industry 
documents reveals that tobacco companies have 
operated for many years with the deliberate 
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purpose of subverting the efforts of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) to control tobacco 
use. The attempted subversion has been elaborate, 
well financed, sophisticated, and usually invisible' 
(Zelltner, 2000). 
In the case of benzene (EEA, 2001, Ch. 4), the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH) repeatedly recommended 
benzene limits higher than those in line with 
scientific evidence on benzene poisoning. Scientists 
employed by various corporations participated in 
the Threshold Limit Value Committee that made 
exposure recommendations (Castleman and Ziem, 
1988). In the early phase of using lead in petrol in the 
1920s (see Chapter 3), public health specialists acted 
as paid consultants to the Ethyl Corporation while at 
the same time advising the US Government's Bureau 
of Mines, providing assurances of 'complete safety' 
for public health. In the pharmaceutical domain, 
conflicts of interest seem pervasive. Reviewing 
three European drug regulatory agencies, Lexchin 
and O'Donavan (2010) find evidence of widespread 
potential conflict of interests among scientific 
experts. 
Last, companies can also influence regulation 
indirectly through the above mentioned influence 
on public perception of the involved risks. In an 
increasingly demand driven economy, public 
trust, consumer perceptions or NGOs can have a 
considerable influence on the politics and decisions 
of regulatory agencies (Aerni, 2004; Carter, 2002). 
25.2.4 Psychological factors
There is ample evidence from the behavioural 
sciences indicating that people's capacity for proper 
recognition and evaluation of early warnings is 
limited. This section outlines prominent findings 
and assesses their role for business decisions and the 
perceptions of the general public.
Bounded rationality
A large body of psychological and 'behavioural 
economics' research is dedicated to the 'bounded 
rationality' of risk perception and decision-making 
under uncertainty, (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982). Psychological theories of judgment and 
decision-making provide a number of explanations 
for human failure to adequately process risks 
and probabilistic information. Note that the 
manifestation of potential hazards may be either 
described as low-probability events (e.g. a nuclear 
catastrophe), or, when the scientific evidence of an 
adverse effect is scarce, the likelihood of the effect 
will be formulated in terms of a low probability 
(e.g. the increase of cancer rates caused by exposure 
to a chemical substance). While low-probability 
events can be overestimated when they are vivid 
in people's mind (Kahneman, 2011), it has been 
shown that awareness of risks is more effectively 
communicated by engaging in direct experience 
and the associated emotions, rather than abstract 
statistical descriptions (Weber, 2006). Also, concrete 
losses or events have a much higher impact on 
people's beliefs than information about uncertain, 
abstract ones (Dana, 2003). 
This focus on direct experiences as basis for 
decisions, however, leads human cognition to 
struggle with an appropriate consideration of 
low-probability risks as indicated by early warning 
signals. When early warnings signals occur, people 
have typically not directly experienced the hazards 
themselves. In that case, people tend to neglect the 
likelihood of rare events (Hertwig and Erev, 2009). 
As Kahneman (2011) emphasises, 'when it comes to 
rare probabilities, our mind is not designed to get it 
quite right. For the residents of a planet that may be 
exposed to events no one has yet experienced, this 
is not good news.' The psychological hurdles for a 
proper recognition and evaluation of early warnings 
apply to business decision-makers and the general 
public alike (Boyd, 1997). Note that in exceptional 
cases, this psychological disposition can trigger 
an opposite effect, namely when a low-probability 
event does indeed occur. Then, people may even — 
at least temporarily — overrate the probability of 
occurrence (Sunstein, 2003), and increased public 
concern may lead to faster regulatory measures. This 
may have been the case for the German decision 
to phase out nuclear energy after the Fukushima 
accident in 2011. In most situations, however, human 
risk perception seems to impede precautionary 
corporate action as well as public pressure for 
responding to early warnings with precaution.
A related phenomenon is the so-called 'pensioner's 
party fallacy', according to which people tend to 
overrate the fact that some people live long in spite 
of exposure to harmful substances and are hence 
still present at pensioners' parties — as opposed 
to their deceased colleagues — and this presence 
is perceived as evidence against the existence of 
harm (EEA, 2001). Here, people neglect the fact that 
their personal experience with formerly exposed 
colleagues is biased towards meeting the survivors. 
For instance, this effect is likely to play a role also for 
the perception of risks from smoking.
Another well documented characteristic of risk 
perception is that immediate losses or harm have 
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a larger bearing on people's beliefs than losses 
or harm in the future (Dana, 2003; Weber 2006). 
Economic models capture this systematic bias in 
preferences over time by using discount factors 
for present value calculation. Recent 'behavioural 
economics' approaches even use hyperbolic 
discounting to represent the seemingly exponential 
diminishing of value over time. This systematic bias 
works against precautionary measures since those 
measures typically involve direct costs in the present 
in order to avoid uncertain costs from harm in the — 
often far away — future. One may argue that people 
should decide freely on their 'time preferences' and 
that any type of paternalism on how to trade off 
present versus future consequences is inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, uncertain future hazards also 
involve consequences for future generations and 
discounting such consequences based on the time 
preferences only of the present generation may be 
questionable from an ethical point of view (O'Neill 
et al., 2008). There is currently a heated debate 
about an appropriate discounting of the effects of 
climate change and of biodiversity loss (Stern, 2006; 
Weitzman, 2007; Spash, 2007; TEEB, 2009). 
Other findings on the limits to taking into account 
information about risks are noteworthy. For 
instance, the 'finite-pool-of-worries' hypothesis 
reflects that the degree of concern for a certain 
issue depends on the presence of other, perhaps 
more direct worries, such as the financial crisis, 
job security etc. (Weber, 2006). For most people, 
uncertain future hazards may not be high enough on 
the agenda to invoke any action. The 'single action 
bias' reflects the tendency not to take further action 
after one initial step, which leads to suboptimal 
behaviour when a portfolio of actions or a constant 
change in behaviour would be appropriate (Weber, 
2006). Moreover, there is evidence for cultural 
differences in how health and safety risks affects 
decision-making (Biana and Keller, 1999). Last, even 
though we have not found psychological studies on 
the phenomenon, several reviewed cases reported 
that companies exploited people's tendency to 
interpret 'no evidence of harm' as 'evidence of no 
harm' (Chapter 3; Chapter 6; Zelltner, 2000).
Bounded ethicality 
Apart from 'bounded rationality' in risk perception, 
there are psychological findings revealing 'ethical 
blindness' (Palazzo et al., 2012), 'ethical biases' 
(Banaji et al., 2003) or 'bounded ethicality' (Gino 
et al., 2008). A prominent and widely studied 
phenomenon is the 'self-serving bias', which refers 
to people's general tendency to interpret ambiguous 
situation in their self-interest (Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997). For decisions where self-interest 
conflicts with ethics, this implies that people engage 
in self-deception that helps them reinterpret or 
disguise that acting in their self-interest violates 
ethical principles. Such phenomena can be largely 
unconscious and psychologists tend to relate 
them to the reduction of a 'cognitive dissonance' 
(Festinger, 1957) that stems from conflicting goals 
such as making profit and acting ethical. 
Self-deception may be enabled through different 
mechanisms, including language euphemisms 
and 'slippery-slope' decisions, where a series of 
small infractions of ethical standards can lead to a 
journey towards immoral conduct (Tenbrusel and 
Messik, 2004). In addition, people tend to hide from 
relevant knowledge on ethical attributes of decisions 
(Ehrich and Irwin, 2005) and to neglect those 
arguments or types of reasoning that may reveal 
them as responsible for immoral action (Rode and 
Le Menestrel, 2011). The self-serving bias seems of 
high relevance when business decision-makers face 
uncertain early warnings signals but precautionary 
measures are not in the economic interest of 
the company (Gollier and Treich, 2003). Strong 
uncertainty may not only be inherently difficult to 
integrate into risk assessment, but it may also serve 
as a welcome 'excuse' and justification about why 
the profitable action may not be so unethical after 
all.
Other research has shown that people tend to 
engage in self-deception also when evaluating 
potentially harmful behaviour of others, in 
particular that they overlook unethical behaviour 
of others that may harm them when that behaviour 
is not clear, immediate and direct, and when it 
has not yet resulted in a bad outcome (Gino et al., 
2008). With respect to our analysis, such a tendency 
may further explain the public lack of awareness 
of inappropriate corporate responses to early 
warnings, and hence the public's reluctance to react 
with potentially supportive actions in their role as 
consumers, voters or engaged citizens.
For the case of asbestos, Sells (1994) provides 
testimony of the relevance of self-deception and 
denial as critical factors for why business actors fail 
to act with precaution in the face of early warning 
signals. He cites one of the presidents of Manville 
Corporation saying that 'the blunder that cost 
thousands of lives and destroyed an industry was a 
management blunder, and the blunder was denial. 
…Manville managers at every level were unwilling 
or unable to believe in the long-term consequences 
of these known hazards. They denied, or at least 
failed to acknowledge, the depth and persistence 
of management accountability' (Sells, 1994). It is as 
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if the combination of economic interests, scientific 
uncertainty, and psychological factors concur to 
trap business executives in an organisational culture 
where the danger is minimised and alternative 
business solutions unattainable: 'If an organisation's 
culture encourages denial, problems get buried. 
Corporate cultures are built by successful people, 
good men and women who are often pillars of 
their communities as well as business leaders. The 
executives at Manville were good people too, and 
nevertheless they fostered a culture of self-deception 
and denial' (Sells, 1994). 
Evidence from the same company, however, also 
shows that such cultural factors can be reversed. The 
tragedy of asbestos and the eventual bankruptcy 
acted for Manville Corporation as a lesson for the 
company to stop its culture of denial and changed 
its approach towards products stewardship. In 
1986, shortly after learning that its fiberglass 
products could be related to an increase in cancer 
rate, the company's leadership took precautionary 
action with regards to its operations and voluntary 
re-labeled these products as possibly carcinogenic 
despite the reluctance of their lawyers. The company 
benefited from this proactive strategy thanks to a 
successful indemnification and marketing strategy, 
proving that what may be perceived as a conflict of 
interest could well lead to a successful alignment 
of business and social values. It took then nearly 
five years to realise that the excess detected in 
respiratory cancer in fiberglass manufacturing 
workers were not sufficiently significant to justify 
such a warning label (Sells, 1994; Paine and Gant, 
2009).
25�3 Lessons and reflections about 
business and early warnings
We now provide a set of lessons and reflections that 
summarise our findings and whose consideration 
may promote more precautionary business 
decision-making.
Lesson 1: early warning signals often entail conflict 
of values for business actors, who expect to be 
in their economic interest not to respond with 
precautionary 'business actions'
The cases we have studied here illustrate that 
early warning signals often raise conflicts between 
short term economic gains for business actors on 
the one hand and long term human health and 
environmental values on the other. Given that health 
and environment are regarded as issues pertaining to 
society at large or at least to multiple societal actors or 
groups, these conflicts of values are often conflicts of 
interest between business actors and public interest.
The reviewed cases illustrate how business actors 
tended to give priority to their short-term economic 
interest and did not respond to early warnings. This 
behaviour is in line with the standard economic and 
management paradigm, which regards maximising 
profits as the main objective of companies, as long 
as this is done respecting the relevant regulatory 
frameworks. In other words, when early warning 
signals entailed potential conflicts between profit 
and other societal values, economic interests pushed 
business to dismiss those business actions that 
would respond with precaution, such as modifying 
or terminating potentially hazardous products or 
operations.
Lesson 2: characteristics of the research environment 
and the regulatory context can provide business 
actors with opportunities to enter into 'political 
actions' to undermine early warning signals
When companies respond to early warning signals 
by giving priority to their business interest at the 
expense of public interest, they have a further 
incentive to suppress, contradict or downplay these 
early warning signals, both to maintain favourable 
public opinion and to avoid regulatory constraints. 
Many of the reviewed cases were characterised 
by a regulatory and societal context that allowed 
companies to effectively pressure science, lobby for 
favourable regulation and influence public opinion 
against the recognition and acceptance of early 
warning signals. In some cases, like tobacco, such 
actions contributed to discrediting national and 
international institutions and NGOs, weakening their 
ability to produce or relay early warnings signals. 
Because these actions go beyond strictly speaking 
'business actions' but rather influence the societal 
context of business, they can be seen as 'political 
actions' and illustrate a political role of business 
actors (Scherrer and Palazzo, 2010). It seems therefore 
important to distinguish these types of actions from 
'business actions', such as decisions to continue or not 
with a potentially hazardous product or operation. 
'Political actions' are not aimed at maximising profits 
within the political and regulatory contexts but rather 
aim at influencing these political and regulatory 
contexts in the pursuit of profits. 
Lesson 3: psychological and cultural factors 
contribute to neglecting early warning signals
Business decision-makers face psychological barriers 
to awareness and acceptance of the conflicts of 
values and of interest entailed by early warning 
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signals. Human risk perception and time preferences 
are biased towards underrating uncertain hazards, 
and there is a tendency to avoid the cognitive and 
emotional dissonances generated by the presence 
of value conflicts. In particular when own interests 
are at stake, it is well documented that people tend 
to reveal self-serving biases in their perception of 
the situation. Hence, when business actors have an 
economic interest in producing or using potentially 
hazardous substances, they are tempted to justify 
their behaviour by dismissing early warning signals 
and the conflicts of values they entail.
The cultural business context further contributes 
to the denial of conflicts of values entailed by early 
warning signals. Typically, the idea that the main 
objective of business is to maximise profit and 
the belief that this is the most appropriate way 
for business to serve society provide a powerful 
justification for dismissing the relevance of these 
value conflicts for business actors and to increase 
self-perception of responsibility. As in the asbestos 
example, organisational cultures can also explain 
the difficulty in facing the conflicts of values and of 
interest entailed by early warning signals. 
Reflections about business and early warning 
signals
A prominent policy response to conflicting interests 
between business and society are regulatory 
measures that attempt to steer business rationality 
towards internalisation of external effects. We would 
agree that for uncertain hazards, proposals for legal, 
fiscal, and financial regulatory mechanisms still have 
a large potential to further align business interests 
with interests of society. Innovative solutions 
such as assurance bonding should be considered 
(Kysar, 2009). Yet, our article has outlined that 
precautionary business operations face further 
barriers that are of epistemological, psychological, 
political and cultural nature. Given the variety and 
complexity of these barriers, it seems unrealistic to 
believe that complete alignment of business interests 
with interests of society at large will always be 
feasible. At least in the short term, or until business 
actors indeed face the ideal societal and regulatory 
context, business decision-makers will face difficult 
situations with value conflicts. In our opinion, 
the possibility to discuss these conflicts of values 
rationally and openly is an absolute necessity to 
mature our responses towards them.
In particular, and notwithstanding the necessity to 
strengthen the accountability of business actors, 
we believe there is a need to better understand 
and expose the rationale for business actors not 
to respond voluntarily to early warning signals 
with precautionary actions. Blaming business, 
in particular with hindsight, tends to be a 
rather typical reaction that may not always be 
constructive. It often misses the complex or even 
contradictory set of motives and drivers that 
business actors are facing. When companies give 
priority to their business interest at the expense 
of precautionary actions, it is not necessarily 
because they willingly act against the interests 
of society or to harm the environment. Some 
business actors may well acknowledge the need to 
sacrifice some business interest, but may consider 
in good faith that the early warning signals are not 
strong enough to justify precautionary measures. 
Others may be unaware of the full extent of their 
conflicting interests and of their self-serving 
biases, for instance because of a cultural or an 
organisational context that is trapping them in a 
short-sighted economic approach. 
We thus believe that a crucial first step towards 
any solution is awareness and acceptance of the 
dilemmas business actors are facing, and of the 
various temptations for business to act in a way 
that is harmful to society. Here, we can imagine 
that public institutions could support progressive 
business by analysing and publically disclosing 
the dilemmas and temptations entailed by early 
warning signals, e.g. for different industries and 
for the specific societal and regulatory context of 
decisions. This includes disclosure of the conflicts 
between making profit and causing potential 
societal harm, but also the psychological temptations 
to hide from such value conflicts, the temptations 
to use gaps and loopholes of regulation or to 
influence the regulators, as well as the temptations 
to influence the scientific evidence. Rather than 
prescribing specific precautionary business actions, 
such institutions could then promote more open, 
transparent, and stakeholder-inclusive participatory 
decision frameworks that recognise the reality and 
the difficulty of the complex trade-offs (Stirling, 
2008). 
Rigorous and explicit exposition of the dilemmas 
will create further incentives for responsible actors 
to share and communicate their precautionary 
responses. Clear and factual descriptions of these 
difficult situations, if possible devoid of judgemental 
considerations, may contribute to reducing 
unconscious denials, force business organisations 
to openly discuss the factors driving their 
decision-making (see Tenbrusel and Messik, 2004), 
and promote more transparency, proactive attitudes 
and innovative responses to difficult business 
decisions. Because they would make explicit the 
conflict of values, such institutional approaches 
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would more realistically complement initiatives 
based on the idealised principle that being socially 
responsible is economically profitable, typical of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Porter and Kramer, 
2011).
An additional reflection lies more specifically 
on the role of political actions of business actors, 
in particular those actions aimed at suppressing 
early warning signals. Even though they could 
be regarded as a natural tendency to justify and 
protect one's own interest, such political actions 
have the potential to disrupt an honest debate and to 
prevent the development of an appropriate context 
within which business actions lead to positive 
consequences for society. The fact that some business 
actors spend sophisticated efforts to hide or keep 
secret their political actions can be seen as a signal 
that their behaviour is of bad faith and would not 
be socially acceptable. Regulatory efforts that make 
more transparent the political actions of business 
can help to sustain a sound balance of power, 
thereby maintaining our ability to benefit from early 
warning signals and reducing the likelihood of 
health and environmental hazards. 
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26 Science for precautionary 
decision‑making
Philippe Grandjean (1)
(1) The author would like to thank Mette Eriksen for conducting the searches on SciFinder. Helpful contributions on earlier versions were 
made by John Bailar, Carl Cranor, David Gee and David Kriebel.
  
The goals of academic researchers may differ from those of regulatory agencies responsible for 
protecting the environment. Thus, research must take into account issues such as feasibility, 
merit and institutional agendas, which may lead to inflexibility and inertia.
A large proportion of academic research on environmental hazards therefore seems to focus 
on a small number of well studied environmental chemicals, such as metals. Research on 
environmental hazards should therefore to a greater extent consider poorly known problems, 
especially the potential hazards about which new information is in particular need. 
Misinterpretation may occur when results published in scientific journals are expressed in hedged 
language. For example, a study that fails to document with statistical significance the presence 
of a hazard is often said to be negative, and the results may be misinterpreted as evidence that 
a hazard is absent. Such erroneous conclusions are inspired by science traditions, which demand 
meticulous and repeated examination before a hypothesis can be said to be substantiated.
For prioritising needs for action, research should instead focus on identifying the possible 
magnitude of potential hazards. Research is always affected by uncertainties and many of them 
can blur a real association between an environmental hazard and its adverse effects, thereby 
resulting in an underestimated risk. Environmental health research therefore needs to address 
the following question: are we sufficiently confident that this exposure to a potential hazard leads 
to adverse effects serious enough to initiate transparent and democratic procedures to decide on 
appropriate intervention? 
The choice of research topics must consider societal needs for information on poorly known 
and potentially dangerous risks. The research should be complementary and extend current 
knowledge, rather than being repetitive for verification purposes, as required by the traditional 
science paradigm. Research findings should be openly available and reported so that they inform 
judgements concerning the possible magnitude of suspected environmental hazards, thereby 
facilitating precautionary and timely decision‑making.
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26.1 Science and the Precautionary 
Principle
The case studies in this volume illustrate that 
science can provide powerful evidence for targeted 
prevention to protect against hazards to the 
environment and public health. However, the 
chapters also shows how science can be insufficient, 
and it can be misinterpreted or ignored, so that 
appropriate intervention is deferred or abandoned. 
This chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses 
of environmental health research seen from the 
perspective of the wider needs of society and the use 
of 'Precautionary Principle' (PP). 
At the outset, societal investment in environmental 
research would seem unwise if it is irrelevant, poor, 
or difficult to access. Research support should 
favour studies that stimulate timely decision‑making 
and prudent action to prevent hazards. While not 
disregarding the need for basic research, I shall 
focus primarily on the weaknesses of current 
applied research in the environmental field and the 
possible avenues for science to become more useful 
for future environmental health decision‑making. 
Some researchers have raised the concern that 
the PP may potentially make further research 
redundant, given that an intervention has already 
been decided upon (Goldstein and Carruth, 2004). 
But any decision on environmental health hazards 
should be considered tentative and amenable to 
change, as justified by further research (including 
intervention studies to determine if the action 
had the intended effect). The basic problem is that 
prevention has too often been deferred due in 
part to the alleged absence of convincing scientific 
evidence, as illustrated by the case studies in this 
volume (2). The error is recognised only when 
decisive evidence has finally been gathered, and it is 
realised that action should have been initiated much 
earlier on. With time, nearly all exposure limits for 
hazardous agents have decreased as new evidence 
documented that harm occurred at lower exposure 
levels than previously believed. Thus, when 
scientific evidence is incomplete, environmental 
standards are more lenient. But can science provide 
better support for prudent decision‑making, so that 
adequate protection may be decided upon from the 
beginning? 
For research to provide sufficient documentation 
for potential intervention, it has to be both reliable 
and pertinent. Thus, the quality of research has 
two sides — the methodology and the utility. One 
could also refer to these two aspects as the validity 
and the relevance. The two are of course related, 
but even research considered 'poor' from a narrow 
methodological perspective could nonetheless be 
highly relevant. Still, a study of limited validity 
is most likely also to have little impact, especially 
if the conclusions cannot be trusted. While the 
researchers should focus on securing a high 
methodological level, that should not turn them 
into sceptical ivory‑tower nit‑pickers preoccupied 
with methodological precision and technical 
detail. On the other hand, focusing mainly on 
environmental implications of the research can 
lead to inappropriate (or apparent) advocacy for 
particular policies or precautionary action that may 
be inspired, though perhaps not justified, by the 
research. 
Environmental health is often considered a field 
of applied research, usually multidisciplinary. 
Researchers and their employers are engaged 
in science not just for purely altruistic reasons. 
Universities and other research institutions are 
enterprises that need to fulfil the institution's 
mandates, satisfy requirements stipulated by 
funding sources, and avoid going into debt. 
Within the EU, more than half of the research and 
development activities carried out are funded by 
industry, while slightly more than one‑third is 
paid for from public sources (Eurostat, 2011). The 
EU's new Horizon 2020 research programme is 
intended to increase the public financing of 'smart 
investment' in research and innovation while 
dealing with pressing societal challenges, including 
climate change and environmental health problems 
(EC, 2011). Given the substantial public investment 
in research (van den Hove et al., 2011), one would 
anticipate that environmental research, especially 
the part of it that is reported in academic journals, 
would somehow reflect priorities expressed by 
regulatory agencies and other public bodies. The 
next section of this chapter will therefore examine 
the research coverage of environmental chemicals 
and whether poorly documented and potential 
hazards receive appropriate attention. But there is 
more to it than the coverage of priority topics. 
(2) As the preface to the first volume of Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001) pointed out, 'the absence of political will to take 
action to reduce hazards in the face of conflicting costs and benefits seems to be an even more important factor in these histories 
than is the availability of trusted information'. 
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Under PP‑based decision‑making, scientific proof 
or a very high degree of certainty are not required. 
Incomplete, but reliable evidence can be sufficient 
to justify a precautionary intervention. On the 
other hand, if extensive evidence is available, then 
a conventional risk assessment and subsequent 
prevention are indicated, and there would be little 
need to invoke the PP. However, traditional risk 
assessment is sometimes anti‑precautionary when 
it demands convincing evidence and thus ignores 
emerging insight and incomplete documentation. 
Due to its focus on scientific justification, risk 
assessment may inspire continued elaboration 
of fairly well documented hazards, so that 
remaining uncertainties can be resolved to allow 
firm decisions. When decisions are PP‑based, 
less extensive evidence is required, and some 
uncertainties are accepted as being inevitable or 
impossible to remove in the time available for 
preventing plausible harm. The less extensive 
requirement regarding scientific evidence can have 
significant implications for the ways that research 
is planned, performed, analysed, interpreted and 
reported (Grandjean, 2008b). 
We rely on science as evidence to help justify 
decisions on environmental hazards. But, as the 
case studies in the present and the first volume of 
Late lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001) clearly 
demonstrate, science does not automatically 
lead to appropriate prevention or precautionary 
action. Thus, neither the quality nor the relevance 
of the science as such will necessarily translate 
into responsible and prudent decisions. Still, the 
interpretation of incomplete research data, the 
evaluation of uncertainties and misunderstandings 
of the findings can obfuscate the discussion on the 
urgency of possible environmental protection. So 
the question must therefore be asked: Can science 
somehow better serve to support better public 
policy decisions? 
I think that the answer is yes, although better 
quality and relevance in terms of PP‑based 
decision‑making may not be easy to achieve. This 
chapter will focus on four main issues listed below. 
Concerns regarding science as evidence for 
decisions on environmental hazards:
1) Does the research cover the societal needs for 
supporting information on suspected, poorly 
documented or potential hazards?
2) Does the research explore new and emerging 
hazards so that it could serve as an early 
warning system? 
3) Is the reporting of research findings 
appropriate to serve as evidence for reducing 
environmental hazards?
4) If the research is available, is it reliable and 
independent of vested interests?
26.2 Current research focus is on 
well‑known hazards
The most appropriate and feasible way to assess 
the topics covered by environmental research 
is to carry out bibliometric analyses using 
internet‑based databases on scientific publications. 
Environmental journals are usually categorised in 
the fields of toxicology, environmental sciences and 
public health (a total of 78 major journals in both 
Web of Science and the PubMed database). The 
Web of Science covers scientific literature back to 
1899, but searches are limited to chemical names 
in the titles of journal articles. However, for recent 
publications, it is possible to use the SciFinder 
database, where individual environmental 
chemicals can be identified from their Chemical 
Abstract Service (CAS) registry numbers. Using 
these internet resources, information can be 
retrieved on how often scientific publications 
have dealt with chemicals of interest from an 
environmental viewpoint (Grandjean et al., 2011). 
As a starting point, we first used Web of Science 
to examine the coverage of the seven chemical 
substances from the 14 case studies reviewed in 
Late lessons from early warnings Volume 1 (EEA, 
2001). Table 26.1 shows the number of articles 
published in the relevant journals during the 
years 2000–2009, i.e. the 10 years right after the 
completion of the report. One could have expected 
that these early warning substances would have 
faded somewhat from the science radar, given 
that their environmental impact had already been 
recognised during the 20th century and that some 
had been banned several decades ago. However, 
the number of scientific publications on these 
substances during 2000–2009 corresponded to 
about 40 % of all articles available since 1899. 
The relative coverage before and after year 2000 
differed somewhat between the substances. Both 
sulfur dioxide and DES clearly faded during 
recent years, with only about one quarter of all 
titles available in environmental and toxicological 
publications since 1899 being published during 
2000–2009. On the other hand, MTBE became more 
popular, with three‑quarters of all papers available 
since 1899 having been published during the first 
decade of this century. 
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These numbers suggest that substantial research 
continued to be published on these substances, 
long after the recognition of their importance as 
environmental contaminants. However, the numbers 
extracted from the Web of Science are incomplete, 
as a research article might well address a chemical 
without the substance name appearing in the 
title. Thus, when extracting data from SciFinder, 
we obtained a greater number of articles (total of 
8 267 during 2000–2009, asbestos not included). With 
an average of over 10 scientific articles per substance 
per month, these early warnings chemicals remained 
a significant focus of research reports published since 
2000. PCBs, in particular, remained very much in 
focus, as I shall discuss shortly. 
Given the continued attention paid to these 
chemicals characterised by 'early warnings', 
what about environmental chemicals in general? 
Thousands of potentially toxic chemicals are being 
released into the environment, and there is a need 
to determine their persistence, dissemination, 
biomagnification and toxic effects, especially when 
only minimal information is available. So how does 
published research reflect the societal needs to cover a 
wide range of potential hazards?
Based on CAS number links from the science journals 
during 2000–2009, the substances can be ranked in 
accordance with their numbers of publication links 
(as SciFinder is not limited to environmental chemicals, 
we had to manually exclude radioactive isotopes, 
enzymes, metabolites, etc.). All told, 119 636 articles 
were published by the 78 scientific journals during 
the first ten years of this millennium. SciFinder 
listed a total of 760 056 CAS links from these articles 
Table 26.1 Total numbers of articles published 1899–2009 and during the most recent 
10 years (and percent of total) in environmental and toxicology journals listing 
'early warnings' substances in the title 
Note: *MBTE uses were expanded during the late 20th century, not restricted like the other substances in the table.
Source: Data from the Web of Science (Grandjean et al., 2011).
Name
Total number of articles 
1899–2009
Articles published 2000–2009
Number % of total
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 5 809 2 738 47
Asbestos 2 735 809 30
Sulfur dioxide 2 380 548 23
Benzene 2 075 879 42
Tributyltin (TBT) 672 344 51
Diethylstilboestrol (DES) 603 147 24
Methyl‑tert‑butyl ether (MBTE)* 542 411 76
Total 14 816 5 876 40
(Grandjean et al., 2011). Thus, on average, each of the 
many scientific articles had six CAS links, thus not 
only describing a single substance at a time. The total 
numbers of publications and links are large and reflect 
an intense publication activity. However, the coverage 
turned out to be extremely uneven. 
We focused on the 100 most frequent environmental 
chemicals. Each of them was covered in a minimum 
of 600 articles — and up to 10 000 — during the 
10‑year period. Thus, each of the top‑100 substances 
would be addressed in about five to 80 articles 
every month. The total number of links to the 
top‑100 environmental chemicals was 180 822. Thus, 
the vast majority of the many thousand chemicals 
listed were far less popular than the top‑100. This 
finding suggests that research on environmental 
chemicals is and has been for some time fairly 
narrowly focused on a limited number of substances. 
This conclusion becomes very clear when we examine 
the 20 most commonly studied environmental 
chemicals. Each had between 2 000 and 10 000 CAS 
links during the first ten years of the millennium. The 
sum of article links corresponds to 12 % of all CAS 
number links. Assuming they also represent 12 % of 
all published articles, one or more of these substances 
would be featured in 14 264 publications during the 
10 years, or 119 articles per month, on average. To 
keep up with the literature in the top‑20 substances 
only, one would have to read five or six papers every 
work day, without holiday breaks. 
All of the top‑10 substances are metals (including 
arsenic, which is regarded as a semimetal). Also 
well covered are several tar chemicals (polyaromatic 
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hydrocarbons), solvents and the PCBs — already 
known from Late lessons from early warnings 
Volume 1 (EEA, 2001) and Table 26.1. For the 
top‑20 substances, an average of 51 % of all articles 
available in 2009 had been published within the 
most recent 10 years. Some variation was present: 
arsenic increased in popularity (74 % during the 
most recent 10 years), while aluminium decreased 
after the year 2000 (31 %). Also, the tar chemicals 
often found in air pollution (e.g. benzo[a]pyrene 
and phenanthrene) tended to appear more often in 
recent article titles. Overall, these results show that 
the chemicals most commonly studied in recent 
years had already been extensively studied during 
the previous century. Thus, the chemicals that were 
popular during the previous century remained a 
focus (Grandjean et al., 2011). 
Two of the top‑20 chemicals — lead and mercury 
— are included in the case studies, and Table 26.2 
shows the results for the main substances reviewed 
in this volume. Thus, whether or not the chemicals 
are persistent in the environment or the human 
body, some of them have clearly become persistent 
and highly prominent in the scientific literature. The 
tens of thousands of articles on lead, mercury, and 
other well recognised environmental hazards testify 
to the enormous investments in studying, reporting 
and publishing on these prominent substances. It 
would therefore seem that the choice of research 
topic in the field of environmental health greatly 
benefits the well‑known chemicals.
The next question to consider is whether research 
addresses societal needs for more poorly known and 
potentially dangerous risks. Does academic research 
in environmental chemicals ignore less‑well known 
compounds that need documentation? We conducted 
additional studies to examine this question. 
Table 26.2 Numbers of articles published in environmental science journals during 2000–2009 
on chemicals covered in the present volume, as determined from SciFinder links to 
the CAS numbers
Name CAS no. Number of links Rank
Lead 7439‑92‑1 8 926 2
Mercury 7439‑97‑6 4 399 9
p,p'‑DDT 50‑29‑3 1 968 21
Bisphenol A 80‑05‑7 952 62
Perchlorethylene 127‑18‑4 898 68
Beryllium 7440‑41‑7 400 235
Vinylchloride 75‑01‑4 319 276
Dibromochloropropane (DBCP) 96‑12‑8 41 > 1 000
26.3 Ignoring new potential 
environmental hazards
We now focus on the other end of the spectrum, 
as many environmental chemicals have not been 
adequately tested. When the US National Research 
Council conducted a study in the 1980s on toxicity 
testing, 78 % of the industrial chemicals most 
commonly produced was found without even 
minimal test data for toxicity (NRC, 1984). Later 
follow‑up showed little improvement (US EPA, 
1998). Even today, the European Chemical Agency 
complains that gaps in safety data remain and that 
little has been done to mend the problem so far 
(Gilbert, 2011). Thus, as metals and tar chemicals 
attract much research attention, are substances 
of importance to society being neglected by 
environmental researchers? 
To examine this question, we looked at the 
high‑production chemicals considered in particular 
need of scientific documentation (US EPA, 2009). 
This high‑priority list was first published in 
2006 and included thirteen important substances 
lacking both a robust hazard data set and exposure 
information. For the time period of 2000–2009, 
we found that these chemicals had a total of only 
352 links to scientific articles, i.e. an average of only 
three per month for the entire group (Grandjean 
et al., 2011). Five of the thirteen high‑priority 
substances were not encountered at all in the 
78 journals during the ten years. One could excuse 
the lack of coverage up to 2006, when the EPA 
published its list, and perhaps 2007. However, when 
extending the search to 2010 and 2011, the result 
was pretty much the same — the priority listing had 
not inspired any increased number of publications 
in scientific journals. When compared with the 
staggering numbers for top‑20 substances, the 
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publication rates for these high‑priority substances 
appear tiny. 
Other substances may be considered likely emerging 
hazards, about which further information would be 
highly useful. Triclosan is a biocide often used in 
cosmetics, but releases into the environment have 
raised concern (Dann and Hontela, 2011). There 
were 259 articles on this chemical during 2000–2009, 
much better than the high‑priority substances 
listed by the US EPA, but way below the popularity 
of toxic metals. Likewise, the perfluorinated 
compounds have been in use for decades, and 
concerns about their environmental fate and toxicity 
have grown (Lindstrom et al., 2011). The most 
prevalent member of this group, perfluorinated 
octanoic sulfate was covered in 271 articles, about 
the same as triclosan. Thus, each of them was 
addressed only in about two dozen scientific articles 
in the scientific journals every year. Accordingly, 
about 35 articles would focus on lead (and close 
to 20 on mercury) each time a single article would 
present evidence on one of these emerging hazards. 
But can we trust these numbers? 
Although the bibliometric data do not distinguish 
between short, descriptive reports and thorough 
reviews, the overwhelming emphasis on a small 
minority of environmental chemicals cannot be 
explained away. Also, the scientific journals may 
not reflect research activities outside academic 
institutions, but one would have to imagine huge 
numbers of reports outside the mainstream journals 
to make up for the differences. The conclusion 
therefore seems inevitable that the long‑term 
prominence of substances commonly covered in 
articles in environmental journals does not match 
the societal needs or those of regulatory agencies. 
Substances that were highly popular in research 
during the previous century remained so during 
the first ten years of the present millennium, despite 
the changing needs for evidence on environmental 
impacts. 
26.4 Inertia and its reasons
An important reason for such inertia and continued 
focus on well‑known substances may relate to 
the traditional science paradigm, where solid 
conclusions depend on replication and verification. 
While a single study should not be relied upon as 
firm evidence, the extent to which replication is 
needed seems to have been stretched to the extreme, 
when well‑known environmental chemicals inspire 
almost 1 000 publications per year. 
It may well be that academic researchers do not 
know or contemplate the needs for environmental 
health documentation. We may question 
environmental researchers, who keep studying 
lead toxicity to obtain even more detailed or perfect 
results (3). However, individual researchers and 
their institutions may have insufficient access to 
public and private funding that would allow an 
unrestricted choice of research topics. This limitation 
would especially refer to young researchers of low 
academic rank. Further, if students are taught to 
replicate and extend their mentor's own research, 
they will later become the seniors with the same 
type of expertise and narrow focus on well‑known 
environmental hazards. Existing expertise as well as 
facilities may favour a continued focus on the same 
hazards, thereby propagating long‑term traditions 
and ignoring society's changing needs for early 
warning investigations. In more general terms, a 
tendency to maintain a narrow focus is likely to be 
counter‑productive in regard to scientific discovery 
and innovation, as there would potentially be much 
more to learn from studying new hazards than from 
replicating studies on old ones. 
Several factors may contribute to the estrangement 
of academic research from societal needs for 
documentation on environmental hazards. Research 
institutions have an interest in maintaining highly 
qualified personnel and efficient use of costly 
infrastructure. All of the most popular chemicals 
can be inexpensively measured by instruments 
that became widely available already in the 
1970s and 1980s. Analytical methodologies are 
already established and well documented. These 
instruments (atomic absorption spectrometers 
and gas chromatographs) make it possible within 
a week or so to generate results sufficient to 
justify a scientific paper on one or more of the 
top‑20 substances. Under these conditions, why 
would ambitious researchers and their students take 
on new substances that might require the purchase 
of expensive equipment and arduous development 
of new methods? 
The loyalty to established methods and research 
topics is not just a matter of convenience. In 
(3) The author has published numerous articles on lead, mercury, and other top‑20 chemicals in scientific journals, thus being part 
of the inertia. However, as the chapters on lead and mercury show, real or alleged uncertainties were often used to argue against 
hazard abatement, thereby requiring more research.
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academic research, competition is fierce and each 
researcher must demonstrate his or her qualifications 
by frequently publishing articles in scholarly journals. 
By endeavouring to research the unknown, these 
researchers would face longer time periods between 
publications, if any. The mere number of publications 
is a crucial metric for academic prestige and for 
obtaining a tenured position. By using existing 
instruments and methods, a researcher can more 
effectively expand the CV, especially if the reports can 
be framed into small incremental manuscripts, each 
of them contributing an entry on the publications 
list. So‑called vanity publications may contaminate 
the scientific literature, as they contain little new 
information, but primarily serve to augment the 
author's credentials. Whether they contribute new 
insight then becomes a secondary concern. Similarly, 
the budget in many research departments is tied 
to the number of scientific publications, thus also 
favouring quantity over quality. Such a focus on 
publication numbers may deny the higher societal 
goals of environmental research while promoting 
earthly aspects of personal desires and academic 
reputation. 
The pressure to complete a project on time 
(or even before the deadline) and to publish the 
findings with minimal delay also invites the use 
of short‑cuts. Convenience and lack of funds may 
determine that some parameters in a study are 
not measured in appropriate detail, e.g. by relying 
on questionnaire responses rather than actual 
measurements, which may be too expensive. When 
a study claims to address an environmental hazard 
using study parameters that are unreliable or 
perhaps not representative, the results will often 
be non‑informative. Worse, the results may be 
interpreted as evidence against the hazard causing 
any risk at all. Such misleading conclusions are 
sometimes referred to as Type III errors (Schwartz 
and Carpenter, 1999). I shall return to this problem 
shortly (see Section 26.5 below). 
The inertia and reliance on convenience are not 
restricted to researchers themselves, or public 
research institutions, for that matter. It also affects 
the funding agencies. If a proposed project deals 
with a known environmental problem, the principal 
investigator probably has an impressive track record, 
the protocol is feasible and easy to comprehend 
and capable reviewers are readily recruited. That 
may not be the case with poorly studied substances 
and emerging hazards. The funding agency can 
feel comfortable about the proposed time schedule 
and the anticipated outcome of the project, as the 
exposures and effects rely on established methods. 
Uncomfortable surprises are unlikely. Hence, it may 
be safer and more convenient for grant managers to 
concentrate on the known hazards. 
Scientific journals probably also play a role in 
maintaining a focus on well‑known substances. 
Peer review of submitted manuscripts is rarely a 
problem with a manuscript on lead exposure. Bias 
toward publication of the report may occur when the 
reviewer finds that his or her own research has been 
cited, thus demonstrating the sound judgment of 
the authors of the manuscript. Some of the journals 
that we explored in the bibliometric databases are 
regarded as prestigious, with high citation rates. The 
possibility exists that some environmental chemicals 
may be held in higher esteem than others, thereby 
adding to their continued prominence, or publication 
persistence, no matter what the societal needs may 
be. This means that there may be an element of 
circular reasoning involved, where a substance is a 
popular research item simply because it has been 
widely studied in the past — a self‑prophetic bias that 
maintains a continued prominence of a small number 
of scientists and their publications. 
The science sociologist Robert K. Merton (Merton, 
1968) dubbed this phenomenon a 'Matthew' effect, 
referring to the New Testament ('For unto every one 
that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: 
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that 
which he hath'). Popularity among scientists in the past 
seems to provide justification for the importance or 
relevance of continued research in a particular field. 
The opposite strategy would appear more attractive 
from the point of view of innovation. 
However, it must be said that some conventional 
research into well‑known substances have 
identified novel scientific breakthroughs that are 
not only relevant to our understanding of these 
well‑characterised substances, such as mercury and 
lead, but they have also been scientifically valuable, 
via analogy, to many other substances.
Clearly, academic research has multiple purposes, 
a number of constraints and some limitations, 
when viewed from an environmental health angle. 
Societal needs for evidence on priority substances 
or emerging risks are apparently not seen as a high 
priority for academic research in general. But the 
choice of research topic is not the only problem. 
26.5 Research methodologies and 
assumptions 
Jointly with the inertia in the choice of research topics, 
traditional scientific thinking may also represent 
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an obstacle. According to the standard paradigm, 
we need to justify our conclusions by replicating 
our findings, securing the highest possible data 
quality and documenting each component of the 
anticipated causal link. Such high standards will 
protect science from making mistakes by claiming, 
e.g. that lead is toxic to the brain, unless extensive 
documentation is truly available to back this assertion. 
The links to scientific traditions extend back to 
the Leonardo da Vinci's and Galileo's writings. In 
studying environmental health hazards, the prevalent 
paradigm determines how the problem is usually 
framed as below:
'The traditional scientist will address an 
environmental research question as follows:  
Have we reliably documented through 
meticulous study and replication that this 
substance is mechanistically and causally linked 
to an adverse biological change?'
Along with the demand for replication, tradition 
calls for a narrow focus. Uncertainty is commonly 
restricted through rigorous control of the study 
setting. The advantage of a well‑defined study is 
that it addresses only a single factor under specific 
circumstances and therefore more likely will lead to 
firm or indisputable conclusions. However, due to 
its limited scope, the study will at best result only 
in an incremental increase in knowledge about the 
overall issue at hand, including multiple or complex 
exposure scenarios and the significance of individual 
vulnerability. Thus, the disadvantage is that this 
approach leads to reductionism and explores only 
limited or individual aspects of each hazard. Such 
proximate and simplistic risks poorly represent the 
true complexity of environmental hazards. 
Examination of the chapters on human health 
hazards in this volume and Late lessons from early 
warnings Volume 1 (EEA, 2001) allows identification 
of several assumptions that were, at first, considered 
valid and important, but were later found to be 
misleading. Table 26.3 shows some of the most 
crucial — and erroneous — assumptions that 
were initially made in regard to one or more of the 
environmental hazards included in this volume. 
The case studies in this volume show that relying 
on these assumptions, while seemingly meaningful 
in terms of the prevailing research paradigm, led to 
proliferation of environmental hazards due to the 
substantial delay in their recognition. 
Table 26.3 Erroneous assumptions made in initial evaluations of environmental hazards and 
the subsequent scientific recognition of the true complexity
Initial assumption Late scientific lesson
1. Presence of environmental chemicals in the body can 
1. be tolerated at 'safe' or natural doses 
Delayed effects, cumulated or re‑mobilised doses, or 
toxic metabolites may occur at exposures previously 
thought to be safe
2. Absence of harm in adult male workers (from routine 
1. medical data or mortality) means absence of risk to 
1. the general public
Sub‑populations, such as children and the elderly,  
may be more vulnerable to the exposure
3. Acute or short‑term effects also reflect chronic or 
 1. long‑term effects
Dose‑response relationships for acute effects may 
substantially differ from those for chronic effects
4. Biological effects may not necessarily be adverse and 
1. can be considered harmless 
Early changes can predict more serious adverse effects 
which can develop later on 
5. Dose‑response relationships are consistent (and 
 1. 'monotonic'), and no risk occurs at doses below 
 1. apparent thresholds
Some substances show 'low dose' effects that are not 
readily predictable from responses to high doses
6. Short‑term assessment of exposures from a single 
 1. pathway can generally be considered sensitive and 
1. valid
Most methods for exposure assessment are imprecise, 
and imprecision usually results in underestimation of the 
toxicity
7. The placenta and the blood‑brain barrier amply 
 1. protect sensitive life‑stages and organs from toxic 
 1. chemicals
The barriers may be bypassed, as they offer limited 
protection against industrial chemicals
8. Average findings in exposed subjects indicate the 
 1. potential for harm to the exposed population
Sensitive sub‑groups may show effects that are not 
apparent from the average data 
9. Toxicity evidence from animals and wildlife is not 
1. relevant to human toxicity
Animal data have reliably predicted most known 
carcinogens and many other hazards, and humans may 
be more vulnerable than other species
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A crucial assumption was that a biological change 
may not necessarily reflect an adverse health effect 
and could therefore be ignored. Within normal 
variability, it may indicate adaptation or 'hormesis', 
therefore being innocuous. With proper justification, 
the assumption may be true, but biological changes 
should not be disregarded just because they are 
prevalent (or unwelcome, for some reason). For 
many years, researchers believed that the inhibition 
of an enzyme called ALAD due to lead exposure at 
blood‑lead concentrations thought to be low, was a 
biological change that had no health implications 
(as described in the Chapter 3). That may be true in 
a strict sense, as the enzyme in red blood cells has 
no important function. However, recent research has 
shown that serious adverse effects do occur at lead 
exposures that were previously regarded as too low 
to be harmful. 
Also, habitual levels of lead exposure were called 
'natural' simply because they were normal or 
habitual. But prevalent lead exposures were the result 
of centuries of increasing lead use. Analyses of lead 
isotopes and of mummified tissues documented that 
normal lead exposure were far above what could be 
considered natural. 
For efficiency reasons, toxicology studies have aimed 
at avoiding considerations of the sex, age and strain 
of the animals used. If focusing on inbred, adult 
male rats only, important sources of variability were 
ignored while making the study more efficient and 
precise. This problem became centre stage when 
reproductive toxicology and endocrine disruption 
began to attract attention (see Chapter 13 on ethinyl 
oestradiol in the acquatic environment and Chapter 
10 on BPA, as well as PCBs, DES and TBT in Late 
lessons from early warnings Volume 1 (EEA, 2001, 
Ch. 6, 8, 13)). Also, it is only a recent discovery that 
exposures to environmental chemicals may cause 
much more toxicity if they happen during vulnerable 
developmental windows (Grandjean et al., 2008). 
However, prospective studies of birth cohorts take 
a long time and are extremely costly, and even 
multi‑generation animal assays are often resisted due 
to economic burdens on industry. 
The assumptions in Table 26.3 prevailed for a 
long time due to the failure of available, though 
incomplete data to show clear evidence of a risk. 
If adverse effects were not proven to exist, the 
(4) When Joe Forman first observed the hole in the ozone layer using low technology instruments he could not believe his results as 
they conflicted with the satellite data. He returned to the Antarctica to observe the hole three times before he — under pressure 
from his funding sources — felt confident enough to report his findings. See the chapter on Halocarbons in the first volume of Late 
lessons from early warnings (EEA, 2001).
erroneous conclusion was drawn that adverse effects 
must be absent. Perhaps this is the underlying 
assumption, which represents the greatest error. It 
survived, as uncertainties were ignored, whether 
in regard to exposure assessment, sensitivity 
of outcome measures, individual vulnerability, 
statistical analysis methodology or statistical 
power of the study. Overlooking imprecisions 
and incompleteness will most often result in 
underestimation and may lead to rejection of the 
presence of a (true) risk. Also, these uncertainties 
are not likely to create spurious associations, unless 
confounding factors are present. 
26.6 Vulnerability of research to 
criticism
The downside of the traditional strategy to provide 
ample verification is that science becomes vulnerable 
to a critique that raises concerns about various 
possible sources of error or bias, particularly in regard 
to emerging insights and early warnings. The desire 
to document the truth, preferably the 'full' truth, 
makes science vulnerable to purported weaknesses. 
Thus, while careful scientists must pay meticulous 
attention to the methodological standards and 
quality assurance, some colleagues primarily exert 
these skills when judging the work of colleagues. 
Such critique may be unjust, but the halo earned 
from emphasis on the quality of scientific methods 
thrives from the collusion of admiring colleagues and 
students (e.g. at scientific conferences). 
However, harsh critique and exaggerated scepticism 
may be particularly inappropriate in regard to 
emerging insights and early warnings which are 
often innovative and necessarily tentative (4). Thus, 
the case studies illustrate that astute observations by 
clinicians, factory inspectors, workers, anglers, bee 
keepers and community members can sometimes 
provide valid hypotheses on new hazards that are 
only confirmed by in‑depth research much later.
A common strategy is to disregard studies that do 
not satisfy certain methodological criteria, sometimes 
abusing 'criteria' for causality. Although such criteria 
are useful, UK statistician Austin Bradford Hill noted: 
'All scientific work is incomplete… All scientific 
work is liable to be upset or modified by 
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advancing knowledge. That does not confer 
upon us the freedom to ignore the knowledge 
we already have, or to postpone the action that 
it appears to demand at the given time' (Hill, 
1965). 
Despite Hill's prudent advice, some researchers may 
mistake the validity of their own conclusions for 
meticulousness in identifying presumed violations 
of the causal criteria or other validity requirements 
committed by their colleagues. 
The overly sceptical focus on scientific methodology 
may lead to bias and narrow‑mindedness. Thus, 
special interest groups have praised what they call 
'sound science', which supports conclusions that 
are considered attractive (but, of course, is no more 
reliable than other research, and is sometimes actually 
less). In particular, so‑called black‑box epidemiology 
studies of health hazards have received harsh critique 
(Taubes, 1995). Some of that exaggerated critique is 
echoed in the chapters of the present volume. 
Expert committees that advise national and 
international bodies are often tempted to express 
unreasonable critiques of research results and 
stress the preponderance of uncertainties. Such 
critiques may be considered appropriate for highly 
respected experts and is in accordance with their 
high methodological standards and unrelenting 
scepticism. However, a narrow focus on scientific 
methodology may be coupled with blindness to 
environmental degradation and social injustice. 
Not surprisingly, the strategy of criticising research 
methodologies has been vigorously explored 
by vested interests, often with the purpose of 
manufacturing doubt (Michaels, 2005; Michaels, 2008; 
Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
When a call for guidelines on 'Good Epidemiological 
Practice' was first promoted, it was at first embraced 
by researchers as a useful tool to stimulate high 
quality (and sound) science. However, strict 
interpretation of epidemiological rules could also 
be applied in order to disregard epidemiological 
findings that for other reasons were regarded 
as unwelcome. It turned out that the initiative 
originated with industry groups in order to disqualify 
unwelcome 'junk science' (as described in Chapter 7 
on tobacco) (Ong and Glantz, 2001).The scientific 
rigour that had been considered a prerequisite in the 
traditional science paradigm was now turned around 
and became an unrealistic requirement for repetitive, 
controlled studies that could furnish virtual statistical 
certainty (5). Using strict criteria, unwanted results 
could then be criticised as junk and the uncertainties 
were then erroneously interpreted as an indication 
that no hazard was present. 
26.7 Statistics and confidence limits
A key issue is the statistical data analysis. When 
analysing their results, researchers use statistical 
methods to determine whether the observed data 
were 'statistically significant', or whether they 
can be attributed to chance. The probability that 
their results are significant is usually expressed as 
p values, or probability values. The p was originally 
proposed by the UK statistician Ronald Fisher along 
with a limit of 5 % thought to be appropriate. This 
method allowed the researcher to identify findings 
that deviated significantly — unlikely due to 
random variation — so that the hypothesis that no 
difference was present would be rejected. 
From its early application to agricultural plant 
breeding test designs, the 5 % limit has since been 
applied much more widely and has become almost 
sacrosanct amongst scientists from many disciplines. 
Using Fisher's p value limit allowed researchers to 
classify research findings that — when the p value 
was above 5 % — did not reliably support the 
'null' hypothesis of no difference or no association, 
as the results could be due to random variation. 
Accordingly, the 'null' hypothesis could be rejected 
only when the p value was lower. A few studies and 
many anecdotes suggest that scientists place greater 
emphasis on results that have a p value of, say, 4.9 % 
than on results with a p value of 5.1 % (Holman 
et al., 2001). Statistically, there is no meaningful 
difference between outcomes with such similar p 
values. But if Fisher's proposed limit is applied in a 
strict sense beyond Fisher's own recommendations, 
then one set of results with a p value of 4.9 % would 
be interpreted as rejecting the hypothesis (hereby 
providing evidence of possible causality), whilst 
the other with a p value of 5.1 % would not refute 
the null hypothesis and would be considered 
non‑informative. 
(5) An additional criterion often used was that only a 2‑fold increased risk above background would be believable, e.g. from childhood 
leukaemia in residences close to power lines or from heart disease from environmental tobacco smoke. Apart from the much 
greater impact of a 2‑fold increase in heart disease, there is no meaningful statistical difference between increases by a factor of 
1.9 and 2.1, one of which would satisfy the criterion for a hazard, the other one not.
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As commonly applied and interpreted, the p 
value is used mainly to determine the viability of 
a hypothesis. Although science in principle aims 
at falsifying hypotheses — since a definite proof 
cannot be obtained — it seems to make too little use 
of the data if we are just determining whether or 
not the p value is below 5 %. If the p value is high 
(well above 5 %), the results are rendered useless, 
as they failed the only criterion for success, namely 
to refute the hypothesis (although a hypothesis 
may theoretically be correct, even though the data 
deviate substantially from prediction). Sometimes, 
repeated attempts at falsifying a hypothesis fail, but 
a joint calculation (so‑called meta‑analysis) could 
result in an overall p value that perhaps finally 
reaches statistical significance with p less than 5 %, 
or some other specified level. 
In most cases, the null hypothesis is that an exposure 
has no effect. Thus, in environmental research, the 
p value is used to test a null hypothesis that may be 
unrealistic or obviously wrong. This would seem to 
be a serious limitation. Would we ever be tempted 
to conclude that lead is not toxic, just because a 
small study has resulted in a p value that is greater 
than 5 %? Of course not. But the traditional use of 
the significance limit means that scientists are very 
reluctant to draw conclusions if the p value is 5.1 %. 
The so‑called frequentist tradition in statistics 
considers the data in isolation and evaluates them 
in regard to a theoretical null hypothesis, which 
may or may not be appropriate. Combined with a 
sacrosanct 5 % limit, the research results may not 
be as useful as they could be, and the conclusions 
could even be confusing and counterproductive 
(Goodman, 2008). The point is that we may be 
testing the wrong hypothesis and not making ample 
use of all of the available data. Thus, several case 
studies have shown that early warnings are often 
initially not statistically significant, such as the first 
IARC study of passive smoking, but nevertheless 
turned out to be robust.
Even if a study has reached statistical significance, 
this could still be due to chance. If we are 
conducting a large number of comparisons, then 
in all likelihood a small proportion of them could 
happen to be unusual and perhaps deviate from 
expectation at a statistically significant level. But 
such deviation is accidental and would be associated 
with a large number of comparisons. A common 
method is to adjust the p values using a procedure 
named after the Italian mathematician Bonferroni, 
thereby requiring p values to be significant only at 
lower values, the larger the number of comparisons. 
However, this technique, too, can also be used 
erroneously to disregard an unwelcome study 
(Perneger, 1998). 
The use of an alternative approach to frequentist 
statistics started back in the 18th century, when 
UK Reverend Thomas Bayes designed a formula that 
let the study results modify the prior probability of a 
hypothesis, thereby generating a posterior probability 
of the hypothesis based on the new evidence obtained 
(Greenland, 2008). Bayes allowed inclusion of any 
results, whether few or large‑scale, and no matter the 
p value, to help modify our reliance on a hypothesis 
and to determine its updated plausibility. One could 
still focus on the null hypothesis, or perhaps rather 
the overall outcome of all previous studies. This 
way, each study would still be useful and would 
be utilised to modify and fine‑tune the hypothesis 
under consideration. Although attractive, Bayesian 
statistics sometimes results in serious mathematical 
complications that limit their usefulness. Also, 
we may not have a good idea about the exact 
hypothesis under study, and a prior probability of 
that hypothesis may be impossible to obtain. Bayesian 
statistics has therefore been criticised for being 
subjective and overly laborious. Still, empirical use 
of Bayesian statistics is gaining support (McGrayne, 
2011). 
Some scientists and some scientific journals now 
reject the use of p values (Lang et al., 1998). But 
if we are to limit our reliance on p values, how 
can we best extract a robust statistical summary 
of a complex study? A key parameter will always 
be the point estimate of the average effect. But 
instead of calculating whether this estimate is 
'significantly' different (p less than 5 %) from no 
effect, many researchers recommend using the 
confidence interval (Thompson, 1987). It represents 
the range of values within which 95 % of averages 
would fall if a large number of similar studies 
were conducted. In other words, given the point 
estimate and the calculated variability, the study 
would be in accordance with any hypothesis that 
postulated an effect within the confidence interval. 
If zero is included in the interval, then the results do 
not deviate significantly from the null hypothesis. 
However, they also do not deviate from many other 
hypotheses, some perhaps suggesting a serious 
effect. The upper confidence limit indicates how 
large an effect that would be in agreement with 
the data. In a precautionary setting, the upper 
limit would often represent a plausible worst case 
scenario that would serve as a useful basis when 
considering intervention. 
The two studies illustrated in Figure 26.1 show the 
same average effect, though with different degrees 
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of certainty. The study on the right shows an effect 
that is statistically significant, as the no‑effect 
hypothesis (zero effect) can be excluded. The study 
on the left has less precision, perhaps because it is 
smaller, and the point estimate does not deviate 
significantly from no effect (the null hypothesis). 
However, the upper confidence limit suggests that 
the study cannot exclude a large effect. In contrast, 
the significant study on the right would speak 
against the hazard being very large. Both of these 
perspectives are relevant, for both studies. A focus 
on the upper confidence limit would have the 
additional advantage that it would inspire larger 
studies with greater precision. 
From a precautionary viewpoint, the use of 
confidence intervals is highly attractive. Instead of 
concluding that we are not sure that there is an effect 
at all, we can now also say that the results do not 
contradict an effect, and that it could possibly be up 
to a certain magnitude. If a study is large, and when 
results from two or more studies are combined, the 
confidence interval will narrow due to the decrease 
in statistical uncertainty. If a small study (like the 
one on the left) is in accordance with a potentially 
large effect, it would call for extended studies to 
explore whether such a serious hazard is indeed 
realistic. However, from the 'frequentist' viewpoint, 
the small study cannot reject the null hypothesis and 
would therefore not call for any further attention. 
Hence, the two perspectives differ substantially as 
to the interpretation of research, the conclusions, 
and the priorities for further information. Both are 
Figure 26.1 The importance of confidence limits
Upper confidence limit shows 
how serious the effect could be 
Point estimate of the most 
likely magnitude of the effect 
No effect
E
ff
ec
t 
si
ze
0 0
The point estimate is the 
same, but more certain, 
as the precision is better 
Lower confidence limit shows that 
no effect or an effect in the opposite 
direction cannot be excluded
Note: Two studies show the same average effect (horizontal line), but the vertical line suggests that the study on the left has 
a larger confidence interval and more uncertainty, so that it is both in accordance with no effect (it includes zero and is 
therefore not statistically significant), but it also cannot exclude a large effect. The study on the right shows the same effect, 
now statistically significant, but due to the greater precision, this study can exclude the presence of a large effect. 
useful, and a narrow focus on p values should be 
avoided (Stang et al., 2010).
The choice of statistical analysis is even more 
important in situations, where we do not have 
the option of calling for more studies. If a disease 
is serious but very rare, that number of subjects 
included will be small, and it may take a long time 
before enough information has been gathered in 
order to obtain a p value below 5 %. Perhaps most 
dramatically, in regard to endangered species, it 
is simply not possible to sample sufficiently large 
materials to reach 'significance'. Thus, wildlife 
biologists some years ago concluded: 'At least part 
of the blame for the spectacular overexploitation 
of the great whales can be placed on scientists 
being unable to agree… In certain circumstances, 
a population might go extinct before a significant 
decline could be detected' (Taylor and Gerrodette, 
1993). When the researchers examined the frequency 
and precision of recent monitoring efforts, they 
concluded that the percentage of precipitous 
declines that would not be detected as statistically 
significant would be between 72 % and 90 % for 
various whale species and 55 % for polar bears. 
Thus, more than half of the world's polar bears 
and the great majority of the whales would have to 
disappear before current studies would be able to 
conclude that the decrease is 'significant' (based on 
a one‑sided p value limit of 5 %) (Taylor et al., 2007). 
Similarly, to the extent that monitoring and effect 
studies of environmental hazards are patchy, we are 
probably overlooking adverse effects, even those 
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that are serious, simply because the information is 
uncertain (like the study on the left in Figure 26.1).
To avoid inconclusive results, researchers often carry 
out power analyses to determine the sensitivity of 
a proposed study, that is, the likelihood that the 
proposed study will lead to conclusions on the 
existence of a hazard of a certain relevant magnitude. 
If the protocol is not able to ascertain with any 
confidence the presence of an important risk, then the 
statistical power is insufficient (as in the monitoring 
of polar bears). Either the study would be a waste of 
time and should be disbanded, or the protocol should 
be expanded to allow sufficient power. 
26.8 Bias in research
For the reasons listed above, the research results are 
often non‑informative. Such inconclusive studies 
are sometimes called 'negative', although this term 
could suggest that an effect was in the direction 
opposite to expectation. Worse, such studies have 
sometimes been thought to represent 'no risk', rather 
than 'no information'. Such aspects of the traditional 
science paradigm involve inherent biases toward 
the null hypothesis. Based on the case studies in 
the present and the previous volume, Table 26.4 has 
been revised from previous compilations (Gee, 2009; 
Grandjean et al., 2004).
Most of the aspects listed in Table 26.4 have to do 
with the design of the research study and therefore 
Table 26.4 Key aspects of research likely to affect the outcome of a study, whether 
underestimating (false negative) or exaggerating (false positive) the possible 
existence of an environmental hazard
Methodological features and their main direction of error 
Inadequate statistical power  
False negative
Lost cases and inadequate follow‑up for long‑term effects
Exposure misclassification 
Insensitive or imprecise outcome measures
Adjustment for confounders with better precision than the exposure
Failure to adjust for confounder with effects in the opposite direction
Disregarding vulnerable subgroups
5 % probability level to minimize risk of false positives (Type I error)
20 % probability level to minimize risk of false negatives (Type II error)
Pressure to avoid false alarm
Incomplete adjustment for confounders with similar effects
False positivePost hoc hypothesis
Publication bias towards positive findings
refer to the methodology, rather than the relevance 
of the research. So, in that respect, greater attention 
to methodology would be beneficial. However, 
the main problem is that even though the research 
results may be less informative than desired, the 
research may well contain information that is 
more relevant than the simple claim that the null 
hypothesis of no effect cannot be excluded. As 
illustrated in Figure 26.1, we need to ask: How 
large an effect can the study have overlooked? This 
question should also take into account the possible 
existence of vulnerable subgroups, long‑term effects, 
and other issues that may have been ignored.
Two entries in the table refer to the possible 
existence of publication bias. It is quite likely that 
some science journals, and more often the mass 
media, prefer to publish alleged scares rather 
than to report that there is nothing to worry 
about (Ioannidis, 2008). But the bias may also be 
in the opposite direction (Oreskes, 2004). More 
importantly, our data on publication frequencies 
(Grandjean et al., 2011) suggest the opposite. 
The journals publish extensively on well‑known 
chemicals, where new scares are rare, and only 
occasionally publish on the unknown and emerging 
environmental hazards which could possibly 
represent much scarier risks, given that so little 
attention is paid to them. So the few scares that 
catch occasional headlines should be interpreted 
in light of the overwhelming background of 
environmental hazards that are and have been 
ignored, some of which could well represent 
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serious hazards. Chapter 2 on false positives shows 
that erroneous alarms are fairly rare. 
In summary, the context of justification needs 
to be balanced with the context of application 
or, in other words, the quality of the research 
must be linked with its relevance. So the focus 
on methodology issues and the preoccupation 
with verification studies should not happen at the 
expense of providing evidence on issues of major 
environmental and social relevance. While polishing 
the same stone over and over again, we should not 
ignore all the other shingles and rocks where some 
scientific gems may yet be hiding. 
26.9 The changing research paradigm
Science sociologist Robert K. Merton characterised 
traditional science by the acronym CUDOS, 
which stands for Communalism, Universalism, 
Disinterestedness, Originality and Scepticism. These 
traits are still valued and are prevalent in many 
scientific disciplines, but differences occur and the 
research paradigm within the environmental sciences 
is changing. All of these attributes for science, whether 
basic or applied, are needed to secure a meaningful 
and trustworthy research activity in society. However, 
the preoccupation with publication, credentials and 
funding that is common in academia today can lead 
to social apathy, thereby providing fertile ground for 
dependence on narrow interests that may include 
corporate money (Grandjean, 2008b). 
Of particular note, Merton characterised ideal 
science as 'disinterested', but vested interests of 
whatever origin may make research less neutral and 
less reliable. Several case chapters in this volume 
describe how industries have withheld evidence, 
lambasted whistle‑blowers and promoted research 
that supported the conclusions desired (Kurland, 
2003). Especially when cover‑up is included in such 
diversions, the result is that research loses credibility. 
Transparency in regard to conflicts of interest has 
been recommended, but complete elimination 
of financial ties may be the best way to secure 
trust‑worthy research (Krimsky, 2003). Although 
conflicts of interest undoubtedly occur within 
academia at large, perhaps an additional problem is 
that the academic agenda is likely to differ from the 
priorities of regulatory agencies in environmental 
health. 
Another science culture has developed, as research 
contracts or privately funded research have grown. 
They differ in several respects from the CUDOS 
ideal. The results may not necessarily be published 
in scholarly journals (and would therefore be missed 
by our SciFinder searches). When the research is kept 
secret, it will not inspire further studies at public 
institutions. A particularly important chemical, 
bisphenol A (952 publications during 2000–2009), 
has enjoyed vast industrial popularity and became 
widely used in food packaging materials and 
beverage containers (see Chapter 10 on BPA). It 
was said to be safe at the very low exposures that 
consumers were likely to receive. However, after 
several decades of expanding use, independent 
research eventually uncovered evidence of health 
risks (Myers et al., 2009). The same pattern was seen 
with the perfluorinated compounds, where a major 
US producer for decades claimed that little would 
escape into the environment, and that essentially 
no toxicity occurred (Lindstrom et al., 2011). Only 
recently was it discovered that current exposures 
may be far from safe (Grandjean et al., 2012), but 
these chemicals have been disseminated into the 
global environment and cannot be recalled. 
Physics professor John Ziman characterised the 
'industrial' (or contracted) research as Proprietary, 
Local, Authoritarian, Commissioned, and Expert, 
thereby stressing that this activity builds on 
local expertise to reach specific goals. The same 
characteristics may apply to contract research 
carried out with public funding, but the initiator 
may not always be apparent. Thus, the Center for 
Indoor Air Research, the Electric Power Research 
Institute or the Chlorine Council may sound like 
charitable donors, rather than industry front 
groups. But they are in fact organisations funded by 
corporations with vested interests in the research 
outcome. However, the reader may be led to 
erroneously believe that the sponsored research 
reflects CUDOS values. 
The source of funding will also affect the choice 
of study topics. Accordingly, comparatively 
little research is devoted to the risks associated 
with pesticide exposures and the advantages of 
alternative crop protection methods (Krimsky, 2003). 
Booster biocides (see Chapter 12), such as Diuron 
(389 links to articles in 2000–2009 in SciFinder) 
and Dichlofluanid (39 links), received only a little 
attention in independent research, some of them 
much less than the organotin compounds (see 
tributyltin in Table 26.1) that have been phased out. 
SciFinder also located only 133 links to Gaucho®, 
the pesticide that endangered bee populations 
(see Chapter 16). As there are clear commercial 
interests in these compounds, the paucity of 
complementary academic research publications 
is unfortunate, although perhaps not surprising. 
Similarly, much less attention is paid to adverse 
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effects of new technology than to its advantages, 
although this has recently changed in regard to 
mobile telephony. Perhaps there is a parallel to 
physicians collaborating with the pharmaceutical 
industry in clinical trials of new drugs, which, 
with patent protection, will be capable of yielding 
great monetary returns. In contrast, older drugs no 
longer protected by patent are the subject of far less 
research, but may be as effective as modern drugs 
costing far more (Washburn, 2005). 
Because evidence is the basis upon which the 
evaluation of risks must rely, researchers publishing 
results at odds with certain vested interests have 
become targets of criticism and intimidation with 
the aim of suppressing or throwing suspicion on 
unwelcome information about health risks. Perhaps 
the best known case involves Herbert Needleman, 
who supplied the first, weighty documentation 
of prevalent lead pollution damaging brain 
development (see Chapter 3 on lead). He was 
angrily persecuted and harassed with unfounded 
accusations of dishonesty (Needleman, 2000). 
Disagreement usually focuses on the uncertainties 
and the scientific inference, not the choice of 
study topic. Harsh critique has sometimes been 
voiced, as have angry accusations of bias in 
differing interpretations of evidence (Gori, 1996). 
Research that has direct implications in regard 
to considerations of pollution abatement usually 
receives more wrath than reports on already 
recognised hazards. Perhaps this is another key as to 
why researchers favour well‑known hazards. 
In order to introduce dissent into the literature, 
possible strategies involve publication in trade 
magazines disguised as scientific journals. The 
best examples are Indoor and Built Environment 
(Tong et al., 2005) and Regulatory Toxicology and 
Pharmacology (Axelson et al., 2003). These journals 
tend to publish articles that contain conclusions 
favourable to the industrial sponsors, no matter their 
scientific weaknesses. This strategy is counter to the 
Precautionary Principle, as they argue for 'no risk' 
when the evidence is uncertain or non‑informative. 
In addition to the tobacco industry, other examples 
include studies supported by the pharmaceutical 
industry, which are much more likely to conclude 
that a drug is safe and efficacious than studies 
conducted without such support (Jorgensen et al., 
2006), but the same seems to happen in toxicology 
and environmental research (Myers et al., 2009). 
As a consequence, public trust is abused by deceit. 
The purpose of research seeking truth is betrayed, 
when undisclosed ties taint the research and its 
conclusions.
Under such contentious conditions, researchers 
may choose to hedge their conclusions by incessant 
use of words, such as 'maybe', 'perhaps', 'in theory' 
and similar terms (Hyland, 1998). By softening the 
conclusions and avoiding attribution of specific 
causality, the researchers protect themselves against 
critique by appearing well‑balanced, unassuming 
and even sceptical toward the implications of 
one's own findings (6). However, this strategy has 
a downside. To the lay reader, who is not familiar 
with the traditions of scientific writing, the caveats 
and reservations may sound like the new results 
really do not prove anything, and that we are still 
left with the same uncertainty. To readers with a 
vested interest, the soft wording can be exploited 
through selective quotation and by emphasising 
real or alleged weaknesses (Grandjean, 2008a). 
Because of the involvement of research funders, the 
industrialised (or contracted) science can be better 
characterized by the PLACE acronym (Ziman, 
2000), although often posing like independent, basic 
research in accordance with CUDOS. If all research 
today earned CUDOS, no matter its funding, there 
would be little to worry about. But the weaknesses 
and biases outlined above suggest that PLACE 
needs to be supplemented by an additional 
research, one that better fits with the use of the PP in 
decision‑making. 
In this complementary paradigm, environmental 
research in support of PP‑based decision‑making 
would involve stake‑holders and therefore become 
Participatory, rather than Communal or Proprietary 
as in the other paradigms. It would be Accessible, 
Transparent, Inventive and Open‑minded. Although 
the various attributes may perhaps not be compared 
horizontally in Table 26.5, the PATIO characteristics 
would seem to fit better the research that is needed 
in a precautionary setting. 
A key aspect is that, given the absence of final 
proof, an integrated evaluation must include 
uncertainty as a normal condition that needs to be 
explored and addressed, rather than minimised 
for the purpose of making research more efficient. 
An additional feature is the inclusion of the public 
in exploring how the uncertainty should affect 
(6) Please note how often I use the words 'may' and 'perhaps'. I do so, too, because I do not want to jump to conclusions and therefore 
present my case with understatement rather than the opposite.
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Table 26.5 Main properties of research in three different settings
Academic (normal) Industrial* Precautionary
CUDOS (a) PLACE (b) PATIO 
Communalism Proprietary Participatory
Universalism Local Accessible
Disinterestedness Authoritarian Transparent
Originality Commissioned Inventive
Skepticism Expert Open‑minded
Note:  * 'Industrial' science is driven by private or other special interest and may violate some of the CUDOS norms in its pursuit of 
knowledge within fields of commercial or other defined interest, where public interest may be ignored.
Source: (a): Merton, 1973; (b): Ziman, 2000.
the decision‑making. As discussed above, and in 
agreement with the PATIO paradigm, both study 
designs and the reporting of research results need to 
change.
In contrast to the traditional science paradigm, 
where replication is held as a key to supporting 
conclusions on causation, the PP does not inspire 
repetitive verification. If available, replication will be 
useful, but a hypothesis may well be plausible even 
in the (temporary) absence of supportive evidence. 
Given the enormous diversity and complexity of 
environmental hazards, one implication of the PP is 
that research is primarily needed to document the 
extent of uncertainty and, when possible, to narrow 
this uncertainty to better inform decision‑making and 
eventually to support more precise risk assessments 
as a basis for interventions that will no longer need 
to be precautionary. But rather than fine‑tuning 
risk assessments for individual hazards, the vastly 
incomplete information on most environmental 
chemicals makes research into uncertainty a very 
urgent need. 
26.10 Precautionary science
As already discussed, the PP does not specifically 
demand testing of a null hypothesis that an 
exposure may be without a discernible effect. 
Rather, information is required whether a hazard 
could potentially be serious. This point of view 
should inspire new ways of planning, conducting, 
and reporting environmental research. So the 
research question outlined in the beginning of this 
chapter in accordance with traditional scientific 
paradigms now needs to be rephrased (Neutra, 
2002):
'PP‑based question on an environmental hazard: 
Are we sufficiently confident that this exposure 
to a potential hazard leads to doses of a 
magnitude that can result in adverse effects that 
are serious enough to initiate transparent and 
democratic procedures to decide on appropriate 
intervention?'
We must pay closer attention to variability and 
uncertainty when determining their possible 
magnitude. Unfortunately, standard statistical 
methods assume that an exposure is measured 
without imprecision, which is usually not true, 
although this problem is generally ignored, thus 
resulting in underestimation of a hazard (Table 26.4). 
Assessment of the imprecision and its implications 
is therefore crucial. While uncertainties may be 
erroneously thought to cause exaggeration of alleged 
risks, most often the opposite is true (Grandjean, 
2008b). The extent of uncertainties can be expressed 
in terms of confidence limits (Figure 26.1), but the 
impact may often need to be explored by using 
sensitivity analyses. One or more worst‑case scenarios 
deserve as careful scrutiny as the null hypothesis: 
How serious could the effects be; how large an effect 
can be reasonably ruled out? 
The research evidence must be considered in 
light of both strengths and weaknesses. While a 
methodological failure may weaken the support for 
a particular association, the mere occurrence of some 
scientific weakness does not prove the absence of a 
risk. Unfortunate and erroneous rejection of warning 
signals has occurred in the past because of presumed 
confounding or other biases and uncertainties. 
As illustrated by the case chapters in this volume, 
inconsistencies in some methodological aspect have 
been used to derail conclusions otherwise adopted 
by the scientific community. Likewise, statistical 
acceptance of the null hypothesis has sometimes been 
interpreted as proof of safety. Further, effects within 
normal variability have been considered irrelevant, 
although a population‑wide shift in the distribution 
may represent substantial harm. Focus on average 
effects may also be misleading, as populations at risk 
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may suffer much greater harm that can be diluted by 
the results of non‑vulnerable groups.
By acknowledging the limitations to the research 
evidence, a different point of view needs to 
considered, i.e. what could possibly be known, given 
the type of evidence available? Studies e.g. with 
imprecise estimates of the causative exposure and 
insensitive and nonspecific outcome measures, 
are likely to detect only the most serious risks and 
therefore should be interpreted in light of the weight 
of such evidence. The fact that the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected with confidence may be 
irrelevant in such cases. 
In general, all conclusions must be accepted as 
being provisional and temporary. While a study 
of often‑cited publications in major medical 
journals found that many of the conclusions were 
subsequently found to be wrong (Ioannidis, 2008), 
this does not mean that environmental hazards 
are exaggerated. While accepting that a tentative 
conclusion based on preliminary evidence may later 
turn out to be wrong, public health responsibility 
may still demand that a serious threat be taken 
seriously, even though a final proof is not at hand. 
Any actions would then need to be adjusted later 
on, as more definite evidence emerges. At the same 
time, we should not ignore that the majority of 
environmental chemicals are poorly documented 
(Gilbert, 2011; NRC, 1984; US EPA, 1998), and 
ignoring such potential risks is likely to involve a 
very large number of false negative conclusions. 
The bibliometric analyses that we conducted 
assume, as to regulatory agencies, that research 
results are published. But the science publication 
industry has undergone substantial change 
due to the electronic potentials of the internet 
for low‑cost distribution. However, the costs of 
science publication need to be covered, just like 
the subscribers paid for the print journals. Thus, 
the majority of science articles are not accessible to 
the public on the internet, unless an access toll is 
paid (although access may be free after an embargo 
period of 6–12 months). Thus, while a citizen may 
view the science journal at a public library, the 
internet favours the academic world despite the stiff 
subscription charges. Some journals are open access, 
where the author pays a fee for quality control, 
processing and maintenance of the website, and the 
published article is then free for everybody to see. 
A growing number of journals now use this model. 
The European Commission recommends that articles 
arising from EC‑funded research must be available 
after no more than 12 months. Other funding 
agencies, such as the Welcome Trust, have as a 
requirement that the results of sponsored research 
must be published with open access. Groups of 
universities, e.g. in the Netherlands, have launched a 
repository, where their research publications can be 
accessed by anyone. So in regard to the Participatory 
aspect of the PATIO paradigm, access to information 
is improving.
Even preliminary data can facilitate PP‑based 
decision‑making. While early findings may provide 
only tentative conclusions, they can later be 
included in potential meta‑analyses or provide a 
starting point for follow‑up studies. This potential 
assumes that the data from previous studies are 
available, and that may not be true. Trade secrets 
may allegedly be involved, and numerous cases 
have occurred with suppression of information 
and withholding of evidence (Kurland, 2003). 
Some public funding agencies now demand that 
a data‑sharing strategy be worked out for major 
projects, so that other researchers can carry out 
additional analyses, including meta‑analyses. But 
there is also a risk that such further analyses are not 
entirely benevolent (Pearce and Smith, 2011). Hostile 
analyses have occurred, thus making researchers 
wary with whom they share their raw data. 
Given the discussion on coverage of environmental 
hazards, attention to the needs of regulatory 
agencies, traditions of science publication and the 
impact of other players, we can now attempt to 
answer the four questions posed in the beginning. 
Stakeholder involvement, innovation, openness 
and transparency should become new, important 
assets in environmental research to serve better 
as documentation and inspiration for PP‑based 
decision‑making.
Ways to improve scientific evidence for robust and 
precautionary decisions on environmental hazards: 
1) The choice of research topic should involve 
stakeholders and consider the societal needs for 
information on poorly known hazards; 
2) The research should be innovative and 
complementary with the aim of extending 
current knowledge, rather than repetitive for 
verification purposes;
3) The findings should be communicated in such 
a way as to facilitate judgements concerning the 
possible magnitude of suspected environmental 
hazards;
4) The research should be openly available and 
independent of vested interests. 
Implications for science and governance | Science for precautionary decision‑making
672 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
As argued elsewhere in this volume, science does 
not provide a prescription for the right decisions 
on environmental hazards. The emphasis on 
research will be different for those whose first 
priority is scientific exactitude and those who focus 
on making policy in the context of environmental 
protection and public health. When a precautionary 
perspective mandates action to prevent foreseeable 
harms, the evidence does not have to meet the 
most rigorous demands of science. However, world 
views, political and other preferences, technical 
and economic feasibility, and alternative options 
are crucial for decision‑making. As illustrated by 
the case studies in both volumes of Late lessons 
from early warnings, science does not have a good 
track record for supporting decisions on improving 
environmental health. This chapter has highlighted 
some opportunities for environmental research to 
provide more relevant results, interpretation, and 
conclusions for prudent and timely decisions on 
environmental hazards. 
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27 More or less precaution?
  
Despite its presence in a growing body of EU and national legislation and case law, the application 
of the precautionary principle has been strongly opposed by vested interests who perceive short 
term economic costs from its use. There is also intellectual resistance from scientists who fail to 
acknowledge that scientific ignorance and uncertainty, are excessively attached to conventional 
scientific paradigms, and who wait for very high strengths of evidence before accepting causal links 
between exposure to stressors and harm. 
The chapter focuses on some of the key issues that are relevant to a more common understanding 
of the precautionary principle and to its wider application. These include different and confusing 
definitions of the precautionary principle and of related concepts such as prevention, risk, uncertainty, 
variability and ignorance; common myths about the meaning of the precautionary principle; different 
approaches to the handling of scientific complexity and uncertainty; and the use of different strengths 
of evidence for different purposes.
The context for applying the precautionary principle also involves considering the 'knowledge to 
ignorance' ratio for the agent in focus: the precautionary principle is particularly relevant where the 
ratio of knowledge to ignorance is low, as with emerging technologies.
A working definition of the precautionary principle is presented that aims to overcome some of the 
difficulties with other definitions, such as their use of triple negatives; a failure to address the context 
of use of the precautionary principle; no reference to the need for case specific strengths of evidence 
to justify precaution; and overly narrow interpretations of the pros and cons of action or inaction.
The chapter also points to the need for greater public engagement in the process of framing 
and decision‑making about both upstream innovations and their downstream hazards, including 
the specification of the 'high level of protection' required by the EU treaty. A precautionary and 
participatory framework for risk analysis is proposed, along with some 'criteria for action' to 
complement criteria for causation.
The capacity to foresee and forestall disasters, especially when such action is opposed by powerful 
economic and political interests, appears to be limited, as the case studies in Late lessons from early 
warnings illustrate. The chapter argues that with more humility in the face of uncertainty, ignorance 
and complexity, and wider public engagement, societies could heed the lessons of past experience and 
use the precautionary principle, to anticipate and minimise many future hazards, whilst stimulating 
innovation. Such an approach would also encourage more participatory risk analysis; more realistic 
and transparent systems science; and more socially relevant and diverse innovations designed to meet 
the needs of people and ecosystems.
David Gee
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'The precautionary principle has, within the 
space of a decade, experienced a meteoric rise' 
Nicolas de Sadeleer (2010).
27.1 Introduction
Since the publication of Volume 1 of Late lessons from 
early warning in 2001, the precautionary principle 
(PP) has received increasing attention and is now 
included in many laws and constitutions. It has also 
been the focus of much intense public and scientific 
debate in the European Union and its Member 
States, particularly in France where it was enshrined 
into the national constitution in 2005. 
The debate on GMOs in France in the years 1997–2005 
(Marris, 2005) is just one example of how debates on 
the PP can trigger the examination of wider issues, 
moving from narrow questions of risk and scientific 
uncertainty to broader questions about the future of 
agriculture, the direction of scientific research and 
innovation, and public engagement. Where a political 
process opens up rather than closes down debates, 
the result can be 'empowering wider social agency in 
technology choice' (Stirling, 2008). Debates on future 
innovation pathways do not necessarily eliminate 
conflict between stakeholders but often clarify 'what 
[the] conflict is really about' (de Marchi, 2003).
These realities are reflected in Chapter 19 on 
genetically modified (GM) crops and agro‑ecology, 
which analyses two contrasting innovation 
pathways to global food security and sustainable 
agriculture. It finds that, in addition to some 'top 
down' genetic engineering, 'bottom up' approaches 
to agricultural innovation 'are proving capable 
of getting sustainable, participatory and locally 
adapted solutions into the hands of those that need 
them most'. 
A catalyst for debate and for timely action
The PP seems to have two roles. First, as a trigger for 
broad debates on what kind of future we want in a 
water‑, energy‑ and resource‑constrained world and 
what innovation pathways could lead towards such 
futures (WBCSD, 2011; WEF, 2012; WBGU, 2012; 
OECD, 2012; UNEP, 2011; EEA, 2010). And second 
as a legal and moral justification for more timely 
actions on early warnings about potential hazards. 
The case studies in this volume furnish evidence 
that contributes to a wider understanding of both 
roles. While there is much more emphasis on its role 
in justifying actions on early warnings, the chapters 
in Parts B and C, on emerging lessons and issues, 
begin to illustrate the PP's role in facilitating debates 
around innovation pathways and technological 
choices. In addition, Chapter 26 on science and 
Chapter 24 on justice for early warning scientists and 
late victims, illustrate the PP's role in stimulating 
discussion about reforms within environmental 
science, the law and scientific organisations. 
The case studies addressing substances or 
chemicals that are now widely known to be 
hazardous focus on the combination of early 
warnings and (usually) late actions. The studies 
address asbestos, benzene, BSE (mad cow disease), 
diethylstilboestrol (DES) tributyl tin (TBT) and 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in Volume 1 and 
DDT, dibromochloropropane (DBCP), vinyl chloride 
monomer VCM, lead in petrol, mercury, beryllium, 
and booster biocides in Volume 2. They primarily 
illustrate how more precautionary action could be 
applied to chemical risks emerging now, such as 
those from Bisphenol A (BPA) and other chemicals, 
nicotinoid pesticides, and endocrine disrupting 
substances which are present in some consumer 
products, including pharmaceuticals, such as 
ethinyl oestrodiol in the pregnancy pill, discussed in 
Chapter 13.
The histories of well known technologies, such 
as X‑rays, fishing techniques, fossil fuel power 
sources and early nuclear plants, can also provide 
lessons for prudent action on the potential hazards 
of such emerging technologies as nanotechnology, 
genetically modified (GM) food, radio‑frequency 
from mobile phones, and the new generation of 
nuclear plants. The chapters on alien species, floods, 
and ecosystems, as well as the late actions on 
climate change, also provide insights into how the 
management of ecosystems could develop. 
Taken together, the examples of late action on 
known hazards illustrate the high cost of inaction. 
Globally that cost has been paid in millions of lives 
and cases of disease and dysfunction, much damage 
to the environment and species, and very large 
economic penalties, some of which are described in 
Chapter 23 on the costs of inaction.
The case studies are not all negative, however. Five 
of the 34 case studies describe precautionary actions: 
the European ban on hormones in cattle feed; the 
regulations and some member state actions on 
GMOs in Europe; the ban on TBT in France in 1984; 
the ban on the pesticide Gaucho in France in 1999; 
and, arguably, the belated but still precautionary 
European ban on some antibiotics when used as 
growth promoters in farm animals. These actions, 
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along with the histories of the 88 claimed false 
positives analysed in this volume, also illustrate the 
value of the PP in minimising harm and societal 
costs. 
There are other examples where action was taken 
quite quickly but only after serious and compelling 
human evidence became available, sometimes 
from an observant clinician (in the cases of DES 
and VCM) or from the victims themselves (DBCP). 
In these three examples, just four to seven cases of 
very rare cancers or sperm reduction (DBCP) were 
sufficient to justify prompt regulatory action. 
Barriers to wider use of the PP
One obvious question that emerges from the case 
studies is 'how can the PP be more widely used, 
both as a justification for early policy action and as 
a broad trigger for wider, more upstream debates 
about innovation pathways?' 
Looking across the case studies, there appears to 
be a number of common barriers to using the PP 
to justify more timely responses to early warnings. 
Taken together, these barriers explain much about 
the decades‑long delay between warnings and 
action. These barriers include:
•	 opposition	from	powerful	corporations	—	
supported by some scientists, policymakers 
and politicians — who fear high economic, 
intellectual and political costs to themselves 
from early and sometimes even late actions to 
reduce risks; 
•	 key	misunderstandings	about	the	PP's	definition	
and meaning;
•	 difficulties	understanding	and	dealing	with	
complex biological and ecological systems that 
are characterised by multi‑causality, scientific 
uncertainty, ignorance and scientific 'surprises';
•	 scientific	and	political	tensions	between	the	
high strength of evidence needed for scientific 
causality and the lower strength of evidence 
needed for timely public policy; 
•	 inadequate	analysis	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	
proposed actions and inactions; and unrealistic 
market prices for hazardous agents that fail to 
reflect the costs to society of their production, 
consumption and wastes;
•	 political	and	financial	short-termism;
•	 a	failure	in	most	cases	to	engage	with	civil	
society and the public to help counter the power 
of the corporate and other stakeholders that may 
wish to dismiss early warnings.
Barriers 1, 6 and 7 mainly concern political and 
economic power, whereas barriers 2–6 primarily 
relate to the more technical process of applying 
knowledge to policymaking. 
There is, of course, no clear‑cut separation between 
these two aspects of regulatory activities or between 
the roles that scientists play as 'experts' in the 
process of evaluating the regulatory science used in 
the policy process. As Jasanoff (1990 and 2011) has 
pointed out:
'Policy relevant science comes into being in a 
territory of its own that is subject to neither 
purely scientific nor wholly political rules of 
the game.'
'It is not so much scientists (but) experts, who 
govern the production and evaluation of policy 
relevant science.'
To help encourage broad and wise use of the PP, 
this chapter will briefly examine the barriers to its 
use, focusing initially on the first barrier, relating to 
corporate power. This is followed by consideration 
of the more technical barriers 2–5, using the EEA 
definition of the PP as the framework for the analysis. 
Thereafter, Section 27.7 of this chapter briefly 
addresses political and financial short‑termism, 
before considering wider public engagement as part 
of the process of creating and managing innovations 
and their attendant hazards.
27.2 The power of corporations to 
oppose action
Chapter 11 on DDT notes Rachel Carson's observation 
that corporations have often focused on 'making a 
dollar at whatever the costs'. Although this overstates 
the situation, the case studies provide ample evidence 
of how corporations responded to early warnings 
about possible hazards from their products by 
organising 'product defence' campaigns. Chapter 7 
on environmental tobacco smoke describes seven key 
strategies that the tobacco companies used to defend 
their products. 
The tobacco industry was certainly not alone in 
using similar tactics, as case studies on lead, VCM, 
beryllium and fossil fuels illustrate. Indeed it seems 
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likely that other industries with hazardous products 
to defend today would employ similar strategies, 
including trying to control, directly or indirectly, the 
relevant scientific research.
This was a key objective of the leaded petrol industry, 
which maintained a virtual monopoly on leaded 
petrol research from immediately after the 'one day 
trial' of leaded petrol in 1925, when early warnings 
emerged from some senior public health scientists, 
until the 1970s. Without access to independent 
research the regulatory authorities were vulnerable 
to corporate influence on the scientific evidence 
made available to them. This was an issue that Clair 
Patterson, lead expert and eminent palaeontologist, 
noted with some vehemence in evidence to the US 
Congress: 
'It is not just a mistake for public health agencies 
to cooperate and collaborate with industries 
in investigating and deciding whether public 
health is endangered; it is a direct abrogation 
and violation of the duties and responsibilities 
of those public health organisations.' (1)
Today scientific research agendas are often 
determined by more independent academics and 
public sector organisations. However, the way in 
which technological and hazard problems are framed 
can result in research that focuses much more on 
developing products than on the need to find out 
whether those products are harmful. 
For example, over the past decade public 
research funding by the EU on nanotechnology, 
biotechnology and information technology was 
heavily biased towards product development, with 
only about 1 % of the EUR 20 billion budget spent 
on investigating their potential hazards. There 
was a similar imbalance on research into genetic 
modification in the US, where over the period 
1992–2002 the US Department of Agriculture spent 
USD 1.8 billion on biotechnology research, of which 
just 1 % went to risk‑related research (Mellon, 2003, 
cited in Chapter 19). 
In some areas where research is dominated by issues 
of intellectual copyright, such as GMOs, there have 
been problems with access to the organisms in 
question. There has recently been some opening up 
of research on GM seeds, however, following a letter 
of complaint from 26 academics in the US, whose 
research was inhibited by the lack of access to GM 
seeds owned by the corporations (Pollack, 2009).
The funding of different innovation pathways is also 
an issue. For example, the European Commission's 
Standing Committee on Agricultural Research 
(SCAR, 2012) has called for increased support for 
research on the economic and social dimensions of 
new technologies and farming practices, calling for 
the highest priority be given to funding low‑input 
high‑output systems, which 'integrate historical 
knowledge and agro‑ecological principles that use 
nature's capacity' (cited in Chapter 19). 
There is also a strong bias in the environmental 
sciences towards research on well known problems 
rather than on emerging issues (Chapter 26).
Corporations have also realised that the language 
used in debates about the hazards associated with 
their products is also important. An example of 
the use of loaded language was the claim by the 
leaded petrol industry that 'normal' levels of lead 
in blood were 'natural' and therefore safe. 'Sound 
science' was another common term taken over by 
public relations companies for the tobacco industry 
to mean science that supports the industry position 
(Baba et al., 2005). The term has since been used 
by other industries engaged in product defence 
who characterise science that does not support the 
industry position as 'unsound'. 
The strategy of 'manufacturing doubt' out of 
uncertainties in the science was also a key part 
of product defence in several of the case studies, 
such as those on tobacco, lead, asbestos, beryllium, 
benzene and climate change (Michaels, 2008; 
Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
The long history of corporate misconduct begs 
the question why corporations adopt strategies 
of 'product defence' and how such actions could 
be minimised for the public good. Chapter 6 on 
beryllium concludes with some reflections on 
this question by Tee Guidotti, who suggests that 
corporations quickly lock themselves into product 
defence because of 'fear, denial and risk of loss'. 
His conclusion is that if corporations are expected 
to reverse course as the evidence of harm from 
their products increases, then 'there must be room 
for them to turn around'. It seems likely that 
his suggestions that this may involve 'forgiving 
past liabilities and reducing punitive damages' 
will be controversial, whereas his call for more 
active shareholder engagement on the question 
of responsible corporate behaviour is likely to be 
welcomed. 
(1) Senator Muskie Hearings on Air Pollution, 1966, cited in Chapter 3 on leaded petrol.
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Chapter 24 addresses the question of why businesses 
do not react to early warnings with precaution in 
more depth, looking more closely at the issue of 
corporate behaviour. It notes that 'blaming business, 
in particular with hindsight ... may not always 
be constructive' as it often misses the 'complex or 
even contradictory set of motives and drivers that 
businesses face'. The authors, Le Menestrel and Rode, 
find that corporate decisions are influenced by a 
mixture of economic, epistemological, regulatory, 
cultural and psychological factors. Economic motives 
dominate: 'in virtually all reviewed cases from both 
volumes of Late lessons from early warnings, it was 
perceived to be profitable for industries to continue 
using potentially harmful products or operations'. 
Corporate short‑term interests have dominated 
over longer‑term public interests mainly because 
the costs of damage to people and environments 
were, and still are, largely externalised to society 
as a whole. The external costs of climate change 
are described by former chief economist to the UK 
Treasury, Nicholas Stern, as 'the biggest market 
failure ever' (cited in Chapter 14). This means that 
corporations bear few of the costs of harm from 
their activities, except in cases where victims win 
compensation or ecosystems are restored, where 
possible. Even here, however, the sums may be 
largely covered by insurance. 
As noted in Chapter 23 on the costs of inaction, 
external costs need to be internalised into the 
accounts of corporations via regulations, taxes, 
charges and permits. Anticipatory assurance bonds 
would also be helpful, as illustrated by Robert 
Constanza using the example of Deepwater Horizon 
(Chapter 24).
To deal with some of the non‑economic factors 
influencing corporate responses to early warnings, 
Le Menestrel and Rode suggest distinguishing 
between the economic and the 'political' roles 
of businesses that are given ample opportunity 
to influence the regulatory process (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011; UCS, 2012) . They also call for new 
institutional arrangements involving rigorous and 
explicit exposition of the dilemmas and trade‑offs 
involved in reconciling value conflicts, and the 
organisational pressure to deny the reality of the 
early warnings. These 'institutional approaches 
would more realistically complement initiatives 
based on the idealised principle that being socially 
responsible is economically profitable'. 
Finally, the historical case studies also reveal one or 
two examples of responsible corporate behaviour, 
albeit by companies selling hazardous products 
rather than by their manufacturers. For example, 
some companies stopped using asbestos in the 1970,; 
and Johnson & Johnson stopped using CFCs in their 
aerosols in 1977, eight years before the ozone hole 
was discovered. 
More recent case studies such as on BPA illustrate 
that some user companies abandoned BPA for 
some products some years before the European 
Commission took action on its use in baby toys. 
The marine and forest stewardship councils 
encourage responsible environmental actions; and 
some nanotechnology companies, such as BASF, 
are working with civil society organisations to 
agree codes of conduct on the responsible use of 
nanotechnology in both research and products 
(EU, 2010). Hewlett Packard has likewise been 
very active in getting lead and other hazardous 
compounds out of its electronic goods and Astra 
Zeneca is working on reducing the envionmental 
impact of pharmaceutials, by, inter alia, researching 
the potential for 'green' medicines.. There is even 
some action on the issue of more environmentally 
realistic accounting, with Puma leading the way. 
Meanwhile, as part of the broader debate about 
innovation pathways from current unsustainable 
economic activities in an increasingly resource‑, 
energy‑ and water‑constrained world, the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development has 
produced its business vision for the way forward 
(WBCSD, 2010). 
27.3 The precautionary principle — key 
elements and misunderstandings 
Public health decisions about moving from 'evidence 
to action' are a balancing act between what needs 
to be known and what ought to be done (Weed, 
2004). It took more than 40 years of much scientific 
endeavour and public debate between the 1940s 
and the 1980s, before what was known about 
smoking and lung cancer was applied to protect 
public health, following sustained opposition from 
economic and political interests. In this case, the 
opportunity for precautionary action on a likely 
hazard in the 1950s and 1960s was lost. By the 1990s 
only prevention of known harm was possible.
Numerous international treaties and other 
instruments refer to the PP, as summarised in 
Box 27.1. Many share common elements but there is 
also variance in the definitions with respect to: the 
standard of scientific evidence required to invoke 
the PP; the extent of the obligation imposed on 
public bodies to apply the principle; the objectives 
Implications for science and governance | More or less precaution?
680 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Box 27.1  International treaties relevant to the case studies illustrating key elements of the 
precautionary principle 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992: 'Where there are threats of serous or 
irreversible harm, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costs effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.' 
European Union's Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Article 191(2): 'Union policy on the environment 
shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of 
the Union, it shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should 
be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter should 
pay.'
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), Preamble: 'the need to do more to protect public health and the 
environment in accordance with the precautionary principle'. In addition, Article 69 provides that: 'To ensure 
a sufficiently high level of protection for human health, including having regard to relevant human population 
groups and possibly to certain vulnerable sub‑populations, and the environment, substances of very high 
concern should, in accordance with the precautionary principle, be subject to careful attention.'
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: 'The parties should take precautionary measures 
to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should 
be cost‑effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and 
measures should take into account different socio‑economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant 
sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors.
EU Directive 2001/18/EC on deliberate release of GMOs, Article 4 (1): 'Member States shall, in 
accordance with the precautionary principle, ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse 
effects on human health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on 
the market of GMOs'. 
Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, 2000, Article 11(10): 'lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living 
modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, 
taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
appropriate, with regard to the import of that living modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, 
or for processing, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.'
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 establishing the European Food Safety Authority and procedures 
in matters of food safety, Article 7: Precautionary principle: 'In specific circumstances where, following 
an assessment of available information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific 
uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health 
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment.'
EU Regulation 1107/2009 on plant protection products, Article 1(4): 'The provisions of this Regulation 
are underpinned by the precautionary principle in order to ensure that active substances or products placed 
on the market do not adversely affect human or animal health or the environment. In particular, Member 
States shall not be prevented from applying the precautionary principle where there is scientific uncertainty as 
to the risks with regard to human or animal health or the environment posed by the plant protection products 
to be authorised in their territory.'
London International Maritime Organisation Convention on the control of Harmful Anti‑fouling 
Systems on Sips, 2000, Articles 6(3) and (4): 'Where the Commission is of the view that there is a threat of 
serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to prevent a decision 
to proceed with the evaluation of the proposal … (which involves considering) whether the proposal has 
demonstrated a potential for unreasonable risk of adverse effects on non‑target organisms or human health.'
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Box 27.1  International treaties relevant to the case studies illustrating key elements of the 
precautionary principle (cont.)
European Court of Justice in the BSE case (Case C‑157/96, National Farmers Union and others, 
1998, ECR 1‑2211): 'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, 
the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of 
those risks become fully apparent.' 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001: 'Acknowledging that precaution 
underlies the concerns of all the Parties and is embedded within this Convention …'
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Article 5(7): 'In 
cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant 
international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members.'
European Commission communication on the precautionary principle, 2 February 2000: 'The 
precautionary principle applies where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and 
preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the high 
level of protection chosen by the EU.'
of applying the PP; and the inclusion of elements 
such as provisions on costs and benefits or public 
participation. 
The EEA's working definition of the PP
It is not surprising that many debates about the 
PP are confused and lengthy, given the variations 
apparent in the instruments and statements listed 
in Box 27.1. During the last decade of discussions 
arising out of Volume 1 of Late lessons from early 
warnings, the EEA has produced and refined a 
working definition of the PP that has proved useful 
in helping to achieve a more common understanding 
of the PP:
'The precautionary principle provides 
justification for public policy and other 
actions in situations of scientific complexity, 
uncertainty and ignorance, where there may 
be a need to act in order to avoid, or reduce, 
potentially serious or irreversible threats 
to health and/or the environment, using an 
appropriate strength of scientific evidence, 
and taking into account the pros and cons of 
action and inaction and their distribution.' 
This definition is explicit in specifying situations 
of uncertainty, ignorance and risk, as contexts for 
considering the use of the PP. It is expressed in the 
affirmative rather than the triple negatives found 
in, for example, the Rio Declaration. It explicitly 
acknowledges that the strength of scientific evidence 
needed to justify public policy actions is determined 
on a case‑specific basis, and only after the plausible 
pros and cons, including their distribution across 
groups, regions, and generations, have been 
assessed. 
The three key sets of issues highlighted in the EEA 
definition above are explored in Sections 27.4–27.6 
below.
27.4 Complex biological and ecological 
systems. 
The Late lessons from early warnings case studies cover 
a vast range of complex systems so it is useful to 
focus on reproductive and developmental hazards 
as an illustration of such systems. 
Many of the case studies have demonstrated 
developmental and reproductive harm from 
exposures to agents such as mercury at Minamata, 
TBT, DES, PCBs, tobacco, lead, VCM, ethinyl 
oestradiol from the contraceptive pill, BPA and 
radiation from X‑rays. 
These cases have shown that serious damage to 
health can be initiated in the early life stages of 
humans and other species but may not become 
apparent until much later in adult life, and even 
Implications for science and governance | More or less precaution?
682 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
 
Box 27.2 Reproductive and developmental harm
Developmental periods are highly sensitive to environmental factors, such as nutrients, environmental 
chemicals, drugs, infections and other stressors. 'Many of the major diseases — and dysfunctions — 
that have increased substantially in prevalence over the last 40 years seem to be related in part to 
developmental factors associated with either nutritional imbalance or exposures to environmental chemicals 
…The conditions that are affected by nutritional or environmental chemical exposures during development 
include the pathophysiologies, diseases, and syndromes that constitute major public health problems 
across the globe: obesity, diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, asthma and allergy, immune and 
autoimmune diseases, neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative diseases, precocious puberty, infertility, 
some cancer types, osteoporosis, depression, schizophrenia and sarcopenia' (Baruoki et al., 2012).
The mechanisms of biological action in each of these earlier experiences are not yet well established, 
despite decades of research. However, it seems clear that it is more the timing of the dose, rather than 
the dose itself, which, inter alia, distinguishes harmful from harmless exposures to reproductive and 
developmental toxicants (Gee, 2006, 2008; Grandjean et al., 2008; Kortenkamp et al., 2011; Chemtrust, 
2008; EEA, 2012). 
Such harm is often irreversible and sometimes multigenerational, causing life‑time personal and societal 
costs that cannot be offset by any benefits to the individual from intrauterine exposures. Thus, biology, 
economics, equity and morals all justify early actions to prevent developmental and reproductive harm. 
However, establishing sufficient evidence for action on such complex hazards is much more difficult than 
it was for tobacco and lung cancer, where there was clear evidence that just one agent, albeit a complex 
mixture like tobacco smoke, caused a specific cancer that was relatively rare before smoking became 
widespread. 
in subsequent generations, as in the DES case (see 
EEA, 2001). Such examples illustrate the realities 
of complex biological and ecological systems that 
are characterised by multi‑causality, scientific 
uncertainty, ignorance and scientific 'surprises'.
From monocausality to multicausality
The biological processes that lead to chronic diseases 
such as breast or prostate cancer, or to reproductive 
or developmental harm, appear to involve some 
or all of at least eight main events in the disease 
process: preparation within the host; initiation; 
promotion; retardation; progression; disease onset; 
the strengthening or weakening of severity; and 
prevalence of the disease. These steps in the causal 
chain of the disease process can be affected by many 
interdependent, co‑causal risk factors, where the 
timing of exposures is usually critical. Some factors, 
including chance, may operate at one or several 
stages of the same disease process.
It is therefore a challenging task to identify the 
'causal' and often co‑causal factors needed to 
prevent or reduce the population burden of such 
ill health, given that exposures occur at different 
developmental stages; are often interactive, 
mixed, and usually low level; and affect people 
with specific environmental histories and 
susceptibilities. 
Within the history of the public health sciences there 
has long been a tension between the monocausal, 
reductionist approach to investigating disease 
causation and multicausal, more holistic approaches. 
A similar tension exists within ecology between 
'diversity' and 'variable ' approaches to complex 
ecosystems — see Chapter 17 on ecosystems. Some 
scientists frame their studies around the view that 
it is the germ, or the gene, the oncogene, or a single 
risk factor, which is mainly 'responsible' for disease. 
Others look to the overall environmental history of 
the host for the many factors and influences that, if 
taken together, may explain disease causation (Sing 
et al., 2004).
Concentrating research on particular parts of the 
puzzle, rather than on the causal puzzle itself, may 
inhibit the clarification of causality. For example, 
some 4 000 chemical substances have been identified 
in tobacco smoke, of which more than 100 are 
classified as toxic. However, the precise disease 
process that leads to cancer or heart disease in some 
smokers but not in others is still largely unknown 
after more than 40 years of research.
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Despite ignorance about the disease process 
associated with mixtures of chemicals, it has still 
been possible to prevent some harm by reducing 
exposures to the whole mixture, such as smoke 
from burning tobacco and fossil fuels, from complex 
welding and rubber fumes, and from fine particles 
of air pollution. 
The practical difficulties of studying and 
understanding complex multicausal biological 
processes have meant that the attraction of a 
monocausal approach remains strong. Reductionism 
and the metaphor of the body as a machine are 
powerful paradigms that continue to support the 
idea of linear relationships between specific causes, 
long after knowledge about irreducible uncertainties, 
emergent properties and non‑linear dynamics became 
available (Di Guiliio and Benson, 2002).
From confounders to co-causal factors?
The tools available to unravel multicausal, 
complex and dynamic disease processes are not 
well developed or used (Cory‑Slechta, 2005). 
As a consequence, most epidemiologists try to 
identify specific risk factors while eliminating 
possible confounding factors via various statistical 
techniques. Such 'statistical surgery' or 'context 
stripping' may remove many confounders from the 
analysis that are really co‑causal factors. If the focus 
is on just one toxicant, then other 'environmental 
properties tend to be regarded as marginal and 
designated as covariates or confounders: treating 
such environmental conditions as confounders 
is equivalent to defining genetic differences as 
confounders. 'A true evaluation of toxic potential 
and its neurobehavioral consequences is inseparable 
from the ecologic setting in which they act and 
which creates unique, enduring individual 
vulnerabilities that warrant the same status as 
genetic predispositions and are imprinted as 
forcefully' (Weiss and Bellinger, 2006).
Even with a well‑studied phenomenon, such as 
lead poisoning, there is a growing realisation 
that lead exposure, environmental deprivation 
and enrichment, and neurotoxicity are complex 
and 'perhaps bidirectional' (Bellinger, 2007). For 
example, an enriched and intellectually stimulating 
home environment seems to reduce the harmful 
effects of a toxicant such as lead, while lead 
exposure can reduce the benefits of such enriched 
environments. Similarly, a deprived socio‑economic 
environment can increase the harmful effects of lead 
while reducing the beneficial effects of a reduction in 
lead exposure. More fundamentally, scientists have 
also noted that bidirectional relationships, such as 
cell signalling and crosstalk, imply that causality 
may be circular (Soto and Sonnenschein, 2006). 
Similar scientific challenges emerge from the field 
of endocrine disruption in wildlife, as well as 
within ecotoxicology more generally (Newman, 
2001). These arise from having to investigate and 
draw inference across biological scales, from 
population level to lower levels of biological 
organisation and back again, in order to show, for 
example, whether harm to individual fish can cause 
fish population decline (Chapter 13 and Kidd et al., 
2007).
It would seem then that the 'key to understanding 
these causal processes is clearly the ability 
to elaborate and understand complexity: the 
interacting systems involved will always 
overwhelm predictions of independent effects of 
any single factor, reducing them to very limited 
and uncertain information' (Bellinger et al., 1985). 
It also follows that in complex systems very small 
changes in key variables can have profound 
effects 'Small' can be very significant in finely 
balanced non‑linear systems, where, as Heraclitus 
observed centuries ago, there is a 'harmony of 
opposites'. Removing even the 'smallest' link in an 
interdependent causal chain can sometimes break 
at least pathway to disease. 
Such complex and multi‑causal factors are also 
evident in ecological systems and species as 
illustrated in Chapter 14 on climate change, 
Chapter 16 on bees, Chapter 17 on ecosystems and 
Chapter 20 on invasive alien species. 
How then can we identify possible or probable 
causality from observed associations in such 
complex biological and ecological systems, so that 
some co‑causal priorities for public health and 
environmental protection can be agreed?
Multicausality and the Bradford Hill 'criteria' for 
causality
'With preventive medicine in mind the decisive 
question is whether the frequency of the 
undesirable event B will be influenced by a 
change in the environmental feature A' (Bradford 
Hill, 1965). Building on the tobacco controversy, 
Bradford Hill identified nine characteristics of 
scientific evidence that, if taken together, could 
help scientists to move with some confidence from 
observing associations to asserting causation. His 
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Box 27.3 The Bradford Hill 'criteria' for identifying causation
1. Strength of association 
2. Consistency
3. Specificity
4. Temporal relationship (temporality) 
5. Biological gradient (dose‑response relationship)
6. Plausibility (biological plausibility)
7. Coherence
8. Experiment (reversibility)
9. Analogy
subsequently misnamed 'criteria' are still widely 
used today in both the health and environmental 
fields (WHO, 2002; Collier, 2003; Maxim and van 
der Sluijs, 2010). 
Bradford Hill's explicit approach to deriving 
causation from association was essentially based on 
monocausality, that is, on finding the specific cause 
of a specific disease. 
He was aware that several factors would be 
implicated in disease but that removing one of 
them may reduce its frequency, or incidence, 
without necessarily eliminating the disease entirely. 
He also acknowledged the other, simpler type of 
multicausality, which is where one disease can 
have several different independent causes, noting 
that: 'diseases may have more than one cause. It 
has always been possible to acquire a cancer of the 
scrotum without sweeping chimneys or taking to 
mule spinning in Lancashire' (Bradford Hill, 1965). 
The Bradford Hill 'criteria' need to be reappraised 
in the light of multicausality and complexity. This 
is particularly important because the absence 
of some or all 'criteria' is often used in current 
controversies to deny the possibility of causality. 
More generally, the criteria seem less robust now as 
reasons for dismissing associations than they did in 
the world of the 1960s, when issues were perceived 
in largely monocausal terms. 
For example, the criterion of consistency between 
the results of different studies into the same 
phenomena, when present, clearly adds much 
confidence to assertions of causality. However, 
multi‑causality can make consistency very 
difficult to achieve: 'if all studies of lead showed 
the same relationship between variables, one 
would be startled, perhaps justifiably suspicious' 
(Needleman, 1995). The sources of variability arise 
both from the study and the investigator, such as 
the framing and initial assumptions; the models, 
methods and statistical analyses used; the choice 
of population group; the presence of susceptible 
sub‑groups; and the data selected. Other sources of 
variability and bias have been noted (Bailar, 2007) 
and the limitations of conventional epidemiology 
have been explored from a precautionary 
perspective (Grandjean, 2008). In addition, there 
are the sources of variability in populations arising 
from the 'sociomics' of environments and the 
epigenetics of individuals.
It is hardly surprising therefore that, after decades 
of research, most lead studies can still only 'explain' 
30–40 % of the variance in most lead‑linked 
biological end‑points, and sometimes far less 
(Bellinger, 2007). As inconsistent results are to be 
expected from complex biological and ecological 
systems the absence of consistency between studies 
does not imply an absence of causality.
Bradford Hill included a linear dose-response 
relationship between a toxicant and its effects as 
another important criterion. However, where the 
timing of exposure is more important than the 
dose itself, and where non‑linear, 'low‑dose' effects 
are present, the absence of a linear dose‑response 
relationship does not provide robust evidence 
against causality. 
The condition of temporality anticipates that a 
cause must precede the effect. This is obviously so, 
except where there are multiple causes arising at 
different times, and with varying rates of increase 
or decrease, which may therefore reverse, stabilise, 
or accelerate the overall disease trend, depending 
on their relative strengths. If this feature of reality 
is not taken into account then some widely used 
interpretations of temporality in relation to overall 
disease trends can lead to shaky conclusions. 
Implications for science and governance | More or less precaution?
685Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
For example, in a review of the evidence on falling 
sperm counts and endocrine‑disrupting chemicals, it 
was concluded that, as overall sperm counts began 
to fall in some countries in advance of the rise of 
chlorine‑based chemistry, such chemical exposures 
could not be a cause of change in the overall trend 
(WHO, 2002). In the context of multicausality, where 
the combined effects of several causes together 
determine the overall time trend of a disease, such a 
conclusion is not soundly based. 
Such time‑dependent factors within multicausal 
systems also mean that obtaining evidence based on 
the experiment criterion — i.e. demonstrating the 
impact of removing one cause of a disease affected by 
many causes — can be very difficult, as with changes 
in IQ or sperm counts. 
Less weight should also be placed on specificity as a 
criterion, given the widespread prevalence of 'many 
to many' cause and effect relationships, and the 
capacity of many substances, such as tobacco PCBs, 
asbestos, lead and mercury, to cause many types of 
harm.
The strength of association, which Bradford Hill put 
first in his list of features, is clearly still very relevant 
but with caveats that arise from multicausality. Even 
a 'low' relative risk of say, 1.5, if replicated in several 
studies, can be very robust for a multicausal disease 
as is the case with smoking and heart disease. Such a 
'low' relative risk will also represent much harm if the 
background rate of the disease is large. 
The criteria of biological plausibility and coherence 
are dependent on the established knowledge of 
the day and therefore are not robust criteria for 
dismissing early warnings, where relatively novel 
 
Box 27.4  Criteria for precautionary action: some features of evidence about the hazardous 
potential of agents that may justify precautionary action
1. Intrinsic toxicity/ecotoxicity data
2. Novelty (i.e. where there is a low 'knowledge/ignorance ratio')
3. Ecological or biological persistence
4. Potential for bio‑accumulation
5. Large spatial range in the environment e.g. potential for global dispersion.
6. Seriousness of potential hazards
7. Irreversibility of potential hazards 
8. Analogous evidence from known hazards
9. Inequitable distribution of hazardous impacts on particular regions, people and generations
10. Availability of feasible alternatives 
11. Potential for stimulating innovation
12. Potential and time scales for future learning
science, at the frontiers of scientific knowledge, is 
often used. 
Whereas multicausality seems to weaken most 
of the criteria, analogy becomes more necessary 
given the difficulties of establishing clear causality 
from complex systems. If precautionary actions are 
needed then analogies from past experiences may be 
particularly valuable. Box 27.4 provides some 'criteria 
for action' to complement the criteria for causation, 
based on experiences of past ecological and biological 
hazards, including by analogy, which may provide 
quite robust evidence of emerging potential hazards. 
In judging strength of association, Bradford Hill also 
warned against the overuse and misuse of statistical 
significance testing: 'we waste a deal of time, we 
grasp the shadow and lose the substance, we weaken 
our capacity to interpret data and to take reasonable 
decisions whatever the value of P. And far too often 
we deduce "no difference" from "no significance".' 
Although similar cautions have been repeated 
regularly since then (Cohen, 1994; Poole, 
2000; Hooper, Stang and Rothman, 2011), the 
misinterpretation of statistical significance and the 
relative neglect of confidence intervals continue 
(see also Chapter 26 on science for precautionary 
decision‑making).
In the circumstances of multicausality and complexity 
the Bradford Hill criteria are characterised by a strong 
element of asymmetry. The presence of the criteria 
can be robust evidence for a causal association, 
whereas the absence of the criteria is not robust 
evidence that there is no causal association. Bradford 
Hill drew attention to this asymmetry with several of 
his criteria but some of his followers have forgotten 
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this in their use of the criteria to dismiss possible 
hazards (Ashby, 1997; WHO 2002). When addressing 
biological and ecological complexity, such asymmetry 
in the application of the Bradford Hill criteria is even 
more pronounced than it was when he introduced 
them. 
Another barrier to early action arises from the 
systemic biases towards not finding a causal link, 
specifically biases within the epidemiology and 
toxicology methods that tend to generate false 
negatives (i.e. assertions that something is safe when 
it turns out not to be). These methodological biases 
are illustrated by Grandjean in Chapter 26. 
Both policymakers and scientists need to 
acknowledge and take account of these main 
directions of methodological error when they 
evaluate the methods and results of research. 
Many scientists do (Grandjean, 2004 and 2005) but 
awareness of these methodological biases among 
many stakeholders appears to be low.
Finally, the issue of funding bias, whereby research 
results can be closely associated with the source of 
funding, has been observed in the tobacco literature 
(Barnes, 1998) and then identified in other fields such 
as pharmaceuticals (Goldacre, 2012; Lexchin, 2003) 
the food and beverage industry (Levine, 2003) BPA, 
(Vom Saal, 2005), mobile phones (Huss et al., 2007), 
food, (Levine, 2003), biomedics (Bekelman, 2003), 
GMOs (Diels, 2011). The explanation for this bias is 
not clear (Krimsky, 2006, 2010). Funding bias is also 
to be found in the transport and constructions fields, 
where underestimation of costs and construction 
times by the developers is routine, and in cost‑benefit 
analysis where the direction of bias is routinely in the 
direction of those who fund the study. 
Other concepts related to the PP and complexity are 
likewise often understood differently by different 
actors. An important example is the distinction 
between uncertainty and ignorance, which constitute 
quite different states of knowledge. For example, 
both the asbestos‑induced mesothelioma cancer and 
the hole in the ozone layer caused by CFCs were 
complete scientific 'surprises', arising from a state 
of ignorance. They were not gaps or uncertainties in 
existing states of knowledge. 
To be uncertain one has to be uncertain about 
something and any 'gaps' in knowledge relate to 
current knowledge. Both 'uncertainty' and 'gaps' 
relate to a stock of existing knowledge. 'Ignorance', on 
the other hand (or more elegantly, 'nescience', i.e. 'no 
knowledge') relates to 'unknown unknowns'. 
More research can close some gaps in knowledge 
and reduce some uncertainties but such research will 
also uncover new sources of uncertainty and gaps in 
knowledge, as well as raising awareness about new 
areas of ignorance. Learning to live with and manage 
irreducible uncertainties is as necessary as trying to 
reduce them.
The knowledge-to-ignorance ratio
Acknowledging ignorance raises questions about 
how much knowledge we have in a given field 
Figure 27.1 Expanding knowledge, continuing uncertainties
Today's knowledge
Tomorrow's knowledge
Gaps and uncertainties in today's knowledge
Gaps and uncertainties in tomorrow's knowledge
No knowledge (ignorance) source of surprises and discoveries
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compared to ignorance. This issue was noted in the 
World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980), which 
advised people to :
'keep in mind that, in spite of present 
knowledge, what we know about 
the biosphere, ecosystems and their 
interrelationships is less than what we do 
not know. Consequently, it is often difficult to 
accurately predict the effects of human actions. 
Gaps in knowledge should be filled where 
possible.. but in the meantime risks should be 
reduced' (emphasis added).
This may be dismissed as a trivial observation but it 
does draw attention to the need for scientific humility 
even when considering the large stocks of current 
knowledge on many hazards. Scientists in many of 
the case studies failed to show scientific humility, 
instead being guilty of what has been termed 'the 
sin of hubris' in the context of marine ecosytems and 
fisheries science (MacGarvin, 1994).
While the knowledge‑to‑ignorance ratio cannot be 
quantified, it is possible to get an informed qualitative 
appreciation of the balance in the various fields 
covered by the case studies. For example, there is 
clearly a difference between the current stock of 
accumulated knowledge, on, say, asbestos, ionising 
radiations and tobacco, compared to our stock of 
knowledge on nanotechnology, GM food, or on 
non‑ionising radiations when used in recent consumer 
products such as mobile phones. And while there will 
still be a lot of new knowledge that could be gained 
about even a well known substance like asbestos (2) 
the practical need to search for more knowledge about 
asbestos is very minimal, as we know more than 
enough to avoid its dangers successfully.
In contrast, there is a vast ocean of scientific ignorance 
surrounding nanotechnologies, biotechnologies 
and non‑ionising radiation technologies and 
chemicals used in consumer and other products. 
This remains to be explored. What is known in these 
relatively immature fields can perhaps be likened 
to the few 'pebbles' of knowledge that Sir Isaac 
Newton gathered from his scientific work and that 
he contrasted to that 'great ocean of undiscovered 
truth', which remained to be explored and which 
encouraged scientific humility (3).
Where the 'knowledge‑to‑ignorance ratio' is high 
(implying much knowledge and little practically 
necessary ignorance), as with, for example, lead, 
asbestos and mercury, there is little need for either 
more research or for precautionary (as distinct from 
merely preventative) measures. Where the KIR is 
low, however, there is a need for both precautionary 
measures following credible early warnings and 
for novel research, rather than the 'scientific inertia' 
of excessive research on well known substances 
described in the Chapter 26. As de Sadeleer (2010) 
has observed, 'it may be impossible to carry out a 
full risk assessment because such investigations 
operate at the frontiers of scientific knowledge, ... 
(where scientists) must even point to the limits of 
their knowledge or, where appropriate, to their 
ignorance.' 
The limitations of scientific knowledge imply moral 
courage in taking precautionary action in time to 
avert harm. As Lewontin has observed: 'Saying that 
our lives are the consequence of a complex and 
variable interaction between internal and external 
causes does not concentrate the mind nearly so well 
as a simplistic claim; nor does it promise anything in 
the way of relief for individual and social miseries. It 
takes a certain moral courage to accept the message 
of scientific ignorance and all that it implies' (Orrell, 
2007).
Table 27.1 attempts to clarify concepts such as 
ignorance and uncertainty that often arise in debates 
on the PP.
27.5 Conflicts between the high 
strength of evidence needed for 
scientific causality and the lower 
strength of evidence needed for 
timely public policy
All responsible applications of the precautionary 
principle require some plausible evidence of an 
association between exposures and potentially 
harmful impacts. For example, the European 
Commission's communication on the precautionary 
principle (EC, 2000) specifies that 'reasonable 
grounds for concern' are needed to justify action. 
However, it does not explain that these grounds 
will vary with the specifics of each case, nor does 
(2)  It is only recently that new Dutch analyses of the epidemiological data on asbestos has shown that the difference in harmful 
potency between blue and white asbestos ,claimed by some scientists, practically disappears when the exposure estimates are 
scrutinised more carefully (Lenters et al., 2012). 
(3) 'I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea‑shore, and 
diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all 
undiscovered before me' (Newton, 1855).
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Table 27.1 Some common concepts used in PP debates
Situation Nature of knowledge Type of action taken
Risk 'Known' impacts and 'known' probabilities, 
e.g. regarding asbestos from 1930.
Prevention: action to reduce known hazards, 
e.g. eliminating exposure to asbestos dust
Uncertainty (*) 'Likely' impacts but 'unknown' probabilities, 
e.g. regarding antibiotics in animal feed and 
associated human resistance to those antibiotics, 
from 1965. 
Precaution: action taken to reduce exposure to 
plausible hazards, e.g. the EU ban on antibiotic 
growth promoters in 1999.
Ignorance 'Unknown' impacts and therefore 'unknown' 
probabilities, e.g. the then unknown but later 
'surprises' of the ozone layer 'hole' from CFCs, 
pre‑1974; the mesothelioma cancer from asbestos 
pre 1959; the rate of Greenland ice sheet melting 
pre‑2007.
Precaution: action taken to anticipate, identify 
earlier, and reduce the extent and impact of 
'surprises' e.g. by using intrinsic properties of 
chemicals e.g. persistence, bioaccumulation, spatial 
range; using analogies; long‑term monitoring; and 
using robust, diverse and adaptable technologies that 
can help minimise impacts of 'surprises'. 
Ambiguity Concerning the different values and 
interpretations about information used by 
stakeholders. E.g. in invasive alien species cases 
where a species can be welcomed by some but not 
others. 
Participatory precaution: stakeholder engagement 
in decision‑ making about innovations and their 
potential hazards. 
Variability The natural differences in population or ecosystem 
exposures and sensitivities to harmful agents. 
Obtain more information in order to minimise 
simplistic assumptions about average exposures and 
sensitivities
Indeterminacy Unpredictable uses of technologies e.g. use of X‑rays 
in children's shoe shops in the 1950s.
Pre-market benefit assessment of novel uses of a 
technology with potential hazards. 
it explicitly distinguish between risk, uncertainty 
and ignorance as important factors in judging the 
'reasonableness' of the grounds for action. 
The strength of evidence deemed to be reasonable 
justification for action varies between different 
jurisdictions and cases and can be quite low. In 
Sweden, for example, a 'scientific suspicion of risk' 
constitutes sufficient evidence for restricting an 
existing chemical substance. Similarly, for the World 
Trade Organization, 'pertinent scientific information' 
can be sufficient to justify protective measures 
under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures whenever there is an insufficiency of 
science to permit a comprehensive and robust risk 
assessment. 
The strength of scientific evidence appropriate to 
justify public policy or other actions depends on the 
pros and cons of action or inaction in the specific 
circumstances of each case. These circumstances 
include the nature and distribution of potential or 
plausible harm; the justification for and the benefits 
of the agent or activity under examination; the 
availability of feasible alternatives; and the overall 
goals of public policy. Such policy goals include 
'high levels of protection' of the public, consumers, 
and the environment, as required by the Treaty of 
the European Union.
The use of different strengths of evidence for 
different purposes is not a new idea. Legal practice 
has long employed several tests, such as 'beyond all 
reasonable doubt' in criminal courts and the lower 
'balance of probabilities' used in many civil courts. 
Moreover, public health practitioners have long 
advocated the use of varying strengths of evidence 
in different circumstances. For example, Bradford 
Hill (1965) concluded his classic paper on association 
and causation in environmental health with a 
'call for action' in which he proposed the use of 
case‑specific and differential strengths of evidence, 
observing that:
'It almost inevitably leads us to introduce 
differential standards before we convict. Thus 
on relatively slight evidence we might decide 
to restrict the use of a drug for early‑morning 
sickness in pregnant women. If we are wrong 
in deducing causation from association no 
great harm will be done. The good lady and the 
pharmaceutical industry will doubtless survive. 
On fair evidence we might take action on what 
appears to be an occupational hazard, e.g. we 
might change from probable carcinogenic oil to 
a non‑carcinogenic oil in a limited environment 
and without too much injustice if we are wrong. 
But we should need very strong evidence 
Note: * Different types, sources and levels of uncertainty can be identified (Walker, 2003).
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before we made people burn a fuel in their 
homes that they do not like or stop smoking 
the cigarettes and eating the fats and sugar that 
they do like' (emphasis added).
In the field of cancer, the International Agency 
for Research on Cancer also uses several types of 
scientific evidence to categorise their strengths of 
evidence on carcinogens (Cogliano, 2007). 
Failing to acknowledge the reality of different 
strengths of evidence for action has led to several 
ill‑founded debates. For example, opponents of the 
PP often cite the North Sea Ministerial Declaration, 
which calls for: 'action to avoid potentially damaging 
impacts of substances, even where there is no 
scientific evidence to prove a causal link between 
emissions and effects' (emphasis added).
Critics claim that this definition justifies action even 
when there is 'no scientific evidence' that associates 
exposures with effects. However, the North Sea 
Declaration clearly links the words 'no scientific 
evidence' with the words 'to prove a causal link'. 
There is a significant difference between the evidence 
needed to show a plausible link between a pollutant 
and harm, and evidence which is robust enough to 
'prove' a causal link. Once evidence reaches the level 
of 'proving' a causal link there is no need for the PP 
as the issue is then firmly in the 'prevention principle' 
area where the risks are well characterised.
Similar confusion arose in interpreting the different 
strengths of evidence for association and causality set 
out in a 13‑country study of brain cancers and mobile 
phones (the Interphone study) (see Chapter 21 on 
mobile phones). 
The confusion of commentators, including the 
media, in these cases arose because scientists were 
not transparent and clear about the difference 
between the very strong evidence needed to establish 
'causality' and the suggestive evidence of plausible 
risks. 
For example, the Interphone concluded that:
'There were suggestions of an increased risk 
of glioma, and much less of menigioma, at the 
highest level of exposure….. (but) biases and 
errors limit the strength of the conclusion we 
can draw from these analyses and prevent a 
causal interpretation'.
One consequence of not clarifying the difference 
between the low and high strengths of evidence 
embedded in these two sentences was that readers 
of the Interphone conclusion, particularly the media, 
interpreted the study as providing either no evidence 
of cancer or evidence of cancer. Both conclusions 
were strongly cited by different and similarly weighty 
parts of the media. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the BBC 
(17 May 2010) reported that 'No proof of mobile 
cancer risk, major study concludes'. One the same 
day, The Telegraph asserted that 'Half an hour of 
mobile use a day increases brain cancer risk'.
Beneath the strong evidence of 'scientific causality' 
there is a large evidentiary space containing a 
continuum of strengths of evidence that can be used 
to justify action under the precautionary principle, 
depending on the case‑specific circumstances. The 
question remains, however, where, in that continuum, 
is 'sufficient evidence' located? 
Identifying an appropriate strength of evidence 
for action has a been an important issue in climate 
change debates. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) discussed this issue at length 
before formulating its 1995 conclusion that 'on the 
balance of evidence' mankind is disturbing the global 
climate. It further elaborated on this issue in its 2001 
report, which identified seven strengths of evidence 
that can be used to characterise the scientific evidence 
for a particular climate change hypothesis (see 
Panel 14.1 in Chapter 14 on climate change). By 2007 
the IPCC was able to conclude with 'high confidence' 
that the evidence for human‑induced climate change 
had strengthened to 'very likely' (IPCC, 1995, 2001 
and 2007).
Table 27.2 presents five of these strengths of evidence 
based on the IPPC approach and illustrates their 
practical application to a variety of different societal 
purposes. 
The decision about when there is sufficient evidence 
to justify preventive action clearly involves more 
inputs to decision‑making than merely science. The 
strength of evidence that is deemed appropriate 
depends on such non‑scientific criteria as the costs of 
being wrong with actions or inactions (including their 
nature and distribution between different groups 
and generations); the justification for, and benefits of, 
the agents or activities that pose potential threats to 
health; and the availability of feasible alternatives.
The term 'no established or conclusive evidence' 
is often used to characterise the absence of some 
strength of evidence that would convince the 
particular scientists doing the risk assessment that 
an agent causes harm. The different consequences 
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Table 27.2 Different strengths of evidence for different purposes: some examples and 
illustrations
Strength of evidence Illustrative terms Examples of use
Very strong (90–99 %) Statistical significance Can be part of strong scientific evidence of 'causation'
Beyond all reasonable doubt Most criminal law, and the Swedish Chemical Law 1973, for 
evidence of 'safety' of substances under suspicion — placing 
the burden of proof on manufacturers
Strong (65–90 %) Reasonably certain US Food Quality Protection Act, 1996 
Sufficient scientific evidence To justify a trade restriction designed to protect human, 
animal or plant health under World Trade Organization 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, Art. 2, 1995
Moderate (33–65 %) Balance of evidence Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1995 and 2001
Balance of probabilities Much civil and some administrative law
Reasonable grounds for concern European Commission Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle 2000
Strong possibility British Nuclear Fuels occupational radiation compensation 
scheme 1984 (20–50 % probabilities triggering different 
awards up to 50 % + which triggers full compensation)
Weak (10–33 %) Scientific suspicion of risk Swedish Chemical Law 1973, for sufficient evidence to take 
precautionary action on potential harm from substances 
— placing the burden of proof on the regulators
Available pertinent information To justify a provisional trade restriction under World Trade 
Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, Art. 5.7,
where 'scientific information is insufficient'
Very weak (1–10 %) Low risk Household fire insurance
Negligible and insignificant Food Quality Protection Act, 1996 (USA)
for those for whom the evidence is 'not established' 
(i.e. risk takers or risk makers) is seldom discussed. 
Nor are the purposes for which the evidence could 
be conclusive discussed, for example to justify 
warning labels, or low cost exposure reductions, or 
a ban. 
Decision‑makers must also be aware of the 
common mistake of assuming that 'no evidence of 
harm' is 'evidence of no harm', when the relevant 
research has not been done, a feature of many case 
studies which is picked up in Chapter 26, where 
'authoritative but unsubstantiated assertions of 
safety' are described. 
Finally, interpreting 'convincing evidence' only as 
the high strength of evidence needed to establish 
'scientific causality' is of little practical use in 
helping to apply the precautionary principle or in 
averting, as opposed to observing, future harm. This 
means that risk assessment committees may need 
to consider the consequences of their judgements 
as well as just causation, as Bradford Hill and the 
IPCC have demonstrated. It may be argued that it is 
for risk managers to deal with the consequences of 
decisions about causation. Nevertheless, scientists 
involved in risk assessments are well placed to 
contribute to analysis of consequences, as was 
acknowledged by the European Court when it noted 
that a scientific risk assessment should provide the 
competent public authority with sufficient, reliable 
and cogent information so that it also understands:
'…the ramifications of the scientific question 
raised and can decide upon a policy in full 
knowledge of the facts' (ECR, 1999 and 2002) 
(emphasis added).
27.6 The pros and cons of actions and 
inactions
The EEA definition of the PP widens the 
conventionally narrow and quantifiable 
interpretation of costs and benefits to embrace wider 
and sometimes unquantifiable 'pros and cons'. These 
include, for example, a loss of trust in science after 
the public experiences harm that scientists had 
assured them would not occur. Such unquantifiable 
costs can sometimes be as significant as the 
economic costs, as in the case of BSE (EEA, 2001) and 
the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima 
(Chapter 18). 
Chapter 23 on costs of inaction illustrates how 
the costs and benefits of action and inaction are 
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skewed towards the tangible short‑term compliance 
costs of regulatory action, which usually fall on 
specific, often powerful actors, and against the 
long‑term diffuse benefits to society as a whole 
of timely actions. The polluter pays principle and 
the internalisation of external costs are essential 
components of approaches to achieving a more 
economically efficient and equitable distribution 
of the pros and cons of action and inaction. 
Such measures would bring the market prices of 
hazardous agents into line with their real costs, 
encouraging earlier development of substitutes 
and other economic and technological innovations 
(EEA, 2012).
Several of the case studies (asbestos, lead, mercury, 
PCBs CFCs, benzene) indicate that early actions 
can stimulate innovations and conversely illustrate 
how late actions have consolidated technological 
monopolies for products, at unrealistically low 
prices, which served to keep smarter substitutes out 
of the markets for many years. 
Other work has demonstrated the role that strong 
and smart environmental regulations, tax incentives 
and other measures can play in stimulating 
innovation (Porter, 1995; Ambec, 2011; Ashford, 
1979, 2011a, 2011b and 2012). 
27.7 Political and financial 
short‑termism
The time horizons of democratic politics are 
very short in comparison to the long timescales 
associated with successfully managing the harm 
to environments and people illustrated in the case 
studies. This is a deep‑seated problem but some 
countries have begun to devise some institutional 
responses to protect the long‑term interests of 
society. For example, countries like Finland, 
Israel, New Zealand and Hungary have been 
experimenting with nominating ombudsmen or 
committees charged with caring for the long term 
(Roderick, 2010; Ward, 2012). 
The financial sector is even more limited by short 
termism but since the financial crash there has been 
some effort to establish more long‑term perspectives 
(Mainelli and Giffords, 2009). 
27.8 Public participation in hazard and 
options analysis 
There are many value judgements involved in hazard 
and risk analysis, from the framing of the issue and 
the questions to be addressed to the ethical choice 
of the appropriate strength of evidence that should 
justify action to reduce hazards in a particular case. 
As several authoritative bodies have highlighted 
in recent years, the public should be involved in 
decisions about serious hazards and their avoidance, 
and at all stages of the risk analysis process (US PCR, 
1997; RCEP, 1998; German Advisory Council 
on Global Change, 2001; Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 2007; JRP/IPCS, 2007; Health Council for 
the Netherlands, 2008; NAS, 2009)
Figure 27.2, based on the above reports, illustrates 
the circular, iterative nature of risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication; the links and 
feedback loops between them; and the involvement 
of stakeholders at every stage, albeit with different 
intensities of engagement — greater at the problem 
framing and options choice stages, less so at the 
scientific risk assessment stage. 
The report from the US National Academy of Sciences 
on Risk Assessment, Science and decisions: advancing 
risk assessment (NAS, 2009), strongly recommends 
such stakeholder involvement, especially at the crucial 
problem framing stage.
These recommendations for enhancing stakeholder 
participation in the hazard and options analysis 
process do not appear to be reflected in most existing 
international and European arrangements for 
analysing risks and setting public exposure limits 
e.g. relating to contaminants in food (JRC/IPTS, 2007). 
European authorities are continuously improving, 
albeit at speeds that fail to satisfy all stakeholders. 
Changes are nevertheless in the air. The European 
Commission increasingly involves stakeholders in 
risk assessment by, for example, asking for public 
comments on the questions to be put to risk assessors 
and holding stakeholder consultative meetings (4). 
There have also been recent improvements in the way 
that uncertainties are handled in the food (EFSA, 2009; 
Hert, 2010) and emerging issues fields (SCENIHR, 
2012), building on the earlier work of the IPCC on 
(4)  See the stakeholder dialogue procedures in EC (2009). The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), for example, organises a 
Stakeholder Consultative Platform for food industry stakeholders and widely publishes agendas, minutes, and scientific opinions as 
part of its response to Articles 38 and 39 of its founding regulation on openness and transparency in the governance of food safety 
risks.
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Figure 27.2 A participatory and precautionary framework for analysis of hazards and options
Note:  The dotted line indicates feedback.
Source:  EEA, based on NRC (1996), US Presidential Commission on Risk (1997), UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(1998) and NAS, 'Science and Decisions' (2009).
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how to manage and communicate uncertainty. 
As Chapter 15 on floods illustrates, balancing 
timely early warnings against false alarms is 
a very challenging task for decision‑makers 
under conditions of complexity, uncertainty and 
ignorance. 
There have also been improvements in the 
transparency of risk assessments, including , most 
recently, improved public access to the scientific 
data submitted by companies to regulatory 
authorities for product authorisations (EFSA, 2013). 
The need for this openness has emerged as a strong 
lesson from several case studies — from Minamata 
to the bio‑ and nanotechnology fields — and the 
improvements follows recent controversies over the 
food additive aspartame and GM maize (Seralini 
et al., 2012; Genewatch, 2012). 
From uncertain risks to relevant and responsible 
innovation?
In the introduction to this chapter the debates 
in France on GMOs were used to illustrate the 
potential of the PP to trigger or facilitate debates 
that go well beyond the issue of risks and into 
the area of responsible and socially relevant 
innovation. 
One or two other case study chapters also 
raise this question. For example, the Chapter 3 
on leaded petrol reviewed the technological 
'roads not taken' and Chapter 19 on GM crops 
analysed 'top down' and 'bottom up' innovation 
pathways to agricultural futures. Chapter 5 on 
Minamata disease and Chapter 16 on bees also 
raised questions concerning the value of current 
democratic institutions in dealing with complex 
socio‑technical issues. More involvement of the 
public in hazard and options analysis, discussed 
above, may also lead to wider discussions about 
technological choices and directions of innovation. 
Richard Owens, co‑author of the Chapter 13 on 
the 'birth pill' has further developed these ideas 
in a forthcoming book on 'responsible innovation' 
(Owens et al., 2013).
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Box 27.5 Responsible research and innovation
Responsible research and innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and 
innovators become mutually responsive to each other regarding the ethical acceptability, sustainability 
and social desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products. Social desirability is currently 
essentially determined by market mechanisms, however, as universal principles on what counts as socially 
desirable are not easily agreed upon.
The 'Innovation Union' flagship initiative is a central part of the EU's Europe 2020 strategy and is seen as 
means to deliver 'smart growth', defined as 'developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation' 
(EC, 2011). 
From this macroeconomic perspective, innovation is assumed to be steerless but inherently good, as it 
produces prosperity and jobs and meets societal challenges, addressed through market mechanisms. 
Modern societies lack a specific forum or policy for evaluating particular technologies in terms of benefits 
and risks within the legislative context. We only have formal safety, quality and efficacy assessment 
procedures evaluating the properties of products in the course of passing these three market hurdles.
The benefits of technologies are 'demonstrated' only by market success, whereas the potential negative 
consequences are evaluated under formal risk assessment schemes. The state is responsible for defining 
the risks of technologies under product authorisation procedures and product liability law and ensuring 
market operators compliance, whereas society lacks a particular responsibility for what could count as 
positive impacts of technologies.
Modern 'Frankensteins' are not intentionally created by a single actor. If they arise they are more likely 
the unforeseen side effects of collective action. Indeed, techno‑scientific applications can remain ethically 
problematic even in cases where scientists and engineers have the best possible intentions and users have 
no conscious intention to misuse or abuse (5). 
This situation constitutes the major ethical challenge we face today. An ethics focused on the intentions 
and/or consequence of actions of individuals is not appropriate for allocating responsibilities for the impacts 
of innovations.
Responsible innovation therefore requires an ethics of co‑responsibility for ensuring the right impacts and 
avoiding negative consequences, whether these impacts are intentional or not and whether they can be 
fully foreseen or not.
The challenge is to arrive at a more responsive, adaptive and integrated management of the innovation 
process. A multidisciplinary approach involving stakeholders and other interested parties should lead to 
an inclusive innovation process whereby technical innovators become responsive to societal needs and 
societal actors become jointly responsible for the innovation process. That includes contributing to defining 
socially desirable products that reflect basic needs and public values, for example by focusing on the great 
challenges of our times such as climate change and food security.
Effecting such changes requires a paradigm shift in innovation policy. The state must assume responsibility 
for positive outcomes of innovation, reflect basic public values beyond consumer market preferences 
and move away from technology‑oriented research and innovation policy and towards an issue‑oriented 
approach. 
Source:  Edited extracts from von Schomberg, 2013 (6). 
(5) The concept of collective co‑responsibility in response to the shortcomings of professional roles — responsibility in science and 
engineering is outlined in von Schomberg (2007).
(6) René von Schomberg is at the European Commission, Directorate General for Research. The views expressed here are those of the 
author and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission.
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Box 27.5 includes a short description of responsible 
innovation written by Rene Schomberg, a 
contributing author to the Owens book. Innovation 
'with a human purpose' is also being proposed as 
a means to rebalance market‑focused innovation 
and to meet the environmental challenges posed by 
meeting human needs in a resource‑, energy‑ and 
water‑constrained world (van den Hove, 2012).
The field of public engagement on risks, hazards 
and innovations is large (Wynne, 2007; Stirling, 
2008 and 2010; Wesselink and Hoppe, 2011; 
Wesselink, 2011; Hoppe, 2012) and extends well 
beyond the bounds of the present study. However, 
the evidence from Late lessons from early warnings 
provides further grounds for boosting public and 
corporate engagement in responsible innovation. 
27.9 Conclusion
The case studies and this chapter have illustrated 
the need for wider use of the PP both as a 
justification for timely actions on early warnings 
and as a trigger for broader debates about 
technological pathways to the future. Mistakes will 
be made, surprises will occur. But if the quality of 
the scientific and stakeholder processes used to 
arrive at such decisions are sound, and the best of 
science is used, then living with the consequences, 
of such decisions, both pleasant and unpleasant , 
will be more acceptable. 
The capacity of people to foresee and forestall 
disasters appears to be limited, however, especially 
when such action is opposed by powerful economic 
and political interests, as the case studies in Late 
lessons from early warnings illustrate. It is not just 
corporations that have the capacity for denial when 
confronted with evidence of impending disaster 
— as the financial collapse of 2009 demonstrated. 
'Wilful blindness' and human 'folly' are general 
human traits that thwart our capacities to do the 
right thing (Heffenan, 2010; Tuchman, 1984). 
If we adopt optimism of the will to counter 
pessimism of the intellect, however, it is possible 
to believe that human behaviour could improve. 
Decision‑makers could heed the lessons of past 
experience. Armed with more humility in the 
face of scientific uncertainty and ignorance, 
and supported by broad and effective public 
engagement, they could apply the precautionary 
principle more widely. In so doing, they would 
help anticipate and minimise many future hazards, 
while stimulating innovation.
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Since 2001: many changes, crises and 
lessons relearnt
The first volume of Late lessons from early warnings 
was published in 2001. Since then, the world has 
changed significantly. It is larger in population 
but smaller in interconnectivity; faster in terms 
of technology adoption but slower in terms of 
policy action in the face of complex interlinked 
problems; more volatile in terms of economic and 
environmental changes, yet more static in terms of 
political reflexivity and adaptations in governance. 
Beyond the current financial and economic 
crises, there are several long‑term, systemic and 
interconnected challenges, such as depletion of 
natural resources, climate change, a 2‑billion 
person increase in the world population by 2050, 
and diminishing ecosystem resilience (EEA, 2011a; 
OECD, 2012; WEF, 2012).
These developments point to two important realities. 
First, the systems of governance misrepresent 
the socio‑ecological system, making societies and 
the environment subordinate to the economy 
— essentially serving as sources of human and 
natural capital. This misrepresentation ignores the 
reality that any civilisation is ultimately dependent 
on its ecological and social foundations and 
that economies function to sustain and enhance 
human well‑being (Passet, 2001). Second, the 
scale, interconnectedness and sheer complexity of 
feedbacks between nature and human interventions 
have outstripped society's capacity to understand, 
recognise and respond to these effects. 
The first volume ended with a call to action for 
policymakers. How much progress has been made 
since then? One important area is that of innovation 
and the effect that precaution can have on it. In 
volume 1, the difficulties of balancing precaution 
with technological innovation were recognised. 
However, there is now increasing evidence that 
precautionary measures do not stifle innovation, but 
can encourage it, in particular when supported by 
smart regulation or well‑designed tax changes (EEA, 
2011b, 2011c; Ambec et al., 2011; Ashford and Hall, 
2011). 
Volume 1 also invited policymakers to take more 
account of a 'richer body of information from 
more diverse sources'. It identified public health 
and the environment as two fields of science that 
were separate and polarised. And it suggested 
involving a wider range of stakeholders to expand 
the information base and to 'improve public trust in 
society's capacity to control hazards, without stifling 
innovation or compromising science'. These are all 
areas where improvements have been made since 
2001. 
There has been less progress with other lessons, 
particularly the call to 'identify and reduce 
institutional obstacles to learning and action'. Both 
political and scientific 'bureaucratic silos' do not 
seem to have disappeared, despite the frequent 
calls for policy integration and inter‑departmental 
coordination (Hamdouch and Depret, 2010; Phoenix 
et al., 2012).
Worryingly, warnings of impending hazards are, in 
many areas, still not being heeded and the resulting 
damage is far more widespread, geographically, 
across species and extending to future generations, 
who will particularly suffer many of the harmful 
effects of our current energy systems, chemicals and 
technologies. Damage is now shown to be occurring 
at increasingly lower levels of exposure to pollution, 
and the polluters, for the most part, are still not 
paying the full costs of their pollution, partly 
because of a lack of incentives to do so. At the same 
time we see the destruction of the stocks of natural 
capital that underpin human well‑being. It is easy to 
lose sight of the crucial dependence of economies on 
a diverse, healthy and resilient natural environment, 
especially in times of economic crises.
A key message in the 2001 report was the notion 
that 'the growing innovative powers of science 
seem to be outstripping its ability to predict the 
consequences of its applications, while the scale 
of human interventions in nature increases the 
chances that any hazardous impacts may be serious 
and global.' This is happening at an ever‑greater 
pace, with globalised industries racing to introduce 
new technologies but with limited understanding 
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of what their impacts might be. National 
governments now have less control over globalised 
technologies.
More positively, however, new transformative 
approaches are emerging for managing the 
systemic and interconnected challenges that we 
face (e.g. Gladwell, 2012; Stirling, 2008). They 
are building in particular on the increasing use 
by consumers, citizens and shareholders of the 
power of the internet and social media to demand 
and foster increased participation, responsibility, 
accountability and transparency. 
Such approaches also need longer‑term perspectives. 
Greater complexity, uncertainties, scientific 
ignorance, broader risks and the irreversibility of 
many harmful impacts together necessitate the 
increased use of long‑term scenarios and strategy 
analysis by citizens, governments and corporations 
alike (EEA, 2011a). The long‑term interests of society 
as a whole, distinct from the partial interest of 
particular stakeholders and individuals, also require 
new political and financial institutions that can help 
overcome the short termism of most politics and 
much finance (Ward, 2012; Roderick, 2010; Mainelli 
and Giffords, 2009; RMNO, 2009).
The case studies in this second volume of Late 
lessons from early warnings provide some new 
insights from the lessons of the past that can help 
stimulate actions to reinforce, complement and 
put into practice the emerging transformative 
approaches, mindful of the observation that 'those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it' (Santayana, 1905).
2001–2013: what new insights emerge?
Many of the cases in this report reveal similar 
lessons to those in the 2001 report. Some insights 
have been strengthened, however, as the body of 
evidence has increased and our understanding of 
ecological and biological systems has improved. The 
case studies in the two volumes of Late lessons from 
early warnings cover a very diverse range of both 
recent and historical chemical and technological 
innovations and their impacts on humans and 
nature. All cases have unique characteristics 
stemming from the type of the innovation, the 
origins and nature of the hazards, the prevailing 
approaches to policymaking, and the cultural 
influences of time and place. The studies also 
share common features, such as key decisions on 
innovation pathways made by a few people on 
behalf of many; a lack of institutional and other 
mechanisms to respond to early warning signals; 
misleading market prices that do not properly 
reflect all costs and risks to society and nature; and 
inadequate accounting for assets and liabilities 
across different types of capital. 
Such features from the past raise questions for 
the future. How, for example, can the innovations 
that are driving knowledge economies, such as 
nanotechnologies, be developed without repeating 
the mistakes of the past? How can the wider and 
wiser application of the precautionary principle 
support decision‑making in the face of uncertainties 
from within complex systems that defy prediction 
and where 'surprises' are inevitable? How can we 
ensure that the lack of 'perfect' knowledge is not 
a justification for inaction in the face of 'plausible' 
evidence of serious harm? How can conflicting 
interests (including public and private ones) be 
balanced in the development, use and impact 
phases? How can the distribution of costs and 
benefits over time be made more equitable? 
The Late lessons from early warnings case studies 
demonstrate the complexities of handling the 
interactions between the many actors and 
institutions involved — governments, policymakers, 
businesses, entrepreneurs, scientists, civil society 
representatives, citizens and the media. Each comes 
to the debate with different and often conflicting 
knowledge, perceptions, interests and priorities; 
balancing these numerous and often antagonistic 
positions should be seen as a prelude to making 
decisions on those innovations that have broad 
societal implications.
The opportunities are manifold but can be boiled 
down to three main ones: 
•	 to	correct	the	prioritisation	of	economic	and	
financial capital over social, human and natural 
capitals through the broader application of the 
policy principles of precaution, prevention and 
polluter‑pays, and improved accounting systems 
across government and business; 
•	 to	broaden	the	nature	of	evidence	and	public	
engagement in choices about crucial innovation 
pathways by balancing scientific efforts more 
towards dealing with complex, systemic 
challenges and unknowns and complementing 
this knowledge with lay, local and traditional 
knowledge; 
•	 to	build	greater	adaptability	and	resilience	
in governance systems to deal with multiple 
systemic threats and surprises, through 
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strengthening institutional structures and 
deploying information technologies in support 
of the concept of responsible information and 
dialogues. 
Taken together the case studies provide some 
lessons to support action, supplementing the 
conclusions of Volume 1. These findings are 
presented in the remainder of this section.
Reduce delays between early warnings and actions
Most of the case studies in both volumes of Late 
lessons from early warnings illustrate that if the 
precautionary principle had been applied on the 
basis of early warnings, many lives would have 
been saved and much morbidity and damage to 
ecosystems would have been avoided.
Today, several factors related to the speed, scale 
and breadth of technological innovation exacerbate 
the tendency to delay action. First, by the time 
evidence of harm is confirmed, the technology has 
often changed, leading to assumptions that, unlike 
yesterday's technology, today's technology is now 
safe. Second, for some technologies (e.g. broad‑
scale energy production systems or chemical 
plants), the huge initial investments mean that 
yesterday's investments will be redeemed before 
any serious risk reduction is implemented, creating 
de facto technological lock‑ins. Third, the scale of 
technological development puts very difficult 
demands on those attempting to monitor and 
respond to the risks before they have become 
serious, widespread and irreversible. 
These features of contemporary life further 
strengthen the case for taking early warning signals 
more seriously and acting on lower strengths of 
evidence than those normally used to adduce 
'scientific causality'. 
The case studies have shown that the main barriers 
to timely action include the short‑term nature 
of many political and financial horizons; the 
novel and challenging nature of the technologies 
and the scientific problems that arise from their 
interactions with complex biological, ecological 
and social systems; the conservative nature of 
much environment and health science; the ways in 
which scientific and other evidence is evaluated; 
the different perspectives and interests of many 
stakeholders and the vested interests of some 
powerful ones; and the broader cultural and 
institutional circumstances of public policymaking 
that often favour the status quo. 
Addressing these causes of delay can help to 
reduce the negative impacts that arise from many 
innovations. But tackling them is not easy. For 
example, the problem of the unequal distribution 
of political power between citizens, business and 
financial actors, and governments is a persistent 
problem of politics, which has increased through 
globalisation and the rise of multinational 
corporations, yet it is an issue that is well beyond 
the scope of this report. Some of the other causes of 
delay are more amenable to change and these are 
addressed in the rest of this section.
In evaluating the pros and cons of using the 
precautionary principle, it is important to remember 
that the harm from most hazards analysed in the 
case studies turned out to be more diverse and 
widespread than anticipated and such damage 
is often found to occur at exposures lower than 
initially considered dangerous. 
For example, it has been known since 1960 that 
asbestos causes the mesothelioma cancer, in addition 
to lung cancer (identified in 1955) and asbestosis 
(identified in 1906–1929). Similarly, it is now known 
that smoking causes a wide range of cancers, heart 
disease and foetal damage, beyond the harm of 
lung cancer identified in 1951. PCBs are now known 
to cause neurological problems in children, and 
cancer, in addition to harming the reproduction 
of eagles (identified in the 1960s). Lead has also 
been demonstrated to be more broadly chronically 
harmful — it was initially recognised as damaging 
children's IQ but it is now known to cause heart 
disease in adults. Radiation has gone through a 
similar expansion of known hazards. 
This phenomenon of 'harm expansion' is rendered 
more problematic by the discoveries that harm from 
all of the above agents has been found to occur at 
lower and lower levels, such that, more often than 
not, no 'safe' threshold of exposure can be identified. 
This knowledge needs to be taken into account 
when evaluating the potential pros and cons of 
future precautionary action on emerging issues. 
Continuous, anticipatory reductions in exposures 
to emerging hazards could help to avoid repeating 
these histories of harm expansion. 
More and better prospective and retrospective 
analyses of the costs of action and inaction, across 
the full lifecycle of a technology, would highlight 
the value of precautionary and preventive actions, 
particularly the value of 'secondary benefits and 
costs' which can be substantial, such as the health 
benefits from reduced fossil fuel use, where the 
main objective is to mitigate climate change. They 
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should also consider the psychological and societal 
costs of both false alarms concerning a health 
hazard, e.g. the over‑reaction to swine flu in the US 
in the 1970s, and misplaced reassurances concerning 
the safety of a technology, such as the downplaying 
of risks associated to nuclear power plants by 
Japanese authorities and utilities. Such pro and 
con analyses should be independent of interested 
parties, both commercial and political, as they often 
have a 'natural' tendency to exaggerate costs of 
hazard reduction and to underestimate the benefits 
of action. 
As case studies from both volumes have also shown, 
the timely use of the precautionary principle can 
often stimulate rather than hamper innovation, 
in part by promoting a diversity of technologies 
and activities, which can also help to increase the 
resilience of societies and ecosystems to future 
surprises. Keeping options open and following 
multiple paths means that a particular option can 
be terminated if it turns out to pose high risks, and 
avoids situations of technological monopolies such 
as those experienced, for example, in the cases of 
asbestos, CFCs, and PCBs. 
In contrast, technological monopolies hamper 
innovation. For example, it was the monopolies of 
lead in petrol, asbestos, CFCs and PCBs that both 
prolonged the harms they caused and made those 
harms widespread. These monopolies contributed 
to technological 'lock‑in' but also to institutional 
and ideological lock‑ins, which further hampered 
innovation and the development of alternatives. 
These technologies and their products were also 
'cheap' in the market place, bearing little relation to 
their real costs in terms of harm to the environment, 
human health and financial compensation to 
victims. These artificially low market prices in 
turn helped to stifle the development of smart 
substitutes. 
This past experience should be taken into account 
with the emerging technologies such as GMOs and 
nanotechnologies, where there are already signs of 
technological monopolies, driven by the high costs 
of research, development and production involved 
and the patent protections for developers on many 
of their products and processes (Stirling, 2007; van 
den Hove et al., 2012).
When applying the precautionary principle, there 
are, therefore, not only scientific issues to be 
considered but also ethical choices, concerning 
the appropriate strength of evidence for action; 
the equity implications arising from the costs and 
benefits of action and inaction; the appropriate 
balance between generating false negatives and 
false positives; and the social necessity of large‑scale 
innovations. 
Clearly, acting to avoid or reduce harm on lower 
strengths of evidence than that used to establish 
scientific causality will sometimes increase the 
number of false alarms — although the review of 88 
cases of alleged false positives in Volume 2 of Late 
lessons from early warnings confirmed just four actual 
cases, suggesting that the risks are considerably less 
than sometimes claimed. Moreover, it is important 
to recognise that, in cases where there are damages 
over a long time span that may irreversibly alter 
the system, there is a fundamental asymmetry 
between the competing policy and scientific 
options of avoiding false negatives and avoiding 
false positives. Examples of such situations of 
irreversibility include climate change, modification 
to the genetic make‑up of humans or other species, 
persistent chemical or radioactive contamination, 
and species loss. 
If an early warning signal triggers a double reaction 
of precautionary policy measures and more 
intensive research on risks and alternatives, then 
at some point the research may show that this was 
a false alarm and the precautionary measure can 
be cancelled. The loss in this case will be a delay in 
economic and social benefits from the technology 
(or the cost of mitigating actions in cases such as 
climate change) during the time it took to show 
that there was no cause for concern. But the system 
will not be irreversibly altered. In contrast, if the 
early warning triggers no precautionary action but 
more research shows, only much later, that there 
was indeed real cause for concern then irreversible 
systemic damages will already have taken place. 
Acknowledging this asymmetry is central to 
understanding when precautionary and preventive 
approaches are best deployed. 
Tipping the overall balance of public policy towards 
avoiding harm, even at the cost of more false alarms, 
would seem to be a price that is well worth paying, 
given the costs of being wrong in acting or not 
acting. This is one of the strategic and ethical societal 
choices, similar to the choice of strengths of evidence 
to be used in civil or criminal court cases, that needs 
to be openly debated. 
Acknowledge complexity when dealing with 
multiple effects and thresholds 
The world is drawing down its natural capital 
through an over‑reliance on fossil‑fuel‑based, 
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synthetic chemicals that are compromising the 
health and resilience of ecosystems and key 
organisms such as fish and bees, in combination 
with other stressors such as climate change and 
invasive alien species. There is also evidence that 
some types of genetically modified crops (and the 
agrochemical substances used alongside them), 
which are released into the environment and the 
food chain, present a threat to human health, some 
species and ecosystems, and food security. Human 
health is being further compromised by chemicals 
that threaten health from before birth, through 
childhood and into adulthood. (Barouki et al., 2012; 
EEA, 2012; Kortenkamp et al., 2011).
Such exposures appear to contribute to increases 
of many types of cancers, birth defects, male 
infertility, and cardiovascular, neurological and 
immunological dysfunctions and diseases. The 
impacts of these hazards are being supplemented 
by the harmful effects of unhealthy eating habits 
and lifestyles in many parts of the world, and 
resulting epidemics such as diabetes and obesity. 
Taken together, these multiple stressors have 
profound public health significance. 
Growing scientific knowledge clearly shows that 
the causal links between stressors and harm are 
more complex than was previously thought and 
this has practical consequences for minimising 
harm. Much of the harm described in Volumes 1 
and 2, such as cancers or species decline, is 
caused by several co‑causal factors acting either 
independently or together. For example, the 
reduction of intelligence in children can be linked 
to lead in petrol, mercury and PCBs as well as to 
socio‑economic factors; bee colony collapse can be 
linked to viruses, climate change and nicotinoid 
pesticides; and climate change itself is caused 
by many complex and inter‑linked chemical and 
physical processes. 
In some cases, such as foetal or fish exposures, 
it is the timing of the exposure to a stressor that 
causes the harm, not necessarily the amount; 
the harm may also be caused or exacerbated 
by other stressors acting in a particular timed 
sequence. In other cases, such as chemicals like 
BPA, low exposures can be more harmful than 
high exposures; and in others, such as asbestos 
with tobacco, and some endocrine disrupting 
substances, the harmful effects of mixtures can 
be greater than from each separate stressor. 
There are also varying susceptibilities to the 
same stressors in different people, species and 
ecosystems, depending on pre‑existing stress 
levels, genetics and epigenetics. This variation can 
lead to differences in thresholds or tipping point 
exposures, above which harm becomes apparent in 
some exposed groups or ecosystems but not others. 
Indeed there are some harmful effects that occur 
only at the level of the system, such as a bee colony, 
which cannot be predicted from analysing a single 
part of the system, such as an individual bee.
The increased knowledge of complex biological 
and ecological systems has also revealed that 
certain harmful substances, such as PCBs and 
DDT can move around the world via a range of 
biogeochemical and physical processes and then 
accumulate in organisms and ecosystems many 
thousands of kilometres away. The practical 
implications of these observations are threefold. 
First, it is very difficult to establish very strong 
evidence that a single substance or stressor 'causes' 
harm to justify timely actions to avoid harm; in 
many cases only reasonable evidence of co‑causality 
will be available. Second, a lack of consistency 
between research results is not a strong reason for 
dismissing possible causal links: inconsistency is to 
be expected from complexity. Third, while reducing 
harmful exposure to one co‑causal factor may not 
necessarily lead to a large reduction in the overall 
harm caused by many other factors, in some cases 
the removal of just one link in the chain of multi‑
causality could reduce much harm. 
A more holistic and multi‑disciplinary systems 
science is needed to analyse and manage the causal 
complexity of the systems in which we live and 
to address long‑term implications. For example, 
there would be substantial benefits from exploring, 
much earlier and more systematically, the multiple 
effects on people and ecosystems of chemical 
and other stressors, their cumulative effects, 
chemical metabolites, and their mixture effects. 
Exposures to low doses of contaminants and their 
effects, particularly in susceptible sub groups in 
populations, should also be more fully investigated, 
accompanied by more biological monitoring that 
would improve the detection of the precursors of 
disease. 
Several case studies provide examples of where 
assertions that 'no evidence of harm' have been 
interpreted as 'evidence of no harm', which may 
not be the case if appropriate research over relevant 
time periods is missing. Examples include leaded 
petrol in the 1920s‑60s, and risks to children from 
mobile phones before 2011, when the first study 
on children was published. Such authoritative but 
unsubstantiated assertions of safety have led to 
much harm, for example, in cases such as asbestos, 
tobacco, lead and mercury 
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Acknowledging both uncertainties and scientific 
ignorance is particularly important where the 
science is relatively immature, as with such 
emerging technologies as GM crops, mobile phones, 
nanotechnology and invasive alien species and 
where exposures are widespread. Recognising 
uncertainty also helps to avoid putting too much 
reliance on simple models of complex systems as 
in the cases of floods, nuclear accidents, climate 
change, ecosystems resilience and multi‑pollutant 
human exposures 
Uncertainty, though, can be a two‑edged sword, 
being used as the basis for challenging both 
assurances of safety and evidence of a hazard. 
In particular, uncertainty has been misused, 
exaggerated, or even 'manufactured' in order to 
delay and undermine regulatory measures to protect 
health and environments. Examples include climate 
change, tobacco, lead, honeybees, and beryllium 
(Michaels, 2008; Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
There is also an asymmetry between the high 
levels of proof of harm demanded by proponents 
of a technology as sufficient to justify remedial or 
preventive actions compared to the level of evidence 
they deem sufficient to claim that their products are 
'safe'. Waiting for high levels of proof of harm before 
acting not only leads to much harm but also to a 
stifling of innovation, as the case studies on asbestos, 
lead, mercury, PCBs, and CFCs illustrate. 
Rethink and enrich environment and health research 
The need for research to focus more on the 
potential hazards of emerging technologies in 
addition to research on product applications has 
already been noted. It would also be helpful if 
there were a greater focus on emerging hazards 
rather than on well‑known risks. Recent research 
(Grandjean et al., 2011) indicates that much 
environmental health research still focuses on how 
well known hazards, such as lead and mercury, and 
tends to ignore newly emerging threats to health. 
The top ten substances studied are all metals 
such as copper, lead, zinc and cadmium. These 
established hazards account for approximately half 
of all the journal articles on impacts of chemical 
substances of the last ten years (Grandjean et al., 
2011). This disproportion has crowded out research 
into other dangerous hazards and risks, such as 
on endocrine‑disrupting substances and other 
hazards where less is known about their pathways 
and impacts (despite over 100 million euro of EU 
research funding on EDCs in the last decade) but 
where the evidence is growing of widespread 
impacts on humans and nature (EEA, 2012; 
Kortenkamp et al., 2011).
A major reason for this imbalance may relate to the 
prevailing regulatory science paradigm, where solid 
conclusions depend on replication and verification. 
Other likely contributing factors to scientific inertia 
are the effective use of costly infrastructure to ensure 
value for money; the desire of policymakers for 
more certainty from science regarding politically 
difficult choices; and the tendency of funding 
agencies to be conservative in their research 
strategies.
In order to identify hazards that may only appear 
over decades, there needs to be more long term 
monitoring of biological and ecological systems, 
focusing on 'surprise sensitive' parameters such 
as bees, amphibians, invertebrates, foetuses etc. 
Such monitoring will also be essential to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the precautionary and later 
measures to avoid harm. Monitoring can be 
supported in part by citizen scientists, using the 
latest GIS and monitoring technologies. 
Several cases highlight the benefit of having lay and 
local knowledge alongside scientific evaluation of 
harm so that a broader knowledge base can support 
decision‑making. For example, when a mother 
hypothesised that neurological signs observed in 
her son were due to exposure to mercury in her 
womb, this was dismissed by experts who did 
not question their assumption that the placenta 
provided protection (see Chapter 5 on Minamata 
disease). Patients, fishers, wives (e.g. in the sperm 
damaging, described in Chapter 9 on DBCP), 
mothers (see Chapter 5 as well as and the chapter 
on DES in Volume 1 (EEA, 2001, Ch. 8)), factory 
workers, and bee keepers, as well as clinicians and 
factory inspectors are amongst those non‑scientists 
who have reliably provided early warnings in the 
case studies. 
Precautionary actions are justified by lower strengths 
of evidence than those conventionally used for 
establishing scientific causation, yet in their search 
for 'certainty' scientists are cautious in attributing 
causation to an agent while some scientists may 
sometimes be less cautious when asserting 'safety'. 
The case studies show that in the past there have been 
premature assertions of safety based on inadequate 
scientific methods, such as an over‑reliance studies 
that were conducted over too short a period to reveal 
long‑term effects for example. 
Also evidence of harm has often had to reach the 
high standard of 'causality' as is the standard for 
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less complex situations, rather than precautionary 
strengths of evidence based on plausible association 
between hazards and harms. The strength of 
evidence chosen can range from 'a scientific 
suspicion' of harm to 'beyond all reasonable doubt', 
depending on the complexity of the system, the 
level of protection required and the pros and cons of 
being wrong in acting or not acting.
To avoid waiting for strong evidence of harm in 
humans and ecosystems, data from animal or 
other species and methods (ECVAM), should be 
more widely used to justify precautionary action. 
This is particularly needed where the potential 
damage is irreversible — as with some cancers, 
species and ecosystems losses, and reproductive or 
developmental effects.
Research, precaution, and exposure control also need 
to be applied to the substitutes or alternatives to 
hazardous agents. The chapters on pechloroethylene 
(Chapter 4), CFCs (EEA, 2001, Ch. 7), leaded 
petrol (Chapter 3), DDT (Chapter 11) and booster 
biocides (Chapter 12) as well as the chapter on 
MTBE in Volume 1 (EEA, 2001, Ch. 11) illustrate the 
hazards that some alternatives have brought in the 
wake of banned substances, especially when the 
alternatives are chemically very similar (e.g. HFCs 
for CFCs). Minimising the hazards of alternatives 
could be helped by the avoidance of such chemical 
characteristics as persistence, bioaccumulation, 
and large spatial range; by the hazard screening of 
alternatives; and by the greater use of the knowledge 
to be found in smarter and greener chemistry and 
technology.
Greater awareness of the complexity, 
interconnectedness, multi‑causality and 
uncertainties inherent in global environmental 
issues underlines the need for greater humility 
about what science can and cannot tell us. 
Framing issues as purely scientific and technical 
inappropriately places scientific perspectives above 
equally valid social and ethical contributions that 
should be part of decision‑making. A shift is needed 
to more explicitly integrative environmental science 
approaches in support of public policy, in which 
systemic considerations and early warnings feature 
strongly. This shift has started to take place in 
discourses but often not in practices. 
The case studies in Volume 2 of Late lessons from early 
warnings also illustrate how regulatory health and 
environmental science is still defined in very narrow 
terms, which obstructs it from being able to identify 
the complex multifactorial stresses on environmental 
systems and humans. There is therefore a need for 
environmental science to become more attuned to 
the inherent complexities of socio‑ecological systems 
by, for example, balancing a traditional disciplinary 
focus with more holistic cross‑disciplinary scientific 
research, thereby complementing precision with 
relevance and comprehensiveness (Phoenix et al., 
2012). Such science would often embrace longer 
timescales, more end‑points, and multi‑causality.
Since the first volume of Late lessons from early 
warnings, scientific approaches such as 'sustainability 
science', 'systems biology', or 'futures research' 
have continued to emerge to help deal with some 
of the challenges arising from the interconnections 
and dynamics of socio‑ecological systems, focusing 
on analysis and interventions at the systems level. 
These emerging disciplines can also help build 
bridges between research, policy communities, other 
stakeholders and the public (Kates, 2011). 
Last but not least, the case studies show that early 
warners — scientists and others — have often 
been harassed for their pioneering work which 
threatened economic interests and often challenged 
conventional scientific paradigms. This harassment 
can include bans on speaking out or publishing; 
loss of funding; legal or other threats; demotion; 
transfer to other work and character assassination 
in scientific and other media (McCulloch and 
Tweedale, 2007; Martin, 1999, 2008; UCS, 2012). Such 
early warners should receive better protection via 
the extension of 'whistle blowing' and discrimination 
laws; by more active support and protection from 
scientific societies in the case of scientists; and by 
awards that acknowledge the value of their work. 
Improve the quality and value of risk assessments
Volume 1 stressed the differences between risk, 
uncertainty and scientific ignorance, and the 
need to acknowledge and identify all three when 
doing evaluations of evidence, as in formal risk 
assessments. Since 2001, some considerable progress 
has been made in characterising uncertainties in 
risk assessments, for example, in the food industry 
(EFSA, 2006, 2013), the field of emerging risks 
(SCENIHR, 2012), and in climate change (IPCC, 
2010). This recognition of uncertainty and ignorance 
is particularly important where there is much 
reliance on modelling, as in climate change, invasive 
alien species, or exposure assessment. 
The majority of case studies indicate that it is often 
inappropriate to use a narrow conception of 'risk' 
to manage the complex issues at hand with their 
inevitable features of ignorance, indeterminacy 
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and contingency. The increasing awareness of 
the complexity of biological, ecological and 
technological systems, calls into question the 
relevance and prevalence of some of the simplistic 
methods, models and assumptions used in risk 
assessments. For example, linear dose response 
curves can be inappropriate when low doses are 
more harmful than high doses, as in the BPA story; 
the dictum that the dose alone 'makes the poison' 
is inaccurate when it is the timing of the dose that 
makes the dose harmful, as in the TBT and DES 
cases; assuming uni‑causality is too simplistic when 
multi‑causality is the reality, as in the lead case 
study and many ecosystems such as fisheries; testing 
for single substances is inadequate when mixtures 
are present as in all cases of chemical exposures; 
and there can be an over‑reliance on statistical 
significance when use of confidence limits would be 
more appropriate. 
Simplistic assumptions are also observed in 
technological risk assessments. As the Fukushima 
Investigation Committee (NAIIC, 2012) concluded, 
'the accidents present us with crucial lessons on 
how we should be prepared for 'incidents beyond 
assumptions'. With its failure to plan for the cascade 
effects beyond design–base accidents 'the regulatory 
emphasis on risk based probabilistic risk assessment 
has proven very limited'. 
In other words, narrow risk assessment approaches 
are now outstripped by the realities that they cannot 
address, recognise and communicate. Too often this 
contributes to effective denial of those risks that 
do not fit the risk assessment frame. It is therefore 
urgent to transform risk assessment practices 
to make them broader‑based, more inclusive, 
transparent and accountable. That should also 
enable more transparent communication of diverse 
scientific views, especially on emerging issues 
where the uncertainties and ignorance are high and 
genuine differences of scientific interpretations are 
likely, desirable, and defensible (Stirling, 2010). 
In practice, risk assessments could be improved 
by including a wider range of stakeholders 
when framing the scientific risk agenda, through 
ensuring all available evidence is readily accessible, 
by broadening the scope and membership of 
risk evaluation committees, by increasing the 
transparency and consistency of committee 
approaches and methods, and by ensuring their 
independence of vested interests. Improvements in 
transparency were recently announced by EFSA, 
who wish all data submitted as part of the product 
authorisation procedure to be made publicly 
available, (EFSA, 2013).
The case studies on mercury, nuclear accidents, 
leaded petrol, mobile phones, BPA, and bees, have 
shown that there can be significant divergence in the 
evaluations of the same, or very similar, scientific 
evidence by different risk assessment committees. 
It is often not clear from their published reports 
why this is so. It would be helpful if each risk 
assessment report explained the committee's choice 
of paradigms, assumptions, criteria for accepting 
evidence, weights placed on different types of 
evidence, and how uncertainties were handled. 
This would also help reduce the confusion amongst 
users of such divergent risk assessments when 
they are faced with very different evaluations of 
essentially the same evidence. It would also help 
people to recognise the difference between 'settled 
fact, majority opinion, legitimate minority view, 
and unsubstantiated assertions' (Weiss, 2002). 
Moreover, it is helpful if the sources of finance for 
the research studies under consideration are made 
explicit because of the 'funding bias' that has been 
observed in research on issues such as tobacco, 
pharmaceuticals, food, BPA, GM products, and 
mobile phones. 
The case studies on bees, lead, BPA, and nuclear 
accident risks have shown that the scope and 
membership of some risk assessment committees 
have been too narrow, and they have sometimes 
been dominated by one discipline or paradigm 
with shared assumptions which are not therefore 
questioned. Risk assessments can be made more 
reliable if they embrace all relevant scientific 
knowledge and approaches. For example 
endocrinology currently brings new insights 
into hormonally active biological systems that 
complement conventional toxicology. Toxicity test 
methods and risk assessments can benefit from more 
recent yet reliable scientific knowledge emerging 
from academic research fields. 
The case studies also show that toxicity tests 
designed for acute effects are unlikely to be 
relevant to chronic effects, and that novel 
technologies, such as systemic pesticides that 
replace sprayed pesticides or new chemical 
compounds replacing earlier ones, usually need 
novel risk assessments.
The value of being transparent about what is 
known and not known and about uncertainties 
and disagreements is equally pertinent. Scientific 
conclusions should not be portrayed as if there is 
consensus when there is not. Science by its nature 
progresses by building on critical appraisal. Several 
cases show that disagreement can be helpful to 
decision‑makers with a broader picture of the 
Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
710 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
alternative directions and options available before 
making a decision. 
The whole process of risk analysis which 
includes risk assessments, risk management and 
risk communication, would benefit from the 
involvement of stakeholders, particularly when 
framing the risk assessment and identifying options 
for risk management. This is illustrated in Ch. 27 on 
the precautionary principle. 
Foster cooperation between business, government 
and citizens 
An element that is often missing from innovation 
policies and practice is the recognition that 
innovation should be considered as a means, 
not an end in itself, and desirable to the extent 
that it improves human health and well‑being 
while maintaining ecological resilience. Policy 
formulation should start from these premises and 
from a broader concept that includes not only 
technological innovation but also non‑technological, 
social, institutional, organisational and behavioural 
innovation (van den Hove et al., 2012).
In this framework, governments have at least 
three roles: first, providing direction by putting 
in place smart regulations and consistent market 
signals; second, ensuring that the distributional 
consequences of innovations are balanced between 
risks and rewards across society; and third, fostering 
a diversity of innovations so that the wider interests 
of society take precedence over narrower interests. 
Numerous case studies show that decisions to act 
without precaution often come from businesses. 
There are, however, several impediments to 
businesses acting in a precautionary manner, 
including a fundamental economic focus on 
creating and increasing short‑term economic 
value for shareholders. There are also a number 
of psychological factors involved that lead to a 
so‑called 'ethical blindness' or a 'self‑serving bias' 
whereby people largely (and often unconsciously) 
tend to interpret ambiguous situations in their own 
interests. 
This report reveals interesting parallels between 
older case studies and fast emerging issues such 
as nanotechnologies, genetically modified crops, 
new chemicals, and the possible link between brain 
tumours and non‑ionising radiation from mobile 
phones. For example, only a very small number of 
actors were involved in making strategic decisions 
about lead in petrol in the USA in 1925 yet the 
technology spread all around the world before being 
phased out some 60 years later. With issues such as 
GMOs in food and energy options for a low carbon 
future, only a relatively few actors are involved in 
choosing innovation pathways that will shape the 
future of agriculture and energy supply and use for 
many decades. 
Governments and businesses could collaborate more 
with citizens and civil society on publicly disclosing 
and analysing the potential value conflicts entailed 
in acting on early warning signals. Public disclosure 
and a culture of transparency and open discussion 
can in turn promote positive business attitudes 
and innovations. As stressed above, in many cases, 
accurate determination of risk is difficult and open 
to disagreement, making engagement, openness and 
transparency all the more important. 
Involving the public can also help in choosing 
between those innovation pathways to the future 
(WBCSD, 2010; EC, 2011; WBGU, 2012); identifying 
and prioritising relevant public research (e.g. Diedrich 
et al., 2011); providing data and information from 
other knowledge holders — including NGOs, lay 
observers and citizens — in support of monitoring 
and early warnings; improving risk assessments; 
identifying and considering both alternatives to 
potentially hazardous agents and the unintended 
consequences of both actions and inactions on such 
agents; striking appropriate trade‑offs between 
innovations and plausible health and environmental 
harms; and, making decisions about risk‑risk 
trade‑offs, such as the health benefits of consuming 
fish which contains mercury and PCBs. In particular, 
a feature of the studies is the top‑down nature of 
innovations — the history of antibiotics in animal 
feed and lead in petrol, for example, show how a 
very small number of people can take decisions 
which have a major impact on millions. The public 
should help shape the future, including helping to 
choose strategic innovation pathways, for example, 
to sustainable agriculture and low impact renewable 
energy systems, by 2050. 
The case studies also illustrate that there is often a 
lack of public accountability and access to the private 
research on which public protection authorities rely. 
Such access would help to increase independent 
verification of data submitted for licensing and would 
increase public trust in the regulatory authorities at a 
time when such trust in elites is very low. 
Information and communications technologies 
(ICT) and their role in transforming social behaviour 
can help to engage the public on these issues. ICT 
has spawned a wide range of new collaborative 
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tools and approaches, which, as we saw above, are 
already transforming the dynamics of governance 
and innovation, fostering two‑way interactions, 
and which can be used to support a more diverse 
approach to engaging with citizens. Less positively, 
ICT developments and access to knowledge may be 
building barriers to collaboration by fostering more 
hectic interactions and competition in the pursuit of 
enhanced productivity, less face‑to‑face contact, and 
less space for thinking through possible solutions 
to complex realities. Creating the space for more 
deliberative thinking and innovation could contribute 
to more collaborative problem solving.
For public engagement to be effective there needs 
to be adequate procedures for identifying and 
including the relevant stakeholders and public 
interest groups and for the provision of adequate 
educational and financial resources to enable such 
groups to play an effective role. Public engagement 
can be encouraged and supported by substantially 
improved and simpler access to relevant data and 
information, building on the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention and national freedom of information 
laws. Business concerns about confidentiality and 
competitiveness can be overcome through judicious 
use of information technologies to manage access 
rights while maintaining transparency on how such 
information has been used and the insights drawn.
Today there are large imbalances within publicly 
financed research between product development 
and the study of potential hazards, an imbalance that 
seems to repeat the histories of better‑known hazards. 
In Europe for example, in the period 2002–2013, 
about 1 % of the total amount that the EU Framework 
Programmes of Research and Development allocated 
to developing products from nanotechnologies, 
biotechnologies and ICT was spent researching their 
potential hazards. Research carried out by private 
industry may well show a similar imbalance, but data 
is not easy to obtain. 
Correcting this imbalance between researching 
innovations and their applications, and anticipatory 
researching of potential hazards posed throughout 
their life cycle (production, use, recycling and 
disposal) can help avoid unequal distribution of costs 
and benefits further down the line and support a 
better public acceptability of such technologies. 
Correcting market failures using the polluter pays 
and prevention principles
When evidence of initial harm emerges, the costs 
of such harm need to be internalised into the prices 
of polluting products, via taxes and charges, in line 
with the polluter pays principle. The revenues could 
be devoted partly to stimulating research into less 
hazardous alternatives, as was the case in the US 
with CFCs, and partly to reducing taxes and charges 
on labour. 
The pollution taxes/charges would rise or fall in line 
with knowledge about increasing/decreasing harm 
and this would help to level the market playing field 
for innovative alternatives to the harmful products 
that are otherwise subsidised by the external 
costs of their pollution. Tax shifts from labour to 
pollution and inefficient use of resources bring other 
benefits such as increased employment, a stimulus 
to innovation and a more efficient tax system 
(EEA, 2011b and 2011c). 
More realistic market prices, that reflect the true 
economic, environmental and social costs, can 
help encourage more sustainable behaviours 
by governments, businesses and citizens. More 
broadly, firms and governments need to extend their 
accounting systems beyond economic and financial 
capital considerations to incorporate the full human 
and natural capital impacts of their activities, 
building on developing practices worldwide 
(UN, 2012; EEA, 2011d; Puma, 2011) 
Many case studies also demonstrate the long time 
lags between evidence of harm and the additional 
injustice and time of forcing victims to pursue their 
case through civil compensation claims. In the case 
of Minamata this took over 50 years. Prompt and 
anticipatory no‑fault compensation schemes for 
victims of harm and damage to ecosystems could 
be set up and financed in advance of potential 
harm by the industries that are producing novel 
and large‑scale technologies, thereby helping to 
correct this market failure. These schemes increase 
incentives for innovating companies to carry out 
more a priori research into the identification and 
elimination of hazards. 
Precedents exist for such schemes in some countries, 
for example for nuclear accidents, oil spills, some 
radiation exposures, and some environmental 
liability laws, including contamination by GM crops 
of adjacent non‑GM farms. Within the schemes 
there needs to be provision for penalising gross 
negligence, which under a tort system justifies 
punitive damages. Consideration also needs to 
be given to the use of anticipatory liability bonds 
by innovating companies so as to increase their 
incentive to minimise hazards and to provide 
adequate funds to compensate those who may 
suffer from any harm that may arise from their 
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products. Re‑insurance schemes are also playing a 
role in helping to anticipate long tail liabilities from 
emerging technologies. 
Attributing responsibility and sometimes negligence 
to corporations and others active in the history of 
hazards has relied mainly upon evidence uncovered 
by the legal processes of document discovery in 
civil compensation cases. The further use and 
development of freedom of information laws and 
the Aarhus Convention could provide a speedier 
means of accessing documented history. This will 
be even more necessary if no‑fault administrative 
schemes replace some civil compensation cases. 
Governance of innovation and innovation 
in governance
This chapter opens with a picture of unprecedented 
global change and interdependence. Such change 
provides many benefits to societies but also exposes 
them to more shocks and surprises. Scientific and 
technological innovations proceed apace, more 
often than not on trajectories that exacerbate risks 
and threats. At the same time, those researching 
and developing technological innovations often fail 
to acquire relevant existing knowledge from other 
disciplines. Governments tend to use structures 
and methods from the past to monitor the potential 
hazards of future technologies, rather than 
implementing more advanced, flexible and relevant 
approaches.
Failures, such as those presented in the two volumes 
of Late lessons from early warnings, provide numerous 
valuable insights, yet it appears that memories fade 
quickly. Typically, a hazardous event generates a 
sense of urgency and enthusiasm for strengthening 
preparedness systems, initiating research and 
implementing long‑term monitoring, and heavy 
expenditure often follows. In the aftermath of an 
event, relevant authorities elaborate ambitious plans 
and launch works, but lessons are soon forgotten. 
After some time without adverse events, willingness 
to invest in risk research, long‑term monitoring, etc. 
decreases sharply and projects are downscaled or 
suspended. Chernobyl and Fukushima are cases in 
point. 
This cycle of events is termed the 'hydro‑illogical 
cycle' in the case study on floods but could perhaps 
be called the 'homo‑illogical cycle' as it seems to be 
a recurrent pattern for humankind, which is found 
across many cultural, political, social and economic 
systems. Despite its prevalence, this pattern need 
not be inescapable. Humans can learn, change 
and transform and there is enormous potential in 
human creativity and its capacity to inspire cultural, 
social, political, institutional, organisational and 
behavioural innovation, beyond 'mere' technological 
innovation. If, as Plato said, necessity is the mother 
of invention, then the crises we are facing create a 
level of necessity that will hopefully engender the 
needed innovations. 
Crucially, governance systems also need to better 
recognise the value conflicts that are underpinning 
all societal and environmental issues. They are 
unavoidable and are even desirable as they are 
constitutive of the human condition. What is often 
missing is the institutional space to have a much 
more systematic, and non‑judgmental, analysis of 
such conflicts so that they can be made explicit, 
enabling policymakers and other actors to start 
working together on the problems along the lines 
described in this chapter. 
Of course such analysis already takes place (in part) 
in some quarters — examples include some 
parliamentary commissions and non‑governmental 
organisations — but it is not sufficiently systematic 
and does not always focus on value conflicts. There 
could be merit in establishing a place in formal 
institutional frameworks where such value conflicts 
(and consequent conflicts of interests) could be 
analysed and proposals offered for their resolution. 
The ideas for the governance of innovation and 
innovations in governance presented in this chapter 
will remain at the level of good intentions unless 
they are translated into institutional arrangements 
and practices. This is the task that lies ahead.
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associated with Medical Advisory Services, 
Rockville, Maryland, USA. Dr Guidotti is an 
international consultant and physician certified 
as a specialist in internal medicine, lung diseases 
and occupational medicine. His primary research 
interests are air quality, inhalation toxicology and 
occupational and environmental lung diseases. In 
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recent years his work has also been directed toward 
policy and sustainability studies.
Nigel Haigh 
e‑mail: nhaigh@btinternet.com
Nigel Haigh is Honorary Fellow and a former 
Director of the Institute for European Environment 
Policy. He is an authority on the development and 
impact of EU environmental policy. He was a Board 
member of the Environment Agency of England 
and Wales when it was created in 1985, and was 
nominated by the European Parliament to the 
Management Board of the European Environment 
Agency from 2000 to 2005.
Steffen Foss Hansen 
Technical University of Denmark 
Department of Environmental Engineering 
Miljoevej, building 113 
2800 Kgs. Lyngby 
Denmark 
e‑mail: sfh@env.dtu.dk
Steffen Foss Hansen is a senior researcher at the 
Technical University of Denmark, Department 
of Environmental Engineering and NanoDTU 
Environment & Health. He conducts research 
into risk analysis, regulation and governance 
of nanotechnologies, and the applicability of 
decision‑making tools under uncertainty. He is and 
has been actively involved in the expert advisory 
group on nanotechnology of the World Health 
Organization as well as the European Commission's 
REACH Implementation Projects on Substance 
identification, Hazard identification and Risk 
characterization of Nanomaterials.
Masazumi Harada 
Department of Social Welfare Studies 
Kumamoto Gakuen University 
Japan
Masazumi Harada, MD, PhD, graduated from 
Kumamoto University School of Medicine. While 
working as a psychiatrist, he was involved in the 
study of Minamata disease throughout his career 
and is the author of the book 'Minamata disease' 
which gives a thorough account of the incident 
from the first outbreak to lawsuits. Professor 
Harada testified frequently in the Minamata disease 
court cases as well as in other environmental 
and occupational disease cases. His research 
areas include the congenital Minamata disease, 
fetal toxicology, environmental and occupational 
toxicology and epidemiology. Dr. Harada sadly 
passed away in June 2012.
Lennart Hardell 
Department of Oncology 
University Hospital 
701 85 Örebro 
Sweden 
Tel: + 46 19 602 10 00 
e‑mail: lennart.hardell@orebroll.se 
Lennart Hardell is professor in oncology and cancer 
epidemiology at the University 
Hospital in Örebro, Sweden. Most of his research 
has been on risk factors for cancer 
such as exposure to pesticides and persistent organic 
pollutants. Examples of such agents are herbicides, 
dioxins, PCBs and brominated flame‑retardants. 
During recent years he has studied use of cellular 
and cordless telephones and the risk for brain 
tumours. 
Jack A. Heinemann 
Centre for Integrated Research in Biosafety (INBI) 
School of Biological Sciences 
University of Canterbury 
Christchurch 
New Zealand  
e‑mail: jack.heinemann@canterbury.ac.nz
Jack Heinemann is a professor of genetics and 
molecular biology in the School of Biological 
Sciences and director of the Centre for Integrated 
Research in Biosafety at the University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand since 1994. 
He is a recipient of the ICAAC Young Investigator 
Award from the American Society for Microbiology 
(ASM) and the New Zealand Association of 
Scientists Research Medal. He has served the 
Secretariat for the Convention of Biodiversity on the 
Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management under the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety. 
Vernon H. Heywood 
University of Reading 
Centre for Plant Diversity & Systematics 
School of Biological Sciences 
Whiteknights  
Reading RG6 6AS 
United Kingdom 
e‑mail: v.h.heywood@reading.ac.uk/vhheywood@
btinternet.com
Vernon H. Heywood is professor emeritus at the 
University of Reading, UK. He is an authority on 
biodiversity, plant systematics and conservation and 
the conservation role of botanic gardens and has 
extensive experience of conservation problems in 
many parts of the world. He is currently concerned 
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with developing strategies for the conservation 
of germplasm of wild species, including wild 
relatives of crop plants and medicinal and aromatic 
plants, the effects of global change in Europe and 
the Mediterranean and its impacts on biological 
invasions. He coordinated and edited the UNEP 
Global Biodiversity Assessment, and has advised 
governments, ministries and universities and NGOs 
in many part so the world. 
Sybille van den Hove 
Median SCP 
Passeig Pintor Romero, 8 
08197 Valldoreix (Barcelona) 
Spain 
e‑mail: sybille@median‑web.eu 
Sybille van den Hove is Director and Partner of 
MEDIAN SCP and visiting professor at the Institute 
for Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA) 
of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Dr. van 
den Hove also serves as chairman of the scientific 
committee of the European Environment Agency. 
Her core expertise is in sustainability governance; 
science‑policy interfaces; decision‑making and 
policy formation under conditions of complexity; 
integration of natural and social sciences research; 
environmental research strategies; and corporate 
environmental responsibility. Her recent work has 
focused on biodiversity and climate change policies 
at international and EU levels.
James Huff 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
Research Triangle Park 
North Carolina 27709  
USA 
e‑mail: huff1@niehs.nih.gov
James Huff, PhD, is a staff scientist at the 
National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences (NIEHS), US, with expertise in chemical 
carcinogenesis and identifying environmental 
carcinogens. Before joining the National Toxicology 
Program to further develop and coordinate the 
carcinogenesis bioassay programme, Dr Huff was 
Chief of the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer (IARC) Monographs Program. His major 
research interests center on chemical carcinogenesis 
and their possible impact on environmental, 
occupational, and general public health and 
primary prevention of environmental‑associated 
cancers. He is a Fellow of the Collegium Ramazzini 
and received the American Public Health 
Association's 2002 David P. Rall Award for science‑
based advocacy in public health.
Susan Jobling 
Brunel University London Institute for the 
Environment  
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB83PH, 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 1895 266284 
e‑mail: susan.jobling@brunel.ac.uk
Professor Jobling is head of Brunel University 
London Institute for the Environment. Her work 
focuses on the ability of environmental contaminants 
to interfere with the actions of chemical messengers 
(hormones) and alter functioning of the reproductive 
and endocrine systems of aquatic wildlife. Prof 
Jobling's research team investigates effects of 
chemical pollution right from the molecular level, 
through to the individual and population levels. 
She has served on several government expert 
committees in Europe and the U.S. advising on test 
methods for chemicals present in food, consumer 
products and the environment. She is also an editor 
for Chemosphere.
Bill Kovarik 
Radford University 
PO Box 6929  
Radford VA 24142  
USA 
e‑mail wkovarik@radford.edu
Bill Kovarik is a Professor of Communication at 
Radford University in southwestern Virginia. He 
teaches science and environment writing, media 
history and media law. He has written extensively 
about environmental and energy issues for 
publications ranging from the New York Times to 
Earth Island Journal. He is also an environmental 
historian and has served as a consultant with the 
Nebraska State Historical Society, Lloyds of London 
and other organizations. His Ph.D. dissertation, 
The Ethyl Controversy, explored the role of the 
news media in protecting the public interest in a 
scientific controversy over leaded gasoline and safer 
alternatives. 
Christoph Kueffer 
ETH Zürich — Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
Zürich 
Universitätstrasse 16 
8092 Zürich 
Switzerland  
Tel.: +41 44 632 43 08 
e‑mail: kueffer@env.ethz.ch
Christoph Kueffer is a senior scientist at the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich. His 
primary research interest is ecological change in 
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the Anthropocene, with a focus on oceanic islands 
and mountains, and expertise in transdisciplinary 
research. He is editor‑in‑chief of 'Perspectives in 
Plant Ecology, Evolution and Systematics' (PPEES) 
and coordinator of the 'Mountain Invasion Research 
Network'.
Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz 
Institute for Agricultural and Forest Environment 
Polish Academy of Sciences 
Bukowska 19 
60-809 Poznań 
Poland  
e‑mail: zkundze@man.poznan.pl
Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz is professor of Earth 
Sciences and head of Laboratory of Climate and Water 
Resources in the Institute for Agricultural and Forest 
Environment, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poznan, 
Poland. He is also associated, as senior scientist, with 
the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 
Potsdam, Germany. His fields of expertise include 
climate change impacts, water resources and weather 
extremes. He is a corresponding member of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences and a member of the Advisory 
Board on the Environment (including climate change) 
of the EU Seventh Framework Programme. He has 
been heavily involved in preparation of multiple 
IPCC publications.
Henrik Kylin 
Department of Water and Environmental Studies 
Linköping University 
581 83 Linköping 
Sweden 
e‑mail: henrik.kylin@liu.se
Henrik Kylin is a professor of Water and 
Environmental Studies at Linköping University, 
Sweden. His research has covered organic 
environmental chemistry in the wide sense, 
including adjacent research areas such as 
environmental and human toxicology, and 
ecotoxicology. Much of prof. Kylin's research has 
been about the global distribution of persistent 
organic pollutants, including expedition to both the 
Polar Regions and the Tropics.
Malcolm MacGarvin 
e‑mail: MalcolmMacGarvin@dao‑group.com 
Dr Malcolm MacGarvin is a partner in Swedish 
based Dao Group, collaborating with the financial 
and business sectors, with government agencies 
and with environmental NGOs, on trend bending 
activities that create sustainable futures. Malcolm 
co‑created the largest UK stakeholder‑lead 
exploration of the future of UK fisheries (Invest 
in Fish) and maintains an active involvement 
in marine fisheries through Pisces‑RFR, was 
a technical consultant to DG Environment on 
nutrient pollution, and with the European 
Environment Agency on emerging megatrends. He 
was also technical editor and chapter contributor to 
the first volume of Late lessons from early warnings.
Laura Maxim 
Institut des Sciences de la Communication,  
CNRS UPS 3088 
20 Rue Berbier du MetsRue 
75013 Paris 
France 
e‑mail: laura.maxim@iscc.cnrs.fr
Laura Maxim holds a PhD in ecological economics 
and is a researcher at the CNRS Institute for 
Communication Sciences (ISCC). She presently 
leads interdisciplinary research on sustainable 
chemistry and on the analysis and communication of 
uncertainty in chemical risk assessments.
Andrew Maynard 
University of Michigan 
School of Public Health 
SPH I Room 1792 
1415 Washington Heights 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109‑2029 
USA 
e‑mail: maynarda@umich.edu
Andrew Maynard is the Charles and Rita Gelman 
Risk Science Professor and director of the Risk Science 
Center at the University of Michigan. Prof Maynard 
is a leading authority on the responsible development 
and use of emerging technologies. His research 
interests span from identifying, assessing and 
managing emergent risks, to exploring innovative 
solutions to established and emerging human health 
and environmental risks, to equipping people with 
the tools they need to make informed decisions in 
the face of risk and uncertainty. Prof Maynard is 
a member of the World Economic Forum Global 
Agenda Council on the Challenges of Emerging 
Technologies.
Jacqueline McGlade  
European Environment Agency  
Kongens Nytorv 6 
1050 Copenhagen K 
Denmark 
Tel. +45 33 36 71 00 
e‑mail: Jacqueline.McGlade@eea.europa.eu
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Professor McGlade became Executive Director of 
the European Environment Agency on 1 June 2003; 
she is on leave from University College London 
where she is a Professor in the Mathematics 
department. Prior to this she held academic and 
government positions in Europe and North America, 
focusing her research on spatial data analysis and 
informatics, climate change, scenario development 
and the international politics of the environment and 
natural resources.
Owen McIntyre 
University College Cork 
College Road 
Cork 
Ireland 
e‑mail: o.mcintyre@ucc.ie
Dr McIntyre is a Senior Lecturer specialising 
in Environmental Law at the Faculty of Law, 
University College Cork. He has co‑authored 
a report for the Law Society of Ireland on 
Enforcement: The Case for Reform (2008). He has 
published extensively in all areas of environmental 
law, in particular in relation to international water 
law, emerging principles of environmental law and 
environmental liability.
Marc Le Menestrel  
Department of Economics and Business  
University Pompeu Fabra  
08005 Barcelona 
Spain  
Tel. +34 93 542 27 23 
e‑mail: marc.lemenestrel@upf.edu
Marc Le Menestrel teaches business at University 
Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) where he is Associate 
Professor and at INSEAD (Fontainebleau and 
Singapore) where he is Visiting Professor of 
ethics. His core expertise is in decision‑making, 
in particular the role of ethical values in business 
decisions. He proposes frameworks to improve 
decision‑making in the presence of dilemmas 
between economic, environmental, social and 
individual values. At the practical level, Le 
Menestrel has worked and taught about ethical 
rationality, value‑based strategic management, 
responsible leadership, communication in ethical 
crisis, corporate social responsibility, codes of 
conduct or e‑business ethics. At the theoretical 
level, he does research on the rationality of 
human behaviour. Studying the mathematical 
foundations of the theory of choice, he uses objective 
and experimental methods to better reveal the 
subjectivity of human behaviour. 
Bert Metz 
European Climate Foundation 
Tournooiveld 4  
2511 CX Den Haag  
The Netherlands 
e‑mail: Bert.Metz@europeanclimate.org
Bert Metz has vast experience in the field of climate 
change policy. He served as the coordinator of 
climate policy at the Netherlands Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 
and chief negotiator for the Netherlands and the 
European Union in the international climate change 
negotiations from 1992 to 1998. He was Co‑chair 
of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Working Group III on mitigation on climate 
change for the third and fourth assessment report 
of the IPCC. At the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency from 1998 to 2005, he led the 
group on climate change and global sustainability, 
publishing a large series of national and 
international policy analyses on climate change and 
sustainability. Since retiring, he is serving as advisor 
to the European Climate Foundation and other 
organisations. 
David Michaels 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety 
and Health  
U.S. Department of Labor 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
(OSHA) 
200 Constitution Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20210 
USA 
e‑mail: publicmichaelsdavid@dol.gov
David Michaels, PhD, MPH, is an epidemiologist 
with extensive experience in research, regulatory 
and public policy and program administration. 
He is currently Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health; in addition, he is 
on leave from the George Washington University 
School of Public Health, where he is Professor of 
Environmental and Occupational Health. Much of 
Dr. Michaels' academic work focused on the use of 
science in public policy. He directed The Project on 
Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP), 
bringing together an interdisciplinary group of 
scientists to examine the use and misuse of science 
in two forums in which public policy is shaped: the 
courts and the regulatory arena. From 1998 to 2001, 
Dr. Michaels served as Assistant Secretary of Energy 
for Environment, Safety and Health. In this position, 
he had primary responsibility for protecting the 
health and safety of workers, the neighbouring 
communities and the environment surrounding the 
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nation's nuclear weapons facilities. David Michaels 
also served as an expert witness in a civil suit 
involving chronic beryllium disease.
Erik Millstone 
University of Sussex 
SPRU — Science and Technology Policy Research, 
School of Business, Management and Economics 
Sussex House 
Brighton 
BN1 9RH 
United Kingdom 
e‑mail: e.p.millstone@sussex.ac.uk
Erik Millstone is a Professor of Science Policy 
in SPRU — Science and Technology Policy, at 
the University of Sussex. He is co‑leader of the 
Agriculture and Food domain of the STEPS Centre 
(see http://www.steps‑centre.org), where STEPS 
stands for 'Social, Technological and Environmental 
Pathways to Sustainability'. Furthermore, he is the 
Director of Studies for the SPRU MSc programme 
in Science and Technology Policy. Much of Prof. 
Millstone's research has focused on the ways 
in which public policymakers reach decisions 
concerning the protection of environmental and 
public health, and particularly on the interactions 
between scientific and non‑scientific considerations. 
In recent years his research has increasingly focused 
on agricultural policy in developing countries.
Celeste Monforton 
George Washington University  
School of Public Health and Health Services  
Department of Environmental and Occupational 
Health 
2100 M Street NW, Suite 203  
Washington, DC 20037  
USA 
e‑mail: cmonfort@gwu.edu
Celeste Monforton, DrPH, MPH, is a professorial 
lecturer at The George Washington University's 
School of Public Health and Health Services. 
Her research interests include regulatory 
policy and its effect on implementing timely 
protection for workers from occupational health 
hazards. Professor Monforton worked at the 
US Department of Labor's Occupational Safety 
& Health Administration, OSHA, as a policy 
analyst (1991–1995) and at Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, MSHA, as special assistant to the 
Assistant Secretary of Labor (1996–2001). 
Anne I. Myhr 
GenØk — Centre for Biosafety 
PB 6418 Forskningsparken 
9294 Tromsø 
Norway 
e‑mail: anne.i.myhr@uit.no
Anne Ingeborg Myhr has been a senior scientist at 
GenØk —Centre for Biosafety since 2003. She holds 
a Master's degree in Biotechnology from NTNU, 
Trondheim, and a PhD from the University of 
Tromsø. The title of her PhD thesis is 'Precaution, 
Context and Sustainability. A Study of How Ethical 
Values may be Involved in Risk Governance of 
GMOs'. Her present research involves the use 
of emergent technologies, such as GMOs and 
nanobiotechnology, and capacity building in risk 
assessment and management of GMO use and 
release in the developing countries. She has been 
a member of the Norwegian Scientific Committee 
for Food Safety (VKM) and has internationnally 
been involved in various issues related to GMOs 
including socio‑economic impacts under the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
Herbert Needleman 
School of Medicine 
University of Pittsburgh 
3520 Fifth Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 
United States  
e‑mail: hlnlead@pitt.edu
Herbert Needleman is a pediatrician and child 
psychiatrist at the University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center, known for ground‑breaking studies on 
the developmental implications of lead exposure. 
Dr Needleman's research and advocacy were 
instrumental in federal regulations banning lead 
from gasoline and paint as well as the removal of 
lead from government housing. The federal Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention also issued 
guidelines for pediatric lead poisoning diagnosis 
and treatment due, in part, to his research. 
Joy Onasch 
Toxics Use Reduction Institute 
UMass Lowell 
One University Ave., Lowell 
MA 01854 
United States 
Tel.: +1 978 934 4343 
e‑mail: joy@turi.org
Joy Onasch oversees the community program at 
TURI. She manages the Institute's community grants 
and works with the dry cleaning sector to reduce 
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their use of Perchloroethylene. She is an engineer 
with over 10 years of experience with industry, 
government, and institutions, assisting them with 
environmental compliance issues and pollution 
prevention projects. Her technical focus areas 
include hazardous waste, stormwater, wastewater, 
oil storage, and toxic use reduction. Joy earned a 
bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from 
Union College and a Master's in Engineering and 
Policy from Washington University in St. Louis. She 
is a registered Professional Engineer in three states.
Richard Owen 
University of Exeter Business School 
Streatham Court,  
Exeter EX4 4PU,  
United Kingdom 
e‑mail: R.J.Owen@exeter.ac.uk
Richard Owen holds the Chair in Responsible 
Innovation at the University of Exeter Business 
School. Originally an environmental scientist 
by training Professor Owen's current research 
involves understanding the responsible emergence 
of innovation and new technologies in democratic 
society, with a particular emphasis on governance. 
In previous roles he was Head of the Environment 
and Human Health Programme at the Environment 
Agency (UK), which included research supporting 
policy development regarding endocrine disrupting 
chemicals and the UK National Demonstration 
Programme.
David Ozonoff 
Boston University School of Public Health 
715 Albany Street, Talbot Building 
Boston, MA 02118 
USA 
e‑mail: dozonoff@bu.edu
David Ozonoff is Professor of Environmental Health 
at the Boston University School of Public Health. 
He was the founding Chair of the Department 
of Environmental Health, a position he occupied 
from 1977 to 2003. His current research centers 
on community health effects of toxic exposures, 
especially from hazardous waste sites; the 
mathematical foundations of epidemiology; and 
the use of scientific evidence in court. Prof. Ozonoff 
has been principal or co‑investigator of several 
major studies of waste sites and has been Director 
of the Superfund Basic Research Program—a 
multidisciplinary effort, funded by the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences for the 
last 16 years. 
Andrew R.G. Price 
Environment Department | School of Life Sciences  
University of York | University of Warwick 
York YO10 5DD | Coventry CV4 7AL 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0) 24 76 524457 
e‑mail: andrew.price@warwick.ac.uk
Andrew R.G. Price is an honorary professor at York 
University's Environment Department and visiting 
professor in Warwick University's School of Life 
Sciences. He is a marine biologist and environmental 
consultant, with specialist knowledge of the 
Gulf, Middle East and wider Indian Ocean. His 
research includes biodiversity, robustness/resilience 
and environmental disturbance. He has worked 
with many international organisations, overseas 
governments and industry. Professor Price has 
published more than 90 refereed publications. His 
most recent book is interdisciplinary, showing how 
robustness helps ensure smooth‑running in nature, 
in what we do and in the things we create. 
David A. Quist 
GenØk — Centre for Biosafety 
PB 6418 Forskningsparken 
9294 Tromsø 
Norway 
e‑mail: david.quist@uit.no
Dr. David Quist has been a senior scientist at 
the GenØk — Centre for Biosafety since 2005. 
He received his PhD from the University of 
California, Berkeley (2004), where he researched 
with indigenous Mexican campesinos questions 
surrounding the fate of transgenic DNA introgressed 
into traditional varieties of maize in Oaxaca, 
Mexico. He is a former Switzer Environmental 
Fellow (2003) and a founding member of the 
European Network of Scientists for Social and 
Environmental Responsibility (ENSSER). He served 
the as the Norwegian representative on the Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group on Risk Assessment and 
Risk Management under the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. 
James W. Readman 
Plymouth Marine Laboratory 
Prospect Place 
The Hoe, Plymouth 
Devon PL1 3DH 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 1752 633100 
e‑mail: jwre@pml.ac.uk
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Professor Readman leads fundamental research into 
the composition/cycling of organic material and 
the behaviour and impact of pollutants in estuarine 
and coastal environments. His most recent research 
relates to emerging contaminants and nanoparticles. 
He has gained professional experience in academia, 
governmental service, industrial contract research 
and United Nations laboratories. Professor Readman 
has published over 100 refereed papers relating to 
environmental science and analytical chemistry.
Johnny Reker 
European Environment Agency 
Kongens Nytorv 6 
1050 Copenhagen K  
Tel. +45 3343 5955 
e‑mail: johnny.reker@eea.europa.eu
Johnny Reker is a marine ecologist of the European 
Environment Agency. He is seconded from the 
Danish Ministry of the Environment, where he 
has been involved in the implementation of the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive. He has also 
been involved in several national and international 
initiatives on the classification and mapping of 
marine habitats, assessment of the coherence of 
MPA (Marine Protected Areas) networks as well as 
large‑scale restoration of offshore cave‑forming reefs.
David M. Richardson 
Stellenbosch University  
Private Bag X1 
Matieland, 7602 
South Africa 
e‑mail: rich@sun.ac.za
Professor Richardson is Deputy Director: Science 
Strategy at the Centre for Invasion Biology at 
Stellenbosch University in South Africa. David 
Richardson's specific expertise is in invasion 
ecology and particularly alien tree invasions. He 
is Editor‑in‑Chief of the journal 'Diversity and 
Distributions' and was editor of the book 'Fifty 
years of invasion ecology. The legacy of Charles 
Elton' (Wiley‑Blackwell, 2011). He is a member of 
three specialist groups of the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), including the 
Species Survival Commission, Invasive Species 
Specialist Group (ISSG).
Julian Rode 
Department for Environmental Politics 
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research 
GmbH — UFZ  
Permoserstraße 15  
04318 Leipzig 
Germany 
Tel. +49 341 235 1479 
e‑mail: julian.rode@ufz.de
Julian Rode holds a PhD in economics and is a 
researcher at Helmholtz Centre for Enviromental 
Research — UFZ in Leipzig, Germany. Dr Rode 
does academic research, teaching, and consulting 
mainly on ethical and environmental aspects in 
economic decision‑making of individual or business 
actors. His research interests include: ethics in 
economic decision‑making, values and decisions 
for environmental sustainability, Policy support for 
biodiversity protection, Business and biodiversity 
as well as behavioral and experimental economic 
research.
Christina Rudén 
Department of Philosophy 
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) 
Teknikringen 78 B 
100 44 Stockholm 
Sweden 
Tel. +46 (0)8 790 95 87 
e‑mail: cr@abe.kth.se
Christina Rudén is a professor at the Department 
of Philosophy at the Royal Institute of Technology 
(KTH) in Stockholm, Sweden. Her main research 
interest is in regulatory aspects of toxicology. The 
overall objectives of her research are to improve the 
scientific basis of risk assessment and management; 
and to strengthen the protection of human health 
and the environment against harmful effects of 
chemical substances. Professor Rudén is a member 
of Eurotox Executive Committee and of the 
Swedish Chemicals Agency's Supervisory Council 
('Insynsråd').
Jennifer Beth Sass 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
1152 15th Street NW, Suite 300 
Washington, DC 20005 
USA 
e‑mail: jsass@nrdc.org
Jennifer Sass is a senior scientist in the Health and 
Environment program of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC), an environmental 
non‑profit organisation dedicated to protecting the 
planet's wildlife and wild places and to ensuring a 
safe and healthy environment for all living things. 
Dr Sass is also a professorial lecturer at George 
Washington University. For NRDC, she reviews the 
US government regulations of industrial chemicals 
and pesticides and advocates for health protective 
regulations. Dr Sass has degrees in anatomy and 
cell biology from the University of Saskatchewan, 
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Canada, and in toxicology from the University of 
Maryland.
Noelle E. Selin 
Engineering Systems Division 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
77 Massachusetts Avenue [E40‑379], Cambridge, MA 
02139, 
USA 
e‑mail: selin@mit.edu
Noelle Eckley Selin is Assistant Professor of 
Engineering Systems at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, with a joint appointment 
as Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Chemistry 
in the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and 
Planetary Sciences. Her research focuses on 
using atmospheric chemistry modeling to inform 
decision‑making strategies on air pollution, climate 
change and hazardous substances such as mercury 
and persistent organic pollutants (POPs). She 
developed and evaluated the mercury simulation for 
the GEOS‑Chem global chemical transport model. 
She has also published articles and book chapters 
on the interactions between science and policy in 
international environmental negotiations.
Jeroen van der Sluijs 
Copernicus Institute 
Department IMEV 
Utrecht University 
Heidelberglaan 2 
3584 CS Utrecht 
The Netherlands 
e‑mail: J.P.vanderSluijs@uu.nl
Jeroen P. van der Sluijs holds an MSc in Chemistry 
from the Leiden University and received his PhD 
at Utrecht University. Currently, Van der Sluijs is 
Associate Professor and Senior Researcher on New 
Risks at Utrecht University. He has more than 20 
years of research experience in understanding 
scientific controversies and systematic treatment of 
uncertainties and Knowledge Quality Assessment 
in scientific advice for policy making about complex 
risks such as climate change, nano particles, 
electromagnetic fields and systemic insecticides. 
Katherine Smith 
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Social Policy, School of Social & Political Science 
University of Edinburgh  
15a George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9LD 
Scotland, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0)131 651 1461 
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Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
Volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings was 
published in 2001. The rationale behind the report 
was that science's growing powers of innovation 
seem to be outstripping its ability to predict the 
consequences of its applications, while the scale of 
human interventions in nature increases the chances 
that any hazardous impacts could be serious and 
global. The report therefore aimed to take stock of 
past experiences and identify lessons on how we 
can adapt to these changes, particularly in terms 
of providing information and identifying early 
warnings.
The lessons of history have rarely been used 
in trying to manage current and future risks. 
In volume 1 of Late lessons from early warnings, 
fourteen case studies were chosen where sufficient 
is now known about their impacts to draw 
Annex 2 — An overview of Late lessons  
from early warnings: the precautionary 
principle 1896–2000 vol. 1
conclusions about how well they were addressed 
by governments and civil society. Such conclusions 
were based on 'the spirit of the times' and not on the 
luxury of hindsight. The authors, all experts in their 
particular field of environmental, occupational and 
consumer hazards, were asked to identify the dates 
of early warnings, to analyse how the information 
was used or not used in reducing hazards, and to 
describe the resulting costs, benefits and lessons for 
the future.
This annex summarises the fourteen cases studies 
included in Late lessons from early warnings: the 
precautionary principle 1896–2000. The full report is 
available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/
late‑lessons‑2001. A free printed copy can be ordered 
from the EU Bookshop: http://bookshop.europa.eu.
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Table A2.1 Case studies in Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 
1896–2000
Case study Date of 
first early 
warning
Date of effective risk reduction action Years of 
substantial 
inaction
Fisheries: taking stock 1376 1995–2008 'responsible' management (which is not very 
effective)
Hundreds
Radiation: early warnings, 
late effects
1896 1961–1996 UK and other countries, then EU laws. 65 
Benzene: occupational 
setting
1897 1978 benzene voluntarily withdrawn from most US consumer 
products.
81
Asbestos: from 'magic' to 
malevolent material
1898 1999 EU ban by 2005 101
PCBs and the precautionary 
principle
1899 1970–1980s: EU and US restrictions, phase out  
by 2010
c. 100
Halocarbons, the ozone 
layer and the precautionary 
principle
1974 1987–2010 global ban on CFCs and other ozone depleters 10–30 
DES: long-term 
consequences of pre-natal 
exposure
1938 1971–1985 US, EU, global ban 30–50 
Antimicrobials as growth 
promoters: resistance to 
common sense
1969 1999 EU ban 30
SO2: from protection of 
human lungs to remote lake 
restoration
1952 (lung)  
1968 (lakes)
1979–2001 increasing EU and other restrictions leading to  
c. 90 % reduction on 1975 levels by 2010
25–55
MTBE in petrol as a 
substitute for lead
1960 taste/
odour/
persistence in 
water
2000 undesirable in Denmark and California, permitted 
elsewhere
40+
Great Lakes contamination 1962/1963 1970s DDT banned in North America and the EU. Debates 
continue about persistent health damaging pollution
45+
TBT antifoulants: a tale of 
ships, snails and imposex
1976–1981 
French oyster 
beds collapse
1982–1987 French, UK then north-east Atlantic ban;  
2008 global ban
5–30
Beef hormones as growth 
promotors
1972/1973 
oestrogen effects 
on wildlife
1988 EU ban, US continues 16+
Mad cow disease — 
reassurances undermined 
precaution
1979–1986 1989 partial; 1996 total ban 10–17 
Source:  Gee, 2009. 
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Early fisheries in the United Kingdom 
1376–1377 Setting up a committee is the answer of the English parliament to a call for precautionary actions in fishing by 
controlling the mesh of the nets 
1866–1893 Following uncertainty about the consequences of fisheries growth official enquiries take place, but no action is 
taken 
Sardine fisheries in California 
Mid-1920s Californian sardine fisheries scientists call for precaution and research 
1942 Continuous inaction leads to the collapse of the sardine stock (signs of recovery only in mid-1980s) 
Northern cod fisheries in Canada 
Late 1970s Canada starts managing the northern cod fisheries up to 200 nautical miles, claiming it is doing so 
precautiously 
1986 Keats Report commissioned by inshore fishers indicates severe underestimation of the fishing pressure 
1988 Alverson Report, prepared by fishery scientists, states that consistent overestimation of the stock size leads 
to overfishing 
1989 A new government assessment recommends that the offshore catch should be halved 
1990 A new independent assessment, the Harris Report, confirms overfishing 
1992 The stock collapses and a moratorium is imposed 
1999 Restart of the northern cod fisheries at low levels, but dissidents state it is not low enough 
General fisheries 
1990s The ecosystem approach slowly settles in fisheries management procedures 
1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the UN Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks are negotiated and published 
2001 European Commission Green Paper on the future of the Common Fisheries Policy 
2001 Positive changes are occurring, but are they happening fast enough to avoid further collapses? 
Table A2.2 Fisheries — early warnings and actions
Fisheries: taking stock
Malcolm MacGarvin
Measures to secure sustainable fishing have been 
known for centuries. However, when industrial 
fishing intensified in the second half of the 
20th century pressure on fish stocks increased 
dramatically. Necessary safety margins were 
underestimated, bringing, for example, North Sea 
herring to the brink of collapse by the 1970s. 
The chapter analyses different approaches to 
managing stocks in Canada, the US and the EU. 
It also evaluated the implications of international 
documents introducing the term 'precautionary 
approach' to fisheries.
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Table A2.3 Radiation — early warnings and actions
1896 Injuries from exposure to X-rays noted by Edison, Tesla and Grubbe
1899 John Dennis, New York journalist, campaigns for licensing of radiologists and warns of harm from X-rays
1904 Death of Edison's assistant from complications arising from severe X-ray radiodermatitis
1904 William Rollins, Harvard dentist/doctor, publishes many warnings on X-ray hazards, and recommendations on 
prevention for radiologists and patients, including pregnant women
1913 First published rules of voluntary radiological protection by German Radiological Society
1924 New York dentist, Theodore Blum, identifies 'radium jaw' in radium dial painters: but wrongly attributes this 
to phosphorous
1925–1929 Harrison Martland, New Jersey pathologist, identifies radium as the cause of the jawbone cancers in the dial 
painters studied
1928 Establishment of the International X-ray and Radium Protection Committee: which later became the 
International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
1934 Reports by Colwell and Russ, on the death of more than 200 radiologists from radiation-induced cancers
1949 ICRP concludes that there is no dose threshold for radiation-induced cancer and optimisation of all exposures 
is crucial
1958 Alice Stewart reports that 'low dose' X-rays to pregnant women can cause leukaemia in their children. 
Not generally accepted until the 1970s
1961 The United Kingdom publishes regulations covering the use of radioactive substances
1977 ICRP updates its radiation protection recommendations and links dose limits to risk
1988 Regulations covering radiation doses to patients produced in the United Kingdom 
1990–1997 NRPB reports 20 % of medical X-rays are probably clinically unhelpful; that 50 % of the collective dose to 
patients could be avoided; and that individual doses for the same X-ray vary by 100x between hospitals
1990 ICRP concludes in Publication 60 that the risk of radiation-induced cancer is 4–5 times greater than estimated 
in 1977 — reduces the occupational dose limit to 20mSv per year
1996 EU Directive on Ionising Radiations based on ICRP 60 which will be mandatory on Member States
Radiation: early warnings; late effects
Barrie Lambert
This case study analyses the development of 
radiation and radium protection over more than 
100 years. Although injuries and fatalities caused by 
radiation were acknowledged as early as 1896, the 
serious consequences of widespread use of radiation 
were not recognised. Absence of an agreed unit to 
measure radiation made the introduction of effective 
standards of protection difficult. In the 1930s–1950s 
there were still many examples of ill‑conceived 
use of radiation e.g. for fitting children's shoes, the 
treatment of ringworm and removal of hair. 
In the 1950s Alice Stewart was instrumental in 
collecting evidence linking radiology during 
pregnancy to leukaemia in children. Although 
controversial at first, her work along with that of 
other researchers eventually lead the way for the 
principles of justification, optimisation and dose 
limitations aimed at protecting patients as well 
as radiologists. Similar concerns are now being 
expressed at the frequent over‑exposure to radiation 
from CT scans.
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Table A2.4 Benzene — early warnings and actions
1897 Santessen report on observed aplastic anaemia in Sweden and other reports show that benzene is a powerful 
bone marrow poison 
1926 Greenburg and colleagues observe abnormally low white blood cell counts in benzene workers 
1928 Dolore and Borgomano publish the first case of benzene-induced leukaemia 
1939 A number of investigators recommend the substitution of benzene with other solvents, but this was not 
implemented 
1946 American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) recommends a limit of 100 ppm for 
benzene exposure, even though some cases of benzene poisoning were associated with levels of 25 ppm and 
10 ppm 
1947 Recommended value reduced to 50 ppm 
1948 Further reduced to 35 ppm 
1948 American Petroleum Institute (API) concludes that the only absolutely safe level is zero, but recommends 
50 ppm or less 
1957 ACGIH lowers recommended exposure to 25 ppm 
1950s–1960s Obvious lack of precaution for workers exposed to benzene in many parts of the world with fatal 
consequences 
1977 Infante et al. publish the first cohort study of workers linking benzene exposure directly to leukaemia 
1977 Based on these results, the US Department of Labor wants to reduce exposure to 1 ppm, but is challenged in 
the courts by API 
1978 Benzene was voluntarily withdrawn from consumer products in the United States of America
1980 US Supreme Court issues the Benzene Decision severely limiting regulatory actions 
1987 New benzene standard of 1 ppm. This 10-year delay caused more than 200 deaths in the United States 
1996 Studies showing benzene-related diseases from 1 ppm level of exposure 
2001 Petrol contains benzene, giving public exposure risk 
Benzene: an historical perspective on 
the American and European occupational 
setting
Peter F. Infante
Despite early knowledge that benzene is poisonous 
to bone marrow, it was used as a solvent in the 
rubber industry from 1910 and later expanded into 
many other industries. This was accompanied by 
reports of benzene‑induced leukaemia as well as 
other cancers and non‑cancer diseases. Exposure 
recommendations were set slowly and remained 
at high levels for many years. From the 1970s 
the benzene industry began to attack the science 
demonstrating its harm. This contributed to delays 
in government action and in identifying safer 
threshold limit values on occupational exposures.
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Asbestos: from 'magic' to malevolent 
mineral
David Gee and Morris Greenberg
Asbestos became increasingly popular among 
manufacturers and builders in the late 19th century 
because of its sound absorption and its resistance to 
fire, heat, electrical and chemical damage. A severe 
downside, however, was the risk for workers in 
the mining and production industries, as exposure 
to asbestos dust proved to cause the lung disease 
asbestosis and cancer. With an average latent 
1898 UK Factory Inspector Lucy Deane warns of harmful and 'evil' effects of asbestos dust 
1906 French factory report of 50 deaths in female asbestos textile workers and recommendation of controls 
1911 'Reasonable grounds' for suspicion, from experiments with rats, that asbestos dust is harmful 
1911 and 1917 UK Factory Department finds insufficient evidence to justify further actions 
1918 US insurers refuse cover to asbestos workers due to assumptions about injurious conditions in the industry 
1930 UK Merewether Report finds 66 % of long-term workers in Rochdale factory with asbestosis 
1931 UK Asbestos Regulations specify dust control in manufacturing only and compensation for asbestosis, but this 
is poorly implemented 
1935–1949 Lung cancer cases reported in asbestos manufacturing workers 
1955 Doll establishes high lung cancer risk in Rochdale asbestos workers 
1959–1960 Mesothelioma cancer in workers and public identified in South Africa 
1962/1964 Mesothelioma cancer identified in asbestos workers, in neighbourhood 'bystanders' and in relatives, in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, amongst others 
1969 UK Asbestos Regulations improve controls, but ignore users and cancers 
1982–1989 UK media, trade union and other pressure provokes tightening of asbestos controls on users and producers, 
and stimulates substitutes 
1998–1999 EU and France ban all forms of asbestos 
2000–2001 WTO upholds EU/French bans against Canadian appeal 
Table A2.5 Asbestos — early warnings and actions
period of 20–40 years from first exposure to cancer 
outbreak, it took a long time before the seriousness 
of the problems were recognised, although 
inspectors had warned about the risks as early as 
1898. 
From 1959 a third asbestos‑induced disease, 
mesothelioma cancer, was identified. It is this 
cancer that is now causing the bulk of current 
and future harm from asbestos, including some 
400 000 expected deaths in Europe over the next 
three decades.
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PCBs and the precautionary principle
Janna G. Koppe and Jane Keys
PCBs were primarily used in the electrical industry 
where they facilitated smaller, lighter, and 
what were thought to be safer, equipment. Use 
subsequently expanded to many other industries. 
Within the electrical industry, adverse effects on 
workers such as a painful disfiguring skin disease, 
Table A2.6 PCB — early warnings and actions
1899 Chloracne identified in workers in chlorinated organic industry 
1929 Mass production of PCBs for commercial use begins 
1936 More workers affected by chloracne and liver damage 
1937 Chloracne and liver damage observed in experiments with rats. Results did not gain attention from 
policymakers but both labour regulators and manufacturers were made aware of the concerns surrounding 
PCBs 
1966 Jensen discovers unknown molecules in sea eagles in Sweden — only in 1969 was he able to demonstrate 
that they were PCBs 
1968 Poisoning of 1 800 people who had ingested PCB-contaminated rice oil in Japan gives rise to a new Japanese 
word: Yusho — rice oil disease, and to the first well-publicised warning that PCBs are harmful to humans 
1970s High levels of PCBs found in infertile seals of three different species 
1972 Sweden bans 'open' uses of PCBs 
1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (United States) — PCBs to be used only in a 'totally enclosed manner' 
1979 2 000 people again poisoned, in Taiwan, by polluted rice oil. Follow-up research showed that 25 % of children 
born of poisoned mothers died before the age of four years 
1980s Evidence of PCB contamination of breast milk 
1990s PCBs associated with IQ and brain effects in children exposed in utero to mothers' PCB-contaminated diets. 
Fetotoxicity represents a new paradigm for toxicology 
1996 EU directive to eliminate PCBs, with phase-out by 2010 
1999 Chicken food contaminated with PCBs is found in Belgium 
chloracne, and severe liver damage, were already 
well known in the 1930s. From the 1960s findings 
emerged of PCBs in the tissues of wildlife causing 
infertility and severe damage to animals. Later PCB 
contamination of human breast milk was found 
and studies showed effects of endocrine disruption. 
Prohibition only happened gradually with each 
government action taken on the basis of a high level 
of scientific proof.
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Halocarbons, the ozone layer and the 
precautionary principle
Joe Farman
CFCs came into industrial use in the 1930s as 
refrigerants and their use increased during the 
Second World War when widespread use of aerosol 
sprays commenced. The ozone layer had been 
discovered at that time and variations in the amount 
of ozone measured. Concerns linking human 
activities to the ozone layer did not arise before the 
1970s. Five reports from the World Meteorological 
Organization published in the period 1985–1999 
concluded that halocarbons were beyond reasonable 
doubt responsible for damage to the ozone layer. 
When phasing out CFCs they were largely replaced 
by HCFCs (ozone depleting substances, but less 
harmful that CFCs) and HFCs (with zero ozone 
depletion but powerful greenhouse gases). The 
political process failed to stimulate more radical 
changes towards halocarbon‑free and energy‑
efficient technology.
Table A2.7 Halocarbons — early warnings and actions
1907 Laboratory experiments by Weigert on the decomposition of ozone photosensitised by chlorine 
1934 Ditto by Norrish and Neville 
1973 Global survey of CFCs by Lovelock et al. showing their distribution in the atmosphere worldwide 
1974 Molina and Rowland publish their theoretical arguments that CFCs would be destroying the ozone layer 
1977 United States bans CFCs in aerosols based on 'reasonable expectation' of damage, followed by Canada, 
Norway and Sweden
1977 Research-oriented 'world plan of action on the ozone layer' agreed, overseen by UNEP 
1980 European decision restricting use of CFCs in aerosols, but rising use in refrigerators, etc. marginalises this 
restriction 
1985 UNEP Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer agrees research, monitoring, information 
exchange and restrictions if and when justified 
1985 Farman, Gardiner and Shanklin publish results showing hole in ozone layer over Antartica 
1987 Montreal Protocol on protection of the ozone layer is signed, with phasing out of ozone depleting substances 
for both developed and developing countries within different timescales 
1990s Increasing finance to developing countries to help them reduce their dependence on ozone depleting 
substances 
1997 Amendments to the Montreal Protocol in order to restore levels of chlorine by 2050–2060 
1999 Beijing Declaration calling for efforts to stop illegal trade in ozone depleting substances 
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The DES story: long-term consequences 
of prenatal exposure
Dolores Ibarreta and Shanna H. Swan
In 1970 seven young women were diagnosed 
with a rare vaginal cancer in the US. Studies in 
the following years linked these and other cases 
to consumption of DES (a synthetic oestrogen 
diethylstilboestrol) by the patients' mothers during 
pregnancy. DES had been prescribed to pregnant 
women from 1947 in the belief that it prevented 
miscarriages. Prescription continued even though 
trials in the 1950s established the ineffectiveness of 
DES in preventing miscarriages. The cancer findings 
forced scientists to abandon their commonly held 
view of the foetal environment as a safe place, 
protected by the placental 'barrier' and replace it 
with an understanding of the extreme vulnerability 
of the developing foetus. 
Table A2.8 DES — early warnings and actions
1938 DES synthesised 
1938 First report of increased cancer incidence in animals after DES administration 
1939 First report of DES administered to patients 
1942 Approval of DES by the American Council of Pharmacy and Chemistry 
1942 First report of DES used for prevention of abortion 
1947 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves DES for the treatment of threatened or habitual abortion 
1948 Use of DES increases following publication of large-scale study in the US 
1953 First large placebo-controlled randomised trial shows DES ineffective in the prevention of miscarriage 
1970 Published report of seven cases of vaginal clear-cell adenocarcinoma in young women 
April 1971 Prenatal DES exposure is linked to vaginal clear-cell adenocarcinoma 
November 1971 FDA withdraws approval of DES for use by pregnant women 
1972 Registry of Clear-Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Genital Tract in Young Females is established 
1978 Reanalysis of 1953 Dieckmann data shows that DES actually increased the risk of miscarriage and other 
adverse pregnancy outcomes 
1985 Last reported use of DES by pregnant women world-wide 
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Antimicrobials as growth promoters: 
resistance to common sense
Lars-Erik Edqvist and Knud Børge Pedersen
Antimicrobials are defined as substances of natural, 
semisynthetic or synthetic origin that kill or inhibit 
the growth of microorganisms. Growth promoting 
properties of antimicrobial agents in farm animals 
were discovered in the late 1940s, resulting in 
e.g. faster growth of chicken, improved egg 
production in laying hens and increased milk yields 
in dairy cows. Bacteria exposed to antimicrobials 
can, however, develop resistance to them with 
possible effects on human health. The number of 
independent scientific studies of this issue was 
relatively small compared to the number of studies 
supported by the pharmaceutical industry. The 
number of independent studies only increased when 
the resistance associated with using additives in 
animal feed was made clear.
Table A2.9 Antimicrobials as growth promoters — early warnings and actions
1945 Alexander Flemming warns against misuse of penicillin as 'microbes are educated to resist' 
1950s Antibiotic resistance widely recognised — vertical transmission 
1960s Horizontal transmission recognised 
1969 Swann Committee recommends severe restrictions on antimicrobials in animal feed 
1970s Most Swann recommendations initially implemented in the United Kingdom and EU 
1975 Swann recommendations are relaxed: tolysin and spiramycin still permitted as growth promoters as human 
equivalents; vancomycin comes into use 
1977 Swedish Agriculture Board considers potential risk of antibiotic resistance, but concludes it is negligible 
1984 Swedish farmers ask for government ban on antimicrobials in animal feed because of health and consumer 
concerns 
1985 Swedish ban on grounds of antibiotic resistance in animals and 'uncertain' long-term effects 
1997 Swedish report concludes that risk of antibiotic resistance in humans is 'far from negligible' 
1997 WHO scientific meeting concludes that it is 'essential to replace growth promoting antimicrobials' 
1998 EU bans four antimcirobials in animal feed as 'precautionary' measure 
1999 EU Scientific Steering Committee recommends phase-out of antimicrobials that may be used in human/animal 
therapy 
1999 Pharmaceutical industry opposes EU bans and takes EU to the European Court; judgement expected end 
2001 (*) 
2000 WHO recommends ban on antimicrobials as growth promoters if used in human therapy and in absence of 
risk-based evaluation
Note:  (*) EU won the case against Pfizer Animal Health (Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union, judgment 
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61999A0013:EN:HTML.
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Sulphur dioxide: from protection of 
human lungs to remote lake restoration
Arne Semb
Dense smog over London in 1952 and 1962 drew 
attention to air pollution and its severe health 
impacts. Measures were slowly taken to reduce the 
emission of sulphur dioxide (SO2) but increasing 
energy consumption in the 1960s resulted in 
large emission increases. Studies of precipitation 
introduced the concept of 'acid rain' and determined 
the long‑range impact of emissions. Its harmful 
effects on forests and fish drew attention to the need 
for transnational cooperation. In Europe, this was 
extremely difficult during the Cold War period but 
progress in reducing SO2 emissions were achieved 
during the 1980s and 90s.
Table A2.10 Sulphur dioxide — early warnings and actions
1952 A dense smog kills more than 2 000 people in London 
1952 The Beaver Report prepared by a parliamentary commission proposes modest remedies 
1962 Second smog incident kills 800 people in London 
1968 Acidification of precipitation and rivers in Sweden is linked to sulphur dioxide emissions in other countries 
Late 1960s An OECD Air Management Sector Group is set up, contributing to solving air problems 
1972 Further evidence of acidification of Swedish lakes presented to the UN environment conference, Stockholm 
1972 OECD acid rain study is launched 
1972 OECD programme on long-range transport of air pollutants is launched 
1977 OECD report is published, determining the relationship between emissions and depositions of sulphur 
compounds 
1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP Convention) is agreed 
1979 WHO recommends air quality guidelines, setting a standard for the pollution abatement work in Europe 
1980s Forest death from 'acid rain' in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and North America 
1985 LRTAP Convention protocol agrees 30 % reduction in sulphur emissions 
1988 The EU directive on large combustion plants is published, and amended in 1988. These were very efficiently 
used by Germany against the British opposition to emission controls 
1994 Second sulphur protocol, based on the critical load concept that had already been mapped all over Europe 
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MTBE in petrol as a substitute for lead
Martin Krayer von Krauss and Poul Harremoës
The toxic effects of lead have been well‑known for 
centuries (as noted in Chapter 3 on lead in petrol). 
Following debate about the hazards of using lead 
as an anti‑knocking agent in petrol in the 1960s, the 
petrochemical industry chose MTBE as a substitute. 
In around 1990 concerns arose as studies identified 
MTBE contamination of groundwater, which 
rendered large water reserves useless and thereby 
put pressure on supplies in many areas. Suspicions 
were also raised that MTBE causes asthma, cancer 
and endocrine disruption. 
The chapter examines the extent to which it would 
have been possible to foresee undesirable properties 
of MTBE at the time of its introduction. 
Table A2.11 MTBE in petrol — early warnings and actions
1954 First scientific paper demonstrates low biodegradability of the ether family in water 
1960 Information about taste and odour in water and low biodegradability available in textbook 
1990 First indications of the potential for groundwater pollution with MTBE at laboratory scale 
1990 Significant increase in use of MTBE in the United States due to amendments to the Clean Air Act 
1990 Comprehensive investigations of carcinogenicity initiated in the 1990s 
1995 MTBE detected in wells that supplied drinking water in Santa Monica, California. These had to be closed and 
the city lost 71 % of its local water supply 
1996 Concerns become widespread following a US Geological Survey report 
1997 Field studies demonstrate that MTBE is highly soluble, mobile and persistent and therefore a potential risk to 
groundwater 
1998 A Danish EPA report acknowledges that the government was informed in 1990 that MTBE might give rise to 
groundwater problems and presents an action plan for MTBE remediation and risk reduction 
1999 California recommends removal of MTBE from petrol as soon as possible, but not later than end 2002 
2000 Indications that MTBE might be linked to asthma in some US cities 
2000 Indications that MTBE might be an endocrine disrupter 
2000 US EPA announces that steps will be taken to significantly reduce or eliminate MTBE as a petrol additive 
2000 Danish EPA places MTBE on its list of undesirable substances 
2001 EU reports on analysis of risks and risk reduction related to MTBE. European Chemicals Bureau decides that 
MTBE should not be classified as a carcinogen 
2001 The debate goes on 
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The precautionary principle and early 
warnings of chemical contamination of 
the Great Lakes
Michael Gilbertson
The Great Lakes on the border between the US 
and Canada have been subject to comprehensive 
pollution for decades. In 1972, the two governments 
responded to findings of organochlorine compounds 
Table A2.12 Great Lakes contamination — early warnings and actions
1962 Silent spring by Rachel Carson is the significant early warning of the effects of organochlorine pesticides on 
fish and wildlife as well as the threat of cancer in humans 
1963 First observation of changes in eggshell quality on Pigeon Island in Lake Ontario 
1966 Hickey et al. publish the first analytical results of the presence of organochlorine compounds in organisms in 
the Great Lakes 
1969 DDT and related pesticides are banned in Canada 
1972 DDT is banned in the United States (dieldrin is banned in 1973) and gradual improvements in wildlife begin in 
the Great Lakes 
1974 Concerns of possible effects of organochlorine compounds on human health 
1978 Association of incidence of diseases (high rates of birth defects, miscarriages, cancers, etc.) in Love Canal, 
Niagara Falls with the disposal of toxic wastes (including dioxin) denied by Hooker Chemical Company 
1978 Renegotiation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, including a precautionary policy, but it is not 
properly implemented 
1980 President's Emergency Declaration moves 900 families from the hazardous Love Canal area 
1984 Studies show that, at birth, infants exposed to high levels of PCBs (maternal consumption of Lake Michigan 
contaminated fish) weighed less and had smaller heads 
1996 Studies of Lake Ontario affected children published that observed same behavioural effects as in affected 
children from Lake Michigan 
2000 The specific relationship between behavioural anomalies and prenatal exposures to the highly chlorinated 
biphenyls is determined 
2000 Reluctance to undertake costly remedial actions even after causal relationship is proven 
in wildlife with the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement and prohibitions of DDT and other 
substances. In the 1980s, however, the political 
climate changed and statements about the effects of 
persistent toxic substances on wildlife and humans 
were met with scepticism and demands for proof of 
a causal relationship before appropriating funds for 
remedial works. Decades later the efforts to clean up 
the area continue.
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Tributyltin (TBT) antifoulants: a tale of 
ships, snails and imposex
David Santillo, Paul Johnston and William J. Langston
Preventing plants and animals from growing on 
and fouling hulls has a huge effect on the fuel 
consumption of boats. TBT marine paint was 
introduced in the late 1960s and the first incidents 
of imposex in gastropods were discovered in France 
in 1970. It was not until early 1980s, however, 
that analytical techniques were sensitive enough 
to identify TBT as the agent responsible for sex 
reversals in oysters and snails caused by disruption 
to the endocrine system. This case study analyses 
the process leading up to the prohibition of TBT for 
vessels under 25 metres and subsequently for all 
vessels.
Table A2.13 TBT — early warnings and actions
Early 1970s Rapid increase in the use of TBT antifouling paints on vessels of all sizes and first reports of imposex in 
marine snails (Blaber, 1970; Smith, 1971) 
1976–81 Repeated failure of larval settlement leads to near collapse of oyster fishery, Arcachon Bay, France 
1982 France introduces legislation prohibiting the use of TBT paints on small vessels 
1985 First controls introduced in United Kingdom limiting concentrations of TBT in paints 
1986 Bryan et al. (1986) report widespread imposex in dogwhelks on southern coast of United Kingdom, linked to 
TBT 
January 1987 United Kingdom announces further restrictions on TBT content of applied antifouling paint 
May 1987 United Kingdom introduces ban on retail sale of TBT paint for use on vessels < 25 m and on fish cages 
June 1987 PARCOM Recommendation 87/1 calls for similar ban over entire convention area (Northeast Atlantic) 
1988 United States introduces restrictions. Waldock et al. (1988) highlight significance of inputs from shipyards 
1989 Restrictions introduced in Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
1991 Harmonised ban on retail sale of TBT paint introduced at European Union level 
1994 Early reports of imposex in whelks from offshore areas of North Sea linked to shipping activity 
1995 Ministerial declaration of fourth North Sea conference (Esbjerg) commits to working for global phase-out of 
TBT paint within IMO 
1997 Concept of global phase out of organotin containing paints agreed at MEPC's 40th session 
1998 Draft mandatory regulations aimed at such a phase-out adopted. OSPAR (Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic) prioritises organotins for action to cease all releases. Cessation 
of all releases of organotins to marine environment, under OSPAR's hazardous substances strategy in 2020 
November 1999 Deadlines for phase-out adopted under IMO Assembly Resolution A.895(21) 
2001 Text of International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems to be finalised. In 2003 
worldwide prohibition on new application of organotin antifoulants to all vessels and in 2008 the existing 
organotin antifouling coatings will be replaced on all vessels worldwide 
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Hormones as growth promoters: the 
precautionary principle or a political risk 
assessment?
Jim W. Bridges and Olga Bridges
Oestrogen and androgen hormones have been used 
as growth promoters to increase meat production 
since the 1940s, with diethylstilboestrol (DES) being 
the favoured growth promoter for cattle, sheep 
and poultry in many countries. In the early 1970s 
concerns about safety were raised as DES was 
confirmed to be a human carcinogen. Although 
expert scientific committees concluded that growth 
hormones were safe to use, the EU banned several 
hormones as growth promoters within Member 
States in 1988 and later extended this to imports 
as well. This can be seen as an early example of 
application of the precautionary principle. 
The case study discusses the approach of the 
European Commission and the legal and financial 
implications of the trade restrictions in the World 
Trade Organization context.
Table A2.14 Hormones as growth promoters — early warnings and actions
1970s Concerns about growth promoters' safety, as DES confirmed a human carcinogen 
1972 Peakal publishes that DES likely to affect a wide range of species in the environment (wildlife) but this was 
ignored until the late 1980s 
1972 DES banned as a hormone growth promoter in the United States 
1974 Use of DES reinstated in the United States 
1976 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sets the minimum detectable level of DES 
1979 DES banned again on the grounds of the impossibility of identifying levels below which it would not be 
carcinogenic 
1982 EU expert working group (Lamming Committee) concludes that some growth promoters are safe 
1985 First EU ban is adopted, ignoring results from the Lamming Committee because the scope of their 
assessments had not been broad enough 
1987 Lamming Committee disbanded by EU and their results were not published 
1988 Ban of several growth promoters throughout the EU based on uncertainty of their effects on humans 
1988 WHO/FAO Joint Expert Committee on Food, using standard risk assessments, reaches same conclusions as 
Lamming Committee 
1989 EU ban extended to other growth promoters and to imports from third world countries 
1989 Pimenta Report finds illegal use of growth promoters in some Member States 
1989–1996 USA takes unilateral retaliatory measures on EC exports 
1995 European Commission organises an international conference on growth promoters and meat production 
where uncertainties remain regarding effects on the immune system, endocrine system and cancer 
1999 The EU Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures Relating to Public Health publishes a report concluding 
that no threshold levels can be defined for six growth promoters 
2000 International workshop on hormones and endocrine disrupters in food and water confirms impacts on the 
environment (wildlife) of veterinary drugs 
2001 EU still suffers from sanction to its exports of around EUR 160 million per year 
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Mad cow disease 1980s–2000: how 
reassurances undermined precaution
Patrick van Zwanenberg and Erik Millstone
With the first case of an infected animal 
acknowledged in 1986, BSE (popularly known as 
mad cow disease) evolved into a serious crisis in 
the United Kingdom. The source of the epidemic 
was suspected to be animal slaughterhouse wastes 
recycled in animal feed, which was infected with 
Table A2.15 Mad cow disease — early warnings and actions
scrapie. A decade later, suspicions that BSE might 
transmit to humans in the form of Creutzfeld‑Jakob 
disease were confirmed. 
This case study analyses the decisions of action and 
inaction taken by policymakers when weighing 
human health and financial consequences. The lack 
of precautionary measures and information to the 
public about the risks contributed to prolonging the 
crisis and the collapse of public trust in scientists 
and governments.
Mid-1970s The United States of America bans scrapie-infected sheep and goat meats from cattle food chain 
1979 UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution recognises risks of pathogens in animal feed and 
recommends minimum processing standards in rendering industries 
1986 First cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) are officially acknowledged 
1988 First documented official acknowledgement that BSE may be transmissible to humans 
1988 Southwood Committee is set up and recommends that clinically affected cattle should not go into human and 
animal food 
1989 Ruminant feed ban, slaughter and destruction of affected cattle and specified bovine offal (SBO) ban 
1995 Almost 50 % of the abattoirs checked are found to be failing to comply with the SBO ban 
1995 Evidence that BSE may cause Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) 
1996 At last, experiments start to see whether cattle fed on rations deliberately infected with scrapie would get 
BSE 
1996 BSE crisis, after a new variant of CJD emerged in the United Kingdom and consuming BSE contaminated food 
was considered the most probable cause 
1998–2000 The Phillips Inquiry takes place and its 16-volume report is published. Its conclusions do not seem sufficiently 
rigorous on judging government actions over time. These conclusions state that appropriate policy decisions 
had been taken, although not always timely, or adequately implemented or enforced
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